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1. By a complaint dated and filed on 5th July 2013 accompanied with the statement of claim, list of witness, written statement on oath of the witness, list and copies of Exhibits, the claimant prayed for: (a) A declaration of this Honourable Court that the termination of the claimant’s appointment by the defendants vide their letter dated 9th November 2011 is wrongful and unlawful. OR in the ALTERNATIVE, a declaration that the termination of the service of the claimant cannot take effect from 5th of October 2009 but 9th of November 2011 the date the letter was issued. (b) A declaration of this Honourable Court that the claimant is for all intents and purposes a staff of the defendants until the day his letter of disengagement was issued and signed which is 9th day of November 2011. (c) A declaration of this Honourable Court that the defendants jointly and severally are liable to pay the claimant his salary in full, and the calculation must be based on the salary he last received before he proceeded on the study leave, for the period of 13 (thirteen) months from October 2010 to October 2011 which they kept him waiting without allowing him to take up another job as doing so will vitiate absorption. (d) A declaration of this Honourable Court that the defendants jointly and severally must pay the his entitlement and severance package which must be calculated from the day he joined the Bank till the letter of disengagement was issued and signed, inclusive of the period of the study leave. (e) NGN50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira only) general damages against the defendants jointly and severally for distress, mental exertion, psychological trauma they intentionally and deliberately caused the claimant being the bread winner of his family, for wrongful and unlawful termination of his employment and willful and deliberate incapacitation of the claimant by the defendants to pick another employment/establish himself with veritable business. (f) NGN1,500,000.00 (One Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) the cost of prosecuting this matter. (g) Any other applicable reliefs as may be just and applicable in the circumstances. 2. The defendants entered formal appearance and then filed their statement of defence, list of witnesses, written statement on oath of the witness, list and copies of documents to be relied on at the trial. By order of Court made on 17th December 2014, the defendant was permitted to substitute both its witness on record as well as the said witness’ statement on oath. The claimant did not file any reply to the defendant’s defence processes. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW, while Franklin Adaghubu, a Human Resources Practitioner working for the defendant, testified as DW for the defendant. at the close of trial, parties filed and served their respective written addresses. the defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 1st March 2017, while the claimant’s is dated 19th May 2017 but filed on 22nd May 2017. The defendant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed on 1st June 2017. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 3. To the claimant, he was vide the letter of employment dated 25th March 1997 employed by FSB International Bank Plc as a Banking Officer and rose to the post of Assistant Manager in 2003. In 2005, FSB International Bank Plc merged with the 1st defendant and by virtue of the merger he automatically became the employee of the 1st defendant. In December 2006, the 1st defendant promoted him from Deputy Manager 1 to Deputy Manager 3. That he applied for study leave for the period of 12 (twelve) months in July 2009 to enable him pursue a Masters Degree Program in Information Technology Management and Organizational Change and the leave was duly approved by the 1st defendant. The claimant went on that upon receiving the approval of his study leave, he proceeded to the University of Lancaster, United Kingdom for the said program approved by the 1st defendant. Six months to the completion of his program, in accordance with the policy of 1st defendant, he gave the Bank notice of his intention to return to the employment of the 1st defendant. That he completed his program in September 2010 and returned to Nigeria; and upon his resumption, the defendant requested him to submit his updated Curriculum Vitae and the business impact analysis of the course he had gone to study on the business of the 1st defendant, which he did and made available to the 1st defendant. That he was put to and attended re-absorption interview on two different occasions and the last interview he had was with the 2nd defendant who told him that he cannot afford two managers in the same department and told him to start looking for job elsewhere. That this was after keeping him waiting for thirteen months without any employment, no salaries or any benefits to him. The claimant continued that on 9th November 2011 he received a letter of termination of his employment from the 1st defendant with effect from 5th October 2009, the date he proceeded on the study leave. Dissatisfied, the claimant this filed the present action praying for the reliefs contained in the complaint and statement of claim. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS 4. The case of the defendant is that the claimant was a bad employee, having been cautioned and queried for acts of gross misconduct and utter disregard for constituted authority. To the defendant, it approved the study leave application of the claimant on the condition that his re-absorption would be subject to availability of vacancy and the required skills. That it invited the claimant for re-absorption interviews but he was deficient in the skill needed for the job position available. Accordingly, that the defendant on 9th November 2011 served on the claimant a letter of termination on the grounds of non-availability of vacancy and the required skill to take effect from 5th October 2009 in line with section 7.1.16 of the Staff Handbook. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS 5. The defendants submitted three issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the claimant is entitled to the declaratory reliefs in the statement of facts. (2) Whether the defendant (sic) is entitled to N50,000,000.00 damages against the defendants jointly and severally. (3) Whether the 2nd defendant is known to law. 6. On issue (1), the defendant submitted that as for relief (a) of the claimant, it is the case of the claimant that he applied for study leave for a period of twelve months to enable him pursue a Masters program in Information Technology Management and Organizational Change which study leave the defendant approved vide Exhibit C8, paragraph 2 of which provides thus: “Kindly note that the twelve month leave is without any financial obligations from the Bank but counts as part of your years of service only if you eventually return and serve the Bank for at least six (6) months…” That a cursory look of the above clause reveals that the study leave which the claimant embarked upon was at his own instance as the defendant had no financial obligations to the claimant for the period of the study leave. That this means that the defendant had no financial commitment in terms of payment of salaries and allowances to the claimant between 10th August 2009 when the claimant proceeded on the said study to 19th September 2010 when the claimant arrived Nigeria. That the claimant cannot, therefore, seek a declaration of the Court for the payment of his entitlement inclusive of the period of study leave having accepted the terms and conditions stated in the Exhibit C8 and in view of the salient provisions of section 7.1.16(i) of Exhibit D8 which provides as follows: “Study leave without pay for up to 24 months may be granted at Management’s discretion to staff with at 60 months service for a course related to Banking”. The defendant referred to Okonkwo v. CCB (Nig.) Plc [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 822) 347 at 382, where the Supreme Court held that persons of full age and sound mind are bound by any agreement lawfully entered into by them, and that extrinsic evidence will generally not be acceptable to vary the terms agreed upon. 7. Now, that the claimant complains that the termination of his employment was wrongful and unlawful; and contends that he was an employee of the defendant until the 9th of November 2011 and wanted his terminal benefits and entitlements to be calculated up to 9th November 2011. To the defendant, by the terms of Exhibits C8 and D8, the claimant ceased to be its employee upon the completion of his study leave and this explained why the claimant had to be invited and interviewed on three occasions for new job position in the defendant. That under cross-examination, the claimant confirmed the process as follows: Yes, I was invited twice by the 1st defendant for interview after I came back. Yes, in the Bank, any interview ends with the Managing Director, the 2nd defendant. Yes, for the last interview with the 1st defendant, I was referred to the 2nd defendant. Yes, I met with the Managing Director for the last stage of the interview. When I met the MD, he asked if I have been looking for job in other places. I told him No. He said that he has no vacancy for me and so I should go. And so I left. 8. The defendant went on that the claimant pleaded in paragraph 17 of the statement of facts that he submitted his Curriculum Vitae (CV) to the defendant which means that the claimant wanted a new post or opening above the one he held before proceeding on the study leave which made him to undergo the interview process. That the claimant, by allowing himself to undergo the process of interview for a new opening in the defendant, had invariably severed the earlier employment relationship he had with the defendant. That it is noteworthy that his re-absorption to the defendant upon this interview is not automatic as paragraph 4 of Exhibit C8 states as follows: “Please note that re-absorption will be subject to availability of vacancy and the required skills”. That the Court will observe that Exhibit C8 and section 7.1.16 of Exhibit D8 simply relate to the period of twelve months study leave without pay which the defendant granted to the claimant. That there is nothing in the Exhibit C8 or D8 which affords the claimant the right to the payment of salary or entitlements for the period outside the twelve months study leave stated in the Exhibit C8, that is, from 19th September 2010 to 9th November 2011 when he received Exhibit C11. That the claimant was not in the service of the defendant during this period of 19th September 2010 to 9th November 2011 as he failed to establish any obligation he rendered to the defendant for the said period. 9. To the defendant, the question the Court should determine is whether the claimant was an employee while on the study leave and whether the period of his study leave should be reckoned with while calculating his gratuity. The defendant conceded that the claimant was an employee while on the study leave but without pay as clearly stated in the conditions of the grant of the approval of the study leave (Exhibit C8). It is also the defendant’s contention that the period of the study leave cannot be reckoned with while calculating the gratuity of the claimant because the claimant did not serve the defendant for at least six months after the end of his study leave, referring to section 7.1.16 9(ii) of Exhibit D8, which provides as follows: “The period of the course or the number of months granted should be counted as part of the employee’s years of service only if the staff eventually returns and serves the Bank for at least another six(6) months”. That there are two conditions in this clause which the claimant must fulfill before his period of study leave can be reckoned with while calculating his gratuity. One, the claimant must return. That the claimant did return, and even attempted to be reabsorbed into the defendant. The other condition is that the claimant must serve the defendant for at least six (6) months, which to the defendant he did not as there was no vacancy in the defendant and the required skill as stated in paragraph 11 of the statement of defence. That this very averment of the defendant in paragraph 11 of the statement of defence remains uncontroverted as the claimant did not file a reply. That the law is that uncontroverted fact is deemed admitted, urging the Court to so hold. The defendant then submitted that it was, therefore, right to have made Exhibit C11 served on the defendant on 9th November 2011 to take effect from 5th October 2009 having regard to the express conditions of the approval of the study leave comprised in Exhibit C8 and the express provision of section 7.1.16 of Exhibit D8. 10. The defendant continued that since the declaratory relief must be strictly proved, the claimant has not established his case within the ambit of section of 133 of the Evidence Act. The defendant cited NRW Ind. Ltd v. Akingbuluge [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1257), where the Court of Appeal held that an employee who seeks a declaration that the termination of his employment was wrongful must prove the following material facts: that he is an employee of the defendant; the terms and conditions of his employment; the way and manner and by whom, he can be removed; nd the way and manner the terms and conditions of his employment was breached by his employer. It is not the duty of the employer to prove any of these facts. Also cited are Patrick Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2011] 24 NLLR (Pt. 67) 113 at 138 and Mix & Bake v. FBTSSA [2011] 25 NLLR (Pt. 72) 357 at 388. That by these authorities, the claimant did not tender his terms and conditions of service while in the employment of the defendant to enable the Court determine in what manner the parties could determine the contractual relationship between them as well as the length of notice to be given. That the claimant did not also plead his remunerations or produce any document in proof of same. That Exhibit C2, which the claimant tendered, regulated his contractual relationship with FSB International Bank Plc, and FSB International Bank Plc is not the defendant in this suit and so Exhibit C2 goes to no issue. In fact, that it was the defendant who produced and tendered Exhibit D8 (Staff Handbook) to establish that the study leave it approved for the claimant was without pay. That it is a settled law that a party must rely and succeed on the strength of, his own case, citing NIIA v. Ayanfalu [2011] 24 NLLR (Pt. 67) 1 CA. 11. The defendant further contended that relief (d) of the claimant is not supported by his pleadings. That the claimant did not in any part of his statement of facts plead any facts relating to his entitlement and severance package. He did not tell the Court the years of service he spent in the defendant. He did not plead the part of Exhibit D8 which afforded him the right to the payment of his entitlement and several package. That the Court will not grant a relief not supported by any averment in the pleading of a party, citing Salubi v. Nwariaku [2003] 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 426 at 455. The defendant then urged the Coirt to resolve issue (1) in its favour of the defendant. 12. Issue (2) is whether the defendant (sic) is entitled to N50,000,000.00 damages against the defendants jointly and severally. The defendant conceded that this Court by virtue of section 19 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 can exercise its discretion to award damages where a party has successfully proved wrongful termination of his employment. However, that the claimant has not proved his declaratory reliefs as stated on the face of his complaint and so this Court cannot exercise its discretion in the award of damages in favour of the claimant. Assuming, however, that the Court holds otherwise, the defendant asked what the measure of damages recoverable by the claimant would be. The defendant referred to Kaduna Textiles Ltd v. Umar [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 319) 142 CA, which held thus: Ordinarily, on wrongful termination of an employee's appointment, the measure of damages is the amount he would have earned had he continued with the employment. Nevertheless, where the employer reserves in the contract of employment the right to terminate such employment before the end of the term, damages will be determined in accordance with such stipulated period of notice for which the employer had failed to notify him of the intended termination. 13. Continuing, the defendant asked what the gross salary of the claimant was before he proceeded on the study leave or while in the employ of the defendant. That the claimant did not tell the Court. That the claimant did not also tell the Court the stipulated length of notice in the contract between him and the defendant to enable the Court determine the damages payable to him. The defendant then submitted that the award of damages is not automatic as it is dependent on a party establishing his case on the balance of probability, which in this case the claimant has failed to discharge. Also that this Court cannot speculate as to what would be the measure of damages payable to the claimant in case the Court finds that the claimant has proven his case as speculation has no place in the world of evidence, citing REAN Plc v. Anummu [2003] 6 NWLR (Pt. 815) 52 at 117 - 118. It is, therefore, the defendant’s submission that the claimant is not entitled to damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 having failed to prove his case against the defendant. 14. Issue (3) is whether the 2nd defendant is known to law. It is the defendant’s contention that the 2nd defendant is not known to law. That parties to a suit can either be natural persons or artificial persons created by statute or incorporated with the Corporate Affairs Commission. That the law is settled that it is only natural persons or juristic or artificial persons that can sue or be sued, citing Administrators/Executors of the Estate of General Sani Abacha (Deceased) v. Eke-Spiff [2009] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97 at 136, where the Supreme Court held thus: As a general rule, only natural persons, that is to say, human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate are competent to sue and be sued before any law. In other words, no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or persons unless such party has been given by statute expressly or impliedly or by common law either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued. As to who are juristic persons, the defendant referred to Gov. Kwara State v. Lawal [2007] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) 347 CA at 379, where the Court enumerated the categories of juristic persons as follows: Juristic personality consists of several categories, natural persons, incorporated companies, corporations with perpetual succession, and unincorporated associations granted the status of legal persons by law. Only juristic persons can sue or be sued in their names generally - exceptions to the general rule occur where such rights are created or vested by a statute or rules emanating from the exercise of statutory power. 15. The defendant then submitted on the above authorities that the 2nd defendant is not a juristic person and does not fall within the purview of the legally recognized exceptions to the juristic personality, urging the Court to so hold. Also, that it is settled that where there is a misjoinder of parties in a suit, the Court has the power at any stage of the proceedings to strike out such party that has been improperly joined, citing Comrade Eugene Ugwu v. Mrs Bridget Orjiekwe & ors [2011] 25 NLLR (Pt. 72) 427. In the light of the above authority, the defendant urged the Court to strike out the name of the 2nd defendant from this suit. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 16. On his part, the claimant submitted five issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether it is wrongful for the defendant to terminate the employment of the claimant retrospectively. (b) Whether the 1st defendant actually terminated the employment of the claimant in accordance with study leave approval and the policy of the 1st defendant. (c) Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs subscribed to and endorsed on the complaint and statement of claim in this suit. (d) Whether the claimant is entitled to NGN50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) damages against the defendants jointly and severally. (e) Whether the claimant is entitled to relief (f) subscribed to and endorsed on the complaint and statement of claim in this suit. 17. Regarding issue (a), the claimant submitted that his relief (a) is in two legs, alternatively though, a declaration of this Court that the termination of his appointment/employment by the defendants vide their letter dated 9th November is wrongful and unlawful OR in the alternative a declaration that the termination of his service cannot take effect from 5th of October 2009 but 9th of November 2011, the date the letter was issued. That upon application he was granted a twelve-month study by the 1st defendant to pursue a masters degree program in Information Technology Management and Organizational Change, the essence of which is to enhance his performance in his work. That the defendant’s witness under cross-examination stated thus: “Yes, the claimant did a proposal as to how his study will enhance his managerial, which he gave to the defendant”. That the study leave was granted by the defendants as a result of their conviction that the course which the claimant has applied to study abroad will indeed enhance his managerial skills on his work. That the 1st defendant’s approval to the claimant for study leave was granted vide a letter dated 10th August 2009 (Exhibit C8), which contained the terms and condition for granting the study leave and returning to his job. 18. To the claimant, it is germane to state in respect of paragraph 2 of Exhibit C8 that assuming without conceding that the claimant embarked on the study leave at his own instance, the defendant had no financial obligation to the claimant for the period of the study leave. That the defendant may have no financial commitment in terms of payment of salaries and allowances to the claimant between 10th August when the claimant proceeded on the said study leave and 19th September 2010 when he arrived back in Nigeria, neither is the claimant making any such claim at all. That paragraph 2 of Exhibit C8 states that the twelve-month leave will only count as part of his years of service only if he eventually returns and serves the Bank for at least another six months and that the study leave period cannot be utilized as notice for resignation. That the claimant indeed returned to the employer, the 1st defendant, but was kept hanging by the 1st defendant without assigning him any role or position. That he did not resign on arrival after giving the 1st defendant six months’ notice of his intention to return to his job as required in the approval letter of his study leave, neither did he use the period of the study leave as a notice period of for resignation. That he complied with all the conditions in the Exhibit C8 and section 7.1.16 of Exhibit D8 that is within his capacity to comply with. That it is the 1st defendant who from its behaviour set out to frustrate the claimant to resign. That the essence of six months’ notice of his intention to return to the 1st defendant is to enable the defendants to find a suitable position for him, if at all he is not returned back to his previous job role; and in the event that there is none the defendants could have terminated his appointment within few weeks of his arrival from United Kingdom instead of keeping him waiting and playing politics with his career for thirteen months. That if he had taken up another job from another organization within this thirteen months it would definitely vitiate his chance of been re-absorbed by the 1st defendant. 19. The claimant went on that the defendants terminated his employment by a letter dated and signed on 9th day of November 2011 and paragraph 2 of the letter provides as follows: “Consequently, please be informed that in line with policy and terms of your study leave approval, your services are no longer required with effect from 5th day of October, 2009”. That assuming without conceding that it is not in doubt that an employer has the right to dismiss, terminate and or retire his employee, he must do so within the ambit of law. That the major contention of the claimant in this case is that his termination cannot take effect two years before the said letter of termination was issued and delivered to him. That the effective date of a dismissal or termination of employment is the date when the said letter was written, referring to Mrs Benedicta Uzoamaka Marchie v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/48/20141, the judgement of which was delivered on 30th March 2017, which held 12th March 2010, the date of the letter of dismissal, to be the effective date of the dismissal, not 15th March, 2009 indicated in the letter of dismissal. Also referred to is Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd v. Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 156 SC, which held that an employer cannot dismiss or terminate his employee’s employment with retrospective effect; as well as New Nigeria Bank Ltd v. Obevudiri [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 387 CA, which held that the effective date of dismissal of an employee is the date when the letter of dismissal was written. On this note, the claimant submitted that the effective date of termination of his employment with the 1st defendant is the 9th November 2011, the date the letter was issued and not 5th October 2009, hence his gratuity and earned entitlement must be calculated by Human Resources Department as it is indicated in Exhibit C3 up till the 9th November 2011, the date the letter of termination was issued, urging the Court to resolve this issue in his favour. 20. Issue (b) is whether the 1st defendant actually terminated the employment of the claimant in accordance with study leave approval and the policy of the defendants as they claimed. To the claimant, the defendants even though pleaded and tendered some of the queries issued to the claimant while in FSB International Bank and Fidelity Bank which he replied as at when due as Exhibits D1, D2, D3 and D4, and the claimant never faced any disciplinary panel as a result of any of these queries; as such these queries have no bearing with the purported termination of the claimant’s employment as documents always speak for themselves. That paragraph one of the letter of termination provides thus: “We refer to your application for reabsorption in the bank, post your study leave and regret to inform you that we are unable to grant your request due to unavailable opening presently suitable for your skill set”. That the reason for which the defendants purported to have terminated the employment of the claimant is stated in the termination letter and it is not for gross misconduct or insubordination. In fact, that it is elementary that document speaks for themselves, and where a document is clear and unambiguous, averments in pleading or any other evidence cannot be led to contradict it. In other words, extrinsic evidence is basically inadmissible to add to or alter the content of a document, citing Baliol (Nig.) Ltd v. Navcon (Nig.) Ltd [2010] NWLR (Pt. 1220) 619 SC. That the Court should discountenance Exhibits D1, D2, D3 and D4 and attach no probative value to them in this matter as they have no bearing or connection to the purported termination of the claimant’s employment. That the defendants are just groping for straw to hold on to in their defence of their action. 21. To the claimant, the defendant’s witness under cross-examination said thus: “Yes, the claimant’s employment was terminated under clause 3.16.3(b) of Exhibit D8”; and this clause provides thus: “With Notice: Normal termination in accordance with the appropriate clause in the individual’ s contract of service. In such cases, the employee will be given as much advance warning as circumstances permit”. That as opposed to the provision reproduced above, under which the defendants purported to have terminated the employment of the claimant, the claimant was never given any advance Notice at all. That a notice in its simplest term signifies knowledge, it is information given ahead of some act done. That notices should be in writing, setting in precise terms their object and be signed by the proper person, or his authorised agent, be dated and addressed to the person to be affected by them, referring to Federal Road Safety Corps v. Okebu Gideon [2015] All FWLR (Pt. 803) 1778 at 1787. 22. The claimant proceeded that he was employed by FSB International Bank Plc before the Bank and Manny Bank merged with Fidelity Bank in January 2006. The letter of offer of employment, Exhibit C2, stipulates the conditions of service and period for which the claimant had worked with the defendants starting from the time when he was employed by the FSB International Bank Plc and the time of his purported termination of service, which is more than twelve years. The claimant then referred to section 11 (dealing with termination of contracts by notice) of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004, which provides thus: (1) Either party to a contract of employment may terminate the contract on the expiration of notice given by him to the other party of his intention to do so. (2) The notice to be given for the purpose of subsection (1) of this section shall be - (a) One day where the contract has continued for a period of three months or less; (b) One week, where the contract has continued for more than three months but less than two years; (c) Two weeks, where the contract has continued for more than a period two years but less than five years; and (d) One month, where the contract has continued for five years or more. (3) Any notice for a period of one week or more shall be in writing. That the law as just reproduced provides expressly in section 11(2)(d) that one month’s notice shall be given in a situation where the contract has continued for five years, while section 11(3) provides that any notice for a period of one week or more shall be in writing. That it is a trite law that the use of SHALL in any provision of law like the one cited above connotes compulsion. In the instant case, that the claimant had worked with the 1st defendant for more than twelve years yet no prior notice, not even oral verbal notice was giving to him before the purported termination of his employment. 23. The claimant continued that the combined effect of clause 3.16.3(b) of Exhibit D8 and section 11(2)(d) and (3) of the Labour Act is that notice is a condition precedent to termination of the employment of the claimant, which was not met. That the study leave approval (Exhibit C8) in paragraph 2 provides thus: “…that the period of study leave cannot be utilized as notice period for resignation”. It is the claimant’s contention that as the period of study leave cannot be utilized as notice for resignation, which the claimant did not flout, in the same vein the period of study leave cannot be utilized by the 1st defendant as notice period for termination. The claimant then urged Court to resolve this issue in his favour and hold that the defendant did not terminate the employment of claimant in accordance with the study leave approval and the policy of the defendants as they claimed or the Labour Act and the termination is thereby wrongful. That in an action for wrongful termination/dismissal/retirement of a claimant, only two primary issues call for determination and these are: whether the termination/dismissal/retirement of the claimant is wrongful and the measures of damages recoverable where termination/dismissal/retirement is found to be wrongful, citing Ekeagwu v. The Nigerian Army [2010] 16 NWLR 419 SC, Miss Rosemary Mokogwu v. Excel Contracts Nigeria Limited and other unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/357/2012, the judgement of which was delivered on 6th April 2017. 24. Issue (c) is whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs endorsed and subscribed to on the complaint and statement of claim in this suit. To the claimant, it is not in contention that the claimant is an employee of the 1st defendant, as this was pleaded in the paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of his statement of claim and supported with Exhibit C1, the staff identity card of the 1st defendant issued to the claimant as its staff, and Exhibit C2, the letter of employment issued by FSB International Bank Plc, which shows the terms and conditions of service of the claimant with the 1st defendant. That having argued that the 1st defendant cannot terminate the employment of the claimant retrospectively and that the 1st defendant did not terminate the employment of the claimant in accordance with the study leave approval and the policy of the 1st defendant, the claimant submitted that he is accordingly entitled to the reliefs endorsed on his complaint. The claimant proceeded that he was on twelve months study leave, and it was part of his study leave approval that he must give the 1st defendant six months’ notice of his willingness to return to his job which he did. That the essence of the notice is for the 1st defendant to prepare the avenue for his return to his job. That upon his return, he was not on suspension by the 1st defendant, neither did he engage in any misconduct to vitiate his employment with the 1st defendant. That in paragraphs 15 - 23 of his statement of claim, he pleaded how he returned to Nigeria from United Kingdom on 19th September 2010 and contacted the 1st defendant on 23rd September 2010, within four days of his return, to notify the defendants of his arrival and his readiness to return to his job. That the defendants did not terminate his appointment that time but rather requested that he should submit his updated curriculum vitae (CV) and business impact analysis of the course he has gone to study, which he made available to the 1st defendant on 28th September. That after the submission of the documents requested by the 1st defendant, he was asked to wait for them to look for a most suitable position for his additional skill level regardless of his previous job position. He was eventually called for re-absorption interview in mid-November 2010. That the essence of re-absorption process is just to update the bank with acquired knowledge and the staff database. The mere fact that he submitted his curriculum vitae (CV) to the 1st defendant as requested does not mean he wanted any other position or opening above or different from the one he held before he proceeded on the study leave. That he never requested for another job position on return, neither did he apply for one. That in a well structured organisation, to which the 1st defendant belongs, it requires that a vacant job position be advertised and applied for internally before an external advert. The claimant continued that after the interview in December 2010, he went back to United Kingdom for his graduation and while there he contacted the Executive Director Shared Services who doubles as the Group Head of Human Resources of the 1st defendant who assured him that he will be assigned a position any moment from that time. That after graduation, he could have stayed back in United Kingdom to pursue another job, but the assurance he had in returning to his job in 1st defendant made him to jettison that. That it is the prerogative of the 1st defendant to fix the claimant into a position which he never did apply for but all the 1st defendant claimed is that there is no vacancy. 25. To the claimant, it is the law that when an employer gives reason(s) for the termination or dismissal of an employee like in this ease, the burden of proof is on him to discharge, to prove or justify the said reason to the satisfaction of the court, referring to SPDC Ltd v. Olanrewaju [2008] LPELR-3046(SC), Mr. Kunle Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 360) 1480SC, Angel Shipping & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 685)CA, George Abolmeli v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451 and Miss Rosemary Mokogwu v, Excel Contracts Nigeria Limited and other unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/357/2012. That this means that the burden is on the defendant to justify the reason of non-availability of vacancy as the basis of terminating the claimant's employment. That the defendants failed to discharge this burden; even in paragraph 11 of their statement of defence, the defendants did not say more than “the 1st Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment on the grounds of non-availability of vacancy and the required skill in line with the bank’s study leave policy”. That it is share absurdity to say that an employee who has been in the employment of the 1st defendant for twelve years and a Unit Head (Head, Information Technology Security) before he proceeded on study leave of just one year to study a course that the 1st defendant approved that it will enhance his managerial skill is lacking the required skill. Required skill for what, the job he has been on for twelve years? 26. The claimant went on that the defendants’ sole witness admitted under cross-examination that he was not a member of the panel that interviewed the claimant for re-absorption interview. To the claimant, it is not within the knowledge of the defendants’ witness to know or assert that the claimant is lacking the required skill. Also, that he said that before a staff is invited for re-absorption interview, the panel must have his resume and credentials beforehand to enable it study same; thus it means that the panel will invite for a re-absorption interview a staff whose resume is not in terms with the available job? That this is not likely to happen in a well-structured and regulated institution that the 1st defendant belongs to. Furthermore, that the defendants’ sole witness under cross-examination admitted thus: Depending on the level or grade of staff, reabsorption interview can go on for up to 4 levels i.e. from group to division, to directorate and up to Managing Director for Executive level. For an Assistant Manager like the claimant, he will go through these 4 stages depending on the vacancy and recommendation of the lower panels. After seeing the Executive Director in charge of the Directorate, the claimant would be scheduled to meet the MD. That the claimant, as admitted by the defendants’ witness, was made to go through 4 stages of the interview and he was recommended by the panel at every stage of the interview without complaining or mentioning anything about deficiency in the required skill, even the Executive Director in charge of Directorate interviewed him and at that stage he didn’t complain about any required skill and recommended him to go for the final stage. That under cross examination the claimant reiterated his meeting the MD thus: “Yes, I met with the MD for the last stage of the interview, when I met the Managing Director, he asked if I have been looking for job in other places. I told him No. He then said he has no vacancy for me and so I should go. And so I left”. To the claimant, the MD did not complain of any required skill; as such the defendants cannot prove or justify the reason for the termination of the claimant employment hence the 1st defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden placed on him by law. 27. It is the contention of the claimant that the rule is that an employee making a claim in an employment or labour case has the burden of proving his entitlement to the claim and quantum of his claim in terms of how he came by the said claim, referring to Ineh Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NlCN/LA/98/2014, the judgement of which was delivered on 21st February 2017 and Mr Charles Ughele v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NlCN/LA/287/2014, the judgement of which was delivered on 10th February 2017. That to prove an entitlement, the employee must refer the Court to the exact provisions of law, instrument or document that conferred the entitlement, citing Mr Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39 and Otunba Gabriel Oladapo Abijo v. Promasidor (Nig.) Ltd unreported Suit No: NICN/LA/602/2014, the ruling of which was delivered on 17th February 2017. That in consonance with the above cited case law, the claimant pleaded and tendered Exhibit C3, which is captioned “Earned Gratuity and Pensions as at December 31, 2005” and confirmed that earned gratuities and pensions of the three uniting institutions will be preserved and held for the benefit of the individual staff of each of the three uniting institutions. It also confirmed that only the Human Resources Department of the three uniting institutions is in the position to calculate and confirm to the staff at any point in time what their earned entitlements are. That section 12(2)(a) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 provides that this Court is not strictly bound by evidence act as it has power to depart from it in the interest of justice. On this note the claimant submitted that having established his case, he is entitled to the reliefs endorsed on his complaint, urging the Court to hold so. 28. Issue (d) is whether the claimant is entitled to NGN50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) damages against the defendants jointly and severally. To the claimant, section 19(d) of the NIC Act 2006 provides that this Court can award compensation or damages in any circumstances contemplated by the Act or any Act of National Assembly dealing with any matter that the Court has jurisdiction. That general damages are those damages which the law presumes in every breach and every violation of a legal right; they are losses which flow directly from the wrongful acts or omission of a defendant in a matter and so its quantum or measure need not either be expressly pleaded, nor proved since they are generally presumed by law. That the manner in which general damages are assessed by a trial court is adopting the objective test of relying on what would be the opinion or judgment of a reasonable man in the peculiar circumstances of a case, citing Nigeria Agip Oil Company Limited v. Janyim Nigeria Limited [2015] All FWLR (Pt. 785) 366 and Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v, Ajabule [2012] All FWLR (Pt. 611) 1413. In the instant case, that the study leave was approved consequent upon the claimant’s proposal written and presented to the defendants and the defendants’ approval was based on the fact that the course which the claimant is going to study will impact positively on his job. That the defendants even though have no financial obligation directly to the claimant in respect of the course, they were favourably disposed to it. That the claimant in the course of studying the said course incurred avoidable expenses of Twenty-Three Thousand British Pounds which he would not have incurred. 29. The claimant continued that despite the fact that he followed the study leave approval strictly without any deviation or breach, the defendants kept him waiting without assigning any job position for thirteen months within which he was prevented from applying for another job as doing so will vitiate his right of reabsorption, he was not paid any salary or allowance for that thirteen months, he could not travel abroad as the he might be called by the defendant to resume work, in fact that he could not really plan his life without recourse to this job and his life was kept in limbo while himself and his family were suffering from undue hardship. That after the termination, each time the claimant applied for job in any financial institution and recommendation and confirmation from his last place of employment is sought, the defendants have always refused and failed to reply or give such recommendation. Even in the course of interview the question that usually comes up is that “if you have not done any wrong, why did your former employer not reabsorb you upon the approved study leave?” That the defendants terminated his employment in a manner that till today he cannot pick any job not only in the banking sector where he has built his career over time but also in any financial institution. That the defendants ruined and put a permanent end to his banking career thereby putting him to early retirement. Along the line, that his wife deserted the home and filed divorce suit, left him to care for the two sons. That his health has been impaired with high blood pressure due to mental exertion and high level of stress with adverse effect. That the term general damages covers all losses which are not capable of exact quantification; it includes all non-financial losses (past and future) and future financial loss, citing Samuel Iyiola Agundipe v. Nigeria Telecommunications Limited [2016] All FWLR (Pt. 817) 613, which held that items of general damages need not and should not be specifically pleaded, but some evidence of such damage is required; giving the heads of general damages to include pain and suffering; loss of amenities; loss of expectation of life; future loss of earning capacity; and future expenses. Furthermore, that the primary object of damages is to as far as money can do fairly compensate a claimant for the injury done by the acts or omission of a defendant. That the award of general damages is at the discretion of the Court, which discretion must be reasonably exercised judiciously and judicially. Also, that in the awards of damages the Courts are endowed with an unfettered discretion to keep up with times and economic trend in the country and most especially, with prevailing fluctuating and rather obvious decline of the purchasing power of the Nigeria currency, citing Flour Mills of Nigeria Limited v. Tajudeen Ogunbayo [2016] All FWLR (Pt. 816) 522. The claimant then urged the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour and while doing so consider the prevailing economic situation of the country and award what can fairly assuage the trauma, pain and mental exertion the claim and had gone through as a result of the action of the defendants. 30. Issue (e) is whether the claimant is entitled to relief (f) subscribed to and endorsed on the complaint and statement of claim in this suit. To the claimant, relief (f) is akin to special damages, the reason being that the defendants made the claimant incur such financial expenses and or loss he would not have ordinarily made. That special damages must be specifically pleaded and specially or strictly proved. That it is easily discernible and quantifiable and does not rest on a puerile conception or notion which would give rise to speculation, approximation or estimation or such like fractions. It is unlike general damages that are awarded on the slightest proof. That special damages are awarded on strict proof. Strict proof is said to mean the claimant adducing credible evidence to establish his claim to the satisfaction of the Court that he is entitled to the relief under that head, citing Ahuruonye v. lkonne [2015] All FWLR (Pt. 811) 1233 and SPDC v. Okonedo [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 368) 1104. Also, that proof of special damages also entails adducing evidence of particular losses and or expenses, which are exactly known or capable of exact or precise knowledge and accurate measurement before the trial, referring to paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 as well as Exhibits C12, C13 and C14 as proof of his claim. That the defendant did not in any way challenge this claim even under cross-examination when they had all the chance to do so. That in the absence of any crucial evidence or opposition to the relief (f) of the claimant, it is safe to conclude that the claimant expended the amount mentioned in relief (f) of his statement of claim. That it is a trite law that unchallenged evidence is deemed admitted, urging the Court to treat this relief thus and grant him this relief as well as all the other reliefs. THE DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 31. In reacting on points of law, the defendants submitted that the law is that fact not pleaded goes to no issue, citing Nwokorobia v. Nwogu [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 553. That the claimant did not plead facts contained in paragraphs 4.4b to 4.4c of his final written address (relating to expenses of GBP25,000 and the claimant’s attempt at finding another job and being refused same as well as the defendants’ failure to give the claimant work reference) and so they go to no issues, urging the Court to so hold. 32. The defendants went on that the claimant also cited section 11 of Labour Act in support of his submission for the length of notice the defendant ought to have given him. To the defendants, the Labour Act does not apply to the claimant having risen to the position of Assistant Manager while in the employment of the defendants, referring to section 91 of the said Act which defines the term “worker” to exclude employees in the class of the claimant. In conclusion, the defendants reiterated that the claimant has not proved his case and so the Court should dismiss his case. COURT’S DECISION 33. I have carefully considered all the processes and submissions of the parties in this matter. The claimant put the 2nd defendant in this suit as “Managing Director Fidelity Bank Plc”. To the defendants, the 2nd defendant is not a juristic person and does not fall within the purview of the legally recognized exceptions to the juristic personality. I need not expend energy on this objection of the defendant as to the juristic personality of the 2nd defendant. In labour relations, the definition of an employer has an expansive meaning as to include officers of the employer himself. For instance, section 91(1) of the Labour Act Cap. L1 LFN 2004 defines the “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of that first-mentioned person and the personal representative of a deceased employer”. Of course, by section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 2004, “person” includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporated. Since the definition of an employer includes the agent, manager or factor of an employer, the 2nd defendant in the instant suit is a juristic person properly sued in this case; and I so find and hold. The argument of the defendant in that regard accordingly goes to no issue and so is hereby discountenanced. 34. I need to resolve the issue of the evidential value of certain documents tendered in evidence. The said documents are Exhibits C6 and D5. Exhibit C6 is unsigned. The parties described it as a printout of the email sent to the claimant. On its face, there is no evidence indicating that it is a printout of an email. In the absence of evidence that Exhibit C6 is a printout from an email, it cannot take the character of a document electronically signed as to make it of any evidential value. See Mrs. Titilayo Akisanya v. Coca-Cola Nigeria Limited & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/40/2012, the judgment of which delivered on 7th April 2016 and Mr Ahmed Ishola Akande v. Lilygate Nigeria Ltd (The Lilygate) unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/209/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th November 2017. As it is, Exhibit C6 had no evidential value and so is hereby discountenanced. Exhibit D5 is an incomplete document and is described as an Internal Memo dated 23rd March 2009. As an incomplete document, I cannot ascribe to it any evidential value. See Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors v. Federal Ministry of Health unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/238/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on July 22, 2013. Exhibit D5 is accordingly discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. 35. The claimant equally urged the Court to discountenance Exhibits D1, D2, D3 and D4 and attach no probative value to them in this matter as they have no bearing or connection to the purported termination of the claimant’s employment, submitting in the process that the defendants are just groping for straw to hold on to in their defence to this action. I shall deal with this issue in terms of the merit of the defendants’ argument that it terminated the claimant’s employment because he had disciplinary issues with the defendant. 36. The claimant as an employee of the defendants had in July 2009 applied for study leave to study abroad, which the defendants granted. On the claimant’s return, instead of being re-absorbed into the service of the defendant, he was later on served with a termination letter. The claimant is contesting his termination, hence this suit. Exhibit C11 (also Exhibit D9) dated 9th November 2011 and titled “Services No Longer Required” is the letter terminating the services of the claimant. It reads thus: We refer to your application for reabsorption in the Bank, post your study leave and regret to inform you that we are unable to grant your request due to unavailable opening presently suitable for your skill set. Consequently, please be informed that in line with policy and the terms of your study leave approval, your services are no longer required with effect from October 05, 2009. Kindly hand over all the Bank’s property in your possession (including your identity card) to Human Resources. From this exhibit, it is clear that the claimant’s services were terminated because the defendants could not reabsorb the claimant given the unavailability of any opening suitable for the claimant’s skill. This is the reason that the defendant gave for terminating the employment of the claimant. 37. Having given this as the reason for terminating the employment of the claimant, can the defendant also turn around and say that the claimant was facing disciplinary issues, for which it has now terminated the claimant’s employment? I do not think so given the circumstances of this case. The defendants relied on Exhibits D1, D2, D3 and D4 to come to this conclusion. Exhibit D1 is dated 24th September 2002; Exhibit D2 is dated 9th February 1999; Exhibit D3 is dated 4th February 1999; and Exhibit D4 is dated 17th September 2008. All these documents are disciplinary warnings to the claimant; but they all predate the approval given to the claimant to proceed on study leave without pay. Can the defendant on 9th November 2011 (the date of Exhibit C11/D9) use something that happened as far back as 1999, 2002 or even 2008 as the basis for a termination communicated on 9th November 2011? I do not think so. The law is that an employer who upon the knowledge of an infraction by an employee chooses to condone same cannot be heard to resurrect the issue again. See Ekunda v. University of Ibadan [200] 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 220 CA, ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725 CA, Nigerian Army v. Brig. Gen. Maude Aminu-Kano [2010] LPELR-2013(SC); [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 429; [2010] 1 MJSC (Pt. I) 151 and Lawrence Idemudia Oborkhale v. LASU [2013] 30 NLLR (Pt. 85) 1 NIC. And by Udegbunam v. FCDA [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 SC, an employer has the discretion to give a lesser punishment to an employee but he has no discretion to give a higher punishment than that prescribed. In the instant case, the action of the defendant approving a study leave for the claimant is sure one of condoning whatever infraction the claimant had committed. In any event, Exhibits D1, D2, D3 and D4 in being warnings to the claimant are themselves the punishment already meted out to the claimant. Accordingly, I do not see any merit in the defendant’s argument that it terminated the claimant’s employment because of disciplinary issues the claimant has. The argument of the defendant in that regard is thus dismissed. 38. The reason for terminating the employment of the claimant by the defendant accordingly remains what is indicated in Exhibit C11/D9, which is the unavailability of any opening suitable for the claimant’s skill. The validity/justification of this reason (the law by Angel Shipping & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 685) 551 CA, Institute of Health ABU Hospital Management Board v. Mrs Jummai R. I. Anyip [2011] LPELR-1517(SC), George Abomeli v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451, Ogunsanmi v. C. F. Furniture (W.A.) Co. Ltd [1961] 1 All NLR 224 and Mr. Kunle Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 360) 1480 SC at 1491; [2007] 1 – 2 SC 317 is that once an employer gives a reason for terminating or dismissing an employee, the burden lies with him to justify the said reason) can only be determined by considering the conditions under which the claimant’s study leave without pay was granted by the defendants. 39. Exhibit C8 dated 10th August 2009 is the letter by the defendants approving the study leave without pay for the claimant. It provides as follows: We wish to inform you that Management has approved your captioned request for a period of Twelve (12) months effective 5th October, 2009 to enable you pursue a Master Degree programme in Information Technology Management and Organisational Change at Lancaster University, United Kingdom. Kindly note that the twelve-month leave is without any financial obligations from the Bank but counts as part of your years of service only if you eventually return and serve the Bank for at least six (6) months. Please note, however, that the study leave period cannot be utilized as notice period for resignation. Where you wish to resign while on or immediately after the study leave your date of commencement of the leave will automatically be your date of separation from Bank. You are required to give a six months notice of your intention to return to the service of the Bank after the completion of your program. Please note that re-absorption will be subject to availability of vacancy and the required skills. We wish you God’s guidance and success in your studies in the United Kingdom and encourage you to be a good ambassador of the Bank. The interpretation of Exhibit C8 will reveal the true status of the claimant in terms of his relationship with the defendant during and post study leave as well as the validity or otherwise of the termination of the claimant’s employment. 40. There is no gainsaying that in stating in the second paragraph of Exhibit C8 that “the twelve-month leave is without any financial obligations from the Bank”, the study leave was one without pay. The second paragraph went on to state that the study leave “counts as part of your years of service”; but qualified this by saying “only if you eventually return and serve the Bank for at least six (6) months”. I must state that the period of 12 months given as the study leave period counting as part of the claimant’s years of service is only relevant and applies for purposes of determining the period to be used in determining disengagement benefits of the claimant, if any. This is the sense in which the qualification as to “only if you eventually return and serve the Bank for at least six (6) months” makes any meaning and so thereby relates to the question of the period of study leave being something to be counted as part of the claimant’s service years - once again, only for purposes of determining terminal benefits of the claimant, if any. The defendant went on to make it pretty clear that the study leave period cannot be utilized as notice period for resignation. All of this suggests that the defendants held the claimant to still be in service even when on study leave. See Igwe v. AICE [1994] 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 459, which held that where an employee is on an approved study leave without pay, he still remains a staff of the employer. So by the overall effect of the second paragraph of Exhibit C8, the claimant remained an employee of the defendants even when he was on study leave; and I so find and hold. This means that the argument of the defendant that the claimant, by allowing himself to undergo the process of interview for a new opening in the defendant, had invariably severed the earlier employment relationship he had with the defendant goes to no issue, and so is discountenanced. 41. By the third paragraph of Exhibit C8, where the claimant chooses to resign while on or immediately after the study leave the date of commencement of the leave will automatically be the date of the claimant’s separation from the Bank. For this provision to apply, the choice of leaving the Bank must be the claimant’s. In the instant case, there is no evidence before the Court indicating that it was the claimant who chose to resign from the services of the defendants. It was the defendants who chose to terminate the claimant’s employment. The defendants cannot, therefore, by Exhibit C11/D9 put the claimant’s termination as being effective from 5th October 2009. This is because by law, termination or dismissal cannot be retrospective. See New Nig, Bank Ltd v. Obevudiri [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 387 CA and Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd v. Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 156 SC. I held that the claimant remained an employee of the defendant even while on study leave. This being the case, the defendants cannot retrospectively terminate the employment of the claimant. I so find and hold. 42. The fourth paragraph of Exhibit C8 enjoined the claimant to give a six months notice of his intention to return to the service of the Bank after the completion of his program. In paragraph 14 of the statement of claim, the claimant pleaded that in compliance with the policy and terms of his study leave approval, he contacted the 1st defendant six months before the completion of his study and gave six months’ notice of his intention to return to the services of the 1st defendant after the completion of his programme. The supporting evidence for this pleading is paragraph 15 of the claimant’s deposition of 5th July 2013. There is no documentary evidence supporting paragraph 15 of the said deposition. Under cross-examination, the claimant testified that he gave the Bank a notice of intention to return to the Bank, which notice is with the Bank and was sent via email. There is no evidence of this email before the Court. The kind of notice required by the fourth paragraph of Exhibit C8 must be one that is in writing. The approval to go on study was leave was in writing; the notice to return to work in terms of Exhibit C8 must be in writing. As it is, there is no sufficient proof before this Court that the claimant gave notice of his intention to return to the services of the defendant after his study leave (the verbal evidence of the claimant in insufficient in that regard). I so find and hold. 43. The fifth paragraph of Exhibit C8 provides that “please note that re-absorption will be subject to availability of vacancy and the required skills”. By this provision, re-absorption was not made automatic by the defendant. It is dependent on availability of vacancy and the required skills, the termination of which is by the defendants. I referred to Igwe v. AICE (supra), which held that where an employee is on an approved study leave without pay, he still remains a staff of the employer in the absence of any evidence that he was dismissed, relieved or had his appointment terminated. That to do so, the employer would have to show that by the conditions or terms regulating the service of his employees, an employee who is on study leave without pay is not entitled to automatic re-absorption. In Exhibit C11, the defendants communicated to the claimant that it terminated the claimant’s services “due to unavailable opening presently suitable for your skill set”. This complies with Exhibit C8. I so find and hold. This means that the termination is valid contrary to the argument of the claimant; and given the holding that the defendants cannot terminate the claimant’s services retrospectively, the said termination of the claimant’s employment took effect on 9th November 2011. 44. What all of this means is that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendants was only wrongful in terms of the its effective date; but not as to fact of the termination itself. This being the case, the main relief (a) is not grantable. It fails. The alternative relief (a) is, however, grantable. Given that I held that the claimant remained an employee of the defendants even while on study leave, relief (b) becomes grantable. 45. Is the claimant entitled to any salaries, entitlements and severance package as per reliefs (c), and (d)? I do not think so. For one, the study leave was without pay; as such the claimant cannot be paid for the period of the study leave. Relief (c) is, however, for salaries for the period of 13 months from October 2010 to October 2011, the period the claimant was kept in waiting before the eventual termination of his employment. I held that there is no proof in this case that the claimant notified the defendants in writing of his intention to return to the services of the defendants. The claimant cannot accordingly make any claim for the period he was kept in waiting; and I so find and hold. Relief (c) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. 46. Relief (d) is for entitlement and severance package, which must be calculated from the day he joined the Bank till the letter of disengagement was issued and signed, inclusive of the period of the study leave. The argument of the defendants here is that this relief is not sustainable given that there are no supporting pleadings. I looked through the statement of claim. The closest one came to as pleading touching on the issue of entitlement is paragraph 25 of the statement of claim where the claimant pleaded thus: “On receiving the said letter of termination, the Claimant contacted his Solicitors…who write (sic) a letter to the Defendant demanding among other things that his day of disengagement from their organization be reversed to take effect from the day the letter was issued and the claimant’s benefit and entitlement be calculated to that day…” This cannot be the pleading (or sufficient pleading at that) that the claimant would rely on for a claim as per relief (d). In any event, what is the entitlement claimed; and what is the severance package claimed? The Court was not told. The claim for entitlement and severance package sounds like it is one for special damages, the particulars of which the claimant did not give as required by law. See NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC). Relief (d) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. 47. Relief (e) is for N50 Million as general damages for distress, mental exertion, psychological trauma they intentionally and deliberately caused the claimant being the bread winner of his family, for wrongful and unlawful termination of his employment and willful and deliberate incapacitation of the claimant by the defendants to pick another employment/establish himself with veritable business. In his written submission, the claimant talked of expenses of GBP25,000 and his attempt at finding another job and being refused same as well as the defendants’ failure to give the claimant work reference. I agree with the defendant’s submission that all of this is not supported by any pleading in the claimant’s statement of claim. Relief (e) accordingly fails and so is hereby dismissed. 48. Relief (f) is for N1,500,000.00 only being the cost of prosecuting this matter. Cost is at the discretion of the Court. Other than the alternative relief (a) and relief (b) which the claimant succeeded in, the claimant failed in all the other reliefs; as such he is not entitled to any cost. Relief (f) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. 49. Relief (g) is for “any other applicable reliefs as may be just and applicable in the circumstances”. It is neither here nor there and so is dismissed. 50. On the whole, and for the avoidance of doubt, the claimant’s case succeeds only in terms of the alternative relief (a) and relief (b); even at that only in the following terms: 1. The termination of the service of the claimant is effective only from 9th November 2011. 2. The claimant remained a staff of the defendant up to 9th November 2011, when his employment was terminated by the later of that date. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD