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1. This is a transferred suit from the Federal High Court sitting in Lagos. The claimant had taken up a civil summons at the Federal High Court Lagos Division against the defendant on 21st April 1998. By the order of this Court made on 25th June 2013 upon the transfer of the case to this Court, parties were directed to file and serve fresh processes in conformity with the Rules of this Court. In compliance, the claimant on 10th February 2014 filed the complaint, statement of facts (undated), list of witnesses, witness statements on oath, list and copies of the documents to be relied upon at the trial. The defendant did not comply, and so filed no fresh defence processes. At the trial, the claimant called two witnesses. The claimant testified on his own behalf as CW1; while Samuel Oghoro. a retired civil servant and younger brother to the claimant, testified for the claimant as CW2. In fact, despite having a counsel on record, the defendant did not enter any defence or even cross-examine the claimant’s witnesses. At the close of trial, parties were asked to file their respective written addresses. Only the claimant filed one dated 30th March 2017 but filed on 4th April 2017. There was no reaction from the defendant. 2. From the originating processes, the claimant is claiming against the defendant, the following relief: N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) damages for personal injuries the right hand and right leg being paralysed, loss and expense, the injury having been sustained on 28th October, 1996 while the Claimant was on the course of his employment with the Defendant and which injury was caused by the negligence and/or breach of statutory duty of the Defendant in its failure to supply a safe system of equipment and place of work to its employees including the Claimant. 3. The claimant’s claim is in negligence, and is for damages for personal injuries suffered while in the course of the defendant’s employment. the nature of injuries complained of is paralysis of the right hand and right led as well as loss and expense incurred in relation to the said injury. The claimant was employed by the defendant on 20th May 1996 as Shrimpmaster but was not given any employment letter. He filled and returned an employment form and was eventually issued with staff identity card. That the defendant collected his seaman’s passport, which is still with the defendant. That he was sent to the sea and tested for a month to sea if he was competent to be a shrimpmaster, and the defendant was convinced he was. He, however, worked ashore until 28th October 1996 when he and others were asked to discharge a fishing vessel. Here, he was instructed to operate the winch of the fishing vessel. While doing this, the snatch broke and hit him and he fell on top of the winch. To the claimant, this occurred because the defendant supplied an old and defective instrument to its employees when it knew that it was unsafe to do so. Other acts of the defendant’s negligence are: the defendant did not replace the snatch block of the vessel; the defendant provided an unsafe system of work to its employees; failure of the defendant to rake any or any adequate precautions for the safety of the claimant while operating the winch; and exposing the claimant to risk or damage or injury, which the defendant knew or ought to know. 4. The claimant went on that on the happening of the accident on 28th October 1996, he became unconscious and was later told that he was carried to St Stephens Hospital, Old Ojo Road, Mazzamazza, Lagos-Badagry Expressway. That after he regained consciousness, he was told by a Friend (Mr Benson Edema, not called as a witness) that he was transferred to Igbobi Orthopedic Hospital for treatment as the defendant’s hospital confirmed that it could not treat his case. That at Igbobi, a deposit of N30,000 was demanded which the defendant did not pay; as such Igbobi refused to admit him. That because of the defendant’s failure to settle the Igbibi deposit bill, the claimant’s brother, CW2, had to take him to a native doctor, who treated him from 30th October 1996 to 9th January 1997. For this, that the defendant gave him N12,000 for transport and other charges of the native doctor. The defendant later gave N10,000 for feeding and part payment (or deposit) of the native doctor’s fees. That the native doctor charged N28,000, out of which the claimant gave him N13,000 leaving a balance of N15,000. That as the native doctor kept demanding for the balance of his money, the claimant had to charter a taxi to the defendant’s jetty, where one of the defendant’s Captains (Captain Godwin Oweh) on seeing the claimant’s hand advised that the claimant be sent to Lagos for a better treatment. That Captain Oweh then recommended to the defendant’s Operations Manager and General Manager a bone setter at Ujeren in Delta State, which these officers of the defendant agreed with. That the defendant then gave the claimant N15,000 for his feeding and transport. That he went to and met the bone doctor, Mr Cooper, who attended to him and gave a bill of N22,500. That he sent this bill to the defendant through his wife but the defendant refused to pick/settle the bill. He then had to ask for a salary advance, which took him to June 1997. However, the second salary advance for three months that he asked for was refused by the defendant. That he had to go to the defendant’s jetty where he met new Operations and General Managers, who told him that it is the defendant’s policy not to give any assistance to any of its employees after three months of an accident. The claimant concluded that he has been living through the generosity of his relations and receiving treatment from some local and orthodox doctors given that the defendant’s security agents turned him back when he returned to the defendant’s jetty. 5. The claimant submitted three issues for determination, namely: (i) Whether the defendant is not liable for the injury suffered by the claimant in the course of his service to the defendant. (ii) Whether the claimant has not established a case of negligence against the defendant. (iii) Whether the claimant is not entitled to the damages claimed for the injury sustained while working for the defendant which injury caused permanent disability to the claimant. 6. On issue (i), it is the case of the claimant that in the course of his employment and in the discharge of his assigned duties he had an accident and the accident was as a result of the negligence of the defendant in not providing safe work place/tools, referring to paragraphs 14 to 17 of the claimant’s testimony on oath. That the law is settled on when the tort of negligence could be said to have occurred, citing Abubakar v. Joseph [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 350, where the Supreme Court stated that “Negligence is the omission or failure to do something which a reasonable man under similar circumstances would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable man would not do”. That it is the case of the claimant that the defendant failed to and neglected to provide good and safe work place/equipment for the claimant which led to the injury suffered by the claimant. That the defendant has a duty to ensure that the claimant was not exposed to the danger that fatally destroyed and damaged the claimant’s right hand. That it is the requirement of the law that in an action for damages for negligence, the claimant must prove the following essential elements: the existence of a duty of care owed to the claimant by the defendant; breach of the duty of care by the defendant; and damages suffered by the claimant as result of that duty of care, referring to Abubakar v. Joseph (supra) 341, Edok-Eter Mandilas Ltd v. Ale [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 23) 47 and Agbonmagbe Bank v. GB Ollivant Ltd [1961] 1 All NLR 116. That all these elements have been established by the claimant in the course of this proceeding. 7. On the duty of care, the claimant submitted that his position and the defendant, which is a master-servant relationship, placed the burden or duty of care on the defendant. That given the nature of the relationship that exists, and the nature of the task the claimant was expected to perform, it is incumbent on the defendant to ensure that the claimant’s safety was properly guaranteed; this the defendant failed to do as could be succinctly seen in the claimant’s testimony on oath before the Court. That the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care, citing Oilserv Ltd v. L.A.I. & Co. (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 208, which defined duty of care as: Taking reasonable care to avoid acts or omission which one can reasonably foresee would likely injure one’s neighbor. Thus where there is sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that in the reasonable contemplation of the wrongdoer, carelessness on his part may have caused damage to the other party, then duty of care arises. The claimant then submitted that the defendant clearly owes him duty of care, urging the Court to so hold. 8. On the element of the breach of the duty of care by the defendant, the claimant submitted that in as much as he may not wish to plead res ipsa loquitur, that it is obvious as have been established in the claimant’s testimony on oath before the Court that: (a) The defendant did not replace the snatch block of the vessel ‘Oluwi’ when it knew or ought to have known that it was in use for a very long time. (b) The defendant providing an unsafe system of work to the claimant which resulted in the accident suffered by the claimant. (c) Failure to take any or adequate precautions for the safety of the claimant while he was engaged in carrying out the operation of the winch. (d) Exposing the claimant to a risk or damage or injury of which they knew or ought to have known would occur, referring to paragraph 19 of the statement on oath of the claimant. That the Supreme Court has held in UBA Ltd v. Achoru [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 156) 277 that: “Negligence is the failure to take reasonable care where there is a duty and it is attributed to a person whose failure to take reasonable care has resulted in damage to another”. 9. On the damages suffered by the claimant as a result of the breach by the defendant of that duty of care, the claimant referred to paragraph 15 of his testimony on oath, which runs thus: “That as I was operating the winch the snatch block and hit me and I fell on top of the winch”. Also paragraph 20 states further: “That on the happening of the accident on 28th October, 1996, I was unconscious but I was told later that I was carried to St. Stephens Hospital, Old Ojo Road, MazaMaza, Lagos, Badagry Expressway”. Paragraph 55 of the statement on oath states as follows: “That I have been having a terrible, painful and unbearable experience to myself and my family because of the deformity and helplessness on account of the accident I suffered while in the employment of the defendant”. That his right hand has been permanently incapacitated; in fact the hand has been rendered existentially dead. To the claimant, the defendant is liable to him in negligence, citing Odinka v. Moghalu [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 1 at 15 and Blyth v. Birmingham Water Work Co. (1856) 11 EX 781 at 784. 10. The claimant went on that it is in evidence that the defendant did not exercise the required due care on diligence when they allowed a snatch block that has been used for a very long time without replacement or proper service and maintenance. That the resultant effect of the breach of duty of care is the permanent incapacitation of the claimant’s right hand following the accident that happened in the course of the operation of the equipment, referring to Koiki v. NEPA [1972] CCHCJ 127 and Heaven v. Pender Per Breh (1883) 11 QBD 503 at 507. That it is settled in law that an employer owes duty of care to his workers to provide safe equipment and a safe system of work, citing Wilson & Clyde Coal Co. v. English [1938] AC 57; and that where the employer fails to so do, any consequential accident or injury would be blamed on him. On the degree of care the situation requires, the claimant referred to Northwest Utilities Ltd v. London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd (citation was not supplied), Latimer v. E. C. Ltd [1952] 2 QB 701 at 711 and Western Nigerian Trading Co. v. Ajao [1965] NMLR 178. 11. Regarding issue (ii), which is whether the claimant has not established a case of negligence against the defendant, the claimant answered in the affirmative. Referring to his statement on oath, the claimant submitted that uncontroverted evidence will be accepted as proof of facts, citing Febson Fitness Centre v. Cappa H. Ltd [2015] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1457) 263 CA at 269, NBA v. Ojigbo [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1481) 186 at 188 and Military Gov. Lagos State v. Adeyiga [2012] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291 at 305. Furthermore, that evidence that is neither challenged nor debunked remains good and credible evidence which should be relied upon by the trial Judge (Adeleke v. Iyanda [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 729) 1 at 22 - 23, Insurance Brokers of Nigeria v. ATMN [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 466) 316 at 327 and Kopek Construction Ltd v. Ekisola [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 618 at 663), who would in turn ascribe probative value to it, citing Ebeinwe v. State [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 402 at 416 and Monkom v. Odili [2010] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1179) 419 at 442. That where evidence is unchallenged under cross-examination, the Court is not only entitled to act on or accept such evidence, but it is in fact bound to do so, provided that such evidence by its very nature is not incredible. Thus, where the adversary fails to cross-examine a witness upon a particular matter, the implication is that he accepts the truth of that matter as led in evidence, citing Oforlete v. State [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) at 436. 12. On the evidential value of Exhibit C5, which is the claimant’s undated letter to the defendant, the claimant submitted that this can be resolved in law. Generally, that undated documents are worthless documents in law, but where the content can be situated within a time period, or where parties are not in disagreement of its source/timeframe, the Court can act on it. Te claimant then concluded by urging the Court to resolve issue (ii) in his favour. 13. Issue (iii) is whether the claimant is not entitled to the damages claimed for the injury sustained while working for the defendant which injury caused permanent disability to the claimant. The claimant referred to UBA Ltd v.. Achoru (supra) at 280 - 281, which held on the issue of assessing the nature of claim for damages for “loss of amenities of life” in personal injury thus: It encompasses the entire claim which result from the injury and by reason of which the plaintiff’s enjoyment of ordinary pleasures or facilities of life have been impaired. It is a head claim based on the loss resulting from the extent of disability. The claim is an objective one and will be awarded on the extent of the loss, as long as the disability has been established. The claimant then placed his case on the Latin maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (i.e. where there is a wrong there is a remedy) and which to him is available to all legal systems involved in the impartial administration of justice. That it enjoins the Court to provide a remedy whenever the claimant has established a right; the Court obviously cannot do otherwise. That it is enjoined to eschew reliance on technicalities in the determination of disputes. That the substance of this action rather form should be predominant consideration, referring to Bello v. A G Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828, Stitch v. AG Federation [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 42)1007 and Saleh v. Monguno [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 26 at 37 - 38. To the claimant, he has been able to establish the fact that the injury he sustained was in the course of his duties and as a result of the defendant’s negligence. That this, therefore, presupposes the fact that the claimant is entitled to award of damages against the defendant. 14. The claimant continued that whatever criteria used in assessing damages, reference must be had to the evidence in the case and the subject matter of the action; in so doing, the difficulty faced by the Court when called upon to assess damages in a case would be assuaged, citing Mircchandani v. Pincheiro [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 557 at 561 and Uyo v. Egware [1974] 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 293. That he testified that he had an accident and lost his right hand, which is permanently incapacitated, in the course of his duties as a result of the defendant’s negligence. That it, therefore, means that as a result of the accident, the claimant has been rendered incapacitated for life. That is, he is unfit for employment for life, urging the Court to award the N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) damages he claims. That the duty is on the claimant to prove a case of negligence, which he has discharged, citing Odinaka v. Moghalu (supra) at 15 and Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] All ER (the page is not given). That once he has succeeded in establishing a case of negligence, the Court has a duty to go on to determine the extent of the liability of the Defendant for the damages being claimed. That this is based on facts and evidence adduced before the tribunal. That his right hand is permanently incapacitated and by extension, he is totally unfit for any productive work again; he can no longer do anything unaided. That this is evidence before the Court. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to grant his reliefs as claimed as this will meet the justice of this case. COURT’S DECISION 15. I indicated at the start of this judgment that this matter was transferred to this Court from the Federal High Court; and that this Court ordered that parties are to file and serve fresh processes to accord with the Rules of this Court. While the claimant complied, the defendant did not. However, the statement of facts filed by the claimant was undated, and does not have on it the date it was filed - only the complaint has the date, 10 Feb 2014, endorsed as the date of filing. Throughout the claimant’s final written address, the claimant only referred to his statement of oath, not the pleadings, further evidencing that his statement of facts bear no date or the date of filing. The law, by Eke v. Ogbonda [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 506 at 532 and Alhaji Idris Alaya v. Engr Adewumi Ademola Issac [2012] LPELR-9306(CA), is that a court of law takes cognizance and relies on a date a process of court is filed, not the day it is dated. This means that by law, the material date is the date of filing a process of court, not the date a party or legal practitioner appended on it; and a party or a lawyer may date a document months before it is filed in court. Consequently, a court process that is undated, but duly filed with the date of payment filing fees is valid and acceptable. Since the claimant’s statement of facts has no date or date it was filed, I cannot refer or use it in this judgment. However, because this is a transferred case from the Federal High Court, the claimant had filed a statement of claim in that Court when it filed this suit. The statement of claim is dated 21st April 1998, to which the defendant file its statement of defence dated 26th May 1999. The claimant reacted by filing the reply to statement of defence dated 1st July 1999. These processes are valid for all intents and purposes and so will be used in this judgment. The defendant, however, did not lead any evidence at the trial. What we have, therefore, is the pleadings of the defendant without evidence, which in law goes to no issue. See Banjoko & ors v. Ogunlaja & anor [2013] LPELR-20373(CA), which held that pleadings without evidence go to no issue. I shall accordingly discountenance the pleadings of the defendant as without evidence it goes to no issue. This of course does not take away from the duty imposed on the claimant to still prove his case under the minimal evidence rule. See Azenabor v. Bayero University, Kano & anor [2009] LPELR-8721(CA); [2009] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1169) 96 CA and Afemai Microfinance Bank Ltd v. Seacos Nigeria Ltd [2014] LPELR-22583(CA). In civil matters, a plaintiff cannot assume that he is entitled to automatic judgment just because the other party had not adduced evidence before the trial Court. See Agienoji v. C.O.P., Edo State [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 23 and Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 SC at 247. 16. The injury the claimant is complaining of occurred on 28th October 1996. This means that the applicable law for recovery is the now repealed Workmen’s Compensation Act given that the law applicable when a cause of action arose is the law to be used in determining that cause of action. See Obiuweubi v. CBN [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465. The claimant did not, however, come under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He came under the tort of negligence. By Chaquary v. Yakubu [2006] 3 NWLR (Pt. 966) 138, where the injury to a servant was caused by the personal negligence or willful act of the employer or of some other person for whose act or default the employer is responsible, nothing in the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall prevent proceedings to recover damages being instituted against the employer in a civil court independently of the Act. This is what the claimant has just done. It is his right to choose how to come to this Court; the only caveat is that in choosing to come by way of negligence, the claimant foreclosed any consideration of his right under the Workmen Compensation Act. 17. In proof of his case, the claimant had tendered the following documents as exhibits: claimant’s Staff Identity Card (Exhibit C1); claimant’s Reference/Appointment Card with National Orthopedic Hospital (Exhibits C2(a), C2(b), C2(c) and C2(d)); Medical Report dated 15th September 1998 (Exhibit C3); claimant’s letter dated 20th February 1997 (Exhibit C4); claimant’s undated letter to the defendant (Exhibit C5); claimant’s solicitors’ letter to the defendant dated 5th January 1998 (Exhibit C6); and defendant’s letter to the claimant’s solicitors dated 4th February 1998 (Exhibit C7). Exhibit C3, addressed to whom it may concern, signed by Dr F. S. Omitiran, Prin. Medical Officer II of General Hospital Ikeja, is dated 15th September 1998 Ref.No. SUB/IGH/302/VOL.II/522 and is titled “Re: Mr Amos Oghoro Medical Report”. The medical report runs thus: The above named was first seen at out department on the 21st of July 1988. He gave a history of a heavy load having fallen on his right shoulder from a height of about 1 year 9 months then. Physical examination revealed: (1) Impaired vision of the right eye (2) Complete paralysis of the right upper limb (3) Abnormal sensation right upper limb Degree of Disability: Very severe. I shall be grateful if he could be given the necessary assistance. Thanks. 18. Now, from the relief being sought by the claimant and his pleadings, the complaint of the claimant in this case relates to “… personal injuries the right hand and right leg being paralysed, loss and expense, the injury having been sustained on 28th October, 1996 while the Claimant was on the course of his employment with the Defendant…” By paragraph 3 of the statement of claim of 21st April 1998, the claimant pleaded that he was employed by the defendant as Shrimpmaster on 20th May 1996. Since the claimant is complaining of an injury sustained on 28th October 1996 and Exhibit C3 deals with the claimant’s health status as at 21st July 1988, of what use is Exhibit C3 to the case at hand? None! The claimant is not in court because of injuries he sustained prior to going to hospital on 21st July 1988; he is in court for injuries he sustained on 28th October 1998. This being the case, Exhibit C3 is irrelevant to the instant claim of the claimant; and I so find and hold. 19. Exhibits C4 and C5 are two letters written by the claimant to the defendant. While Exhibit C4 is dated 20th February 1997, it is, however, not signed; and Exhibit C5 is neither signed nor dated. To the claimant, the evidential value of Exhibit C5 can be resolved in law. Generally, that undated documents are worthless documents in law, but where the content can be situated within a time period, or where parties are not in disagreement of its source/timeframe, the Court can act on it. The claimant did not cite any authority for his proposition of law. The law as I know it is that a document which ought to be signed, if not signed, is worthless and should be discountenanced; while an undated letter can be cured by parol evidence in terms of its date. See Nwancho v. Elem [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 225) 107, Aiki v. Idowu [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 293) 361; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 47 and Sarai v. Haruna [2008] 23 WRN 130, which held that any document which ought to be signed and is not signed renders its authorship and authenticity doubtful; and Global Soaps & Detergent Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 599) 1025 at 1047 and Udo & ors v. Essien & ors [2014] LPELR-22684(CA), which held that an unsigned and undated document has no evidential value. This being the case, Exhibit C4 is a document that ought to be signed but is not so signed. It is accordingly worthless as its authorship and authenticity is doubtful. I so find and hold. Exhibit C5 is not dated and no parole evidence as to its date was given. It accordingly has no evidential value. I so find and hold. Exhibits C4 and C5 are accordingly discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. 20. I now turn to the merit of the claimant’s case, which is the claim for negligence against the defendant. Duty, breach, causation, and damage are the elements which together make up a successful negligence claim. By these requirements, the tort of negligence relies on the blameworthy nature of the defendant’s conduct for success. In other words, for a claimant to succeed in a negligence action, he must prove that the defendant was in fact negligent, that is, he failed to take that degree of care which is reasonable in all circumstances of the case or he failed to act as a reasonable man would have acted. Then if the defendant owes a duty of care, his negligence becomes breach of that duty. The resultant damage on the claimant would then be actionable. Even here, there is still the possibility that the claimant may not recover (or only partly recover) against the defendant given the limiting/control devices of remoteness of damage, contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. In other words, a defendant may owe a duty of care, may breach that duty of care, for which the claimant suffers resultant damage, and yet not be liable or be only partly liable if the damage is too remote, or the claimant contributed to the injury or the claimant voluntarily assumed the risk in issue. 21. I do not have any problem in finding that the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care given the proximate relationship between the two. In Exhibit C7 dated 4th February 1998, the defendant wrote to the claimant’s solicitor where it acknowledged that the claimant was a sailor (not a technician) with the defendant who was injured in the normal course of duties as a sailor when operating a winch (an equipment used to shoot fishing net and to haul up catches). According to the defendant in Exhibit C7, the claimant was injured when the wire rope holding a snatch block broke and a block fell on the claimant. Going by Exhibit C7, therefore, the defendant accordingly acknowledged the relationship it has with the claimant, which relationship is one that imposes on the defendant a duty of care to the claimant, and the fact that the claimant was injured in the course of working for the defendant, indicating that there was a breach of the duty of care, and resultant damage. The English case of Smith & ors (FC) v. The Ministry of Defence [2013] LPELR-17965(UKSC); Suit No: [2013] UKSC 41 held thus: “An employer owes his employees a duty to take reasonable care to provide safe equipment and a safe system of work, which includes assessing the tasks to be undertaken, training in how to perform those tasks as safely as possible, and supervision in performing them”. This position is reinforced by IITA v. Amrani [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 332) 296, which held that the standard of the master’s duty towards his servant is to see that reasonable care is taken; the scope of that duty extends to the provisions of safe fellow servants, safe equipment, safe place of work and access to it and a safe system of work. The earlier authority of Western Nigeria Trading Co. Ltd v. Ajao [1965] All NLR 524 is no less instructive: an employer’s duty at common law is not only to provide goggles (safety equipment), but also to see to it that they are used. See also this Court’s decision in Ola Suleiman v. Hongzing Steel Company Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/73/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 26th February 2015, which applied Western Nigeria Trading Co. Ltd v. Ajao (supra). Green Pack Rubber Ind. Ltd v. Ossai [2004] 2 FWLR (Pt. 194) 668 on its part stressed that when a statutory duty is imposed on an employer but not also on the workman who is injured and there is breach of that duty which is a cause of the accident to the workman, the employer will be liable subject to an apportionment for contributory negligence. The case went on that the employer will be completely exonerated if the workman, having been given appropriate equipment and instructions disobeyed those instructions or did some deliberate wrongful act which breaks the causal connection; in the later case the statute must have imposed a similar duty on the employee. 22. Applying these case law authorities to the case at hand, the defendant vide Exhibit C7 acknowledged that the claimant as its sailor, in the normal course of his duties, was injured when the wire rope holding a snatch block broke and a block fell on him. This is an acknowledgment of negligence on the part of the defendant and resultant damage to the claimant; and I so find and hold. The excuse/explanation of the defendant, however, as per Exhibit C7, an exhibit supplied by the claimant, is that the claimant aggravated the state of his injury by discharging himself from the hospital even when the hospital advised against this. To the defendant, the decision to discharge himself and go to bone healers was completely that of the claimant and his relations contrary to the advice of the hospital. The claimant did not contradict this piece of evidence given that it is even the claimant that tendered Exhibit C7. It is the duty of the claimant to mitigate the damage, and he cannot recover damages for an aggravation or prolongation of his injuries which is due to his neglect or willful default; such unreasonable conduct is novus actus interveniens. Two older case law authorities call for consideration here. The first is Ekwo v. Enechukwu (1954) 14 WACA 512. The plaintiff’s hand in this case was seriously injured as a result of the negligent fixing of a seat belt in the defendant’s lorry. Immediately after the accident, a servant of the defendant offered to take the plaintiff to a hospital for medical attention, but the plaintiff refused, preferring instead to consult a native doctor. Seven days later, the plaintiff did go to a hospital, by which time the hand had become septic and gangrenous and so had to be amputated. The doctor who attended to the plaintiff in the hospital testified that the amputation was the result of the wound becoming septic, and he was of the opinion that had the plaintiff come to the hospital immediately, he might have been saved from amputation and the fracture would have been cured. The Court held that the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in consulting a native doctor instead of going immediately to a hospital. 23. The second case is Mange v. Drurie [1970] NNLR 62. Here, the plaintiff was riding a bicycle when he was knocked down and suffered injury to his leg as a result of the careless driving of a lorry by the defendant. He was immediately taken to the hospital by the defendant. However, before treatment was complete and against medical advice, the plaintiff discharged himself and did not return to the hospital for two days. During these two-day period, the leg became infected and so had to be amputated. The plaintiff’s claim for damages for loss of the leg was rejected by the Court. 24. In the instant case, the claimant’s story is that he went to a native doctor because the defendant refused to settle the hospital bill demanded at Igbobi. I find it difficult to believe this story. The defendant who refused to settle the medical bill of a hospital still gave the claimant money to visit a native doctor? This is difficult to reconcile. The defendant’s version as per Exhibit C7 is that the claimant on his own volition chose to go a traditional bone healer, an act the defendant warned against and alerted the claimant’s family that the defendant would not be held liable for any complications arising therefrom; and that the family accepted this. When the defendant wrote Exhibit C7 to “set the records straight” in response to Exhibit C6, a letter written to the defendant by the claimant’s solicitor, the claimant did not write back to the defendant to refute all that the defendant said in Exhibit C7. It is also the evidence of the claimant that on one of his trips to see the defendant, one of the defendant’s Captains (Captain Godwin Oweh) on seeing the claimant’s hand advised that the claimant be sent to Lagos for a better treatment. That Captain Oweh then recommended to the defendant’s Operations Manager and General Manager a bone setter at Ujeren in Delta State, which these officers of the defendant agreed with; for which the defendant gave the claimant N15,000 for his feeding and transport. Here again I have difficulty believing this version of events. How can Captain Godwin Oweh advise that the claimant be taken to Lagos for a better treatment and still be recommending a bone setter in Delta State? How can the defendant who is reluctant in settling hospital bills be eager to give money for transport and feeding to see the Delta bone setter? All through the claimant’s testimony, the claimant peddled names such as Mr Benson Edema but called none (other than his brother, CW2) as a witness. I accordingly find it difficult to believe the claimant in all of this regard. 25. I believe the defendant as per Exhibit C7 that the claimant discharge himself from hospital. I held earlier that Exhibit C3, in relating to the health status of the claimant prior to the injury that is the subject matter of this suit, cannot be used in evidence as proof of the instant claim. Exhibit C3 is, however, useful in casting doubt as to the extent of injury that the claimant is even currently complaining of. The claimant by Exhibit C3 had as at 21st July 1988 complete paralysis of the right upper limb. The instant suit relates to personal injuries in terms of the right hand and right leg being paralysed. Can an upper limb that is paralysed in 1988 be the subject of paralysis in 1996? I really wonder. 26. I now turn to the applicability to the instant case as between Ekwo v. Enechukwu and Mange v. Drurie. In Ekwo, the plaintiff was never in hospital; he chose outrightly to see a native doctor. However, in Mange, the plaintiff was first in hospital before choosing to leave the hospital and against medical advice. Mange is more in consonance with the claimant’s case in the instant suit. I held that I believe the version of events as per Exhibit C7 where the claimant was said to have been advised against leaving the hospital but he did not accede to the advice. In consequence, I do not see how the claimant can recover against the defendant in terms of the instant suit. 27. As it is, therefore, and for all the reasons given, I hold that the claimant did not prove his case to the satisfaction of this Court to enable him recover as claimed. The action of the claimant accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. 28. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD