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1. The claimants by a General Form of Complaint dated October 27, 2010 but filed on October 29, 2010, and 2nd amended statement of claim dated and filed on April 29, 2013 claimed against the defendants jointly and severally as follows: I. (a) 1st claimant, the sum of N3,993,409.35k as unpaid redundancy benefits (b) 2nd claimant, the sum of N1,580,850.00k as unpaid redundancy benefits (c) 3rd claimant, the sum of N1,927,356.36k as unpaid redundancy benefits (d) 4th claimant, the sum of N4,183,571.70k as unpaid redundancy benefits (e) 5th claimant, the sum of N1,718,140.49k as unpaid redundancy benefits (f) 6th claimant, the sum of N5,098,849.92k as unpaid redundancy benefits (g) 7th claimant, the sum of N1,897,465.08k as unpaid redundancy benefits (h) 8th claimant, the sum of Nl,718,140.49k as unpaid redundancy benefits (i) 9th claimant, the sum of N3,993,409.35k as unpaid redundancy benefits (j) 10th claimant the sum of N5,048,981.52k as unpaid redundancy benefits (k) 11th claimant the sum of N1,718,140.49k as unpaid redundancy benefits (l) 12th claimant, the sum of N6,339,260.92k as unpaid redundancy benefits (m) 13th claimant, the sum of N4,183,571.70k as unpaid redundancy benefits (n) 14th claimant, the sum of Nl,718,140.49k as unpaid redundancy benefits (o) 15th claimant, the sum of N1,400,945.04k as unpaid redundancy benefits (p) 16th claimant, the sum of N359,619.42k as unpaid redundancy benefits (q) 17th claimant, the sum of N1,711,461.10k as unpaid redundancy benefits II. Interest on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 19% per annum from the 30th of July, 2009 until final judgment and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum until final liquidation of the entire sum. III. The sum of N2,000,000.00 representing cost of prosecuting this suit. 2. In reaction, the 1st defendant entered formal appearance and filed its statement of defence, which with the leave of Court was amended. The amended statement of defence is dated 6th June 2014. The 2nd defendant also entered formal appearance and filed its statement of defence, which was also amended with leave of the Court. The 2nd defendant’s amended statement of defence was filed on 25th September 2014. 3. At the trial, parties calling one witness each and all documents vide the list of documents relied upon were admitted in evidence. Kunle Obasola, the 6th claimant testified for the claimants as CW. Mrs Ilobekemen Ogunmwonyi, Superintendent for Logistics with the 1st defendant, testified for the 1st defendant as 1st defendant’s witness. And Sumola Bello-Osagie, a businessman and a Labour Contractor and Managing Director of the 2nd defendant, testified for the 2nd defendant as 2nd defendant’s witness. At the close of trial, parties filed and served there respective written addresses. The 1st defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 14th December 2016 whilst the 2nd defendant’s is dated 20th January 2017 but filed on 23rd January 2017. The claimant’s final written address is dated 2nd June 2017 but filed on 6th June 2017. The 1st defendant filed a reply on points of law dated 14th June 2017 but filed on 16th June 2017. The 2nd defendant did not file any reply on points of law. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANTS 4. To the claimants, by the pleadings and evidence before the Court, they were a category of employees who are drivers and technicians. The 1st defendant would advertise, or source personnel, shortlist, train, fix their salaries, and refer them to paymasters. The 1st of the paymasters as at the time the 1st group of the claimants were employed was Olakunle Ashaye & Co. That the official of the 1st defendant would fix the remuneration of the claimant and revert or advise the paymaster to pay the category of employees, like some of the claimants. That Olakunle Ashaye died and the 2nd defendant was appointed as a paymaster by the 1st defendant. That during the period that the 2nd defendant assumed that responsibility, it became expedient that the conditions of service of the category of employment like the claimants should be regulated and be governed by Collective Bargain Agreement between Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited Contractors’ Forum and NUPENG Contract Staff in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited. That two separate Collective Bargain Agreements dated 1st July 2006 and 1st July 2008 were relied upon. Both Collective Bargaining Agreements provided inter alia for payments of redundancy benefits, alongside other benefits. In 2007, as a result of the restructuring going on in the 1st defendant company, Eighteen (18) of the colleagues of the claimants were disengaged and paid redundancy benefits. In 2009, the 2nd defendant in furtherance of the restructuring going on in the 1st defendant company disengaged the claimants but unlike the case of the colleagues of the claimants disengaged in 2007, the claimants were not paid their redundancy benefits. Representations were made by the solicitors to the claimants for the payments of redundancy benefits but the defendants refused. That the 1st defendant in its defence was elusive and relied on the service outline agreement between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant to state that the claimants were not their employees; that it was the obligation of the 2nd defendant to provide driving services. The claimants accordingly filed this suit claiming redundancy benefits of various sums. THE CASE OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 5. To the 1st defendant, it is a company duly incorporated in accordance with the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and operate in the Oil & Gas sector of the Nigerian Economy; while the 2nd defendant is a company duly incorporated in accordance with the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and operates as an independent contractor that provides labour and services. That it (the 1st defendant) engages independent contractors (companies), under which category is the claimants’ employer, to provide various services in the course of normal business. These classes of workers are typically auxiliary support services workers whose employment or disengagement are not directly negotiated with the 1st defendant but with the contractors who employ them under their specific contract of employment agreements. These contract workers are unionized and negotiate their terms and conditions of service with their employers (the Manpower Service Contractors). That in the course of normal business, the 1st and 2nd defendants entered into a contractual relationship whereby the 2nd defendant provided driving services for the 1st defendant. The contract agreement defined the terms and conditions for provision of the said services. The agreement also described the 2nd defendant as an independent contractor and not the agent or employee of the 1st defendant. That in order to discharge its obligation under the contract, the 2nd defendant employed the services of drivers under which category were the claimants herein. The terms and conditions of employment as well as the process of recruitment and placement of the workers including their interview and subsequent employment was done by the 2nd defendant. That the 2nd defendant as the claimants’ employer terminated the employment of the claimants by its letters dated 30th July 2009 and paid each of them terminal benefits. Dissatisfied with what they were each paid as terminal benefits, the claimants sued the 1st and 2nd defendants for additional sums alleging that they were not paid redundancy benefits. The 1st defendant is thus contending that there is no privity of contract between it and the claimants hence the employment contract and claims (if any) involved in this dispute is between the claimants and the 2nd defendant. THE CASE OF THE 2ND DEFENDANT 6. The 2nd defendant first gave a summary of the case of the claimants, which is that the claimants say that they were drivers and technicians employed by the defendants at various times between 1985 and 2005 and that the sixth claimant had the consent and authority of all the other claimants to prosecute this suit for the protection of their common interest. That the claimants allege that they were employed by the 1st defendant as drivers and technicians and then referred to the 2nd defendant as paymaster but at all material times, they remained under the control and supervision of the 1st defendant who was also responsible for their salaries (paragraphs 1, 4b, 6, 8 of the claimants’ pleading). That the claimants aver that they were unionized members of NUPENG contract staff in 1st defendant. Also that their employment with the defendants was governed by various Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) between Mobil Producing Unlimited Nigeria Contractors Forum and NUPENG contract staff in Mobil Producing Unlimited and relied on the collective agreement of 1st July 2006 and 1st July 2008. That under the prevailing CBA, the defendants were bound to pay the claimants redundancy benefits. That it was also the usual custom and implied term in the contract between the claimants and the defendants and the defendants thereby agreed to pay the claimants redundancy benefits in the event of the involuntary but permanent loss of employment due to an excess of manpower. That on account of ongoing restructuring in 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant on behalf of the 1st defendant terminated the employment of each of the claimants by letter dated 30th July 2009. The 2nd defendant went on that the claimants admit that the defendants paid each of them the following terminal benefits: gratuity; contract completion bonus; allowance in lieu of notice; ex gratia; and medical for July 2009. But that they were not paid redundancy benefits. 7. The 2nd defendant proceeded to give the summary of the 1st defendants’ case, which is that the claimants are not employees of the 1st defendant and that at no time were any of them interviewed for employment by the 1st defendant nor were they referred to any paymaster by the 1st defendant as alleged by the claimants. That the so called training given to the employees of the contractors by the 1st defendant were embarked upon because Mobil being the beneficiary of services to be rendered by the claimants and because they wanted good and perfect services sent affected claimants to those training but not on the ground that they were 1st defendant’s employees. That the salary review referred to by the claimants in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 2nd amended statement of claim was strictly the act of Olakunle Ashaye & Co, who was the initial employer of the claimants and who was responsible for fixing their salaries and welfare before the 2nd defendant took over. That the 1st defendant played no role in the review except to ensure that it was not adversely affected under the contract between it and Olakunle Ashaye & Co. That the firm of Olakunle Ashaye & Co was erstwhile employer of the claimants and the 2nd defendant took over from them. That Olakunle Ashaye & Co and the 2nd defendant were sole parties who determined the recruitment and termination of the claimants as well as the payment of their entitlements and benefits under the collective agreements. That it is the evidence of the 1st defendant that the 2nd defendant is an independent contractor and not the agent or employee of the 1st defendant. That the relationship between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant is contractual being defined in the Services Outline Agreements No. 1210006 and No. 2106505 executed between the 1st and 2nd defendants in 2002 and 2007 respectively. That by the terms of the said agreement between the two parties, it is the obligation of the 2nd defendant to provide driving services for the 1st defendant at Lagos and Abuja for which the 1st defendant shall pay the 2nd defendant for its services and nothing more. That the second defendant employed the services of the claimants as drivers/technicians in order to discharge its obligations under the contract it entered with 1st defendant. That it is thus the case of the 1st defendant that there is no privity of contract between the claimants and the 1st defendant and that the employment contract claim (if any) involved in this dispute is between the claimants and the 2nd defendant. 8. The 2nd defendant agreed with the 1st defendant that it (2nd defendant) is an independent labour contractor and that it provides, as part of its businesses, driving services to the 1st defendant at Lagos and Abuja. That its relationship with the 1st defendant is contractual and as contained in the Service Outline Agreement No A2106505 dated September 10, 2007 made between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant. That pursuant to the 2nd defendant’s obligations under the said agreement, the 2nd defendant employs drivers/technicians to provide driving services to the 1st defendant at Lagos and Abuja. Also that it had been providing such services to the 1st defendant since March 2002. That a Service Outline Agreement in A1210006 was earlier entered into by the first defendant and 2nd defendant on March 2002. The 2nd defendant admitted that the claimants were its former employees and that its relationship with the claimants is contractual vide a contract of employment by which the services of the claimants are drivers/technicians pursuant to meeting the 2nd defendant’s obligation of providing driving services to the 1st defendant. That the terms of the employment of the claimants by the 2nd defendant are as contained and regulated by their various letters of employment and the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 2008 entered into between the MPN & EEPNL Labour Employers Forum and NUPENG (Contract Workers Branch) in MPN & EEPNL locations. To the 2nd defendant, it reserved to itself under the prevailing terms of the employment letters and the Collative Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 2008, condition 20, the right to terminate the employment of each or any of the claimants provided that such termination shall be with notice or payment in lieu of notice. That by letter dated July 30, 2009, the 2nd defendant terminated the employment of each of the claimants and paid each of them their full entitlements which each received as full and final payment. The 2nd defendant denied that the claimants were entitled to redundancy benefits as alleged by the claimants or at all; and that redundancy was never used nor declared as the ground for the termination of the claimant’s employment. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 9. The 1st defendant submitted two issues for determination, to wit: (1) Whether or not there is privity of contract between the claimants and the 1st defendant. (2) If issue one (1) is resolved in the affirmative, then, whether the claimants from the state of pleadings and evidence on record have been able to establish their claims/reliefs sought against the 1st defendant. 10. On issue (1), the 1st defendant submitted that as a general rule, a contract affects only the parties thereto and cannot be enforced by or against a stranger, citing Markwe v. Nwukor [2001] FWLR (Pt. 63) 1 at 14, UBA Plc v. Alhaji Babangida Jargaba [2007] 43 WRN 1 at 19 and Basinco Motors Ltd v. Woermann Line & anor [2009] Vol. 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) at 91 - 92. That in the instant case there is no privity of contract between the claimants and the 1st defendant; there are two separate and independent contracts between the parties to this suit. That in the first contract, which is a contract of service, the 1st and 2nd defendants are the only parties thereto. That there is a relationship between the 1st and 2nd defendants vide a contractual agreement entered into by both parties for the provision of driving services for the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant. The agreements (Exhibits DA1 and DA2) define the terms and conditions for provision of the said services, as well as description of the services. That Article 10 of the said Agreements clearly described the contractor under which category is the 2nd defendant as follows: In performing services and other obligations under this Agreement; contractor shall be an independent Contractor and not the Agent or Employee of Company. The relationship of employer and employee shall not exist between Company and Contractor or any of contractor’s employees, if any. [Underlining is the 1st defendant’s.] Contractor acknowledges and agrees that, with respect to any services provided under this Agreement, neither Contractor nor any of its employees is eligible to participate in and shall not receive any benefits from any employee benefit plan sponsored by company and/or its affiliates. Services shall be performed under the supervision and control of Contractor, and Company shall have no authority to supervise Contractors employees, representatives or Sub-contractors. Contractor shall have no authority to make statements, representations or commitment of any kind or take any other actions binding on Company, except as specifically provided in this Agreement It is expressly agreed that it is not the purpose or intention of this Agreement or of any order to create nor shall the same be construed as creating any partnership or joint operation between Company and Contractor, Contractor’s agents, representatives and sub-contractors. 11. In the second contract, which is a contract of employment, it is only the 2nd defendant and claimants that are parties thereto. The claimants were employed by the 2nd defendant as drivers to enable the 2nd defendant discharge its obligation to the 1st defendant. See the averments of the 2nd defendant in this regard in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9A of its Amended Statement of Defence and paragraphs 5, 6, 7, & 9A of its witness deposition on oath. That the relationship between the claimants and 1st defendant is as defined in the Service Outline Agreements (Exhibits DA1 and DA2) executed between the 1st and 2nd defendants. The 1st defendant then submitted that only the parties to each of the two separate and independent contracts can enforce and are bound by the contracts; they are the only parties that can sue or be sued on it, referring to Markwe v. Nwukor (supra). 12. The 1st defendant continued that in the first contract between the 1st and 2nd defendant wherein the 2nd defendant is “Contractorâ€, the contract agreement is very clear on who bears responsibility for settlement of claims by employees. That Article 34 of the contract agreement between the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of claims for Labour provides that: Contractor shall pay and completely satisfy all claims for labour, equipment, rental and materials employed or used by it in connection with any or all services performed under this Agreement, when those claims become due and payable. To the 1st defendant, this clause clearly defines the responsibility of the 2nd defendant as the sole party responsible for the settlement of all claims for labour by any of its employees arising from the contract of service being rendered to the 1st defendant, when those claims become due and payable. It is the further submission of the 1st defendant that since the claimants were not employees of the 1st defendant, but those of the 2nd defendant and going by the aforesaid terms of the contract between the 1st and 2nd defendants, the claimants cannot lay any claim against the 1st defendant as far as their contract of employment is concerned. Referring to the averments in paragraphs 16 to 27 of the 2nd amended statement of claim, that it is clear that what the claimants are claiming are redundancy benefits as a result of their employment having been terminated by the 2nd defendant and for which they had earlier made a demand to the 2nd defendant and not the 1st defendant. That the only party which has been paying their salaries and emoluments and which has the obligation to pay other claims (if any) is the 2nd defendant based on the contract of employment between the claimants and the 2nd defendant. Accordingly, that the 1st defendant has absolutely nothing to do with their claim as it is neither their employer nor does it control the conditions of service of the claimants, referring to the averments of the 1st defendant in this regard in paragraphs 18 to 20 of its amended statement of defence and paragraphs 17 to 19 of its witness deposition on oath. That it is instructive to note that the claimants never referred to any agreement or contract of employment between them and 1st defendant in their statement of claim neither did they place sufficient, cogent, and compelling materials before this Court upon which the Court can find such a relationship. That the truth is that no such relationship existed between the claimants and the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant then submitted that there is no evidence before this Court to indicate that there was a direct contract of employment agreement executed between the 1st defendant and the claimants. 13. The 1st defendant went on that a detailed examination of the exhibits (Exhibits C1, C2, C12, C13A - D, C14A - D and C15) the claimants are relying on as forming the basis of the purported privity of contract between them and the 1st defendant would reveal that it is a curious and unsupported position on its part to forcibly impose, albeit surreptitiously, the claimants on the 1st defendant, without any concrete evidence to support such a position. That a brief examination of some of the Exhibits would bear testimony to this fact an example of which could be found in Exhibits C1 and C2. For example, that a cursory examination of the signatories to the claimants’ Exhibits C1 and C2 (Collective Bargaining Agreements) would reveal without any doubt that they are all employees/representatives of the various Manpower Service Contractors, who provide manpower services to the 1st defendant and that the said employees are members of NUPENG (MPN Contractors Staff Branch). That the relationship between the claimants and the 1st defendant is as defined in the Service Outline Agreements (Exhibits DA1 and DA2) executed between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant (claimants’ employer). That it is, therefore, untrue and incorrect to state as the claimants has done in paragraphs 1, 4B, 5 and 6 of the amended statement of claim that they were actually employed by the 1st defendant without any concrete evidence to back up such an assertion. That it is also not true as averred by the claimants in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the amended statement of claim that the 1st defendant controlled the conditions of service of the claimants nor were the processes of recruitment and placement of claimants including their interview and subsequent employment done by the 1st defendant without any shred of evidence to back up the averments. The 1st defendant then submitted that the contract documents regulating the relationship between the claimants and the 1st defendant are the Service Outline Agreements (Exhibits DA1 and DA2) and not any convoluted or complex relationship brought up by the claimants as allegedly spelling out a non-existent relationship between them, citing Adetoun Oladeji (Nig) Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Plc [2007] 15 WRN 1 and National Revenue Mobilization Alocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson [2007] 49 WRN 123 at 150 - 151. The 1st defendant then submitted that the claimants cannot move out of the clear and unambiguous contract between them and their employer, the 2nd defendant, in search of more favourable terms with the 1st defendant. Having willfully entered into a contract of employment with 2nd defendant, the claimants cannot attempt to opt out of the said agreement in favour of another one which they were not initially a party to. To the 1st defendant, the relationship of an employer and employee should not be determined by an advert in a Newspaper, personal recommendation letter or training programme midway into the employment period, as the claimants have sought to do before this Court. The 1st defendant referred to the decision of this Court in Suit No: NIC/LA/47/2010 between PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited delivered on the 21st March 2012, which decision has adequately taken care of the issue of privity of contract as applicable in this case. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to resolvee issue (1) in its favour and hold that there is no privity of contract between the claimants and 1st defendant as such position is neither supported by any existing contract nor could be inferred from the conduct of the parties as the claimants are attempting to do. 14. Regarding issue (2) i.e. if issue (1) is resolved in the affirmative, whether the claimants from the state of pleadings and evidence on record, have been able to establish their claims/reliefs against the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant submitted that a claimant will only succeed on the strength of his own case and cannot rely on the defence put up by the adverse party. However, that the weakness of defendant’s case may support or give more credence to the case of the claimant, citing CBC Ltd v. SCOA Ltd [2009] 5 MJSC 140, Din v. Enemuo [2009] 4 MJSC (Pt. 1) 153 at 170 - 172 and Iyere v. BF & F. M Ltd [2008] 12 MJSC 102. That he who asserts must prove the affirmative and not for the opponent to proof the negative as the negative is incapable of proof, citing Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 5 (Pt. II) MJSC 170 at 196. Also, that the burden of proof in a suit or proceedings equally lies on that person who will fail if no evidence at all were given on either side, referring to section 132 of the Evidence Act. From the case presented to the Court by the claimants, that they were employed by 1st defendant (Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited) and that the 2nd defendant terminated their appointment on behalf of the 1st defendant which led to their not being paid redundancy benefits, the 1st defendant submitted that for the claimants to succeed in their claim for redundancy benefit from the 1st defendant, they must prove that they were in the first instance employed by the 1st defendant and that their employment was equally terminated by the 1st defendant. That at trial, there is nothing on record to establish any nexus between the 1st defendant and claimants both through oral and documentary evidence. 15. To the 1st defendant, from the state of pleadings and totality of evidence before the Court, the claimants have failed to establish all these before the Court in the following respects. a) On Employment (i) No employment letter issued by 1st defendant (MPN) was tendered by any of the claimants before the Court. (ii) No condition of service between the 1st defendant and the claimants was tendered by any of the claimants before the Court. (iii) No letters of termination issued by the 1st defendant to the claimants were tendered before the Court. 16. That the only document tendered that has anything to do with employment at all was the contract pay review issued in the name of Olakunle Ashaye & Co wherein the claimants were categorically described as employees of Ashaye & Co, tendered and marked as Exhibits C13A to C13D. Even at that, it is glaring that the so called exhibits were annexures to principal documents which were never produced and tendered in court. The said principal documents would have explained the purport or rationale of those exhibits in Court. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to invoke the provision of section 167(D) of the Evidence Act Cap E14, 2011 which provides for the presumption of withholding evidence wherein it clearly states that evidence which could be and is not produced is presumed to be unfavourable to the person who withholds it as against the withholding or non-production of the said principal documents to which Exhibits C13A to C13D were attached as annexures; that if they were produced, they would have worked against the claimants, in establishing that it was Ashaye & Co alone that employed them and not the 1st defendant, citing Oparaji & anor v. Ohanu & ors [1999] 6 SCNJ 27 at 42 - 48 and Sale v. The State [2015] 12 MJSC 36 at 54. 17. b) On Collective Bargaining Agreements In this respect, that it should be noted more importantly that the claimants placed heavy reliance on the Collective Bargaining Agreements, Exhibits C1 and C2, in an attempt to establish a nexus between them and the 1st defendant. That a careful perusal of the said agreements will show that the Collective Agreements (Exhibits C1 and C2) are agreements between the Forum of Contractors and the Union (NUPENG). The 1st defendant was never a party, neither a signatory to the agreement. That the claimants are aware of the full nature of the relationship, hence the label of the Branch Union as “NUPENG (Contract Staff Branch) in MPN & EEPNL Locationâ€. It is under this name that the Collective Bargaining Agreement of July 1, 2006 and July 1, 2008 were entered into with the MPN & EEPNL Labour Employers Forum. These collective agreements specifically recognizes and describes the MPN & EEPNL Labour Employers Forum as employers of the contract staff members of NUPENG to which the claimants belong. The overriding effect is that the 1st defendant is by no way bound by the agreements. That even in the instant case and from the state of pleadings, the 2nd defendant never said it was acting on behalf of the 1st defendant in the collective agreements, hence the liability under the agreements cannot be extended to the 1st defendant under any guise or circumstance, referring to BB Apugo & Sons Ltd v. Orthopedic Hospitals Management Board (OHMB) [2016] 6 MJSC 71 at 118 - 120, which held that and agreement cannot create an agency relationship between the appellant and a third party who was not a signatory to the agreement; nor can the third party be liable under the agreement even when the appellant said he was acting for and on behalf of the third party since the third party was not a signatory to the agreement. That the instant case is even worse because the 2nd defendant did not say that it was acting for and on behalf of the 1st defendant in the collective agreements to which the 1st defendant is neither a party nor a signatory which makes the 1st defendant not liable under any circumstance. That is why the claims of the claimants in this regard and the evidence of DW2, who said the 2nd defendant was acting at the “behest†of the 1st defendant are gross misconception on the issue of privity of contract. 18. c) On Other Related Documents/Evidence To the 1st defendant, even Exhibit C12 cannot be of any assistance to the claimants because it is not an employment letter but a mere letter of recommendation in respect of Mr Alabi Elijah only (the 9th claimant) and not any of the other sixteen (16) claimants and it is not conclusive that the so called 9th claimant was employed by 1st defendant in view of the evidence before the Court that even since 1985 the drivers were being engaged by 1st defendant’s contractors for the benefit of the 1st defendant as contract workers in MPN & EEPNL Locations only. Also, that all the documents evidencing training of the claimants by 1st defendant tendered and marked Exhibits C14A to C14D have not established any contract of employment between the 1st defendant and the claimants. That the documents only go to show the benefits the claimants derived from the 1st defendant (MPN) for providing services beneficial to 1st defendant (MPN) as contract workers through their employer and also to enhance their productivity for the benefit of the 1st defendant. The the claimants are only being mischievous in tendering them and purporting to use them to establish contract of employment. 19. The 1st defendant went on that it is the rule that he that has the power to hire is the only one that has the power to fire. In other words, the person that has the power to employ is the only one that has the power to terminate the said employment. That if it was actually the 1st defendant (MPN) who employed the claimants, how come that it was the 2nd defendant that terminated their employment and also paid their benefits, including that of the 9th claimant (Alabi Elijah), referring to Exhibits C3A to C3Q and Exhibits C4A to C4P. That a detailed Examination of Exhibits C3A to C3Q shows clearly that the claimants’ employment was terminated by their employer, the 2nd defendant. In the same vein an examination of Exhibits C4A to C4P will also show clearly that their benefits were paid by the 2nd defendant. 20. The 1st defendant continued that it is also settled from decided cases that an employer of services has the power to terminate the contract of employment of its employee with or without any reason, referring to NNPC v. Benjamin Manager Evwori [2007] 9 WRN 160. That as employer of the claimants, the 2nd defendant has a right in law to determine who works for it, which right it exercised by terminating the contract of employment of those it felt their services were no longer needed. The 1st defendant then urged the Court to note that the attempt by the claimants to ascribe an agency connection into the relationship between the 2nd defendant and 1st defendant by referring to the 2nd defendant as “paymaster for the 1st defendant†is flawed and unsupported by any evidence; more so, because the 1st defendant had clearly defined its relationship with the 2nd defendant (contractor) in Article 10 of the Service Outline Agreements (Exhibits DA1 and DA2). That to ascribe such an agency relationship would be at variance with the clear and unambiguous terms of the SOAs. That the claimants in letters of demand to the 2nd defendant (Exhibits C7A to C7J) dated 2nd February, 2010 and copied to 1st defendant (MPN) threatened to recover redundancy benefits from the 1st defendant (MPN) if the 2nd defendant fails to pay, hence raising the issue of who is responsible to pay redundancy benefits. Based on the foregoing, the 1st defendant submitted that it has no role to play in the settlement of any claim on the demand made by the claimants. That the only party who has the obligation to do so has unequivocally replied to the claimants’ letters of demand vide its letter dated 8th February 2010 admitted and marked as Exhibit DB6 wherein it stated that redundancy was never at any time used or declared as basis to determine the employment of any of the claimants and, therefore, any demand thereof is unacceptable and that the 2nd defendant is not obliged to pay any further claim other than the ones they have paid pursuant to the collective agreements (Exhibits C1 and C2) to which the 1st defendant is neither a party nor a signatory, citing BB Apugo & Sons Ltd v. Orthopedic Hospitals Management Board (supra). 21. That the foregoing submissions are in accord with the state of pleadings of the 1st and 2nd defendants and which are also in line with the statements on oath of the witnesses of both the 1st and 2nd defendants. However, that the witness to the 2nd defendant (DW2) gave certain evidence under cross-examination, which were not in line with the pleadings of the 2nd defendant in the following respects: (i) DW2 gave evidence that he simply inherited all but one of the claimants which facts are not contained in 2nd defendant’s pleading and which is contrary to paragraphs 2 and 7 of the 2nd defendant’s amended statement of defence. (ii) That the 1st defendant transferred all the other claimants to the 2nd defendant which facts relating thereto are not contained in the 2nd defendant’s pleadings and therefore go to no issue. (iii) That on Exhibits DB3AA (letter of employment) DW2 said the year 2007 was the first time the 2nd defendant employed the claimants contrary to paragraphs 7 & 12 of 2nd defendant’s amended statement of defence. (iv) DW2 further gave evidence that the benefits paid to certain class of employees who were laid off in 2007 were paid at the behest of the 1st defendant which fact was never pleaded and which is contrary to the averment in paragraph 20 of the amended statement of defence. (v) He also gave evidence that all other payments were at the behest of the 1st defendant which fact was also not pleaded and is contrary to the averments in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the amended statement of defence. (vi) He gave evidence that the contract between the 1st & 2nd defendants dictated that 2nd defendant should pay whatever quantum of amount 1st defendant asks 2nd defendant to pay which fact was not pleaded and contrary to the averment in paragraph 23 of the amended statement of defence, as well as the Service Outline Agreements (Exhibits DB1 and DB2). (vii) DW2’s evidence that he did not train the claimants is contrary to the averment in paragraph 9B of the amended statement of defence. (viii) DW2’s evidence that the employees that were laid off were paid redundancy benefits based on the advice of the 1st defendant is nowhere pleaded and it is contrary to the averment in paragraph 20 of the amended statement of defence. (ix) DW2’s evidence that the claimants were not paid redundancy benefit because the 1st defendant did not advice payment is nowhere pleaded and it is contrary to the averments in paragraphs 18, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of the amended statement of defence. (x) Also DW2’s further evidence that when he noticed that there was no advice by the 1st defendant to pay the claimants redundancy benefits, he asked the 1st defendant and was told of factors which employers use to terminate employment such as old age, stealing, low productivity, etc upon his oral enquiry is a piece of evidence not pleaded and it is contrary to the averments in paragraphs 27, 29, 30 and 35 of the amended statement of defence, referring also to Exhibit DB6. 22. That all the above stated evidence are not part of the 2nd defendant’s pleadings; as such they are inadmissible, citing West Construction Co. Ltd v. Batahal [2006] 7 MJSC 184 at 203 and UBN v. Ajabule [2011] 12 (Pt. II) MJSC 155 at 169 - 170. The 1st defendant then urged the Court that all the above-mentioned evidence given by the 2nd defendant’s witness under cross-examination having not formed part of the facts pleaded should be expunged from record or at best discountenanced; as such issue (2) should also be resolved in favour of the 1st defendant. In conclusion, the 1st defendant submitted that given the nature of evidence brought by the claimants, they have failed to establish their entitlement to the claim or relief sought by them against the 1st defendant; as such their case should be dismissed with substantial cost, citing Eze Okonkwo v. Okeke [2002] 9 MJSC 189 at 202, Din v. Enemuo (supra) and. Emenike v. P.DP & ors [2012] 5 - 7 MJSC (Pt. II) 77 at 100. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 2ND DEFENDANT 23. The 2nd defendant on its part also submitted two issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether the 2nd defendant is the agent of the 1st defendant in 2nd defendant’s employment relationship with the claimants as alleged by the claimants. (b) Whether on the facts and evidence before the Court, the claimants are entitled to be paid redundancy benefits as claimed. 24. On issue (a), the 2nd defendant explained that what is discernible in the instant case is that there are three parties involved in this dispute namely the claimants and the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant and that a critical look at the relationship between the parties reveal what this Court in PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/47/2011 delivered on March 21, 2012 referred to as a triangular employment relationship. That by triangular employment relationship the Court meant a relationship that occurs when employees of an enterprise (the ‘provider’) perform work for a third party (the ‘user enterprise’) to whom their employer provides labour or service. That the Court explained that the triangular employment relationship comes in a variety of forms the best known of which is (as in the instant case) the use of contractors and private employment agencies. To the claimants, a triangular employment relationship is valid, lawful and not wrongful. Also, that the practice of outsourcing or contracting out is not an unfair labour practice. That all that the Court is enjoined to do is to respectfully apply the relevant laws on the issues guided by the facts of what was actually agreed and performed by the parties and not the name they have given the contract. 25. The 2nd defendant went on that two other types of contracts are also discernible in this case: the first is the contract for service between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant by which the 2nd defendant was to employ and provide workers, namely, drivers, for the use of the 1st defendant on terms as contained in Exhibits DA1 and DA2 (same as Exhibits DB2 and DB1) - The service Outline Agreements, referring to Shena Security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig) Ltd & ors [2008] 4 - 5 SC (Pt. 117) That the second contract is the contract of employment between the 2nd defendant and the claimants by which the 2nd defendant fulfills its obligation to the 1st defendant under the Service Outline Agreements. (Exhibits D82). To the 2nd defendant, the determination of the issue of the exact or real nature of the employment relationship between the 2nd defendant and the claimants must be guided by the facts of what was actually agreed and performed by the parties in this case. That the law is that he who asserts must prove and that a claimant is expected to win on the strength of his case rather than on the weakness of the case of his adversary, referring to Esther & ors v. Skye Bank Plc [2015] 63 NLLR (Pt. 224) 492 at 586. 26. That the case being urged by the claimants is that the 1st defendant is their employer or originally employed them and then transferred them to the 2nd defendant as 1st defendant’s “paymasterâ€, and that the 2nd defendant acted on behalf of the 1st defendant even in the 2nd defendant’s termination of the employment of the claimants (paragraphs 1, 4a, 4b, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the claimants’ 2nd amended pleading and paragraphs 4a, 4b, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the claimants witness written statement of facts on oath adopted as claimants evidence). That various paymasters have dealt with them overtime, citing one Olakunle Ashaye & Co. and the 2nd defendant said to have succeeded the former - Messrs Olakunle Ashaye & Co. To the 2nd defendant, if it (2nd defendant) is the 1st defendants paymaster or agent as alleged by the claimants then, clearly the claimants have no cause of action against the 2nd defendant. That by denying that the 2nd defendant is their employer and alleging that the 2nd defendant is the agent of the 1st defendant, the claimants admit that all that the 2nd defendant did was as an agent of the 1st defendant and that the claimants have improperly joined the 2nd defendant. That on their own case and evidence the position of the law is that an agent cannot be sued over the contract entered into on behalf of the principal; in which case, the claimants have improperly joined the 2nd defendant and the 2nd defendant’s name ought to be struck out. That at paragraph 4b of the amended statement of claim and the claimants witness written statement on oath, the claimants alleged respective dates of employment are indicated inferring that most of them were employed by the 1st defendant in some instances before the 2nd defendant entered into a contract with the 1st defendant. 27. To the 2nd defendant, employment relationship between an employer and employee is generally found in the service agreement or in the letter of employment between the parties, citing Anaja v. UBA Plc [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 600) 1289 at 1300. That the claimants’ assertion that they were severally employed by the 1st defendant must be proved by the claimants individually presenting before the Court their respective letters of employment. But none has been produced or tendered to the Court. No conditions of service between the claimants and the 1st defendant has been tendered either. Under cross-examination, that the claimant’s only witness, Mr. Kunle Obashola, the 6th claimant, said he was representing all the other claimants and that they were all not regular, but were contract, staff of the 1st defendant; who were not issued with any conditions of service although the CBA (Collective Bargaining Agreement) contained their conditions of service. That when asked whether he was aware Mobil (1st defendant) had labour contractors that provided manpower services to it, CW1 answered in the affirmative. And that when asked who terminated his appointment CW1 answered “2nd defendant on the instruction of the 1st defendantâ€. To the 2nd defendant, nothing on the face of Exhibits C3A - C3Q, the letters terminating the employment of the claimant written by the 2nd defendant, bears out the claimants’ assertion that their employment was terminated on the instruction of the 1st defendant. That from the above scenario, one would find that although the claimants are alleging that they were employed by the 1st defendant and that the 2nd defendant was their “paymaster†there is no evidence that the 1st defendant was their employer nor that the 2nd defendant is the 1st defendant’s paymaster or agent; only the production of the letters of employment evidencing contracts of employment between the claimants and the defendants would suffice, and the claimants produced none. 28. The 2nd defendant continued that the claimants tendered Exhibit “C12â€, a reference letter by a former Managing Director of the 1st defendant, in favour of the 9th claimant titled “To whom it may concernâ€, attesting that the 9th claimant, a driver, had previously worked with him and that he is diligent in his duties. That good as this may be, it is not a letter of employment in proof of the assertion that the 1st defendant employed the 9th claimant. That Exhibit C15 presented to the Court by the claimants is a Daily Times of January 11, 1985 advert for motor mechanics and auto electricians by an Advertiser with PMB 12054. Again, that this does not prove employment relationship as required by law. That Exhibits C13A to C13D tendered by the claimants are excerpts issued by one Olakunle Ashaye & Co. in request of a proposed contract pay review in which some of the claimants, whose names appear therein, were described as employees of Olakunle Ashaye & Co. That these exhibits do not establish that claimants were employees of the 1st defendant or that the 2nd defendant is an agent of 1st defendant. Next, that the claimants tendered Exhibits C14A - C14D, certificates issued some of the claimants by various agencies certifying that the affected claimants participated in training programs apparently sponsored by the 1st defendant. The claimants also tendered Exhibits C4A - C4D and C11A - C11L, various pay slips allegedly issued by Olakunle Ashaye & Co. and the 2nd defendant to the claimants. To the 2nd defendant, the onus on the claimants to prove that they were employed by the 1st defendant is not proved by the exhibits so far tendered by the claimants. Also, none of the exhibits establish an agency relationship between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant. In particular, that Exhibits C13A - C13D are only attachments meaning that the whole document in each case has not been produced. That the production of the full documents of which Exhibits C13A to C13D are attachments would have assisted the Court in verifying their very nature and the claimants’ claim. As they stand, that they are of doubtful origin having not been tendered by the maker and no evidence was led that they were copied to the claimants. Secondly, the Court must presume the contents of the unproduced or withheld parts of Exhibits C13A to C13D as being against the claimant’s case. That it was within the means of the claimants to produce or enforce the production of the full documents and not in parts, if they didn’t have it; and no satisfactory reason was adduced for failure to produce them before the claimants’ case was closed, relying on section 167( d) of the Evidence Act 2011. The 2nd defendant then submitted that Exhibits C13A to C13D have no probative value, urging the Court not to attach any weight to them as the exhibits are not capable of establishing the fact for which they were tendered, citing Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 252) 469 and Uzoho v. Task Force on Hospital Management Board & ors [2015] 63 NLLR (Pt. 224) 462 at 487. 29. The claimants had alleged that the Collective Bargaining Agreements (Exhibits C1 and C2) contain their conditions of service and that the collective agreement is between the claimants and the 1st defendant. To the 2nd defendant, Exhibits C1 and C2, which came into effect on July 1, 2006 and July 1, 2008 respectively, were made between the MPN & EEPNL Labour Employers Forum and NUPENG (Contract Workers Branch) in MPN & EEPNL Locations in Nigeria. That MPN & EEPNL Labour Contractors Forum is the 2nd defendant’s union, while NUPENG i.e. National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (Contract Branch) in MPN & EEPNL Location is the claimants’ union. Thus the parties to the collective agreements are the 2nd defendant’s union and the claimants’ union. That the 1st defendant is not a party nor a signatory to either of the collective agreements; only the 2nd defendant is a party. That it is trite law that only parties to a contract are bound by the contract, citing Markwe v. Nwukor “[20010]†FWLR (Pt. 63) 1 at 14. That the claimants’ Exhibits C1 and C2 do not prove that the 1st defendant employed the claimants, which is what the claimants want the Court to believe, but the collective agreements do establish that the Labour Contractors Forum in the 1st defendant to which the 2nd defendant belong are the employers of the claimants. That the collective agreements defined the claimants’ employer as the Labour Contractors Forum, which includes the past and present members of the Labour Forum depending on the relevant time frame. That the collective agreements do not establish that the 2nd defendant is an agent or tool of the 1st defendant or that the 2nd defendant was acting on behalf of the 1st defendant in joining the Labour Contractors Union. That the claimants’ union well knew at the time of signing the collective agreement that 1st defendant was not a party or signatory. The claimants’ union was fully aware of the true nature of the triangular employment relationship between the parties and the employment relationship the claimants entered into and the terms and conditions of the collective agreement governing the employment relationships, citing Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN) v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/47/2011 delivered on March 21, 2012. That although the collective agreements were made for the benefit of the claimants, none of the claimants is a party to the said CBA and so the claimants lack the requisite locus standi to seek the enforcement of the terms of agreement through this suit, particularly as the claimants have also failed to present their individual employment letters to enable the Court determine whether or not the collective agreements were incorporated thereon. Also, that the CBA cannot ground a cause of action being a gentleman’s agreement, citing Oguejiofor v. Siemens Ltd [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 283 at 297 - 298 and UBN Ltd v. Edet [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288. 30. The 2nd defendant went on that the claimants’ Exhibits C4A - C4D; C11A - C11L which are various pay slips issued allegedly by Olakunle Ashaye & Co. and the 2nd defendant as well as Exhibits C3A - C3Q (letters by the 2nd defendant to the claimants terminating their employment) as well as Exhibits C7A - C7J, C8, C9A - C9M and C10A - C10D, being letters of demand from claimants lawyer to the 2nd defendant for payment of redundancy benefits, also fail woefully to establish an agency relationship between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant in the absence of the 2nd defendant expressly claiming to act on behalf of the 1st defendant or an employment relationship between the 1st defendant and the claimants in the absence of the employment letters and conditions of service, citing PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/47/2011 delivered on March 21, 2012. The 2nd defendant, however, admitted that the claimants were its employees and that the claimants’ Exhibits C1, C2, C3A - C3Q, C7A - C7J, C8, C9A - C9M and C10A - C10D establish an employment relationship with 2nd defendant even though the claimants in one breath admit the 2nd defendant as employer (paragraph 1 of the claimants’ statement of claim as amended) and in another breath claim that the 2nd defendant was the 1st defendant’s paymaster and agent. That although the claimants’ Exhibits C4A - C4D and C11A - C11J (pay slips) establish the period cumulatively the claimants were in employment, nevertheless they do not prove that the claimants were employed by the 1st defendant or that there is an agency relationship between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant. That the length of term of employment is not proof of employment relationship between the claimants and the 1st defendant in absence of evidence of contracts of employment like letters of employment and conditions of service given the 1st defendant’s evidence in this case that Olakunle Ashaye & Co., a former contractor with the 1st defendant, employed the claimants. 31. The 2nd defendant then referred to PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (supra), where this Court citing Cases and Materials on Employment Law (Oxford University Press) 8th edition 2010 at page 62 written by W. Painter and Ann EM. Holmes referred to Daca v. Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd [2004] IRLR 358 and James v. London Borough of Greenwich [2008] IRLR 302, two cases which were reviewed by the aforementioned authors and agreed that a contract does not depend on the length of service with an end user or on the degree to which workers have been integrated into the workforce. That on the facts and the evidence before the Court, the claimants have not supplied any evidence to warrant the Court holding that an employment relationship exists between them and the 1st defendant on one hand or that an agency relationship exists between 1st defendant and 2nd defendant. That it is not in dispute that the relationship between 1st defendant and 2nd defendant is contractual and as contained in their Service Outline Agreement (Exhibits DA1 and DA2, same as exhibits DB2 and DB1), which became effective in 2002 and 2007 respectively by which among other things the 2nd defendant, an independent labour contractor, provides services to the 1st defendant on terms at Lagos and Abuja. That it was in pursuance of this agreements that the 2nd defendant employed the claimants and provided them to the 1st defendant. That the claimants served the 1st defendants as drivers and technicians until July 30, 2009 when the 2nd defendant terminated their employment and paid their full entitlements, referring to Exhibits DB5A - DB5Q. 32. To the 2nd defendant, it is also not in dispute that the claimants are contract workers in contradistinction to the 1st defendants regular employees. That when Ashaye & Co were succeeded by the 2nd defendant, the claimants knew and accepted the arrangement. That section 21 of the Labour Act provides that “employer†means “any person who has entered into a contract to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person and includes the agent, manager or factor of that first mentioned person and the personal representative of a deceased employerâ€. That the claimants’ terms of employment are regulated by their letters of employment, which they have failed to produce. On the facts and evidence before the Court, that the 2nd defendant became the claimants’ employer since year 2002. This fact was formalized by the collective agreements (Exhibits C1 and C2) and the 2nd defendant’s Exhibit DB4. That in year 2007, the 2nd defendants’ initial contract of service with the 1st defendant came to an end. Although the 2nd defendant bided to continue as a contractor to the 1st defendant, not being sure of winning the bid, the 2nd defendant terminated the employment of all the claimants and paid them their contract completion bonus, referring to Exhibits DB3A - DB3Q. However, the 2nd defendant won the bid and was awarded another contract by the 1st defendant. Thus, by another letter dated September 10, 2007 the 2nd defendant offered employment to all the defendants which they each accepted, referring to Exhibits DB3AA - DB3QQ. 33. The 2nd defendant continued that it is trite law that either party to a contract of service or a master servant relationship may bring the contract to an end; and he who hires can fire, citing Texaco (Nig) Plc v. Kehinde [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224. That the 2nd defendant finally determined the employment of all the claimants by letter dated July 30, 2009, referring to Exhibits DB5A –DB5Q. To the 2nd defendant, the question is: if the 2nd defendant was not the claimants’ employer why did the claimants accept the 2nd defendant’s termination of their employment? 34. Under cross-examination, the 2nd defendants witness, Mr. Sumola Bello-Osagie had testified that all but one of the 17 claimants were working with the 1st defendant before year 2002 when the 2nd defendant became a contractor. To the 2nd defendant, this admission goes to no issue because the claimants at the time accepted the arrangement whereby they were inherited or absorbed and became employees of the 2nd defendant (section 21 of the Labour Act). That the claimants cannot approbate and reprobate. The exception was the 16th claimant, Mr. Olusanya Omotayo, and that the 2nd defendant inherited all the other claimants. On the case of the 16th claimant, the 2nd defendant submitted that he was first employed in the year 2005 by the 2nd defendant, and issued a letter of employment (Exhibit DB3PPP); yet he failed to tender his letter of employment which evidences that he was employed by the 2nd defendant and that the relationship between him and the 2nd defendant was just the ordinary master and servant relationship. The 2nd defendant then asked: might the refusal of the 16th claimant, indeed, determination of the 16th claimant to withhold evidence of his employment, not be a conspiracy of all the claimants to do likewise so as to deceive the Court to believe that the 1st defendant was the claimants’ employer? That the 16th claimant’s conduct in withholding evidence of his employment by the 2nd defendant is a pointer to why the employment relationships as evidenced by the letters of appointments originally issued by Olakunle Ashaye & Co to the claimants might remain a mystery, urging the Court to presume the failure and refusal of the claimants to produce before the Court their letters of employment as proof that if produced, it would have been unfavorable to their case (section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011). The 2nd defendant then submitted that the claimants have not been able to prove that their employer is the 1st defendant nor that the 2nd defendant is an agent or paymaster of the claimants. That the 2nd defendant is an independent contractor and its contract with the 1st defendant is for service. That in pursuance of the contract for service it employed the claimants and provided them to 1st defendant as its workers, urging the Court to resolve the first issue against the claimants. 35. Regarding issue (b) i.e. whether the claimants are entitled to be paid redundancy benefits as claimed, the 2nd defendant submitted that the claimants have failed to prove that the termination of their employment by the 2nd defendant was on the basis of redundancy. That the 2nd defendants’ employment of the claimants was based on master and servant relationship (Exhibits DB3AA - DB3QQ). That the 2nd defendants complied with the terms of employment in terminating the claimants’ employments and paid each of the claimants their respective entitlements; and each claimant acknowledged receipt of his entitlements as full and final payment of the entitlements due to him (Exhibits DB5A - DB5Q). To the 2nd defendant, by each claimant certifying that he had received his full and final entitlement from the 2nd defendant waived the right to make further claims; as such the claimants are estopped from canvasing to be paid redundancy benefit or other. That the letter of termination of the claimants employment did not state any reason for termination; and the 2nd defendant was not obliged to explain or give the reason for the termination of the employment. That redundancy was never declared or stated to be the basis of termination of claimants employment. That in the ordinary case of master and servant as in the instant case, the master can terminate the contract at any time for good or for bad reasons or for none, referring to Ajayi v. Texaco Nig. Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 577 at 593 and Olarenwaju v. Afribank (Nig) Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691 at 705. 36. The 2nd defendant continued that paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the claimants’ statement of claim and written statement of facts on oath relate to the issue of redundancy. At paragraph 18, the claimants alleged that following the termination of their employment the defendants failed to pay them in accordance with the usual custom and Collective Bargaining Agreements. That at paragraph 19, the claimants admitted that they were each paid the following terminal benefits: gratuity, contract completion bonus, allowance in lieu of notice, ex gratia and medical for July 2009. That the 2nd defendant’s letter of termination said that the 2nd defendant did so on the basis of the power reserved to it in clause 20 of the Collective Agreement (Exhibit DB4, claimants’ Exhibit C2). It did not state that redundancy was the basis. That a harmonious reading of clause l(h), 19, clauses 20, 21 and 52 shows that an employee’s appointment can be brought to an end by either resignation, death, termination, dismissal, retirement or redundancy. The 2nd defendant then submitted that where a contract of service gives a party right of termination of contract by either giving a particular length or notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice and the latter course is chosen (as in the instant case) the party seeking to put an end to the contract must pay to the other party the salary in lieu of notice at the time of the termination of the contract, citing Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512. That under cross examination, the claimants’ witness testified the claimants were all paid terminal benefits except redundancy, which by their reckoning it is the 1st defendant that must pay. 37. Referring to clause 52 of the Collective Agreement effective July 1, 2008 (Exhibit DB4), the 2nd defendant submitted that there is no indication in the letter of termination of the claimants’ employment that it was done on the ground of redundancy. That clauses l (h), 19, 20, 21 and 52 variously state the basis of leaving service to be either, resignation, death, termination, dismissal, retirement or redundancy. That clause 52 distinguishes between separation resulting from termination of appointment and separation arising by redundancy; and redundancy under clause 52 is defined to mean “an involuntary but permanent loss of employment by an employee due to excess manpower as declared by the companyâ€. That the claimants have failed to present before the Court any evidence that the 2nd defendant terminated their employment on the ground of redundancy or that the 2nd defendant declared excess of manpower. That the 2nd defendant terminated the claimants employment vide clause 20 of the Collective Agreement and pursuant to the terms of their respective letters of appointment the basis of the contract of employment between 2nd defendant and the claimants. 38. To the 2nd defendant, the claimants tendered Exhibit C5, a purported Communiqué at the end of meeting of separated members of NUPENG between MPN Contract Branch of NUPENG and MPN/EEPNL Employers Forum held on 29th June 2009. That this was to prove that there was restructuring in the 1st defendant and that the restructuring led to the termination of the employment of the claimants; but Exhibit C5 does not support the claimants’ allegations. On the contrary, that it supports the 2nd defendant’s position that redundancy was not the basis for terminating the appointments of the claimant. That the termination of appointment of an employee is, therefore, in a bracket of its own far removed from the incident of an employee leaving service because of redundancy. Termination of appointment implies complete severance of an employer/employee relationship by dispensing with the services of an employee with his post extant while redundancy implies that the post occupied by an employee is no longer necessary and or useless to the employer, citing Nigerian Society of Engineers v. Ozah [2016] 64 NLLR (Pt. 225) 1 CA at 34 - 35 and Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Limited (PAN) v. Oje and ors [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 625 at 635. 39. The 2nd defendant went on that the claimants are also claiming for redundancy on the basis of a purported “usual custom†and in proof referred to the 2nd defendant’s termination of some 18 ex staff, colleagues of the claimants in year 2007 who the 2nd defendant paid redundancy upon termination. The letters of termination of the said ex-staff were tendered by the claimants as Exhibits C6A - C6H. That Exhibits C6A - C6H, particularly at paragraph 1 of the body of each letter, states the reason for their separation from service by the 2nd defendant to be because of “the expiration of our contract with Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited†and that the circumstance was totally different from the case of the claimants. That the 2nd defendant’s contract with the 1st defendant had come to an end in 2007 whereas in 2009 when the claimants contracts were terminated, the 2nd defendant’s contract with the 1st defendant had not expired. the 2nd defendant referred to Esther & ors v. Skye Bank Plc [2015] 63 NLLR (Pt. 224) 492 at 585, where the NIC held thus: Redundancy envisages circumstances where the employer is shutting down the business entirely, the employer is shutting down the business in the place where the employee works or the employer eliminates the work the employee does, either generally or in the particular place of work and where the number of people doing that job is to be reduced but not eliminated. The 2nd defendant then submitted that the claimants claim on the basis of “usual custom†is not proved as no such custom has been adduced in evidence and none exist. To it, custom is said to be a mirror of accepted usage and for a practice to be accepted as custom or tradition it must have been practiced for a fairly long period of time. The essence of custom is in its uninterrupted practice, acceptability and habit of compliance by the people so affected, citing Registered Trustees of Union Bank Pension Association v. UBN & ors [2015] 56 NLLR (Pt. 190) 78 NIC. 40. The 2nd defendant also submitted that the alleged payment of redundancy benefits to the aforesaid 18 ex-staff former colleagues of claimants herein in 2007 pursuant to the Collective Agreement of July 1, 2006 by the 2nd defendant did not establish a contractual liability by the 2nd defendant to the claimants. For only a termination for redundancy on some contractual entitlement entitles the claimants to claim against the 2nd defendant, citing Esther & ors v. Skye Bank Plc (supra). Reiterating its argument as to the claimants not being parties to the collective agreement and so have no locus to invoke it, and that a collective agreement is binding in honour only, referring to Osoh v. Unity Bank of Nig [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 196, the 2nd defendant urged the Court to find and hold that the claimants have failed to discharge the burden placed on them to prove their entitlements under the said collective agreement to redundancy payment from the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the claimants’ case with cost. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANTS 41. On their part, the claimants submitted three issues for determination, namely: (i) Whether from the surrounding circumstances of this case, the claimants are entitled to be paid redundancy benefits computable by the relevant provision of the Collective Bargain Agreement that regulates their condition of service at Mobil Producing Unlimited, at the time of their disengagement in 2009. (ii) Flowing from the issues for determination raised by the 1st defendant whether the 1st defendant is not estopped from raising the issue of privity of contract as it relates to the entitlements of the claimants. (iii) Flowing from the issues for determination raised by the 2nd defendant, whether the 2nd defendant cannot be rightly said to be the agent of the 1st defendant. 42. For issue (i), the claimants submitted that it is settled law from judicial authorities that the onus of proof in a civil matter is on the plaintiff and the standard of proof required to secure judgment is the preponderance of believable evidence on the balance of probabilities, referring to sections 133(1) and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011, Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd v. Union Bank of Nig. Ltd [2003] Vol. 9 MJSC 38 at 55, Michael Eyo v. Emeka Collins Onuoh & anor NWLR (Pt. 1257) 1 at 26, Adebayo v. Adesei [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 862) 44 CA and Agbi v. Ogbo [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) at 65 SC. That in determining same, this Court must bear in mind as it is trite that a claimant must succeed by the strength of his case, citing Ayam v. State [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1376) 34. Citing Magaji v. Odofin [1978] 4 SC 91, the claimants submitted that in the evaluation of evidence, trial Courts are guided by the following principles namely: (a) whether the evidence is admissible; (b) whether the evidence is relevant; (c) whether the evidence is credible; (d) whether the evidence is conclusive; and (e) whether the evidence is more probable than that given by the other party. Also referred to is this Court’s decision in Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39 at 91, where it was held that an entitlement is shown by reference to the law that gives it, the collective agreement from which the entitlement was agreed on between the contractual parties or the conditions of service governing the relationship of the employee and his/her employer. 43. To the claimants, from the evidence adduced the following facts are not disputed to wit: (a) All the claimants excluding the 16th claimant were already working in the 1st defendant before the 2nd defendant ever had a contract with the 1st defendant. (b) Exhibits C1 and C2 (Collective Bargain Agreements) at various times from when it carne into effect regulated the conditions of service of the claimants. (c) Prior to Exhibits C1 and C2, the 1st defendant directly regulated the condition of service of the claimants and the remuneration of the claimants who were with the 1st defendant at that time was fixed by the 1st defendant and transmitted to the then paymaster, Olakunle Ashaye & Co., for purposes of payment, referring to Exhibits C13A, C13B, C13C and C13D. (d) A name that featured prominently in Exhibits C13A to C13D is “Otunba Solomon. A. Oladunniâ€, a Director of the 1st defendant whose name appeared on the letter headed paper of the 1st defendant as seen in Exhibit C12. (e) There was no formal letter of employment by both the 1st defendant and the paymaster, Olakunle Ashaye &Co. (f) It was clear that the 1st defendant directly sourced, shortlisted, trained, retained and remunerated the claimants. Particularly in the daily times publication of January 11, 1985 at page 17, the 6th claimant and his colleagues at the time responded to an advert placed there in inviting qualified applicants to apply and indicated PMB address No. 12054 (Exhibit C15) and a careful look at Exhibit C12, the PMB No. of the 1st defendant is the same 12054. (g) The claimants pay NUPENG dues and union levies by deductions made from source by the 2nd defendant as can be seen by Exhibits Cl1A to C11E. (h) Some colleagues of the claimants were disengaged by the letters dated the 27th December 2007, Exhibits C6A to C6H and contained therein are: gratuity, contract completion bonus, allowance in lieu of notice, ex gratis and redundancy. (i) The claimants were disengaged on the 30th of July 2009 vide the 2nd defendant’s letters (Exhibits C3A to C3Q) and contained therein are gratuity, contract completion bonus, allowance in lieu of notice, ex gratis and medical for July 09. (j) Redundancy was completely left out. (k) Demands were made vide the claimants’ solicitors’ letters (Exhibits C7A - C7J) and Exhibits C9a – C9m. (l) Payment made to the claimants upon their disengagements by the 1st defendant through the 2nd defendant, that is, Exhibits C4a to C4p indicated the period covered by the payments, that is, years, months and days they served at the 1st defendant. 44. The claimants then submitted that they have placed sufficient material facts before this Court for the consideration of the Court as it relates to their claim upon the preponderance of evidence. That it was agreed that Exhibits C1, which is the Collective Bargain Agreement dated the 1st day of July 2006 and C2, which is the Collective Bargain Agreement dated 1st day of July 2008 regulated the conditions of service of the category of employee inclusive of the claimants at the time they came into existence. That the bindingness of a collective agreement cannot be overemphasized, referring to National Coal Board v. Gallery [1958] 1 All ER 91, Union Bank of Nig Ltd v. Edet [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 CA, ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725 CA and ACB Plc v. Nwodika [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 470 CA. That it is also clear from Exhibits C11A to C11E that the 2nd defendant deducts NUPENG and other union levies and taxes from the claimants at source. 45. The claimants then asked if they should be paid based on Exhibits C1 and or C2. To the claimants, pursuant to callus 52 of Exhibit C1, the Collective Bargain Agreement of 1st July 2006, when their colleagues were disengaged in December 2007, they were paid all the headings contained therein and “Redundancy†benefit, relying on Exhibits C6A to C6H. However, that at the time the claimants were disengaged, the operative Collective Bargain Agreement was the one dated 1st July 2008 and clause 52 thereof also made provision as to end of service benefits similar to the 2006 collective bargain agreement. That Exhibits C4(a) to C4(p) indicated the monthly gross salary of the claimants and the year of service of the claimants though in some cases there were typographical errors in the figures. The claimants then submitted that they are entitled to redundancy benefits. Furthermore, that the 2nd defendant had by Exhibit C8, in response to Exhibits C7A to C7J, contended that they were only parties to the Collective Bargain Agreement effective July 1st, 2006 that is Exhibit C1. To the claimants, even if clause 52 of the Collective Bargain Agreement effective 1st July 2006, that is, Exhibit C1, is the operative one, it will achieve the same result as clause 52 of Exhibit C1 and clause 52 of Exhibit C2 are impari material. 46. Exhibit DB1 is dated September 10, 2007 whilst Exhibit DB2 is dated March 01, 2002 which are the Service Outline Agreements between the 1st and 2nd defendants. To the claimants, all of them excluding the 16th claimant predated the Service Outline Agreements, that is, Exhibits DB1 and DB2 in terms of services to the 1st defendant. That the 2nd defendant also relied on the letters of termination of the claimants’ employment dated September 9, 2007 (17 Nos.) and seventeen letters of employment of the claimants dated September 10, 2007 that is Exhibit DB3A, AA to Exhibit DB3R, RR. The claimants then asked the whereabout of the letters of employment of the claimants by the 2nd defendant in 2002 or any other time that begat the letters of termination dated 9th September 2007 i.e. Exhibit DB3A - R. Also, that if the aforesaid letters of termination and employment are not of any consequence and not a sham, why did the defendants pay items based on the year of service which predated the relationship between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant as it relates to all the claimants excluding the 16th claimant. The claimants accordingly submitted that the letters of the 2nd claimant i.e. DB3A,AA to Exhibits DB3R,RR are a sham as they were not relied upon by the defendants in the course of payments of entitlements to the claimants and their colleagues, urging the Court to so hold. 47. The claimants took issues (ii) and (iii) together. Issue (ii) relates to the 1st defendant being estopped from raising the issue of privity of contract as it relates to the entitlements of the claimants, while issue (ii) relates to the question of the 2nd defendant being an agent of the 1st defendant. To the claimants, it is clear that both defendants have done everything condemnable and to present a disguised and objectively ambiguous employment relationship which is either meant to mask the identity of the employer where the person designated as an employer is an intermediary with the intention of shielding the employer from any involvement in the employment relationship and above all from any responsibility to the workers or make the form in which the relationship is established, as where the the nature of the employment relationship is intentionally misrepresented so as to deny certain rights and benefits to dependent workers. That given the fact that the 1st defendant advertised, sourced, shortlisted, trained and fixed the claimants’ remuneration before the 2nd defendant was engaged as an intermediary for the purposes of “receiving advise†to pay the claimants and paying them, this is one of those condemnable practices and for all intents and purposes the 2nd defendant is an agent of the 1st defendant. 48. The claimants continued that the argument of the 2nd defendant that it terminated the claimants’ employment pursuant to clause 20 of the collective bargain agreement means that the consequence of such is to be found in clause 52 of same collective bargain agreement. 49. On the 1st defendants reliance on privity of contract, the claimants submitted that, having raised the issue of privity of contract in their preliminary objection, which this Court ruled against in a considered ruling delivered on 13th December 2012, the 1st defendant can no longer raise the issue at this stage, it being estopped, citing Duches of Kingston (1775 - 1802) All ER Rep 623, Fidelitus Shipping Co. Ltd v. V/O Export Chleb [1965] 2 All ER 10 and Bwacha v. Ikenya & ors [2011] 3 NWLR 610; [2011] LPELR-8105. The claimants wants on to refer the Court to its ruling (in the instant case) of 13th December 2012, and then submitted that the Court has determined the issue of privity of contract raised in the application of 6th June 2012. That it should be noted that this Court also considered its decision in PENGASSAN v. Mobil Producing Unlimited of 21st March 2012 in arriving at its decision of 13th December 2012. That, applying the principle of primacy of facts, and given the facts and evidence which are undisputed and their veracity thereof, the peculiarity of this suit is such that indeed the 1st defendant employed the claimants respective of the coloration given to it because the elusive disposition of the 1st defendant. That it is true that there was no collective bargaining agreement before the 2006, rather through the 2nd defendant and the union, the collective bargaining agreement of 2006 and 2008 entrenched in it the entitlements ‘applyable’ by the 1st defendant. The claimants referred to the evidence of the 2nd defendant’s sole witness under cross-examination to the effect that unlike the earlier group that were paid when disengaged, the claimants were not so paid because he was not advised by the 1st defendant to pay the claimants. That this testimony is conclusive that it is not the 2nd defendant who fixes remuneration for the claimants and other categories of employees within their cadre. 50. On the argument of the 1st defendant that the evidence of the 2nd defendant’s witness elicited under cross-examination is not supported by the pleadings, the claimants submitted that this position is totally misconceived as the position of the law is that the purpose of cross-examination is to discredit a witness and to demolish the case of the opposing party as well as designed to put across the case of the party cross-examining the witness, referring to Olomosola v. Oloriawo [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 750) 113. That it is the law that evidence procured from cross-examination can be admitted if it is relevant to the live issues before the Court and, therefore, the evidence elicited from the 2nd defendant’s witness is relevant and admissible, referring to Olomosola v. Oloriawo (supra) and Gaji v. Paye [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 585. To the claimants, the evidence that the former set of employees were paid redundancy because the 1st defendant advised so but the claimants were not paid because the 1st defendant did not advise so is relevant and admissible. That because the claimants were not paid the 2nd defendant’s witness asked why. That if the claimants were entitled to redundancy, the 2nd defendant’s witness would have confirmed so under cross-examination and would not have orally enquired why from the 1st defendant. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to grant the reliefs they seek. THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO THE CLAIMANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 51. The claimants had raised the issue of estoppel by stating that the doctrine of issue estoppel has caught up with the 1st defendant on the issue of privity of contract. To the 1st defendant, it is clear that the issue of privity of contract was not distinctly decided in the ruling of 13th December 2012; as such it is a misconception on the part of the claimants to conclude as they did that the Court has decided the issue of privity of contract finally in its said ruling, referring to Okorocha v. PDP & ors [2014] 2 MJSC (Pt. III) 1 at 82 - 83, Aro v. Fabolude [1983] 1 All NLR 67 at 80, Chief Adomba & 3 ors v. Odiese & 3 ors [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 165 at 178 and Oshoboja v. Amida [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 188. That for issue estoppel to apply, the issue must have been decided or settled by a court of competent jurisdiction once and for all, but in this case it has not been decided once and for all by this Court. Therefore, the submission of the claimants to the effect that this Court had in its ruling of 13th December 2012 determined the issue of privity of contract is misconceived since the Court decided to inquire into the merit of the case first before deciding the issue. Accordingly, that this Court should resolve the issue against the claimants. 52. On the issue of evidence elicited from a witness in cross-examination, the claimants had stated that evidence procured from cross-examination can be admitted if it is relevant to the live issue before the Court and, therefore, evidence elicited from the 2nd defendant’s witness that the former set of employees were paid redundancy because the 1st defendant advised so, but, the claimants were not paid because the 1st defendant did not advise so is relevant and admissible. To the 1st defendant, any such evidence procured that is said to be relevant and admissible must be sourced from the pleadings of the parties either a claimant, a defendant or a co-defendant. That from the totality of pleadings of both the claimants as well as the 1st and 2nd defendants no such evidence of the 2nd defendant’s witness aforesaid can be sourced from them, referring to Omisore & anor v. Aregbesola & ors [2015] Vol. 57 MJSC 1 at 64, Punch Nig Ltd v. Enyina [2001] 17 NWLR (Pt. 741) 228 and Alhassan & anor v. Ishaku & ors [2016] Vol 2 - 3 MJSC Ratio 1 - 3. The 1st defendant accordingly submitted that the evidence elicited from the 2nd defendant’s witness that the former set of employees were paid redundancy because the 1st defendant advised so, but that the claimants were not paid because the 1st defendant did not advise so is contrary to the pleadings before the Court and such evidence must be rejected; and since it is not sourced from the pleadings, it goes to no issue as cross-examination is no longer at large, urging the Court to resolve the issue against the claimants. COURT’S DECISION 53. The case of the claimants is one for the claim of the payment of redundancy benefits (plus interest on them), which the claimants are claiming jointly and severally from the defendants. The claimants would be so entitled if they can prove their entitlement to redundancy benefits, and how they arrived at the quantum of the sums they are claiming. See Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39. In considering the merit of the claimants’ case, I need to make certain clarifications. 54. The 2nd defendant had argued that the claimants cannot rely on Exhibits C1 and C2, the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) because they are not signatories to the collective agreements, the collective agreements were not incorporated into the employment contracts of the claimants, and collective agreements are gentleman’s agreements binding in honor only. This Court has held severally that given its power and jurisdiction to interpret and apply collective agreements under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution presuppose that collective agreements are now binding as against those they relate to. In the instant case, the evidence before the Court shows that the claimants were drivers and technicians; as such they were junior employees in which event they were eligible to be members of the trade union in question. Since eligibility is the yardstick for being members of a trade union for junior staff, the claimants automatically are presumed to be members of the trade union unless they specifically and in writing opt out. There is no evidence before the Court that they opted out. See Aghata N. Onuorah v. Access Bank Plc [2015] 55 NLLR (Pt. 186) 17, Samson Kehinde Akindoyin v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/308/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on 15th April 2015 and Mr. Valentine Ikechukwu Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 12th July 2016. This being the case, the claimants are entitled to rely on Exhibits C1 and C2 in proving their entitlements to the claims for redundancy in this case. I so find and hold. 55. Additionally, Exhibits C3(a) to C3(q), same as Exhibits DB(a) to DB(q), titled “Letter of End of Service†all show that the termination of the employments of the claimants was in virtue of clause 20 of the CBA. By CCB (Nig) Ltd v. Okonkwo [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 114, an employer who dismisses his employee under the provisions of a collective agreement between itself and its employee’s trade union cannot thereafter contend that the collective agreement does not contain the terms and conditions of the employee’s service. A fortiori, the 2nd defendant cannot pay the terminal benefits of the claimants under the collective bargaining agreement and now turn around and say that the claimants cannot rely on same agreement to found their claim for redundancy. 56. The 2nd defendant made an issue of the absence of the contract of employment and conditions of employment, indicating that thereby the claimants did not prove the fact of employment between the claimants and the 1st defendant. This argument of the 2nd defendant loses sight of the majority decision of the Supreme Court decision in Okoebor v. Police Council & ors [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444, which held that the fact of employment can be proved circumstantially i.e. not necessarily by direct evidence in terms of pleading and tendering of the letter of employment. 57. It is the contention of the claimants that their colleagues whose employment were terminated in 2007 were paid the component of the redundancy in the usual custom of service though short paid. See paragraph 23 of the claimants’ 2nd amended statement of claim. At the trial, the 2nd defendant’s witness under cross-examination then testified thus regarding the set of employees whose employments were terminated in 2007: Yes, Exhs. C6(a) - C6(h) are from us. Yes, we employed them. Yes, we terminated their employments. Yes, we paid redundancy benefits to this set of employees. The redundancy paid to this set of employees was done at the behest of the 1st defendant. The redundancy amount was that stated by the 1st defendant. Yes, all other payments to this group of employees was dictated by the 1st defendant. Yes, for the instant claimants, all payments made to them was also dictated by the 1st defendant. The contract between us and the 1st defendant dictated that we pay whatever quantum of amount the 1st defendant asks us to pay. 58. To the 1st defendant, this evidence of the 2nd defendant’s witness is not supported by the pleadings. In reaction, the claimants submitted that this position is totally misconceived as the position of the law is that the purpose of cross-examination is to discredit a witness and to demolish the case of the opposing party as well as designed to put across the case of the party cross-examining the witness, referring to Olomosola v. Oloriawo [2002] 2 NWLR (Pt. 750) 113. That it is the law that evidence procured from cross-examination can be admitted if it is relevant to the live issues before the Court and, therefore, the evidence elicited from the 2nd defendant’s witness is relevant and admissible, referring also to Olomosola v. Oloriawo (supra) and Gaji v. Paye [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 585. The claimants went on that the evidence that the former set of employees were paid redundancy because the 1st defendant advised so but the claimants were not paid because the 1st defendant did not advise so is relevant and admissible. That because the claimants were not paid the 2nd defendant’s witness asked why. That if the claimants were entitled to redundancy, the 2nd defendant’s witness would have confirmed so under cross-examination and would not have orally enquired why from the 1st defendant. 59. To start with, the last tranche of the claimants’ argument that if the claimants were entitled to redundancy, the 2nd defendant’s witness would have confirmed so under cross-examination and would not have orally enquired why from the 1st defendant is conjecture on the part of counsel. By Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-40219(CA), “a Court should not decide a case on mere conjecture or speculation because Courts of law are Courts of fact and law. They decide issues on facts established before them and on laws and must avoid speculationsâ€. 60. In the second place, the argument of the claimants that evidence elicited under cross-examination is admissible if relevant is one made out of context and intended to mislead. Like rightly argued by the 1st defendant in its reply on points of law, even if such evidence is relevant, once it is not supported by the pleadings, it goes to no issue. The Supreme Court in Okwejiminor v. Gbakeji & anor [2008] LPELR-2537(SC); [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) 172 SC; [2008] 1 SC (Pt. III) 263 is pretty clear that “evidence obtained in cross-examination but on facts not pleaded is inadmissibleâ€. I read paragraph 23 of the claimants’ 2nd amended statement of claim and the pleadings of the parties carefully. Other than the assertion by the claimants that their colleagues whose employment were terminated in 2007 were paid the component of the redundancy in the usual custom of service though short paid, nothing else is pleaded as to the redundancy paid to this set of employees being at the behest of the 1st defendant, or that it is the 1st defendant who stated or dictated the amount, or that the contract between the 2nd defendant’s witness and the 1st defendant dictated that the 2nd defendant’s witness pays whatever quantum of amount the 1st defendant asked to be paid. As it is, therefore, the evidence of the 2nd defendant’s witness in this regard is one that is not supported by the pleadings; as such it goes to no issue and is hereby discountenanced. 61. The claimants argued that the argument of the 1st defendant to the effect that there is no privity of contract between the 1st defendant and the claimants cannot be so raised, this Court having decided the issue in its ruling of 13th December 2012 in this case. Once again, the argument of the claimants is one that is prone to mislead as the 1st defendant rightly pointed out. In the said ruling, this is what this Court said: In hinging its argument on privity of contract, the 1st defendant stressed the formalism of the two contracts in issue. While the privity rule is clear in its general prescription that one cannot benefit or suffer from a contract one is not a party to, this rule remains what it is: a general rule that is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, it admits of exceptions. So when the 1st defendant talked of the privity rule as if it is sacrosanct, it missed out the point that the rule is not absolute. The case of the claimants is that they started off as employees of the 1st defendant before the said agreement between the 1st and 2nd defendant was entered into. Only an enquiry into the merits of the case can reveal the true position of things. Now, how can a holding that “only an enquiry into the merits of the case can reveal the true position of things†be held by the claimants to have resolved the issue? Unless the claimants deliberately choose to be misleading, I do not see how they can come to the conclusion that they did i.e. that the issue of privity of contract has been resolved by this Court. In clear terms, this Court held that only an enquiry into the merits of the case can resolve the issue of privity of contract having acknowledged that the privity rule is one that is general (not absolute) and so admits of exceptions. The argument of the claimants in that regard accordingly goes to no issue and so is hereby discountenanced. 62. I indicated earlier that the case of the claimants is a claim for redundancy; and that they would be so entitled if they can prove their entitlement to redundancy benefits. The claimants are not contesting their disengagement by the 2nd defendant. Exhibits C3(a) to C3(q), same as DB(a) to DB(q), titled “Letter of End of Service†(through which the claimants were disengaged) all show that the termination of the employments of the claimants was in virtue of clause 20 of the CBA; and the respective sums paid to the claimants were “full and final entitlementâ€, which each claimant endorsed. The entitlements paid consist of gratuity, contract completion bonus, allowance in lieu of notice, ex gratis and medical for July 09. Having been paid their “full and final entitlementâ€, can the claimants bring this suit claiming that they were short paid in terms of not being paid redundancy? This remains the key question in this case. 63. By Isheno v. Julius Berger Nig. Plc [2003] 14 NWLR (Pt. 840) 289, redundancy is a form unique only to its procedure whereby an employee is quickly and lawfully relieved of his post. Such type of removal from office does not carry along with it any other benefits except those benefits enumerated by the terms of contract to be payable to an employee and declared redundant. The case went on that no employee is entitle to both retirement and redundancy benefits as retirement and declaration of redundancy cannot happen simultaneously. And by PAN v. Oje [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 625 CA, redundancy benefits do not include gratuity benefits. That the conditions applicable to redundancy are quite distinct from those applicable to retirement or other conventional modes of relieving an employee from active service, such as termination, resignation or dismissal. The claimants were paid gratuity, contract completion bonus, allowance in lieu of notice, ex gratis and medical for July 09 upon their disengagement by the 2nd defendants as “full and final entitlementâ€. Given the authorities just cited (Isheno v. Julius Berger Nig. Plc and PAN v. Oje), the claimants cannot after being paid these sums turn around and claim redundancy. I so find and hold. The argument of the claimants that the set of employees whose employment were terminated in 2007 were paid the component of redundancy loses sight of the fact that save for a case of unfair labour practice (which is not the case of the claimants in the instant case), a claimant can only found his case on the strength of his right and entitlement, not on that of another person. See Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities v. Federal Government of Nigeria unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2004 the judgment of which was delivered on 8th May 2007, where this Court held thus: “A litigant, without more, cannot build a case on the right of another. The litigant must build the case on his/her own rightâ€. 64. The claimants in signing and endorsing Exhibits C3(a) to C3(q), same as DB(a) to DB(q), the claimants did not endorse them under protest to show that they are contesting the fact of the payment being “full and final entitlementâ€. In Mr. Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374 NIC, an issue was that the claimant signed a release and discharge certificate and so waived his right to bonus. However, in signing the release and discharge certificate, the claimant in his handwriting endorsed an exception in the following words – Exceptions: I do not make any commitments that are not already valid from the terms of my contract. I have an unpaid expense claim and a phone allowance not paid. This Court looked into this and held as follows: Having to endorse this exception on the release and discharge certificate means that there is no talk of the claimant waiving his right to the bonus “by clear and unambiguous termsâ€. The claimant signed the release and discharge certificate under protest. It must be noted that the termination of the claimant’s employment and the drafting of the release and discharge certificate were all at the behest of the defendant. This means that the claimant was presented with these two documents as a fait accompli. The balance of bargaining power in the relationship between an employer and an employee tilts in favour of the employer, which is what was exhibited in the instant case. The defendant did not sit with the claimant to draft the release and discharge certificate. So the only way the claimant could indicate his reservation to the contents of the document was to sign under protest in the manner that he did. This is the only course open to him. On this issue, therefore, we hereby hold that the claimant did not waive his right to bonus as the defendant would want the Court to believe. Having to sign the release and discharge certificate in the manner that he did, the claimant thereby signed under protest indicating he had reservation as to the contents of the said release and discharge certificate. In the instant case, the claimants did not sign Exhibits C3(a) to C3(q), same as DB(a) to DB(q) under protest to indicate that they still had an outstanding payment, redundancy. They must accordingly be held to have waived their right to complain that the said payment to them was not a full and final entitlement. I so find and hold. 65. This being the case, arguments of the parties as to whether reliance can be placed on the collective bargaining agreements, whether or not there is privity of contract between the 1st defendant and the claimants, who as between the defendants or both of them is the employer of the claimants, the nature of the employment relationship between the parties (whether triangular or not), whether or not the letters of termination and employment are a sham, are all academic (See Ibitoye v. Nigerian Navy Board [2016] LPELR-40058(CA)), which should not be of any concern for present purposes given the unequivocal endorsement of Exhibits C3(a) to C3(q), same as Exhibits DB(a) to DB(q). 66. On the whole, I do not accordingly see any merit in the claimants’ case. It fails and is hereby dismissed. 67. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD