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REPRESENTATION A. Lawal, for the claimant. Olufunke Osarenkhoe Esq, Assistant Director, for the defendants. RULING 1. From the pleadings, the claimant was employed as a Veterinary Officer by the Lagos State Government in 1974. In 1999, he was compulsorily retired, a retirement he challenged at the Lagos State High Court vide Suit No. ID/2018/99. By a judgment delivered on 30th October 2008, the Lagos State High Court dismissed the claimant’s case. He appealed against the judgment vide Appeal No. CA/L/517/09. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the trial court and upheld the appeal, declaring the claimant’s retirement null and void and ordering that all his entitlement, gratuity and pension be paid. The decision of the Court of Appeal was not appealed against. However, the Lagos State Government failed to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the claimant suffered damage thereto, hence the instant suit filed on 23rd August 2016 vide a complaint seeking among other reliefs an order of court mandating the defendants to comply fully with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In particular, the claimant is claiming from the defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs: (a) A declaration that refusal to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 22/2/2013 in CA/L/517/09 between the parties in this suit by the defendants is oppressive inequitable and unconstitutional. (b) The sum of N250,000,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) being punitive/exemplary damages against the defendants for non-enforcement and non-compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. (c) The sum of N250,000,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) as aggravated damages arising from refusal to comply with and enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeal by the defendants. (d) Legal costs of N10 million. 2. In reacting to this action, the defendants on 23rd March 2017 filed a preliminary objection (supported by an affidavit and a written address) as to the competence of this suit and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain it, praying thereby that the instant suit be dismissed. The grounds upon which the objection is raised are: (i) The procedure adopted by the claimant in this suit in enforcing the Court of Appeal judgement is a departure from the laid down procedure for execution or enforcement of judgements or order for sum of money as laid down in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. (ii) The action is frivolous and misconceived. 3. The claimant opposed the preliminary objection and thereby filed on 17th May 2017 a counter-affidavit and a written address. 4. The defendants submitted three issues for determination. They are: (1) Whether the suit as presently constituted is incompetent. (2) Whether the suit as presently constituted discloses reasonable cause of action. (3) Whether the applicants can challenge the jurisdiction of court on point of law in lieu of demurrer. 5. On issue (1), the defendants submitted that it is trite that for a matter to be competent and for the court to be able to exercise jurisdiction, the matter must be initiated by due process of law, citing BRTC v. Egbuonu [1991] 2 NWLR 81 at 90 and Sea Trucks Nig Ltd v. Anigboro [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 159. That where a party has refused to obey the judgment of a court, the appropriate procedure by the provisions of sections 20 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap 407 LFN is to institute a proceeding for the execution of the judgement against the goods, chattels and the immovable property of the judgement debtor or take any other auxiliary processes which aid the process of execution. That the appropriate procedure was not followed in this case and it constitutes a feature which prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Section 20(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap 407 LFN 1990 provides as follows: “Any sum of money payable under a judgement of a court may be recovered, in case of default or failure of payment thereof forthwith or at the time or times and in the manner thereby directed, by execution against the goods and chattels and the immovable property of the judgement debtor in provision of this Actâ€. Section 72 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act on its part provides as follows: If any person refuses or neglect to comply with an order made against him, other than for payment of money, the court, instead of dealing with him as a judgement debtor guilty of misconduct defined in paragraph ‘F’ of section 66 may order that he be committed to prison and detained in custody until he has obeyed the order in all things that are to be immediately performed and given such security as the court thinks it fit to obey the other part of the order, if any, at the future times thereby appointed or in case of his no longer having the power to obey the order then until he has been imprisoned for such time or until he has paid such fine as the court directs. That it follows from these authorities that any procedure aside from the procedure spelt out in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap 407 LFN 1990 will be incompetent. 6. That in Lambert Sunday Iwueke v. Imo Broadcasting Corporation [2005] 10 SC 19, it was held that a final decision can be one which puts an end to the action by deciding whether the plaintiff is or is not entitled to the reliefs he claims thereby leaving nothing for further action by the trial court except proceedings in respect of enforcement of that decision. All the claims in this Suit especially as it relates to interest are incompetent as they amount to opening a suit which a superior court has finalized. It is therefore improper for the Claimant to attempt to reopen the closed case and ask for reliefs over a closed case. Furthermore, that the Supreme Court in Tukur v. Governor of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592 itemized the methods of enforcing different kinds of judgement as follows: (a) A judgement or order for the payment of money may be enforced by a writ of fieri facias, garnishee proceedings, a charging order, a writ of sequestration or an order for committal on judgement debtor summons. (b) A judgement for possession of land may be enforced by a writ of possession, a writ of sequestration or committal order. (c) A judgement for delivery of goods may be enforced by a writ of specific delivery or restitution of their value, a writ of sequestration or a writ of committal. (d) A judgement ordering or restraining the doing of an act may be enforced by an order of committal or a writ of sequestration against the property of the disobedient person. That outside these means of execution and some auxiliary processes which aid them, there is no other form of execution. 7. The defendants went on that jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and it is vested by the Constitution or the statute establishing the court. That jurisdiction is also radical and crucial to the competence and authority of a court to decide any matter before it, citing Ogunmokun v. Milad, Ogun State [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) 261 at 265. That to determine the jurisdiction of the Court, a judge must restrict himself to the claimant’s originating process in a matter brought before him, citing FGN v. Oshiomole [2004] 3NWLR (Pt. 860) at 305. To the defendants, a court only has jurisdiction to deal with matters and issues that are properly before it and the court does not speculate or assume jurisdiction to determine matters not properly brought before it, referring to MC Investments Ltd & anor v. Core Inv. & Capital Market Ltd (no citation is given). Furthermore, that a court must adjudicate within the confines of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would be beating in excess of its jurisdiction, referring to Nnaemeka Ufondu v. Shanet Machine Ltd [2008] 4 CLRN. That the claimant in praying the court to make a declaration or take further action in respect of a matter in which a superior court has already concluded is incompetent, urging the Court to hold that the suit is incompetent. 8. As for issue (2), the defendants defined a cause of action as an entire set of facts or circumstances which give rise to an enforceable claim; it means every fact that would be necessary for the plaintiff or applicant to prove if transversed in order to support his right to judgement, referring to Akilu v. Fawehinmi No 2 [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 102) 122. That Dr Irele Thamus & ors v. The Most Rev. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 at 682 defined the term “reasonable cause of action†as a cause of action with a chance of success of success; and AG, Kwara & 2 ors v. Oluwole [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 645 at 663 defined cause of action as factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court, a remedy against another person. That by this objection, the defendants would be deemed to have admitted the facts in the statement of claim but asserts that notwithstanding this, the claimant is not entitled to the relief sought. The defendants then submitted that from the facts averred in the statement of claim, there is sufficient fact to show the claimant is seeking to enforce the judgement of the Court of Appeal and that he is raising fresh issues especially in respect of interest over accrued arrears of salaries and benefit. That these claims cannot be said to be reasonable cause of action since the entire matter has been determined by a superior court. 9. Issue (3) is whether the defendants can challenged the jurisdiction of this Court on point of law in lieu of the demolition of demurrer. That in Akpan v. Bob & ors [2010] LPELR-376(SC); [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 421 SC, it was postulated that “a preliminary objection seeks to provide an initial objection before the actual commencement of the thing being objected toâ€. That the purpose of a preliminary objection is to terminate a case at the preliminary state, citing Executive Governor of Osun State v, Folorunsho [2014] LPELR-23088(CA) and Yaro v. Arewa Construction & ors [2007] 6 SCNJ 418. That the defendants in this suit are seeking to do just that as it is their belief that the claimant’s suit as presently constituted is incompetent and should be terminated at this preliminary stage and ought not to be allowed to go to trial, referring to Lagos State Traffic Management Authority & ors v. Johnson O. Esezobo [2015] LPELR-25003(CA). To the defendants, it is not in dispute that the issues forming the basis for this suit have been adjudicated upon by a superior court and judgement delivered in respect of same by the appellate court. This, accordingly to the defendants, is a feature or defect in the case which prevents this Court from exercising its jurisdiction, referring to Umeh v. Ottah [2014] LPELR-24076(CA), where Hon. Justice Agim, JCA held thus: Generally, it is trite law that the trial of a demurrer must be based exclusively on facts in the writ of summons and statement of claim. The objection postulates the facts in the statement of claim taken as admitted disclose no cause of action or disclose a legal feature that defeats the right of action even if a cause of action exists or that renders the action incompetent. However, in some exceptional circumstances where undisputed facts showing that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the matter or that the action is incompetent, have emerged and formed part of the record before the court by other means outside the statement of claim, such an objection has been allowed by courts on the basis of such undisputed facts on the principle that an objection to the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a case can be raised and tried at any stage of the proceedings in a case. So the underlying notion is that the factual basis of the objection must not be in dispute. In our present case, it is glaring from the affidavit in support of the defendant’s motion on notice, the plaintiffs counter affidavit in opposition, the defendant’s further affidavit and the massive documentary exhibits accompanying their respective affidavits and the addresses of counsel on their behalf that both sides did not agree on when the cause of action accrued. It remained a triable issue on the affidavits. A demurrer cannot be based on such a disputed fact. The defendants accordingly urged the Court to resolve this issue in their favour and dismiss the suit; on the additional ground that the action is an abuse of court process as it seeks to introduce fresh claim to claims that has already been decided by an appellate court. 10. The claimant on his part submitted a sole issue for determination, to wit: whether this Court can entertain this suit as presented before it. To the claimant, this suit is competent and the application of the defendants ought to be dismissed. That jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which in paragraphs (a) and (k) states as follows: Notwithstanding, the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as any be conferred upon it by an Act of National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters - (a) relating to or connected with labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; (k) relating to or connected with dispute arising from payment or nonpayment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto. 11. The claimant then asked: what is the subject matter of this suit? What does it arise from? Is it covered by the above constitutional provisions? The claimant answered that recourse will have to be made the writ of summons and statement of facts before the Court especially the prayer in the summons and paragraphs 1 - 31 of the statement of facts, specifically paragraph 7 of the statement of facts which sets out the prayers granted to the claimant at the Court of Appeal. That the subject matter of this suit, arose from and is incidental to labour matters and it is related to non-payment of salaries, gratuities, pension, etc. That there is no doubt that the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, paragraph 4.1 of the written address of the counsel to the defendants concedes this point; their sole contention being that the mode of instituting this action is not the procedure for enforcement of judgment. To the claimant, the question really is whether he is seeking to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeal. He asked: what is the cause of action in this suit? What is the claim of the claimant? In answer, the claimant first referred to Okafor v. BDU Jos Branch [2017] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385 SC at 417 for the definition of cause of action. That in the instant case, the wrongful act of the defendants which gives the claimant the right to complain and the damage consequent to the wrongful act is the failure to comply with the Court of Appeal judgment. That the damage arising therefrom and suffered by the claimant is set out in paragraphs 33 - 37 of the statement of facts with emphasis on paragraph 33. Paragraph 33 states thus: That pursuant to the non-compliance with the judgment with the Court of Appeal the claimant has suffered and continues to suffer as follows: (a) Emotional and mental torture, psychological stress, mood swings, hypertension, depression anger, panic anxiety and deterioration of life occasioned by his sudden retirement and the continuous litigation arising therefrom since 1999. (b) The continuation of the pain and suffering arising from non-payment of his entitlement till date. (c) The impairment of dignity and loss of social status and responsibility arising from the void compulsory retirement. (d) The continuation of litigation and attendant costs. (e) The destabilization of family life arising claimant’s inability to fulfill his obligation to his family. The claimant’s state of living is virtual penury which continues unabated by the refusal of the defendants to comply and enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeal. (f) Loss of profitable use of money and its depreciation. That where there is a wrong there must be a remedy, referring to Ogbolosingha v. BSIEC [2015] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1455) 311 at 343. 12. The claimant continued that it is to be noted that by this objection, the defendants admit the facts in the statement of facts. That this was conceded by them in paragraph 4.10 of their written address. Thus that they admit as follows: (a) That there is a judgment of the Court of Appeal in favour of the claimant. (b) That the defendants have not complied with the judgment. (c) That non-complying with the judgment is a wrongful act. (d) That the claimant has suffered damage. That contrary to the submission of counsel to the defendants, the claimant is not seeking to enforce the judgment. That a perusal of the prayers of the claimant shows that he is not enforcing the judgment of the Court of Appeal; he is seeking damage arising from the wrongful act of the defendants post-judgment. In fact, that counsel has failed to show in our pleadings where we are seeking to enforce the judgment or any prayer thereto. 13. The claimant went on that learned counsel to the defendant referred to Tukur v. Governor of Gongola State where Supreme the Court itemized the methods of enforcing judgment. That it was stated thus: “Judgment or order for the payment of money may be enforced by a writ of fieri facias, garnishee proceedings, a charging order, a Writ of sequestration or an order for committal on judgment/Debtor summonsâ€. The claimant agreed with this ratio of the Supreme Court for enforcement of judgment; but that he is not seeking to enforce the judgment. In the fact, that under the various modes of enforcing a money judgment, his grievances in this case would not fit in. That his action relates to post-judgment legal wrong which is the complaint of the claimant. That the modes stated are to receive the monetary value of the judgment simpliciter, “nothing more noting lessâ€. That any other damage arising from non-compliance with the judgment can only be by subsequent action. That clear words are needed by the Constitution or statute to oust the jurisdiction of the Court. That learned counsel for the defendants has not referred to any law or authority restraining a claimant from instituting an action for damage over a post-judgment wrong; as such the Court must be slow to abandon its jurisdiction, referring to Kayili v. Yilbuk [2015] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1457) 26 at 36 where the Supreme Court stated: “The Constitution has provided an opportunity for aggrieved persons to ventilate their grievances in a court of law, which is empowered to determine any civil proceedings in which the existence of a legal right, power, duty, liability, interest, obligation or claim is in issue. The right is guaranteed and cannot be taken away or be made subject to any other legislation whateverâ€. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss this application and proceed to hear this suit which is proper and competent before the Court. COURT’S DECISION 14. There is a divergence of opinion as between the parties in this suit as to what the suit is all about; and this lies at the root of the objection of the defendants. The defendants assert that the case is about the enforcement of the Court of Appeal judgment in Appeal No. CA/L/517/09 delivered on 22nd February 2013. The claimant thinks not, and so contends that his case is one seeking recovery in damages for non-enforcement and non-compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In other words, he is claiming for the wrong of the defendant not complying with the Court of Appeal judgment. Alternatively put, the claimant is saying that the fact that the defendant did not comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal is itself an actionable wrong independent of what the Court of Appeal granted in its judgment. Going by the reliefs claimed by the claimant in this case, and paragraph 33 of the statement of facts, I agree with the claimant that his action as framed is not about the enforcement of the Court of Appeal decision delivered on 22nd February 2013; it is that an actionable wrong has been created and so should be remedied in damages by the failure of the defendants to comply with the said judgment. A number of questions accordingly arise. The Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 22nd February 2013; so how long is a judgment to last before it can be said that non-compliance is wrong? We may have to look at the judgment itself in order to ascertain whether the Court in question gave a period within which compliance with the judgment must be done. Once this issue is determined, then the second question arises, which is: when did the cause of action as to the wrong of refusing to comply with the judgment arise? Additional to these questions are two not unrelated questions: is refusal to comply with a judgment of a court a reasonable cause of action i.e. a recognizable actionable wrong? If the answer is yes, what is the character or quality of that wrong? Is it a tort or some other unspecified wrong? 15. In paragraph 33 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded thus: That pursuant to the non-compliance with the judgment of with (sic) the Court of Appeal the Claimant has suffered and continues to suffer as follows:- a. Emotional and mental torture, psychological stress, mood swings, hypertension, depression, anger, panic, anxiety, and deterioration of life occasioned by his sudden retirement and the continuous litigation arising therefrom since 1999. b. The continuation of the pain and suffering arising from non-payment of his entitlement till date. c. The impairment of dignity and loss of social status and responsibility arising from the void of compulsory retirement. d. The continuation of litigation and attendant costs. e. The destabilization of family life arising (sic) claimant’s inability to fulfill his obligation to his family. The claimant’s state of living is virtual penury which continues unabated by the refusal of the defendants to comply and enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeal. f. Loss of profitable use of his money and its depreciation. 16. In paragraph 34 of same statement of facts, the claimant pleaded thus: “The Claimant avers that refusal to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal by the Defendants is unconstitutional, arbitrary, contemptuous, and erodes the confidence of the citizen in the Judiciary rendering it a toothless bulldog. The Defendants as agents of Government are exercising their statutory power in an oppressive manner against the Claimant which merits sanction by the Courtâ€. 17. It is for these infractions that the claimant filed this suit and is claiming damages. These are no doubt perceived wrongs done to the claimant by the defendants; but are they recognizable actionable wrongs? This remains the question. The infractions sound in tort; after all, the categories of tort are not closed. This being the case, there is nothing in principle preventing the claimant from litigating the infractions as he has presently done. But when did the cause of action relating to the infractions arise? The Court of Appeal judgment delivered on 22nd February 2013 did not give any timeframe within which the judgment is to be complied with. It simply stated that “the appeal is allowed, the Judgment of he Lower Court delivered on the 30th of October 2006 is set aside. The Appellant prayers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are grantedâ€. By paragraph 10 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that he wrote several letters (6 listed between 2013 and 2014) to the defendants and the Governor of Lagos State asking them to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, all to no avail. The claimant, however, continued that on or about 9th July 2015, the defendants paid to him N4,152,676.36, what is ostensibly gratuity. See paragraph 15 of the statement of facts. By paragraph 16, that he was paid N9,695,188.03, purportedly arrears of pension for the period 2007 to 2015, with a shortfall of N1,634,112.06. By paragraph 17, the claimant pleads that his monthly pension is being paid by the defendants from January 2016 in sum of N91,855.03 instead of N103,359.55. In paragraph 18, the claimant pleads that he caused to be written to the defendants a letter dated 23rd June 2016 in respect of the payments but to no avail. In paragraph 19 the claimant pleads that his salaries/allowances for the period 1999 - 2007 amounting to N12,928,779.06 remain unpaid. In paragraph 21, the claimant pleads that the outstanding due to him pursuant to the Court of Appeal judgment is N15,311,581.91. The claimant is not claiming this sum in this suit; what he is claiming is N500 Million Naira as punitive/exemplary damages as well as aggravated damages, plus N10 Million as legal costs. 18. Two questions, however, arise: is failure to comply with a court order a separate actionable wrong in the mould of a tort? Secondly, if the answer is in the affirmative, is the wrong actionable in this Court? In terms of the first question, the claimant in paragraph 33(d) of the statement of facts complained that he suffered and continues to suffer “the continuation of litigation and attendant costsâ€. In the instant case, he is claiming in all N510 Million as damages for the defendants’ con-compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Although the categories of tort are not closed (and the rule is that where there is a wrong, there is a remedy) the claimant did not show to this Court a recognizable tort that had been breached. The claimant’s complaint is that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was not complied with. To the claimant, this is an actionable wrong. It raises, however, the corresponding question: assuming that this Court treats the action as an actionable wrong and the claimant succeeds in it, if the judgment of this Court given therefore is also not complied with, will there be a second actionable wrong in terms of the succeeding judgement (of this Court)? And if the answer is in the affirmative, and the third judgment is also not complied with, will there be an actionable wrong? In other words, how far down the line can we go in recognizing as an actionable wrong the non-compliance with the judgment of a court? Is it for nothing that the law allows for post-judgment interest? Is it not for this very reason, to guard against actions such as the instant suit, that the law permits a claimant to ask, and the rules of court provide, for post-judgment interest? In this sense, I really do not see any actionable wrong in this matter. By paragraph 7 of the statement of facts, the claimant set out the reliefs he claimed at the High Court. He did not pray for any post-judgment interest. Is the present action not one, therefore, that seeks to cure the indiscretion of the claimant in not asking for post-judgment interest, the natural remedy for failure to comply with the judgment of a court? There is an alternative side to all of this. In filing a suit to recover N510 Million as damages and cost for non-compliance with a judgment of a Court, is the claimant not gold-digging? I indicated that it not known how far down the line we can go with this sort of claims. For a second and third and fourth degree of non-compliance with a judgment, would the claimant be respectively asking for N1 Billion, N1.5 Billion and N2 Billion? Won’t this be gold-digging? I think so. As it is, I do not see the instant suit as an actionable wrong in the manner couched. I so find and hold. 19. Even if the failure to comply with the judgment of the Court of Appeal (as of any other Court) is an actionable wrong, is it this Court that has jurisdiction over such a wrong? The claimant argued that given the jurisdiction of this Court under section 254C(1)(a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution, the actionable wrong of non-compliance with the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, a judgment that held the retirement of the claimant to be unlawful, null and void must be read to be a matter incidental to the items. This Court has been reluctant in expanding the frontiers of its jurisdiction when it comes to the “matters incidental thereto†argument. See, for instance, Agnes Omeyi Adoga (Mrs) & ors v. Ameh Adoga & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/15/2017, the ruling of which was delivered on 24th May 2017. In Alex Paul Elijah & anor v. Standard Metallurgical Company Ltd (SMC) & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/212/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 10th February 2017, this Court reviewed the caselaw authorities and held thus: …the question remains whether this Court has jurisdiction over this case even if, as argued by the claimants, the arrest, detention and defamation complained of occurred in the workplace. Except for workplace injuries i.e. injuries occasioned by negligence at the workplace where employers are sought to be held liable under tortious principles of employer’s liability, where this Court always assumes jurisdiction given that section 254C(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution specifically confers jurisdiction on the Court over the Workmen’s Compensation Act or any other enactment replacing it (a fact recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in SCC (Nig.) Ltd & 2 ors v. Yusuf Sedi [2013] 1 NWLR 230 per the lead judgment of His Lordship Eko, JCA [as he then was]), this Court has generally declined jurisdiction over other heads of liability in tort, which are all sui generis. This Court has been reluctant to assume jurisdiction even when the “matters incidental thereto or connected therewith†argument has been raised. In this respect, this Court had declined and still declines jurisdiction in claims for defamation even when the defamatory imputation was said to have arisen from the workplace. See Lawrence Idemudia v. LASU unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/08/2009 the ruling of which was delivered on September 28, 2010, Dr E. G. Ayo Akinyemi v. Crawford University [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 90 at 110 and Mr. C. E. Okeke & 2 ors v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 61) 161 at 183. This is because Agbo v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 370 CA held that where a master accuses a servant of misconduct, whether proved or not, but decides merely to terminate his appointment in accordance with the service agreement without reference to the fact of misconduct in the latter of termination, the servant cannot rely on wrongful termination of appointment as cause of action to clear his name for his future, among other purposes. His recourse in an appropriate case may be in an action for defamation. Additionally, Geoffery v. Setraco Nigeria Ltd & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/ABJ/296/2012 the ruling of which was delivered on 4th March 2013 is a case where an applicant was assaulted by fellow workers or superior officers and verbally abused. This Court declined jurisdiction to entertain the matter under section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution. See also Francis v. Bedebede & ors [2012] 26 NLLR 38. 20. In the instant case, the wrong is not a labour or employment wrong, but one as to non-compliance with the judgment of a court, the Court of Appeal in this instance. How is this wrong one as to incidental matters of employment and labour, the issues appropriately under the remit of this Court? If this Court turns down jurisdiction as to defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery, etc even when these occur in the workplace, how can it accept jurisdiction over the wrong of non-compliance with the judgment of a court even if the judgment given, and which was not complied with, was one in the area of labour and employment? As it, therefore, it is my finding and holding that there is no actionable wrong disclosed as far as this suit is concerned; and even if there is one, it is not actionable in this Court. 21. There is a third side to the issue at hand; assuming, that is, that non-compliance with the judgment of a court is itself a separate/independent actionable wrong. And here, the issue relates to the question of when then the cause of action as to the claims of the claimant in this suit arose. I indicated earlier that the Court of Appeal in its judgment did not state the timeframe within which its judgment is to be complied with. By this very fact, the claimant cannot on his own put a timeframe to it, claim non-compliance and brand it an actionable wrong. For non-compliance with the judgment to be an actionable wrong, the Court of Appeal judgment must have a timeframe for compliance. This is not the case in the instant case. If the claimant wants a timeframe to be put in terms of compliance with the Court of Appeal judgment, his remedy lies with the Court of Appeal, not this Court. In paragraph 24 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that the payment of his dues by installments is not in compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Now, if the Court of Appeal did not order the claimant’s dues to be paid in or by installments, the remedy available to the claimant is to go back to the Court of Appeal and complain, not come to this Court. Since the Court of Appeal did not give a timeframe within which its judgment must be complied with by the defendants, it logically follows that no actionable wrong has arisen as claimed by the claimant for purposes of litigation especially in the manner presented in the instant case. I so find and hold. This being the case, there is no competent suit before this Court. On the whole, I do find merit in the defendant’s objection. The instant suit is not only incompetent, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine it. It is accordingly struct out. 22. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD