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1. As Supernumerary (Spy) Police Officers employed in the Ikeja Local government Area and who served as Spy Police Officers under Onigbongbo Local Council Development Area upon its creation, the claimants on 20th March 2017 took up a complaint against the defendants praying for: (1) A declaration that the claimants are entitled to their salaries and entitlements as per their conditions of service and the terms of their employment with the 1st defendant. (2) An order directing the defendants to pay the sum of Twenty-Five Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Seven Thousand, Two Hundred and Ten Naira (N25,437,210.00) being the total salaries and entitlements owed to the claimants. (3) An order directing the defendants to pay the sum of Five Million, Six Hundred and Five Thousand, Nine Hundred and Seventy-Eight Naira (N5,605,978.00) being arrears of salary increment from July 2010 to 2013, to the claimants. (4) The sum of Ten Million Naira (10,000,000.00) as general damages for the wrongful withholding of the arrears of salaries and entitlements of the claimants. 2. At the Court’s sitting of 4th July 2017, the Court noted that the 1st defendant is a Local Council Development Area (LCDA) described in paragraph 2 of the statement of facts as a “Local Government Council in Lagos State, established under section 3(2), in conjunction with Part I of First Schedule, and section 7(1) of the Constitution …” The Court went on to note that it is less than clear if the 1st defendant is one of the Local Government Areas (LGAs) listed in the Constitution; and that this accordingly raises the issue whether the 1st defendant is a recognizable entity under the Constitution for purposes of being sued as is presently the case. The Court then directed that in addition to the preliminary objection of the 2nd defendant parties are to in writing address this Court on whether the 1st defendant is a legal entity capable of being sued in this Court. The claimants, 1st and 2nd defendants all filed their respective written addresses arguing that the 1st defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued. The claimant’s written address was filed on 12th October 2017. That of the 1st defendant was filed on 2nd November 2017. And that of the 2nd defendant was filed on 28th November 2017. The 3rd defendant did not enter any appearance or file any process. However, at the adoption of the written addresses, the claimant and the 1st and 2nd defendants only adopted the written addresses in respect of the issue of legal capacity of the 1st defendant being sued as raised by the Court. The 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection was not moved. That objection is accordingly still pending. 3. Like I pointed out all three of the parties who filed written addresses canvassed the point that the 1st defendant has legal capacity to be sued as is the case in the instant suit. I shall accordingly take their arguments together. Citing sections 7(1) and 8(3) of the 1999 Constitution, it is the contention of the claimant that the Lagos State Government promulgated The Creation of New Local Government Areas Law No. 5 of 2002 in which 57 LGAs were created by breaking the then existing 20 LGAs into 57 LGAs. That in 2004, the said law was amended and a new section was inserted as section 2, which provides that “the 37 Local Government Areas are created in addition to the existing 20 Local Government Areas specified in the Constitution…and listed in Schedule 1 to this Law”. That in AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1 SC, the Supreme Court decided the legality and constitutionality of the additional Local Government Councils created in Lagos State, which later were converted into LCDAs by the said amendment in 2004 given the Supreme Court decision. That the 37 new LGAs/LCDAs created are distinct and separate entities and are clothed with legal capacity. That the Lagos State Government funds the LCDAs and the LGAs have supervisory control over the LCDAs falling within the territory of the LGAs. 4. The claimants went on that the Supreme Court in AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation declared the newly created local governments as validly created but that they remained inchoate entities until consequential amendments of the Constitution by the National Assembly that lists the newly created LCDAs in the Schedule to the Constitution like the other LGAs, hence the designation of the local governments as LCDAs. That by the enabling statutes creating the LCDAs, they have legal capacity to sue and be sued, and are distinct legal entities. That LCDAs in Lagos State, by implication of the Law establishing them, are not administrative units or governing arms of the 20 LGAs listed in the Constitution, but are legal entities with lives of their own and are self-governing entities. 5. The claimants urged the Court to take note that elections have been conducted into the LCDAs since 2004 in the same way and manner elections are conducted into the 20 Local Government Councils listed in the Constitution. That the Law from which the 1st defendant derives its legal personality is the Lagos State Local Government (Administration) Law 2003 (Law No. 15 of the Laws of Lagos State 2004), referring to sections 1, 2 and 3 of the said Law. Referring to section 122(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act 2011, the claimants submitted that the 1st defendant is a creation of Law and so should be judicially noticed needing no further proof. In concluding, the claimant submitted that even if this Court strikes out the name of the 1st defendant, the suit can continue against the other 2 defendants with the consequential order amending the originating summons necessary. 6. Citing Bank of Banoda v. Iyalabani [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 785) 551, the 1st defendant argued that though it has not fully met the requirements for its listing in the Constitution and has not been amended to list it, it is nevertheless a creation of the Lagos State House of Assembly and ipso facto falls within persons at law, though not natural persons, but can sue and be sued. To the 1st defendant, it is a creation of law and so is a person at law being a creation of Parliament. The 2nd defendant reiterated similar arguments and concluded that the 1st defendant is a legal entity that qualifies to sue or be sued in its legal capacity being a creation of a statute under the Lagos State Government. COURT’S DECISION 7. The issue before the Court is whether the 1st defendant, a Local Council Development Area (LCDA), can be sued as in the instant case. As quoted by the 1st defendant, section 8(3) of the 1999 Constitution provides for the creation of new Local Government Areas (LGAs). The argument of the claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants is that the 1st defendant can be sued as it is a creation of the Creation of New LGA Law No. 5 of 2002 by Lagos State House of Assembly as well as the Creation of New LGAs (Amendment) Law 2004. However, paragraph 2 of the statement of facts describes the 1st defendant as “a Local Government Council in Lagos State, established under section 3(2), in conjunction with Part I of First Schedule, and section 7(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999”. This description calls to question the actual legal status of the 1st defendant. The claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants relied on AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1 SC, which to them upheld the legality of the 1st defendant as created. But the thing to note with AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation even as acknowledged by the claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants is that the Supreme Court held The Creation of New Local Government Areas Law No. 5 of 2002 of Lagos State and as amended in 2004 as valid but inchoate; and that in the context of sections 8(3) and 3(6) of the 1999 Constitution, the said Law cannot be operative or have full effect until the National Assembly makes the necessary amendment to the relevant sections of the Constitution. Now, the word ‘inchoate’ by definition in the New Oxford American Dictionary means “just begun and so not fully formed or developed; rudimentary”. 8. AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation went on to hold that the LGAs recognized by the Constitution are those contained in Part I of the First Schedule to the Constitution; and that by virtue of section 8(6) of the 1999 Constitution, after the law mentioned in section 8(3) is passed by the House of Assembly, returns must be submitted to the National Assembly to enable the National Assembly pass an Act which will amend section 3 of the Constitution and Part I of the First Schedule thereof to accommodate the new LGA created by the State. That in the instant case, the passing of the Creation of New LGA Law No. 5 of 2002 by Lagos State House of Assembly was not sufficient to give life to the new LGA. Similarly, that the enactment of Creation of New LGAs (Amendment) Law 2004 by the Lagos State House of Assembly, which was assented to by the Governor of Lagos State is of no effect and inoperative until the National Assembly passes the appropriate Act under section 8(5) of the Constitution appropriately amending Part I of the First Schedule to the Constitution to accommodate the new LGAs. The claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants did not refer to these additional holdings by the Supreme Court in AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation. 9. Now, if the passing of the Creation of New LGA Law No. 5 of 2002 by Lagos State House of Assembly as well as the enactment of Creation of New LGAs (Amendment) Law 2004 was not sufficient to give life to the new LGA, how can the 1st defendant be said to exist as to enjoy legal capacity? As far as AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation is concerned, the 1st defendant has no life. And by Omokhafe v. Esekhomo [1993] LPELR-2649(SC); [1993] NWLR (Pt. 309) 58, “Generally, a dead person is no longer in the eyes of the law a person but in the eyes of the law, he is a person who ceased to have any legal personality from the date of his death and as such, can neither sue nor be sued personally or in representative capacity…” And by APC & ors v. In Re: CPC & ors [2014] LPELR-24036(SC), relying on Nzom v. Jinadu [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 51) 533 at 539, “the dissolution of legal person is analogous to the death of an ordinary human person…” I do not accordingly see how the 1st defendant, a body that has no life, can be bestowed with legal personality to enable it to be sued as in the instant case. 10. The argument of the claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants that the 37 new LGAs/LCDAs created are distinct and separate entities and are clothed with legal capacity cannot stand since all of them have no lives. So too the argument of especially the claimants that elections were even held in the said 37 LCDAs. The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils may be guaranteed under the Constitution as per section 7(1) and as stressed in the concurring judgment of Akaahs, JSC in Hon. Chigozie Eze & ors v. Governor of Abia State & ors [2014] LPELR-23276(SC), and elections may have been conducted into the LCDAs as agued by especially the claimants, a fact that to the extent that the LCDAs are not the constitutionally recognized LGAs brings them frontally in conflict with AG, Lagos State v. AG, Federation and Hon. Chigozie Eze & ors v. Governor of Abia State & ors, yet all of this is still insufficient, without more, to clothe legal personality on the 1st defendant given that it has no life. I do not accordingly agree with the claimants and the 1st and 2nd defendants that the 1st defendant can be sued as has been presently done. It is thus my finding and holding that the 1st defendant lacks the capacity to sue or be sued. The case against the 1st defendant is accordingly incompetent. The name of the 1st defendant is hereby struck out. All processes are to be amended to reflect this order. 11. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD