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1. By a complaint (together with the accompanying originating processes) dated and filed on 24th March 2016, the claimant prayed for: (1) The sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) only being compensation for loss of jobs and earnings and unfair labour practice by the defendant. (2) Interest on the said sum at the rate of 5% per annum till the year judgement is delivered. (3) Interest on the judgement sum at the rate of 21% per annum until same is fully liquidated. (4) The cost of this action assessed at N2,000,000 (Two Million Naira) only. 2. The defendant entered formal appearance and then filed its defence processes (the statement of defence, list of witnesses and statement on oath of the witness). The defendant did not file any list, and copies, of documents to be relied on at the trial. In reaction, the claimant filed his reply to the statement of defence as well as a witness reply statement on oath. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. The defendant, however, opted not to call its witness, thus resting its case on the claimant’s. The Court then ordered the filing of written addresses. The claimant’s finally written address is dated 16th January 2017 but filed on 19th January 2017, whilst the defendant’s is dated 5th June 2017 but filed on 8th June 2017. The claimant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed on 6th July 2017. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 3. To the claimant, he was working as a Food and Beverage Cost Controller in Golden Tulip Hotels. His letter of employment with Golden Tulip was tendered and marked as Exhibit C5, which was issued by African Sun. However, that African Sun subsequently became Golden Tulip. The claimant also referred to Exhibit C2, where in the first paragraph it was stated that Golden Tulip Essential Airport Lagos Hotel was formerly African Sun Lagos. That following a job vacancy advertisement made by the defendant, the claimant applied for employment in the defendant company. He successfully participated in the rigorous interview conducted by the defendant company, and was issued offer of employment (Exhibit C1). He accepted the offer of employment by signing it and transmitted same back to the defendant, and thereafter proceeded to resign his employment with Golden Tulip in order to commence employment with the defendant. Accordingly, that he resumed his employment with the defendant on 23rd November 2015 as per the contract of employment, only to be informed that the defendant’s management had changed their mind about his employment and had consequently withdrew their letter of employment duly issued to him. To the claimant, he was gainfully employed by Golden Tulip, and he had to resign the employment to commence his new job with the defendant following his acceptance of the defendant’s offer of employment. That he even tendered a Reference Letter (Exhibit C2) issued by his former employer, Golden Tulip Essential Airport Hotel Lagos, showing that he had a fruitful and amazing job at Golden Tulip. That but for the employment offered him by the defendant, he would have still remained in the employment of Golden Tulip, referring to Exhibit C2 where it was stated thus: “Mr. Ahmed leaves the company on his own request to further his professional development”. That this clearly shows that he was not terminated or dismissed from the employment of Golden Tulip but resigned the employment for the sole purpose of taking up the employment offered him by the defendant, and which he had legitimate expectations that if he had put up the same good, dedicated and professional work attitude he had put up in his job in Golden Tulip, he would have continued in the employ of the defendant for a long time, earning the salary agreed as per Exhibit C1 and further pursue his career progression and development. It is in consequence of all of this that the claimant filed the instant suit. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 4. To the defendant, the claimant merely claims to have responded to some job vacancies advertised by the defendant consequent upon which he was invited for an interview. That he further claims that he resigned his former job in anticipation, even though he had not been engaged by the defendant. That when it turned out that the defendant did not engage him, he proceeded to Court making claims against the defendant. To the defendant, the claimant was offered employment by “The Lilygate”; he admitted that Exhibit C1, was not signed as it ought to have been; he admitted that that paragraph 6 of Exhibit C1 was not observed or adhered to, in the sense that the conditions precedent to his engagement by the defendant were not fulfilled; he admitted that Exhibit C2, the purported Reference letter from Golden Tulip dated 17th November 2015, was addressed to him (the claimant) wherein he was referred to in the 3rd person pronoun; that Exhibit C5, the purported offer of employment by Golden Tulip dated 21st October 2014 was NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED by the claimant; that Exhibit C6, the claimant’s purported letter of resignation dated 2nd November 2015 was NEVER acknowledged by his employers or at all; and that Exhibit C7, the defendant’s letter dated November 26, 2015 advising the claimant of the outcome of his interview with the defendant was emphatic when it stated that “You were not selected in the final interview”, and without suggesting that the said letter cancels any one previously issued by the defendant or at all. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 5. The claimant submitted four issues for determination, namely: (i) What is the implication of the failure of the defendant to lead evidence during trial? (ii) Was there a valid contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant, and does the act of the defendant amount to a breach of the contract of employment as well as an unfair labour practice? (iii) Whether the offer of employment by the defendant to the claimant and which was accepted by the claimant entitles the claimant to have legitimate expectation interest of a running employment with the defendant. (iv) If issues (ii) and/or (iii) are answered in the affirmative, whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. 6. On issue (i), the claimant submitted that the failure of the defendant to call a witness and lead evidence in trial means that they have abandoned their pleadings, and are by implication, resting their case on the claimant’s case. As such, the only evidence for the Court to consider is the uncontroverted evidence of the claimant, citing Fairline Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd & anor v. Trust Adjusters Nig. Ltd [201] LPELR-20860(CA). The claimant accordingly called on the Court to determine this case on the basis of the evidence put forward by the claimant as the defendant’s pleadings not supported by evidence is deemed abandoned. The claimant went on that, assuming the Court desires to consider the defendant’s pleadings, the defence put forward by the defendant is frivolous and same lacks evidential value as same is not subjected to the rigour of cross-examination to ascertain its veracity. That having not called a witness to adopt the statement on oath, the claimant has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness and thus test the veracity their evidence; nor did the Court have the opportunity to watch the witness demeanour. The claimant then urged the Court to attach very little or no weight to same. 7. The claimant further submitted that the defence is frivolous, watery and a sham. First, that in their defence, the defendant denied that there is any entity like the defendant within the jurisdiction of this Court. However, in paragraph 1 of their witness statement on oath, the defendant’s witness, who is the defendant’s Managing Director and the alter ego of the defendant, stated that he is the Managing Director of the defendant, and put his address as Olubunmi Owa Street, Lekki Phase 1, Lagos, which is also the address on Exhibit C7; thus, it is clear that the defendant is an entity within the jurisdiction of this Court. 8. That the defendant also pleaded that Exhibit C1 did not emanate from them, and that assuming it did, it merely initiated an employment process. That nothing could be farther from the truth. That Exhibit C3 shows clearly that emails were sent and received from the email belonging to the defendant’s Human Resources Officer, who in company practice, is charged with employment and recruitment matters. That the only other way is for the defendant to prove that the email was hacked and used to send those messages; this it have not done. That it is also important to correct the defendant that an offer of employment letter is an offer which once accepted, creates a binding contractual relationship. That the claimant accepted the offer as per Exhibit C1 after signing it and sending it to the defendant on November 2, 2015 as indicated in Exhibit C3; at that point, Exhibit C1 ceased to become a process, but a valid contract. 9. The claimant proceeded that the defendant also pleaded that the claimant did not satisfy the General Terms and Conditions requirement contained in Exhibit C1. Again, that this is false. That the conditions as contained in paragraph 6 of Exhibit C3 are satisfactory references and a medical certificate of fitness to work from the defendant’s designated clinic. That the claimant got the references as seen in Exhibit C2. That the medical certificate would only be gotten from a clinic designated by the defendant, and until they have so designated, there is no obligation on the claimant to provide the medical certificate. That the defendant also denied that Exhibit C1 was signed by the Human Resources Manager of the defendant. Exhibit C1 is a document, and by section 125 of the Evidence Act, 2011 the contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence, citing Obiazikwor v. Obiazikwor [2007] Vol. 37 WRN 106 at 131 - 132. That Exhibit C1 clearly shows that it was issued by Orji Ama Ukpai. the Managing Director of the defendant, who is the defendant’s listed witness in this case but who wasn’t called to give evidence. That it was not issued by the Human Resources Manager of the defendant, but by the Managing Director. 10. That the defendant also pleaded that the communication between the defendant’s Human Resources officer and the claimant had no binding effect on the company. That the question arising therefrom is whether the acts of a Human Resources Manager as the head of employment and personnel in modern corporate governance is binding on a company. To the claimant, the Human Resource Manager is a principal officer of a company who is charged by the Board of Directors of a company with the duty of employment and personnel management. That the Business Dictionary, accessed online, defines a Human Resource Manager as an “individual within an organization responsible for hiring new employees, supervising employee evaluations, mediation between employees and bosses as necessary, and general overseeing of the personnel department”. That the duties of the Human Resources Manager are conferred on that office by the Board of Directors, and as such the Human Resources Manager is a management staff in a company and qualifies as an agent of the company duly appointed by the Board of Directors for that purpose. Accordingly, the acts of the Human Resources Manager in employment and recruitment are deemed to be actions of the company by virtue of section 66(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap. C20 LFN 2004. Indeed, that it is a standard and customary practice to have letters of employment, promotion, suspension, termination and dismissal signed by the Human Resources Manager on behalf of a company and same is binding on the company, citing Olanrewaju v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691 and Abalogu v. SPDC Ltd [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 837) 309 where the Court of Appeal recognized letters of dismissal signed by the Human Resources Personnel of the various companies. The claimant then submitted that the Human Resources Manager of the defendant had the powers of the defendant to communicate with him as per the employment offered him, praying the Court to so hold. 11. Furthermore, that the defendant had also pleaded that the claimant was never employed by Golden Tulip. That a joint consideration of Exhibits C2 and C5 would show that the claimant was employed by the African Sun Lagos which later became Golden Tulip Essential Airport Lagos Hotel. That the defendant had stated, though indirectly, that Exhibit C5 was forged, claiming that it was generated from the computer to deceive the Court. Sadly for them, that this allegation is not proved, and thus fails. That forgery is a serious criminal allegation which needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt even where the forgery is alleged in a civil case as in the instant suit. The defendant had also pleaded that they sent Exhibit C7 to the claimant. Exhibit C7 is dated November 26, 2015, while Exhibit C1 is dated October 29, 2016 accepted by the claimant on 30th October 2015, and the acceptance was communicated to the defendant on November 2, 2015 as shown in Exhibit C3. Thus, Exhibit C7 was belated. That it was made after the contract between the claimant and the defendant had been concluded, urging the Court to so hold. The claimant consequently prayed the Court to disregard the pleadings filed by the defendant or at best, attach very little or no weight to same. 12. For issue (ii) i.e. whether there is a valid contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant, and if so whether the act of the defendant amounts to a breach of that contract of employment as well an unfair labour practice, the claimant answered in the affirmative, relying on the definition of a contract of employment under section 91 of the Labour Act Cap. LI LFN 2004, which is “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other person agrees to serve the employer as a worker” as well as Shena Security Company Ltd v. Afropak (Nigeria) Ltd & ors [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 77 SC at 94. To the claimant, there was a valid offer and a valid acceptance of the contract of employment, citing Olaniyan & ors v. Unilag & anor [1985] NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. For the existence of a bald offer, the claimant referred to Exhibit C1, which to the claimant was signed. Referring to Exhibit C3, the claimant submitted that Exhibit C1 was sent to him ab electronic document. This being so, it would be governed by the provisions on signing of electronic documents as provided in the Evidence Act. In this light, section 93 of the Evidence Act, 2011 comes in handy. The section provides as follows: “Where a rule of evidence requires a signature or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed; an electronic signature satisfies that rule of law or avoids those consequences”. Also that section 94(1) of the Evidence Act goes on to provide as follows: “Evidence that a person exists having the same name, address, business or occupation as the maker of a document purports to have, is admissible to show that such document was written or signed by that person”. That the valediction (sic) of Exhibit C1 is as follows: Yours Faithfully, On behalf of Lilygate Nigeria Limited Orji Ama Ukpai Managing Director To the claimant, Exhibit C1, by virtue of sections 93 and 94(1) of the Evidence Act, is in law deemed to have been signed by Orji Ama Ukpai. That this conclusion is strengthened by the statement on oath of the defendant’s witness, which though is not in evidence before the Court, but is a document in the Court’s file and the Court is entitled to look at it, referring to ANPP & anor v. Argungu & ors [2009] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1171) 445 at 458. That the said statement on oath shows that there is a person like Orji Ama Ukpai who is the Managing Director of the defendant, thus satisfying the requirement of section 94(1) of the Evidence Act. Based on the forgoing, that the inevitable conclusion is that there was a valid offer issued by the defendant, containing the terms of the contract, and duly signed by the defendant. 13. On the issue of valid acceptance, the claimant submitted that the last paragraph of Exhibit C1 clearly shows that it was duly accepted by the claimant, and as such there was also a valid acceptance. Based on this, that it is clear that there was a valid contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant. The claimant went on that first page of Exhibit C3 dated October 29, 2015 sent at 5:01pm by one Kehinde Badmus, designated as a Human Resources Officer in the defendant, states as follows: Subsequent to you [sic] interview with the lilygate hotel, we have decided to make you part of our team. Find attached the offer letter for the position of cost controller with the Lilygate hotel Lagos. We are expecting your swift response. That this clearly shows, even beyond Exhibit C1, that there was a consensus to have an employer-employee relationship, and the claimant responded swiftly. That the address and phone number on Exhibit C3 is the same with the address and phone number written at the bottom of Exhibit Cl. That the email address, kehinde.badmus@lilygatelagos.com, is an active email because mails were sent and received from that email address. Thus, that the evidence clearly shows that there was a valid offer of employment from the defendant to the claimant, there was the intention to create an employer-employee relationship, there was a representation from the defendant that it had offered the claimant a job, and on the basis of the representation and mutual consensus, the claimant resigned his employment with Golden Tulip, urging the Court to so hold. That the action of the defendant giving rise to this suit is a breach of contract of employment. 14. As to whether the act of the defendant amounts to an unfair labour practice, the claimant submitted that the defendant in this case issued an offer of employment to the claimant knowing that the claimant had an existing employment and that he would need to resign that employment before taking up their own employment. The claimant accepted the employment, and returned the signed copy to them on November 2, 2016. He made sure he didn’t resign until he had sent them the accepted Exhibit C1. The defendant didn’t say a word. As per his contract of employment, he resumed in the defendant’s office on 23rd November 2015 only to be informed that management had changed their mind. Then on 26th November 2015 they issued a callous letter, Exhibit C7, purportedly informing him of an unsuccessful interview. To the claimant, this amounts to an unfair labour practice, something this Court has jurisdiction over given section 254C(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution and Aero Contractors Co. of Nigeria Ltd v. National Association of Aircrafts Pilots and Engineers (NAAPE) & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/120/2013. Also referred to are: Mix & Bake v. NUFBTE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 247 at 282 - 283, where this Court defined unfair labour practice as practices which do not conform with best practice in labour circles as may be enjoined by local and international experience; MPWUN v. Alzico Ltd [2010] 18 NLLR (Pt. 49) 69 and Aluminium Manufacturing Co. Nig Ltd v. Volkswagen Nig. Ltd [2010] 21 NLLR (Pt. 60) 428. Similarly, that the word “unfair” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as accessed online as “not based on or behaving according to the principles of equality and justice”. That the question now arises if it is in accordance with the principles of justice for an employer to make an employment offer to a person, who resigns his job to pick up the offered employment only to be informed by that employer three (3) weeks after the job was offered and accepted that he was no longer offered the job. The claimant thought not; and that such acts need to be discouraged to ensure that employees are protected from unfair enchantments by employers in Nigeria who exploit the high level of unemployment in Nigeria to maltreat the citizenry. That that the conduct of the defendant is not only a breach of contract, but same also amounts to an unfair labour practice, praying the Court to so hold. 15. Regarding issue (iii) i.e. whether the offer of employment by the defendant to the claimant and which was accepted by the claimant entitles the claimant to have expectation interest of a running employment with the defendant, the claimant answered in the affirmative. To the claimant, the concept of expectation interest, or otherwise legitimate expectation has been a concept in labour law for many years now, but seems to have come into the firmament of our labour law jurisprudence only recently as per the judgments of this court in Medical and Health Union Workers of Nigeria & ors v. Federal Ministry of Health unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/238/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on July 22, 2013 and Patrick Modilim v. UBA unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/353/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on June 19, 2014. That the doctrine of legitimate expectation as established in international labour practice, and which has constantly been implemented by the labour courts of foreign jurisdictions, and recently by this Court, is that where an employer by his actions or inactions, creates a state of affairs that gives an employee an expectation interest which is legitimate and reasonable, then such employer is by law obligated to meet up with such expectation, a principle said to have roots in the classic case of Administrator of the Transvaal & ors v. Traub & ors [1989] 10 Industrial LJ 823(A) cited in the Zimbabwean case of Wilberforce Chimutimbira v. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority unreported judgment No. LC/H/02/2014, a judgment of the Labour Court of Zimbabwe, where the court explained the doctrine of legitimate expectation as follows: The implication of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is that, if a decision maker, either through the application of a regular practice or through an express promise, leads those affected legitimately to expect that he or she will decide in a particular way then that expectation is protected and the decision maker cannot ignore it when making the decision. 16. That in subsequent cases, the courts have continued to espouse this sublime doctrine of legitimate expectation. Thus, in Health Professions Council v. MC GOWN [1994] (2) ZLR 329(S) cited in Wilberforce Chimutimbira v. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, the court stated that the legitimate expectation doctrine as enunciated in Traub extends the principle of natural justice. Also, that in Minister of Information, Posts & Telecommunications v. PTC Managerial Employees Workers Committee cited in Wilberforce Chimutimbira v. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court held that legitimate expectations include expectations which go beyond enforceable rights provided that they have some reasonable and rational basis. That what can be established from the foregoing is that the doctrine of legitimate expectation, or expectation interest, is one that has become a norm, rule and practice in international labour, and as same has been given recognition and implementation by the courts. Furthermore, that in the South African case of Merafong City Local Municipality v. South African Local Government Bargaining Council & ors unreported judgment of the Labour Court of South Africa, Johannesburg Case No. JR 1769/12, Anton Steenkamp of the Labour Court of South Africa upheld the award of the arbitration panel which had held as follows at paragraph 9 of the Court’s judgment: The [municipality’s] conduct of frequently rolling over the [employee’s] fixed term contracts even after stating that it had no intention to, gave rise to a reasonable expectation on the part of the [employees] and that their contracts will continue to be rolled over in the future. Therefore the [municipality’s] argument that such an expectation is unfounded is illogical as any reasonable employee in the position of the [employees] would have had the same expectation. 17. The claimant went on that in Nigeria, the doctrine of legitimate expectation or expectation interest has also taken roots in our labour law jurisprudence, citing Medical and Health Union Workers of Nigeria & ors v. Federal Ministry of Health (where this court acknowledged that the practice of skipping of salary grade levels by Government can create an expectation interest, which in turn is capable of creating an entitlement or vested right in favour of the complainants who have been beneficiaries of the practice) and Patrick Modilim v. UBA (where this Court held that the claimant was entitled to a remedy regarding the loss of the expectation interest in terms of the breach of the defendant’s commitment to be willing to review the claimant’s position to the level of General Manager). 18. In the instant case, the claimant then asked whether the representations made to him by the defendant can be construed to give rise to expectations by him. That in answering this question, it is important to consider these representations. First, that at page 1 of Exhibit C3, the defendant represented to the claimant that they would employ him into their company, and stated in the email “we have decided to make you part of our team”. The claimant urged the Court to note the use of the word “decided”, which word (“decide”) is defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as “to choose something, especially after thinking carefully about several possibilities”. Thus, that by telling the claimant that they had decided to make him a part of their team, the defendant was simply saying that they had chosen him. Secondly, that Exhibit C1 clearly represents and indeed creates a contract of employment between him and the defendant once the claimant accepted and signed the Exhibit C1. That from Exhibit C1 and C3, it is clear that the defendant had made express representations of employment to the claimant, which he is entitled to rely on and resign his employment with Golden Tulip. Those express representations also created an expectation, which is reasonable and legitimate, that the claimant would continue in the employment of the defendant if he put up the same work attitude he had put up in his former employment with Golden Tulip, and which good work attitude was the reason Golden Tulip issued him with Exhibit C2. Indeed, that he would never have left his stable employment with Golden Tulip which had been on for over one year if he was informed that the employment by the claimant would last a few days or a few weeks or a few months. That the claimant reasonably expected that it was going to be a running employment, especially in view of the excitement in which their email in Exhibit C3 was written. Thus, the expectation of a running employment with the defendant made the claimant resign his job with Golden Tulip. Having frustrated this reasonable and legitimate expectation, that the defendant has exposed itself to liability to the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. 19. In respect of issue (iv) i.e. whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, the claimant submitted that in view of the seeming trite law that the Courts do not award pre-judgment interest, he would abandon relief (2). The then submitted that if the Court answers the claimant’s issues (ii) and/or (iii) in the affirmative, he would be entitled to the reliefs sought in terms of reliefs (1), (3) and (4). The claimant urged to note that his claim for N5 Million as per relief (1) is not a claim founded on wrongful termination, but a claim for compensation for loss of a job and earnings including damages for unfair labour practice. That if the defendant had not represented to the claimant that they had offered him a job, he wouldn’t have resigned his stable job with Golden Tulip. Also, if they had allowed him to resume the job offered him as per Exhibit C1, he expected that he would have had a stable employment with the defendant. By making him to resign his job with Golden Tulip and refusing to let him to resume with them, the defendant had made him lose out on both ends. In such instance, that the measure of damages to be awarded him is not what the employee would have earned for the period of the notice, the Court would have to take into consideration the harm and the injuries the defendant’s act caused him. That sections 14 and 19(d) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 give this Court the powers to award all such remedies, or award compensation or damages in any circumstances as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled. Accordingly, the claimant invited the Court to exercise this discretion and hold that the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) is fair and adequate compensation due to him. 20. Relief (3) is for interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 21% per annum until same is fully liquidated. This interest is a post-judgment interest. That in Stabilini Visioni Ltd v. Metalum Ltd [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 416 at 436, the Court of Appeal held that post-judgment interest may be awarded by the court and it is meant to commence from the date of judgment until whole liquidation of same. That Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 (already repealed) empowers this Court to award post-judgment interest at a rate of not less than l0%. That this relief is, therefore, within the powers of this Court to grant, praying the Court to grant relief (3). 21. Relief (4) is for the cost of this action assessed at N2,000,000. That in NIPOST v. Musa [2013] LPELR-20780(CA), the Court of Appeal recognized the various costs to which a party is entitled to in litigation. According to the Court: In the award of costs, the Court is expected to consider all the circumstances of the case… The relevant considerations in the award of cost by the Courts have been enunciated in a plethora of decided cases by the Supreme Court and this Court. For instance in Adelakun vs. Oruku (2006) 11 NWLR Pt. 992 p. 625 @ 650, this Court laid down certain factors to be taken into consideration in awarding costs. They are: (a) the summons fees paid (b) the duration of the case (c) the number of witnesses called by the successful party (d) the nature of the case of the parties, the plaintiff’s case or the defence of the defendant, whether frivolous or vexatious (e) cost of legal representation (f) monetary value at the time of incurring the expenses; and (g) the value and purchasing power of the currency of award at the time of the award. 22. That it is clear that the wrong that gave rise to this action was caused by the defendant. In prosecuting this case, the claimant paid filing fees and paid his solicitors to prosecute this case on his behalf. The defendant on their part put up a most frivolous and vexatious defence which they abandoned, obviously because it has no substance. Despite this frivolous processes, the claimant still filed a reply to them and paid the filing fees. That a consideration of these issues entitles the claimant to cost from the defendant. The claimant has asked for the sum of N2,000,000, urging that same be granted. The claimant concluded by praying the Court to grant his reliefs as per the General Form of Complaint. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 23. The defendant on its part submitted one issue for determination i.e. whether the claimant has made out a case entitling him to the prayers sought in this suit. To the defendant, it is for a claimant/plaintiff to prove his case and not for a defendant to disprove same, referring to E. D. Tsokwa & Sons Co. Ltd v. UBN Ltd [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 281; and that whoever asserts must offer proof to succeed in his claim, citing Horst Sommer & ors v. FHA 3 SCJE 690. That in civil matters, a plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish his claim, which burden does not shift to the defendant (Orlu v. Gogo-Abite 6 SCJL 1). That it is a matter of a curious nature that the claimant under cross-examination had stated that he was offered employment by The Lilygate. That it is also obvious on the face of the suit that the defendant in this suit is Lilygate Nigeria Limited. That one, therefore, stands to question the discrepancy. To the defendant, if an enabling law provides for a particular name by way of juristic legal personality, a party must sue or be sued in that name; he cannot sue or be sued in another name, citing Anyaegbunam v. Osaka [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 657) 386 and Fawehinmi v. NBA (No.2) [1989] NWLR (Pt. 105) 558. That it, therefore, behoves a claimant and his counsel to supply the accurate name of the party or corporation the claimant intends to sue or feels he has a right of action/relief against, citing J. & J. TECHNO (Nig.) Ltd v. YHQS Ltd [2015] 8 NWLR 1 at 26. That a party to an action is a person whose name is designated on the record as plaintiff/claimant or defendant. The term party refers to that person by or against whom legal suit is brought. For an action to be maintained against any corporate entity, it must be in its registered name and the exact name of the company registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, should be used if it is suing or being sued. That where, therefore, it is the case that the wrong party is proceeded against, as in this case, there cannot be cause of action as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, that there is a world of difference between Lilygate Nig. Ltd, the defendant herein, and The Lilygate which the claimant alleged to have offered him an employment. On that note, that there is no cause of action against the defendant in this suit. 24. To the defendant, Exhibit C1, the defendant’s purported letter of offer of employment dated 29th October 2015, is an unsigned document. That it is settled law that when a document is not signed, credit or liability in respect of the document cannot be given or attached to anyone; in the eye of the law, therefore, an unsigned document has no efficacy and is worthless, citing FRN v. Bankole [2014] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 337 at 357 - 358. That in the instant case, Exhibit C1, which the claimant heavily relies upon, was not signed by the appropriate authority. Thus that document is not authenticated. That the reason why Exhibit C1 is not signed and could not have been signed at that stage is found in paragraph 6 of that very document which contains a proviso or a condition precedent to an applicant’s employment as follows: 6. General terms and Conditions Details of the above and your other terms and conditions of employment are as contained in the The Lilygate Hotels Staff Handbook which is in line with statutory regulations. This appointment is subject to satisfactory references on you from sources the Management may decide, and a medical certificate of fitness to work from The Lilygate Hotel’s designated clinic. If you accept the above terms, please endorse the attached copy of this letter and return same to the undersigned along with a signed copy of the slip below within a week of receiving this letter (the emphasis is the defendant’s). That the claimant, accepted these “GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS” and accordingly endorsed the attached copy of the letter, but would neither await the defendant carry out the “satisfactory references” on him nor wait to be subjected to a medical examination to determine his fitness to work. The claimant was desperate and thought he could impose himself on the defendant. 25. The defendant continued that the employment of the claimant by the defendant was subject to compliance with paragraph 6 of Exhibit C1. That the expression “subject to” subordinates the provisions of the subject section to the section referred to, which is intended not to be affected by the provision of the latter, citing Uchiv v. Sabo [2016] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 264 at 328, 329 and 330. That the law is that a party seeking to enforce his right under a contractual agreement must show that he has fulfilled all the conditions precedent and that he has performed all those terms which ought to have been performed by him, citing BFI Group Corp v. BPE [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209 at 247. That the defendant was not under an obligation to employ the claimant, the latter not having satisfied the requirement for employment as contained in Exhibit C1. 26. To the defendant, Exhibit C2 is the purported reference letter from Golden Tulip dated 17th November 2015. That this bogus document was so hurriedly prepared that its intent and purpose were completely overlooked. That it is elementary that a reference letter is one prepared by someone who knows or claims to know another, giving information about the latter’s character or generally, especially to a would be employer. That Exhibit C2 is not such a document. It is addressed to the claimant himself (the person under reference), telling the claimant (himself) about himself. That Exhibit C2 is not only bogus, it is dubious and doubtful in the extreme; it is not a document emanating from a former employer and intended for a would be employer. That Exhibit C2, though addressed to the claimant, refers to the claimant in the third person pronoun. That it is a document prepared out of desperation and with a view to deceiving the Court. That the document demonstrates total lack of ingenuity on the part of the claimant; it does not deserve any consideration as it is worthless. That reference letters or letters of reference are never directed or addressed to the person whose character and/or abilities are in issue; rather, they are directed/addressed to a third person. It could be to “WHOM IT MAY CONCERN”. The defendant then asked how the claimant procured the official letter headed paper of Golden Tulip. That one thing is however established, which is that the document is bogus; it is self prepared and is intended to mislead the Court. Also, that like the document itself, the signature on Exhibit C2 is doubtful, urging the Court not to act on that document. 27. The defendant went on that Exhibit C3 is a purported email correspondence between the claimant and the defendant. That the document without more cannot impose a duty and/or liability on the defendant. Ditto, even when it is alleged to have transmitted Exhibit C1. That it has become necessary at this point to draw a distinction between an offer and invitation to treat. An invitation to treat is the first step in negotiations between the parties to a contract. An invitation to treat may or may not lead to a definite offer being made by one of the parties to the negotiation. An invitation to treat is not on offer that can be accepted to lead to an agreement or contract. to the defendant, there is no contract or offer made to the claimant by the defendant upon which the claimant can lay claims on. 28. To the defendant, Exhibit C5 is purported to be an offer letter from Golden Tulip dated the 21st October 2014, which the claimant relies on in proof of the assertion that he was a staff of Golden Tulip at the material time. That unfortunately that document does not say so as it is not evident on the face of Exhibit C5 that the addressee, the claimant ever accepted that offer. That he who asserts must offer proof in order to succeed, citing Horst Sommer & ors v. FHA (supra). 29. The defendant continued that Exhibit C6 is a letter purporting to have been written by the claimant resigning his employment from Golden Tulip. Again, that like all other self prepared papers, the claimant is unable to achieve that which he had wished this Court to believe. That the letter dated 2nd November 2015 has not been delivered to the addressee by the claimant. There is no evidence that it was ever received by the addressee or at all. That like every other document sought to be relied upon by the claimant, Exhibit C6 is of no evidential value and consequently cannot be acted upon by the Court. It does not avail the claimant. 30. The defendant proceeded that Exhibit C7 dated November 26, 2015 originates from the defendant and it advices the claimant of the outcome of his interview with the defendant. In very specific terms, the second line of the letter reads: “You were not selected in the final interview”. That Exhibit C7 did not refer to an earlier letter. It did not allude to the fact that this letter was to act as replacement of an earlier one. That the letter was the one that conveyed the outcome of defendant’s meeting with the defendant, which was that the claimant was not successful in the final interview. 31. To the defendant, it is common knowledge that it adduced no evidence to establish its defence. That the consequence of this is that where, prima facie, the plaintiff/claimant has not proved his case, the defendant in not bound to call evidence to establish his defence. That the defence is only required to refute evidence adverse to him. Thus, whenever the defendant adduces no evidence, the plaintiff/claimant does not earn judgment instanto, referring to Akanmobe v. Dino [2008] LPELR 8405, Arabambi v. Advance Industries Ltd [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 1, Awuse v. Odili [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 416 and Elewa v. Guffanti (Nig.) Plc (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 233 at 248. That the abandonment of the pleadings by the defendant does not automatically translate to judgment in favour of the plaintiff/claimant. Thus, the claimant must adduce cogent and credible evidence in support of his claim in order to succeed, citing Oluyede v. Access Bank Plc [2015] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1489) 597 at 607. That by virtue of sections 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden is on the plaintiff/claimant to prove his assertion if he is to succeed; and this is so notwithstanding the defendant’s refusal to adduce evidence. That the claimant has a duty to lead credible evidence in proof of his claim; and this much, the claimant has failed to achieve. The defendant then acknowledged that the address of counsel, however brilliant, can never take the place of evidence, citing Adegbite v. Amosu [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 405 at 423. That submission of counsel is no substitute for hard evidence. 32. On the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the defendant submitted that the doctrine is self-evidently a question of fact, citing FBIR v. Halliburton (WA) Ltd [2016] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 53. That what that doctrine postulates is that where a public body or person acting in public authority has issued a promise or has been acting in a given way, the members of the public, who are to be affected by the scheme of conducting public affairs in the charted manner, would by law require the promise or practice to be honoured or kept by the public body or person acting in public authority, save where there exists sound basis not to so insist on the settled scheme of conducting the public affairs. That the doctrine, therefore, enjoins public bodies to be fair, straight-forward and consistent in their dealings with the public. That this doctrine is based on the existence of regular practice by a public body, which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue or subsist and thus relies on the state of affairs of conduct or arrange his business or affair in anticipation of the availability of the regular practice to cater for the case of the claimant. That fair and open dealing are the pillars of the doctrine; and fairness requires that the exercise of doctrine expectation be moored to full disclosure or utmost good faith by the potential beneficiary of the doctrine, referring to FBIR v. Halliburton (supra) at page 98. To the defendant, therefore, the claimant herein, upon the facts of this case, is not a potential beneficiary of this doctrine, his conduct lacking in full disclosure and utmost good faith. This is assuming (without conceding) that the said doctrine applies in this case where the defendant does not qualify as a public body or one acting in public authority. 33. On award of interest, the defendant submitted that interest may be awarded in a case in two distinct circumstances, namely: as of right; and where there is a power conferred by statute to do so, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. That where the interest is being claimed as a matter of right, the proper practice is to claim entitlement to it in the writ and lead facts which will show such an entitlement in the statement of claim. Furthermore, that interest is not claimed in an unliquidated damage that needs factual existence to be established, referring to Ascot Flowlines Ltd v. Izu [2015] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1478) 119 and Texaco Overseas (Nig.) Unltd v. Pedmar (Nig.) Ltd [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 758) 526. That the claimant is accordingly not entitled to interest as claimed. In conclusion, the defendant submitted that the evidence adduced by the claimant does not entitle him to the claims sought and accordingly the Court should dismiss the claims with substantial costs in favour of the defendant. THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 34. In reacting on points of law, the claimant first called on the Court to discountenance with sub-head 3 (evidence of both parties) of the defendant’s final written address as same is aimed at misleading the Court as the evidence stated therein are not as supplied by the claimant, referring the Court to the Court’s record of proceedings. The claimant then submitted that considering the evidence before the Court, he has proved his case on balance of probability arid he is, therefore, entitled to his claims. On the argument of the defendant that the claimant sued the wrong party and as such, the action is not sustainable, the claimant submitted that at no point did the defendant ever object to this alleged irregularity. That the defendant also never alleged mistaken identity or forgery during trial. That it is too late in the day for the defendant to come up with such assertion. Furthermore, that on the face of the originating process, the name of the defendant is stated there in, the two names complained of. Further still, that this is a fact contained in the statement of claim as regards who the defendant is and its registered address, which was not controverted by the defendant in anyway. And that it is settled law unchallenged or uncontroverted fact or facts, need no further proof more so, if the said fact or facts pleaded, are given in evidence, citing Hillary Farms Ltd & ors v. MV Mahtra & ors [2007] LPELR-1365(SC). In any event, that the defendant has waived its right to object to this having fully participated in the full course of the proceeding without raising an objection to the irregularity. 35. Next, the claimant submitted that in resolving the ambiguity (if any) surrounding the date the employment of the claimant takes effect, the opening paragraph of Exhibit C1 (claimant’s letter of employment dated 29th October 2015), needs to be taken note of. It states: “We refer to your application for employment and subsequent recruitment procedure and are pleased to offer you employment as Cost Controller (Salary Scale E3) for Lilygate Nigeria Limited with effect from November 23rd, 2015”. That from this extract, the employment of the claimant took effect from 23rd November 2015 and the claimant resumed that same day after signing the attachment as required by exhibit C1 within one week of receipt of same. It is thus surprising that the defendant is making an issue out of the date of effect of the employment when Exhibit C1 which is before this Court is clear on this. 36. On the other hand, on the issue of paragraph 6 of Exhibit C1, that the satisfactory references as preferred by the defendant are yet to be indicated by the defendant and more so, as a general and customary practice in employment, the hospital references are usually sorted out after resumption of duties, so, it is odd to hold otherwise that the employment of the claimant has not been perfected by the claimant and at such he has not been employed by the defendant, when it is clear that the employment of the claimant took effect from 23rd November 2015 as per Exhibit C1. 37. Furthermore, that the defendant cannot by the way they have adopted challenge the authenticity of Exhibit C2. The defendant had alleged forgery of the content of Exhibit C2 and the signature contained therein. It is the claimant’s submission that an allegation of fraud is criminal in nature and same needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt as provided for under section 135(1) Evidence Act 2011. That the defendant if in doubt would have written to the author of the said Exhibit C2 (General Manager, Golden Tulip) to confirm the authenticity of the letter rather than sit back, accept same and wake up at the eleventh hour to make a forgery allegation on same. Furthermore, that there is nothing doubtful about the signature on Exhibit C2 as a signature has been defined in the Black Law’s Dictionary, Eight Edition, page 1415 as: “any name, mark, or writing used with the intention of authenticating a document”. Also referred to is The Vessel MV Naval Gent & ors v. Associated Commodity Int’l Ltd [2015] LPELR-25973(CA), which adopted Dr Bolaji Akinsanya v. Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd [2010] LPELR-3687(CA), where the word signature was defined as “A person’s name or mark written by the person or at the person’s direction. Any name, mark or writing used with the intention of authenticating a document”. To the claimant, given all of this, there is no better way to prove the authenticity and content of Exhibit C2 as having emanated from the author (Golden Tulip) other than the signature which was duly affixed to same. That one cannot settle for the submission of the defendant over a document they accepted and acted upon. 38. The defendant also argued that there is no definite offer between the parties and what existed was just an invitation to treat. To the claimant, there is a definite offer between the parties which is Exhibit C1 wherein all the terms of the contract including the effective date were all stated; this offer was equally accepted by the claimant on 30th October 2015. That Exhibit C5 is a letter of offer of employment dated 21st October 2014 written by African Sun Limited and addressed to the claimant. That it is rather misleading to say the offer therein was not accepted when on the face of the document (at the foot of the letter), the letter was duly signed by the claimant showing acceptance of the offer. The defendant also alleged that the claimant’s letter of resignation (Exhibit C6) with his former employer was not acknowledged by his former employer. To the claimant, this submission again is erroneous as it is trite that resignation takes effect immediately and the employer need not acknowledge same. 39. The claimant went on that his employment took effect from 23rd November 2015 by Exhibit C1, and he resumed duty. That Exhibit C7 is dated 26th November 2015, days after the claimant resumed duty as an employee of the defendant. That Exhibit C7 is an afterthought; having accepted the offer for employment, the defendant cannot turn back to say the claimant was not selected from the final interview. 40. The defendant has also argued that the claimant cannot benefit from the doctrine of legitimate expectation. That putting into consideration all facts and evidence before this Court, it is obvious that the claimant’s case does not fall short of one which the doctrine can operate. That having made sacrifices, quitting his job on the information of the defendant that he has been offered an employment to work with the defendant (Exhibit C1) and to resume on a named date shows that the claimant has a legitimate expectation of a running employment with the defendant. That the defendant has also argued that this doctrine only applies to public authorities. That this is far from the truth; the doctrine has been held to apply to private employments, citing Modilim v. United Bank for Africa Plc (unreported) Suit No: NICN/LA/353/201. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to discountenance with the submissions of the defendant as same lacks merit and praying the Court to grant his claims. COURT’S DECISION 41. I have carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. The claimant’s case is that the defendant offered him employment, which he accepted; he thereafter resigned the employment he had (Exhibit C6 dated 2nd November 2015 is the said letter of resignation) only for the defendant to turn around and say that he was unsuccessful in the interview. He is accordingly claiming for damages in the sum of N5 Million plus post-judgment interest and cost of the suit. In arguing his case, the claimant in paragraph 7.2 of his final written address abandoned relief (2). Relief (2) is accordingly dismissed. I so order. 42. The defendant, however, did not lead any evidence at the trial having elected not to call its witness on record. What we have, therefore, as rightly pointed and canvassed by the claimant, is the pleadings of the defendant without evidence, which in law goes to no issue. See Banjoko & ors v. Ogunlaja & anor [2013] LPELR-20373(CA). I shall accordingly discountenance the pleadings of the defendant as without evidence it goes to no issue. This of course does not take away from the duty imposed on the claimant to still prove his case under the minimal evidence rule. See Azenabor v. Bayero University, Kano & anor [2009] LPELR-8721(CA); [2009] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1169) 96 CA and Afemai Microfinance Bank Ltd v. Seacos Nigeria Ltd [2014] LPELR-22583(CA). In civil matters, a plaintiff cannot assume that he is entitled to automatic judgment just because the other party had not adduced evidence before the trial Court. See Agienoji v. C.O.P., Edo State [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 23 and Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 SC at 247. 43. The defendant raised an issue as to competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Court to hear same. To the defendant, there is a world of difference between Lilygate Nig. Ltd, the defendant herein, and The Lilygate which the claimant alleged to have offered him an employment; as such there is no cause of action against the defendant in this suit. I need to make a point here. When on 26th October 2017 the parties were to adopt their respective final written addresses, the claimant had moved a motion to regularize his reply on points of law. The defendant’s counsel objected arguing that by Order 38 Rule 20 of the NICN Rules 2017 the claimant cannot have the last word in terms of filing a reply on points of law. In a considered ruling, this Court dismissed the defendant’s objection. In, for the very first time in its final written address, raising the issue of competence of this suit and the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine same, was the defendant saying that the claimant cannot react to these issues? I really wonder. 44. The argument of the defendant that a wrong defendant was sued given the name of the defendant as sued is misconceived. Even if it is a wrong defendant that is sued by the claimant, the error is not one that goes to the identity of the defendant as sued. Pfizer Incorporated & anor v. Prof. Idris Mohammed [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) 155 held that a party incorrectly named can be corrected but not where the mistake is one of identity. See also Omisore v. Aregbesola and ors [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205. Exhibits C1, C3 and C7 come in the letter-headed papers of the defendant; and they all describe the defendant as “The Lilygate, with Exhibit C7 adding “Lagos” to the name. The defendant on record and as sued is “Lilygate Nigeria Ltd (The Lilygate)”. This is sufficiently descriptive of the defendant as not to leave anyone in doubt that it is the defendant that is being sued, not any other person. I so find and hold. The argument of the defendant in this regard accordingly failed and is dismissed. 45. The first issue that I need to resolve is whether there was an offer of employment to the claimant, which he accepted and the character of that offer. Intricately linked to this issue is the evidential value of Exhibit C1, given the argument of the defendant that it is not signed and that in containing conditions precedent which were not fulfilled by the claimant, Exhibit C1 is worthless. In truth, Exhibit C1 is not signed by the defendant, but the acceptance part of it is signed by the claimant. Part of the argument of the defendant is that it did not sign Exhibit C1 and so cannot be said to have made any offer to the claimant. By Global Soaps & Detergent Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 599) 1025 at 1047 and Udo & ors v. Essien & ors [2014] LPELR-22684(CA), it is the law that unsigned and undated document has no evidential value. But this is not all of the law. There is the qualification that it is only a document which ought to be signed and is not signed that becomes worthless if not signed; for then, its authorship and authenticity become doubtful. See Nwancho v. Elem [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 225) 107, Aiki v. Idowu [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 293) 361; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 47 and Sarai v. Haruna [2008] 23 WRN 130. 46. The argument of the claimant is that Exhibit C1 was sent to him vide an email and so would not require the traditional signature as we know it. I took a careful look at the exhibits filed by the claimant. Exhibit C3 consists of three emails. The email addresses of the senders and recipients are all on the face of Exhibit C3. The first email on Exhibit C3 is dated Thu, Oct 29, 2015, sent at 5.01PM, and is from Kehinde Badmus of Human Resources of the defendant addressed to the claimant wherein the claimant was informed of the desire of the defendant to make him part of the defendant’s team. It then indicated that an offer letter for the position of cost controller with the defendant was attached. At the bottom of the first page of Exhibit C3 would be seen the words: “Lilygate Offer Letter Ahmed Ishola Akande - Cost Controller.docx 47k”. Beside these words is the logo showing that it is an attachment. Any person familiar with the emailing system of today’s technologically driven world of communications and the internet will note this as a matter of common knowledge, of which I hereby judicially notice. Exhibit C1 dated October 29, 2015 is the offer of employment sent by the defendant to the claimant. I believe the claimant that it is the letter attached to the email (Exhibit C3); and as an attachment it is not ordinarily meant to be signed in terms of an orthodox signature. The second email on Exhibit C3 is the reply from the claimant to Kehinde Badmus. It is dated Fri, October 30, 2015 and was sent at 10.05AM. In it, the claimant acknowledged the receipt of the offer letter and declared his acceptance indicating that he will send the scanned and signed copy of the letter as soon as possible. The third email is also from the claimant to Kehinde Badmus. It was sent at 8.41AM on Mon, Nov 2, 2015, also the date of the email. In it, the claimant sent to the defendant the signed copy of the defendant’s offer letter. At the bottom of the second page of Exhibit C3 would be seen the phrase: “2 Attachments”. The logos indicating the attachments are underneath the phrase. 47. In Mrs. Titilayo Akisanya v. Coca-Cola Nigeria Limited & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/40/2012, the judgment of which delivered on 7th April 2016, this is what this Court said about electronic signatures: …by definition, “an electronic signature, or e-signature, is any electronic means that indicates either that a person adopts the contents of an electronic message, or more broadly that the person who claims to have written a message is the one who wrote it (and that the message received is the one that was sent by this person). By comparison, a signature is a stylized script associated with a person. In commerce and the law, a signature on a document is an indication that the person adopts the intentions recorded in the document. Both are comparable to a seal”. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_signature as accessed on April 2, 2016. To start with, Document 15 is a typed document, not an electronic message i.e. one sent through any electronic channel, including email, social media, voicemail, text and instant messages. As frontloaded, tendered and admitted, Document 15 is not an email (there is no email address on it, nor does it indicate that it is an attachment to any email)… I am satisfied that Exhibit C1 was sent through an electronic channel, the email, as an attachment to Exhibit C3. What this means, therefore, is that Exhibit C1 as an attachment to the first email as per Exhibit C3, remains valid and does not exhibit the character of a document that ought to be signed in the first place. I so find and hold. This being the case, Exhibit C1 is a valid offer of employment to the claimant by the defendant contrary to the argument of the defendant’s counsel. I so find and hold. The claimant validly accepted this offer thus creating a binding contract between the claimant and the defendant. I say more on this issue in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. 48. To the defendant, the reason why Exhibit C1 is not signed and could not have been signed at that stage is found in paragraph 6 of that very document which contains a proviso or a condition precedent to an applicant’s employment as follows: 6. General terms and Conditions Details of the above and your other terms and conditions of employment are as contained in the The Lilygate Hotels Staff Handbook which is in line with statutory regulations. This appointment is subject to satisfactory references on you from sources the Management may decide, and a medical certificate of fitness to work from The Lilygate Hotel’s designated clinic. If you accept the above terms, please endorse the attached copy of this letter and return same to the undersigned along with a signed copy of the slip below within a week of receiving this letter (the emphasis is the defendant’s). The defendant went on that the claimant accepted these “GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS” and accordingly endorsed the attached copy of the letter, but would neither await the defendant to carry out the “satisfactory references” on him nor wait to be subjected to a medical examination to determine his fitness to work. That the claimant was desperate and thought he could impose himself on the defendant. In other words, that the employment of the claimant was subject to compliance with paragraph 6 of Exhibit C1. The response of the claimant is that the requirements of satisfactory references and medical certificate do not take away the validity of the contract of employment but are merely conditions to be fulfilled when the the claimant resumes duty in the defendant’s employment. I agree with the claimant. The argument of the defendant appears flawed. The moment Exhibit C1 was issued by the defendant and accepted, there came about a valid contract of employment. That it had conditions did not make it any less a valid contract; after all, all contracts of employment have terms and conditions they are always subject to. 49. Now, traditional contract theory teaches the existence of a contract and hence liability therefrom in three scenarios: a promise for which a price has been paid for (here liability is benefit-based and grows from broad notions of unjust enrichment); a promise upon which the promisee acted in reliance on (here liability is said to be reliance-based); and a promise which has not been paid for and which has not been relied on, generally called executory or promissory contract (here liability is said to be promise-based). The principal grounds for which liability is imposed in executory (or promissory) contracts are: it creates expectations; it is a risk-allocation device; and it is simply desirable to uphold the principle of promissory liability, even in cases where the non-performance of the promise has little practical effect. See P. S. Atiyah - The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press: Oxford), 1979 at pages 1 - 7. In the instant case, into which of these categories does the claimant’s contract of employment fit? I must point out that it is not impracticable that a contract starts off as an executory or promissory one which later transmutes to either one acted upon (reliance-based) or paid for (benefit-based). In the instant case, when the claimant was offered employment vide Exhibit C1 and he accepted, the contract in issue was a promissory contract which in its own right generated an expectation interest on the part of the claimant. However, as soon as the claimant resigned from his prior employment to take up the employment offered by the defendant, he thereby acted upon it thus making the contract a reliance-based contract. The liability here becomes one that is reliance-based. So whether as a promissory contract or a reliance-based contract, a valid contract of employment existed between the parties, which in either case respectively gave rise to expectations and a detrimental reliance. But for the offer of employment, which was accepted, the claimant would not have resigned from his previous employment. In relying on the defendant’s promise of employment, the claimant acted detrimentally. For all of this, the claimant is entitled to recompense. To the extent that the promissory (executory) contract creates expectations, the argument of the defendant in paragraphs 5.25 to 5.27 of its final written address to the effect that the doctrine of legitimate expectations applies only where a public body or public authority is involved is misconceived, misleading and must be discountenanced; and I so find and hold. 50. As an additional point, in labour relations, labour rights inure at three levels: pre-employment rights i.e. those rights that arise prior to the start of an employment e.g. rights inuring to job applicants; employment rights i.e. rights arising during the pendency of an employment; and post-employment rights i.e. rights inuring at the end of the employment such as pension rights. The pleadings of the claimant and his supporting statement on oath indicate that he was offered employment by the defendant hotel, while he was in the employment of another hotel. He accepted the offer, and to be able to assume duty with the defendant he resigned his earlier employment. On 23rd November 2015, he resumed at the defendant’s hotel only to be told that the defendant had changed its mind regarding his employment. He was later issued with Exhibit C7 dated November 26, 2015 by which the defendant wrote to the claimant stating thus: We appreciate the time you took to come for an interview for our Cost Controller position at the Lilygate Hotel. You were not selected in the final interview. Thank you for interviewing with our team. Everyone enjoyed meeting you and we hope that you consider applying for our open positions for which you qualify in future. We wish you success with your current job search. We appreciate your interest in our company. To the claimant, Exhibit C7 is an afterthought given that it came three days after the claimant resumed duty at the defendant’s employment. I agree with the claimant that Exhibit C7 is an afterthought. Having held that a valid contract of employment existed between the claimant and the defendant, the effect of Exhibit C7 is that the defendant breached that contract of employment, for which the claimant is entitled to recompense. I so find and hold. I do not think that it is open to employers to make offers of employment and simply resile from same at their whims and caprices. The Court of Appeal had cautioned in UMTHMB v. Dawa [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 424 CA that every employer, including every public body, must be careful not to abdicate or abuse its powers. The Court of Appeal went on that employers and public bodies are required by law, at all times, to act in good faith, reasonably and fairly towards people and matters under their charge in all circumstances; and that the law does not permit employers to act arbitrarily. In the instant case, the defendant acted arbitrarily and unfairly towards the claimant. I so find and hold. 51. The defendant did not lead any evidence, relying as it were on the evidence of the claimant. This naturally would affect the submissions of the defendant, which noticeably were wild and unsubstantiated. The arguments of the defendant as to how a reference letter (Exhibit C2) should look like and what should be its content were all unsubstantiated. The argument that the signature on Exhibit C2 is doubtful was equally wild and unsubstantiated. The argument that Exhibit C3, an email, is purported and cannot impose a duty and/or liability on the defendant was as wild and preposterous as it was unsubstantiated. Who says that an email cannot impose a duty and/or liability? Equally preposterous is the argument of the defendant’s counsel that Exhibit C1 is an invitation to treat. Exhibit C1 is the offer of employment requesting the claimant to accept if the terms and conditions are agreeable to him. I find the argument that Exhibit C1 is an invitation to treat an attempt to turn contract principles on their head. Not only did the defendant not substantiate its proposition of law in that regard, it is worrying how the defendant’s counsel would interpret an offer of employment as one inviting an offer. This is because, conceptually, an invitation to treat, like its name implies, is an invitation to make an offer. By BFIG v. BPE [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 416) 1915 at 1938, relying on Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante International Ltd [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37, “an invitation to treat is stated to be a mere declaration of willingness to enter into negotiations where the wording of a statement is not conclusive”. If the defendant wanted the claimant to make the offer it would have in clear terms stated so. The defendant invited the claimant for a job interview (at least Exhibit C7 stated this much) and then made the offer of employment. How can this be interpreted by the defendant’s counsel to be an invitation to treat? Once again, what I see here is that because the defendant’s counsel chose not to lead evidence, he his clinging to any straw to support his case. In all, I think that counsel to the defendant got taken aware with the niceties of semantics that he forgot that counsel’s address, no matter how brilliant it may be, is no substitute for evidence, evidence that he chose not to lead. See Oyekan & ors v. Akinrinwa & ors [1996] LPELR-2871(SC); [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 128 SC. The irony is that this was a submission of the defendant’s counsel in paragraph 5.24 of his final written address. 52. In all, therefore, I am satisfied that the claimant has proved his case and so is entitled to the reliefs he claims. Relief (1), the key claim of the claimant, accordingly is granted as claimed. Section 19(d) of the NIC Act 2006 gives this Court the power to grant an award of compensation or damages in any circumstance contemplated by law in terms of the jurisdiction of this Court. The claim for cost is discretionary. In consequence, and for the avoidance of doubt, I make the following orders: (1) The defendant shall pay to the claimant within 30 days of this judgment the sum of N5 Million only as compensation for loss of job and earnings and unfair labour practice. (2) Cost of this suit is put at Three Hundred Thousand (N300,000) only also payable within 30 days of this judgment. (3) Failing this, the judgment sum and or cost shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum until fully paid. 53. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD