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Representation: J. K. U. Nwaozuzu for the Claimant/Respondent S. Yusuf for the Defendants/Applicants RULING/JUDGMENT This action was initially commenced at the Federal High Court Umuahia on the 6th day of November 2002. By an amended Complaint filed at the Registry of this court on 26th September 2014 at the registry of this court, the Claimant claimed the following reliefs: a. A Declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the public service of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants vide a letter of April 30, 1999 without following the rules provided by the legal instruments establishing the 1st Defendant and in violation of the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant under the civil service rules was otiose, ultra vires their powers, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. b. Reinstatement of the Claimant to his office with full benefits and corresponding promotions in line with the terms and conditions of service applicable to the staffers of the 1st Defendant. c. N3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) being special and general damages for the unpaid salaries and other entitlements, medical expenses and intentional infliction of emotional distress. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE d. An Order of the court indemnifying the Claimant in the sum of N30,000,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira) as damages for unlawful dismsissal of the Claimant. Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants on 27th September 2016 filed a motion on notice, in which he sought the following orders: 1. An order dismissing this suit because the claim was based on a repealed law. 2. An order of this court dismissing this suit because the Claimant’s case before this court is statute barred. 3. The jurisdiction of this court or any other court is ousted by Section 3(3) of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act, Cap 381 LFN 1990, when the cause of action arose or accrued. 4. An order dismissing this suit because the Claimant brought an action against non-juristic persons. 5. An order dismissing this suit because proper parties are not before the court. 6. An order dismissing this suit because the Claimant brought the action based on an illegality and fraud. A supporting affidavit of 10 paragraphs deposed to by Samuel Yusuf the Defendants’ counsel. In the accompanying written address, counsel proffered arguments based on the grounds for the application. With respect to the ground that the claim is based on a repealed law, counsel submitted that the date of service of the Claimant’s dismissal letter was on 12/7/1999 while Decree 18 of 1987 which is being relied upon by the Claimant has been repealed by Decree 41 of 1992 (reported as Cap N127 Laws of the Federation 2004). That is to say that the law on which this suit is hinged upon had ceased to exist for almost 5 years before the Claimant’s dismissal. It is the submission of counsel that a repealed statute is no longer an existing law. See IBIDAPO vs. LUFTHANSA AIRLINES (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 498) at 124. Counsel also argued that the Nigerian Postal Service Department (NIPOST) Act relied upon by the Claimant was not the law in force when the cause of action arose. Having been repealed, counsel is of the view that this law did not have a retrospective effect and attempting to rely on the NIPOST Staff Conditions of Service 2003 or the Federal Civil Service Rules 2015 is wrong, because these legislations were not in force when the Claimant was dismissed from service. Similarly, counsel posited that the present management of NIPOST has renewed and repealed the 2003 regulations with a new 2015 regulations, both of which do not apply to the Claimant’s employment. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Claimant cannot rely on the Federal Civil Service Rules or on the protection of the Federal Civil Service Commission because the NIPOST is no longer under the Federal Civil Service Commission but a separate statutory corporation and the Federal Civil Service Commission was joined as a party to this suit to make the court’s judgment binding on it. More so, counsel is of the view that a retrospective operation is not to be given to any statute in order that existing rights and obligations are not impaired and that the courts have the duty to give the words of statute their ordinary meaning when they are clear and unambiguous. Again, counsel citing the case of PLATEAU STATE vs. A.G FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 363, stated that no statute should be construed retrospectively unless its language requires such construction. Regarding the ground that this suit is statute barred, counsel argued that Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act provides a 12-month period for instituting any action against NIPOST. While the Claimant in the extant case was dismissed on 30/4/1999, he filed this suit on 6/11/2002. It is counsel’s further argument that from 12/7/1999 (the day the Claimant was served with the dismissal letter) to the day he commenced this action at the Federal High Court Umuahia is a period of three years and three months; more than the 12 months allowed by NIPOST Act. Consequently, counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case is statute barred and unenforceable, and the court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit based on the decision in the following cases: 1. AMUSAN vs. OBIDEYI (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 647 at 650 2. EGBOIGBE vs. NNPC (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 610 Similarly, counsel relying on IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C. KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1, submitted that it is trite law that for a court to assume jurisdiction over a matter, one of the elements required for the court to assume jurisdiction is that the action must be done upon fulfilment of any condition precedent and there is no feature denying the court of jurisdiction. In this suit, counsel is of the opinion that the feature denying this court of jurisdiction is that the Claimant’s claims are statute-barred by virtue of Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act which was given effect in OYETOKI vs. NIPOST (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 504) 1572. Also, counsel argued that Limitation laws ensure that dormant claims should not be assisted by the courts in recovering them, and equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Counsel further argued that Section 15 of the National Industrial Court Act enjoins the National Industrial Court to apply the principles of law and equity concurrently, and where there is conflict between the two, equity prevails. Therefore, it is counsel’s view that any action not filed timeously is statute-barred, with the effect that the aggrieved party’s right to action and judicial relief are lost, with only an empty action which cannot be enforced. EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 564. Further, counsel submitted that by the rule of judicial precedent provided for by Section 287(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, this court is bound to follow the decisions on limitation law, particularly the cases of TENKU vs. NIPOST decided by the Abuja Division of this court on 25/9/2013, and the Court of Appeal’s decision in OYETOKI v NIPOST (supra), and dismiss the entire suit for being statute–barred. Counsel urged the court to take judicial notice of its earlier judgments and avoid giving conflicting judgments. Also, counsel drew the court’s attention to the case of DALHATU vs. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 845) 310 at 336, where the Supreme Court held that the failure of courts to follow the doctrine of stare decisis or judicial precedent as provided for in Section 287(3) of the Nigerian Constitution will amount to judicial rascality. Another reason offered by counsel to the court to dismiss this suit, is that Section 287 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution is superior, of strict application; and Section 59(1) of the NIPOST Act has an overriding effect on the Rules of this court, and are superior in force being a rule of substantive law. Counsel referred the court to a plethora of cases including: 1. AKIBU vs. AZEEZ (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 814) 652 2. OKOROMA vs. UBA (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 587) 359 3. BAKARE vs. NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 614 Again, counsel citing the case of KRAUSS THOMPSON vs. NIPSS (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 901) 1849, argued that by the rules governing the interpretation of general and specific provisions in a statute, when an issue is governed by a general and specific provision; the specific provision will be deemed to have anticipated the issue as opposed to the general provision. Counsel went further to argue that both Section 59(1) of the NIPOST Act have constitutional flavour because they are covered by Section 285 of the Constitution and NIPOST is part of the 1999 Constitution, listed as item 46 on the 2nd schedule to the Exclusive legislative List. On this assertion, counsel referred the court to the cases of UDENWA vs. UZODINMA (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1346) 102 and PDP vs. CPC (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 495, amongst others. Counsel submitted also, that any correspondence between parties does not stop time running from the date the cause of action arose; and ignorance or illiteracy on the part of the Claimants are not valid exceptions to the operation of a limitation law. See AKIBU vs. AZEEZ (supra). Again, counsel argued that to determine whether an action is statute barred, the court simply examines the “writ of summons and statement of claim†and if the “time on the writ†exceeds the time allowed by law; then the case is statute barred. According to Counsel, the extant suit is statute barred because a calculation of when the cause of action arose in 1999 and when this action was initially filed is outside the time provided for by the relevant Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act. Counsel submitted further that the Defendants raised the issue of limitation law in paragraph 2 of their joint statement of defence, and by the principle of stare decisis, all the decisions of the Federal High Court on the effect of Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act binds the National Industrial Court. These cases referred to by counsel include: 1. USMAN HALIDU vs. NIPOST Suit No: FHC/KD/CS/238/1999 delivered on 28/2/2002. 2. ABUBAKAR vs. NIPOST Suit No: FHC/KD/CS/50/89 delivered on 25/6/2002. It is the opinion of counsel that limitation law is now constitutional as per Section 285 of the Nigerian Constitution, and this court is enjoined to obey all the Supreme Court decisions on limitation law. Also, counsel urged the court to give the Defendants fair hearing as provided in Section 36(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, in their application on limitation law. With respect to the equitable jurisdiction of this court, counsel submitted that the Claimant in this case was dismissed for the criminal offence of converting business boxes to private boxes without lawful authority, making NIPOST to lose revenue, contrary to and punishable under the Telecommunications and Postal Offences Act. It is the opinion of counsel that the Claimant still has a criminal case to answer for the abovementioned crime, which is not statute-barred. Counsel further opined that the Claimant should not be allowed to benefit from his wrong doing, or be allowed to reprobate and approbate before this court; which in effect is that the Claimant is not entitled to the equitable remedies of this court. Learned counsel for the Defendants argued that the remedies sought in this case are equitable, and the principle of equity enjoins a Claimant who comes to equity to do so with clean hands. Counsel referred to the case of WALTER vs. SKYLL (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 701) 447, where it was held that it is the duty of the court to prevent any apparent fraud before it, protect public policy and utmost faith in the law by exposing such fraud. Counsel argued further that the Claimant’s conduct in the illegal conversion of business boxes to private boxes is reprehensible and inequitable, and that the Defendants who have the Taskforce report, Audit report and the investigation report made pursuant to Decree 12 of 1995 (as amended) can still pursue criminal prosecution of the Claimant based on the principle enunciated in OGBORU vs. IBORI (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt. 871) 204. On the point that the Claimant sued non-juristic persons, counsel argued that Section 1 of the Nigerian Postal Service Act establishes the Nigerian Postal service as a body corporate with power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. It is counsel’s argument that the 1st Defendant is the necessary party (one who has a direct interest in the case and suffers the burden of the case) in this suit and was sued as the “Nigeria Postal Service Department†which department was repealed on the 1st July 1992 and the Claimant has been unsuccessful in amending pleadings to delete the word “department†because the aim is to replace a juristic person with a non-juristic person. Counsel submitted that the name of a non-juristic person cannot be amended to bring in the name of an intended Defendant. For this submission, counsel relied on the cases of NJOKU vs. UAC FOODS (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 557 and FAWEHINMI vs. NBA No. 2 (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558. Further, it is the submission of counsel that the Claimant cannot correct the act of suing the 1st Defendant as a non-juristic person by an amendment because it is not a mere mistake of a name incorrectly written. Rather, the mistake goes to the root of the case and affects the competency of the suit. See GREEN vs. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480. Counsel also argued that the only party that the Claimant should sue is a necessary party or a juristic personality. Counsel drew the court’s attention to the case of PLATEAU STATE vs. A. G. FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 3, where it was held that where the proper parties are not before the court, the court is without jurisdiction. See also BUHARI vs. OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1. Consequently, counsel stated that the proper parties are not before the court in this present case, to vest the court with jurisdiction at this juncture, citing the case of BENKAY NIG LTD vs. CADBURY (2012) LPELR 7820, where it was held that a suit commenced by an improper party is an abuse of court process and liable to be struck out. See also LAKANMI vs. ADENE (2003) 4 SC (Pt. 2) 92. The court was urged to dismiss the Claimant’s case with substantial and punitive costs for abuse of judicial process. In opposition, the Claimant on 3rd November 2016 deposed to, and filed a counter affidavit of 12 paragraphs. In the accompanying written address, counsel for the Claimant adopted the points raised by the defence and formulated three issues for determination as follows: 1. Whether the jurisdiction of the court to hear this suit is caught up by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and Section 59 (1) of the Nigerian Postal Service Act 2004. 2. Whether the parties are juristic persons. 3. What is the effect of a repealed law? On issue one, Counsel submitted that a court’s jurisdiction is established by the constitution or by a specific statute and this court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the present suit as provided in Section 254 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). See also A. G. FEDERATION vs. GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER (2001) FWLR (Pt. 32) 93. It is counsel’s submission that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is not absolute but contains certain exceptions which was held in A. G. RIVERS STATE vs. A. G. BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148; to include situations where the acts of public officers constitute a continuance of damage or injury. Counsel argued further that the extant case falls into the exception of cases of continuance of injury and damage because, the Claimant was suspended for 15 months and his salaries withheld and never paid till he was dismissed. See A. G. RIVERS STATE vs. A. G. BAYELSA STATE (supra) and AREMO II vs. ADEKANYE (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 224) 2113 at 2132. Again, counsel argued that the acts of the Defendants in delaying to serve the Claimant with his dismissal letter for two months, was done in bad faith, in order to ensure that the Claimant’s right to seek redress from the court is forfeited. Similarly, it is counsel’s contention that in the event the Claimant’s case is statute barred, the period of limitation can be extended where there are cases of fraud or misrepresentation. Counsel referred the court to Section 3 of the Limitation Law and the case of OLORA vs. ADEGBITE (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1334) 40. More so, counsel contended that the Claimant proceeded to the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), a body set up by the PCC Act to investigate complaints lodged against a statutory corporation or public institution in Nigeria, in order to exhaust all available avenues in the Public Service Rules before proceeding to court as required by Rule 090201 (ii) of the Public Service Rules. It is counsel’s argument that the process of exploring redress at the PCC does not extinguish the Claimant’s constitutional right to seek redress in the courts. See Rule 090201 (ii) of the Public Service Rules. With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that the parties in this case are persons known to law because this court granted the amendment to delete “department†in conformity with Cap N127 LFN 2004. Counsel argued that Sections 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Nigerian Postal Service Act Cap N127 LFN 2004 gave credence to the Claimant’s contention upon which the court exercised its discretion and granted the order for amendment. Regarding issue three, counsel contended that in the determination of jurisdiction, the applicable law is that which was in force at the time the cause of action arose and not that currently in force. See NEPA vs. ATUKPO (2000) FWLR (Pt. 20) 626. It is counsel’s contention that at the time the cause of action in the present case arose, there was no provision for immunity protecting the Defendant or limiting time when an action could be filed against them. Also, counsel argued that the contention of the defence that any reliance on the repealed Decree is misguided, owing to the fact that Section 6 (3) of the extant NIPOST Act provides as follows: Any proceeding…shall be enforced and effected against or in favour of the Postal service and shall be enforceable as fully and effectively as if instead of the Department, the Postal Service had been named therein or had been a party thereto… Counsel urged the court to administer equity in exercising its discretionary power as provided for by Sections 13 and 15 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, and dismiss the arguments of the Defendants’ counsel for being baseless, vexatious, frivolous and lacking in merit. The Defendants’ counsel on 14th December 2016 filed a reply on points of law in which Counsel submitted that the operative word in Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act is “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law†the effect of which admits no exception. It is counsel’s submission that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous they should be given their natural meaning. See FAWEHINMI vs. IGP (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606 at 661. In this circumstance, counsel contended that Section 59 (1) NIPOST Act is “a statute of limitation†that admits no exception, and the cases cited by the Claimant’s counsel are not applicable to the present case because the Claimant’s dismissal is not a continuous injury but a completed act done once. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was at liberty to institute an action against the Defendants during his suspension and did not need to wait for his dismissal. In further contention, counsel stated that in employment maters, issues of malice and bad faith as raised by the Claimant’s counsel do not apply to employment matters once the proper procedure has been followed in determining the employment. Also, counsel argued that once a cause of action has arisen, any correspondence between the parties does not stop time from running. Counsel relied on the case of EGBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 6 SCNJ 74, where it was held that a statute of limitation starts to run from the moment the cause of action arose and not when it was discovered. Furthermore, in response to the Claimant counsel’s reference to the Federal Civil Service Rules in his written address, counsel contended that from 1st July 1992; NIPOST became a statutory corporation independent of the Federal Civil Service Commission, and the Commission did not employ the Claimant; otherwise it would have been joined as a party and this court’s judgment will be binding on it. In addition, counsel argued that the Claimant cannot claim the protection of the Federal Civil Service Rules because the Regulations relating to NIPOST staff came after the Claimant’s dismissal in 1999. Again, counsel argued that since the commencement of this suit from the Federal High Court to this court, neither of the courts has granted any amendment and the Defendants are non-juristic persons, hence the suit as presently constituted is incompetent. Also, counsel contended that this suit was illegally transferred without the prior consent of the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court because of the assumption that the Federal High Court that lacked jurisdiction to determine the issue of limitation when it was raised cannot validly transfer the case to the National Industrial Court. Finally, counsel contended that throughout the proceedings in this case, the Claimant has relied on Decree 18 of 1987 which has been repealed, and he is bound by his pleadings; since the case is premised on a repealed law it is nothing. Counsel referred the court to the English case of UAC vs. McFOY (1962) AC 152, where it was held inter alia that one cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. Counsel repeated his contentions that the present case is statute barred, the Defendants are non-juristic persons, that this court is bound by the all the Supreme Court decisions on limitation law and added that this court lacks the jurisdiction to determine any matter; either in favour or against persons who are not parties before it. Counsel cited the cases of NNAEMEKA vs. CHUKWUOGOR (NIG) LTD (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1026) 60 at 78 and AYOADE vs. SPRING BANK (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1396) 93 at 132, in support of his contention. Counsel indicated also that even in equity, the Claimant has slept over his right and delay defeats equity. He cited CCB PLC vs. A.G ANAMBRA STATE (1992) 10 SCNJ 37, in support of his submission that where a statute such as Section 59 (1) NIPOST Act or Constitution provides a particular way of doing a thing, such a method must be followed. The court was urged by the Defendants’ counsel to dismiss the entire case for want of jurisdiction. COURT’S DECISION The Defendants are seeking in this application an order dismissing the Claimant’s suit. The various reasons which they based their prayer, as disclosed on the motion, are these: i. At the time the Claimant’s cause of action accrued, the jurisdiction of this court or any court was ousted by Section 3 (3) of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act 1990; ii. The Defendants are not juristic person and there are no proper parties before the court in this suit; iii. The suit is statute barred; iv. The Claimant’s claim is based on repealed law. I will consider each of these grounds in the sequence set out above. Before that, I will examine the facts deposed in the affidavit of the parties for and against the application. It is deposed in the Defendants’ affidavit that the Claimant was dismissed from service on 30/4/1999 but was served the dismissal letter on 12/7/1999. The Claimant took out an action against the Defendants on 6/11/2002, which was a period of 3 years and 3 months after the cause of action arose. The Claimant did not institute the action within 12 months as required by the NIPOST Act. It is further deposed that all the Defendants are not juristic persons and cannot sue or be sued. It is averred also that the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the case is also ousted by Public Officers Special Provisions Act. The Claimant, on the other hand, deposed in his counter affidavit that he was suspended for 15 months and his salary was withheld. The salary was not paid up to the time of his dismissal from service by the Defendants. His letter of dismissal was dated 30th April 1999 but was served on him on 12th July 1999. He was not given hearing before he was dismissed and upon receipt of the dismissal letter, he made a complaint to the Public Complaints Commission who arbitrated in the dispute and the Defendants participated. The arbitration lasted till 19th August 2002. He commenced this suit timeously and his suit is not affected by limitation of time. The Claimant stated further that on 19th November 2014, this court granted his motion to delete the word “Department†from the name of 1st Defendant to conform it to the NIPOST Act. In the 3rd prayer on the motion, the Defendants alleged that the jurisdiction of this court has been ousted in respect of the subject matter of the suit. It is stated therein that as at the time the Claimant’s cause of action accrued, the jurisdiction of this court or any other court was ousted by Section 3 (3) of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act 1990. It is stated likewise in paragraph 9 of the Defendants’ affidavit in support of the motion that the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the case is ousted by the Public Officers Special Provisions Act. In other words, the Defendants want this court to decline jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the ground that its jurisdiction had been ousted by Section 3 (3) of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act. From the record of this case, the Claimant filed this suit on 6th November 2002 before the Federal High Court Umuahia before it was later transferred to this court. The courts became seized of the case on the day it was filed before the Federal High Court. Whether or not the jurisdiction of the court has been ousted from entertaining the suit will be considered from the date the suit came before the court. The Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act 1990, also known as Decree No. 17 of 1984, which the Defendants relied on to contend that the court’s jurisdiction has been ousted, was repealed with effect from 29th May 1999 by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeals) Decree No.63, 1999. The Public Officers Special Provisions Act ceased to exist or have effect from 29th May 1999. From that date, the jurisdiction of the courts to inquire into the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of public officers was no longer inhibited or ousted by the repealed Act. Consequently, as at the time the Claimant filed this suit on 6th November 2002, Public Officers Special Provisions Act was no longer in operation. Therefore, the court properly exercised its jurisdiction to entertain this suit at the time it was filed. This aspect of the Defendants’ prayer in the motion paper has no merit. Prayer 3 on the motion is dismissed. The Defendants also alleged that the Defendants in this suit are non-juristic persons. They prayed for the suit to be dismissed because there are no proper parties before the court. This is in prayers 4 and 5 of the motion. While it is stated in ground (k) of the motion that the Nigerian Postal Service Department, Area Postal Controller and the Postmaster-General are not juristic persons, it was deposed in paragraph 8 of the supporting affidavit that all the Defendants are not juristic persons and cannot sue or be sued. In his counter affidavit, the Claimant stated that by an amendment he made and granted on 19th November 2014, the 1st Defendant on record is the Nigerian Postal Service. The Claimant however failed to address the issue of the juristic personality of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in his counter affidavit. His counsel did submit in the written address however that all the Defendants are created in the Nigeria Postal Service Act 2004. It is settled principle of law that only natural or juristic persons can sue or be sued. All the parties to a suit must be juristic or natural persons existing or living at the time the action was instituted. The name of a competent party to a suit must be the real name by which he is known in the case of a natural person and its corporate name in the case of a non-natural juristic person. See THE ADMINISTRATORS/EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA (DECEASED) vs. EKE-SPIFF (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 467) 1 at 31; ABUBAKAR vs. YAR’ADUA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 457) 1 at 136. Therefore, an action cannot be maintained against a Defendant who is not a legal person. Where it is clear that a Defendant or any party to a suit is not a legal person, the party must be struck out. In Section 1 (1) of the Nigeria Postal Service Act 2004, a body known as the Nigerian Postal Service was established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate name. By this provision, the Nigeria Postal Service is a juristic personality who can sue or be sued. The name of the 1st Defendant in this suit was previously expressed as Nigeria Postal Service Department but the Claimant, in a motion filed on 26/9/2014, sought the leave of the court to amend the Complaint for the purposes among which include to delete the word “Department†from the name of the 1st Defendant. That motion was granted by this court on 19/11/2014. The 1st Defendant in this case, from the date of the order, is the Nigeria Postal Service. The Defendants counsel has argued that the Claimant cannot amend his processes to replace a non-juristic person with a juristic person. The learned counsel for the Defendants appears to question the order of amendment granted to the Claimant to amend the processes. The Defendants did not oppose the Claimant’s motion for amendment and did not file any appeal against that ruling of this court allowing the amendment. The present argument of counsel is misplaced and misdirected. The 1st Defendant in this case as at the time this motion of the Defendants was filed is the Nigerian Postal Service established in Section 1 (1) of the Nigeria Postal Service Act. In any case, the addition of “Department†to the name of the 1st Defendant was only a misnomer. From the facts of the Claimant’s case, the person whom he intended to sue from the beginning was the Nigerian Postal Service. In such a circumstance, it is in order to allow an amendment to reflect the proper name of the party. It is trite that there the description of a party on the Writ or Complaint was a misnomer, such can be corrected by amendment provided that the person misnamed and intended to be sued is a juristic entity and in existence. See MAERSK LINE vs. ADDIDE INVESTMENT LTD (2002) FWLR (Pt. 125) 608 at 655-656; NWABUEZE vs. NIPOST (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 480. As for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the Claimants counsel argued that they were established in Sections 6 and 7 of the Nigeria Postal Service Act respectively. Upon a reading of the provision of the said Sections of the Nigeria Postal Service Act, I do not agree with counsel that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are established in the Act. These offices are neither a creation of the Act or juristic offices. Section 6 (1) of the Act merely empowered the President to appoint a Postmaster-General for the Postal Service. This appointment cannot confer juristic personality on the office. Similarly, any posts in the Service established by the Postmaster-General pursuant to the powers conferred on him in Section 7 of the Act do not have juristic personality. I therefore agree with the Defendants that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not juristic persons and are not capable of being sued or made parties in this suit. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are hereby struck out. In the result, the only competent Defendant in this suit is the 1st Defendant. The stage is now appropriate to consider whether the suit against the Defendant is statute barred. The Defendant relied on Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act to contend that the suit is statute barred and should be dismissed. Counsel to the Defendant submitted that Section 59 (1) of the NIPOST Act provides 12 months from date of a cause of action within which to institute action against NIPOST. The Claimant was served dismissal letter on 12/7/1999 but he filed the suit at the Federal High Court Umuahia on 6/11/2006 which was a period of more than 12 months prescribed in the NIPOST Act. The Claimant, in response, stated that his suit was filed within time and it is not statute barred. In the written address of the Claimant’s counsel, he made arguments of some exceptions why the Claimant’s suit is not statute barred. I shall come to the arguments of the Claimant’s counsel shortly. Section 59 of the NIPOST Act provides as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, whatsoever, no action shall lie or be instituted in any court against the Postal Service, a member or an officer of the Postal Service, for any act done in pursuance of or execution of any enactment or law of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such enactment or law, duty or authority, unless it is commenced within twelve months after the act or default complained of or, in the case of a continuous damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof. The above provision is a limitation provision. It is to the effect that action against a the Defendant must be commenced within 12 months of the accrual of the cause of action except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury in which the Claimant must institute the action within 12 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. Where such a suit is not commenced within the prescribed 12 months period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Claimant’s cause of action in this suit, as disclosed in the statement facts and the reliefs sought in the case, is his dismissal from the Defendant’s service through a letter dated 30th April 1999. The Claimant said he received the letter on 12th July 1999. The Claimant’s cause of action occurred when he received the dismissal letter. His right of action against the Defendant started running from 12th July 1999. He filed this action on 6th November 2002. Between the time of his cause of action and the filing of the suit was a period of about 39 months. Obviously, the Claimant did not file the suit within the time prescribed by statute. Perhaps, taking advantage of the part of the provision of Section 59 of the NIPOST Act extending the limitation period to run in respect of continuance of damage or injury until after 12 months after it ceases, the Claimant’s counsel argued that the Claimant’s cause of action suffers from continuance of damage or injury up to the time the suit was filed. I do not share that view. The act of the Defendant in dismissing the Claimant happened on a specific day and the act has not been shown by the Claimant to have been repeated thereafter. I do not see anything in the cause of action of the Claimant which can constitute continuing injury or damage as contemplated in Section 59 of the NIPOST Act. The facts are clear that this suit was filed against the Defendant more than 12 months from the date the Claimant’s cause of action arose. The action is statute barred and no longer maintainable by effect of section 59 of NIPOST Act. See OYETOKI vs. NIPOST (2010) All FWLR (Pt.504) 1572; NIPOST vs. AMINU MORDI (2007) All FWLR (Pt.424). This court consequently lacks jurisdiction to continue to entertain it. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make at this point is to dismiss the Claimant’s suit. In the result, this suit is dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge