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1. By a complaint dated and filed on 10th March 2016, the claimants prayed for: (a) A declaration that the planned merger of the jobs of tally Clerks (a unit of dock Labour) and Cargo Surveyors by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority and the use of Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers and maritime labour to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally Clerks by the 1st defendant is a fundamental breach of section 27 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act 2007 and is therefore illegal, unlawful, ultra vires and of no effect whatsoever. (b) A declaration that the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks and onboard Security men (a unit of dock labour) from the Nigerian Ports by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority and consequent termination/loss of employment and future employment of the claimants who work as tally clerks and onboard Security men in the Nigerian Ports amounts to an implied revocation of the claimants permit to work as dock workers in the Ports and constitute a violent breach of section 27 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act 2007 and is therefore illegal, unlawful, ultra vires and of no effect whatsoever. (c) A declaration that the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks (a unit of dock labour) by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority and the Nigerian Port Authority’s use of Cargo surveyors to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to tally clarks on the ground of Cargo surveyors use of advanced technology without providing the claimants with another permanent or regular employment and means of income amount to an unfair labour practice and conflict with international best practices in labour and international labour standard prescribed by the International Labour Organisation under Dock Work Convention, 1973 (No. 137). (d) A declaration that the claimants consequent loss of employment and future employment opportunities as tally clerks and onboard security due to the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks and onboard Security Men (a unit of dock labour) without providing the claimants with an alternative permanent or regular employment and means of income amount to an unfair labour practice and conflict with international best practices in labour and international labour standard prescribed by the International Labour Organisation in Dock Work Convention, 1973 (No. 137). (e) An order of injunction restraining the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority from abolishing the functions of Tally Clerks and Onboard Security men until the claimants are provided with permanent or regular employment and means of income. (f) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority from using Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers and maritime labour to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally Clerks. (g) An order mandating the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority to continue to provide jobs for the claimants and remunerate them through Stevedoring Companies (Service providers) as Nigerian Ports Authority has hitherto been doing before 15th December, 2015. Alternatively An order mandating the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority to provide jobs for the claimants as tally clerks and onboard Security men and remunerate them. 2. The reaction of the defendants is to each file a preliminary objection, to which all the claimants responded. No defendant filed any reply on points of law to the claimants’ response. THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 3. The 1st defendant hinged his preliminary objection on the following grounds: (a) The action of the claimants as formulated against the 1st defendant is incompetent. (b) The claimants never issued or served on the 1st defendant a Pre-Action Notice before the commencement of this action. (c) The claimants have no locus standi to entertain the action against the 1st defendant. (d) The action of the claimants as formulated against the 1st defendant/applicant is statute-barred and offends section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 LFN 2004. (e) This Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this action against the 1st defendant. 4. To the 1st defendant, his application is brought pursuant to section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, which is hinged on the right to fair hearing and fulcrum of any litigation. The 1st defendant proceeded to argue collectively the grounds of his objection. First, the 1st defendant submitted that the action of the claimants against the 1st defendant/applicant is statute-barred and offends section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 LFN 2004, which limits the period to file on action against a public officer to “within three months” of the accrual of the cause of action. The section reads thus: 2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any Act or law or any Public duty or authority, or in respect of any allegation, neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority; the following provisions shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution, or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing therefore. It is submission of the 1st defendant that by paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the statement of facts the cause of action which finally gave rise to reliefs sought by the claimants arose sometime in 2010, when the issue of merging of the functions of Tally Clerks and On Board Security Men (a unit of dock labour) come up. That though the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria fought against it, which made Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) to set up a Committee to resolve the issue and other disputes between the union and NPA, however, the claimants decided to commence this action on 10th March 2016, about 6 (six) years from the date the cause of action arose. 5. Furthermore, that when an action is statute-barred, as the present case against the 1st defendant, 4 (four) things have happened to the claimants and their case, namely: the claimants have lost the right of action; the claimants have lost the right of enforcement; the claimants have irrelevantly lost the right to judicial reliefs; and the claimants have an empty cause of action which no Court will assist them to enforce, citing Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 - 4 Ratio 10. 6. On accrual of a cause of action, the 1st defendant referred to Woheren v. Emeruwa [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 at 402, which held that: A cause of action matures or arises on a date or from the time when a breach of any duly or act occurs which warrants the person thereby injured or victim who is adversely affected by such breach to take a court action in assertion or protection of his legal right that has been breached. The duration of a right or cause of action which is conferred on an injured party is necessarily limited and does not last till eternity. It lapses after the date the statute of limitation claims that no such legal action or proceeding lawfully be taken nor commenced by an injured party. The 1st defendant then submitted that in the instant case it would be absolutely wrong to assume that the cause of action arose on 15th December 2015; rather, it was on this date that the contract of service between the stevedoring companies, NPA and the claimants expired without option of renewal having run for 5 (five) years. That section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act 2004 provides as one of the conditions that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer or person acting in the execution of public duties. From this premise, that the 1st defendant without any equivocation is a public officer, citing LAUTECH v. Ogunwobi [2006] 4 NWLR (Pt. 971) 569 at 577. That the 1st defendant as an agent of the Federal Government and a public officer is fully protected by the Public Officers (Protection) Act against any legal proceedings by the plaintiffs, wherein the reliefs sought are against the execution of any law, public duty or authority, or in respect of an alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such low duty or authority and such cause of action (as this present one) is instituted outside the statutory period allowed by such law. 7. The 1st defendant went on that the claimants have no locus standi to institute this action against the 1st defendant, citing Onuekwusi v, The Registered Trustees of Christ Methodist Zuon Church [2011] Vol. 198 LRCN 140 at 143 and 146, where the Supreme Court held that for an action to be clothed with competence, the following criteria must among others be complied with: existence or accrual of a cause of action; and locus standi of the party suing. To the 1st defendant, the action of the claimants is based on the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks (a unit of dock labour) by the 1st defendant and the NPA and the NPA’s use of Cargo Surveyors to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to tally clerks on the ground of Cargo Surveyors’ use of advanced technology without providing the claimants with another permanent or regular employment and means of income. On this premise, that there are no established facts before the Court to adjudicate on, rather the Court has been asked or called upon by the claimants to speculate on possibilities not supported by evidence, citing Agharuka v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 482, where the Court of Appeal held that the Courts of law cannot he asked to speculate on possibilities, which are wholly unsupported by evidence. 8. The 1st defendant further submitted that the claimants neither issued nor served any pre-action notice on the 1st defendant before the commencement of this action. That this is a pre-condition which had not been satisfied by the claimants. That this neglect or omission on the part of the claimants goes to the root of their action. That this defect invariably raises the issue of jurisdiction which has not been waived by the 1st defendant. In conclusion, the 1st defendant referred to Gafa v. Govt. Kwara State [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1024) 375 SC at 384 on the issue of jurisdiction, and then urged the Court to dismiss this action. THE RESPONSE OF THE CLAIMANTS TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 9. On the issue of whether the present suit is statute-barred against the 1st defendant, the claimants urged the Court to place reliance on the statement of facts as pleaded in order to discover when the wrong was committed, referring to Gbadehan v. Kiladejo [2012] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1326) 392 CA at 417. That it is. therefore, the complaint and the statement of facts filed by the claimants in this suit that would be considered by this Court in determining when the cause of action in this suit accrued. As to the definition of cause of action, the 1st defendant referred to BEDC Plc v. Esealuka [2015] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1444) 411 CA at 435, where it was defined to mean a combination of facts and circumstances giving rise to the right to file a claim for a remedy in Court. That a look at the claimants’ statement of facts reveals that the combination of facts that gave rise to the claimants’ right to file this case are as follows: a) The claimants are daily wage earners who earn same by working as Tally clerks and onboard security-men in the Nigerian Seaports. b) The 3rd defendant decided to merge the functions of tally clerks and on-board security with that of cargo surveyors because of cargo surveyors use of more advanced technology. c) That following this decision, when the contract of between the 3rd defendant and the Stevedoring companies which it used to engage the services of the claimants expired on 15th December 2015, the 3rd defendant failed. d) That the 3rd defendant is currently making use of Cargo surveyors on a daily basis to do the functions hitherto carried out by the claimants who were hitherto engaged to do same on a daily basis, thereby occasioning lost of job and income to the claimants who were daily wage earners by doing those jobs. e) That the claimants have not been provided alternative employment or means of income by the 1st and 3rd defendants before carrying out this decision as required by international labour standards. f) That the cargo surveyors currently being used on daily basis to do the duties of tally clerks and on-board security men which are dock work are not registered dock workers which contravenes the NIMASA Act, referring the Court to paragraphs 9, l0, 12, 14. 18 and 19 of the statement of facts. To the claimants, the cause of action in this suit as enumerated above is not statute-barred as the wrong/damage or injury caused to the claimants is a continuing one. 10. Furthermore, referring to AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 132 - 133 ratio 9 particularly at 148 - 150 and NIMASA v. Hensmor (Nig.) Ltd [2015] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 278 CA at 358, the claimants submitted that section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act Cap P41 LFN 2004 relied on by the 1st defendant admits of two exceptions, to wit: a) In cases of continuance of injury or damage, the Act permits action to be brought upon the cessation thereof outside three months. b) The Act also does not cover a public officer who acted ultra vires or outside the colour of his office. That in the present case, the claimants have stated in their statement of facts that they are daily wage earners who earn their wages by working as tally clerks and on-board security on a daily basis at the Nigerian seaports and the current use of cargo surveyors to do their jobs on a daily basis by the 3rd defendant is causing them loss of job and depriving them of income on a daily basis. This injury has not ceased and is as such a continuing injury/damage and clearly falls within the exception to the Public Officers (Protection) Act. 11. To the claimants the argument conversed by the 1st defendant’s counsel that the cause of action in this suit arose in 2010 is most laughable. That as can be seen from the statement of facts, though the issue of merger of the job functions of tally clerks and on-board security first came up in 2010, the cause of action did not arise at that time and no right of action accrued to the claimants as the decision was not implemented; the claimants continued to carry on their jobs as tally clerks and on-board security at the Nigerian Seaports on a daily basis and continued to earn their daily income until the expiration of the Stevedoring companies Contract in December 2015. That the claimants averred in their statement of facts that they were informed by the 1st defendant through their trade union on 24th February 2016 that the contract which engaged their services can no longer be renewed because the 3rd defendant no longer require their services. That assuming without conceding that the injury to the claimants is not a continuing one, the cause of action in this suit would at best be said to have accrued on 24th February 2016 when the claimants were informed that their jobs can no longer continue because the contracts of the Stevedore companies will no longer be renewed, referring to Muomah v. Spring Bank Plc [2009] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1129) 553 at 557 ratio 3 particularly at 570, 572, 575 and 558 ratio 5 particularly at 571 - 572, where the Court of Appeal held the cause of action to have accrued on 1st April 2003 when the respondent communicated the result of its investigation to the appellant and delivered liability to the appellant. That this case is similar in material respects to the instant case; and a cause of action can only accrue to the claimants when they were informed through their trade union that their services are no longer required by the 3rd defendant and as such there is a decision not to renew the contracts of the stevedore companies which engaged their services, which took place on 24th February 2016. That the length of time between the said 24th February 2016 and 10th March 2016 when this suit was commenced is clearly less than three months and as such the present suit is not caught by the Public Officers Protection Act, urging the Court to so hold. 12. As to whether there is a requirement to serve pre-action on the 1st defendant. the claimants submitted that service of pre-action notice on a party intended to be sued is a procedural requirement often made pursuant to a statute. Hence, that where it is not prescribed by statute, a claimant is not obliged to give same before commencing an action against a defendant be it a public officer or not, refer Duerueburuo v. Nwanebo [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 690) 287 CA at 289 and 295. That the 1st defendant has not shown any statute requiring service of pre-action notice on the 1st defendant and none exist. That being the case, that the issue of service or non-service of pre-action notice on the 1st defendant does not arise, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance the objection of the 1st defendant on this ground. 13. As for whether the claimants have locus standi to maintain this suit against the 1st defendant, the claimants submitted that it is an established law that that locus standi connotes the legal capacity to commence an action in a court of law and that for a plaintiff to have locus standi, he must show that he has a special right or interest in the performance of a duty sought to be enforced or that his interest is or will be adversely affected, referring the Court to National Hospital, Abuja v. National Commission for Colleges of Education [2014] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 309 at 312. That the claimants who have lost their jobs and means of income as a result of the 1st and 2nd defendant’s act of replacing them with cargo surveyors without taking them into consideration and providing them alternative means of income and which act has caused actual injury to the claimants clearly have locus standi to bring this suit, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance the objection of the 1st defendant on this ground. THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 2ND DEFENDANT 14. The 2nd defendant’s preliminary objection is founded on the twin grounds of the claimants’ action as constituted being incompetent, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the claimants’ suit. The 2nd defendant is accordingly urging the Court to strike out this suit for want of jurisdiction. To the 2nd defendant, the claimants are dockworkers employed by 12 Stevedoring companies under a contract of service provision for Nigerian Ports Authority and these companies were instructed to serve as the claimants’ employers. The contract between the Nigerian Ports Authority and Stevedoring companies expired on 15th December 2015, and the former is not desirous of renewing the said contract. Consequently, the claimants instituted this suit against the defendants for the planned decision of the Nigerian Ports Authority not to renew the said contract. The 2nd defendant submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether this Court can exercise jurisdiction over this suit, the subject matter being speculative. 15. To the 2nd defendant, it is trite that Courts of laws are courts of facts and laws. They decide issues on facts established before them and on laws, citing Agip (Nigeria) Ltd v. Agip Petroli International [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) at 413. That the reliefs of the claimants in the instant suit are all speculative in nature and liable to be struck out. That the claims of the claimants are based upon the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks (a unit of dock labour) by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority. That a clear perusal of the above claims of the claimant will reveal that the bulk of their claims are based upon speculative events which have not fully taken root to amount to an established fact as encapsulated in Agip (Nigeria) Ltd v. Agip Petroli International (supra). That the claims in their totality amount to speculations since the work of the tally clerks is still intact, calling upon the Court to venture into the task of making a declaration that planned abolition of their employments is unlawful which amounts to speculation and goes contrary to the powers vested on this Court. Furthermore, that the claimants have not showed this Court with all certainty that their jobs as tally workers with Nigerian Ports Authority have been terminated or in the process of being terminated; all they have presented before this Courts are all speculations as discernible from Agharuka v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 482. The 2nd defendant then submitted that the claims of the claimants are all speculative and cannot be entertained by this Court since a court of law cannot be called upon to dwell on possibilities that has not materialized for such will amount to chasing the wind, using the Court to dismiss this suit for being frivolous and speculative. THE RESPONSE OF THE CLAIMANTS TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 2ND DEFENDANT 16. The claimants started off with a brief summary of their case. To the claimants, they are all dock workers who work as tally clerks and onboard security in the Nigerian Sea Ports. That due to the sensitive nature of the claimants functions and their great importance to the economy of the nation, the 1st and 3rd defendants upon the concession of the Nigerian Sea Ports in 2005 removed the responsibility of the claimants’ employment from the Terminal Operators and vested same on the 3rd defendant. Thereafter, the 1st and 3rd defendants appointed 12 Stevedoring companies under a contract of service provision for the 3rd defendant and these companies were instructed to serve as the employers of the claimants and agents of 3rd defendant in relation to the claimants’ employment. That though the Stevedoring companies were presented as the employers of the claimants, the 3rd defendant had always controlled the claimants’ employment, paid their remuneration and their services are for the benefit of 3rd defendant and the nation. That the 3rd defendant’s Management in December 2015 decided to completely abolish the claimants’ functions from the Nigerian Ports and disengage them from their services on the grounds that cargo handling has been ceded to terminal operators who now have the responsibility to ensure security of terminals and that there is a duplication of functions between Cargo Surveyors and Tally Clerks and as such Cargo Surveyors who use more advanced and technical means of evaluation should be doing the work of tally clerks. That consequently, when the contract between the 3rd defendant and the Stevedoring companies expired on 15th December 2015, the 3rd defendant refused to renew the contracts in other to carry out its management aforesaid decision. That the claimants have since then been out of jobs and the 3rd defendant has since then been using cargo surveyors on a daily basis to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to the claimants. That the said decision of the 3rd defendant was presented to the 1st defendant for his ministerial approval. 17. The claimants went on that due to the claimants’ loss of jobs and the 3rd defendant’s continued use of cargo surveyors to carry out the functions of the claimants, the claimants’ union approached the 1st defendant to seek for his intervention in the matter in other to restore the claimants’ employment but the 1st defendant told the claimants’ union leaders that based on the memo the 3rd defendant’s Managing Director sent to his office that the services of Tally Clerks and onboard Security are no longer required by the 3rd defendant in the Nigerian Sea Ports, he cannot renew the contract of the Stevedoring companies who served as the claimants’ employers and as such the claimants’ employment can no longer be restored. That the claimants were, prior to the tacit abolition of their functions by the 1st and 3rd defendants, daily wage earners who make their income from rendering dock services as tally clerks and onboard Security men at the Nigerian Sea Ports but since the said decision of the 3rd defendant and tacit approval of the 1st defendant to abolish their functions, the claimants have been forced out of their jobs and the 3rd defendant is on a daily basis using cargo surveyors to carry out the functions that were hitherto carried out by the claimants without first providing alternative means of income or jobs for the claimants as required by international labour standards. That the use of cargo surveyors who are not registered dockworkers or maritime labour to carry out the functions of tally clerks and onboard security men which are dock labour services is contrary to law. 18. The claimants then submitted a sole issue for the determination i.e. whether the claimants’ suit as constituted is speculative. To the claimants, the Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition at page 1529 defined the word speculation to mean “the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge”; and that the Court of Appeal in Aribo v. CBN [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1260) 133 at 159 defined speculation to mean “to form an opinion about something without knowing all the details or facts”. That the law is clear that in determining the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a cause or matter, the processes to be considered are the originating processes filed by the claimant, which in this case is the claimants’ complaint and statement of facts, citing APGA v. Anyanwu [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1407) 541 at 550. That going by the above definitions of speculation, it is very difficult to see how the claimants’ case as contained in their statement of facts and complaint is speculative. That the facts contained in the claimants’ statement of facts as summarised above are clear and certain on the following issues and facts to wit: a) That the 3rd defendant made a decision to abolish the claimants’ job functions, to wit: the duties of tally clerks and onboard Security men from the Nigerian Sea Ports on the grounds that: i) Cargo handling has been ceded to terminal operators who now have the responsibility to ensure security of terminals. ii) There is a duplication of functions between Cargo Surveyors and Tally Clerks and as such Cargo Surveyors who use more advanced and technical means of evaluation should be doing the work of tally clerks. c) That following the aforesaid decision, when the contract between the 3rd defendant and the Stevedoring companies expired on 15th December 2015, the 3rd defendant refused to renew the contracts in other to carry out its management aforesaid decision. d) That the claimants have since the said 15th December 2015 been out of jobs and the 3rd defendant has since then been using cargo surveyors on a daily basis to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to the claimants. e) That when the claimants’ union approached the 1st defendant to intervene in the matter and restore the claimants jobs, the 1st defendant told the said union leaders that because of the Memorandum submitted to his office by the 3rd defendant that the 3rd defendant no longer requires the services of tally clerks and onboard security men in the Nigerian Sea Ports, the contract under which the claimants’ services were engaged can no longer be renewed and as such the claimants’ jobs can no longer be restored. f) That the said Cargo Surveyors are not registered dockworkers and their use to carry out the duties hitherto done by the claimants which are dock work is contrary to law. g) That the decision of the 1st and 3rd defendants to abolish the claimants’ job functions has occasioned loss of employment and income to the claimants who were not taken into consideration in the plan as required by international best practices in labour and international labour standards set by the ILO, referring the Court to paragraphs 6 - 28 of the statement of facts particularly paragraphs 10, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27 and 28. Consequently, that the claimants sought for the reliefs, especially reliefs (d), (f) and (g), contained in paragraph 31 of their statement of facts. 13. To the claimants, their knowledge of the above enumerated facts are certain and not speculative. That the claimants are equally currently undergoing the loss of employment and income that is caused by the said decision of the 1st and 3rd defendants. That the argument of the applicant’s counsel in paragraph 3.5 of the written address in support of this application is canvassed in total lack of appreciation and understanding of the case presented by the claimants and should be discountenanced. That the claimants have clearly shown that they have lost their jobs as tally clerks and on-board security men following the decision of the 3rd defendant to abolish their job functions and that the said decision has been given a tacit approval by the 1st defendant. That Agip (Nigeria) Ltd v. Agip Petroti International and Agharuka v. FBN Ltd relied on by the applicant does not support his case, urging the Court to discountenance all the arguments canvassed by the applicant’s counsel and assume jurisdiction this matter. THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT 14. The 3rd defendant’s preliminary objection, brought pursuant to sections 92 and 93 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act Cap N126 LFN 2004, the relevant rules of this Court and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, in praying for an order dismissing or striking out this suit for want of jurisdiction, is hinged on the grounds that: a) This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action against the 3rd defendant, the claimants having failed to serve the 3rd defendant with the mandatory statutory pre-action notice required for the commencement of this suit. b) The service of the originating process and accompanying documents not having been served on the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant/applicant is invalid and contrary to the Nigerian Ports Authority Act. c) The subject matter of this suit is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the plank of the claim thereto being one for declaration and injunction against the executive and administration decision of the 1st and 3rd defendants rather than on matters of employer-employee and/or industrial relations contemplated by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the National Industrial Court Act. d) The originating process, to wit, complaint having not being affixed with the claimants’ counsel’s stamp before filing is incompetent. e) The originating process, to wit, complaint not being properly signed by the claimants’ counsel before filing is incompetent. f) The claimants lack the status and/or collective right to sue the 3rd defendant on behalf of the 1,686 other tally clerks and onboard Security men in a representative capacity. 15. To the 3rd defendant, the complaint being the originating process was simply addressed to the “Nigerian Ports Authority of 26/28 Marina, Lagos” and this (process) together with the statement of facts were served on the office of the Secretary to the Board of the 3rd defendant, however, without copies of the documents pleaded therein. That prior to the service of these processes, there was no written notice from the claimants indicating their intention to commence this action against the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant then submitted six issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the failure of the claimants to serve the statutory pre-action notice on the 3rd defendant before the commencement of this suit divests this Court of its jurisdiction to entertain this suit. (2) Whether the service of the originating process and accompanying documents on the 3rd defendant in this suit was made as required by law. (3) Whether this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the rights of the parties in this suit, when the subject matter of this suit is not one contemplated by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the National Industrial Court Act but one for declaration and injunction against the planned executive and administrative decision by the 1st and 3rd defendants. (4) Whether the failure to affix the claimants’ counsel legal practitioner’s stamp on the complaint in this suit renders it incompetent. (5) Whether the complaint in this suit was properly signed and the formal requirements necessary for its validity satisfied. (6) Whether in the light of the claimants’ statement of facts, the claimants have the collective right to sue in representative capacity. 16. Regarding issue (1) on failure of the claimants to serve pre-action notice, the 2rd defendant submitted that it is no brainer that the requirement of pre-action notices before the commencement of an action/suit against most government agencies and parastatals are generally creations of statutes and thus failure to comply with these relevant statutory requirements prescribed by the relevant laws under which these agencies and parastatals are created renders such action against the agency or parastatal incompetent and deprives the Court before which the action is taken of the jurisdiction to entertain such, citing Ministry of Education, Anambra State v. Asikpo [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 351 and NPA Plc v. Neiro [1998] 6 NWLR (Pt. 555) 640. That it cannot be overemphasised and tritely so that failure to serve a pre-action notice within the statutorily prescribed period of time as condition precedent to the filing of a competent and proper suit against a government agency/parastatal or defendant entitled to pre-action notice is not a mere technicality or irregularity; instead it fundamentally constitutes an incurable defect that must deprive the Court of jurisdiction to entertain such suit when it comes before it, citing Umukoro v. NPA [1997] NWLR (Pt. 502) 656 SC, NPA Plc v. Neiro (supra) and Amadi v. NNPC [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76. That the 3rd defendant being a creation of a statute which entitles it and/or bestows on it the right to a month’s pre-action notice from any potential claimant claiming against it, in any event cannot even be validly brought before this Court without the fulfillment of that statutory requirement, when in fact such right has not been waived. That this statutory right/requirement finds a succinct and unequivocal expression in section 92 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act Cap N126 LFN 2004. Section 92(1) provides: No Suit shall be commenced against the Authority before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been served on the Authority by the intending Plaintiff or his agent and the notice shall clearly and explicitly state – a) The cause of action b) The particulars of claim c) The name and place of abode of intending Plaintiff; and d) The relief which it claims. 17. To the 3rd defendant, it follows that under section 92(1) stated above, no intending plaintiff or claimant as in the claimants on record in this suit can validly sue or bring a competent and proper suit against the 3rd defendant before this Court or at all without first complying with the statutory requirement of serving on the 3rd defendant a written notice of intention to commence a suit against it one month clear before instituting the suit. In contrast, that where as in the instant, the claimants default or neglect to serve on the 3rd defendant a written intention to commence a suit against it before rushing off to institute an action/suit, undoubtedly the purport of the above section is that the right of action of such claimant is perpetually foreclosed or at best inchoate and, therefore, cannot inure to the benefit of the claimants, referring to Mobil Producing (Nig.) Ltd v. LASEPA [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1 and Umukoro v. NPA [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 52) 656 and contending that the instant suit for which this Court is called upon to hear and determine is incompetent, the claimants and/or their counsel having defaulted in fulfilling the statutory requirement of first engaging the 3rd defendant via a pre-action notice as prescribed in section 92(1). 18. The 3rd defendant went on that this noteworthy position of the law canvassed above has long been established in our legal jurisprudence with several notable judicial stamps of approval, citing the seminal case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 NSCC 374 at 379. That there are several other features, including but not limited to the defective process on which this suit was initiated. That the non-compliance or non-fulfillment of the condition precedent prescribed in section 92(1) of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act no doubt prevents this Court from exercising its jurisdiction in this suit. That the commencement of this suit having not been premised on the statutory prescription of section 92(1) above is terribly and incurably bad, and Rules of Court seeming to provide a remedy are of no moment, and as a rule, cannot torpedo a statutory provision, citing Nasir v. Civil Service Commission, Kano State [20101] NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253 at 276. A fortiori, that any proceeding and consequential decision, if any, that emanates from such suit in the face of such fatality will be a nullity regardless of how urbanely conducted the proceeding of the suit may be or how finely articulated the decision may be, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), and urging the Court to dismiss or strike out this suit for want of jurisdiction. 19. For issue (2) i.e whether service of the originating processes on the 3rd defendant was as required by law, the 3rd defendant submitted that it is trite that service of an originating process or any other process of Court requiring service is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court whose registry the process was issued, citing National Bank Ltd v. Guthrie [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) 643 at 659; and that where service of a process is legally required, the failure to serve it in accordance with the law is a fundamental flaw, referring to Kida v. Ogunmola [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 994) 377. That section 93 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act 2004 states as follows: The notice referred to in section 92 of this Act and any summons, notice or other documents required or authorised to be served on the Authority in connection with a suit by or against the Authority, may be served by: a) Delivering it to the Managing Director or b) Sending it by registered post, addressed to the Managing Director, at the head office of the Authority. That the full implication flowing from this provision is that the proper person/address to which an originating process (“complaint”) which purposes/contemplates to be commencing a legal action against the 3rd defendant, as in the instant case, must mandatorily be the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant; and in default of which any other address/person used, no matter how connected to the 3rd defendant renders the service incompetent and a nullity. That by the use of the verb “may” underlined above, it goes further to mean that whereas the provision contemplates flexibility in the manner of actual delivery of the process, either by direct physical delivery or registered post, there is no ambiguity as to the point that addressing the process to the person of the Managing Director is a sine qua non to the validity of the service under both situations. 20. To the 3rd defendant, a critical look at the “complaint” and/or originating process in this suit indicates that it was not served on the Managing Director as mandatorily prescribed by the Act; rather it was addressed to the Nigerian Port Authority of 26/29 Marina Lagos and delivered to the office of the Secretary to the Board. It is the contention of the 3rd defendant that the service of the originating process in this suit is fundamentally defective which defect cannot be cured even by the Rules of this Court and, therefore, prevents this Court from exercising its jurisdiction in this suit. Order 7 Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2019 provides thus: Subject to any statutory provision regulating service on a Ministry, Agency or Department of Government a Public or Private Institution, registered company, corporation, statutory Agency or public body or body corporate, Enterprise, Partnership, Board or any other Institution or Association required to be registered by law; every process requiring service may be served on the Ministry, Agency or Department of Government, Extra Ministerial Body, Public or Private Institution, company, corporation, statutory Agency or public body or Organization or Partnership or Board of any other Institution or Association required to be registered by law by delivery to the Minister, Permanent Secretary, Director General, or officially designated head of Ministry, Agency, Department of a government, Public or Private Institution, Chairman of the Board, Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Legal Adviser, Personal Assistant/Secretary to the Managing Director/Chief Executive officer or an Executive Director, or other senior principal staff of the organization, or to any responsible person or officer of any branch or zonal office of the organisation, Chief Security Officer of the Company, Statutory Agency or Public Body or organization, or enterprise or any other responsible person who occupies or serves as a representative of the organisation or enterprise or Board of any other institution required to be registered by law by leaving same at the registered, principal or advertised office or place of business of the organisation or institution in Nigeria. That in view of the Rules of this Court the service of the “complaint” on the 3rd defendant, being a body corporate, by the claimants in this suit, peremptorily ought to be subject to the 3rd defendant’s enabling Act, particularly section 93 of that Act. That anything less, as of course, divests this Court of the jurisdiction of which it may otherwise be competent to exercise. 21. The 3rd defendant continued that Kida v. Ugunmola [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 997) 388 SC held that where service of a process is legally required the failure to serve it in accordance with the law is a fundamental flaw. That service of originating process has been held to be a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of Court out of whose registry the originating process was issued. That the “complaint” before this Court is addressed thus: To the Honourable Minister of Transport of the Federal Ministry of Transport Bukar Dipcharima House Central Area District Abuja F.C.T. and the Attorney General of the Federation of the Attorney General’s Chambers, Federal Ministry of Justice, Abuja and the Nigerian Ports Authority of 26/29, Marina, Lagos. That it is glaring that claimants failed to serve it (complaint) in accordance with section 93 of the NPA Act, which specified that any such process must be addressed to and served either directly or by registered post on the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant. It is thus the submission of the 3rd defendant that while conceding that the claimants addressed the complaint to Nigerian Ports Authority of 26/29 Marina, Lagos without more, and served same on the Office of the Secretary to the Board, the failure to address and serve the complaint on the Managing Director of the Authority (3rd defendant) is without a doubt a fatal default on the condition precedent that must prevent this Court from exercising jurisdiction, urging the Court to so hold and dismiss and/or set aside this suit as a nullity. 22. Issue (3) is whether this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the rights of the parties in this suit, when the subject matter of this suit is not one contemplated by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the National Industrial Court Act but one for declaration and injunction against the planned executive and administrative decision by the 1st and 3rd defendants. The 3rd defendant once again referred to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra) arguing that where any of its features is absent in a Court proceeding, such defect has time and again been judicially pronounced as fatal to the case. Therefore, that it is the law that no matter how well conducted a proceeding may be the decision of the Court in such respect shall amount to nullity. It is thus the contention of the 3rd defendant that the subject matter of this present suit before this Court is not squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court but one within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. 23. To the 3rd defendant, it is trite law that Courts being creations of the Constitution and/or statutes derive their powers of jurisdiction from those sources. Hence, that section 251(11)(r) of the 1999 Constitution critically conferred jurisdiction over the subject matter presented by this case when it stated: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters. (r) Any action or proceeding for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. That for a Court to have jurisdiction over a claim or set of claims, those claims must without an iota of doubt peremptorily fall squarely within the subject matters which the Court is empowered by the statute/Constitution creating it to adjudicate on. Without more, that the claims in a suit being the fulcrum of any suit bestow jurisdiction upon a Court of law and not the effect the c1aim(s) will have if successful, citing Western Steel Workers Limited v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (No.2) [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284. 24. The 3rd defendant continued that a sober look at the nature of the claimants’ claims reveals that the very complexion of the claims were such contemplated by section 251 of the 1999 Constitution rather than by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That what is indisputably glaring from the averments and claims in the claimants’ amended statement of facts is that their claims only challenged a speculated administrative action or decision of the Federal Government and its agency, but failed to disclose any cause of action in respect of a breach of a contract of employment by the 3rd defendant or better still, failed to seek a known relief/damage for wrongful dismissal or termination against the 3rd defendant. That for a Court to be properly constituted, the claims before it must be borne from a cause of action that gives enabling power to the Court to adjudicate on. The 3rd defendant went on that from the claims of the claimants the real question in controversy between the parties in this suit is not one connected to a dispute between the 3rd defendant as an employer and the claimants as employees and thus bordering on refusal to fulfill an employment contract or any question, differences or dispute arising as to the rights of the claimants or liability of the 3rd defendant to a contract of employment; or touching on any misconduct and neglect for the conditions of service. 25. The 3rd defendant continued that nothing in the claims of the claimants can be said to properly constitute the suit as a trade dispute between a trade union and employers. Put differently, that there is nothing in their claims that seem to suggest that the claimants are seeking award of damages for wrongful termination, a better condition of service including health, safety and welfare of labour or that a trade union to which they owe allegiance is on their behalf in dispute with their employers. That what, however, is clear is that the claimants devoid of any standing to do so, seek a declaration and injunction against a speculated administrative decision of the 1st and 3rd defendants to abolish their skills trade from the maritime labour industry. That a reading of section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution will show that the makers of the provisions did not contemplate these amorphous and conjectural claims prayed by the claimants in this suit. Better still, that a community reading of the claims of the claimants reveals that the claims are not situated within the purview of the National Industrial Court but are claims which clearly relate to the questioning of the validity or otherwise of the executive and administrative action or decision (if any) by the Federal Government (Ministry of Transport) and its agency (NPA), urging the Court to so hold. That the subject matter of this suit is outside the jurisdiction of this Court but clearly finds a place within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, citing Ahmed v. Ahmed [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274 SC at 348. 26. Issue (4) is whether the failure to affix the claimants’ counsel legal practitioner’s stamp on the complaint in this suit renders it incompetent. To the 3rd defendant, Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007 provides thus: (1) A lawyer acting in his capacity as a legal practitioner, legal officer or adviser of any Governmental department or Ministry or any corporation, shall not sign or file a legal document unless there is affixed on such document a seal and stamp approved by the Nigerian Bar Association. (2) For the purpose of this rule, legal documents shall include pleadings, affidavits, depositions, applications, instruments, agreements, deeds, letters, memoranda, reports, legal opinions or any similar documents. (3) If, without complying with the requirements of this rule, a lawyer signs or files any legal documents as defined in sub-rule (2) of this rule, and in any of the capacities mentioned in sub-rule (1), the document so signed or filed shall be deemed not to have been properly signed or filed. That a thorough look at the originating process, to wit, the complaint filed at the registry of this Court by counsel on behalf of the claimants and upon which this suit purports to commence, reveals that the said process is not affixed with a Nigerian Bar Association’s stamp of the author contrary to Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007. The 3rd defendant then submitted that albeit an irregularity to be remedied or regularized timeously by affixing the stamp of the NBA, where as in the instant case an originating process (complaint) is filed in default of the said Rules above stated, such a process is deemed as not properly filed. That it is apposite to state that the term/word file in its verb form means to deliver a legal document to the Court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record; better still, to enter or record as prescribed by law, referring to Bryan A Garner (ed) - Black’s Law Dictionary (1999), 7th ed. page 642 and the New Britannic Webster Dictionary and Reference Guide (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. 1988). 27. The 3rd defendant the referred to Order 6 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court, which provides that “the Registrar shall after sealing an originating process, file it and note on it the date of filing and the number of copies supplied by a claimant or the claimant’s counsel for service on the defendants, the Registrar shall then make an entry of the filing in the cause book…” It is the 3rd defendant’s submission that where as the claimants in this suit presented the complaint herein for filing and sealing in the registry of this Court, they failed to comply with Rule 10(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007 or to regularise such subsequently. That the Court is not to or ought not to take cognisance of such document as properly filed; rather the Court must view such document or process by employing the negative legal fiction of deeming the document or process as not properly filed, citing Yaki v. Bagudu [2015] LPELR-25721(SC). The 3rd defendant then urged the Court to hold that the complaint or originating process before this Court is not properly filed, hence cannot be accorded cognizance. 28. Issue (5) is whether the complaint in this suit was properly signed and the formal requirement necessary for its validity satisfied. That according to Order 4 Rule 4(3) an originating process shall be signed by the claimant or his or her counsel where the claimant sues through a counsel. That it is trite that Courts have in unanimity decided on the form and steps which must be observed for a process signed by a counsel to be adjudged proper and valid, citing Dr. G. O. Abodunrin v. Governor of Oyo State and anor [2014] LPELR-22445 and SLB Consortium Ltd v. Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation [2011] NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317. That Dr. G. O. Abodunrin v. Governor of Oyo State & anor (supra) held that all processes filed in Court are to be signed as follows: the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption; secondly, the name of counsel clearly written; thirdly, who counsel represents; and fourthly, name and address of legal firm. That following this position of the law, counsel to the claimants would simply have validly signed the said complaint in the following manner: Barrister Chisa B. Anyanwa Claimants counsel Unique Files Solicitors No. 29 Mobolaji Bank Anthony Way Ikeja, Lagos State. But that a cursory look at the said complaint revealed that counsel to the claimants disregarded the formal legal requirements and by so doing failed to validly sign the complaint. That rather than observe the requirement of the law, counsel to the claimants chose a form or format that is completely at variance with the laid down requirements of the law, by placing the contraption of her signature upon the following long and unwinding statement that reads thus: This complaint was issued by Chisa B. Anyanwu of Unique File Solicitors whose address for service is No. 29 Mobolaji Bank Anthony Way, Ikeja, Lagos, Legal Practitioner for the said Claimants of No. 11 Isua Street, Abule Egba, Lagos, No. 22 Fadu Avenue, Ejigbo, Lagos and 3rd Avenue, O Close House 4 FESTAC TOWN Lagos respectively. 29. To the 3rd defendant, by virtue of the case laws stipulated above, the cumbersome manner and style adopted by the claimants’ counsel is not valid, notwithstanding that the name of the claimants’ counsel seemingly appeared to be beneath her signature, urging the Court to hold that the style and manner adopted by claimants’ counsel is not valid and thus breaches the fundamentals of due process in terms of signing of an originating process. 30. Issue (6) is whether in the light of claimants’ statement of facts, the claimants have collective right to sue in representative capacity. To the 3rd defendant, it is trite law that contracts of employment in all its ramification is personal and as such cannot in the event of a breach be actionable by means of a representative suit, citing CCB (Nig.) Plc v. Rose [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 37 at 50. That looking at the averments of the claimants particularly paragraphs 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 26 of the amended statement of facts, the claimants who portray themselves as either tally clerk or on board security men, purport to have been employed by the 3rd defendant through an agent/labour employer under a contract of employment which is domestic to each of the tally clerk and onboard security men. That while not conceding that the claimants were at any material time employees of the 3rd defendant, the 3rd defendant urged the Court to so hold that in the light of the averments in the statement of facts in this matter, the totality of the persons (tally clerk and on board security men) being represented in this suit, could not have been purportedly employed without individual contracts of employment. That flowing from the above reasoning, even if the claimants were at any time employees of the 3rd defendant in the circumstance, the claimants do not possess the collective right in law to sue the 3rd defendant or any employer in a representative capacity, urging the Court to resolve issue five in the negative. In conclusion, the 3rd defendant urged the Court to decline jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and hence dismiss or strike out same. THE RESPONSE OF THE CLAIMANTS TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT 31. The claimants in response to the 3rd defendant’s preliminary objection submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: whether the 3rd defendant is entitled to the relief sought. In arguing this sole issue,the claimants, however, dealt with the grounds upon which the 3rd defendant’s preliminary objection is predicated one after the other. 32. On the service of pre-action, the claimants submitted that they have deposed that pre-action notice was served on the 3rd defendant in line with the requirement of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act and same was duly received and acknowledged by the office of the 3rd defendant’s Managing Director situate at NPA, 26/29 Marina Lagos, referring to paragraph 8 of the affidavit in support of this application and the Exhibit CU1 attached therein which is an acknowledged copy of the said pre-action notice. The claimants then urged the Court to discountenance all the arguments conversed by the 3rd defendant under its issue one as lacking in merit. 33. On whether the 3rd defendant was served with the claimants originating processes and other accompanying documents as required by law, the claimants referred to Order 7(1)(h)(i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria ( Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 which deals with service of Court processes on a company and body corporate and provides thus: Any processes or document required or authorized by these Rules or ordered by the Court to be served on any person who is a party in a matter may be served as follows: h) if the person is a company or other body corporate, by serving a copy of the document or process on a senior or a responsible employee of the Company or body corporate at its registered office or at its principal place of business within the judicial division in which the dispute first arose or, if there is no employee willing to accept service, by affixing a copy of the document or process to the main door of the office or place of business or by posting same on the wall or the fence of the residence or place of business. 34. The claimants continued that that the word “may” in section 93 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act Cap N126 LFN 2004 connotes the exercise of discretion, referring to Wilson v. Okeke [2011] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1235) 456 at 462 ratio 5 particularly at 473. That what is material is the fact that the originating processes were served on the 3rd defendant, which in the instant case was duly served on the 3rd defendant at its Head Office in Marina Lagos where the office of its Managing Director is also situate. That the 3rd defendant has not in any way shown either by production of proof service or otherwise that the claimants’ said processes were not delivered to its Managing Director. That what the 3rd defendant seem to be hinging its argument and objection on is that the said processes were not addressed to its Managing Director. The claimants then implored the Court to find that even the said section 93 of the NPA Act did not state that processes to be served on the authority must be addressed to the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant. That the reason behind the establishment of this Court is to ensure speed and flexibility in the adjudication of industrial disputes; as such this Court is not amenable to undue technicality which the 3rd defendant is inviting this Court to delve into. That in the interpretation of statute, where the words used are plain and unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, literal or natural meanings, citing Berliet Nig. Ltd v. Kachalla [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 478 and Okotie-Eboh v. Manager [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 242. That the 3rd defendant’s interpretation of section 93 of the NPA Act to connote that every process to be served on the 3rd defendant must be addressed to its Managing Director otherwise the Court will be divested of its jurisdiction is most absurd, urging the Court to so hold. 35. It is further submission of the claimants that service of the originating processes on any officer of the Nigerian Ports Authority and on the Secretary of the Board is valid and cannot be sufficient grounds to strip this Court of jurisdiction to entertain this matter. That since the Nigerian Ports Authority Act did not make it mandatory for the processes to be served on the Managing Director, the paramount concern of the Court should be whether service of the originating processes were actually done on the 3rd defendant. In any case, that assuming without conceding that the contention of the 3rd defendant is the correct position of the law, the 3rd defendant’s Managing Director has now been served with the claimants’ originating processes which is addressed to him, urging the Court to dismiss the 3rd defendant’s objection on this ground as lacking in merit. 36. On whether the subject matter of this suit is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the claimants referred to section 254C(1)(a) and (f) of the 1999 Constitution; and then submitted that what this provision means is that section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that defines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court must be read subject to the provision of section 254C once the cause of action or subject matter falls under any of the items listed in section 254C(1)(a) - (m). Hence, that the issue of whether or not the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the Federal Government or any of its agencies is not applicable to labour matters or matters listed in section 254C(1)(a) - (m), referring to the Law and Practice of the National Industrial Court by Bamidele Aturu at pages 12 - 13. Furthermore, that it is not in doubt that the case presented by the claimants for determination by this Court is clearly a labour and industrial relation matter. That the issues raised therein are labour issues. That assuming without conceding that the subject matter as argued by the 3rd defendant is a challenge to the validity or otherwise of any executive or administrative actions of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, the issue remains that such alleged administrative and executive decisions/action are on labour and the Constitution has made the provision of section 251(r) subject to section 254C(1), referring to John v. Igbo-Etiti LGA [2013] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 1 at 17 where the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of the Third Alteration to the Constitution, section 254C (1), which gave exclusive jurisdiction to the National Industrial Court on all labour matters, the Federal High Court, The High Courts of a State and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory ceased to have jurisdiction on labour matters. For emphasis, that the Blacks Law Dictionary 9th Edition at page 1561 defines the word, “Subject Matter” to mean “the issue presented for consideration; the thing in which a right or duty has been asserted; the thing in dispute”; while a cause of action has been defined by a plethora of judicial decisions to mean a combination of facts and circumstances that give rise to a right to file a claim for remedy in Court, referring to BEDC Plc v. Esealuka [2015] 2NWLR (Pt. 1444) 411 at 419 ratio 12 particularly at 435. 37. To the claimants, the issue that is presented for consideration in this case are in the main: a) Whether it is right for the defendants to use Cargo Surveyors due to their advanced technology to carry out the functions of tally clerks and onboard security men hitherto being carried by the claimants which has occasioned loss of employment to the claimants without providing them with alternative jobs or means of income as required by international labour standards. b) b) Whether it is legal for the defendants to use Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally clerks and onboard security men. That the cause of action in this suit is the claimants’ loss of employment and future employment following their replacement with cargo surveyors without complying with international labour standards. That the above highlighted issues presented in this case for determination clearly fall outside the ambit of the Federal High Court as the 3rd defendant would want to deceive this Court into believing and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance all the arguments of the 3rd defendant on this issue. 38. On whether the complaint in this case was properly signed, the claimants submitted that the complaint was duly and properly signed by a legal practitioner whose name, signature, the party being represented by the counsel and the name and address of the counsel law firm were clearly written on the complaint, referring to the claimants’ amended complaint filed on 12th July 2016 urging the Court to dismiss the argument of the 3rd defendant on this point. 39. On the Issue of Counsel Stamp and seal; We submit that the seal of the counsel who prepared the Claimants amended originating processes was duly affixed to the said processes in compliance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In any case, assuming without conceding that the counsel seal was not affixed to the said amended originating processes, failure to do so is merely an irregularity which can be remedied and does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court. We therefore urge the Court to dismiss the Applicants objection on this point. 40. On whether the claimants are entitled to bring this suit in a representative capacity, the claimants submitted that the law is settled that an action can be brought in a representative capacity where the persons representing have a common interest with those represented, referring to CCB (Nig) Plc v. Rose [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 37 at 41 ratio 5 particularly at 50. To the claimants, the principal element required to bring an action in a representative capacity is common interest. That it does not matter whether the suit is in the realm of master-servant relationship or employment; once the parties represented and those representing have a common interest, they are qualified to bring a suit in a representative capacity. That the decision in CCB (Nig.) Plc v. Rose was quoted out of context and given a wrong interpretation by the 3rd defendant’s counsel. That in CCB (Nig.) Plc v. Rose. the plaintiffs filed an action in a representative capacity before the Enugu State High Court seeking for in main: “the sum of N1,649,290.40 in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendant being balance of the gratuities, value of earned leave and transport entitlements due to the Plaintiffs from the Defendant upon the compulsory lay-off of the Plaintiffs by the Defendant”. That the Court in that case held that the parties do not have a common interest or a common right because what they are seeking for is their entitlements which is governed by individual contracts of employment. That the terms of their contract are different from each other. That this case is clearly distinguishable from the present case where the claimants and those they represent are not seeking for any entitlement governed by individual contracts of employment or conditions of service but what they are seeking for is something that is common to them, to wit: to stop the 3rd defendant’s continued use of cargo surveyors to do jobs hitherto assigned to them without first providing them with alternative jobs or means of income as required by international labour standards. That this issue applies to the named claimants and all those they represent and as such there is common purpose and a common mission which they are all pursuing, urging the Court to so hold. 41. Moreover, that Order 13 Rule 11 (1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2017 clearly provide that: “where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested”. That this Rule clearly empowers the claimants to bring this action and in a representative capacity, urging the Court to so hold and dismiss all the objection of the 3rd defendant on this ground. In any case, that even if the claimants are not entitled to bring this suit in a representative capacity, the commencement of this suit in such capacity is not an issue that could rob this Court the jurisdiction to entertain this matter. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to dismiss this objection with punitive cost against the 3rd defendant. COURT’S DECISION 42. I have carefully considered all the processes filed and the submissions of the respective parties as far as the objections of the respective defendants are concerned. I shall endeavour to consider the bases of the defendants objections in terms of the issues they raised noting that some of the issues raised by the respective defendants coincide. For instance, all the defendants talked of the claimants’ cause being speculative and incompetent, over which this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction. 43. It is the submission of the 1st defendant that the claimants did not serve on him any pre-action notice, which failure robs this Court of jurisdiction over this case. The 1st defendant did not, however, tell the Court which law enjoins the serving on it of pre-action notice. The issue of pre-action notice is essentially one imposed by statute law. Whether or not a pre-action notice can be imposed by contract is debatable. See Hon. Justice Peter O. Affen, writing extra-judicially in a paper titled, “The Law on Pre-action Notice in Nigeria: The Search for a New Outlook”, and published as Chapter 13 in C. C. Nweze, et al (eds.) - Beyond Bar Advocacy: Multidisciplinary Essays in Honour of Anthony Okoye Mogboh, SAN (Umuahia: Impact Global Publishers Ltd: Umuahia), 2011 at pages 251 - 275, NPA v. Construzioni [1974] All NLR (Reprint) 945, Katsina Local Authority v. Makudawa [1971] 7 NSCC 119 at 126, NBC v. Bankole [1972] All NLR 331 SC at 338, adopting the views expressed by Crossman, J in Compton v. West Ham County Borough Council [1939] 3 All ER 193 at 198 – 200 and Ntiero v. NPA [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 129 at 142. After reviewing these case law authorities, this Court in Mrs Kikelomo Kola-Fasanu v. Prestige Assurance Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/25/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 24th January 2017 came to this conclusion at paragraph 27: “…contracts upon which pre-action notice needed to be given before a suit can be filed were not the contracts that made pre-action notice a pre-requisite; it was a statutory provision that made the pre-action notice a pre-requisite”. Since the 1st defendant did not show under what law a pre-action notice is required to be served on him before this suit can be filed, the argument of the 1st defendant that no pre-action notice was served on him is lame and not sustainable. It fails and is hereby dismissed. 44. It is also the submission of the 1st defendant that this suit as formulated against the 1st defendant is statute-barred and offends section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) Cap P41 LFN 2004. In order to determine whether this suit is statute-barred, it is necessary to first know what the claimants’ cause of action is. The reliefs claimed by the claimant, and hence their case, relates to the planned merger of the jobs of tally Clerks (a unit of dock Labour) and Cargo Surveyors and the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks and onboard Security men (a unit of dock labour) from the Nigerian Ports by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority, which actions will lead (and has led) to loss of jobs by the claimants. The claimants added as part of their case the question whether it is legal for the defendants to use Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally clerks and onboard security men. To the claimants, their cause of action is not statute-barred as the wrong/damage or injury caused to the claimants is a continuing one. Here, I do not think that the claimants understand what is meant when an injury/wrong/damage is said to be continuing for purposes of the limitation law. An injury is said to be continuing when the act which caused the injury or damage continues, not the injury itself. See INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Government & ors [2015] LPELR-24839(SC) and Alhassan v. Aliyu & ors (2009) LPELR-8340(CA), which defined “continuance of injury” as the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury, and not the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. In this sense, the argument of the claimants that their injury in this suit is continuing lacks merit and so is discountenanced. 45. However, a look at the pleadings of the claimants will show that the claimants pleaded in their amended statement of facts that they were informed by the 1st defendant through their trade union on 24th February 2016 that the contract which engaged their services can no longer be renewed because the 3rd defendant no longer require their services. See paragraph 15 of the amended statement of facts. In paragraph 26 of the amended statement of facts, the claimants also pleaded that they have been out of job since 15th December 2015 following the NPA’s decision to abolish their functions and the consequent refusal of the 1st defendant to renew NPA’s contract with stevedoring companies. Though section 11(3) of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004 enjoins that any notice for a period of one week or more shall be in writing, and none of such notice was shown to this Court by the claimants, paragraphs 15 and 26 of the amended statement of facts are sufficient to situate the claimant’s cause of action and hence the right to come to Court as arising on 15th December 2015. Paragraph 26 of the amended statement of facts in stating that the claimants were out of job since 15th December 2015 supersedes paragraph 15 which pleaded that the claimants were informed through their union that the contract which engaged them will no longer be renewed. The pleading in paragraph 15 sounds more like hearsay than a direct statement, which is what paragraph 26 is. I take it, therefore, that the claimants cause of action and hence their right to come to Court arose as at 15th December 2015. The instant suit was filed on 10th March 2016. This means that the suit was filed within the 3 months allowed by section 2 of POPA. The instant suit as against the 1st defendant is accordingly not statute-barred. I so find and hold. 46. The 3rd defendant also contended that no pre-action notice was served on it by the claimants before this suit was filed. In response, the claimants submitted that they have deposed that pre-action notice was served on the 3rd defendant in line with the requirement of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Act Cap N126 LFN 2004 and same was duly received and acknowledged by the office of the 3rd defendant’s Managing Director situate at NPA, 26/29 Marina Lagos, referring to paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit and the Exhibit CU1 attached therein which is an acknowledged copy of the said pre-action notice. In the first place, Exhibit CU1 attached to the claimants’ counter-affidavit to the 3rd defendant’s objection is a copy of the amended general form of complaint served on the 3rd defendant and as received on 20th February 2017 by the Office of the Managing Director (MD) of the 3rd defendant. Exhibit CU1 is accordingly not a pre-action notice as the claimants’ counsel is arguing. What qualifies as the pre-action notice is Exhibit CU2 dated 7th March 2015, a letter from the counsel to the claimants and addressed to the MD of the 3rd defendant. The pre-action notice as per Exhibit CU2 can be found at its second page. However, Exhibit CU2 was served on and received by the Office of the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant on 7th March 2016. This suit was filed on 10th March 2016. In other words, the pre-action notice was served on the 3rd defendant three days before the suit was filed. It is curious how the 3rd defendant was served the amended complaint and accompanying originating processes on 7th March 2016 even when the motion to join the 3rd defendant was filed on 8th April 2016 and the order to join it was granted by this Court on 15th June 2016. Since this suit was filed on 10th March 2016 and Exhibit CU2 shows that the pre-action notice was served on the 3rd defendant on 7th March 2016, this is clearly not in consonance with section 92(1) of the NPA Act 2004, which provides that no suit shall be commenced against the NPA before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been served on the NPA by the intending plaintiff or his agent. 47. Case law authorities abound on the effect of non-service of pre-action notice. For instance, by Clifford Ebere & ors v. Imo State University & ors [2016] LPELR-40619(CA), “the effect of non-compliance or non-service with a pre-action notice where it is statutorily required is only an irregularity which can only render an action incompetent”. Yaki & anor v. Bagudu & ors [2015] LPELR-25721(SC) on its part held that “a pre-action notice has been held to be a condition for the exercise of the right to bring the action and not as abridgement of that right”. By Dominic E. Ntiero v. NPA [2008] LPELR-2073(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 129 SC; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 1, “the effect of non-compliance with service of pre-action notice amounts to an irregularity… In other words, non-service of a pre-action notice merely puts the jurisdiction of a court on hold pending compliance with the preconditions…the irregularity can be waived by a defendant who fails to raise it either by motion or plead it in the statement of defence…If, therefore, a defendant refuses to waive it and he raises it, then the issue becomes a condition precedent which must be met before the court could exercise its jurisdiction”. And by Nigercare Development Co. Ltd v. Adamawa State Water Board & ors [2008] LPELR-1997(SC); [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 498; [2008] 2 - 3 SC (Pt. II) 202, “…an action commenced without a pre-action notice, where one is statutorily required, is a nullity ab initio”. In the instant case, since Exhibit CU2 did not conform to section 92(1) of the NPA Act, it cannot be a valid pre-action notice; and I so find and hold. This being the case, there is no valid pre-action notice served by the claimants on the 3rd defendant. I so find and hold. The suit against the 3rd defendant on this score is accordingly incompetent as it is pre-mature and liable to be struck out. I so order. 48. Section 93 of the NPA Act 2004 talks of the service of “any summons, notice or other document required or authorized to be served on the Authority in connection with a suit by or against the Authority”. I agree with the claimants that this provision talks of service, not address, of the said processes. I also agree with the claimants that the use of the word “may” in section 93 connotes a discretion, not compulsion. This being the case, Exhibit CU1 attached to the claimant’s counter-affidavit shows that the “Office of the Managing Director” of the 3rd defendant received the amended general form of complaint on 20th February 2017, after the 3rd defendant was joined by order of this Court granted on 15th June 2016. This to me is good enough service, which satisfies the requirement of section 93 of the NPA Act 2004. I so find and hold. The 3rd defendant’s argument in this regard lacks merit and is hereby discountenanced. 49. The 3rd defendant argued that the complaint in this case was not properly signed by counsel to the claimants, citing Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007. I took a closer look at the amended general form of complaint as well as its accompanying originating processes, which were served on the 3rd defendant, what I found is that the amended complaint, amended statement of facts, claimants’ list of witness and amended claimants’ list of documents are all signed by the claimants’ counsel and each has the claimants’ counsel’s practicing seal. I do not accordingly find any merit in the 3rd defendant’s argument in that regard. It is my holding, therefore, that Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007 was not in any way breached. Even if it was breached, the effect is not that this Court would have no jurisdiction over the matter but that the claimants’ counsel must be given the opportunity to remedy the defect in question. I so find and hold. 50. The 3rd defendant further contended that the claimants cannot sue in a representative capacity given that they do not have any collective right to do so. To start with, the 3rd defendant is not a member of the group of claimants; as such it has no locus to challenge the representative capacity in which the claimants field this suit. The Supreme Court in Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig. Ltd v. Chief Tigbara Edamkue [2009] LPELR-3048(SC);[2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1 SC; [2009] 6 - 7 SC 74, relying on Chief P. O. Anatogu & ors v. Attorney-General East Central State [1976] 11 SC 109; [1974] ECSLR 36, Oyemuze & ors v. Okoli & ors [1973] 3 ECSLR 150, Alhaii/Chief Otapo & ors v. Chief Sunmonu & ors [1987] 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 587 at 603; [1987] 5 SCNJ 57; [1987] 2 NSCC Vol. 18 page 677, Daniel Awudu & anor v. Bautha & anor [2005] 2 NWLR (Pt.909) 199 at 222 - 223 CA and Busari v. Oseni [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 557, held thus: …It is settled that once the Plaintiff/Plaintiffs, expressed on a writ or Statement of Claim that the action, was brought in a representative capacity as appears in the two consolidated suits, it is/was prima facie, though not conclusive evidence of authority by his/their group, family or Community to sue in that capacity. It is only a member of that group, family or Community, who can dispute, intervene or challenge, the proper representation or the capacity in which the plaintiff/plaintiffs sued. It will be futile for a defendant who is not one of those the plaintiff/plaintiffs purport to represent, to challenge his/their said authority for or because, if the plaintiff/plaintiffs wins/win, the losing defendant, cannot share in the victory and if the plaintiff/plaintiffs case be dismissed, such dismissal, can never affect the defendant adversely… Given this authority, I hold that the 3rd defendant lacks the locus to challenge the fact of this suit being filed in a representative capacity. 51. This point aside, the Supreme Court has enjoined that the rule permitting representative action is a rule of convenience and as such ought not to be treated with any rigidity but as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. See Ejezie & ors v. Anuwu & ors [2008] LPELR-1063(SC); [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt.1101) 466; [2008] 34 NSCQR (Pt. II) 996. This being the case, the key rule is that in a representative action, common interest or same interest or common grievance is a necessary ingredient to maintain the action. In other words, the legal burden cast upon the claimants in the instant case is that of establishing the existence of a common interest and a common grievance. See Okwu & anor v. Umeh & ors [2015] LPELR-26042(SC), Alhaja Barakat Alafia & ors v. Gbode Ventures Nig. Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-26065(SC) and Anabaronye v. Nwakaihe [1997] LPELR-478(SC); [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 374. In the instant case, I agree with the claimants that their interest/grievance is common to all of them and so is the same. By Mbanefo v. Molokwu & ors [2014] LPELR-22257(SC), the rule further is that in a representative action, it is not only the named plaintiffs or defendants who are the parties to the action. The others who are not named but whom the plaintiff or defendant purports to represent are also parties to the action given that they are also to be bound by the outcome of the litigation. Accordingly, whatever is the outcome of the instant suit, the claimants (1,689 in all) going by paragraph 26 of the amended statement of facts would all be bound. Given these case law authorities, I agree with the claimants that this representative action is proper; and the defendants have no right to challenge the capacity in which it was brought. I so find and hold. See Mr Eyiaromi Christopher Oladele & ors v. The Attorney-General, Lagos State & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/102/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 6th June 2017, where I held similarly in paragraph 39. The argument of the 3rd defendant in that regard accordingly fails and is accordingly dismissed. 52. The 1st defendant had contended that the action of the claimants is based on the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks (a unit of dock labour) by the 1st defendant and the NPA and the NPA’s use of Cargo Surveyors to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to tally clerks on the ground of Cargo Surveyors’ use of advanced technology without providing the claimants with another permanent or regular employment and means of income. On this premise, that there are no established facts before the Court to adjudicate on, rather the Court has been asked or called upon by the claimants to speculate on possibilities not supported by evidence. This position of the 1st defendant is similar to the stance of the 3rd defendant that the subject matter of this suit is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, referring to section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which all parties incidentally relied on in arguing their respective cases. For the defendants, the subject matter of the claimants’ suit falls within the purview of section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution, it being an executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies, and so it is the Federal High Court, not this Court, that has jurisdiction over the case at hand. I indicated earlier that the reliefs claimed by the claimant, and hence their case, relates to the planned merger of the jobs of tally Clerks (a unit of dock labour) and Cargo Surveyors and the planned abolition of the functions of tally clerks and onboard Security men (a unit of dock labour) from the Nigerian Ports by the 1st defendant and the Nigerian Ports Authority, which actions will lead (and has led) to loss of jobs by the claimants; and that the claimants added as part of their case the question whether it is legal for the defendants to use Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally clerks and onboard security men. If all of this is not a labour issue, I do not know what will qualify as a labour issue. Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution is made subject to section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution by section 254C(1) itself. This being the case, the argument of the defendants here cannot hold ground. I accordingly agree with the claimants that being a labour issue, the jurisdiction of this Court has not been ousted by section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as the defendants have argued. 53. However, there is a flip-side, which all the parties did not seem to appreciate. All the defendants argued that the subject matter of this suit is speculative. (It is in this sense that the 1st defendant also talked of the claimants not having the locus standi to sue the 1st defendant; and both the 1st and 2nd defendants talked of the suit being incompetent; as such this Court has no jurisdiction over the suit.) In other words, the claimants must wait until they lose their jobs before they can come to Court. Here, the defendants may be right but only to the extent that the nature of the dispute is one technically called in labour circles as an interest dispute i.e. a dispute that is yet to crystallize into a rights dispute. An interest dispute in labour relations is no less a dispute; the only caveat being the process or procedure through which it can be resolved under existing law, or whether it has sufficiently crystallized into an entitlement as to warrant litigation in this Court. The 3rd defendant talked of nothing in the claims of the claimants that can be said to properly constitute the suit as a trade dispute between a trade union and employers; and that there is nothing in the claimants’ claims that seem to suggest that the claimants are seeking award of damages for wrongful termination, a better condition of service including health, safety and welfare of labour or that a trade union to which they owe allegiance is on their behalf in dispute with their employers. The claimants themselves stated their case to include the question whether it is legal for the defendants to use Cargo Surveyors who are not registered dock workers to carry out the duties hitherto assigned to Tally clerks and onboard security men. In their pleadings, the claimants stated that they are tally clerks and onboard security men, a unit of dock labour in the Nigerian Ports; and the claimants variously talked about how their union, the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN), negotiated on their behalf the issues at stake. In other words, their union is seized of the issues presently before this Court, and the interposition of the union regarding the issues in dispute is not in any doubt. Even as against the argument of the 1st defendant that this suit as against him is statute-barred, the response of the claimants was that they averred in their statement of facts that they were informed by the 1st defendant through their trade union on 24th February 2016 that the contract which engaged their services can no longer be renewed because the 3rd defendant no longer require their services. Yet in all of this the said union is not a party to this action. All of this signifies that, in a sense, the nature of the claims of the claimants is one involving an interest, not rights, dispute especially if it is noted that the claimants’ union negotiated the issues on the claimants’ behalf. Did the claimants refuse to come to Court in the name of their union because they know that thereby the dispute would be branded a collective labour dispute, a trade dispute, to use the terminology of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap T8 LFN 2004? In arguing that the claimants’ dispute is not a trade dispute, the issue was thus raised, though not addressed by the parties, whether the dispute in truth was not a trade dispute as to make the claimants coming to this Court in its original jurisdiction one that is uncalled for and hence premature. In other words, if the claimants’ dispute with the defendants is one that is a trade dispute, should the claimants not have exhausted the processes of Part I of the TDA before approaching this Court? Since parties did not addressed this issue in their respective written addresses, I am inclined to giving them the opportunity to do so. Starting, therefore, with the claimants, parties are to accordingly file and serve their respective written addresses on this issue. 54. On the whole, for all the reasons given, and for the avoidance of doubt, I hold that all the grounds upon which the defendants objected to this suit fail except as against the 3rd defendant where the ground of non-service of an effective pre-action notice succeeds and is hereby sustained. The suit against the 3rd defendant is accordingly incompetent as it is premature; as such it is hereby struck out. All court processes are to be corrected to reflect this order. Secondly, all parties (the claimants and the remaining defendants i.e. the 1st and 2nd defendants), starting with the claimants, are to file and serve their respective written addresses on the issue whether the claimants’ case in this suit is not a trade dispute for which they must first exhaust the processes of Part I of the TDA before coming to this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. 55. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD