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1. By a complaint dated and filed on 5th May 2017 together with the statement of facts, list of witnesses, witness statement of facts, list and copies of documents, the claimant prayed for: (a) A declaration that the letter of dismissal served on the claimant by the 1st defendant dated 24th January 2017 is null and void and of no effect as the claimant did not make false declaration for the purpose of appointment. (b) A declaration that the failure and/or refusal of the 1st to 3rd defendants to pay the claimant’s monthly salary between the months of June 2011 to July 2014 (a period of 31 months) amounts to a breach of the claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants. (c) A declaration that the failure of the 1st to 3rd defendants to pay the claimant’s salary for the months of January and February 2017 while he was in the employment of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants before his employment was wrongfully terminated amounts to a breach of the claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants. (d) An order of the Honourable Court directing the 1st and 2nd and 3rd defendants to reinstate the claimant in their employment as Executive Officer (Litigation) on salary Grade Level 07 being his last rank in the service of the 1st and 2nd defendants. (e) An order of the Honourable Court directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants to immediately pay to the claimant his lawful salary for the months of June 2011 to July 2014 (a period of 31 months). (f) An order of the Honourable Court directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants to immediately pay to the claimant his lawful salary for the months of January and February 2017. (g) An order of the Honourable Court directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants to immediately pay the sum of N25,000,000.00 (Twenty-Five Million Naira) to the claimant as damages for wrongful termination of his contract of employment. (h) An order of the Honourable Court directing the 4th defendant to pay the sum of N100,000,000 (One Hundred Million Naira) as damages to the claimant for the hardship, embarrassment, emotional trauma and cost incurred as result of his dismissal from the employment of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants on the wrongful information supplied to them by the 4th defendant. (i) Cost of this action valued at N1,500,000.00 (One Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) for filing fees and professional fees. 2. The defendants respectively entered formal appearances, the 2nd and 3rd defendants entering a joint appearance; and then filed their respective defence processes (statement of defence, list of witnesses, witness statements on oath, list and copies of documents), once again with the 2nd and 3rd defendants filing joint defence processes including the joint statement of defence and counterclaim. The 2nd and 3rd defendant counterclaimed against the claimant for the following: (1) A declaration that the employment of the claimant into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants is invalid, irregular, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (2) And order for a refund to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, within 90 days of the judgement of this Honorable Court, by way of special damages all salaries, allowances, remuneration and any payment made and received by the claimant from 12th April 2010 accounting and/or representing the period when the claimant was erroneously employed under the false believe (sic) and representation that he had the requisite qualification for gaining employment into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants when he know that he had not completed his course of study thereby making the 2nd and 3rd defendants to incur financial losses and expenses in payment of salaries and allowances for the period he deceitfully held office. 3. The claimant did not file any reply to any of the defence processes. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. The 1st defendant called one witness, Kabiru Isa-Koto, Chief Administrative Officer on GL14 with the 1st defendant, who testified as the 1st defendant’s witness. The 2nd and 3rd defendants jointly called three witnesses, all of whom are with the 3rd defendant: Olanrewaju Lawrence Aremo, Director of Administration; Miss Esther Olubunmi Alabi, Deputy Director, Administration; and Anthony Dibie, Assistant Chief Executive Officer (Accounts), who testified respectively as 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witnesses 1, 2 and 3. The 4th defendant called one witness, Enokela Eliase Odumuh, Assistant Registrar with the 4th defendant, who testified as 4th defendant’s witness. At the close of trial, parties, starting with the defendants were asked to file and serve their respective written addresses, which they did. The 1st defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 9th November 2017. The 2nd and 3rd defendants’ joint final written address is dated 12th October 2017, but filed on 18th October 2017. The 4th defendant’s final written address is dated 10th October 2017, but filed on 12th October 2017. The claimant’s final written address is dated and filed on 22nd November 2017. Only the 1st defendant filed a reply on points of law, which is dated and filed on 24th November 2017. The 4th defendant on its part, while adopting its final written address reacted orally on points of law regarding two issues arising from the claimant’s final written address. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 4. The claimant was employed by the 2nd and 3rd defendants as Litigation Officer II Grade Level 06. To the claimant, at the time of his employment, he had successfully completed his programme at the 4th defendant and was awaiting the release of his Diploma Certificate which was the requirement for the employment. The claimant attached Exhibit C2 issued to him by the 4th defendant as evidence that he had successfully completed his programme of study with the 4th defendant. That the 2nd and 3rd defendants, satisfied with his application, employed him thereby creating a contract of employment between him and themselves. That the 1st and 3rd defendants suddenly stopped paying his salary from July 2011 to July 2014 without any form of query or letter of suspension. That during the period when the 1st to 3rd defendants stopped paying the claimant his salary, the same 3rd defendant confirmed his appointment by issuing Exhibit C4 to the claimant after several attempts to get the 4th defendant to issue his statement of result to him which he forwarded to the 2nd and 3rd defendants. That the 2nd and 3rd defendants, satisfied with the statement of result forwarded to them by the claimant, resumed the payment of his salary from February 2014 and went ahead to promote the claimant to the post of Executive Officer (Litigation) on salary Grade Level 07 with effect from 1st July 2015. That upon the claimant’s insistence that he be paid his salary arrears for the period which the 2nd and 3rd defendants failed to pay him without any reason, the 2nd and 3rd defendants wrote to the 4th defendant to confirm the statement of result which the claimant had submitted to them. That the 4th defendant confirmed the authenticity of the statement of result. Rather than pay the claimant what is due to him, that the 1st defendant issued the claimant a letter of dismissal tendered and admitted as Exhibit C9, hence the instant action. THE CASE OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 5. The case of the 1st defendant is that the claimant had not completed his Diploma in Law Course from the 4th defendant as at when the claimant was employed by the 3rd defendant. That the claimant made false claim by stating that he had passed the failed Course in 1998, when the Table of Results sent by University of Abuja (Exhibit D9) showed otherwise. That the claimant on 28th October 2009 applied for the post of a Litigation Officer II and was employed by the National Industrial Court on 12th May 2010 on the strength of the assertion that he obtained a Diploma in Law from the 4th defendant in 1998. To the 1st defendant, the claimant was employed on the belief that he had a Diploma in Law. The claimant was employed and documented by the 3rd defendant with the claimant’s clearance letter (Letter of Final Clearance Exhibit C2) attached to the application letter dated 28th October 2009 (Exhibit D1) pending when the claimant made available his statement of result and certificate to the 3rd defendant. That during the 1st defendant’s (Federal Judicial Service Commission’s) staff verification exercise in 2011, it was discovered that the claimant had not submitted the statement of result which the claimant purportedly obtained from the 4th defendant in 1998. That he was given a grace period to furnish the 3rd defendant the said statement of result but the claimant failed to produce same and as a result the claimant’s salary was stopped with effect from July 2011 pending the submission of his statement of result or certificate as required to the 3rd defendant. Furthermore, that the required qualification for the employment of a person as a staff of the 3rd defendant on GL 06 is a National Certificate of Education (NCE) and/or Ordinary National Diploma (OND). That the claimant was absent from duties throughout the period wherein his salary was stopped. That his salary was reinstated and verified entitlements paid with effect from the date of the submission of the statement of result. That a cursory look at the statement of result presented to the 3rd defendant would reveal that same was awarded on 24th April 2013, 15 years after 1998 which the claimant claimed as the year of his graduation in the application letter submitted for the employment under reference. 6. The 1st defendant went on that by the extant provision of the Regulation which governs the 1st - 3rd defendants, the defendant is empowered to confirm and promote a staff employed by the 3rd defendant in line with the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulation 2010 from GL 06 to GL 07 and above. Thus, the claimant was promoted to the post of Executive Officer (Litigation) with effect from 1st July 2015. However, that upon the discovery of discrepancies in the year of graduation stated by the claimant in his application letter of 2009 and statement of result presented in 2013, the 3rd defendant wrote a letter to the 1st defendant recommending the claimant’s dismissal from service. In furtherance of this, that the claimant’s dismissal was based on the documents furnished by the 4th defendant, which actually indicated that the claimant had a carryover in DCL 407 and only passed same in March 2011. Aptly, that the claimant’s dismissal was based on the false declaration/misrepresentation made in his application letter. The claimant was dismissed from service of the 1st - 3rd defendants vide a letter dated 24th January 2017, which was in line with Regulations 16(2)(v) (a, b and c) and 213 of the Federal Judicial Service Regulation 2010 (Exhibit D2). The 1st defendant continued that the claimant made false representations in his application letter of 28th October 2009 by asserting that he completed Diploma in Law programme from the 4th defendant in 1998 and was duly cleared in 2006 for issuance of statements of results. That it is also the case of the 1st defendant that when an officer is dismissed from service in line with the FJSC Regulations 2010 such officer(s) forfeits all claims to entitlements and this applies to the claimant. THE CASE OF THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS 7. To the 2nd and 3rd defendant, the claimant who was their former member but now dismissed from service was employed into the service of 2nd and 3rd defendants as a Litigation Officer II GL. 06 on 21st June 2010 pursuant to a letter of appointment to that effect. That when the claimant was to be employed, he did not tender his Diploma in Law certificate purportedly obtained by him from the University of Abuja in 1998 and which is the requisite qualification demanded and acceptable for the status into which the claimant was employed. In other words, that the claimant deceived the 2nd and 3rd defendants into believing that he was a holder of Diploma in Law of the University of Abuja obtained in 1998 for purposes of gaining employment into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. However, that during the staff verification exercise conducted by the 2nd and 3rd defendants for purposes of ascertaining the actual qualification status of all their employees and members of staff with a view to ensuring that each employee holds the post in which they are with requisite qualification, it was discovered and revealed that the claimant could not submit or tender his Diploma in Law certificate of the University of Abuja as earlier claimed by the claimant during the time of his employment into service. That notwithstanding the fact that he (the claimant) was unable to present his certificate on demand during the staff verification exercise, he was given added time and opportunity to produce the certificate but yet he failed to do so. That due to the persistent refusal or neglect by the claimant to tender and submit his certificate as demanded by the 2nd and 3rd defendants coupled with his prolonged absence from duty between July 2011 to June 2013, the claimant was subjected to necessary disciplinary actions by the 2nd and 3rd defendants, first by stoppage of his salary and finally dismissal from the service for reasons of making false statement and declaration and nondisclosure/concealment of material facts for the purpose of his appointment into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. Consequent upon the dismissal of the claimant by a letter dated 24th January 2017, the claimant being aggrieved instituted this action against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants challenging the dismissal from service while alleging thereof that his dismissal is wrongful null and void and of no effect, and praying for the reliefs he seeks. THE CASE OF THE 4TH DEFENDANT 8. To the 4th defendant, the claimant claimed to have graduated from the 4th defendant in 1998, having completed his courses in Diploma in Law. He applied to the 3rd defendant for employment sometimes in 2010. He was appointed vide Exhibit C1 (letter of appointment issued by the 3rd defendant). That at the time of his appointment, the claimant only had his Final Clearance from the 4th defendant and no other document to prove that he had completed his studies from the 4th defendant. Upon his request, the 4th defendant issued a statement of result (Exhibit C3) to the claimant on 24th April 2013. That prior to the issuance of Exhibit C3, the claimant had been suspended sometimes in 2011 from his duty post for failure to present his certificate or proof that he actually graduated from the 4th defendant in 1998 as claimed. Upon the presentation of Exhibit C3, the claimant’s salary was restored and he was absorbed back into his duty post with the 3rd defendant. However, that the claimant demanded for the refund/payment of his remaining salaries held back while his suspension lasted, referring to Exhibits C7 and C8. Subsequent upon this, that the 3rd defendant wrote to the 4th defendant for a verification and clarification of the claimant’s statement of result as well as the reason for the delay in releasing the claimant’s result. That the 4th defendant replied the letter and, having confirmed the authenticity of Exhibit C3, attached two tables containing the courses that the claimant undertook and the carryover he had in DCL 407 as at 1998 when he finished his examination. That the code of Course DCL 407 which the claimant failed and carried over was later changed to DCL 142 by the time he re-wrote the examination during the Extra Semester Examinations in March 2011. That the 4th defendant’s letter undoubtedly was the basis for the eventual dismissal of the claimant by the 3rd defendant, the crux of this case. 9. The 4th defendant went that although the claimant was issued the Final Clearance sometimes in 2006, the clearance did not in any way stand in place of a statement of results; and that the Final Clearance speaks for itself. That it is not uncommon for students to obtain the final clearance before compilation and eventual release of their results. That the only time the claimant came to re-write his carry-over course was in March 2011; and that the 4th defendant could not have processed a statement of resultful the claimant whilst he had an outstanding course yet to be paid. That it was the success in the March 2011 examinations that the request for the claimant’s statement of result was processed; and the delay in processing and eventual issuance of the statement of result to the claimant was due to the outstanding carryover he had in DCL 407. The 4th defendant continued that there was no formal or otherwise from of request by the claimant in respect of his results earlier than the time he visited the Academic Office and found that he was having an outstanding course yet to pass. That there was no form of complaint or protest ever raised or brought to the Registrar of the 4th defendant by the claimant to justify that there was an unusual delay or tardiness in preparing and/or releasing his result. That it was only when the claimant requested for his statement of result in 2013 that same was prepared and released to him. That the 4th defendant had at all times been fair and just in handling issues concerning her students and the claimant’s case is no exception. That the claimant has not been sincere, objective and realistic in his claims against the 4th defendant in this suit, using the Court to dismiss the suit as same is frivolous, speculative and constituting and abuse of process of the Court. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 10. The 1st defendant submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: taking into cognizance the evidence before this Honourable Court, whether the claimant’s employment was not rightfully terminated by the 1st defendant. Before addressing this sole issue, the 1st defendant itemized 7 facts that are not in dispute. They are: (a) The claimant was employed by the 3rd defendant as a Litigation Officer II. (b) The claimant was promoted to the post of Executive Officer (Litigation) GL 07 by a letter of 1st December 2015. (c) The claimant was served with a preliminary letter dated 9th November 2016 by the 3rd defendant which informed him of the allegations leveled against him and a request that the claimant respond within 48 hours of the receipt of the letter. (d) The claimant received the preliminary letter and responded accordingly vide a letter dated 10th November 2016. (e) The claimant’s response was found unsatisfactory and the 3rd defendant referred the matter to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant at its meeting held on the 17th January 2017 decided in accordance with Regulations 213 of the Federal Judicial Service Regulations 2010 to dismiss the claimant from the services of the 3rd defendant. (f) The claimant was accordingly dismissed from the Federal Judicial Service for misleading the 3rd defendant to believe that he was awarded the Diploma in Law in 1998. (g) The claimant until his dismissal was an Executive Officer (Litigation) at the Calabar Division of the National Industrial Court (3rd defendant). To the 1st defendant, these facts not being in dispute require no further proof, urging the Court to so hold. 11. The 1st defendant then proceeded to address the sole issue it raised, arguing that it be resolved in its favour and the Court dismissing the claimant’s claims. The 1st defendant’s contention here is based upon the following: a) The claimant’s failure to prove that he graduated from University of Abuja (4th defendant) in 1998. b) The claimant did not possess the minimum requisite qualification for employment in the 3rd defendant as Litigation Officer II. c) The claimant’s failure to prove that his employment was not determined in accordance with the Federal Judicial Service Regulations 2010. 12. To the 1st defendant, by the claimant’s pleadings and his evidence before this Court, the claimant prayed this Court to declare his dismissal as null and void on the account that he did not make false declarations for the purpose of employment despite the glaring contents of Exhibit D1, which states that the claimant holds an Ordinary National Diploma in Law from the University of Abuja since 1998. That from all the evidence before the Court there is no evidence to show that the claimant completed his Diploma in Law programme in 1998 as alleged. That the best the claimant has done is to rely on a Punch Newspaper publication of 24th March 2013 (Exhibit C13), referring to paragraph 26 of the statement of facts, to explain the delay in procuring his result. That the claimant is saddled with the responsibility of proving that he indeed completed his Diploma in Law programme in 1998 by virtue of sections 132 - 137 of the Evidence Act 2011, Morohunfola v. Kwaratech [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506, Alade v. Alic (Nig.) Ltd [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 563) 1849 at 1860 and Eyo v. Onuoha [2011] All FWLR (Pt.574) 1 at 23. That the onus remains on the claimant until he has completely and successfully discharged the burden on him, which onus never shifts; and the plaintiff is not to rely on the mistake of the defendants to succeed. That until the onus is successfully discharged by the claimant, the Court is not obliged to look at the defendant’s case, citing Odumade v. Ogunnaike [2011] FWLR (Pt. 566) 529 at 543. 13. Continuing, the 1st defendant referred to paragraphs 5, 7, 14 and 15 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath, which state as follows: 5. At the time of his employment, my Diploma result from the 4th Defendant was not ready and I applied for the job with my final clearance issued to him by the 4th Defendant stating that I had completed my course of studies and was cleared for issuance of statement of result having completed my program and paid all applicable fees pending the release of my Diploma Result. 7. I got the 4th Defendant to issue me a Statement of Result which I forwarded to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on the 6th May 2013 in satisfaction of the request for my result by the 3rd Defendant. 14. I actually completed my Diploma program from the 4th Defendant in 1998 and was duly cleared in 2006 and issuance of my Statement of Result. 15.That if I had a carryover as claimed by the 1st to 3rd Defendant I wouldn’t have been cleared in 2006 and issued a clearance to collect my statement of result by the 4th Defendant. To the 1st defendant, premised on this testimony of the claimant, the questions that are ignited include: when exactly did the claimant finish the Diploma in law program? If he completed same as alleged in 1998, why was he not cleared same year or a year thereafter? Assuming without conceding that the claimant had no carryover, why was he cleared in 2006 about 8years after he purportedly completed the Diploma in law program? The 1st defendant then submitted that the claimant has the onerous duty to proffer concrete and credible in proof of his averments specifically in regard to when he graduated from the 4th defendant and that he had the requisite requirement for the post of a Litigation Officer II as at when he applied for the employment. Pathetically, that the evidence adduced and the exhibits before this Court do not in any way support the assertions of the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. 14. To further buttress and fortify the above submission that the claimant had failed to lead credible evidence to show that he graduated in 1998, the 1st defendant went on that the claimant’s evidence before the Court is apt and glaringly inconsistent with assertions of the claimant. That by the attachments to Exhibit D5, titled “Presentation of my Certificate (Diploma in Law)” and dated 6th May 2013, the claimant purportedly approached Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba to write a letter dated 17th October 2011 on his behalf to the University of Abuja (4th defendant). Curiously, that the content of the aforesaid letter states inter alia that the claimant was awarded a Diploma in law certificate in 2004. That in another letter purportedly written on behalf of the claimant by Senator Prof Benedict Ayade on 15th February 2012 (attached to Exhibit D5), the letter states that the claimant was recalled in 2004 to rewrite a carryover. That these letters were pleaded and tendered by the 2nd and 3rd defendants through the claimant during cross-examination in order to prove that the claimant did not graduate in 1998 and the claimant could not deny same; more so as it is trite that the document speaks for itself and oral evidence cannot contradict a documentary evidence. 15. The 1st defendant proceeded that though the claimant stated that he completed his Diploma in law program since 1998 in the pleadings and evidence before the Court, he suddenly under cross-examination by the 4th defendant changed like a weather cock in climatology that “I never did a carryover”, “yes I did not”, “the letter written by Sen. Ayade did represent me but there was a mix up”. That Exhibit C10(a), “Respond to Preliminary Letter dated 9th November, 2016”, by the claimant states that “I completed the programme of Diploma in Law in the year 1998, even though I had a carryover course in (DCL 407)”. That it is elementary law that a party must consistently make his case and not change like the weathercock in climatology. The 1st defendant, citing Ajose v. FRN [2011] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1244) 465 at 476, then submitted that no witness who has given on oath two materially inconsistent evidence is entitled to the honour of credibility; such a witness does not deserve to be treated as truthful witness. That although it may be argued that it is not every minute contradiction that would be sufficient to discredit a witness, that where the contradiction and discrepancies are on material points as in the instant case such a witness should not be relied upon, citing Okafor v. Ilukwe [2013] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1363) 465 at 488. To the 1st defendant, the oral testimony of the claimant must be assessed in line with documentary evidence tendered. That the claimant’s testimony that he did not have a carryover is in conflict with the letter dated 15th February 2012 written by Sen. Prof. Ben Ayade (attachment to Exhibit D5), wherein it was clearly stated that the claimant was recalled to write a carryover in 2004 and the letter dated 9th November 2016. That this conflict greatly affects the evidential value to be ascribed to the testimony of the claimant as to the time he graduated from the 4th defendant. That the testimony of the claimant is without credit and incredibly tainted with various contradictions and this Court is urged to so hold and consequently discountenance same as being false. 16. The 1st defendant went on that as at the time the claimant was offered appointment as Litigation Officer II GL 06 on 21st June 2010 the claimant did not possess the minimum requisite qualification for the said employment; as such the 1st defendant’s position is inter alia hinged on Exhibit D5 and the claimant’s inconsistent evidence before this Court. That the claimant adduced evidence before this Court to the effect that, his Diploma result from the 4th defendant was not ready as at the time he applied for the position of a Litigation Officer in 1998, and that he applied for the job with the Final Clearance (Exhibit C2) issued to him by the 4th defendant. That the claimant further testified that Exhibit C2 implies that he had completed the Course of studies, completed the Diploma in law program and paid all applicable fees and as such was qualified to be issued a statement of result. To the 1st defendant, a mere cursory look at Exhibit C2 would reveal that same was issued by the 4th defendant sometimes in 2006, that is 8 years after the claimant supposedly completed the Diploma in law program. Also, that Column B captioned “Completion of Programme” clearly states thus: “I confirm that the student has completed his/her programme and is now awaiting result”. Premised on the foregoing, that it is evident that the claimant did not complete his Diploma in law as alleged in 1998, more so there is a 100% chance that a student awaiting result might fail a Course; it is a simple arithmetic that requires no quadratic formula to resolve. 17. Furthermore, that a careful analysis of Exhibit D9 (the 4th defendant’s letter with REF. NICN/CONF/392/VIII/743 dated 14th July 2016) particularly the attachments thereto (“University of Abuja, Consultancy Services Unit, Educational Consultancy, Diploma in Law Programme - Fourth Semester”) shows that the claimant’s name is listed thereat as “S/No. 11” and “COV: DCL 407” glaring in the column captioned “Remarks”. Also, that in the document titled “University of Abuja, Centre For Distance Learning and Continuing Education, Diploma in Law: Extra Semester Examination Results - March 2011” the name of the claimant is listed as “S/N. 22” and the “Remarks” column shows “Pass”. Now, that the question that begs for an answer is whether the claimant completed his Ordinary Diploma in Law Program as at 2010 when he was appointed by the 3rd defendant. The 1st defendant answered in the negative in view of the documents before the Court which were not contradicted by another documentary evidence. That it is settled law that document speaks for itself and that oral testimony is inadmissible to vary, add to or take away from the contents of the document, citing Ogundele v. Agiri [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 219 at 239, Egharevba v. Osagie [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 299 at 327. That the claimant in his pleadings (paragraphs 22 and 26 of the statement of facts) and during trial rigorously contended that the attachments to Exhibit D9 forwarded to the 3rd defendant by the 4th defendant claiming that he wrote a carryover does not represent the true record of the 4th defendant. To the 1st defendant, the claimant failed to adduce any concrete documentary evidence to contradict and discredit the said document. That it is trite that he who asserts must prove and the claimant has woefully failed to discharge this burden, urging the Court to so hold. 18. Additionally, that it is not in doubt that Exhibit C3 (statement of result) was awarded and issued on 24th April 2013 and the claimant did not challenge same but rather the claimant was so excited and promptly forwarded the said exhibit to the 2nd and 3rd defendants via Exhibit D5 (the claimant’s letter dated 6th May 2013). The 1st defendant then asked whether in view of the uncontroverted and unchallenged document (Exhibit C3), which the claimant also placed heavy reliance on to convince the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants and this Court that he completed a Diploma in Law programme, can it be said that the said Diploma in law programme was completed in 1998 as alleged by the claimant; and submitted that the claimant did not possess the minimum requirement for the position of Litigation Officer II as at the time he was employed by the 3rd defendant. 19. It is also the submission of the 1st defendant that the claimant’s employment was determined in accordance with the Federal Judicial Service Regulations 2010, which provisions are concise, clear, unambiguous and explicit on the issue of concealing material facts or making false statements, referring to Regulations 16(2)(v)(a), (b) and (c) and 213. Regulations 16(2)(v)(a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010 provides as follows: (2) To be eligible for appointment to the Federal Judicial Service, every applicants must: ………………………… …………………………. (v) Any person who obtains appointment under or in pursuance of these Regulations by: (a) Making false statement; (b) Tendering false documents; or (c) Concealing any material fact which if disclosed, would militate against his being offered the appointment, may be liable to dismissal notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of these Regulations. And Regulation 213 of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010 provides as follows: Any person who obtains appointment under or in pursuance of these Regulations by making (a) a false statement (b) tendering false documents; or (c) concealing any material fact which, if disclosed, would militate against his being offered the appointment, may be liable to dismissal notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of these Regulations. 20. To the 1st defendant, indisputably, the claimant was employed by the 3rd defendant on 21st June 2010 (referring to Exhibit C1) as a junior officer and the said employment was confirmed by the 3rd defendant on 19th February 2013 (referring to Exhibit C4). Also, that the claimant was thereafter promoted via the letter dated 1st December 2015 (Exhibit C6) to the post of Executive Officer Litigation by the 1st defendant, referring to paragraphs 6, 10 and 13 of the statement of facts. That Exhibit C1 with the attached “Offer of Appointment to the Pensionable Establishment” inter alia clearly spelt out terms and conditions upon which the claimant was employed. That upon being promoted via Exhibit C6, the provisions of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010 became outright statute which governed the employment of the claimant, which the claimant admitted under cross-examination by counsel to the defendant. That contained therein are provisions for discipline and dismissal, amongst which are Regulations 16(2)(v)(a), (b) and (c) and 213 also read out by the claimant during cross-examination. The 1st defendant then submitted that it complied with the principle of fair hearing and the condition for dismissal of an employee on ground of misconduct and/or false representation, urging the Court to so hold. That the claimant was duly informed, given adequate opportunity to explain and defend the assertion in Exhibit D1 and grievous discrepancies noticed in Exhibit C3, referring to Exhibits C10, C10(a) and D9. That an employee is bound by the terms and conditions of his employment; as such, in the instant case, the claimant is bound by the provisions of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010, which the claimant for all intents and purposes knew the terms and conditions of his employment as well as the provisions of the aforesaid Regulations, referring to Teliat Sule v. Nigerian Cotton Board [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 17 and Dupe Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt, 80) 25. The 1st defendant concluded by submitting that stemming from the foregoing and having regard to the extant Regulations of the 1st defendant and all the authorities submitted above, the claimant’s employment was rightfully terminated, urging the Court to so hold. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS 21. The 2nd and 3rd defendants on their part submitted seven issues for determination, namely: (i) Whether the 2nd and 3rd defendants have placed before the Court sufficient evidence and materials necessary to establish the reasons for the dismissal of the claimant, thereby discharging the burden of proof or onus placed on them for doing so. (ii) Whether or not the dismissal of the claimant from the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants by the 1st defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24th January 2017 is valid, regular and proper and in accordance with the service conditions of the claimant and the statutory disciplinary powers conferred on the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC) under the FJSC Regulations 2010. (iii) Whether the Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties in an employment contract. (iv) In the light of the declaratory reliefs sought by the claimant herein as contained in paragraph 28 of the statement of facts, whether and if the claimant has discharged the burden of proof and onus required of him in law to entitle claimant to the declaratory reliefs sought from the court. (v) Whether and if the claimant by pleading only the facts of his employment without pleading the terms and conditions of service of the said employment and without leading evidence on same has discharged the burden of proof and onus on him necessary to establish the claim of wrongful dismissal from the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. (vi) Whether the Court can order the re-instatement of the claimant as sought for in this case. (vii) Whether or not the claimant herein is entitled to damages as sought for by him in the circumstances of this case. 22. On issue (i), the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that the law is settled that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. However, that where the employer gives reasons for the termination, the onus lies on the employer to establish that cause or reason at the trial and to the satisfaction of the court, referring to Professor Dupe Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] NWLR p. 8025 at 32 [wrong citation] and Joseph Sunday Adedayo v. Kwara Polytechnic [2013] 52 WRN 106 CA at 136. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then referred the Court to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 6a, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 14a, 14b, 19 and 19a of the joint statement of defence as establishing the cause and reasons for the dismissal of the claimant. Also referred to the Court the depositions of the three witnesses of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as well as Exhibits D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10 and D11, which exhibits are direct and positive evidence in support and proof of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ pleadings and case. In particular, the Court was referred to paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the deposition of 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 1 and paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the deposition of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 2. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that at all times material to the claim of the claimant, the claimant was neither holding nor in possession of a Diploma in Law certificate of the University of Abuja as represented, claimed and asserted by him in Exhibit D1, which when juxtaposed with Exhibit D5 have copiously and sufficiently established the height and magnitude of falsehood and deceit of the claimant that as at the time of his employment he had a Diploma in Law certificate of the University of Abuja. That during cross-examination of the claimant when he was asked to read paragraph 7 of his statement of facts (an admission by the claimant that he gained employment in 2010 into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants by tendering only the final clearance form issued by the 4th defendant) and a question was put to him, he answered thus: “I was not having a Diploma Certificate. All I have was a final clearance letter from the University”, referring to Exhibit C2. 23. The 2nd and 3rd defendants continued that when Exhibit D5 is carefully and thoroughly subjected to judicial crucible and examination along with all the attachments thereto, it reveals in full measure the height of deceit, deliberate act of falsehood and concealment of material facts by the claimant with a view to gain undue advantage for himself and fraudulently so, when he claimed and asserted particularly in Exhibit D1 (letter dated 28th October 2009) where he stated as follows: “I hold an Ordinary National Diploma in Law from the University of Abuja in 1998”. That the statement of result of the claimant, which is one of the attachments to Exhibit D5 copiously indicated that the award of Diploma to the claimant by the 4th defendant was effected on 24/04/2013, which is radically and emphatically contrary to the assertion of the claimant, referring to Exhibit D1. What more, and by this revelation, that the 2nd and 3rd defendants were indeed justified by believing the deliberate and intentional act of serious misconduct committed by the claimant in flagrant breach and contravention of the FJSC Regulations 2010 particularly Regulations 16(2), 48 (iv, xxi, xviii and xxviiii) and 213 thereof. That the claimant under cross-examination admitted that his service conditions with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants are guided and governed by the FJSC Regulations 2010 (Exhibit D2). 24. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, it is on record that when claimant was confronted with Exhibit D4, a letter dated 1st March 2012 and titled, “Re: Prolonged Absence From Duty. Adula Raphael Odama”, which he himself wrote to the 2nd defendant herein, he spontaneously by his response discredited his own averments as contained in paragraphs 8 and 10 of his pleadings, as lacking in substance and truth. Equally, that Exhibit D6, a letter written to the claimant dated 15/2/2012 titled, “Prolonged Absence From Duty”, together with Exhibit D7 titled, “Stoppage of Salary”, and dated 27th June 2011, have all conclusively justified the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ reasons and cause for the dismissal of the claimant as stated in the letter of dismissal dated 24th January 2017 (Exhibit C9). That all these exhibits speak for themselves and give credence to 2nd and 3rd defendants’ action against the claimant. Additionally, that Exhibit D8 comprising memos or briefs written by the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 1 (Mr. Lawrence Aremo) to the Chief Registrar (CR), the 2nd defendant, dated 23rd May 2016 and another dated 27th May 2016, contain findings to the effect that the claimant was involved in acts of misconduct by obtaining or gaining appointment into service through making false statements or declaration, tendering false documents and concealing material facts, which if disclosed would militate against his being offered employment and the penalty for which is dismissal by the provisions of the FJSC Regulations 2010. The Court was urged to note that Exhibit D8 particularly the one dated 27th May 2016 recommended to the 2nd defendant herein that all the findings against the claimant for acts of misconduct be referred to the FJSC, the 1st defendant herein, for further and necessary disciplinary actions as deemed appropriate in line and full compliance with provisions of the FJSC Regulations 2010. It is, therefore, the submission of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that when the evidence of their three witnesses are considered and together with reliance on all the exhibits, which speak for themselves, the 2nd and 3rd defendants herein have discharged the onus and burden of proof placed on them by establishing and convincingly too, the cause and reasons for the dismissal of the claimant and that all the exhibits as tendered together with the evidence of their three witnesses have placed before the Court satisfactory and sufficient materials that the claimant committed acts of serious misconduct which led to his dismissal. 25. Issue (ii) is whether or not the dismissal of the claimant from the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants by the 1st defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24th January 2017 is valid, regular and proper and in accordance with the service conditions of the claimant and the statutory disciplinary powers conferred on the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC) under the FJSC Regulations 2010. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the competent body set up, established and conferred by law with the vires and powers to dismiss the claimant for acts of serious misconduct is the 1st defendant. That the Court should take judicial notice of the fact that the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC), the 1st defendant herein, is a creature of the 1999 Constitution by virtue section 153(1)(e) of the said Constitution. That section 160(1) of the Constitution donates to this statutory body the power and vires which is vested in it, albeit with the approval of the President to make rules to regulate its own procedures and to also confer powers and impose duties on any officer or authority for the purpose of discharging its functions. That section 153(2) specifically provides that the composition and powers of the FJSC established under section 153(1)(e) are contained in Part I of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, paragraph 13 of which states the powers of the FJSC thus: (c) appoint, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the Chief Registrars and Deputy Chief Registrars of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court and all other members of the staff of the judicial service of the Federation not otherwise specified in this Constitution and of the Federal Judicial Service Commission. That the 2nd and 3rd defendant proceeded that the claimant is bound by the provisions of this document and exhibit before the Court. 26. The 2nd and 3rd defendants proceeded that it is on record that pursuant to the findings of acts of misconduct by the 2nd and 3rd defendants against the claimant, he was issued with a query, Exhibit C10, which is the preliminary letter dated 9th November 2016, to which the claimant responded to through Exhibit C10(a), response letter dated 10th November 2016 and titled, “Respond to Preliminary Letter Dated 9th November 2016”. This response letter was addressed to the 2nd defendant (CR) herein. Further to the said response, and the claimant having been promoted by Exhibit C6 (Notification of Promotion dated 1st December 2015), that the claimant fell into the category of “all other members of the staff of the Judicial Service of the Federation…” who are subjected to the disciplinary control of FJSC (the 1st defendant) for purposes of disciplinary actions. That by evidence on record the claimant was given adequate opportunity to defend himself on all the allegations against him before he was removed and dismissed from service, citing S. O. Adedeji v. Police Service Commission [1967] 1 All NLR 67. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then submitted that the termination and dismissal of the claimant from the service was validly, properly and legally effected by the FJSC which is the body statutorily empowered to do so. That there is no averment in the pleadings of the claimant controverting this fact neither is there any evidence to that effect. Additionally, that all the FJSC needed to comply with had been religiously complied with by ensuring that: i) The allegation of misconduct was disclosed to the claimant and brought to his notice and attention. ii) He was given the opportunity to defend himself by making representations in writing to the employer. iii) The employer believed that the acts of claimant amounted to gross misconduct and was found guilty of same after the necessary investigation into the allegations. The Court was then referred to Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290 at 302, 345 and 358, Saibu Nda Maliki v. Michael Imodu Institute for Labour Studies [2009] 21 WRN 35 at 69 and Francis Adesegun Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1999] 5 SCNJ 1 at 23. 27. Issue (iii) is whether the Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties in an employment contract. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, in a contract of service of employment of this nature, where the employee alleges wrongful dismissal or any breach in the conditions of service, the Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties, which provides for their rights and obligations. That in the instant case it is the FJSC Regulations 2010 (Exhibit D2) that must be construed and applied and nothing more, referring to Fakuade v. OAU [1993] 6 SCNJ (Pt. I) 35 at 44, Katto v. CBN [1999] 5 SCNJ 1 at 12 and Joseph Sunday Adedayo v. Kwara State Polytechnic [2013] 52 WRN 104 at 123 and urging the Court to hold that the FJSC Regulations 2010 is the document that governs the service condition between the defendants and the claimant and which empowers the FJSC to terminate and dismiss the employment of the claimant for reasons of contravention of the regulations as applicable in the circumstance of this case. 28. Issue (iv) is whether the claimant has discharged the burden of proof and onus required of him in law to entitle him to the declaratory reliefs sought from the Court. In answer, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that where a claimant before the Court seeks by his claim certain declaratory reliefs the law requires such a claimant on the basis of the relief he seeks to plead and prove his claim to the satisfaction of the Court. That from the evidence of the claimant, the claimant has failed woefully to prove his claim to the satisfaction of the Court. That under cross-examination, the claimant admitted that he had a carryover which he sat for and re-wrote. In addition, that there is uncontroverted evidence on record that the claimant wrote this carryover in 2011 and not in 1998 as pleaded and averred by him. Furthermore, that there is hard fact and solid documentary evidence, Exhibit D5 dated 6th May 2013 with all the annexure thereto, inclusive of the statement of result submitted by the claimant stating clearly that the Diploma in Law awarded to him with registration number 9650262 (Odama Raphael) by the University of Abuja was awarded only on 24th April 2013 in total negation, contradiction and discredit of the claimant’s pleading particularly in paragraphs 6, 7 and 16. 29. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that the pleading of the claimant in paragraphs 16 and 17 placed heavy weather on the clearance form (Exhibit C2) issued to him by the University authorities, which the claimant almost equated to the status of a certificate of the institution. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the administrative effect of the clearance form is meant ordinarily to indicate completion of programme by such student and to further highlight that the named student referred to in the form has completed his/her course and paid his/her fees fully and, therefore, the student named in the form is cleared for issuance of Testimonial/ITF letter/statement of result. The Court was referred to the evidence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 2 under cross-examination when the question was put to her by counsel to the claimant on the qualification requirement for employment to the post of litigation Officer II; and in answer said: “OND Certificate in Law from a Polytechnic, University, College of Legal Studies as accredited to issue such”. Furthermore, that Exhibits D5 and D11, each of which contains attachment of letters written by Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba dated 17th October 2011 and Senator Professor Benedict Ayade dated 15th February 2012 for and on behalf of the claimant to the University authorities (4th defendant), have conclusively controverted the claimant’s assertion in his pleadings and evidence that he completed his Diploma in Law programme in 1998. That the two letters gave different versions which are contradictory on the date the claimant passed his exams and obtained his Diploma in Law certificate from the University. Citing Bukar Modu Aji vs. Chad Basin Development Authority and anor 61 NSCQR (Pt. 3) 1817 at 1851, CPC v. INEC [2012] 2 - 3 SC 1, AG, Cross River State v. AG Federation & anor [2012] 7 SC (Pt. II) 72, AG Rivers State v. AG Akwa Ibom State & anor [2011] 3 SC 1 and Dumez Nig Ltd v. Nwakboba & 3 ors [2008] 12 SC (Pt. III) 142, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that the claimant having failed woefully to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he obtained his Diploma in Law certificate in 1998, which was the requisite qualification for employment into service, is definitely not entitled to the declaratory reliefs he seeks from the Court. 30 Issue (v) is whether the claimant, by pleading only the facts of his employment without pleading the terms of service of the said employment, has discharged the necessary burden of proof and onus on him to establish the claim of wrongful dismissal from the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, it is the law that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus first, to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and second, to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. That it is not in principle for the employer who is a defendant to an action brought by the employee to prove any of these, citing Francis Adesegun Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1999] 5 SCRN.J 1 at 11 - 12. That it is apparent and striking that throughout the whole stretch and gamut of the claimant’s pleadings and averments in the statement of facts from paragraph 1 up to the end in paragraph 27 inclusive, there is nowhere the claimant pleaded and alluded to, neither did he aver his terms and conditions of service with the 2nd and 3rd defendants, which incidentally is the bedrock and basis for the alleged wrongful dismissal and termination of his employment by the defendant. However, that in paragraphs 1, 6 and 7 of the statement of facts, the claimant averred to the facts of his employment elaborately without the slightest mention and averment to the terms and conditions of service governing the employment. That the claimant made heavy weather and particular focus on non-payment of his salary to him rather than the necessary focus and emphasis on the terms and conditions of service necessary to prove the alleged wrongful dismissal of service, referring to paragraphs 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 18 of the statement of facts being averments on non-payment of salary to him whilst apparently discarding to aver and plead the terms and conditions of his service. It is thus the submission of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that this obvious and apparent failure by claimant to plead and/or prove the terms and conditions of his service with the 2nd and 3rd defendants is very fatal to the claimant’s case and the consequential effect of this is that the claimant has only succeeded in chasing shadows in his alleged claim for wrongful termination or dismissal from service, for which the Court is helpless and cannot grant him any relief, for his failure to discharge the burden of proof required of him in law, citing Modu Aji v. Chad Basin Dev (supra). 31. Issue (vi) is whether the Court can order the re-instatement of the claimant as sought for in this case. It is the submission of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that the court of law shall not impose a willing servant on an unwilling master, referring to Calabar Cement Co. Ltd v. Abiodun Daniel [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 70 at 758 and Imoloame v. WAEC [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303 at 318. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then urged the Court to refuse the claim for reinstatement given that it is lacking in merit, baseless and unsupportable in law. 32. Issue (vii) is whether the claimant is entitled to damages as sought for by him in the circumstances of this case. It is the view and submission of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that they terminated and dismissed the claimant in full compliance with the provisions of the FJSC Regulations 2010 (Exhibit D2) and, therefore, the dismissal was effected and carried out properly, validly and in accordance with the service conditions governing the appointment of the claimant at all times material to this action. That the defendants have not committed any breach of the conditions of service of the claimant to entitle him to any damages from the Court. Additionally, that the defendants exercised the right conferred upon them by the law, particularly the FJSC Regulations 2010 when they dismissed the claimant from service. However, that assuming without conceding that the claimant has any right for which he can place reliance for damages before this Court, the law is very well settled and trite on the measure of damages the claimant is entitled to for wrongful dismissal of his employment, which is prima facie the amount that the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to contract, citing Imoloame v. WAEC (supra) and Olatunbosun v. NISER Council (supra). That notwithstanding these judicial pronouncements on the measure of damages that can be awarded by the Court where properly so deserved, the claimant in this suit is most undeserving of this relief in the circumstances of this case, urging the Court to discountenance the claim as frivolous and lacking in merit and substance. 33. The 2nd and 3rd defendants proceeded to address their counterclaim; and raised two issues in that regard, namely: (a) Whether sufficient materials have been placed before the Court, both in terms of fact and evidence by the 2nd and 3rd defendants/counterclaimants, to establish that the claimant/defendant herein at all times material to his employment was not so qualified to be employed into their service thereby rendering the employment invalid, irregular, null and void? And/or (b) What is the legal effect in law when the defendant in a counterclaim fails to file a defence thereto and/or the legal implication and consequence in the absence of reply or necessary response from the defendant to the counterclaim? 34. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the claimant did not file any reply by way of response and defence to the counterclaim of the 2nd and 3rd defendants up to date. That the Rules of this Court in Order 15 Rule 2(5) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (CPR) 2017 provides as follows: “Where claimant intends to defend a counterclaim or set off, the claimant shall file a defence to the counterclaim or set-off within seven (7) days of receipt of the counter-claim and/or the set-off”. That going by the spirit and intendment of this provision, the failure by the claimant only confirms that the claimant did not intend to defend the counterclaim; but rather elected to rest his case on that of the counterclaimants. The this is the only reasonable, forceful and logical corollary to be inferred from their failure to file any defence or reply after having been served with the processes and in which they further acknowledged service of the processes even in the open Court, and had adequate time and opportunity to react accordingly if only they had wished to do so. Citing Ayinke v. Lawal [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 356) 263 at 275, Bernard Okoebor v. Police Council and 2 ors [2003] Vol. 40 WRN 93 at 109 and Linus Onwuka & anor v. R. L. Omogue [1992] 3 SCNJ 98 at 127; [1992] 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 393 at 424, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that because the claimant did not file any defence to the counterclaim, he must be deemed to have admitted the counterclaim. 35. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that during the trial their three witnesses had testified and adopted their respective written statements on oath in proof of the case of the counterclaimants. That particularly pertinent and germane in proof of the claims and reliefs sought by the counterclaimants is the evidence of 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 3 who tendered Exhibit D12 titled, “Re: Salary Details of Mr Odama Raphael 2010 - 2016”, to establish the facts of all the payments consisting of the salaries, remunerations, allowances paid to and collected by the claimant while his employment in the service subsisted with the 2nd and 3rd defendants. That the claimant had not in any way denied or controverted the claims of the counterclaimants both in their averments in the statement of fact or in their evidence on record in respect thereof. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then urged the Court to grant their reliefs as requested and prayed in the interest of justice. That it is on record that the claimant was given adequate opportunity to defend the action but he elected to waive his right and abandon all the opportunities and right at his disposal; as such he cannot be heard to complain, referring to British American Insurance Company (Nig) Ltd v. Murtala Omotayo [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 721 at 727, Omoregbe v. Lawani [1980] 3 - 4 SC 108, Nwabuoku v. Ottih [1961] 2 SCNLR 232, Nwogo v. Njoku [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 140) 570 and Maobison Inter-Link Associated Limited v. UTC Nigeria Plc [2013] 9 NWLR 197 SC at 209 and Nigerian Housing Development Society Limited v. Yaya Mumuni [1977] 2 SC 57 at 58 - 86. The 2nd and 3rd defendants thus submitted that they have fulfilled the necessary standard of proof required of them to merit the reliefs and claim before the court, urging the Court to grant and order the reliefs as prayed, referring to Vodokanal Project (Nig.) Ltd v. Mr. Rick Oladele and 2 ors [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 239) 883 at 906 - 907 and 909. 36. Finally, and still on the relief as contained in paragraph 36(1) and (2) of the counterclaim where the 2nd and 3rd defendants asked for the order for a refund to them within 90 days of the judgment of this Court, and by way of special damages, all salaries, allowances, remuneration paid and collected by the claimant, the Court was referred to two recent Supreme Court decisions (unreported), namely: Isah Shuaibu Lau v. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) & 3 ors Suit No SC. 583/2016 delivered on Friday 23rd June 2017; and Hon. (Mrs.) Dorothy Mato v. Hon. Lorwase Herman Hember & 2 ors Suit No SC. 733/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on Friday 2nd June 2017. That these two cases are essentially similar in their cause of action, and the underlying grievances and complaints leading to the actions by the appellants therein. That the appellants in the two cases challenged the selection and nomination of the respondents who got elected into the Senate and House of Representatives irregularly and wrongfully by acts of arbitrary nominations by their respective parties, the PDP and APC respectively, when the political parties knowing fully well that the said candidate so nominated did not fulfill all the necessary pre-conditions for nomination and selection neither did they meet up with the requirements for nomination and election into the National Assembly contrary to the provisions of section 89(9) of the Electoral Act, and their party constitution and guidelines. That the very nomination and election of the respondents/candidates in the two cases particularly smacked of gross act of illegality and irregularity by their respective parties who nominated them since the respondents did not even partake in the primary elections necessary for their nominations to the detriment and disadvantage of the appellants who went through the primary elections and were duly found eligible and qualified for election into the National Assembly. That the Supreme Court in nullifying and voiding the elections of the respondents in the two cases cited herein above and while further terminating their memberships of the NASS, in addition to their sack, ordered each of the respondents to refund all payments and remunerations collected and received by them during their illegal, invalid and wrongful appointment and election into the NASS. The 2nd and 3rd defendants accordingly urged the Court to grant their reliefs as prayed. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 4TH DEFENDANT 37. The 4th defendant on its part submitted two issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether the claimant has a cause of action to maintain his claim against the 4th defendant. (b) Whether considering the materials placed and evidence before the Court, the Court can accede to the prayers of the claimant. 38. On issue (a), the 4th defendant asked whether the claimant even has a cause of action as against the 4th defendant. That the claimant alleges that the 4th defendant misled the 3rd defendant into dismissing him from his job, for which he is asking a whooping sum of N100,000,000.00 to assuage the situation. That a cursory look at the pleading and statement of the claimant on oath would convince anyone, urging the Court to so hold, that the claimant has no viable cause of action against the 4th defendant. On what is cause of action, the 4th defendant referred to Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 and Ibrahim v. Osim [1988] 1 NSCC 1184 at 1194 where it was held to be the bundle or aggregate of facts which the law will recognise as giving a plaintiff a substantive right to make the claim against the relief or remedy being sought. That from the facts averred by the claimant in the statement of facts particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 26, and 28 thereof and the documents referred and tendered, no essential ingredients of enforceable rights have been disclosed to justify the claim for damages against the 4th defendant. That where evidence is at variance with pleadings, the Court will not place any value on such evidence; it will be discountenanced because it is contrary to the issue joined and, therefore, goes to no issue worthy of consideration, citing Eze & 6 ors v. Atasie & 3 ors [2000] FWLR (Pt. 13) 2180 at 2189. 39. The 4th defendant went on to point out the part of the evidence led by the claimant which is against his pleadings. In the first instance, that the claimant in paragraph 6 of his statement of facts alleged that he was employed and started work with the 3rd defendant with Exhibit C3, a Diploma in Law Certificate, from the 4th defendant. And in paragraph 7 of the statement of facts, that the claimant averred that the certificate he said in the penultimate paragraph was not ready and that it was his Final Clearance (Exhibit C2) he relied upon in lieu of his certificate. Without more, that it is abundantly clear that both Exhibits C2 and C3 in evidence contradicted paragraphs 6 and of the claimant’s statement of facts, urging the Court to so hold. Taking the argument further, on the strength of Exhibit C3, that the claimant as CW testified under cross-examination that he knew that Exhibit C3 has not been issued at the time Exhibit D1 was made. That he also confirmed that there was a difference between Exhibits C2 and C3. When asked for an explanation for the reason why Exhibit C3 was not issued until 2013, that the claimant testified that he made several efforts to get the statement from the 4th defendant without any proof of such efforts. That there is nothing on the letters written by both Distinguished Senators Victor Ndoma-Egba and Benedict Ayade (attached to Exhibits D4 and D11) to prove that those letters or any other were submitted to the Director of Consultancy Services Unit and the Vice Chancellor of the 4th defendant at any time. That none of the letters as shown to the Court were in their original forms without any form of endorsement of receipt thereon. Again, that it is only logical that the letters purportedly written to the officers of the 4th defendant could not have remained in their original forms with the claimant, urging the Court to so find and hold. Accordingly, that the claimant has no cause of action to institute this action against the 4th defendant, urging the Court to so hold. 40. On Exhibit C13, the Newspaper publication, the 4th defendant urged the Court to discountenance it in its entirety for having no evidential value, and that such cannot serve as the basis for a cause of action as in the case of the claimant, referring to paragraph 26 of the statement of facts, which provides thus: The Claimant avers that the 4th Defendant has a history of maladministration and poor record keeping which had led to a lot of hardship on the side of her students. A Punch Newspaper publication of 24th March 2013 titled “ROT IN UNIABUJA” is hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit. That the claimant undoubtedly made a heavy weather of Exhibit C13 as pleaded and redacted above. That it is undoubtedly on this strength the claimant seeks damages in sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) against the 4th defendant. In other words, the reliance placed on Exhibit C13 is the plank upon which the claimant seeks the damages against the 4th defendant. That the law as it is today has made it untenable for the claimant to rely on newspaper report as the basis for a cause of action, an issue settled in Bajowa v. Federal Republic of Nigeria & ors [2016] LPELR-40229(CA) per Ekanem, J.C.A where it was held that: Again, the appellant could not have sued based on his being aware of the allegations against him which came from a newspaper report or publication of short passages thereof. It must be stated that newspaper reports are not generally admissible as evidence of facts recorded in them. See Lawal v. Governor of Kwara State [2006] All FWLR (321) 1294, 1308. It follows therefore that knowledge or awareness derived from a private newspaper report cannot generally form the basis of a cause of action. 41. Also referred to the Court is Kashamu v. Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria [2013] LPELR-22357(CA), which held that a Newspaper report is not generally admissible as evidence of the fact recorded in it; Abegunde v. The Ondo State House of Assembly & ors [2014] LPELR-23683(CA), which held that a newspaper report is hearsay evidence and thus irrelevant and inadmissible in proof of whatever is reported there; and Njoku v. Jonathan & ors [2015] LPELR-24496(CA), which held that Newspaper reports in any case are not generally admissible as evidence of facts contained in them. The 4th defendant then urged the Court to discountenance Exhibit C13 and place no reliance on it as it is a worthless document, citing sections 37 - 38 of Evidence Act 2011 and ACB v. Apugo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 at 85; as well as hold that the claimant has no cause of action against the 4th defendant and strike out the statement of facts as it discloses no reasonable cause of action against the 4th defendant, citing Nokia West Africa (Nigeria) Ltd v. Mr Williams Orioha (aka 2shotz) [2016] LPELR-40189(CA) and Dr Irene Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669. 42. Issue (b) is whether the Court can accede to the prayers of the claimant. The 4th defendant then proceeded to be consider the claim for damages. That assuming without conceding that Exhibit C13 is admissible and worthy of its contents, the claimant would have still had an uphill task to make the document worth it and to justify his claim, referring to paragraph 28(h) of the statement of facts. That it is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. That in the entire gamut of his witness statement on oath and oral evidence before this Court, the claimant did not by any shred of evidence prove his claim for damages. That the law is well settled that when a party fails to give evidence in support of his pleadings, he is deemed to have abandoned it, citing Yashe v. Umar [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 465 and Ajero v. Ugorji [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 621) 1. The 4th defendant went on that in paragraph 5 of its statement of defence, the claimant’s claim for damages was denied and the claimant was thereby put to the strictest proof thereof. Further to this, that paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the witness statement on oath of Enokela Elias Odumuh in support of the 4th defendant’s statement of defence also supported the denial of the claimant’s claim for damages. That on this singular honour, the proof of damages claimed by the claimant is in issue. That the law is settled that where a plaintiff alleges that he has suffered damage and claims for damages, the allegation and damages claimed will be deemed in issue unless the defendant specifically admits them. That damages are deemed to be an issue whether special or general and whether the alleged damage is part of cause of action or not, referring to Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623 and Reynolds v. Rockonoh [2005] 10 MJSC 159. 43. The 4th defendant continued that the claim for damages by the claimant is not self-fulfilling. That it is a settled law that if damages are being claimed in an action, there must be evidence in proof of such damages whether special or general to entitle the claimant to the award being made, citing UBA v. Ekanem (MD Paragon Ent. Ltd) & anor [2009] LPELR-8383(CA). That going by the evidence before the Court, the claim of damages against the 4th defendant has to fail as same, being unproved, is deemed abandoned. That the claimant has failed in strict proof of damages he claims, citing Amadi v. Essien [1993] LPELR-14644 (CA), which held the term strict proof of damages to mean no more than that the evidence must show the same particularity as is necessary for its pleadings; it should consist of evidence of particular losses which are exactly known or accurately measured before the trial but it does not mean unusual proof. That the claimant, having failed to strictly proof his claim for damages, must have his case against the 4th defendant dismissed in terms of issue (b). That it is trite law that averment in pleadings is not evidence. That even if it was duly pleaded, it would have been deemed abandoned, there being no evidence led to prove such averment, unless it is admitted, citing Brawal Shipping Nigeria Ltd v. Ometraco International Ltd [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 290 at 303, Omo-Agege v. Oghojafor [2011] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1234)341 at 353 and Ojoh v. Kamalu & ors [2005] 24 NSCQR 256; [2006] 6 WRN 110. The 4th defendant then urged the Court to hold that the claim of damages in the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) on which no evidence is led remains moribund. 44. On Exhibits C10, C10(a) and D9, the 4th defendant pointed out that this Court had raised an issue on the purport of Exhibits C10 and C10(a) when Mr. Enekola E. Odumuh (witness to the 4th defendant) was asked to explain why the said Exhibit C10 failed to address the issue of the delay in the release of the claimant’s result. To the 4th defendant, there was no ambiguity in Exhibit D9. That for avoidance of any doubt, the issuance and context of Exhibit D9 by the 4th defendant cleared the confusion surrounding the misinformation earlier made to the 3rd defendant by the claimant. That as a matter of fact, the letter (Exhibit D9) was so understood that the 3rd defendant acted promptly on it. That the letter referred to the attached results and without much ado, it was the attached results that explained the reason for the delay in the issuance of Exhibit C3. To further buttress the point being made, that the issuance of Exhibit C10 and subsequently a response in Exhibit C10(a) applauded the fact that there was no ambiguity in Exhibit D9. Again, that the clarity and understanding of Exhibit D9 was re-echoed in paragraph 15 of the witness statement on oath of Mr. lsa-Koto Kabir (the 1st defendant’s witness), a fact that was not controverted even by the claimant. That the only point raised by the claimant on Exhibit D9 was that the attached tables did not represent the true record (referring to paragraph 22 of the statement of facts). That the issues surrounding the tables of results (Exhibit D9) are that the claimant failed DCL 407 as at the time he completed his courses in 1998; he only re-wrote and passed same examination in March 2011 and by which time same DCL 407 was referred to as DCL 142. That the explanation as to the change of course code was offered by Mr. Odumuh. 45. The 4th defendant continued that the onus is on the party who alleges to prove. That the onus was on the claimant who alleged that the tables of results attached to Exhibit D9 were not reflections of the true records to prove same. That the claimant did not only fail to do so, he had admitted that he knew that his result was not ready and thus he did not possess a Diploma in Law certificate from the 4th defendant at the time he joined the service of the 3rd defendant. On this score, the 4th defendant urged the Court to take into cognisance the demeanour of the claimant (as CW) and the fact that he even denied knowing his own age; he refused to give accurate answers when asked to tell this Court his age at the time he finished the Diploma in Law programme, etc. That it should be noted also that the claimant alleged that Exhibit D9 did not represent the true records of his academic pursuit with the 4th defendant. That this mere allegation cannot be considered as an averment strictu senso. That it ought to have been particularized sufficiently, citing Macron Services (Nig.) Ltd v. Afro Continental [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 201. That it is trite law that oral or parole evidence will not be allowed or admissible to contradict or alter a document, citing Bunge v. Governor of Rivers State (supra). That it goes without saying that the claimant’s oral evidence cannot challenge the results contained in the attachment to Exhibit D9, urging the Court to so hold and to view the inability of the CW to justify his claim of making several efforts to get his result whereas he knew as a matter of fact that that was not true. At least, that he alluded to this fact only after the publication of Exhibit C13, which the 4th defendant have urged the Court to discard. 46. To the 4th defendant, it is only logical for the Court to have recourse to the litany of lies and misconstruction of facts by the claimant all which have culminated in the institution of this suit. That the Court should note that the claimant is deceptive and very elusive; he paraded copies of letters from distinguished Senators of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to make the 3rd defendant believe that he was pursuing the collection of his result from the 4th defendant whereas he knew as a fact that the only time he took definite step was in early 2011. That rather than supplying evidence to prove the negligence of the 4th defendant, the claimant relied on mischief to allude to an inefficient system whereas he was only penny-wise and pound foolish. That the 4th defendant could not have fabricated a result from the claimant, the essence of the correspondence in Exhibit D9. That the claimant had no answer to this as he even admitted that he never made any formal or written request to the 4th defendant. That it is only logical that no reasonable man, with his wealth of working experience with reputable law firms, could have been silent over such nagging issue as the purported delay, urging the Court to consider this singular fact as a basis to determine the mischief the claimant sought to make. In all, that the claimant has failed sufficiently to prove his claim against the 4th defendant; and that the law is that a claimant should prove his case through credible evidence and not rely on the weakness of the defendant’s case even where the defendant did not lead any evidence, citing Health Care Products (Nig.) Ltd v. Bazza [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 582 at 605 - 606. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 47. The claimant on his part submitted four issues for determination, namely: (i) Whether the claimant was properly employed by the 2nd and 3rd defendants. (ii) Whether the stoppage of the claimant’s salary by the 1st to 3rd defendant was lawful and whether the claimant is entitled to arrears of his salary for the period of June 2011 to July 2014 (a period of 31 months); and the period of January and February 2017 (the period before his unlawful dismissal). (iii) Whether the claimant was properly dismissed from the service of the 1st to 3rd defendants and whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated. (iv) Whether the 4th defendant misinformed the 1st to 3rd defendants and whether the claimant is entitled to damages as a result of the action of the 4th defendant. 48. Regarding issue (i), the claimant submitted that the 2nd and 3rd defendants knew the requirement for employment of a Litigation Officer II Grade Level 06 when the claimant applied for employment. That the claimant stated clearly in his application that he possessed a Diploma in Law from the 4th defendant. That Exhibit C2 is a confirmation of the fact that the claimant had the requisite qualification; and it reads in paragraph ‘E’ thus: FINAL CLEARANCE The above named student has completed his/her course and paid all his/her fees. He is therefore cleared for issuance of a Testimonial/ITF Letter/Statement of Result. That the 4th defendant having issued Exhibit C2 had clearly affirmed that the claimant had successfully completed his programme. That it is only a successful student that is cleared and entitled to be issued a statement of result, referring to section 128(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, which reads thus: When a judgment of a court or any judicial or official proceeding; contract or any grant or other disposition or property has been reduced to the form of a document or series of documents, no evidence may be given of such judgment or proceeding or of the terms of such contract, grant or disposition of property except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its content in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under this Act; nor may the contents of any such document be contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence. 49. To the claimant, he only applied for employment and attached what he possessed; he did not tell the 2nd and 3rd defendants that he had been issued the Diploma result from the 4th defendant. That attaching Exhibit C2 meant that he had completed his course of study and was awaiting his statement of result. That the 4th defendant throughout the trial did not deny issuance of Exhibit C2 to the claimant. The claimant then submitted that he was sufficiently qualified to be employed by the 1st and 2nd defendant. That the 2nd witness who testified for the 2nd and 3rd defendants was asked in cross-examination what the requirement for employment as Litigation Officer II, GL 06 was; and in her answer she listed a number of certificates including a Diploma in Law certificate. That she initially said that the claimant was employed based on a letter of recommendation from a certain Senator Greg Ngaji. That the claimant’s counsel asked her whether one of the requirements for employment include a recommendation letter from a Senator and she said No, urging the Court to hold in favour of the claimant. That if the 2nd and 3rd defendants required the production of the Diploma certificate of the claimant, they would have made it a condition precedent for the employment. That merely being satisfied is enough and lifts any burden on the claimant as Exhibit C2 shows the certificate had not been issued to the claimant. That the claimant did not issue a letter of employment to himself, neither did he give himself the internal posting and duty schedule; all these were done by 2nd and 3rd defendants, and the claimant cannot be held responsible. The claimant then submitted that he was duly and properly employed into the services of the 1st to 3rd defendants. That the 1st defendant’s witness when asked in cross-examination what criteria the 1st defendant used to promote the claimant, he answered that the claimant was educationally qualified and had no disciplinary issues so he deserved to be promoted. That he justified the promotion of the claimant to level 07 by the 1st defendant, urging the Court to hold that the claimant’s employment was done in accordance with the law. 50. Issue (ii) is whether the stoppage of the claimant’s salary by the 1st to 3rd defendant was lawful and whether the claimant is entitled to arrears of his salary for the period of June 2011 to July 2014 (a period of 31 months); and the period of January and February 2017 (the period before his unlawful dismissal). To the claimant, having been properly employed by the 1st to 3rd defendants and having not been suspended by the 1st to 3rd defendants and also having not been sacked from their employment between the period of June 2011 to July 2014 (a period of 31 months), he is entitled to his full salary as a worker deserves his wages. That the 1st witness who testified in favour of the 2nd and 3rd defendants was asked in cross-examination whether the claimant was suspended during the period in issue and he answered clearly that the claimant was not suspended. That the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ 3rd witness said in his witness statement on oath in paragraph 8 that: “based on the facts in paragraph 7 above, the 2nd defendant directed the stoppage of claimant’s salary with effect from 1st July 2011 as a result of his inability to present his certificate to justify his employment in the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants”. That there is nowhere in his deposition where he stated that the claimant was suspended or dismissed from the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants to warrant a stoppage of his salary. The claimant then submitted that the Court should hold in his favour that he is entitled to the payment of his salary for the period in review. That the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulation provides the procedure for disciplinary action to be taken against an earring officer in section 46; and that there is nowhere in the said section where it is provided that an officer who has been alleged to commit any form of misconduct should have his salary stopped without being suspended or dismissed. Furthermore, that the letters of appointment, confirmation and promotion of the claimant do not in any way provide for the stoppage of the salary of the claimant upon a mere allegation without being dismissed or even suspended. Additionally, that the claimant in averred in paragraph 18 of his statement of facts establishing the cause of action and paragraph 16 of his witness statement on oath that he worked throughout the months of January 2017 and was served a letter of dismissal on the 7th February 2017 as evidenced by Exhibit C9 without being paid salary for the months of January and February 2017. That there exist a contract of employment between the claimant and the 1st to 3rd defendants which has been breached, urging the Court to order as per the claimant’s reliefs that his salary for January and February 2017 be paid as the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s 1st witness admitted in cross-examination that the claimant’s salary was stopped in December 2016. 51. Issue (iii) is whether the claimant was properly dismissed from the service of the 1st to 3rd defendants and whether the claimant is entitled to be reinstated. Here, the claimant submitted that he was wrongly dismissed from the service of the 1st to the 3rd defendants and is entitled to be reinstated, citing Federal University of Technology, Yola v. Danjuma Maiwuya [2013] All FWLR 753, Nze v. NPA [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 528) 10 and NEPA v. Ango [2001] 15 NWLLR (Pt. 737) 627. That the contract of service that exist between the claimant and the 1st to the 3rd defendants is a contract of service with statutory flavour; it is created by statute with terms and conditions which must be strictly adhered to, citing Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc v. Mr I. C. Offoelo [2013] All FWLR 1, Eperokin v. University of Lagos [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 160, Lyase v. UBTHMB [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt 643) 45, Uwangbenebe v. Nigerian Palm Produce Board [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 490 and Shita-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40. That the employment of the claimant in this case enjoys statutory flavour as it is being regulated by the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulation made pursuant to section 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The claimant further referred to Mr Richard Omidiora & anor v. Federal Civil Service Commission & 3 ors [2008] 2 FWLR 2377, Iderima v. Rivers State CSC [2005] 7 SCNJ 493 and Gov, Kwara State v. Ojibara [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt. 645) 661 and submitted that his purported dismissal from the service of the 1st to 3rd defendants is subject to be declared null and void by this Court. 52. The claimant went on that Exhibit C1 is the letter of appointment issued by the 3rd defendant to him, and Exhibit C4 is a letter of confirmation duly signed by O. L. Aremu, who testified as the 1st witness to the 2nd and 3rd defendants. That if the claimant was not qualified, his appointment wouldn’t have been confirmed. More so, that the 1st and 3rd defendants confirmed the appointment of the claimant at a period where his salaries were not being paid, urging the Court to hold in favour of the claimant. That Exhibit C6 is the notification of promotion issued to the claimant by the 1st defendant. That the said 1st defendant in its defence and whose testimony is before the Court said that the claimant was qualified academically and has no disciplinary action against him at the time of being promoted; as such the said 1st defendant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. 53. Issue (iv) is whether the 4th defendant misinformed the 1st to 3rd defendants and whether the claimant is entitled to damages as a result of the action of the 4th defendant. The claimant submitted on this issue that the 4th defendant misinformed the 1st to 3rd defendants in the letter written in response to the letter of enquiry written to the 4th defendant by the 3rd defendant. That during the course of trial and during the defence of the 4th defendant, the Court asked the 4th defendant witness to read the said letter written by the 4th defendant to the 2nd defendant. The content of the letter revealed that the claimant’s statement of result was issued by the 4th defendant. That paragraph 2 of the letter states as follows: “this is to confirm that the Statement of Result, Diploma in Law, with a pass of 24th April, 2013, presented to you by Odama Raphael as authentic”. To the claimant, this is a confirmation of Exhibit D1, which reads in part that: “I hold an Ordinary National Diploma in Law from the University of Abuja in 1998”. That the attachments to the said letter which the defendants relied upon to misinform the Court about a carry-over written by the claimant is of no probative value as there are contradictions in the so called results. That during cross-examination, the 4th defendant’s witness told the Court that he doesn’t know who changed the course code from DCL 407 to DCL 142. That course codes are designed according to the year of study and the semesters.; as such DCL 407, which is a 4th Semester Course, couldn’t have been changed to DCL 142 which is supposed to be a 1st Semester Course. That the 4th defendant’s witness also in cross-examination couldn’t explain to the Court the reason for the 4th defendant’s silence in offering explanation to the 2nd defendant’s enquiry as to the reason for the delay in the release of the result of the claimant. The claimant then submitted that silence in law means consent to the fact that the delay was caused by the 4th defendant for no fault of the claimant. 54. The claimant continued that in a deliberate attempt to continue to conceal the truth and to cause undue hardship to him, the 4th defendant deliberately refused to reply to Exhibit C12 written by the claimant’s solicitor to it. That Exhibit C13 is self explanatory as to the conduct of the 4th defendant to her students. The exhibit explains the rot in the 4th defendant and the resultant effect to the students. That the exhibit reads in part that: “The school has no Examination Records office to handle examination issues, but matters are handled either by the Academic Office or Academic Planning Office with neither being solely responsible”. That the publication which was done in the Punch Newspaper which is widely read across the nation and beyond was not controverted. That the 4th defendant did not publish a rejoinder to contradict or controvert the said publication. That facts not controverted by a counter publication are deemed admitted, citing Arum v. Nwobodo [2013] 54 (Pt. 2) NSCQR 866 at 910. 55. Furthermore, that the 4th defendant’s witness told the Court that the claimant came to his office sometime in 2011 and requested to obtain his statement of result where he discovered that the claimant had a carry-over DLC 407. That in cross-examination, he told the Court that the claimant then sat for the carry-over sometimes in March 2011. To the claimant, the testimony of the witness is not coherent and should not be given any probative value as the claimant couldn’t have visited the witness’ office sometime in 2011 and then sat for the same carry sometimes in March 2011. 56. The claimant proceeded that he averred in paragraphs 24 and 25 of his statement of facts establishing the cause of action and paragraphs 22 and 23 of his witness statement on oath that he has suffered a lot of psychological trauma, embarrassment and financial hardship as a result of the action of the defendants. That he averred further that his character has been assassinated. He then urged the Court to consider his name and character that has greatly been assassinated, the nature of the libel and the recklessness in which the 4th defendant has carried on and award the damages as per the claimant’s endorsement, citing David West v. Odumote [2003] FWLR (Pt. 163) 146 Ratio 4 and UBA Ltd v. Oredein [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 147) 355. The claimant also urged the Court to take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Naira over the years and the economic vicissitude of the country in making award of damages, citing Asesa v. Ekwenem [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 97; and CBN v. Okojie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488 CA at 519 - 520, which held that in tortious liability, even where there has been no physical injury, substantial damages may be awarded for the injury to the plaintiff’s dignity or for discomfort or inconveniences where liberty has been interfered with. That the damages are given to indicate the plaintiff’s right even though he has not suffered any pecuniary damages. In this case, the claimant submitted that he has suffered psychological trauma to warrant award of damages against the 4th defendant. The claimant concluded by praying for all his reliefs. THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO THE CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS 57. The 1st defendant reacted on points of law; even here only in terms of the claimant’s issue (iii) wherein the claimant had canvassed that he was wrongfully dismissed and in addition argued to the effect that the 1st defendant did not follow due process in dismissing him and as such his dismissal should be declared null and void by the Court. To this, the 1st defendant submitted that the claimant did not in the statement of facts filed on 5th May 2017 plead lack of fair hearing and/or irregularity in the procedure adopted by the 1st defendant in dismissing him, urging the Court to so hold. That it is settled law that the record of this Court is binding on all the parties including the Court and as such, this Court would not permit any importation into it what it does not contain as attempted by counsel to the claimant, citing Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule [2012] All FWLR (Pt. 611) 1413 at 1426. That parties are bound by pleadings and the claimant could not be at liberty to wonder or stray out of his pleadings, citing Abubakar & ors v. Yar’adua [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 457) 1 at 138, Agboola v. Uba Plc [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 74) 74 at 89 and Igwemadu v. Igwemadu [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 573) 1980 at 2013. That it is also trite that address of counsel no matter how eloquently or beautifully prepared cannot take the place of evidence, citing Ajayi v. Total (Nig.) Plc [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1378) 423 at 443, and urging the Court to ignore or discountenance the submissions of the claimant made in terms of his said issue (iii). 58. That assuming without conceding that the claimant pleaded that the 1st defendant failed to follow the procedure laid down by law, it is 1st defendant’s rejoinder that the claimant was informed of his wrongdoing, given adequate time to prepare and submit his response and ultimately due process was followed in dismissing the claimant as could be gleaned from paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the claimant’s statement of facts. More so, that a party who alleges wrongful dismissal must plead facts to that effect and in addition adduce evidence to show the proper steps the employer ought to follow in dismissing him and the employer’s failure thereof. That the claimant in this case failed to discharge this burden, urging the Court to so hold. The 1st defendant went on that upon calm and careful perusal of the surrounding circumstances of the claimant’s employment by the 3rd defendant, it became expedient to remedy the irregularities hence the dismissal of the claimant. That the claimant’s employment was void ab initio. That the FJSC Regulations 2010 is explicit on the requirement for employment and the consequences of being employed without complying with the requirements and prerequisite conditions. That where mandatory rules are not complied with and they go to the root of the action as in this case, such action will not only be a nullity but the entire actions predicated on it shall become void. That it is settled law that one cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay; it will fall like a pack of cards. As regards the cases the claimant cited in terms of his issue (iii), the 1st defendant submitted that they are inapposite to the instant case as the facts are totally different and as such the decision therein cannot inure in favour of the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. that cases are not cited at large without relating them to the facts of the case at hand; every case is decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances, relying on Omowaiye v. Att.-Gen., Ekiti State [2011] All FWLR (588) 876 at 908. THE 4TH DEFENDANT’S ORAL REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO THE CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS 59. Although the 4th defendant did not file a written reply on points of law, it nevertheless reacted orally on two issues arising form the claimant’s submissions. First, the 4th defendant submitted that counsel to the claimant cannot use a written address to stand in the place of evidence. that this point goes to the point the 4th defendant raised in its written address specifically as to the admissibility and probative value of Exhibit C13 as contrasted with the submissions of the claimant in paragraphs 6.06 and 6.07 of his written address, urging the Court to accordingly discountenance both paragraphs. Secondly, the 4th defendant submitted that paragraph 6.09 of the claimant’s written address cannot stand given that the fact of the claim of N100 Million against the 4th defendant was not proved in any way whatsoever by the claimant; hence that counsel cannot in the written address lead evidence. The 4th defendant then urged the Court to hold that this suit is across abuse of judicial process and accordingly dismiss it. COURT’S DECISION 60. From the reliefs claimed by the claimant, the claimant’s case can essentially be said to fall into two broad spheres: the claim for wrongful and/or invalid dismissal by the 1st to 3rd defendants together with the claim for reinstatement and hence payment of the requisite salaries and damages for wrongful termination of his employment, and the claim against the 4th defendant for damages for wrongful information supplied by the 4th defendant, which wrongful information led to the dismissal of the claimant by the 1st to 3rd defendants. Given these claims of the claimant, the 2nd and 3rd defendants made a counterclaim against the claimant for the refund of all salaries, allowances, remuneration and any payment made and received by the claimant from 12th April 2010 accounting and/or representing the period when the claimant was erroneously employed under the false belief and representation that he had the requisite qualification for gaining employment into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. I shall accordingly first consider the validity of the dismissal of the claimant by the 1st to 3rd defendants, and hence the reliefs sought against the 1st to 3rd defendants, as well as the relief sought against the 4th defendant; and conclude by considering the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ counterclaim. 61. I must at the outset state that the facts of this case are as messy and intriguing as they reveal the not so glorious actions of the parties, as dramatis personae. The messy nature of the case starts with the claimant’s statement of facts where in paragraphs 3 and 4 the claimant respectively referred to the 2nd defendant, the Chief Registrar (CR) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), as “a Court established by Law to adjudicate on Labour and industrial matters”; and the 3rd defendant, the NICN itself, as “the Chief Registrar of the 2nd Defendant vest with powers of running the administration of the 2nd Defendant as provided by law”. Once it is appreciated that the 2nd defendant in this case is the CR of the NICN and the 3rd defendant is the NICN itself, then it cannot be that the CR is the NICN, while the NICN is the CR as described by the claimant in his pleadings. A narration of the sequence of the facts, a necessity at that, illustrates the inglorious nature of the actions of the parties. 62. Exhibit D10 is the personal file of the claimant in terms of his employment with the 3rd defendant. It consists of the certified true copies of documents numbered from pages 1 to 126. At page 1 is the claimant’s application for the post of a Litigation Officer dated 28th October 2009, which application is also Exhibit D1. At page 11 of Exhibit D10 is an offer of provisional appointment to the post of Litigation Officer II on salary GL 06 dated 12 April 2010 addressed to the claimant and signed by E. Ekam for the Chief Registrar. This is the offer referred to in Exhibit C1 when Exhibit C1 talked of “offer of provisional appointment contained in my letter Ref. No. NIC/455/V/844 dated 12 April, 2010”. The offer of 12th April 2010 gave the claimant 30 days within which to report to the 3rd defendant’s office in Calabar with an acceptance letter and original copies of his credentials including the certificates for documentation and other details. At page 12 of Exhibit D10 is a letter of acceptance by the claimant dated 12th May 2010. At page 15 is the appointment form filled and signed by the claimant on 17/5/2010. The assumption/resumption of duty certificate is at page 18 and it shows that the claimant resumed duty on 17/5/2010, the date the appointment form was filled - yet Exhibit C1 (the letter of appointment dated 21 June 2010, which can also be found at pages 19 to 21 of Exhibit D10) appointed the claimant with effect from 21st May 2010. From the documents in Exhibit D10, the claimant proceeded to complete his documentation for employment (see especially page 24 of Exhibit D10) and so commenced work as Litigation Officer II on GL 06 in the Calabar Division of the 3rd defendant where he was posted to. See the Assumption/Resumption of Duty Certificate at page 18 of Exhibit D10. The claimant even applied for staff identity card, which application was treated by the 3rd defendant. See pages 28 and 29 of Exhibit D10. 63. By Exhibit D7 daed 27th June 2011 (a memo from Head of Admin, Calabar Division to Head of Account, Enugu Division), which can also be found at pages 37 and 38 of Exhibit D10, instruction was given for the claimant’s salary to be stopped with effect from 1st July 2011. The reason given for this was that the claimant was not able to present his certificate to justify his present position as Assistant Executive Officer (Litigation). The 2nd and 3rd defendants had conducted a verification exercise at the Calabar Division of the 3rd defendant June 2011 wherein they found the claimant wanting in terms of his claim of possessing a Diploma in Law certificate. See paragraph 7 of the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s joint statement of defence and paragraph 10 of the witness statement on oath of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 3, Mr Olanrewaju Lawrence Aremo, Director of Administration of the 3rd defendant. By a letter (at page 39 of Exhibit D10) dated 15th February 2012 signed by Mrs F. A. Liman (Chief Admin Officer) and addressed to Principal Admin Officer, Calabar Division, the claimant was given three weeks ultimatum within which to present the requisite certificate. This ultimatum was then communicated to the claimant vide Exhibit D6 titled, “Prolonged Absence From Duty” and dated 15th February 2012 (also found at page 40 of Exhibit D10), which was also emailed to him as endorsed on same Exhibit D6. The said salary of the claimant was accordingly stopped as instructed. See the memo at page 41 of Exhibit D10. By a letter dated 1st March 2012, titled “Re: Prolonged Absence From Duty” and signed by the claimant to the 2nd defendant (the letter is Exhibit D4, which is also attached to Exhibit D6, and can be further found at page 43 of Exhibit D10), the claimant apologized for his prolonged absence from duty and pleaded for more time while the process of getting his statement of result is on and reinstatement to his position in the office. 64. By a memo to AD (Admin) from Miss E. O. Alabi (PAO) dated 29th March 2012 on the prolonged absence from duty of the claimant, the antecedents of the issue at hand were given and three recommendations were given: that the claimant be given up to April 2012 to produce the result; or that the claimant be advised to tender his letter of resignation; or that the claimant be dismissed. This memo is Exhibit D11 and can also be found at pages 46 and 47 of Exhibit D10. By Exhibit D5 dated 6th May 2013, also to be found at pages 48 to 54 of Exhibit D10, the claimant presented his Diploma in Law certificate, the statement of result of which he attached. The statement of result is dated 6th May 2013 and indicates that the claimant was awarded Diploma in Law by the 4th defendant and that the statement of result is valid for only one year from the date of issue. The date of award was put as 24/04/2013. On 16th January 2014, O. L. Aremu, Asst Director (Admin) wrote to the Ag Chief Registrar requesting that the claimant’s salary be restored with effect from July 2013, which request the Ag CR approved. The said memo and endorsed approval can be found at page 61 of Exhibit D10. On same 16th January 2014, O. L. Aremu communicated the Ag CR’s approval to restore the claimant’s salary to the Deputy Director (Accts) vide a memo that can be found at page 60 of Exhibit D10 as well as one of attachments to Exhibit D8. 65. With his salary restored, the claimant vide a petition dated 20th October 2014 asked for the payment of the arrears of his salary, which he put to be for 32 months. The petition can be found at pages 67 and 68 of Exhibit D10. The claimant had earlier vide two letters dated 20th November 2013 (Exhibit C7) and 20th March 2014 (Exhibit C8) requested for the payment of his salary. The two letters can also be found at pages 77 to 80 of Exhibit D10. The 2nd defendant on a memo written to him by the Head of Calabar Division dated 4th November 2014 then endorsed an instruction on 10th November 2014 to the DDAdmin to study the petition and let him have his views as to the way forward. See the memo at page 65 of Exhibit D10. Nothing appears to have been done as the claimant went on to write and appeal to “His Lordship, Hon. Justice Walter Onnoghe Judge of the Supreme Court of Nigeria” vide a letter dated 10th May 2016 on the issue of his salary. See pages 75 and 76 of Exhibit D10 for this appeal. His Lordship Hon. Justice W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) vide a letter dated 16th May 2018, which can be found at page 74 of Exhibit D10, then wrote to the 2nd defendant praying that the 2nd defendant “may wish to look into his case for possible solution”. His Lordship proceeded to indicate that he will be sending a copy of his later to the Hon. President of the 3rd defendant. Again the 2nd defendant endorsed on His Lordship’s letter of 16th May 2016 to the Ag. D.Admin thus: “Pls study and let me have your full Report (detailed) on this matter to enable appropriate Response asap”. 66. In his report to the CR dated 23rd May 2016, O. L. Aremu, Ag. Director (Admin) indicated how the claimant was employed as Litigation Officer II GL. 06 (now Assistant Executive Officer, Litigation - GL 06), how during the verification exercise it was discovered that the claimant was employed without the requisite qualification, how he was given time to produce the statement of result, how his salary was accordingly stopped, how he finally presented his Diploma in Law certificate, and how his salary was restored with effect from July 2013. The report went on to point out that the arrears the claimant is claiming is actually for 25 months; and then put the issue at stake thus: “…which certificate was he using during this period to earn him the salary he is requesting?” The report ended thus: “The officer’s request for the salary that he did not earn and the certificate he did not obtain until May 2013 is fraudulent and against the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010; section 48 (iv, xxi, xviii, & xxviiii)”. The report can be found at pages 85 and 86 of Exhibit D10. It is curious that all this while the 2nd and 3rd defendants did not see anything fraudulent about the acts of the claimant (he was even given time to cure the defects noticeable in the issue of his Diploma in Law certificate) until his appeal to His Lordship Hon. Justice W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was). 67. In his endorsement of 24/5/16 on the report (see page 86 of Exhibit D10), the CR noted thus: “I need your confirmation that the officer, Odama, R. A. obtained his Diploma in Law on 24/4/2013 (Date of Award on his Statement of Result) and not as at 12th May 2010 when he was offered employment as litigation Officer II on Grade level 06”. The confirmation came vide the memo of O. L. Aremu to the CR dated 27th May 2016 with a recommendation that the claimant’s case be referred to the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC) for further necessary action since he is now an Executive Officer on Grade Level 07. See page 87 of Exhibit D10 for the confirmation. The claimant had all along been confirmed as a staff (see Exhibit C4 dated 19th February 2013 signed by O. L. Aremu Esq for the CR a copy of the confirmation letter is not in the claimant’s personal file, Exhibit D10) and even promoted to the rank of Executive Officer (Litigation) on salary Grade Level 07 (Exhibit C6, which can also be found at page 72 of Exhibit D10). The CR endorsed on the memo of 27th May 2016 request for confirmation that the claimant’s Diploma in Law certificate has a direct bearing with his study programme at the University of Abuja. The CR went on to direct that the University of Abuja be asked to confirm that the claimant did not have a diploma in Law certificate before 24th April 2013. This second confirmation came vide a memo dated 6th June 2016 from O. L. Aremu, Ag. Director (Admin) who even observed and maintained in paragraphs 5 and 6 respectively that the claimant did not have certificate that qualified him for employment in 2009; and as such he is not qualified for the 25 months salary he requested for. See page 88 of Exhibit D10. 68. Mr O. L. Aremu vide a letter dated 14th July 2016 (Exhibit D9, also to be found at pages 89 and 90 of Exhibit D10) then wrote to the 4th defendant to verify i.e. confirm the authenticity of the statement of result of the claimant, which awarded the Diploma in Law to the claimant as at 24th April 2013. In the second paragraph of the said letter, the 2nd and 3rd defendants wrote thus: “If the result is authentic, the Court would like to be informed on the reason for the delay in issuance of the Statement of Result, and to ascertain if Mr Odama actually graduated from your institution with Ordinary Diploma in Law since 1998”. The 4th defendant replied through a letter dated 9th August 2016, which is attached to Exhibit D9. In the second paragraph of the said letter, the 4th defendant wrote thus: “This is to confirm that the Statement of Results, Diploma in Law, with a Pass of 24th April, 2013, presented to you by Odama Raphael is authentic”. A copy of the duly stamped Statement of Result was said to be attached by the 4th defendant, but what was actually attached were two sheets of Semester Result Tables. The 4th defendant was silent on the second aspect of the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s letter of 14th July 2016, which is “If the result is authentic, the Court would like to be informed on the reason for the delay in issuance of the Statement of Result, and to ascertain if Mr Odama actually graduated from your institution with Ordinary Diploma in Law since 1998”. During the trial, the Court asked the 4th defendant’s witness to read out the asterisked portion of the letter of 14th July 2016 (Exhibit D9) asking the 4th defendant to authenticate the claimant’s statement of result and also tell the 3rd defendant the reason for the delay in issuing the claimant the statement of result plus ascertaining whether the claimant actually graduated with Ordinary Diploma in Law since 1998. The witness also read out the 4th defendant’s reply of 9th August 2016 (attached to Exhibit D9) to the 3rd defendant’s letter of 14th July 2016. In the 4th defendant’s letter of 9th August 2016, the 4th defendant confirmed the statement of result, Diploma in Law with a Pass of 24th April 2013, issued to the claimant. But the 4th defendant’s letter in reply as already indicated was silent as to whether the claimant graduated in 1998 and as to the reason for the delay in the issuance of the statement of result. The 4th defendant’s witness was then asked by the Court why the silence in answering to or explaining these issues by the 4th defendant. The 4th defendant’s witness had no answer to give to the Court. My take is that if the 4th defendant had explained the reason for the delay in the issuance of the Statement of Result and ascertained whether the claimant actually graduated with Ordinary Diploma since 1998, all of the issues that led to the filing of this case may not have arisen at all. In keeping mute on this vital question posed to it, the 4th defendant escalated the problem at hand yielding to the conclusion that it actually has something to hide in all of the mess so created. In this wise, the 4th defendant is not without blame despite the pontification in its submissions. 69. Armed with the letter of the 4th defendant of 9th August 2016 with its attachment, Mr O. L. Aremu as Director (Administration) wrote a comprehensive report to the CR dated 8th November 2016 wherein he gave the antecedents of all the issues pertaining to the claimant’s case. See pages 107 to 109 of Exhibit D10 for the report. On the issue of the verification of period of completion of the Diploma programme, he had this to say: In October 2016, further clarification was sought with regards to the year, 1998 that the officer claimed to have graduated, in his application for employment at the University of Abuja with a Diploma certificate. It was revealed in the Semester Result Table released by the University Senate in year 1996 that Mr Odama did not complete his course in the University. The officer failed a course which he went back to rewrite in 2011. This was when he had already been appointed based on the certificate which he did not possess… 70. The report went on to make six findings, namely: 1. It was established that the officer did not graduate in 1998. 2. The officer misled the Court to believe that he completed the Diploma in Law as at 1998. 3. Mr Raphael ODAMA obtained employment under false declaration. 4. He requested for salary arrears which he did not earn. 5. He further lied to the Court that the Statement of Result he presented in 2013 is the one he completed and obtained in 1998 whereas he actually has a carryover. 6. His involving notable and distinguished citizens in pursuance of his fraudulent claims is geared toward damaging the image of the Court. 71. The report then recommended that the officer be issued with a query to submit a representation explaining the disparities in his claim of obtaining a Diploma in Law 1998 and the University’s statement that he passed in 2011; and that the matter will be referred to the FJSC for termination. The report then concluded thus: In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Mr. Adula Raphael ODAMA obtained employment under false declaration and he misled notable and distinguished citizens in the lie. Mr. Adula Raphael ODAMA’s action constitutes serious misconduct as provided in the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 48(1) xviii, xxxiii, 213. 72. On 9th November 2016, vide a letter of that date titled “Preliminary Letter” (Exhibit C10), a query actually, addressed to the claimant and signed by C. Iyelobu (A.O. I), the claimant was asked to respond with 48 hours to the content of the tables from the School and why he misled the Court to believe that he completed the programme in 1998. See also page 110 of Exhibit D10 for the preliminary letter, which had also indicated that the University, in its response request of the 3rd defendant to clarify the reason in the delay in issuance of the statement of result of a programme which he completed in 1998, furnished two tables bearing the information that the claimant had a carryover (DCL 407) and the second indicating when he passed the paper in March 2011. Now, I indicated earlier that the 4th defendant beyond merely attaching the two tables it did to its response of 9th August 2016 to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, did not answer to the enquiry as to the reason for the delay in the issuance of the statement of result and the ascertainment of whether the claimant actually graduated in 1998 with Ordinary Diploma in Law. So the conclusions arrived at in terms of the report of 8th November 2016 and the preliminary letter of 9th November 2016 are the deductions drawn by the 2nd and 3rd defendants from reading the tables attached to the letter of 9th August 2016. I took a closer look at the two tables. The first has 1996 handwritten on it; otherwise it bears no date of its generation. On it, the claimant is listed as number 11. As against the column for DCL 407 (2), it is recorded against the claimant 32FO; and in the remarks column, it is recorded “COV: DCL 407”. What I gather from this is that the claimant failed course DCL 407 since the marks he scored is 32 and so he had a carryover of the said course. The second table has 24/4/13 handwritten on it with the claimant listed as number 22. This second table is described in its heading as “Diploma in Law: Extra Semester Examination Results - March 2011”. 73. Under cross-examination, the 4th defendant’s witness reiterated that in terms of the first table, the claimant is listed as No. 11, with Exam No. 9650262. That under the remark column, one will see against the claimant’s name, the word “COV: DCL 407”, which signifies that the claimant did not graduate and has a carryover in Course DCL 407, and that DCL 407 is company law. In terms of the second table, the 4th defendant’s witness went on that the claimant is indicated as serial No. 22, Registration No. 9650262. He acknowledged that DCL 407 is not reflected in the second table. That what is reflected is DCL 142, and that Company Law is DCL 142. That the claimant wrote a carryover in DCL 142, which is the same as DCL 407. On being asked as to Course Codes changes in his University, the 4th defendant’s witness testified that in the University of Abuja, Course Codes change from time to time. That what does not change is the name of the courses, but that he does not know why DCL 407 changed to DCL 142. To him, it is the Faculty that changes course code; and that it is within the Faculty’s power to change Course Codes. When asked if he has any evidence before the Court to show that there was a change in Course Code, he answered that he does not have. He went on that he does not know if it is every year that the Course Code changes; and that he does not know if it was only DCL 407 that changed to DCL 142 or that all the Course Codes changed. Neither does he know the date or year DCL 407 changed to DCL 142. He reiterated paragraph 9 of his deposition wherein he deposed that the claimant sat for and passed the carryover course during the Extra Semester Examination sometime in 2011 by which time the code of the carryover course had been changed to DCL 142. He continued that he does not know whether it is the Senate, not the Faculty, that has the power to change course codes; and that it is not correct to say that DCL 407 is different from DCL 142. He even testified that he does not know if the claimant wrote the carryover alone or with other students. He proceeded to explain that an Extra Semester means the Semester in which students with carryover write the carryover exams. And that the claimant’s Diploma programme was a two year programme structured into 4 Semesters. Each semester takes a Course Code bearing the year or number of the semester e.g. 1st Semester course would start its code with 1; 2nd Semester, 2; 3rd Semester, 3; 4th Semester, 4; and so on. However, that as to how DCL 407 became DCL 142, it is not uncommon to have a 4th Semester course bearing figure starting with “1” e.g. DCL 142. He then pointed out that the two tables attached to Exhibit D9 have Course Codes, but not Course titles; and that there is no document before the Court that has Course titles, nor is there a document before the Court showing that DCL 407 and DCL 142 are both Company Law. In all of this a good deal does not just add up. 74. It is common knowledge that when it comes to academic matters it is the University Senate that has the final responsibility. For instance, the Statement of Result attached to Exhibit D5 has it that the Diploma in Law awarded therein was so awarded under the authority of Senate. It is the University Senate that approves new courses and so is the appropriate body to approve course codes changes. So why would the 4th defendant’ witness testify that it is the Faculty that does this when this is against the grain of common sense? Even when Course Codes are changed by the University, is this dome orally as to preclude any documentary evidence to that effect? How can the 4th defendant change Course DCL 407 to DCL 142 and there is no documentary evidence to authenticate the change? Course DCL 407 from its figure is a 4th Semester Course, hence the “4” in 407. Under what logic did it become Course DCL 142, supposedly a 1st Semester course given the “1” in 142? As far as evidence of the 4th defendant’s witness is concerned in this regard all is wishy-washy, not worthy of any probative value. If anything, it goes to show the tardiness of the 4th defendant, and how uncoordinated and disorganized it is, in its administration. 75. The claimant responded to the preliminary letter (query) of 9th November 2016 vide a letter dated 10th November 2016 - Exhibit C10(a), which can also be found at page 116 of Exhibit D10. The claimant’s response vide Exhibit C10(a) is thus: …I completed the programme of Diploma in Law in the year 1998, even though I had a carryover course in (DCL 407). Consequently sir, I sat and passed the carryover course in same year 1998. This led to the relevant authorities of the School to clear me for issuance of my statement of result that was subsequently issued to me in the year 2006. Respectfully attached are the clearance letter and the result. The clearance letter and the result attached are respectively Exhibits C2 and C3. I shall come to these exhibits shortly. 76. The 2nd and 3rd defendants were not satisfied with the claimant’s response and so they referred the matter to the FJSC, the 1st defendant. See the memo and its endorsements at page 113 of Exhibit D10. By a letter dated 24th January 2017 and addressed to the claimant, the 1st defendant intimated to the claimant that, after due consideration of the matter at its meeting held on 17th January 2017, it has decided in accordance with Regulation 213 of its Regulations to dismiss him with immediate effect for making a false declaration for the purpose of appointment. The claimant was accordingly and thereby dismissed with immediate effect for serious misconduct. In the copy to the CR, the 1st defendant also directed the CR that the claimant, in addition to being dismissed from service, should be reported to the Police for prosecution for making a false declaration for the purpose of appointment. See page 121 of Exhibit D10 for this said directive. This directive was complied with vide a letter to the Commissioner of Police Cross River State Command dated 31st January 2017. Aggrieved, the claimant accordingly filed this action praying for the reliefs he seeks. Like I pointed out earlier, I chose to give this narration and sequence of the facts of this case just so that I can show how messy the acts of the dramatis personae are. 77. I shall accordingly proceed to determining the validity or otherwise of the dismissal of the claimant by the 1st to 3rd defendants. The law is that an employer has the right to dismiss an employee, even if not specifically written in the contract of service. See Simon Ansambe v. Bank of the North Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 650 and Ziideeh v. RSCSC [2007] LPELR-3544(SC); [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554; [2007] 1 – 2 SC 1. Ziideel v. RSCSC went on to lay down that an employee who complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated has the onus to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment, and prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. The case continued that it is not the duty of the employer as a defendant to prove any of these facts. See also Morohunfolu v. Kwara Tech. [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 SC, Ningi v. FBN Plc [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt. 435) 220 CA, Katto v, CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 SC, Adams v. LSDPC [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 291 CA, Igbinovia v. UBTH [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 667) 53 CA, Taduggoronno v. Gotom [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 453 CA, Okoebor v. Police Council [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444 SC, Ibama v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364 SC, Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd v. Dudusola [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt. 957) 292 CA, WAEC v. Oshionebo [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 258 CA and UBN v. Chinyere [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 CA. The Supreme Court decision in Bukar Modu Aji v. Chad Basin Development Authority & anor [2015] LPELR-24562(SC), the judgment of which was delivered on 27th March 2015, is even more reinforcing in holding (per Peter-Odili, JSC who delivered the lead judgment) that waving the flag of a breach of the constitutional right to fair hearing does not provide any saving grace once the conditions of service are not pleaded and brought before the Court by a claimant who is complaining of wrongful termination of or dismissal from employment. In other words, the claimant must first plead and prove his conditions of service before any talk of breach of fair hearing can even be entertained. The conditions of service is accordingly a sine qua non in any claim for wrongful dismissal or termination; for only the conditions of service can be used to determine the wrongfulness or otherwise of the dismissal or termination. I must state here that aside from the letter of appointment with the offer of appointment dated 21st June 2010 (Exhibit C1), the claimant did not place before the Court the conditions of service under which he was employed by the 1st to 3rd defendants. 78. As enjoined by sections 131 to 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of proving a case lies on the party that would fail if no evidence were led at all on either side. Whoever alleges has the burden of proof; in the instant case, the claimant. See Okereocha v. Min. of Comm. and Tourism [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt. 693) 126 CA at 136, which held that the burden of proof of the invalidity of the dismissal was on the plaintiff and if no evidence was called by either side, judgment would be given against him; and Borishade v. NBN Ltd [2005] LPELR-11968(CA) and Mba Ede v. Okufo [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 SC. However, once an employer gives a reason for terminating or dismissing an employee, the burden lies with him to justify the said reason. See Angel Shipping & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 685) 551 CA, Institute of Health ABU Hospital Management Board v. Mrs Jummai R. I. Anyip [2011] LPELR-1517(SC), George Abomeli v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451, Ogunsanmi v. C. F. Furniture (W.A.) Co. Ltd [1961] 1 All NLR 224 and Mr. Kunle Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 360) 1480 SC at 1491; [2007] 1 – 2 SC 317. In relief (a), the claimant is seeking for a declaration that the letter of dismissal served on him by the 1st defendant dated 24th January 2017 is null and void and of no effect as the claimant did not make false declaration for the purpose of appointment. The burden of proving that his dismissal is null and void and of no effect, and the fact that he did not make a false declaration for the purpose of appointment, lies on the claimant. 79. In proof of his case, the contention of the claimant is that he stated clearly in his application that he possessed a Diploma in Law from the 4th defendant as evidenced by Exhibit C2, which to him is a confirmation of the fact that he had the requisite qualification. He relied on paragraph E of Exhibit C2 as signed by the Director on 14/06/06, which reads thus: FINAL CLEARANCE The above named student has completed his/her course and paid all his/her fees. He is therefore cleared for issuance of a Testimonial/ITF Letter/Statement of Result. To the claimant, the 4th defendant having issued Exhibit C2 had clearly affirmed that he, the claimant, had successfully completed his programme; and that it is only a successful student that is cleared and entitled to be issued a statement of result. Paragraph B of Exhibit C2, dealing with “Completion of Programme”, and as signed by the Course Coordinator on 13/6/06, however, provides thus: “I confirm that the student has completed his/her programme and is now awaiting result”. Now, it was on 28th October 2009 vide Exhibit D1 of that date that the claimant applied to the 2nd defendant for the post of Litigation Officer. In the second paragraph of this exhibit the claimant indicated thus: “I hold an Ordinary National Diploma in Law From the University of Abuja since 1998”; and in the fourth paragraph, he indicated thus: “Attached Sir is my curriculum vitae and Ordinary National Diploma testimonial letter…” The curriculum vitae (CV) of the claimant can be found at pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit D10. At the first page of the CV, under “Educational Qualification Obtained With Dates”, the claimant indicated that he has an OND acquired in 1998. In his response dated 10th November 2016 to the preliminary letter (query) dated 9th November 2016 (see page 116 of Exhibit D10), the claimant explained to the 2nd and 3rd defendants that he completed the programme of Diploma in Law in the year 1998 even though he had a carryover in course DCL 407; and that he sat and passed the carryover course in same year 1998. That this led the relevant authorities of the School to clear him for the issuance of his statement of result that was subsequently issued to him in 2006. The clearance he referred to is Exhibit C2. From all of this, it is not in doubt that the claimant applied for the post of Litigation Officer II, a GL 06 post, having represented himself as a holder of the Diploma in Law certificate. It is common knowledge that as a GL 06 post, the minimum educational requirement for direct occupation of the post is an Ordinary Diploma or its equivalent. Although the Scheme of Service indicating the qualification for the post of Litigation Officer II GL 06 was not tendered before the Court, the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 2 testified under cross-examination that for a Litigation Officer on GL 06, the requisite requirement is a Diploma in Law from an accredited Polytechnic, University or College. 80. Additionally, and like I indicated earlier, relying on paragraph E of Exhibit C2, the claimant categorically stated that he possesses a Diploma in Law. But is this the case? I need to point out here that in paragraph 3.05 of his final written address the claimant’s counsel submitted that the “claimant did not tell the 2nd and 3rd defendant that he had been issued the Diploma result from the 4th defendant”. Earlier, however, in paragraph 3.03 of same final written address, the claimant’s counsel indicated thus: “The claimant stated clearly in his application that he possessed a Diploma in Law from the 4th Defendant”. Is there any difference between these two statements? The two statements sound to me as double-speak. How can a person who says that he possesses a Diploma in Law from the 4th defendant turn around and say that he did not tell the 2nd and 3rd defendants that he had been issued with the Diploma result? What authenticates the Diploma certificate if not the Diploma results? It is the favourable results that yield to the certificate. So, when the claimant said he possessed a Diploma in Law, it can only mean that he passed his exams and was issued with a statement of results to that effect or the Diploma certificate itself. 81. The claimant’s counsel would even later in paragraph 6.02 of the final written address argue that paragraph 2 of the letter of the 4th defendant of 9th August 2016 attached to Exhibit D9, in stating that “This is to confirm that the Statement of Result, Diploma in Law, with a pass of 24th April, 2013, presented to you by Odama Raphael is authentic”, is a confirmation of Exhibit D1 (the application letter for the post of Litigation Officer II dated 28th October 2009), which reads in part that: “I hold an Ordinary National Diploma in Law from the University of Abuja in 1998”. I think that the claimant’s counsel is merely patronizing the claimant here. How can “the statement of result, Diploma in Law, with a pass of 24th April, 2013” be evidence of and confirms the possession of the said certificate in 1998? I really wonder. 82. The law is that a document is to be read holistically, and not in isolation. Alternatively put, it is a fundamental rule of construction of instruments (documents and agreements inclusive) that its several clauses must be interpreted harmoniously so that the various parts of the instrument are not brought in conflict to their natural meaning. The best construction of documents, therefore, is to make one part expound the other, and so make all the parts agree. Effect must, so far as possible be given to every word and every clause. See Agbareh & anor v. Mimra & ors [2008] LPELR-235(SC); [2008] NWLR (Pt.1071) 378 SC; [2008] 1 SC (Pt. III) 88 and Lamikoro Ojokolobo & ors v. Lapade Alamu & anor [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 377; [1987] 7 SCNJ 98. In the instant case, therefore, the claimant cannot rely on paragraph E of Exhibit C2 without regard to paragraph B, which is even more apt given that it deals with completion of programme and was signed by the Course Coordinator. When the Director signed in paragraph E to the effect that the claimant has completed his/her course and paid all his/her fees, as such he is “cleared for issuance of a Testimonial/ITF Letter/Statement of Result”, did it signify that the claimant had a statement of result? Certainly not! All it signified was that the claimant has nothing to answer to in terms of the departmental heads who signed each column i.e. Bursary, Library and the Director, who has the final signature as to the said clearance. The final clearance as per paragraph E is as to payment of fees and completion of course, not as to passing of the course. It is when the claimant is ascertained as not owing any sums or answerable as to anything pertaining to the school that if he passes his exams he can then be issued with the qualifying certificate. This is the only way paragraph B makes any meaning, which is that he completed the course and is now awaiting result. 83. By the New Oxford American Dictionary, the word “await” is a verb meaning to wait for. A person is said to await (wait for), say, an event or a proposal, as where prisoners are said to await ( i.e. wait for) trial. A circumstance could also await a person as where danger awaits a person. In all of these senses, the event or circumstance being awaited has not occurred. So a student said to be awaiting results means and can only mean that the results are yet to come out or be released (i.e. occur). In other words, a student is said to be awaiting result only when he/she has written an examination whose result is yet to be released. So as at 2006 when Exhibit C2 was issued, the claimant was awaiting result and so he cannot be said to have in his possession any Diploma in Law certificate as he claimed. I asked the claimant in open Court whether between 13/6/06 (when the Course Coordinator signed) and 14/06/06 (when the Director signed) Exhibit C2, it was possible that the claimant could have moved from being an awaiting result candidate to that of being a holder of a statement of result as he would want the Court to believe. I got no meaningful answer. The explanation of the claimant at page 116 of Exhibit D10 that he sat for the carryover he had in 1998 and passed is less than convincing given that no evidence beyond his mere words authenticating that fact was presented to the Court. If he took the carryover in 1998 and passed it, it is unlikely that it would take 8 years to issue him with Exhibit C2 (1998 to 2006 when Exhibit C2 was issued is 8 years). The more plausible fact is that no carryover was taken by the claimant in 1998. 84. I indicated earlier that once an employer gives a reason for dismissing an employee, the onus is on the employer to justify that reason. Accordingly, the case of the defendants is that the claimant misrepresented that he had a Diploma in Law certificate, which then led to his employment by the 3rd defendant. That the claimant was accordingly dismissed from the Federal Judicial Service for misleading the 3rd defendant to believing that he was awarded the Diploma in Law in 1998. This is the reason that the 1st to 3rd defendants gave in the letter dismissing the claimant. Before addressing this issue I need to clarify a submission made by the claimant. In support of his case, citing Federal University of Technology, Yola v. Danjuma Maiwuya [2013] All FWLR 753, the claimant had submitted that he was wrongly dismissed from the service of the 1st to the 3rd defendants and so is entitled to be reinstated. By this submission, I do not think that the claimant understands that the law regarding Nigerian labour relations is that a wrong dismissal entitles only damages, not reinstatement. To be entitled to reinstatement, the dismissal must be branded null and void. See BCC Plc v. Ager [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 292 SC, which held that there is a distinction between mere wrongful dismissal and an invalid or null dismissal. That where the Court makes a finding of wrongful dismissal, a payment in lieu of notice will apply; but where the finding is that the dismissal or termination was null and void, then there is no dismissal or termination as what the employer did was a nullity before the law. Accordingly, unless this Court makes a finding that the claimant’s dismissal is null and void, the question of reinstatement will not arise; a finding that the dismissal if wrongful is insufficient to grant the remedy of reinstatement prayed for by the claimant. 85. In all of this, did the claimant make any false declaration for the purpose of appointment? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the defendants would have justified the reason for dismissing the claimant as enjoined by law. In the letter dismissing the claimant, the 1st to 3rd defendants relied on Regulation 213 of the FJSC Regulations 2010 made pursuant to section 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution (Exhibit D2). Regulation 213 provides as follows: Any person who obtains appointment under or in pursuance of these Regulations by making (a) a false statement; (b) tendering false documents; or (c) concealing any material fact which, if disclosed, would militate against his being offered the appointment, may be liable to dismissal notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of these Regulations. 86. Regulation 213, which comes under Part XIV titled, “Miscellaneous”, is similar in words to Regulation 16(2)(v)A, B and C of the FJSC Regulations 2010, which comes under Part IV titled, “Appointments, Promotions and Transfers”, and more specifically under the subtitle, “Appointment”. Regulation 16(2)(ii) and (v)A, B and C relied upon by the 1st to 3rd defendants provides as follows: (2) To be eligible for appointment to the Federal Judicial Service, every applicants must: ………………………… (ii) possess such minimum qualifications as are specified from time to time. ………………………… ………………………… (v) Any person who obtains appointment under or in pursuance of these Regulations by: A. Making false statement; B. Tendering false documents; or C. Concealing any material fact which if disclosed, would militate against his being offered the appointment, may be liable to dismissal notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of these Regulations. 87. The 2nd and 3rd defendants further relied on Regulation 48 (iv, xxi, xviii and xxviiii) as per paragraph 3.8 of their written address. To start with, there is no regulation as Regulation 48(xxviiii) in the FJSC Regulations 2010 for the simple reason that there is no figure known as xxviiii in the Roman numerals. The argument of the 2nd and 3rd defendants here is that the acts of the claimant offend this Regulation. Regulation 48(1)(iv) and (xviii) provides thus: (1) Serious misconduct is defined as specific act of wrong-doing or improper behavior which is inimical to the image of the service and which can be investigated and if proven, may lead to dismissal. It includes: .………………… iv. absence from duty without leave; ………………… xviii. dishonesty; 88. I will take Regulations 213 and16(2)(ii) and (v)A, B and C together since they make the same provision i.e. obtaining appointment by false statement, false documents or concealment of any material fact. By the provision, the 1st to 3rd defendants have made it clear that a false statement, false document or the concealment of any material fact which yields in an appointment can be annulled. In other words, appointments are hinged on full disclose of all material facts and valid documents prior to employment; and any failure is inimical to the appointment that ensues. In this sense, Oronsaye v. ECN [1969] NSCC (Vol. 6) 128, which held that where there is no fiduciary relationship between the employee and employer, the employee is not under any duty to disclose any facts which would render him ineligible for employment, and that the disclosure of such facts only when accepting the employer’s offer of employment cannot affect the validity of the contract of employment, is inapplicable in the instant case given that the disclosure of facts is made a sine qua non for employment in the FJSC. It is not in doubt that the claimant categorically claimed to have possessed the Diploma in Law certificate, the qualification needed to be appointed Litigation Officer II GL 06 since 1998. I have already discountenanced the attempts to explain this away by the claimant; and this remains so despite the unrealistic and lame explanations of the 4th defendant as to it was only in 2013 that the claimant could secure the said Diploma in Law certificate. Having held out to be in possession of the Diploma in Law certificate since 1998, and upon which the claimant was employed, the argument of the claimant that he did not mislead since he disclosed Exhibit C2 is also untenable given that I have already debunked the fallacy of Exhibit C2 being regarding as evidence of having passed the Diploma in Law examination necessitating thereby for the award of the Diploma in Law certificate. It remains plain, therefore, that it was misleading for the claimant to hold out himself to be in possession of a Diploma in Law certificate in 1998 when in fact and in law he had none. When he was offered employment in 2010, he had no Diploma in Law certificate and so could not have rightly occupied the post of Litigation Officer II GL 06. I so find and hold. 89. I acknowledge a measure of carelessness and hence blameworthiness of the 2nd and 3rd defendants here in not appreciating from the outset that Exhibit C2 is not and cannot be evidence of passing an examination, talk more of it being evidence of a statement of result as to the possession of a Diploma in Law certificate; and that the claimant’s employment was confirmed within the period his salary was stopped as testified to under cross-examination by the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 1; and that the claimant was employed simply on the strength of a letter from Senator Ngagi addressed to the Hon. President of the NICN (not taking any step to find out if the certificate the claimant claims he has actually exist) as testified to under cross-examination by the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ witness 2 who would even acknowledge (still under cross-examination) that the requisite requirement for the post of Litigation Officer II GL 06 does not include recommendations from Senator. I also acknowledge the magnanimity of the 2nd and 3rd defendants in, despite all the noticeable flaws, confirming and even promoting the claimant, and giving him the opportunity to remedy the situation, a magnanimity which, but for the incessant calls by the claimant for payment of arrears of salary, may have worked as to make the instant case not see the light of day. The truth of the matter is that it is a fundamental requirement that goes to the root of the employment of the claimant that he MUST possess the requisite qualification to occupy the post he was employed. This requirement cannot be waived or condoned, and is not even something that is time bound or barred. Whoever is employed based on false qualification, no matter how long it takes to discover that fact, is liable to be laid off. The claimant’s case was not one of condonation; and even it was, it is inapplicable in the instant case since what is in issue is possession of the requisite qualification at the time of being employed. In the instant case, the claimant did not possess the requisite qualification to be appointed a Litigation Officer II GL 06 and so is liable to be laid off as soon as that fact was discovered. I accordingly hold that the dismissal of the claimant under Regulations 213 and16(2)(ii) and (v)A, B and C of the FJSC Regulations 2010 is in order. 90. The argument of the 2nd and 3rd defendants that the conduct of the claimant amounted to serious misconduct as to come within the definition of that term under Regulation 48(1)(iv) and (xviii) of the FJSC Regulations 2010 must be taken with a pinch of salt. The issue of the claimant being absent from duty without leave is not all together without the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s fault. They stopped the claimant’s salary and gave him the leeway to remedy the anomaly of not having a qualifying certificate for the post he occupied. The 2nd and 3rd defendants do not expect that after this, the claimant would still come to work. In not collecting a salary and in pursuing to sort out the issue of his lack of Diploma in Law certificate, how did the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s expect that the claimant would come to work? I do not think the argument of the 2nd and 3rd defendants in that regard are sustainable; and I so find and hold. Was the claimant dishonest in all his actions? I do not think so. Naive? Yes! Careless? Yes! But certainly not dishonest! 91. In holding that the dismissal of the claimant is in order, the claims for reinstatement and payment of salaries are just not sustainable as they lack any basis. This being the case, the claims of the claimant against the 1st to 3rd defendants in terms of his dismissal and non-payment of salaries all fail and are hereby dismissed. This leaves out his claim against the 4th defendant for damages for wrongful information supplied by the 4th defendant, which wrongful information led to his dismissal by the 1st to 3rd defendants. The main plank of the 4th defendant’s argument against the claim against it by the claimant is that there are no sustainable pleadings by the claimant to support the said claim of the claimant i.e. the pleadings do not even disclose any viable cause of action against it; and that the evidence of the claimant is at variance with his pleadings. In narrating the sequence of the facts of this case, I showed the ignoble conduct of the 4th defendant and the unreliability of the evidence of its witness in this case. Despite all of this, did the claimant make out any case against the 4th defendant? To answer this question, it needs to be ascertained what is even the case of the claimant against the 4th defendant. Before this, however, I need to resolve the issue of the evidential/probative value of Exhibit C13, termed by the claimant to be the report of a Visitation Panel into the affairs of the 4th defendant. 92. Exhibit C13 is a copy of The Punch Newspaper of 19th March 2013. At page 43 is the caption: “Rot in UniAbuja: Waiting for Jonathan’s action as culprits walk freely”. Like I indicated, the claimant described this publication as the report of a Visitation Panel into the affairs of the 4th defendant. The claimant relied heavily on this publication in its claim against the 4th defendant. I agree with the 4th defendant’s submission that Exhibit C13 cannot serve the purpose ascribed to it by the claimant. Despite that it was admitted, it has no evidential or probative value. In Abegunde v. The Ondo State House of Assembly & ors [2014] LPELR-23683(CA), following RNHW v. SAMA [1991] 12 NWLR (Pt. 171) 64 at 77, Olly v. Tunji [2012] All FWLR (Pt. 654) 39 at 67 and Ojukwu v. Yar'Adua [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 482) 1065 SC, it was held that the law is well settled that newspaper report is hearsay evidence and so irrelevant and inadmissible in proof of whatever is reported there; and that newspaper publications are only proof that the publication was made and not proof of the truth of the contents of the said publication. This being the case, Exhibit C13 has no evidential value and so is hereby discountenanced. 93. What is the case of the claimant against the 4th defendant? The claimant has only one relief against the 4th defendant, which is relief (h), namely: “An order of the Honourable Court directing the 4th defendant to pay the sum of N100,000,000 (One Hundred Million Naira) as damages to the claimant for the hardship, embarrassment, emotional trauma and cost incurred as result of his dismissal from the employment of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants on the wrongful information supplied to them by the 4th defendant”. By this relief, the case of the claimant against the 4th defendant is that because the 4th defendant supplied the 1st to 3rd defendants wrongful information, he was dismissed by the said defendants. The wrong complained of by the claimant is the wrong of supplying wrongful information, as a result of which he suffered dismissal and the attendant “hardship, embarrassment, emotional trauma and cost incurred”. The wrong of supplying wrongful information approximates to that of negligent misstatement in the tort of negligence. Now, in First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Sunday Y. Olaleye [2012] LPELR-20096(CA), relying on Agbomagbe Bank Ltd v. CFAO [1966] 1 SCNLR 367, it was held that negligence is a question of fact, and any party therefore claiming it must plead in the statement of claim the special facts relied on. The pleadings in the statement of facts relating to the 4th defendant are paragraphs 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. In terms of his claim against the 4th defendant, the relevant paragraphs are 16, 17, 20 and 22 to 27. 94. In paragraph 16, the claimant pleaded that he actually completed his Diploma programme from the 4th defendant in 1998 and was duly cleared in 2006 for the issuance of his statement of result; and in paragraph 17, he pleaded that if he had a carryover as claimed he wouldn’t have been cleared in 2006 and issued a clearance to collect his statement of result by the defendant. I have already shown the fallacy of the claimant’s assumption in-built in these pleadings that he had a Diploma as at 1998. It is illogical of the claimant to even be claiming that he had a Diploma in 1998 and yet was at the same time being cleared in 2006 to collect his statement of result. In paragraphs 19 and 20, he pleaded the preliminary letter (query) issued to him and his response to it. Once again, I have dealt in greater details on the issues these letters raised, the thrust of which is that he was asked to explain how come he said he has a Diploma of 1998 and yet was presenting a statement of result to that effect of 2013. His explanation has also been dealt with to the extent that it was based on his own erroneous interpretation and true import of Exhibit C2. 95. What can be said to be directly relevant and related to the claimant’s claim against the 4th defendant in terms of the wrong of giving wrongful information are paragraphs 22 - 27. In these paragraphs, the claimant pleaded thus: the tables forwarded by the 4th defendant claiming that he wrote a carryover does not represent the true record of the claimant as Course 407 is not reflected against his name; the 4th defendant did not reply to the letter his solicitor wrote to it; he suffered psychological trauma, embarrassment and financial hardship as a result of the misinformation given by the 4th defendant to the 1st to 3rd defendants which led to his dismissal; his name and character have been assassinated and maligned by his wrongful dismissal; the 4th defendant has a history of maladministration and poor record keeping which has led to a lot of hardship on the side of its students as evidenced by Exhibit C13; and he can hardly feed himself. Are these pleadings sufficient to sustain the claim of the claimant against the 4th defendant? I do not think so. 96. I have already discountenanced Exhibit C13, a major plank upon which the claimant rests his case, as evidence that has no probative value. In any event the pleading in its regard (paragraph 26) talked of the 4th defendant having a history of maladministration and poor record keeping which has led to a lot of hardship on the side of its students. There is no particularization of the hardship on the side of the claimant. In other words, the pleading is merely general and says nothing about the claimant himself. Exhibit C12 is the letter the claimant’s counsel wrote to the 4th defendant, which the claimant pleaded was not replied to by the 4th defendant. At the second page of Exhibit C12, the claimant’s counsel talked of the National Judicial Service Commission. There is no such body known. What is known is the National Judicial Council (NJC), not a party in this case, and the FJSC, the 1st defendant in this case. The claimant’s counsel then opined that “a final Letter of Clearance cannot be issued to a graduating student unless and until such a student has passed all the required courses to obtain the certificate of study. This is more because the institution has all the records of a student to be able to provide same whenever the need arises”. Here again, I must reiterate that the claimant’s counsel wrongly assumed that a final letter of clearance indicates that a student passed his exams and so is evidence of that fact. More importantly, however, is the question whether the non-reply by the 4th defendant to Exhibit C12 can ground a claim for giving wrongful information. I do not think so. 97. Save for British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 276, which held that where the wrongful termination of employment is a result of an alleged malpractice which carries with it some stigma on the character of the employee, in which case the employee shall be entitled to substantial damages far beyond the payment of salary in lieu of notice, thus making the fact of an employee’s character to be relevant for purposes of assessing the (quantum of) damages awardable, the pleading of the claimant in the instant case as to his name and character being assassinated and maligned by his wrongful dismissal meets a brick wall here for purposes of determining liability of (and attaching it to) the 4th defendant. See, for instance: (a) Agbo v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 379 CA, which held that an employee cannot rely on wrongful termination of appointment as cause of action to clear his name for the future, among other purposes - his recourse in an appropriate case may be in an action for defamation; (b) Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 42) 514, which held that no compensation can be claimed in respect of injury done to the employee’s feelings by his dismissal nor in respect of difficulty in finding an alternative work; (c) Katto v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 SC, which held that where employment is determined in circumstances which may bring the employee into hatred, contempt or ridicule, but the employer had not used and published any defamatory words against the employee in terminating his employment, the employer cannot be held liable in defamation; and (d) Onwuneme v. ACB Plc [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 513) 150 CA, which held that damages for injury to reputation arising from wrongful dismissal are irrecoverable unless the injury results in a pecuniary loss. 98. The claimant had argued that the 4th defendant’s witness in cross-examination could not explain to the Court the reason for the 4th defendant’s silence in offering explanation to the 2nd defendant’s enquiry as to the reason for the delay in the release of the result of the claimant. To the claimant then, silence in law means consent to the fact that the delay was caused by the 4th defendant for no fault of the claimant. Aside from not substantiating this proposition of law with any authority, it is a principle that must be applied cautiously as not all circumstances or contexts admit of it. At least silence is never held to amount to acceptance of a counter-offer in the law of contract. See Achoru v. Decagon Investment Ltd & anor [2014] LPELR-24143(CA). And silence is not an admission of guilt under criminal law. See Egboma v. State [2013] LPELR-21358(CA). Additionally, Adecentro (Nig) ltd v. OAU [2005] 5 SC (Pt. I) 13 at 18 held that the silence of an architect to a request for extension of time did not amount to an approval of the request. However, I acknowledge that silence may not be golden. See Oceanic Bank International Plc (Formerly Oceanic Bank International (Nig) Limited) v. Broken Agro Allied Industries Limited [2008] LPELR-4671(CA). So, at the other end of the divide wold be found contrasting case law authorities. Even at that, the context must be noted; after all in law context is everything. See R v. Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; [2001] 1 AC 532; [2001] 2 WLR 1622; [2001] UKHL 26. Thus even when Agnes Emecheta v. A.U. Ogueri & anor [1997] LPELR-6249(CA), referring to Iga v. Amakiri [1976] 11 SC 1 at 12, held that the maxim of the Law is “silence means consent” this was in the context of the appellant being asked a question in the witness box and she remaining silent on the question. In like manner, Maradun v. Tambuwal [2015] LPELR-24443(CA) on its part held that the silence of the defendant on the letter of the plaintiff's lawyer leads to presumption of admission of its contents by conduct by the defendant, the conduct being the presence of an affidavit to disclose intention to defend action on merits coupled with various documents signed by the defendant and exhibited to the plaintiff's affidavit. And In-Time Connection Limited v. Ichie [2009] LPELR-8772(CA) held that where a creditor writes a demand letter which the supposed debtor fails to react to the silence of the latter leads to presumption of admission by conduct. 99. In earlier addressing the issue of Exhibit D9 and its attachments I noted that if the 4th defendant had explained the reason for the delay in the issuance of the Statement of Result and ascertained whether the claimant actually graduated with Ordinary Diploma since 1998, all of the issues that led to the filing of this case may not have arisen at all; and that in keeping mute on this vital question posed to it, the 4th defendant escalated the problem at hand yielding to the conclusion that it actually had something to hide in all of the mess so created. I concluded that in this wise, the 4th defendant is not without blame despite the pontification in its submissions. But is this sufficient to found an action as to hold the defendant liable in the circumstances of this case? I do not think so for the logical reason that the claimant’s case against the 4th defendant, like I pointed out earlier, is one of supplying wrongful information, not one of keeping mute. 100. So once liability cannot attach to the 4th defendant as I presently hold, the questions of the claimant suffering psychological trauma, embarrassment and financial hardship and not being able to feed himself do not thereby arise, nor do they become actionable as per the claimant’s pleadings. I am accordingly in agreement with the 4th defendant that the claimant’s pleadings cannot sustain his claim against it. I so find and hold. The law is that pleadings cannot constitute evidence; as averments in pleadings on which no evidence is adduced are deemed to have been abandoned for mere averments without proof of facts pleadings do not constitute proof of such facts unless such facts are admitted. See Ifeta v. SPDC [2006] LPELR-1436(SC); [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585. The converse is also true. Evidence given which is not in line with the facts pleaded goes to no issue and so is of no help to the party that produces it. See The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Kwameh Ambah [1999] LPELR-3202(SC); [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 1; [1999] 2 SC 129. The claim against the 4th defendant is accordingly dismissed. On the whole, therefore, the claims of the claimant against all the defendants fail and so are dismissed. This leaves out the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ counterclaim, to which I now turn. 101. The 2nd and 3rd defendants counterclaimed against the claimant for two reliefs. Counterclaim (1) is for a declaration that the employment of the claimant into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants is invalid, irregular, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. This relief approximates to the defence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants to the main claims of the claimant as to the validity of his dismissal. So in holding that the dismissal of the claimant is in order and his claims in that regard dismissed, it is needless to go into the merit of counterclaim (1). I shall accordingly discountenance it; and I so do. 102. Counterclaim (2) is for the refund of all salaries, allowances, remuneration and any payment made and received by the claimant from 12th April 2010 accounting and/or representing the period when the claimant was erroneously employed under the false belief and representation that he had the requisite qualification for gaining employment into the service of the 2nd and 3rd defendants when he knew that he had not completed his course of study thereby making the 2nd and 3rd defendants to incur financial losses and expenses in payment of salaries and allowances for the period he deceitfully held office. The 2nd and 3rd defendants argued here that the claimant did not file any reply by way of a defence to the counterclaim and so should be deemed to have admitted same. This may be so, but NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC) enjoins that to succeed in a claim for special damages it must be claimed specially and proved strictly; and that the fact that it appears to be admitted does not relieve the party claiming it of the requirement of proof with compelling evidence. Counterclaim (2) is for refund of salaries; as such it is a claim for special damages. In proof, therefore, the 2nd and 3rd defendants relied on Exhibit D12 dated 21st June 2017 and titled, “Re: salary Details of Mr Odama Raphael 2010 - 2016”. Attached to Exhibit D12 is the payroll entries of the salaries paid to the claimant all through his employment with the 1st to 3rd defendants, the total of which came to Two Million, Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand, Nine Hundred and Thirteen Naira, Ninety Kobo (N2,450,913.90) only. This is the sum the 2nd and 3rd defendants want refunded by the claimant. 103. Now a counterclaim is separate action which must be proved in its own right. See Maobison Inter-Link Associated Ltd v. UTC Nigeria Plc [2013] LPELR-20335(SC) and Ogiren v. Olufunmilayo & ors [2015] LPELR-24295(CA). Counterclaim (2), like I indicated earlier, is a claim for special damages. Being special damages, a claimant must first show an entitlement to it before showing how he arrived at the quantum. See Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39. To start with, therefore, Regulation 213 of the FJSC Regulations 2010 under which the claimant was dismissed has as its side note, “Penalty for making false statement, etc”. Regulation 213 accordingly imposes the penalty for making false statement. It says nothing about a refund of salaries as part of the punishment or penalty. As it is, therefore, the 2nd and 3rd defendants have not shown an entitlement to the refund of salaries in terms of its Regulations (Exhibit D2). I so find and hold. 104. In the second place, I acknowledged earlier a measure of carelessness and hence blameworthiness of the 2nd and 3rd defendants in terms of the facts of this case; and I also noted that it is curious that the 2nd and 3rd defendants did not see anything fraudulent about the acts of the claimant (he was even given time by the 2nd and 3rd defendants to cure the defects noticeable in the issue of his Diploma in Law certificate, aside from even being confirmed and promoted in the meantime). It took the appeal of the claimant to His Lordship Hon. Justice W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) for the 2nd and 3rd defendants to wake up to their responsibilities. How can the 2nd and 3rd defendants be this blameworthy and yet be counterclaiming for refund of salaries they themselves paid to the claimant? 105. The 2nd and 3rd defendants relied on the twin unreported decisions of the Supreme Court in Isah Shuaibu Lau v. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) & 3 ors Suit No SC. 583/2016 delivered on Friday 23rd June 2017 and Hon. (Mrs.) Dorothy Mato v. Hon. Lorwase Herman Hember & 2 ors Suit No SC. 733/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on Friday 2nd June 2017. The certified true copies (CTC) of these judgments were not made available to the Court as enjoined by Order 45 Rule 3(1) of the NICN Rules 2017. Order 45 Rule 3(1) provides thus: “…Where any unreported judgment is relied upon, the Certified True Copy shall be submitted along with the written Address”. And by Rule 3(2), “failure to comply with rules 2 and 3(1) of this Order may render the written Address incompetent”. Since the CTC of these unreported decisions were not made available to the Court, I am not in a position to determine the circumstances in which the order for refund of all payments and remunerations was said by the 2nd and 3rd defendants to have been made by the Supreme Court. As it is, therefore, the 2nd and 3rd defendants have not satisfactorily made out the case for counterclaim (2). It fails and is hereby dismissed. 106. On the whole, and for the avoidance of doubt, the claimant’s case against all the defendants fails and is hereby dismissed. The 2nd and 3rd defendant’s counterclaim (1) is discountenanced given that it approximates to their defence of the claimant’s claims, which in any event fails and have been dismissed. Counterclaim (2) of the 2nd and 3rd defendants fails and is dismissed. 107. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD