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1. The claimant commenced this suit by way of a complaint filed on 16th December 2011 together with the accompanying originating processes. The claimant’s claim as endorsed on the 2nd amended general form of complaint and statement of facts dated 29th October 2014 but filed on 30th October 2014 is for the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the defendant’s Employee Handbook contains terms and conditions of employment between the defendant and her employees before the Pension Reform Act 2004 came into force whereof the claimant is entitled to calculation of his accrued pension benefits under clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook from March 1993 to December 2004. (2) A declaration that upon proper construction of clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook the claimant is entitled to receive his basic pension contribution and his employer’s contribution together with profit at a minimum rate of 10% compounded per month as his accrued right from 1993 to December 2004 before the Pension Reform Act 2004 came into force. (3) A declaration that the Pension Reform Act 2004 which came into force on the 1st of January 2005 cannot operate retrospectively to deprive the claimant his accrued pension before enactment of the law. (4) A declaration that the sum due to the claimant under clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook Staff Pension and Retirement Scheme is the sum of N1,547,575,787.39.00 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) as his accrued pension benefits right from March 1993 up to December 2004 before the Pension Reform Act 2004 came into force. (5) An order that the defendant pays over to the claimant the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) being the claimant’s accrued pension benefits under clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook between March 1993 to December 2004 with interest at the rate of 20% per annum from January 2005 until judgment is delivered and thereafter at the rate of 21% per annum from January 2005 until judgment debt is fully discharged. ALTERNATIVELY An order that the defendant pays over into the claimant’s pension savings account No. 000100074816333 opened with Trust Funds Pension Plc the sum of N1,547,575,787.39 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) being the claimant’s accrued pension benefits under clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook between March 1993 to December 2004 with interest at the rate of 20% per annum from January 2005 until judgment is delivered and thereafter at the rate of 21% per annum from January 2005 until judgment debt is fully discharged. (6) N10,000,000.00 costs being solicitors’ fees. 2. Upon being served with the originating processes of the claimant, the defendant filed a statement of defence dated 20th March 2012 which was subsequently amended and the extant statement of defence is the 2nd further amended statement of defence amended pursuant to the order of this Court made on 28th October 2014. In consequence of the defendant’s 2nd further amended statement of defence dated.28th October 2014, the claimant filed a reply to the 2nd further amended statement of defence dated 4th December 2014. 3. At the trial, the claimant called three witnesses. The claimant testified on his own behalf as CW1. Mr Aigbe Olotu testified as CW2 and tendered Exhibit KA6, which is a letter dated 1st November 2011, with an enclosure of a computation of the claimant’s version of his end of service entitlement for the period of March 1993 to December 2004 as prepared by CW2. And thirdly, Mr Austin Irabor Akhuemokhan testified as CW3 and further tendered Exhibit KA7, a computation done by him of the claimant’s end of service benefits. The defendant on its part called two witnesses: Mr Nnamdi Owo who testified as DW1 and Mr. Anthony Olukoju, who testified as DW2. Thereupon, the Court ordered the filing of final written addresses. The final written address of the defendant is dated and filed on 28th November 2016, while the claimant’s is dated 10th January 201 but filed on 12th January 2017. The defendant’s reply on points of law is dated and filed on 17th August 2017. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 4. To the claimant, he is a professional banker and a former employee of the defendant. He was employed on 8th March 1993 and rose through the ranks till the position of general manager when he resigned in September 2007 having spent over 14 meritorious years of service with the defendant. That at the time of his employment, he received an employee handbook which bound the relationship between him and the defendant including his entitlements and benefits specified in clause 17.10 upon resignation of his appointment. Clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook on Staff Pension and Retirement Scheme states the benefits on leaving service before retirement as follows: A member will always be entitled to his/her individual contributions plus profits subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly. Members who have completed 2 years’ service with the bank and who are not dismissed on account of fraud, misconduct or any criminal offences, (for this purpose resignation to avoid dismissal on any of the above grounds shall count as dismissal) shall be entitled to a portion of the Bank’s contributions as shown below. Entitlement to bank’s contribution from date of entry: Less than 2 years Nil 2 years but less than 3 years 20% 3 years but less than 4 years 30% 4 years but less than 5 years 40% 5 years but less than 6 years 50% 6 years but less than 7 years 60% 7 years but less than 8 years 70% 8 years but less than 9 years 80% 9 years but less than 10 years 90% 10 years and over 100% 5. That despite repeated demands, the defendant has refused or neglected to pay to the claimant his entitlement and profit under clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook from March 1993 to December 2004 before the Pensions Reform Act of 2004 became enforceable. To the claimant, his total entitlement from March 1993 to December 2004 on a proper construction of clause 17.10 (a) and (b) of the defendant’s Employee Handbook amounts to N1,547,575,787.39 (One Billion Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo). That the defendant had remitted the sum of N1,754,103.09 to the Claimant’s Pension Administrator in June 2007 as his pension entitlement for the period March 1993 to December 2004, which said amount was rejected by the claimant, hence the instant action. That the parties do not disagree on the fact that the claimant is entitled to be paid his pension benefits and his entitlements. However, the point of disagreement has to do with the rate of the pension benefits or entitlements payable to the claimant. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 6. The defendant denied that it is indebted to the claimant the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) as alleged by the claimant or in any sum at all as the claimant’s end of service benefit. To the defendant, since 2004, it had computed and transferred the claimant’s accrued benefit in accordance with the provision of clause 17.10 to the claimant’s Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) as directed under the Pension Reform Act of 2004. That a proper construction of the phrase “interest at 10% compounded monthly” as contained in clause 17.10 is of two components, to wit: a) Interest on the employee monthly contribution at 10% interest rate, which interest rate is annualized and the actual interest rate for each month is 0.797%. b) Monthly compounding of the interest using the formula of compound interest. 7. It is thus the case of the defendant that interest as stated throughout the employee handbook is to be construed as interest “per annum” and upon a proper construction of the phrase “interest at 10% compounded monthly”, the total sum due to the claimant is the sum of N1,378,163.00 for the period of March 1993 to December 2004 which has been paid. The defendant went on that in 2004, it remitted the sum of N1,754,103.09 to the claimant’s pension administrator for the period of March 1993 - December 2004 and an additional sum of N1,113,671.94 for the period of January 2005 to August 2006 was later remitted to the claimant’s Pension Administrator. Consequently, that it is not indebted to the claimant in any sum whatsoever as alleged by the claimant. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 8. The defendant submitted three issues for the determination of this matter, namely: (1) Whether or not this present suit is statute-barred. (2) Whether the claimant is entitled to the sum of Nl,547,575,787.39 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) as claimed or any sum whatsoever. (3) Whether the claimant is entitled to payment of interest at the rate of at 20% per annum from January 2005 until judgment is delivered and thereafter at the rate of 21% per annum from January 2005 until judgment debt is fully discharged. 9. On whether the instant suit is statute-barred, the defendant answered in the affirmative. That the case of the claimant simply put is that as at December 2004, the defendant was indebted to the claimant in the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 (One Billion, Five Hundred and Forty-Seven Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo) given clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA5), which. constitutes a contract between the claimant and the defendant. The claimant instituted this action on the 16th December 2011, which is clearly 7 years after the accrual of the alleged cause of action and, therefore, the action having been instituted more than 6 years from the date which the cause of action arose, is statute-barred, citing section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State and Araka v. Ejeagwu [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) 684 at 710. To the defendant, this Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, citing Ejifodomi v. Okonkwo [1982] NSCC (Vol. 13) 422 at 435 - 436 and Owle v. Ighiwi [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 184 at 223. The defendant urged the Court to this decline jurisdiction in this matter. 10. On whether the claimant is entitled to the sum of N1,547,575,787.39 any sum whatsoever, the defendant answered in the negative. To the defendant, assuming but without conceding that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this action, by the proper construction of clause 17.10(a) of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA5), the claimant IS NOT entitled to the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 as claimed or any sum whatsoever as his accrued pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004. That the determination of issue (2) rests on the proper construction and/or interpretation of clause 17.10(a) of the Employee Handbook given to the claimant by the defendant (Exhibit KA 5). That the claimant’s claim for the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 is based on an erroneous, unsupportable, and unreasonable construction of clause 17.10(a). Indeed, that it is an interpretation and or construction which not only does not reflect the intention of the parties but also makes no commercial sense at all. Clause 17.10(a) provides thus: “A member will always be entitled to his/her individual contributions plus profit subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly”. That the claimant in making his claim interpreted the said clause 17.10(a) to read and mean: “A member will always be entitled to his/her individual contributions plus profit subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% per month compounded monthly”. That it is clear that what the claimant has done was to add into the said clause 17.10(a) what is not there, to wit: the words “per month” immediately after the stipulated rate of 10%, referring to paragraph 7 of claimant’s reply to the 2nd further amended statement of defence. 11. To the defendant, it is clear by this pleading that the claimant admitted that the proper and appropriate interpretation of the period over which to compute interest of “10% compounded monthly” as stated in clause 17.10(a), depends on the agreement between both parties, that is, the agreement between the claimant and the defendant. However, that the claimant and his other two witnesses who computed the purported entitlement and profit of the claimant as shown in Exhibits KA6 and KA7 respectively, on the basis of 10% per month compounded monthly did not state the agreement nor place any material or fact before the Court as to the agreement between the claimant and the defendant regarding the period for computing the 10% interest rate. That the failure to place any such agreement before this Court is detrimental to the case of the claimant and in the absence of such an agreement the claim that the computation is to be done at the rate of 10% per month is unsupportable and cannot stand and the claim for the said sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 based on that construction must perforce fail in its entirety. That the claimant who failed to place any such agreement before the Court, however, interpreted the period for computing the interest rate stated in the said clause 17.10 (a) to mean 10% per month compounded monthly and calculated the alleged entitlement and profit of the Claimant based on the arbitrary interpretation given to clause 17.10 of Exhibit KA5. That this computation as reflected in Exhibits KA6 and KA7 does not reflect the intention of the parties at all and must be rejected by this Court. That courts are to give effect to the intention of parties to a contract, referring to BFI Group Corporation v. BPE [2012] LPELR-9339(SC) and Omega Bank Nig. Plc v. OBC Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547 at 576. 12. The defendant continued that the search result from Google referred to by the claimant in paragraph 7 of his witness statement on oath deposed to on 15th February 2013 and adopted as Evidence-in-chief on 7th May 2014 and admitted as Exhibit KA8 is absolutely against the claimant and supports the interpretation given to clause 17.10(a) by the defendant. That a careful perusal of Exhibit KA8 shows that at the last portion (hyper-link highlighted in blue color), it was stated that “An income statement usually covers a year; …” That this clearly supports the interpretation given by the defendant that the words “10% compounded monthly” is intended by the parties, in line with the banking practice, to mean 10% per annum (i.e. in a year) compounded monthly. Furthermore, that the state of the pleadings and the evidence before this Court clearly show that the intention of the parties when they agreed to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly in clause 17.10(a) of Exhibit KA5 is that the period for computing the interest is annually. That is, 10% per annum compounded monthly. To the defendant, this is clearly so as the claimant did not deny and has effectively admitted that: a) As pleaded in paragraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of defence, the language used in expressing interest rates throughout Exhibit KA5 shows consistency. b) As pleaded in paragraph 23 of the 2nd further amended statement of defence, the rate of 4% stated in clause 16.9(d) of Exhibit KA5 without stating the period of computation just as in clause 17.10(a) presently being construed, is understood and construed by both the defendant and its employees (which includes the claimant, as he then was), as 4% per annum. 13. Furthermore, that the claimant did not challenge the testimony of DW1 in paragraph 26 of the further witness statement of DW1 deposed to on the 31st of October 2014, where it was stated clearly thus: “that even the interest rate of staff loan in clause 16.9(d) of the defendant’s Employee Handbook is stated simply as 4% and in line with banking practice, the same is understood and construed by both the defendant bank and its employees to be calculated on the basis of 4% per annum”. That having not denied the pleading nor controvert the pleadings that 4% as stated in clause 16.9(d) is understood as 4% per annum, which pleading is reinforced by the evidence of DW1, the claimant has clearly and unequivocally admitted that 4% as stated in clause 16.9(d) is understood as 4% per annum. Consequently, that the claimant having admitted that 4% in clause 16.9 is understood as 4% per annum, the interpretation of 10% in clause 17.10(a) must take its bearing from the admitted interpretation of 4% in clause 16.9(d) and thus clause 17.10(a) must be construed as 10% per annum. Further still, that the understanding of the parties that 4% in clause 16.9 is 4% per annum is a clear indication of the intention of the parties regarding the clause 10% compounded monthly which appears in clause 17.10. That this is so as the law is firmly settled that in interpretation of a document, its several clauses must be interpreted harmoniously and one part of such a document can expound the other to make all the parts agree, referring to Unilife Dev. Co. Ltd v. Adeshigbin [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 609 at 626 and Lamikoro Ojokolobo & ors v. Lapade Alamu & anor [1987] 7 SCNJ 98; [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 339. That in adherence to the principle stated in Unilife’s case above, when clause 16.9(d), which is admitted to be understood by the parties as 4% per annum, is used to expound clause 17.10(a), this Court will find that the period for computing the interest rate of l0% stated in clause 17.10(a) as envisaged by the parties is 10% per annum. Additionally, that the surrounding circumstances of the relationship between the parties, to wit: that the claimant is a professional banker; that the defendant is a bank; and that Exhibit KA5 is a document that guided the employment relationship between the claimant as employee of' the defendant in the banking industry, show that the intention of the parties is that 10% compounded monthly should be interpreted and understood as 10% per annum compounded monthly. 14. The defendant went on that there is evidence before this Court, particularly attachments to Exhibit D10 (expert opinion of Mr. Anthony Olukoju, DW2), showing that the standard convention in the banking industry is to express interest rates annually. Examples of this are: Central Bank of Nigeria (page 17 of Exhibit D10); Bank of Ghana - Treasury Bill Rates (page 18 of Exhibit D10); and US Federal Reserve Board - selected interest rates (pages 19 - 21 of Exhibit D10). The defendant urged the Court to note that the claimant did not deny the defendant’s pleading in paragraph 20(d) of the 2nd further amended statement of defence, which is: “using the May 2014 Money Market rates posted on the duration of the instrument (i.e., whether 1 Month, 3 Months, 6 Months, etc.) the interest rate is still expressed annually”. That DW2 (Anthony Olukoju) in his opinion (Exhibit D10) attached the extract from the website of both the Central Bank of Nigeria and Central Bank of Ghana which are at pages 17 and 18 of Exhibit D10, respectively. That a look at these extracts which are marked as Exhibits 4 and 5 in Exhibit D10 show that the interest rate was stated without stating the period of calculation. Yet, it is undisputed that interest rate in the said extracts are computed per year. That the position in the financial institutions such as the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Bank of Ghana represent the industry practice of ascribing a periodic computation of “per annum” to interest rate when it is not stated in the document. That Exhibit D10 shows clearly that the basis for the computation of interest as stated in clause 17.10(a) is consistent with the conventional methods of representing interest rates in the banking industry, referring to the opinion of DW2 at page 4 of Exhibit D10 under the heading “Interest rate”. That this industry practice of computing interest rate on per annum basis constitutes evidence of the surrounding circumstances which this Court is permitted by law to rely on so as to determine the apparent intention of the parties, citing Hillas and Co. Ltd v. Arcos Ltd [1932] 147 LT 503; [1932] AER 494, cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Omega Bank Nig. Ltd v. OBC (supra), and Savannah Bank Nig. Ltd. v. Salami [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 131 at 147. The defendants then submitted that the period for computation of the interest rate stated in clause 17.10(a) of Exhibit KA5 is by intention of the parties 10% per annum compounded monthly. 15. The defendant continued that the construction given by the claimant is unreasonable and makes no commercial sense at all. That the law is that if there are two possible constructions of the terms of a contract, the Court is entitled to reject the one which is unreasonable, citing Wickman Machine Tools Sales Limited v. Schuler AG [1974] AC 235 at 251. That it is not in dispute between the parties that clause 17.10(a) read alone is capable of various interpretations, at the least, two interpretations to wit 10% per annum or 10% per month. That in the circumstance, this Court is entitled to reject the one which is unreasonable, which is the interpretation given by the claimant to wit, 10% per month compounded monthly. Indeed, that it is unreasonable that an employer will guarantee a 10% monthly rate which again is to be compounded monthly to its employees, referring to DW2’s opinion at page 6 of Exhibit D10, which opinion, according to the defendant was not controverted nor challenged in any manner and so must be deemed admitted. That the unreasonability of the construction placed by the claimant is more obvious and palpable when one considers that the entire contribution of the claimant throughout his service, which both parties placed before this Court as shown in Exhibits KA6, KA7 and D10 is a paltry sum of N258,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand Naira) only; now the claimant is claiming that he is entitled to the sum of Nl,547,575,787,39.00. That this is certainly unreasonable. In fact, that when the entire contribution of the claimant and the defendant is added together, it will sum up to N1,290,000.00 (One Million, Two Hundred and Ninety Thousand Naira) only. It is certainly unreasonable and defies and flouts all business and commercial sense that that sum will now, upon the claimant’s so called interpretation of clause 17.10 of the Handbook, entitle him to the humongous sum of N1,547,575,787.39.00 as claimed. Besides, that that amount is more than the entire emolument of the claimant for the entire 14 years which the claimant spent in the service of the defendant. The entire salary of the claimant for the 14 years is N5,159,999.00 (Five Million, One Hundred and Fifty-Nine Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred and Ninety-Nine Naira). That it is certainly not reasonable to construe that the claimant who now leaves the service before the retirement age will suddenly be entitled to N1,547,575,787,39.00. The defendant referred to the English case of Rainy Sky S. A. and ors v. Kookman Bank Suit No: [2011] UKSC 50 on appeal from [2010] EWCA Civ 582 (reported in Law Pavilion), which held that where a term of a contract is open to more than one interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most consistent with business common sense, urging the Court to adopt this approach and reject the construction given to clause 17.10 by the claimant and accept that of DW2 in terms of Exhibit D10, which computed the claimant’s entitlement to be N1,378,163.00, a sum long transferred to the claimant’s pension administrator as per paragraph 21 of the 2nd further amended statement of defence and paragraph 5 of the claimant’s reply to the 2nd further amended statement of defence. The defendant then urged the Court to resolve this issue in its favour and hold that the claimant is not entitled to the sum claim nor any sum at all and the defendant is not indebted to the claimant. 16. On the claim for interest, issue (3), the defendant submitted that the claimant is not entitled to pre judgment interest of 20% per annum and post judgment interest of 21 % per annum, relying on its argument relating to issue (2). That once the claimant is not entitled to any sum at all, the issue of interest will not arise. Furthermore, that the law is indeed well settled that a claim for interest must be specifically pleaded and the claimant must plead all relevant facts to show his entitlement to the interest, citing Saeby Jernstoberi M.F.A S v. Olaogun Ent. [1999] 14 NWLR (Pt. 637) 128. That from the pleadings before the Court, the claimant did not plead his supposed entitlement to interest as arising under a contract, express or implied or under mercantile usage, etc; and moreover no relevant contractual term or any relevant facts relied upon were specifically pleaded nor was there any evidence given in this respect. The defendant then submitted that the claim for interest must fail in its entirety, urging the Court to dismiss the claim of the claimant in its entirety. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 17. The claimant on his part also submitted three issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether claimant’s claims 4, 5 and the alternative claim in the present suit is statute-barred. (b) Whether the amount transferred by the defendant into the claimant’s Pension Savings Account as his entitlement between 1993 and 2004 is in line with clause 17.10(a) of the defendant’s Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA2). (c) Whether upon a proper construction of clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook claimant is entitled to the sum of N1,547,575,787.39 as his actual entitlement under the Zenith Legacy Scheme between March 1993 to December 2004. 18. Regarding the issue of statute-bar, the claimant first submitted that that the issue of limitation, being one of fact, in civil proceedings, is predicated on the rules of pleadings. That limitation as a defence, is one of those defences, christened “special defence” which must be pleaded and particularized before a Court can consider the plea as a defence that can upend the case of the claimant. In other words, that the defence of limitation is a plea that must be raised by the person/party seeking to avail himself of it. That if the plea is not contained in the pleadings, then it is not an issue that arises for adjudication before the Court before whom the cause is contested; if the plea is not an issue, it is not justiciable and if not justiciable the Court cannot reach a determination on it. That the defendant not having raised a plea of limitation as a special defence to the claimant’s case, the issue whether this suit is maintainable, by reason of the statute of limitation, does not call for adjudication in this matter, citing Adekoya v. FHA [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt. 652) 215 CA, Bakare v. NRC [2007] 12 MJSC 76 and Qyebanji v. Lawanson [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 110) 112 at 138. 19. However, that should the Court hold that the plea/defence of limitation has been properly raised, that the subject-matter of this suit comes within the accepted exceptions to the statute of limitation by reason of the fact that this matter relates to pensions contribution and the ensuing resulting Trust. That it is the failure of the custodian of the contributions for which the claimant is the beneficiary to make or remit the total amount it ought to have contributed when it was the custodian of the Pension Fund to the new custodian that has given rise to this suit. How much is the defendant liable to remit? Does the defendant have a right to appropriate to itself monies in its custody as Pension Fund contribution? That it is trite, that when a person has assumed to act as trustee of money or other property, that is, to act in a fiduciary capacity with regards to it and is in consequence in possession of or has exercised command or control over such money or property, a Court of equity will impose upon him all the liabilities of an express trustee and will class him with and will call him an express trustee of an express trust. That the principal liability of an express trustee is that he must discharge himself by accounting to the cestui que trust for all such money or property without regard to lapse of time. That by Nelson v. Rye [1996] 2 All ER 186 relying on the decision on A. G. v. Cocke [1988] 2 All ER 391, all actions for a breach of fiduciary duty (i.e. allegations of deliberate and dishonest under accounting which is based on the same factual allegation as common law claims of fraud), are not subject to a period of limitation. Accordingly, that the statute of limitation does not apply to cases of trust when the person setting up the defence is said to have unlawful withheld and appropriated to itself, money due to the beneficiary while in its custody under a trusteeship. The claimant referred to section 32(4) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, which provides that no period of limitation prescribed shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust being an action to recover from the profit the proceeds thereof in possession of the trustee or previously received by the trustee. That equity will never allow the custodian of funds, held in trust to usurp same to the detriment of the beneficiary and then set up a defence of limitation when its perfidy is found out and the beneficiary seeks to right the wrong by ensuring that the trustee returns to the funds the monies illicitly withheld or appropriated by it. 20. The claimant proceeded to ask: if limitation were to apply to the claim before this Court, whether the claim is in fact statute-barred? In other words how do we reckon time? That it must be borne in mind that this suit bothers on the pension entitlement of the claimant arising from the deductions and contributions of the parties, the contributions and deductions having been agreed to by contract. That two situations have arisen with regards to reckoning time in this case. (i) The first situation, which takes into consideration the subject matter of the dispute, which is “pension contribution”, will reckon time from when the defendant was obliged to transfer the sums held by it under a Trust Scheme for the benefit of the claimant, did indeed transfer the said sums but the sum transferred to the New Pension Funds Custodian was less than what ought to have been transferred. In this situation, that time will begin to run from the time the defendant’s withheld or failed to transfer the portion of the remittance that is the subject of this suit. (ii) The second situation is predicated on the recognition of the fact that whilst the claimant is the acknowledged beneficiary of the pensions funds his right to draw from the funds or to deal with the monies that make up the funds crystalizes, which is when he attains the statutory age that entitles him to withdrawal from the funds or is out of employment for a minimum of three months. None of which has arisen. The claimant then reiterated that it is in the movement of the Pension Funds from the defendant who were the previous Pension Fund managers, and who were also the claimant’s employers, to the New Pension Fund Managers on the claimant exiting the employment of the defendant that gave rise to the claimant’s cause of action as the sum remitted fell short of what he was contractually entitled to. That this suit has been necessitated by reason of the defendant refusing to make good the shortfall, which shortfall it has now sought to justify in its defence. 21. The claimant continued by asking how our law reckons time. He cited NPA v. Ajobi [2006] 9 MJSC 132, where Kutigi JSC (as he then was) held that time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff succeed. In other words, would the claimant have had a cause of action had the defendant fully remitted what it was obliged to under contract? To the claimant, his right of action arose when the defendant failed to remit to the New Pension Fund Managers the total sum of money believed to have been agreed by contract as the contributions constituting the Pension Funds. That had the defendant remitted to the new Managers that which the claimant believed to amount to the sums outstanding in the Pension Funds, no right of action would have arisen or accrued to the claimant, citing Whoerein v. Emerinwa [2004] 1 FWLR (Pt. 221) 1570 at 1581. That from the averments in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 14 of the amended statement of fact, the claimant’s cause of action in this suit arose when on resignation from the service of the defendant vide a letter dated the 27th September 2007 (Exhibit KA3), he received a letter dated the 28th September 2007 where the claimant was informed of the computation of his total final entitlements and became aware of how much money was paid into his Pension Account with Trust Funds Pension Plc, the claimant’s New Pension Funds Managers. The claimant then referred to section 39(1) of the Pension Reform Act 2004, the operation of which and indeed the need to comply with same led the defendant to transfer the pension funds and acts of which the claimant is beneficiary to a new custodian. That the defendant, in seeking protection under the 2004 Pension Reform Act (PRA), stated in its statement of defence that the claimant was duly informed that his Legacy Trust had been transferred to a Contributory Scheme codified by section 39 of the Act and is, therefore, estopped from asserting what the true and proper amount due to him is. 22. To the claimant, the defendant is a financial institution, and its employees are subject to the terms of conditions of employment set down by it, hence the claimant like all other employees of the defendant was, therefore, brought under the provisions of the Pension Reform Act of 2004. That section 39(1)(d) expressly prescribes that an employer shall compute and credit to its employee’s account all contributions and distributable income earned accrued prior to the effective date of the exercise of the employee’s option to come under the provisions of the PRA 2004. That it is important to note that such monies contributed in addition with the emolument sums accrued (profit subject to a minimum guarantee rate of 10% compounded monthly) which were held in a custodian account prior to 2005 when the 2004 PRA came into effect are deemed to be monies held in trust by the defendant for the benefit of the claimant. That in its statement of defence, the defendant did not dispute whether or not monies were transferred from the custodian account to the employee’s PFA account per the provisions of the PRA 2004, it only disputed the quantum of the monies calculated. 23. That it must be borne in mind that the present proceedings follow from the order of the Lagos High Court, which the claimant had initially approached in Suit No. LD/181/2009 in 2009 which Court struck out the suit, declining jurisdiction in favour of this Court. That the consequential filing of the action in this suit does not erase the reckoning of time for the purpose of limitation from 2009 when the action was first filed at the Lagos High Court, as the action which was started at the Lagos High Court but was struck out to be refilled in this Court is considered as one and the same, having been struck out to enable the parties approach the Court with statutory jurisdiction, citing Omisade v. Akande [1987] 1 NSCC Vol. 18 (Pt. 1) 486 at 495, which held thus: “When a cause is before a State High Court and it is found that the cause ought to have been before the Federal High Court, the action will be referred to the competent court and the action will be regarded as one and the same”. That following from this decision, time must be reckoned not from when this suit was instituted at the Industrial Court, but when the claimant filed Suit No. LD/181/2009 in 2009 at the Lagos State High Court. That this matter is, therefore, not statute barred, citing further Sifax Nigeria Ltd & ors v. MIGFO Nigeria Ltd & anor [2015] LPELR-CA/l/843/2013, which relied on Adekeye v. Akin-Olugbade [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214 SC at 230 - 231, a case that held that no period of limitation fixed by this law shall apply to an action against a trustee or any person claiming through him. The claimant then submitted that the defendant as trustee having failed to make the proper contribution into the claimant’s Pension Fund culminated in the cause of action that led to the institution of the suit at the High Court in LD/181/2009, which was subsequently filed in this present suit. Therefore, that his claim is not statute-barred but continuous since he had no access to his total entitlement on the pension funds until his resignation from office in 2007. That the inability of the defendant to pay him his accrued pension rights under clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook led to the present action in 2011 a period of 4 years although he had previously filed an action at the High Court which was struck out in 2011. 24. In concluding his submission on issue (a), the claimant referred to Xtondos Services Nigeria Ltd & anor v. Taisei (WA) Limited & anor [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1003) 533, where the Supreme Court held that where there is a claim in the alternative the trial court will first consider whether or not the principal or main claim ought to have succeeded; it is only after the Court may have found that it could not for any reason grant the principal claim that it would only consider the alternative claim. i.e. an alternative award is an award that can also be made instead of another. To the claimant, what is crucial in determining whether an action is statute-barred is not limited to the date on the writ of summons of the statement of claim but the date when every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to support his right took place as can be determined initially from his pleadings or ultimately from the evidence, citing Thomas v. Olufosoye [2004] 49 WRN 32; and that the failure of the defendant to plead the statute of limitation has rendered its objection null and void and of no effect, referring to Mbonu v. Nigerian Mining Corp [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 659 at 691. Finally, that given that time started to run from the date the claimant was notified of how much was remitted to his New Pension Funds Custodian, as that was when he had the option of electing to take action or otherwise, that was when is cause of action arose. That reckoning from that date which is the 28th September 2007, this action is within time, urging the Court to resolve issue (a) in his and hold that claims 4, 5 and the alternative claim are not statute-barred. 25. Issue (b) relates to whether the amount transferred by the defendant into the claimant’s pension savings account between 1993 and 2004 is in line with clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA2). to the claimant, the defendant’s Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA2) contains the terms and conditions of employment inclusive of the pension benefits which he is entitled to herein, citing Kelechi Irondi v. Adison Chouest Offshore Nig. Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 99 NIC and Hilary Farms Ltd & ors v. M/V “Mahtra” Sister Vessel to M/V “Kadrina” & ors [2007] 6 SCNJ 292 at 311. That it is not the function of a court to make or rewrite a contract for the parties; and extrinsic evidence, whether oral or contained in other writings, is not admissible save in a few accepted exceptions, to add to, vary, contradict or subtract from the terms of such document, citing UBN Ltd v. Nwsaokolo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 127. That it is not in the place of the defendant to alter the conditions of service in clause 17:10. To the claimant, the defendant’s expert witness (DW2) wishes to rewrite 17.10 of the Employee Handbook by inserting the word “annually”. That he had earlier conceded that interest can be either monthly, quarterly or annually. On the interest rate, that DW2 in Exhibit D10 at page 4 says: “Clause 17.10(a) of the Employee Handbook states ‘A member will always be entitled to higher individual contributions plus profits subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly’. Interest rates can be calculated based on various intervals (e.g. monthly quarterly, yearly etc)”. That he had also conceded that the formula used by the claimant’s expert was correct; as such he (DW2) cannot by his evidence approbate and reprobate at the same time as such evidence will be disregarded by the Court. That the absurdity of placing “annually” in front of monthly is obvious; as according to him what was intended was 10% per annum compounded monthly. That an interpreter cannot add to or subtract from the simple language of the document; where the language is clearly unambiguous it should be given its normal every day interpretation. That it is beyond the interpreter to add the word “annually” or any other word to it, citing Chief S.O. Agbareh & anor v. Dr Anthony Mimra & ors [2008] LPELR-235(SC) and Azeez v. Lufthansa German Airline [2014] LPELR-22416(CA). In any event, that section 132(1) of the Evidence Act states that such evidence to add or remove from the wordings of a contract is inadmissible. 26. The claimant went on that the submission of the consultant is said to be his opinion, which opinion is obviously misconceived and out of line with legal thinking. At page 6 of Exhibit D10, DW2 stated as follows: “I was able to recreate the calculations put forth by claimant’s experts, Mr. Olotu and Mr. Austin of the firm Eyewumi Rone & Co. Both experts appeared to use the same methodology, resulting in the same value of the accrued pension benefits owed to the Claimant. They both did not err in the formula used…” Furthermore, that at pages 4 to 5 of Exhibit D10, DW2 appears to be rewriting the contract for the parties when he stated thus: “It is my opinion for the following reasons that the interest rate to be applied in this instance is an annualized interest rate. Thus, I have interpreted the applicable interest as 10% per annum…” that DW2 was never party to the contract and has no locus whatsoever to interpret the contract at variance to the terms and agreement of the parties, citing Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 504 at 521 - 522. 27. As a matter of fact, that the defendant’s consultant had agreed that the claimant’s consultants proceeded from correct basis; in which case, the conclusion reached by the claimant’s consultants must be accepted. That if the defendant’s consultant had not altered the tenor of the contract by introducing the word “annually” which cannot be found in clause 17.10 he would have reached the same conclusion as the claimant’s consultants. That where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous effect must be given to the contract, and it is not the duty of the Court to rewrite contracts for the parties, citing Bookshop House v. Stanley Consultants [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 26) 87 at 93 and Union Bank (Nig) Plc v. Ozigi [1994] 3 NWLR 333 at 385; [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 26) 87 at 93. That under doctrine of sanctity of contract a defendant could not resile from the contract just because it later found that the conditions of the contract or agreement are not favourable to it. That the Court need not look beyond Exhibit KA2 for the meaning of the word “10%” compounded monthly. That the Experts seemed to have agreed on the formula used in the computation however the DW2 decided to “recreate” and rewrite the provision of clause 7.10. That there is absolutely no need for the extrinsic evidence of DW2 to interpret the clear and unambiguous words of Exhibit KA2. 28. The claimant continued that his witnesses (CW2 and CW3) had prepared two reports in computing the pension benefits of the claimant. That the computation relied upon by the claimant in this suit are Exhibits KA5 and KA6 wherein CW2 and CW3 did a computation of claimant’s entitlement for the period March 1993 to December 2004 using the basic salary used by the defendant in its pension schedule of the claimant in the High Court matter in Suit No. LD/181/2009 and relied on clause 17.10 as the basis of the computation. That the claimant having spent over 14 years in the service of the defendant was entitled to 100% contribution with profit being benefits due to the claimant listed as follows: a) Employee’s contribution as 5% of Basic pay from March 1993 to December, 2004 - 257,999.95 b) Guaranteed interest at 10% compounded monthly on employee’s contribution above from March 1993 to December 2004 - 1,546,285,787,64 c) Employer’s contribution at 20% of basic pay from Mach 1993 to December, 2004 - 1,031,959.80 Total - 1,547,575,787.39 29. The claimant then submitted that a court is not to go outside the terms and rewrite the contract for the parties, citing NRC v. Umera [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1008) 265 at 271 - 278, Prof. S. O. Abulraheem & 3 ors v. Prof. B.F. Olugeogba and 43 ors [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1008) 280 at 352, Dr. Adeosun Oluseyi Olalekan v. Management Board, University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital [2012] LPELR 2009(CA), Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd & anor v. Penny Mart Ltd [1992] 5 NWLR 244 and Brigadier G.T. Kurubo & anor v. Zach-Motison Nigeria Limited CA/L/224/89 [1992] 5 NWLR 116. Citing section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011, which states that the burden of proof shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities in all civil proceedings, the claimant submitted that the evidence he and his witnesses led have discharged the burden of proof under section 134 of the Evidence Act and was corroborated by the DW1 when he confirmed the defendant is bound by the provisions of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA2). To the claimant, given the evidence of DW1 as to monthly contributions of both the claimant and the defendant to the fund, there is no ambiguity about “profit subject to a minimum guarantee rate of 10% compounded monthly”. The claimant concluded that upon a proper construction of clause 17:10 of the Handbook, he is entitled to the sum of N1,547,575,787,39 as his pension benefits and same should be paid by the defendant to him through his pension funds administrators, Trust Funds Pension Plc Account No. 000100074816333. The claimant then urged the Court to resolve issue (b) in his favour. 30. Issue (c), similar to issue (b), relates to whether upon a proper construction of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook, the claimant is entitled to N1,547,575,787.39 as his actual entitlement under the Zenith Legacy Scheme from March 1993 to December 2004. The claimant answered this in the affirmative, relying on arguments as to the contraction of clause 17.10 he had advanced in respect of issue (b). To the claimant, clauses 16.9(d) and 17.8 of the Handbook referred to by the defendant are not ambiguous; same also is clause 17.7 which states: The main benefit is a lump sum payable on the normal retirement date. The lump is the total of the contributions paid by a member and the Bank on his/her behalf plus his/her share of the profits earned to date on the investment of the funds so long as the profit so stated shall never be less than an accrued interest at the minimum rate of 10% compounded monthly on the total contributions from the date of joining the fund. That it is not in doubt that the defendant who repeated the same benefit of 10% compounded monthly in clause 17.10(a) was not mistaken as to the benefits accruable to the employee upon retirement as in clause 17.7 or resignation as in the present instance in clause 17.10 as to the entitlement of claimant upon resignation of appointment after 14 years of service. 31. The claimant went on that though clause 17.10 of Exhibit KA2 is very clear and unambiguous, even if the defendant claims that it is ambiguous, the terms are strictly construed against the party who drafted the contract. The rule of strict construction is often applied to contracts containing exculpatory clauses or provisions that attempt to insulate a party from liability. That the Handbook is used to regulate the affairs between the defendant and the claimant including the rights, duties and benefits; the defendant can, therefore, not be allowed to run from its liability. That the contra preferentem rule is a general rule that a Court will construe ambiguous contract terms against the drafter of the agreement but this rule only applies where a contracting party is in a superior bargaining position usually either as a result of greater experience or the assistance of counsel. That it is a doctrine of contractual interpretation providing that where a promise, or agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests of the party who provided the wording; and as such the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist, citing three foreign cases not made available to the Court. That the defendant drafted the contract of employment and has an advantage over the claimant who accepted the contract and fulfilled his responsibilities and duties under same. That the defendant refused to fulfill its obligation under the employment contract by remitting the complete pension benefits of the claimant to the pension funds administrator. That the defendant is estopped from seeking to rewrite the said clause 17.10 having received 14 years of the claimant’s service on the basis of a contract it now seeks to rewrite, referring to section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011. 32. The claimant continued that it is trite law that declaratory reliefs being at the discretion of the Court to grant can only be given where the justice of the case warrants it having regards to the pleadings and evidence led in proof by the claimant wherewith he discharges the onus of proof under section 136 for the Evidence Act 2011. That it is erroneous to assume that declaratory actions are a form of equitable relief only. That they are also statutory and constitutional rights having regard to the combined effect of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court, which except otherwise provided have the powers of the High Court under “section 254” and 6(6) of the Constitution 1999 vesting judicial powers on this Court as a superior court of record most particularly “relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries wages, pensions, gratuities, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker”. 33. On the defendant’s opinion that the claimant is not entitled to post judgment interest since same was not pleaded, the claimant submitted that post judgment interest is granted at the discretion of the Court, citing Stabling Vision Ltd v. Metalum Ltd [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 416 (and Order 21 Rule 4 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, a non-existing Rule). The claimant concluded that in view of the submissions relating to issues (b) and (c) he has satisfied the burden placed on him in proof of his case, urging the Court to exercise its discretion to grant the declaratory reliefs sought in this action and order payment of the sum of N1,547,575,787,39.00 to be credited into the claimant’s Savings Account No. 000100074816333 opened with Trust Funds Pension Plc being the claimant’s entitlement as pension benefit from the defendant from March 1993 to December 2004 before the Pension Reform Act became effective with accrued interest as claimed. THE DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 34. As to whether the issue of jurisdiction and competence of this suit (whether the suit is not statute-barred) raised by the Court suo motu is incompetent given that it is not contained in the defendant’s pleadings, the defendant submitted that the argument of the claimant is entirely erroneous, misconceived and must be discountenanced by the Court. First, that the issue of limitation of action is one that touches on or goes to the jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, the same is a question of law as contained in the relevant statutes, citing Owners of the MV Arabella v. NAIC [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt. l097) 182. Being a jurisdiction issue, that the law is very clear that the same is not limited to being raised as a special defence and pleading them specifically, citing Dr Tosin Ajayi v. (Mrs) Olajumoke Adebiyi & ors [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137, which held that limitation law and locus standi can be raised by preliminary objection at any stage of the proceedings before any Court by any of the parties or even suo motu by the court, and Akpabuyo Local Government Council v. D’Tito Co. (Nig) Ltd [2016] LPELR-41352(CA). In the circumstances, that the issue of whether the action of the claimant is caught by the Limitation Law of Lagos State, which was not pleaded but duly raised by the Court, is competent and the argument of the claimant must be properly discountenanced. What is more, that it is trite law that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even on appeal. Besides, a Court is always competent to raise suo moto any matter it considers decisive and that would affect its decision provided it gives both parties (as the Court did here) the opportunity to respond to the issues so raised, citing Dalro v. UBN Plc [2007] NWLR (Pt. 1059) 99 at 137 - 138. That Adekoya v. FHA, Bakare v. NRC and Oyebamiji v. Lawanson relied upon by the claimant in support of his argument that the statute of limitation must be pleaded are inapplicable to the instant case and must, therefore, be discountenanced. This is because the Court of Appeal case of Adekoya v. FHA cannot supersede the Supreme Court’s authority of Dr Tosin Ajayi v. (Mrs) Olajumoke Adebiyi & ors (supra); the dictum of Niki Tobi, JSC in Bakare v. NRC in his concurring judgment is an obiter dictum as the issue of whether the limitation law need to be pleaded was not raised before the Supreme Court, neither was the point necessary for the determination of the case before the Court; and in Oyebamiji v. Lawanson, the decision of the Court was based on the provisions of Order 25 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Oyo State which stipulate that a party relying on the defence of limitation must plead same whereas in the instant case there is no such provision under the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 under which this action was instituted. The defendant went on that the law is very well settled that cases are to be cited in the light of the facts on which they are decided, citing Babatunde v. PAS & TA Ltd [2007] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 113 at 157; and Bakare v. NRC and Oyebamiji v. Lawanson, decided in 2007 and 2008 respectively, do not represent the current position of the law as the cases are in conflict with the more recent Supreme Court’s decision in Dr Tosin Ajayl v. Adebiyi (supra) - and Courts are enjoined in cases of conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court to follow the more recent Supreme Court decision, referring to Osakue v. FCE Asaba [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) at 34. The defendant then urged the Court to discountenance Bakare v. NRC and Oyebanji v. Lawanson. 35. Next, the defendant submitted that the claimant’s case does not fall within the exceptions to the statute of limitation. That contrary to the argument of the claimant that this suit relates to trust, it is clear that the action is wholly one of simple contract and does not relate to trust at all. That this can clearly be seen from a calm reading of the reliefs sought by the claimant in the writ of summons, the averments contained in the statement of facts and indeed the very argument of the claimant himself wherein he argued variously that the defendant’s Employee Handbook (Exhibit KA2) contains the terms and conditions of employment, and the terms of a contract of employment are binding on the parties thereto and as such is sacrosanct. That the claimant referred to his relationship with the defendant as one of contract; as such even to the claimant, his claim is wholly one of a simple contract. 36. Furthermore, that by arguing that the case of the claimant relates to trust, the claimant has attempted to introduce new facts before this Court, which are not contained in his pleadings. That the law is well settled that parties are bound by their pleadings and that facts not pleaded go to no issue and are bound to the discountenanced by the Court, citing Oruwari v. Osler [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 535 at 558 and urging the Court to discountenance the argument of the claimant in its entirety. 37. To the defendant section 32(4) of the Limitation Law does not apply to the claimant’s case. That assuming without conceding that the claimant’s suit is a trust action or relates to trust, then the argument of the claimant that his action falls within the exception to the statute of limitation because same relates to trust is completely erroneous as the statute of limitation equally applies to matters that relate to trust. That section 32 of the Limitation Law is clear and unambiguous in that under it a period of six years is prescribed as the limitation period for actions relating to trust. Section 32 provides thus: Subject to subsection (4) of this section an action to recover money or other property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is fixed by any other provision of this Law, shall not be brought against a trustee or any person claiming through him after the expiration of SIX YEARS from the date on which the right of action accrued. Accordingly, that, having instituted this action on 16th December 2011, which is outside the six years after the cause of action allegedly arose in December 2004, the action of the claimant is caught by the provisions of the Limitation Law, even if the action of the claimant relates to trust (something the defendant vigorously denied). 38. The defendant continued that even if the action of the claimant relates to trust, the exceptions in section 32(4) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State do not apply to the claimant’s case at all, and so will not avail the claimant as section 32(4) of the Limitation law applies only to cases founded on fraud or any fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or claim to recover trust property or the proceeds thereof still in the possession of the trustee and converted to his own use. Section 32(4) provides thus: No period of limitation fixed by this Law shall apply to an action against a trustee or any person claiming through him where… (a) the claim is founded on any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was party or privy; or (b) the claim is to recover trust property or the proceeds thereof still retained by the trustee and converted to his own use. That from the pleadings of the claimant before this Court, it is clear that the there is no plea/allegation of fraud, or fraudulent breach of trust against the defendant whatsoever. Indeed, that the claimant did not plead that the defendant was a trustee; instead he pleaded that the defendant was his employer and it was on that basis alone that the trial was conducted. That the claimant cannot be allowed to change his case at the stage of final address. 39. Furthermore, that the law is trite that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and particulars given, citing H.M.S. Lld v. First Bank [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 167) 290. That having failed to make such plea or allegation before this Court, the claimant’s argument that his case falls within the provision of section 32(4) goes to no issue and ought to be properly discountenanced by this Court. 40. In the same vein, that the action of the claimant is clearly not to recover trust property or the proceeds of same being retained by the defendant as a trustee which has now been converted to the trustee’s (defendant’s) use. That the claimant did not make any such allegation against the defendant and the defendant had no opportunity to defend such. 41. The defendant went on that Nelson v. Rye [1996] 2 All ER 186 cited and relied upon by the claimant is dead set against the claimant and wholly supports the defendant. First that in Nelson v. Rye, the cause of action before the Court was breach of trust and facts revolving round the claimant’s cause of action were specifically pleaded before the Court unlike in the instant case where the claimant did not plead any fact relating to fraudulent breach of trust. That in the instant case, the claimant’s cause of action, as can be gleaned from the originating processes and even the argument of the claimant on the merit of the case, is on simple contract and, therefore, the limitation period for contractual claims as contained in the section 8 of the Limitation laws of Lagos State applies. Furthermore, that the claimant by his pleadings has chosen to sue the defendant based on the contractual relationship between the parties alone. That in the words of Lord Laddie J in Nelson v. Rye at page198, if the claimant decides to sue on contract alone, then the limitation period for contractual case would apply to the case of the claimant. Therefore, that since the claimant in this case has chosen to sue on the basis of contract alone, the limitation period for contractual cases i.e. 6 years as contained in section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State applies to the instant case and, therefore, the action of the claimant is statute-barred. Indeed, that the action of the claimant does not in any manner, fall within the exception stated in section 32(4)(b) of the Limitation Law and to hold otherwise is a breach of the defendant’s right to fair hearing. The defendant then urged the Court to discountenance the argument of the claimant in this regard. 42. On when time begins to run, the claimant had argued that his cause of action arose in 2007 when he received a letter dated 28th September 2007 (Exhibit KA4) notifying him of the computation of his total entitlement and thus became aware of the amount of money paid into his pension account. To the defendant, this argument is totally erroneous in that: (a) It is completely inconsistent with his pleadings from where the date of the cause of action is to be determined, citing UBN v. Umeoduagu [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 352. (b) By his writ of summons and statement of claim as detailed below, it is clear that the claimant pleaded that his cause of action arose in 2004. This is evident from paragraphs 11 and 12 of the 2nd Amended Statement of Facts dated 29th October 2014 and relief (3)I contained in the amended writ of summons wherein the claimant stated and claimed as follows: Paragraph 11 and 12 of the statement of claim 11. Despite repeated demands, the Defendant has refused or neglected to pay to the Claimant his entitlement and profit under Clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook between March 1993 when he was employed to December 2004 before the enforcement of the Pensions Reform Act 2004. 12. The Claimant engaged the services of Eyewumi Rone & Co., a firm of chartered Accountants and an Accounting Consultant, Mr. Aigbe Olotu, in order to quantify his entitlements as stated in clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook between March 1993, when he was employed, to December 2004 before the enforcement of the Pensions Reform Act 2004. Relief III of the Writ of Summons A DECLARATION that the Pension Reform Act, 2004 which came into force on the 1st of January, 2005 cannot operate retrospectively to deprive the Claimant his accrued pension before the enactment of the Law. (c) Therefore, going by the claim of the claimant, it is clear that the claimant acknowledges that his claim for the pension contribution for 1993 - 2004 indeed accrued before 2004 before the enactment of the Pension Reform Act in 2004, urging the Court to so hold. (d) Furthermore, the said letter of 28th September 2007 (Exhibit KA4) did not give any such notification as erroneously argued by the claimant. (e) Rather, by the content of Exhibit KA4, the claimant’s resignation was duly accepted by the management of the defendant and the claimant was informed that his “end of service” entitlements, which is very different from “pension contribution” will be computed by the company and communicated to him. (f) In any event, the law is clear that the knowledge of the claimant of his cause of action is irrelevant to a successful defence that an action is statute-barred, citing AJibona v. Kolawole [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 22, where Ogwuegbu, JSC held on page 36 thus: “On a cumulative reading of the entire provisions of the Limitation Law and in particular sections 16, 17, 19 and 21 thereof, knowledge on the part of the plaintiff is not a condition precedent, The knowledge of the plaintiff is immaterial. The words of the Limitation Law of Lagos State are clear and unambiguous and must therefore be accorded their ordinary meaning”. (g) Therefore, the claimant’s argument that he only became aware of his pension contribution in 2008, even if same is true (which is not), is irrelevant in determining whether the action is statute-barred. The defendant accordingly submitted that the cause of action of the claimant arose in 2004, urging the Court to so hold. 43. The defendant proceeded to submit that contrary to argument of the claimant the present suit is not and cannot be a continuation of the alleged previous suit allegedly filed at the State High Court. First, that there is no evidence whatsoever of the said previous suit before this Court and the law is indeed well settled that the address of counsel, no matter how brilliant, cannot substitute for evidence, citing Okwejiminor v. Gbakeji [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt.1079) 172 SC. Furthermore, that the position of the law is firmly established that where a court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine a case as the claimant has alleged to be the case in the suit allegedly filed at the Lagos State High Court, the proceedings before that court remain a nullity ab initio, citing Braithwaite v. Skye Bank Plc [2012] LPELR-15532(SC) and Okoye v. NCF & Co Ltd [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 501 at 538. The defendant then submitted that the suit allegedly filed by the claimant at the Lagos State High Court, which that Court declared that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain, was a nullity; it is as if it never existed. Thus, the said suit is utterly incapable of freezing the time stipulated in the Limitation Law, urging the Court to hold that time was never frozen and the claimant’s suit is statute-barred. 44. To the defendant, the arguments of the claimant that he did not freely choose his pension administrator as well as that the defendant did not compute and credit the claimant’s account all contributions earned prior to the exercise of the claimant’s option to come under the provision of the PRA 2004 are an afterthought as same were not pleaded by the claimant and so ought to be properly discountenanced by this Court. That having failed to plead facts relating to the failure of the defendant to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Pension Reform Act, the argument of the claimant in respect of same goes to no issue and should be discountenanced. 45. On the issue of interpretation of documents, the defendant submitted that the argument of the claimant to the effect that a party/court cannot rewrite a contract is irrelevant as it does not address any of the issues before this Court and so is erroneous and misconceived. That the claimant has clearly misconceived the real issue in controversy in this case and this has prevented him from appreciating the defence of the defendant. That it is not true that the defendant’s expert witness (DW2) inserted/placed the word “annually” in front of the word “monthly” in clause 17.10 as argued by the claimant. Rather, the case of the defendant, which DW2 also gave evidence in support, is that after the word “10%”, an annual period was intended before the word compounded monthly. That it is the annual periodic component that the claimant’s expert witness calculated monthly and still went ahead to compound monthly. That this is what the DW2 explained at page 6 of Exhibit D10, which the claimant quoted half-way in his address. That if the claimant had completely “read” and quoted what DW2 stated on page 6 of Exhibit D10, the claimant would have appreciated the point made by the defendant and would have seen the futility in his case. That the evidence of DW2 that the claimant’s expert witnesses used an incorrect qualification of the total accrued interest which ultimately led to an inflated and incorrect quantification of the total accrued pension, was not contradicted in any manner whatsoever at the trial. Furthermore, that the contention of the claimant to the effect that DW2 “decided to ‘recreate’ and rewrite the provision of Clause 7.10” is erroneous and misconceived. That DW2 did not state that it recreated the provision of clause 17.10 of Exhibit 6; what DW2 recreated was the calculations put forth by claimant’s experts. 46. The defendant went on that Chief S. O. Agbareh & anor v. Dr Anthony Mimra & ors [2008] NWLR (Pt. 071) 378 SC relied upon by the claimant in its argument on interpretation of Exhibit KA7 is dead set against the claimant and supports the contention of the defendant for the following reasons: (a) From the pleadings and evidence filed before this Court, it is without doubt that the words of Exhibit KA7 are clearly ambiguous in that it is contended that the phrase 10% compounded monthly contained in clause 17.10 of Exhibit KA7 is capable of being interpreted as “10% per month compounded monthly” (by the claimant) or “10% per annum compounded monthly” (by the defendant). (b) The principle postulated by Akintan JSC and relied upon by the claimant effectively states that one can add or subtract from the words of a document where the language of an instrument is ambiguous as in this case. (c) What is more, the judgment of the Court in Agbareh expressed in the leading judgment delivered by Hon. Justice Ogbuagu JSC stated the position of the law clearly, which is that all classes in instruments be construed harmoniously so that the various parts of the instrument are not brought in conflict to their natural meaning, citing Lamikoro Ojokolobo & ors v. Lapade Alamu & anor [1987] 3 NWLR (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 377; [1987] 7 SCNJ 98. Accordingly, that Agbareh is against the claimant and must be so construed. 47. Further still, that Azeez v. Lufthansa German Airline and Momoh v. CBN cited by the claimant in support of his argument that clear words of a document are to be construed strictly are inapplicable to the instant case as the words of paragraph 17.10(a) are ambiguous; as such the Court should discountenance the said cases. Also, that the arguments of the claimant on “waiver” and “resile from conditions stated in a Contract” (including the case of NRC v. Umera cited thereon) do not arise in this case and should be discountenanced by this Court. That even NRC v. Umera relied upon by the claimant is clearly wholly inapplicable to the instant case and must, therefore, be discountenanced in that the issue before the Court in NRC v. Umera relates wholly to wrongful dismissal of an employee by an employer; and the instant case entirely borders on the proper construction of the clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook. That the law is well settled that cases are to be cited in the light of the facts on which they are decided. 48. On the discharge of the burden of proof, the defendant submitted that, contrary to the argument of the claimant, the claimant has not discharged the said burden. That the law is that a party on whom a burden is placed can only discharge the burden when he has adduced evidence to prove his case, citing Onwugbelu v. Ezebuo & ors [2013] LPELR-20401(CA). That the issue between the parties simpliciter is joined on the interpretation of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook. That in the circumstances of this case, the claimant who apparently has wholly failed to adduce any evidence as to the intention of the parties for the purpose of proper interpretation of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook cannot be seriously argued to have discharged the burden of proof placed on him and indeed has not discharged that burden contrary to his argument. That this Court will find that the only point which the claimant has argued that he has proved is that Exhibit KA2, which is the Employee Handbook, governs the contract between the parties; this point is not in contention between the parties and indeed needs no further prove. That by the claimant’s own showing, he has not discharged the burden of prove on the proper interpretation of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook, which is the issue before the Court. Furthermore, that all the arguments of the claimant and the authorities cited therein on the issue of discharge of burden of proof are dead set against the claimant who had absolutely failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on the claimant, urging the Court dismiss the claimant’s case for failure to prove his case. 49. On the principle of contra proferentem, the defendant submitted that the claimant’s reliance on it as well as Herbil Holdings Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance is not only misplaced but absolutely erroneous. First, that the contra proferentem rule is not a general rule of interpretation as suggested by the claimant, but same is subject to the general principle that instruments must be construed in accordance with the expressed intention of parties AND can only be applied when all other rules of construction fail, referring to Halsbury Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 12 at page 608 para 1473 and Hollway v. Sarcon (No. 177) Limited [2010] NICh 15. That in the instant case, this Court can construe clause 17.10 of the Handbook by a harmonious construction of the various clauses of the Handbook and by the surrounding circumstances of the parties’ relationship; there is, therefore, no basis whatsoever for the use of the contra proferentem rule. In any event, that the contra proferentem rule is wholly inapplicable to the instant case in that the said rule is used in interpreting “exclusion clauses” in a contract or words contained in an insurance policy, referring to Halsbury Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 9 at page 246 para 370. That in the instant case, clause 17.10 which is sought to be construed is not in any way an “exclusion clause” i.e. the said clause does not absolve or insulate the defendant from any form of liability; rather the clause merely states the manner of contribution of the claimant’s pension contribution. Accordingly, that the contra proferentem rule is wholly inapplicable to the instant case. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the claimant’s claim in its entirety. COURT’S DECISION 50. The case of the claimant is hinged on the construction of clause 17.10 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook. During the course of the trial, this Court on 28th October 2014, raised the jurisdictional issue of whether or not reliefs 4, 5 and the alternative relief are statute-barred but ordered that parties should address the Court on the said issue during final addresses. In this regard, the claimant advanced a number of arguments to support his view that this case is not statute-barred. The first argument of the claimant here is that the defence of statute-bar is a special one that must be pleaded; otherwise it must be deemed waived. In other words, this Court cannot raise the issue since the defendant did not raise and plead it. I must point out that the Law Reports are replete with case law authorities (and the defendant gave a number of them) that intone that the issue of statute-bar is one of jurisdiction of the Court; and a Court is at liberty to raise the issue of jurisdiction if it thinks that it has no jurisdiction over a matter. All that the law requires is that parties be given the opportunity to address the Court on such an issue. A similar issue arose before this Court in Anthony U. Aku v. Ministry of Petroleum Resources & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/293/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 1st March 2017 and this Court held that it can raise suo motu the issue of statute-bar given that it is one of jurisdiction. I do not accordingly agree with the claimant that the issue of statute-bar must be pleaded before it can be raised, and that this Court cannot suo motu raise it. 51. The claimant also relied on some English case law authorities; and section 32(4) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, which provides that no period of limitation prescribed shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust being an action to recover from the profit the proceeds thereof in possession of the trustee or previously received by the trustee. Is the claimant’s instant case one for recovery from the profit the proceeds in possession of a trustee? This remains the question. I looked through the claimant’s pleadings; and I agree with the defendant that no where in the pleadings did the claimant indicate that his case is one of trust. I indicated earlier that the claimant’s case is hinged on the construction of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook; and paragraphs 11 to 14 of the 2nd amended statement of facts make it very clear that the claimant’s complaint is that he demanded to be paid his entitlement (which his calculation put at N1,547,575,787.39) under the said clause 17.10 but the defendant refused. As couched, this is not a claim under trust; and I so find and hold. It was Lord Steyn who said in R v. Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; [2001] 1 AC 532; [2001] 2 WLR 1622; [2001] UKHL 26 that “in law, context is everything”. 52. To be able to determine whether or not reliefs 4, 5 and the alternative relief are statute-barred, it is necessary to determine what actually is the claimant’s cause of action in this case, and when the said cause of arose arose. Here, I refer once again to Lord Steyn’s “in law, context is everything”. To the claimant, it is in the movement of the Pension Funds from the defendant who was the previous Pension Fund managers, and who was also the claimant’s employer, to the New Pension Fund Manager on the claimant exiting the employment of the defendant that gave rise to the claimant’s cause of action as the sum remitted fell short of what he was contractually entitled to. That this suit has been necessitated by reason of the defendant refusing to make good the shortfall, which shortfall it has now sought to justify in its defence. Here, by paragraph 25 of the claimant’s reply to the 2nd further amended statement of defence, the claimant pleaded that he “will contend that the issue before the Honourable court is whether the actual entitlement of Claimant under Zenith legacy Scheme was transferred to his Pension Fund Administrator”. The claimant proceeded to state in paragraph 26 of same reply that the defendant is indebted to him in the sum of N1,547,575,787.39 being his pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004, a fact already pleaded as such as per paragraphs 11 to 14 of the 2nd amended statement of facts. From this state of the pleadings, the claimant’s cause of action is the claim for pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004. 53. The claimant would, however, try to explain that from the averments in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 14 of the amended statement of facts, his cause of action in this suit arose when on resignation from the service of the defendant vide a letter dated the 27th of September 2007 (Exhibit KA3), he received a letter dated the 28th of September 2007 (Exhibit KA4) where he was informed of the computation of his total final entitlements and became aware of how much money was paid into his Pension Account with Trust Funds Pension Plc, the claimant’s New Pension Funds Managers. I must correct a misstatement here on the part of the claimant. Exhibit KA4, the letter dated 28th September 2007 accepting the resignation of the claimant, merely states that the claimant’s end of service entitlements are being processed and will be communicated to him in due course. Exhibit KA4 did not inform the claimant of the computation of his total final entitlements as the claimant argues; neither can it be discerned from Exhibit KA4 that it was in virtue of that exhibit that the claimant became aware of how much money was paid into his pension account with Trust Funds Pension Plc. The point is that the fact of being informed of the computation of his final entitlements and that by Exhibit KA4 he was made aware of how much money was paid into his pension account with Trust Funds Pension Plc, are all facts not supported by the pleadings as per the 2nd amended statement of facts as argued by the claimant’s counsel; and I so find and hold. 54. As it, therefore, from the state of the claimant’s pleadings, the case of the claimant, and hence his cause of action, is that on the construction clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook, he is entitled to the sum of N1,547,575,787.39 being his pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004. There is no where in the pleadings (I repeat, pleadings) of the claimant did he state that this sum was only due to him upon his resignation in 2007. It is only in the address of counsel that this fact/point was made; and by law, the address of counsel cannot take the place of pleadings or evidence no matter how brilliant it may be. See Oyekan & ors v. Akinrinwa & ors [1996] LPELR-2871(SC); [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 128 SC This being the case, the claimant’s case and hence his cause of action remains the construction of clause 17.10 of the Employee handbook and the claim for N1,547,575,787.39 being his pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004. I so find and hold. By LUTH & MB v. Adewole [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 406, when a claim is for arrears of salaries, such claim presupposes entitlement to such salary and a denial of payment when and as it fell due. Secondly, that where the claim is that payment of salaries has been wrongfully withheld, the cause of action accrues from the date the salaries are due for payment. The liability of the employer does not generally depend on demand for payment. In like manner, the claim for N1,547,575,787.39 being pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004 can only mean one thing: that the pension benefit became due in 2004, not at any other time since this other time was not disclosed in the pleadings. I so find and hold. The claimant filed this suit on 16th December 2011. For a cause of action that arose in 2004, having to file this suit in 2011 means that the claimant waited for over 7 years before filing this suit, way out of the limitation period allowed by law as per the Lagos State Limitation Law. This matter is thereby statute-barred. I so find and hold. 55. In answer, it is the argument of the claimant that because he had filed at the Lagos High Court Suit No. LD/181/2009, which was struck out, the instant suit is a continuation of that suit and so cannot be statute-barred. This Court in two previous cases rejected a similar argument distinguishing the authorities on the issue as cited by including the claimant’s counsel in the instant suit. See, for instance, Mr. Abiodun Akinsanya v. Schlumberger Nigeria Limited unreported Suit no. NICN/LA/296/2014 the ruling of which was delivered on 16th February 2016 and Isaac Oghuvbu & ors v. Chevron Texaco Corporation unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/89/2014, the ruling of which was delivered on 18th May 2016. The present argument of the claimant’s counsel has not shown any superior reason why I should agree with her on this score. I accordingly discountenance her argument in this regard. As it is, therefore, I find and hold that reliefs 4, 5 and the alternative reliefs, as framed/couched by the claimant, are statute-barred and none of the exceptions to the limitation law applies to them. Being statute-barred, on the authority of Nigeria Ports Authority v. Lotus Plastics Ltd [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158, the said reliefs are liable to be dismissed; and they are hereby so dismissed. Once reliefs 4, 5 and the alternative relief are dismissed, there is hardly anything left of the main case itself; and I so find and hold. 56. I will now address the merit of the claimant’s case just in case I am wrong in holding that the claimant’s case is statute-barred. Everything about the claimant’s case is hinged on the construction of clause 17.10(a) of the Employee Handbook. It is the construction of this clause that would then determine whether the claim for N1,547,575,787.39 as pension benefits from March 1993 to December 2004 is correct or not. Clause 17.10(a) of the defendant’s Employee Handbook on Staff Pension and Retirement Scheme provides as follows: “A member will always be entitled to his/her individual contributions plus profits subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly”. Even here, the core issue is the interpretation of the phrase “10% compounded monthly”. To the defendant the choice in interpreting this phrase is one between “10% per month compounded monthly” or “10% per annum compounded monthly”. The claimant, however, complains that the defendant added the word “annually” in front of monthly in clause 17.10; yet by the letter from Oyewumi Rone & Co as per Exhibit KA7, the computation they did “is based on the schedule of monthly contributions by the employee compounded as a profit of 10% monthly…” The position taken by the defendant is that the law is that if there are two possible constructions of the terms of a contract, the Court is entitled to reject the one which is unreasonable, citing Wickman Machine Tools Sales Limited v. Schuler AG [1974] AC 235 at 251. The claimant on his part argues that there is no ambiguity regarding the construction of clause 17.10 as to warrant the preference of a reasonable construction over an unreasonable one. 57. In construing instruments, documents or contracts, courts are enjoined to construe all the clauses harmoniously so as to get the true import of the instrument, document or contract. So it may be worthwhile in construing clause 17.10 to refer to other clauses of the Employee Handbook. Clause 17.7 dealing with benefit on retirement, for instance, states as follows: The main benefit is a lump sum payable on the Normal retirement Date. The lump sum is the total of the contributions paid by a Member and the Bank on his/her behalf plus his/her share of the profits earned to-date on the investment of the Fund so long as the profit so stated shall never be less than an accrued interest at the minimum rate of 10% compounded monthly on the total contributions from the date of joining the Fund. A member shall have the option to take a loan against his/her pension entitlements guaranteed for 5 years at the retirement age provided the loan shall not exceed the staff’s entitlements at retirement. This loan shall also be applicable to staff who have put in not less than 10 years in the Bank’s service. Interest should be at the prevailing market rate. If a member continues in the Bank’s service after the Normal Retirement Date, contributions will cease but the accrued benefits will continue to earn interest and declared profit. 58. Now, the interest talked of in clause 17.7, is it calculated annually of monthly? A clue to this can be gleaned fro clause 17.16 dealing with profit sharing. It states: On the last day of every year, as soon as practicable thereafter, the Trustees shall furnish to each Member a statement of his/her total contributions plus the Member’s share of the profits. For the computation of profits the Trustees shall obtain an annual valuation of the investments of the Fund. Such valuation will also be carried out as at the date of retirement of a member for the purpose of determining the Member’s share of profits. A Member’s share of profits shall be determined as the proportion of the Member’s total contributions to the total contribution held by the Fund on the first day of the calendar in which the Member retires. Clause 17.16 proceeds to give an example of the computation. Clause 17.16 talks of “on the last day of every year”; and that “for computation of profits the Trustees shall obtain an annual valuation of the investments of the Fund”. What I gather from this is that the computation of profits is done annually. This to me accords with the position taken by the defendant as far as this case is concerned. 59. Although not cited by any of the parties, clause 17.10 had previously been interpreted by my learned brother, Amadi J in Blessing Ifeabyi Okpoko v. Zenith Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/167/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 14th December 2016. This is his what he has to say on the construction of clause 17.10 (same clause as in the instant case): From paragraph 17.7 quoted above it is very clear that interest earned on contribution is different from declared profit which profit by paragraph 17.16 is declared on the last day of every year or as soon as practicable thereafter. In other words, a distinction has to be drawn between the rate of interest on the contributed sum and, or earned interest on the said contributed sum on the one hand and earned profit on investment as declared and the rate of interest on the said profit as declared on the other hand. I am of the view that, the phrase subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% compounded monthly relates to “Profit” of a member on his investment only and has no relationship whatsoever and howsoever with earned interest on contributed sum whether calculated per week, per month or per annum, I so find and hold. The next issue is to determine the real import of the phrase rate of 10% compounded monthly while the learned counsel for the claimant has argued that it means10% interest per month compounded monthly, the learned counsel for the defendant submitted that interest in the banking industry is annualized meaning that it is means 10% interest per annum compounded monthly. It is glaringly clear that there are lacunas in the phrase rate of 10% compounded monthly. However, the golden rule of interpretation is that where the words used in any document or in a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless to do so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. In that case the words have to be interpreted in line with the context or meaning of the whole or entire document or statute in other to give the real meaning of the maker of the document and this is one instance upon which that rule will apply. See the cases of Ibrahim v Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.474) 513: Ojokolobo v Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (pt.61) 377 @ 402 F-H; Adisa v Oyinwola & Ors. (2000) 6 SC (Pt.II) 47; Uwazurike & Ors. v A.G. Federation (2007) 2 SC 169 and Nigerian Army v Aminu Kano (2010)5 NWLR (Pt.1188) 429. I have held that there is a difference between interest earned on contribution which was not contemplated by that clause 17.10 on the one hand and earned profit on investment, which is declared annually by the trustees by virtue of paragraph 17.16. By that same paragraph also the computation of the said profit is done annually. Therefore it [naturally] follows that the said guaranteed 10%, represents interest on the profit per annum. I am of the view, that a comprehensive interpretation of the Employee Handbook as it relates that clause 17.10 is that the profit which is subject to a minimum guaranteed rate of 10% interest per annum is to be compounded monthly further meaning that, the word ‘monthly’ defined the interval at which interest on profit which is 10% per annum would be compounded, but not the rate of interest… 60. I am persuaded by the force of this interpretation. I do not accordingly see any merit in the claimant’s case. It fails and is hereby dismissed. For the avoidance of doubt, it is my finding and holding that this suit, on the pleadings, is statute-barred and so is liable to be dismissed. Where this is, however, not the case, on the merit, the claimant’s construction of clause 17.10 of the Employee Handbook is wrong and does not accord with the intention of the parties as can be gleaned from other clauses of the Handbook. In this regard, the defendant’s construction of the said clause 17.10 is preferable. 61. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD