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Representation: I. C. Achara for the Claimant B. U. Ukachukwu, with him, D. O. Ogbu for the Defendant JUDGMENT This action was commenced by Complaint dated and filed the 10th day of July 2015 wherein the Claimant claimed against the Defendant as follows: a) A DECLARATION that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant from work on 12/12/2014 without pay and the subsequent purported termination of the Claimant’s employment on 8/5/2015 by the Defendant over mere fictitious allegations unestablished against the Claimant were wrongful, prejudicial, arbitrary, victimizing and amount to unfair labour practice that offend against international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relations. b) A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment on 8/5/2015 vide letter of termination dated 8/5/2013 but served on the Claimant on 12/5/2015 is substantially contrary to the Claimant’s express conditions of employment with the Defendant and thus wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. c) AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N2,591,229.62 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Ninety One Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty Nine Naira, Sixty Two Kobo), being the arrears of Claimant’s unpaid salaries and allowances from date of suspension till date of purported termination of his employment as follows: i. Monthly basic salary of N199,219.61 from January 2015 to June 2015 in the total cum of N1,195,317.66 (One Million, One Hundred and Ninety Five Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventeen Naira, Sixty Six Kobo). ii. Quarterly Allowance (less tax) of N233,725.10 for the quarters of December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015 in the total sum of N701,175.30 (Seven Hundred and One Thousand, One Hundred and Seventy Five Naira, Thirty Kobo). iii. Upfront Allowance (less tax) of N141,710.83 for the periods of January 2015 and April 2015 in the total sum of N283,421.66 (Two Hundred and Eighty Three Thousand, Four Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Sixty Six Kobo). iv. Cost of Passage (COP) Allowance of N159,547.50 for the periods of January 2015 and April 2015 in the total sum of N319,095.00 (Three Hundred and Nineteen Thousand, and Ninety Five Naira). v. Leave Allowance of N50,300.00 (Fifty Thousand and Three Hundred Naira). vi. Thirteenth Month Bonus of N41,920.00 (Forty One Thousand, Nine Hundred and Twenty Naira). d) Interest on (c) above at the rate of 15% from January 2015 until judgment is delivered, and 10% per annum until the compliance of the court’s judgment. e) AN ORDER declaring the Claimant’s contract of employment with the defendant as valid and subsisting, and mandating the Defendant therefore not to act upon or otherwise give effect to the aforementioned letter of termination of employment dated 8/6/2015. f) AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to continuously pay to the Claimant his salaries, allowances and full benefits until his contract of employment with the defendant is validly determined. g) In the alternative to reliefs (e) and (f) above, AN ORDER that the Defendant pays to the Claimant his full severance benefits, and an additional sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) as general damages for continued deprivation, Trauma, Inconveniences, undue hardship, psychological torture, financial losses suffered by the Claimant following the unfair and wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment and all other unfair labour practices by the Defendant against the Claimant in the course of employment. h) The sum of N250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) being the cost of instituting this action. The Complaint was accompanied with the Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Claimant’s Written Statement on Oath, List of Documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. The Defendant entered appearance and filed its Statement of Defence on the 10th day of November 2015. This was accompanied with the Written Statement on oath of the Defence Witness, List of Witnesses, List of Documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. These were duly regularized on 10/11/2015. On the 23rd day of November 2015, the Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence. This was accompanied with an additional deposition of the Claimant, An additional list of documents and copies of documents. Hearing commenced on the 15th day of January 2016. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1, while Mr. Seun Orungbemi, an internal audit staff of the Defendant testified for the Defendant as DW1. Hearing was concluded on the 3rd day of November 2016 and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the rules of court. The Defendant filed its final address on the 22nd day of December 2016. This was regularized vide a motion for extension of time filed on the 27th day of January 2017 and granted on the 23rd day of February 2017. The final written address of the Claimant was filed on the 22nd day of February 2017. The Defendant filed a reply on points of law on the 3rd day of March 2017. This was regularized by order of court on the 13th day of March 2017, on which day the parties also adopted their respective written addresses. The brief facts of the case as summarized by counsel for the Defendant in his final written address is that the Claimant was on December 5, 2013 employed as an Assistant Banking Officer at the Defendant's Owerri Branch Office and by a letter dated August 25, 2014, the Defendant confirmed the Claimant's employment. On December 11, 2014, the Defendant's management placed the Claimant on indefinite suspension without pay after an Interim Report on Fraudulent Postings at the Owerri Branch where the Claimant worked came out. The Defendant expressed its dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duties on the day in question and placed him on indefinite suspension without pay from December 12, 2014. The Claimant appeared before the Defendant's Disciplinary Committee in March 2015 and on June 8, 2015, the Defendant's Management terminated the Claimant's employment for breach of the Defendant's policy on Transaction Processing which amounted to gross negligence. Counsel for the Defendant proceeded to submit the following 4 issues for the court’s determination; (i) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit, the Claimant has been able to prove on a preponderance of evidence that his employment with the Defendant was wrongfully terminated. (ii) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit the Claimant has been able to prove that he was not given a fair hearing prior to the termination of his employment with the Defendant. (iii) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit, the Claimant has been able to prove that his employment with the Defendant is still subsisting and as such entitling him to the reliefs claimed in the alternative herein. (iv) Whether in the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant established his claims for damages against the Defendant. In arguing issues one and two together, Counsel for the Defendant submitted that by Exhibit C3, the Defendant clearly informed the Claimant that there was an interim report on fraudulent postings at the Owerri branch and that the role played by the Claimant specifically informing him that the management was dissatisfied with the manner in which he performed his duties during the period that he was being suspended indefinitely without pay. He submitted further that the action of the Defendant is in line with the Defendant’s Policies as provided in Exhibit CS, the Sanctions and Disciplinary grid which makes provisions for cases of fraud or attempted fraud. He went on that it goes on to categorize into those with direct staff involvement or collusion and those with no direct staff involvement but due to staff negligence, omission or error. For the latter category, the Sanctions Grid also provides under the Sanctions Column that the Defendant can suspend the staff without pay or terminate the appointment. Counsel submitted that upon becoming aware of the fraudulent activities at its Owerri Branch where the Claimant was the most senior staff at work on that day, the Defendant was quite in order to have suspended the Claimant from work indefinitely without pay in line with its Sanctions Grid. In the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. LAWSON JACK (1998) NWLR (Pt.545) at page 249, the Supreme Court observed that: "What it has done from the facts available was to set up an investigation panel to look into certain complaints bordering on alleged impropriety committed by one Mr. Ntuk Ntuk, a member of staff of the appellant company. In the process the respondent was suspended from duty on full pay pending the investigation. A suspension of an employee is not an unusual procedure taken in order to facilitate such an investigation. The person affected can hardly complain, in the process, of not having been given a fair hearing, nor can he demand that the rules of natural justice should apply. The interest of the business of the defendant becomes paramount and the Plaintiff is made to keep off the premises thereof until later." Counsel for the Defendant went on to refer to the Supreme Court’s further elucidation on the issue of suspension of staff from work in the case of LONGE vs. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2010) 2-3 S.C. (Pt. III) page 61 at 95 where it was held that: "Admittedly, an employer suspending his employee may impose terms of the suspension but in a general sense suspension of an employee from work only means the suspension of the employee from performance of the ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his office. Counsel submitted on the authority of the above and the Defendant's Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid that one of the terms imposed by the Defendant where there has been an allegation of fraud or attempted fraud against a staff in which the staff had no direct involvement but due to his negligence, omission or error, is suspension without pay. Under cross-examination, the Defendant's witness stated that when the Defendant is confronted with a fraud incident as in this case, it doesn't know who has done what and that it conducted an internal investigation which disclosed an infraction of the Defendant's policy in which the Claimant featured. It is therefore procedural for the Defendant to place staff in such a position on suspension pending investigation. Counsel further referred the court to Page 6 of the Defendant's Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid which provides under item 5 thereof that "Sanctions are of two types, depending on severity of the infraction: (1) With pay (2) Without Pay". At article (iii) thereunder, it further provides that for "suspension without pay, during the period of suspension, staff will not be entitled to his/her total entitlements. Counsel submitted further that the Defendant's witness also testified under oath that the Claimant was suspended to pave way for investigations to be conducted by the Defendant and that his employment was subsequently terminated for password infractions which he was found guilty to have committed on the same day that the fraudulent activities took place at the branch. He argued that the Claimant who avers that he was not given a fair hearing, stated in Paragraph 8 (xii) of his Statement of Facts that he was given the opportunity of appearing before the Defendant's Disciplinary Committee though he alleges without proof that it was an accusatory session and an afterthought. Furthermore, under cross-examination on October 7, 2016, the Claimant also admitted the fact that he appeared before the Defendant's Disciplinary Committee but continued to state without facts that he was not given a fair hearing. Counsel argued further that by virtue of the provisions of Sections 135 (1) and 137 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap E 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004, the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, stressing that the Supreme Court has held that "by virtue of the provisions of Section 135 of the Evidence Act, whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, has the burden of proving that those facts exists. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof of the assertion." That the Supreme Court went on further to hold that "the reason why the burden of proof in a civil case is with the Plaintiff is that he is the person who is making the claim, and where he fails to discharge the burden, he must fail in his claim". Counsel referred the court to the case of A.G. BAYELSA STATE vs. A.G, RIVERS STATE (2007) 1 F.W.L.R (Part 354) Pg. 977 at page 1003 paras D-H. It is the submission of Counsel for the Defendant that the Defendant gave a fair hearing to the Claimant by giving him the opportunity of appearing before the Disciplinary Committee and making representations on his own behalf and that the Disciplinary Committee of the Defendant after its deliberations and after having heard from the Claimant, did not find the Claimant guilty of the allegations of involvement in the fraudulent activities that led to his suspension but found him guilty of the allegation of gross negligence which led to the termination of his employment by the Defendant. Counsel further referred the court to Exhibit C3 where the Defendant stated clearly that it was dissatisfied with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duties on the date in question. He opined that under cross-examination on November 7, 2016, the Claimant admitted receiving the password of the Business Service Manager and using same to authorize two transactions. Furthermore, at Paragraph 2 (iii) of the Claimant's Reply to Statement of Defence, the Claimant admitted that the Manager gave him his password to authorize transactions for that day. He also claimed that it was not an option open to him to turn down the instructions of the Acting BSM as that would have exposed him to defaulting on the Bank's policy on service infraction which attracted more stringent sanctions. Counsel submitted that based on that alone, the Claimant was quite aware that the instructions he had been given to carry out and the manner in which he was to carry them out contravened the Defendant's policy but he went ahead to do so believing that he was choosing the lesser of two evils. Counsel cited the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. OLAREWAJU (2008) 12 S. C. (Pt. III) Pg. 43, where the Supreme Court per Francis F. Tabai JSC held that: "The guiding principle which has been articulated in many cases ..., is that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where, as in this case, he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court. In this case, the appellant, having given gross misconduct as its reasons for the respondent's dismissal, has the onus to establish that the respondent was indeed guilty of the alleged misconduct to warrant his dismissal. And in a case such as this, the court must be watchful to ensure that in the investigations or proceedings of the domestic panel culminating in the employee's dismissal, the rules of natural justice were not breached." However, in the case of IHEZUKWU vs UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1990) 7 S.C. (Pt. I) Pg. 136, the Supreme Court per Obaseki JSC (as he then was) held that: "Where there is a notice of dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee by the employer, it is not necessary for the employer to prove the reasons stated in the notice. The only obligation on him is to show that the contract was terminated in accordance with the express or implied terms of the contract, regardless of whether the appointment is on permanent or probationary basis". Counsel submitted that the reason given by the Defendant for terminating the Claimant's employment was for gross negligence which he was found guilty of by the Disciplinary Committee set up by the Defendant. According to counsel, the Claimant admitted both in his pleadings and under cross-examination that he appeared before the said committee but alleges without any proof whatsoever that he was not given a fair hearing. It is the submission of counsel that the claim by the Claimant that he was not given a fair hearing by the committee without placing any cogent facts before this Court should be disregarded as lacking in any merit and that there was nothing wrong or unfair in the way the Defendant handled the employment, indefinite suspension and termination of the Claimant's employment contract with it, as it followed all its laid down guidelines in such cases. According to counsel, the Defendant was informed through the Internal Memo of December 11, 2014 and in his termination letter of June 08, 2015 that the management of the Defendant was dissatisfied with the way and manner in which he carried out his duties in the period leading up to the fraudulent activities at the Defendant's Owerri Branch and that the Disciplinary Committee of the Defendant found him guilty of gross negligence in the discharge of his duties. The Defendant's witness under cross examination stated that the Claimant received the Branch Service Manager's password (which is restricted to one person) and used the same password to authorise transactions for those doing Saturday banking in clear breach of the Bank's policy. The Defence also testified that the Claimant was also aware of the Bank's policy that under no conditions should any staff give out or receive another's password and that the same compromised password was used in authorizing transactions at the Bank on that day. Not only was there an offence of password compromise established against the Claimant but the same compromised password was also used to authorise transactions at the branch on that date, and even though the Disciplinary Committee found the Claimant innocent of involvement in the fraud that took place in the branch on that day, it found him guilty of the offence of password compromise and the use of the compromised password to authorise transactions at the branch. Finally, counsel submitted on these two issues that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant was not wrongly terminated and that he was given a fair hearing by the Defendant when he appeared before its Disciplinary Committee prior to the termination of his appointment. Arguing issues 3 and 4 together, counsel referred to the averment of the Claimant in Paragraphs 11, 11(b) and 14(e) and (f) Statement of Facts that his contract of employment with the Defendant is still valid and subsisting having not been effectively determined in law and that the Defendant should continue to pay him all his salaries and allowances until his contract of employment is validly determined. Counsel submitted in response thereto, that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant was validly determined on June 8, 2015 through Exhibit C4. He referred to the case of OSAKWE vs NIG. PAPER MILL LTD (1998) 7 S. C. (Pt. II) at Pg. 116-117, where the Supreme Court per Ogundare JSC (as he then was) held that: "Secondly, we must lose sight of the fact that the relationship between the parties was one of master and servant. And what determines the wrongfulness or otherwise of the plaintiff's dismissal is the contract of service and not any notion of fair hearing. In my respectful view, the Board was not obliged to, and did not act quasi-judicially but rather administratively" His Lordship went on further to state that: "Even if I had found that the Plaintiff's right to fair hearing was breached I would still not have granted the declaration sought by him. The effect of that declaration would be to order his reinstatement. The Plaintiff's contract of employment with the defendant was not one with a statutory flavour in that it was not governed by any statutory provision as in OLANIYAN vs. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and did not, therefore, enjoy any statutory flavour. It was simply a contract of personal service, that is, of master and servant. It is settled law that a servant will rarely be forced on a master and vice-versa. The remedy against any party in breach lies in damages." In the case of CHUKWUMA vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 560, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC (as he then was) held that: "It is a well-established principle of the common law, and of Nigerian law, that ordinarily a master is entitled to dismiss his servant from his employment for good or for bad reasons or for no reason at all. The common law recognises and respects the sanctity of contracts. The latin maxim pacta sunt sertvanda is a sacred doctrine for the preservation of contracts which is entitled to the greatest respect. Hence where parties have reduced the terms and conditions of service into an agreement, the conditions must be observed. In the ordinary case and following the common law principle, termination of a contract of service even if unlawful, brings to an end the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee. The rule is based on the principle of the confidential relationship between master and servant which cannot continue in the absence of mutuality". Counsel referred the court to the case of GARUBA vs. KWARA INV. CO. LTD (2005) 1 S.C. (Pt. II) 80 at Pg 92, where the Supreme Court per Oguntade JSC (as he then was) held that: "It is in recognition of the common law principle which recognizes that a master cannot be compelled to retain in his employment a servant he no longer wants that it must be accepted that the letter, Exhibit 3, fully and finally brought the employment of the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant to an end leaving the Plaintiff/Appellant with the option to pursue by an action the payment of the terminal benefits of damages." According to counsel, in the absence of any proof by the Claimant that his employment with the Defendant had statutory flavour, then the termination of his employment by the Defendant through Exhibit C4 still subsists as this Court cannot foist the willing Claimant on the unwilling Defendant. It is submission of counsel that the Claimant is not entitled to the Damages claimed as the Defendant calculated and paid the Claimant his terminal benefits after the termination of his employment with the Defendant as shown on the Net Financial Position of the Claimant annexed to Exhibit C4, the termination letter showing that he's only entitled to the sum of N40,432.94 (Forty Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty Two Naira, Ninety Four Kobo). Counsel cited the case of SENNA SECURITY vs. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD & ORS (2008) 4-5 S.C. (Pt. II) at page 149, where the Supreme Court per Mohammad JSC held that: "The damages recoverable usually in cases of wrongful dismissal/termination have been well pronounced upon by our courts in several decided cases. Such damages are said to be the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of the contract as inevitably arising if one break faith with the other. Certainly, they do not include or take account of speculative or sentimental values. The court in awarding damages will certainly not include compensation for injured feelings or the loss that may have been sustained from the fact that the employee having been dismissed, makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment." The issue of damages recoverable in breach of contract of employment cases was more extensively treated by the Supreme Court in the case of ATIVIE vs. KABEL METAL NIG. LTD (2008) 5-6 S.C. (Pt. II) at pages 70-71 per W. Onoghen JSC when he held that: "From the reproduced reliefs, it is very clear that the appellant made no claim for any tortuous act of the respondent. From the three (3) reliefs, it is obvious that the appellant sought declarations to the effect that the termination of his appointment was wrongful etc and that he is still an employee of the respondent (i.e. reinstatement) and thirdly general and special damages of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) with interest of 21 % thereon obviously for the wrongful termination of the appointment of the appellant. There is no relief in respect of the alleged injuries sustained in the course of the employment with the respondent and it is settled law that parties and the courts are bound by the pleadings of the parties and that the court not being a Father Christmas cannot give to a party what he has not asked for. “ On the issue of damages, it is settled law that the principle of assessment of damages for breach of contract is restitution in integrum - that is, that in so far as the damages are not too remote, the plaintiff shall be restored, as far as money can do it into the position in which he would have been if the breach had not occurred. It is in line with the above principle that award of damages in breach of contract cases should be such as: (a) may fairly and reasonably be expected to arise naturally i.e. according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself; or (b) may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it - See OKONGWU vs NNPC (1985) 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 290 @ 299. It is also settled that the term "general" and "special" damages are normally inapt in the categorization of damages for the purpose of awards in breach of contract cases; that apart from damages naturally arising or resulting from the breach, no other form of general damages can be contemplated. In other words, in an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff, where he succeeds, is not entitled to any award under the general damages head of claim in addition to the damages (special) fairly or reasonably expected to arise naturally from the breach which damages must have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of entering into the contract as the probable result of the breach of the same. In terms of breach of contract of employment therefore, the damages recoverable by the plaintiff are the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties thereto at the time of entering into the contract." Counsel submitted that Exhibit Cl which is the Claimant's letter of employment contains all the terms of the employment contract between the Claimant and the Defendant in this suit and also clearly contemplate the damages to be paid by any party that may be in breach of the contract. The contract provides that any party to the contract may terminate the contract by giving one month's notice of its intention to terminate the contract or may pay to the other party one month's salary in lieu of such notice. Counsel went on that assuming without conceding that the termination of the Claimant's employment by the Defendant was wrongful for the non-issuance of the requisite notice, then the damages which ordinarily would accrue to the Claimant under the contract is the payment of one month's salary and other benefits and allowances for one month and nothing more. He submitted further that the Claimant's terminal benefits after the termination of his employment with the Defendant is as shown on Net Financial Position of the Claimant annexed to Exhibit C4, the termination letter showing that he's only entitled to the sum of N40,432.94 (Forty Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty Two Naira, Ninety Four Kobo). In the final written address of the Claimant filed on the 22nd day of February 2017, counsel for the Claimant submitted the following three issues for determination: a. Whether the indefinite suspension of claimant from work without pay, as per Exhibit C3, was not a punitive sanction and thus wrongful in the circumstances of the case; b. Whether from the facts of this case and evidence before the honourable court (Exhibits Cl and C5 respectively), the termination of the claimant's employment is not wrongful. c. Whether the Claimant has proved his claims on a preponderance of evidence and entitled to judgment of this court. In arguing issue one, Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the indefinite suspension of claimant from work without pay, as per Exhibit C3, was a punitive sanction and not a precautionary measure; thus wrongful in the circumstances of this case. It is the Claimant's case, as disclosed in his pleadings, that the Defendant placed him on an indefinite suspension without pay for alleged involvement in fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri Branch without giving the claimant any prior notice or availing him any fair opportunity to be heard on the alleged accusation of fraud. It is the Claimant's further contention that for such punitive sanction (indefinite suspension without pay) meted on the Claimant without his being fairly heard on the alleged grounds constituted in itself an unfair labour practice contrary to the extant labour laws. See paragraphs 6 (b) & (c) of the statement of fact. According to counsel, in response to the Claimant's above contention, the Defendant did not deny that the Claimant was not given notice or afforded any fair opportunity to be heard before the suspension, but attempted to avoid the consequences thereof when at paragraph 6 of the statement of defence it claimed that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay was merely a precautionary measure to pave way for investigations following the discovery of several irregular transactions in which the Claimant featured. In firm denial of the Defendant's claim that the Claimant was suspended for purpose of investigation, the Claimant pleaded paragraphs 3(b) and 5(c) of the reply to statement of defence and averred specifically that the indefinite suspension without pay as conceived in Exhibit C3 was a punitive sanction for an offence as though same had been established against the Claimant, and not to aid any alleged investigation. From the above state of the pleadings of parties in this suit as regards the issue on the nature of the suspension meted on the Claimant by the Defendant, Counsel submitted that the material question of fact to be resolved by the court is whether the Claimant's suspension on 12/12/2014 was a punitive sanction for an alleged involvement in fraudulent activities in the Defendant's Owerri branch office or a precautionary measure pending investigation, as alleged by the Defendant. Counsel then invited the court to construe the exact wordings and letters of the said Suspension Notice of 12/12/2014 dated 11/12/2014 and admitted in evidence as Exhibit C3, to wit; "Interim Report on Fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri Branch INTERNAL MEMO Dear Okechukwu Osuji, We refer to the role played by you in the above incidence, which occurred in your branch and convey to you management's dissatisfaction with the manner in which you performed your duties during this period. In view of the above, Management has directed that you be placed on indefinite suspension without pay with effect from 12/12/2014. It is hoped that going forward, you will discharge your duties diligently and with strong sense of accountability and respect for laid-down procedure of the Bank. Please be guided" It is the submission of counsel for the Claimant that the above wordings and letters of Exhibit C3 are clear and unambiguous and being a documentary evidence it excludes any oral evidence to be adduced either to add, alter or modify it. The Notice of Suspension speaks for itself. The law is settled that parole evidence cannot be used to alter such documentary evidence. Again it is the law that parties cannot read into a document what is not there or read out of it what is there. See Sections 125 & 128 (1) Evidence Act 2011, INTELS NIG LTD vs. WILLIAM BASSEY [2015] 5 ACELR 88 (CA), UBN LTD vs. PROF ALBERT OZIGI [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385. Furthermore, according to counsel, it is settled law that in construing documentary evidence, the court must confine itself to the plain words and ordinary meaning derivable from the provisions contained therein. See INTELS NIG LTD vs. WILLIAM BASSEY (supra), SULE vs. NIGERIAN COTTON BOARD (1985)2NWLR (Pt. 5) 17. Counsel submitted further that the ordinary and plain meaning of the wordings and letters of Exhibit C3 does not suggest the preposterous claim of the Defendant that it suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay to pave way for investigation. More spurious is the fact that the Defendant's witness under cross-examination claimed that the Claimant was suspended pending police investigation yet it is on record supported by uncontroverted evidence that the Claimant was detained and investigated for 10days by the Police and eventually released innocent of the allegation on 28/11/2014 whereas the Defendant proceeded to suspend Claimant indefinitely without pay on 12/12/2014 i.e. 14days (2weeks) after the police had investigated and released the Claimant unimplicated in the alleged fraud which was the same ground for which the Defendant proceeded most unfairly to suspended the Claimant. Counsel drew the Court’s attention to the concluding paragraph of Exhibit C3 which reads, "It is hoped that going forward, you will discharge your duties diligently and with strong sense of accountability and respect for laid-down procedure of the Bank", and submitted that the Defendant consciously intended the suspension to be a punitive sanction, and not for purpose of any investigation as falsely claimed. Counsel raised the question whether it was right for the defendant to have taken such disciplinary stance against the Claimant without first hearing him or giving him the opportunity to be heard, and without first investigating same alleged fraud, more so when the subsequent internal investigation through the Disciplinary Committee did not eventually find the claimant guilty or involved in the alleged fraud. According to counsel, it is the trite position of the law that before an employer can undertake any disciplinary action against an employee in a master servant relationship he must first satisfy the requirements of fair hearing by bringing the allegation against the employee to his notice and affording him adequate time and opportunity to reply to same. See IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 @ 648 para F where the Supreme court, per Rhodes Vivour JSC, stated thus; "Accusing an employee of misconduct, etc. by way of a query and allowing the employee to answer the query, and the employee answers it before a decision is taken satisfies the requirements of fair hearing or natural justice." See also the unreported judgment of this court in Suit No. NICN/LA/29/2011 between MR. MASAGBOR CHRISTOPHER ALOAYE JACKSON vs. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA delivered on 2/10/2014. It is also the contention of the Claimant that the Defendant failed to give him prior notice of the alleged offence, or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation, before it arrived at its prejudicial conclusions and inferences in Exhibit C3 to wit; that the claimant played a role and or was involved in fraudulent FCUB postings, and therefore punitively sanctioned the Claimant based on the prejudicial conclusion by suspending the Claimant indefinitely without pay. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 6 (b) & (c) of the statement of fact. According to the Claimant, the Defendant did not deny the fact that it did not give the Claimant prior notice of the alleged fraud or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation before it suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay. The Defendant only loosely claimed under cross-examination of DWl that it issued query to the Claimant, which claim was vehemently denied by the Claimant, and the Defendant failed to substantiate its claim by producing the alleged query in court. Counsel urged the court not to countenance the Defendant’s spurious claim and to hold same as having not been proved. Thus, much as the onus of proof rested on the Defendant to show that it allegedly issued the Claimant any query, see section 131 (2) such evidential burden cannot be merely discharged by parole evidence without production of the said query as credible documentary evidence for the court to rely on. See the case of ABUBAKAR vs. WAZIRI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 436) 2025 @ 2047 where the Supreme Court aptly held that where a party pleads and leads evidence as to the existence of a document in proof of his case, the original or, in an appropriate case, secondary evidence of it, should be tendered as the law does not allow oral evidence to be led in proof of such document. See also F.A.T.B LIMITED vs. PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT LIMITED (2004) FWLR (PT 192) 167 SC. Furthermore, there is on record the unchallenged contention of the Claimant supported by credible evidence before the court that in standard employment and industrial relations, the detention and investigation of the Claimant by the police at the instance of the Defendant does not constitute fair labour practice of giving the Claimant notice and or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation of fraud. On this, counsel referred to paragraph 3(c) of the Reply to statement of defence and paragraph 4(c) of the additional written statement on oath of the Claimant as CW1. It is also the contention of the Claimant that the Defendant, in realizing that it had prejudicially dealt with the Claimant by suspending him for the alleged fraud without giving him a fair hearing and particularly when same allegation was not established against the Claimant, sought to evade the consequences thereof by pretentiously and belatedly setting up a Disciplinary Committee (4months into the punitive suspension) to look into the issue and come up with the most preposterous "allegation of gross negligence" upon which it terminated the Claimant's employment. Counsel referred to paragraph 8(xii) of the statement of fact. The Claimant also contended that the punitive sanction of suspending him indefinitely without pay for an unestablished allegation of fraud, without being given an opportunity to be heard first, and 6 months thereafter purport to terminate his employment upon same unjustified accusations amounted, in the circumstances, to an inexcusable double jeopardy and unfair labour practice by the Defendant against the Claimant. Counsel referred to paragraph 8(x) of the statement of fact. He went on that the Defendant in its defence to the claim of the Claimant insists that it afforded the Claimant fair hearing when it invited the Claimant to the Disciplinary Committee. And the Disciplinary committee investigated the matter and established an allegation of gross negligence against the Claimant, not the alleged fraud, and thus advised management to terminate the Claimant's employment. According to counsel, it is the case of the Defendant that the said Disciplinary Committee constituted the internal investigation conducted by the Defendant in this matter. It is on record that the Defendant suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay for alleged involvement in 'fraudulent FCUB postings' several months before he was even invited to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bank, which arguably was the first and only seeming opportunity the Claimant was to have been offered a fair hearing by the Defendant on the allegation of fraud. This fact was not denied by the Defendant though it craftily claimed that the suspension was for the purpose of investigation. Counsel submitted that by the admission of the Defendants that it only invited the Claimant to the Disciplinary committee for the matter to be looked into about 4 months after it had placed the Claimant on an indefinite suspension without pay; strongly underscores the crucial point of contention that the Claimant was punitively sanctioned for an alleged fraud before same was even investigated by the Defendant itself. Suffices to state that the Claimant was exonerated of the alleged fraud after the Defendant eventually investigated the matter internally. Consequently, it is counsel’s submission that the subsequent exoneration of the Claimant of the same allegation for which he was disciplinarily sanctioned renders the indefinite suspension without pay prejudicial and wrongful in the circumstances. Counsel reiterated the sacrosanct position of the law on demands of fair hearing as a fundamental prerequisite to any disciplinary action in employment matters, thus: In AIYETAN vs. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR OIL PALM RESEARCH [1987] NWLR (Part 59) 48 @ 76-77 the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC posited thus: “The rule [of natural justice] is not only fundamental to the administration of justice but also seems invariably common to all known legal jurisprudence and is rooted in the minds of all fair minded person ….it has been held to be applicable to wherever a person or authority is concerned in the determination of the rights of another in such a manner that the version of the person against who the determination is to be made is an essential requirement of the process of determination. Hence the application of the principle is not confined to final determinations of a judicial nature. It is applicable even to those determinations referred to as administrative where no particular rules of procedure have been provided.†Also in OLATUNBOSUN vs. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 80) 25 @ 52 the Supreme court per Oputa JSC asserted that the right to fair hearing arises where there is an allegation of misconduct, which may result and in fact did result in some form of punishment, deprivation of some right or loss of means of livelihood to the appellant Counsel urged the court to resolve issue one in favour of the Claimant by holding, that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant from work without pay on 12/12/2014 being a disciplinary sanction reached without giving the Claimant any fair hearing for the allegation that was eventually unestablished against the Claimant by the Defendant's subsequent internal investigation (4 months thereafter) is prejudicial and thus wrongful in the circumstances. On issue two, counsel submitted that from the facts of this case and evidence before the court, particularly Exhibits C1 and C5 respectively, the termination of the Claimant's employment is wrongful. He submitted further that from the pleadings of the Claimant, it is his contention that the termination of his employment by the Defendant on 8/6/2015 is both substantially and procedurally wrongful. Firstly, the Claimants contended that the Defendant wrongly terminated his employment upon a prejudicial and baseless ground of 'allegation of gross negligence' that does not constitute an offence for which the Claimant's employment can be terminated. Counsel referred to paragraph 9 (b) of the statement of fact. To substantiate this contention, the Claimant tendered in evidence the Disciplinary and Sanction Grid of the Defendant as Exhibit C5; wherein the offences known to the Defendant's policy and the sanctions for each offence are exhaustively listed. The Claimant gave credible evidence to the effect that of all the offences listed therein there is no such offence known to the Defendant's policy as "allegation of gross negligence" needless to say if termination of employment was the sanction thereof. It is trite law settled on a plethora of authorities that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court, otherwise the termination will be held to be wrongful. See the cases of S.P.D.C. LTD vs. OLAREWAJU (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 at 5 Para 1; OLATUNBOSUN vs. NISER COUNCIL (supra) @ 54 paras D-E; IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (supra) @ 637 A. Counsel submitted that having proffered "allegation of gross negligence" as the reason for the terminating the Claimant's employment vide Exhibit C4, the legal duty rested squarely on the Defendant in this case to prove same. In a bid to discharge the legal burden placed on it to prove the reason given in terminating the Claimant's employment, the Defendant through its witness DW1 admitted that the Claimant was not found guilty of any offence, either for fraud or attempted fraud however it spuriously alleged that the Claimant had obtained the password of another staff which was an infraction of the Defendant's policy on password compromise (see paragraph 7(iv) of DW1 written deposition/evidence in chief on 3/11/2016]. Then under cross examination the said DW1 alleged in another radically different breath that it was one staff named Chukwuemeka that gave the Claimant his personal password to authorize transactions at the Owerri branch office. Counsel submitted that the court cannot pick and choose which of the contradictory versions of the DW1's evidence on the alleged password compromise it should believe but must reject such evidence. See BASSEY vs. STATE (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 633) 1816 @ 1832 S.C; WACHUKWU vs. ONWUNWANNE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 589) 1044 and OGIDI vs. STATE (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) l S.C. According to counsel, it is on record that the Claimant vehemently denied both contradictory allegations of the Defendants witness (DW1) but stated categorically that the Acting BSM of the Defendant's branch office in Owerri directed the Claimant to report to the office on 15/11/2014 to authorize two urgent transactions and therefore sent the Claimant a password, which to the best of the Claimant’s knowledge was within the official responsibility of the said acting BSM to create such user id/password for the said transactions. This piece of evidence from the Claimant was not impugned by the Defendant. Counsel urged the court to rely on same as credible evidence on the issue. See the cases of NADABO vs. DABAI (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245) 155; NSITFMB vs. KLIFCO {NIG.} LTD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 534) 73 SC; CBN vs. IGWILO (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1034) 393; BELLO vs EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 101 to the effect that where a piece of evidence is not challenged, controverted or impugned the court is bound to accept the evidence as good and credible evidence upon which the court can safely rely. Counsel however submitted that assuming without conceding that the Claimant was indeed found guilty of the alleged password compromise, the said infraction is expressly listed in Exhibit C5 and the sanctions thereof are warning or suspension with half pay and not termination of employment as the Defendant had wrongly proceeded against the Defendant on 8/6/2014. According to counsel, it is worthy of note that the Defendant, in trying to discharge the legal burden of proving the alleged "allegation of gross negligence" as reason for terminating Claimant's employment, pleaded and led evidence on averments contained at paragraph 5 (i) to (vi). However, under cross- examination DW1 admitted that those averments were not made from his personal knowledge as they constituted in part, what he was allegedly told and partly what he claimed to have obtained from some records in the defendants keeping which included CCTV. Under further cross-examination DWl admitted that the alleged source/record were not brought before this court to ascertain. It is counsel’s submission that this court cannot be made to speculate or make conjectures on content of such alleged records not before it, more so in the face of a clear and direct rebuttal of those averments by the claimant. He urged the court to rightly reject any piece of evidence led at paragraph 7(i) to (vi) of the witness written deposition as constituting hearsay evidence. He urged the court to hold that the Claimant had failed to discharge the legal burden of proving the alleged reason for terminating the Claimant's employment vide Exhibit C4. It is the further submission of counsel that the termination of Claimant's employment is also wrongful having been made contrary to the express terms of his condition of employment with the Defendant and the extant labour laws that provided for a month's notice or payment of a month's salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant tendered Exhibit C1 which is his letter of employment containing the terms and conditions of employment. The Claimant also tendered the said letter of termination of employment as Exhibit C4 dated 8/6/2015 wherein the Claimant's employment was said to be effectively terminated on same 8/6/2015 without any provision for payment of a month's salary in lieu thereof. It is on record that the Claimant pleaded and led credible unchallenged evidence that the said letter of termination of employment was served on him by the Defendant on 12/6/2014 i.e. 4 days after the Defendant had terminated the said employment. The Claimant also pleaded and led evidence in proof thereof by tendering Exhibits C7(A) & C7(B) respectively to establish that no payment of a month's salary in lieu of notice and or his entitlements following termination of his employment were paid to him, as falsely alleged by the Defendant. The Claimant had contended that, on the foregoing discrepancies in terminating his employment without notice or payment of salary in lieu, the termination of his employment was inherently wrongful. It is trite law that where there is a document or series of documents incorporating the terms and conditions of an employment, a Court should not look outside those terms in deciding the rights and obligations of parties to same. See JOWAN & ORS. vs. DELTA STEEL CO. LIMITED (2010) LPELR-4377. Counsel submitted that Exhibits C1 and C5 are part of the documents incorporating the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant which this Court is bound to examine for the just determination of this case. It is certainly not the law that a party will be allowed to resile from such a document where one exists. The Court will also not add to or remove from the content of a clear and unambiguous document. See RANGAZA vs. MIEN PLASTIC CO. LIMITED (2013) LPELR-20303 (CA). It is also trite law to state that in order to determine whether or not the employment of the Claimant was wrongfully terminated, the law requires the Claimant to lay before the Court the terms and conditions regulating his employment and how the termination of same was not in compliance with the agreed terms and conditions. Counsel thus submitted that the Claimant has satisfied this requirement of the law having tendered Exhibit C1 and Exhibit C5 which are of very relevant consideration here, and also showing by his pleadings and evidence led how the termination of his employment did not comply with the agreed terms and condition. Counsel referred to the decision of this court in the unreported judgment of His Lordship HON JUSTICE J. D. PETERS delivered on 19/11/2015 in Suit No. NICN/LA/598/2013 between VINCENT IKE vs. FIDELITY BANK PLC, to urge the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant and hold that the termination of the Claimant's employment with the Defendants on 8/6/2015 is wrongful. On issue three, counsel submitted that on the state of the pleadings of parties and evidence led in this suit and on the strength of counsel’s submissions under issues 1 & 2, the Claimant has proved his claims in this suit on a preponderance of evidence and balance of probability, and is therefore entitled to the judgment of this court. It is trite law that where a party desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of certain facts which he asserts, such a party shall prove that those facts exists and the burden of proof, in civil proceedings, shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities/preponderance of evidence. See Section 133 & 134 of the Evidence (supra). See also the cases of AGBOOLA vs. UBA PLC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 574) 74 SC; EYA vs. OLOPADE (2011) All FWLR (Pt 584) 28 SC; IBIYEYE vs. FOJULE (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 302) 156 SC; NWANKPU vs. EWULU (1995) 7 SCNJ 197; MOGAJI vs. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC. It is basic law that civil suits are decided on the balance of probabilities or on the preponderance of evidence which connotes that the totality of the credible evidence of both parties is bound to be taken into account and appraised so as to determine which evidence has more weight and preponderates when placed on the imaginary judicial scale by the trial court. See OSUJI vs. EKEOCHA (2009) All FWLR (Pt 490) 614 SC. Counsel reiterated that the Claimant's claim as encapsulated in the reliefs sought in this suit are principally for a declaration that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay on 12/12/2014 and the subsequent termination of Claimant's employment on 8/6/2015 are both wrongful, and for orders of the court that the Defendant compensates the Claimant in damages for both wrongful suspension and termination. He submitted that the Claimant has proved each and every fact relevant to establish his claims herein on a preponderance of credible evidence and on the balance of probability on each and every relief of his claim, and that the entire claims of the claimant in this suit, as encapsulated in the reliefs pleaded at paragraph 14 (a) to (h) of the statement of facts and predicated upon the above issues, have been by overwhelming credible evidence sufficiently proved by the claimant. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has proved his case as required by law and is entitled to the judgment of this court on all the reliefs sought. He urged the court to grant the Claimant's claim in its entirety because the Claimant has, by credible evidence replete on the records before this court, proved on the preponderance of evidence and balance of probabilities that he is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the statement of facts. The Defendant filed a Reply on points of law on the 3rd day of March 2017 wherein counsel submitted in response to the Claimant’s legal argument 5.1.11, that the said argument is misconceived as the Supreme Court did not lay down any rule in that matter to the effect that to satisfy the requirements of fair hearing in any master/servant relationship, the master must bring any allegation it may have against the servant through a query. According to counsel, the important thing is that the allegation against him is made known to him and he is given adequate time to respond to same. To counsel for the defendant, the “decision†being spoken of by the apex court in the case of IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 5 SC (Pt. 1) cited by the Claimant, is the decision of the Respondent in that case to terminate the appointment of the Appellant after its disciplinary committee had found him guilty of the offences alleged against him. In reaction to the Claimant’s paragraph 5.1.12, it is the submission of counsel that the Claimant has not placed before the court, any provisions of Exhibits C1 and C5 which makes it mandatory that the Defendant must issue a query to the Claimant before suspending him from duty. Neither has he brought any extant labour laws applicable in Nigeria which makes it mandatory that a query must be issued to the Claimant before his suspension in order satisfy the rules of fair hearing. In response to the Claimant’s legal argument 5.1.18, counsel submitted that the facts of the case of AIYETAN vs. NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) are radically different from the facts of this case. According to counsel, in that case, the appellant was invited among others to testify at an inquiry without being told he was an accused and without any charges brought against him. The Claimant in this case however had ample knowledge of the allegations against him through Exhibit C5 and he was afforded ample time and opportunity to correct and counter those allegations by the Defendant at the disciplinary committee hearings. Counsel submitted further that in the case of OLATUNBOSUN vs. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80), the Appellant had earlier on appeared before a different council over several allegations against him. After the reconstitution of the council and at the meeting of the new council, the issue of the allegations against the Appellant surfaced again. He was not invited to the subsequent meeting and three new members took place in the latter meeting. And he was not given another opportunity to be heard. According to counsel, the facts and the judgment delivered in the above case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. Counsel went further that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs he has claimed in this action. The courts have long laid down the quantum of damages recoverable by the Claimant where his claim is sustained by the court. See ATIVIE vs. KABEL METAL NIG. LTD. (SUPRA). The unreported case of VINCENT EKE vs. FIDELITY BANK PLC relied upon by the Claimant is at best persuasive and not binding on this court, as the circumstances are clearly distinguishable. Counsel cited the case of NITEL PLC vs. OCHOLI (2001) FWLR (Pt. 74) 254 at 285 where it was held that a plaintiff in an action for wrongful dismissal is not entitled to general damages because general damages belong to a claim in tort. COURT’s DECISION Having examined the submissions of the counsels to the parties in their final written addresses, I will now consider this case. Let me start by reviewing the facts and evidence presented by both parties before the court. The Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the Defendant as assistant banking officer by a letter dated 5/12/2013. The Claimant’s employment was confirmed subsequently by the Defendant by a letter dated 25/8/2014. As assistant banking officer, the Claimant functioned as the Transaction Officer (TO) in the Owerri branch of the Defendant. Because of his excellent performance, his annual gross salary was reviewed from N4,550,000.00 to N5,372,460.00 in September 2014. While in the employment of the Defendant, he has never been cautioned or queried either for incompetence, fraud or breach of the bank’s policies. But sometimes on 12/12/2014, the Defendant relied on an interim report on fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri branch to unfairly suspend him from work indefinitely and without pay through an internal memo of 11/12/2014. He was not given prior notice nor was he given any opportunity to be heard on the allegation of fraud before the Defendant arrived at its conclusion in the said interim report and suspended him as a result. According to the Claimant, the duration of the suspension and withdrawal of pay was punitive and constituted unfair labour practice. Six months after his suspension, the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment on 8/6/2015 in a letter of the same date but which was served on him on 12/6/2015. The termination of his employment by the Defendant on a baseless allegation of gross negligence for which he was not given an opportunity to be heard is wrongful and constitutes an unfair labour practice. The termination of his employment is also wrongful for being contrary to the express terms his condition of employment. The Claimant relied on the conditions of employment attached to his letter of employment. To the Claimant, he was not given one month’s notice nor paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment was terminated. As such, his employment has not been validly terminated in law. Hence, his employment is still subsisting. The Claimant averred that his indefinite suspension without pay and the eventual termination of his employment over allegations which were not established was wrongful and amounted to unfair labour practice. The Claimant gave particulars of the unfair labour practice to include his allegations that notice of the alleged fraud was not given to him and he was not given reasonable opportunity to be heard on the allegation before he was suspended indefinitely without pay. Instead of informing him of the allegation, the Defendant moved him to Lagos on 18/11/2014 where he was detained by the police at Criminal Investigation Department, Alagbon, Lagos for 10 days without charging him to court. After his release from detention, the Defendant gave him indefinite suspension without pay notwithstanding that the police did not find or implicate him in the alleged fraud. There was no valid justification for the suspension or the termination of his employment. Furthermore, the disciplinary committee was an accusatory session and the committee failed to establish fraud against him. The subsequent allegation of gross negligence for which his employment was terminated is not an infraction in the Defendant’s Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid. The Claimant averred that he has suffered unjustly as a result of the unfair suspension and termination of his employment. He is entitled to special damages comprising arrears of salaries, allowances and other benefits from the Defendant which he particularized in his statement of facts. The Claimant also averred that his contract of employment with the Defendant is still subsisting as it has not been effectively terminated in law. He is entitled to be given one month’s notice or be paid one month’s salary in lieu. The Defendant is thus bound to pay him his salaries and allowances or compensate him in damages for wrongful termination of his employment and he is also entitled to recover the sum of N750,000.00 he paid to institute this suit from the Defendant. The Claimant made further averments in his reply to the statement of defence and in his additional evidence. I will make use of the relevant areas of the Claimant’s reply and additional evidence in the course of determining issues in this judgment. The Defendant admitted that it employed the Claimant on 5/12/2013 and confirmed his employment on 25/8/2014. According to the Defendant, the Claimant formerly worked in the Owerri branch of the Defendant which branch offers Saturday banking. On Saturday 15/11/2014, the Claimant was the most senior officer on duty and he had the responsibility of coordinating the branch activities. He was also in possession of the branch keys and was responsible for opening and closing the branch doors on that day. In the course of that day, the Claimant committed a serious breach of duty when he abdicated his responsibility by handing over the keys to someone else when he was leaving the banking hall without prior authorization to do so. The Claimant also failed to follow the bank’s process for obtaining the user authorisation profile for authorising higher value tickets. The Claimant obtained the password of another staff who was attending a training program on that day in an act of password compromise and also allowed some other persons access into the IT system when he did not have authority to do so. The compromised password was used in activating the unauthorised high value transactions tickets at the branch on the same date. On 18/11/2014, the Claimant, the officer that compromised his password by giving it out to the Claimant, the transaction officer whose password was used to impute the fraudulent transaction and the IT staff who was granted access to the IT system, were invited to Lagos to explain their roles in the unauthorised transaction at Owerri branch. Following the discovery of several irregular transactions at its Owerri branch and the role suspected to have been played by the Claimant in the incident, the Defendant placed the Claimant on indefinite suspension to pave way for investigation. The indefinite suspension was based on management’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duty during the period as communicated to the Claimant in an internal memo dated 11/12/2014. The Defendant’s disciplinary committee who looked into the matter gave the Claimant opportunity to be heard and the Claimant did appear before the committee and explained the role he played in the incidence. The disciplinary committee recommended the termination of the Claimant’s employment in its report to the management of the Defendant. The Defendant did accordingly, calculated and paid to the Claimant all his entitlements. The Defendant followed its laid down guidelines in the indefinite suspension of the Claimant and in the termination of his employment. The Claimant was not suspended for defrauding the bank but was suspended because of management’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which he performed his duties during the period the fraud took place. That was why his termination letter stated that his employment was terminated for gross negligence. Under the Defendant’s sanctions grid, where the offender has no direct involvement in the fraud but guilty of negligence, omission or error, the Defendant can suspend the staff without pay or terminate the employment. The relationship between the parties was covered by the contract of employment and the Defendant’s sanctions and Disciplinary grid given to the Claimant at his employment. The Claimant did not suffer any general or special damages and he is not entitled to any further payment from the Defendant. The Claimant’s due entitlements were credited into his account by the Defendant. The Claimant is not entitled to notice or payment in lieu as his employment was terminated for gross negligence. The Claimant’s employment was properly terminated. Having examined the facts of this case, the sole issue which, in my view, is to be determined in this matter is whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the claims he sought in this case. Going through the reliefs sought by the Claimant, I observe that reliefs (a), (b) and (e) on the Complaint are in conflict with themselves. While in reliefs (a) and (b) the Claimant sought declarations that the termination of his employment by the Defendant was wrongful, contrary to the terms of his employment, unfair labour practice and offends international best practices in employment relations, null and void, in relief (e) he sought an order declaring that his employment with the defendant is still valid and subsisting. The Claimant did contend that he was neither given one month’s notice nor paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment was terminated. To him, his employment has not been validly terminated in law as such his employment is still subsisting. This appears to be the basis on which he sought a declaration that his employment still subsists. In his pleading and evidence, the Claimant stated that 6 months into the indefinite suspension without pay he was placed by the Defendant, he received a letter of termination of his employment dated 8/6/2015. The said letter of termination of employment was admitted in evidence from the Claimant as Exhibit C4. It reads: “TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT Refer to the allegation of breach of bank’s policy on transaction processing particularly your involvement in the unauthorized withdrawals from a public sector account operated by the Rivers State Government for which you appeared before the Disciplinary Committee of the bank. The Disciplinary Committee is satisfied that the allegation of gross negligence has been established against you. Consequently, in line with the bank’s policy, please be notified of management’s decision to terminate your appointment with the bank effective Monday June 8, 2015. Please find attached your statement of indebtedness/ entitlements as at Monday June 8, 2015â€. By the termination letter, the Claimant was informed by the Defendant that his employment had been terminated with effect from 8th June 2015. The Claimant said he received the said letter on 12/6/2015. Therefore, the Claimant was aware that the Defendant had decided to terminate his employment. In the face of these facts by the Claimant, he, in one breath, wants the termination of his employment declared wrongful and in another he wants his employment declared still subsisting. Without unnecessary waste of time on this point, let me say quickly that the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is that of master and servant. In such an employment relationship, it is settled that termination of the employment, no matter how wrongful, cannot be declared null and void or that the employment still subsists. See ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 398 at 408, EZE vs. SPRING BANK PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 609) 1076; UZONDU vs. U.B.N PLC (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 443) 1389. In employment matters, the remedy whereof termination of employment can be declared null and void or that employment still subsists is only applicable to employment with statutory flavour. The Claimant did not have such employment. Therefore, the Claimant cannot seek for wrongful termination and also seek that his employment be declared to still subsist. The fact which is also very trite in master and servant employment is that the master is entitled to terminate his servant’s appointment at anytime whether for good or bad reason or for no reason at all. See IKHALE vs. F.A.A.N (2003) FWLR (Pt.181) 1726 at 1743; TEXACO OVERSEAS PETROLEUM UNLIMITED vs. OKUNDAYE (2003) FWLR (Pt.136) 961 at 972. Once there is such a purported termination of the employment, the law is settled that the court will rarely make an order that the employment still subsists. In ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (supra) at 408, the Supreme Court held- “The principle is that where there has been a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract still subsists will rarely be made.†Where any of the parties in master and servant employment have exercised his right under the contract to terminate the employment, whatever perceived defect exist in the manner of termination of the contract only renders the termination wrongful but the employment remains terminated. Therefore, given the nature of the Claimant’s employment, the reliefs where he sought that his employment be declared null and void or that it still subsists, notwithstanding the termination letter given to him, are dead on arrival. I will straight away dismiss the aspect of relief (b) where the Claimant sought that the termination be declared null and void and the entire relief (e) seeking that his employment is still subsisting. In that case, the only aspect remaining to be determined with respect to reliefs (a) and (b) is whether the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay and the termination of the Claimant’s employment were wrongful. The Claimant has also asserted quite forcefully that the indefinite suspension without pay which the Defendant placed on him and the subsequent termination of his employment amounted to unfair labour practice and offends against international best practices in employment or labour relations. The Claimant went further to itemise or particularise the unfair labour practices of the Defendant. It was on the basis of these alleged unfair labour practices, among other reasons, the Claimant claims that the indefinite suspension without pay and the termination of his employment were wrongful. Let me mention that in master and servant relationship, what regulates the employment relationship is the terms and condition of the employment as agreed between the parties. As such, where an employee complains of wrongful termination of the employment, he must found his case on the terms and conditions of the employment and the court will not look into any matter outside the terms agreed between the parties or read any extraneous matter into the contract in determining the rights and obligation of the parties. The duty of the court in actions of this nature challenging termination of employment is simply to construe and apply the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. See PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE vs. MATTHEW (2012) All FWLR (Pt.623) 1949 at 1967; TEXACO OVERSEAS PETROLEUM UNLIMITED vs. OKUNDAYE (supra); IKHALE vs. F.A.A.N (supra) at 1742. Therefore, it is the terms of the employment the Claimant is expected to found his allegation of wrongful suspension or termination of employment and not on the notion of unfair labour practice or non-compliance with international best practices in employment relations. In view of the foregoing, what I shall concern myself with in determining the Claimant’s case for wrongful suspension or termination of his employment is whether the Claimant has proved that the suspension or termination were not done in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment. On that premise, what is left to be examined in reliefs (a) and (b), is the Claimant’s claim for a declaration that the indefinite suspension without pay and the subsequent termination of his employment were contrary to the Claimant’s condition of employment and thus wrongful. In these reliefs, the Claimant challenges both his suspension from work and the termination of his employment. I will examine the Claimant’s case against the suspension first. The Claimant’s case is that about the 12th day of December 2014, the Defendant suspended him indefinitely without pay vide an internal memo dated 11/12/2014. The Defendant relied on an interim report on fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri branch to found his suspension. The internal memo conveying the Claimant’s suspension is Exhibit C3. This is what the Defendant wrote therein: “INTERNAL MEMO Dear Okechukwu Osuji, We refer to the role played by you in the above incidence which occurred in your branch and convey to you management’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which you performed your duties during this period. In view of the above, management has directed that you be placed on indefinite suspension without pay with effect from 12/12/2014… It is hoped that going forward, you will discharge your duties diligently and with a strong sense of accountability and respect for laid down procedure of the bank. Please be guided.†From the case of the Claimant, what I can piece together to be his complaint against the suspension are that he was not given prior notice nor was he given an opportunity to be heard on the allegation of fraud before the Defendant arrived at its conclusion in the said interim report and suspended him as a result. The Claimant also stated that his suspension was wrongful because it was based on allegation that was not established against him. He also complained that the duration of the suspension and withdrawal of his pay was punitive and constitutes unfair labour practice. Because the allegation was not established, he ought to have been given precautionary suspension, which is a definite suspension with pay pending investigation, instead of indefinite suspension without pay. Upon reviewing the evidence of the Claimant on his complaint about his suspension, I find that he did not say that the suspension breached any term of the employment or that the Defendant does not have power to impose indefinite suspension without pay on him. The Claimant merely made general allegations against the suspension without tying it to any violation of the terms and conditions of his employment. In the absence of facts showing that the suspension offended any term or condition of the employment, this court cannot conclude that the Claimant’s indefinite suspension without pay was wrongful. The Claimant’s counsel argued that the suspension was wrongful because it was a punitive suspension and not merely precautionary suspension pending investigation. In my view, whether the suspension was punitive or precautionary is not a relevant issue. What is relevant is whether the Defendant has the right under the contract to suspend the Claimant without pay. The Claimant did not allege that the Defendant does not have such right. The Defendant did explain however that the Defendant has a right under its sanctions grid to suspend a staff without pay or terminate the employment where the staff has no direct involvement in a fraud but found negligent or aided the fraud by omission or error. The incidence for which the Claimant was linked and suspended, as indicated in Exhibit C3 was fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri branch. Furthermore, the Defendant has explained that the Claimant was not suspended for defrauding the bank but he was suspended because of the Defendant’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which he performed his duties during the period the fraud took place. Exhibit C5 is the Defendant’s offences and sanctions grid. At page 6, suspension is listed as one of the sanctions the Defendant can impose which can either be with pay or without pay. Then at page 1, it is provided that in cases of fraud or attempted fraud, if the staff is not directly involved but acted negligently or it occurred by error or omission of the staff, the punishment include suspension without pay. In view of Exhibit C5, the Defendant has a right under the contract to suspend a staff without pay. The Claimant’s counsel also argued that the Claimant was not given fair hearing before he was suspended. According to counsel, the failure renders the suspension wrongful. I do not think the suspension of the Claimant without first given him a hearing can render the suspension wrongful. The memo of suspension indicates that the Claimant played a role in the incidence of fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri branch of the Defendant and the Defendant, dissatisfied with the manner the Claimant performed his duties during the period, decided to place the Claimant on indefinite suspension without pay from 12/12/2014. From the case of both parties, it is not in dispute that an incidence of unauthorised transaction occurred in the Owerri branch of the Defendant on 15/11/2014 and the Claimant was implicated in it. It was for that incident he was suspended and later terminated. It is an acceptable practice in employment that an employer can suspend an employee suspected to be involved in irregularities or committed any infraction pending inquiries or until he is cleared of it. Such a suspension cannot be questioned on the ground that it could not be done unless the staff is first given an opportunity of defending himself. An incident has happened which is to be investigated. At the stage of suspension to keep the employee away from work pending investigation, the rules of natural justice do not apply. The instant point has been settled by the Supreme Court in SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD. vs. LAWSON JACK (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 249 at 270, in the following comments- “What it has done from the facts available was to set up an investigating panel to look into certain complaints bordering on alleged impropriety committed by one Mr. Nuk Ntuk, a member of staff of the appellant company. In the process the respondent was suspended from duty on full pay pending the investigation. He was the head of the department directly concerned with the allegation against Mr. Ntuk Ntuk. A suspension of an employee is not an unusual procedure taken in order to facilitate such an investigation. The person affected can hardly complain, in the process, of not having been given a hearing nor can he demand that the rules of natural justice should apply. The interest of the business of the defendant becomes paramount and the plaintiff is made to keep off the premises thereof until later.†In the result, I find that the Defendant has the right to suspend its employees without pay. I also hold that the Defendant was not wrong to have suspended the Claimant to allow investigation into the incidence. The Claimant too has not been able to prove that the indefinite suspension without pay offended the terms and conditions of his employment. I find no merit in the Claimant’s claim that the indefinite suspension without pay is wrongful. This aspect of his claim fails. I will now turn to consider the Claimant’s allegation that the termination of his employment was wrongful. The Claimant’s case is that six months after his suspension, the Defendant terminated his employment precisely on 8/6/2015 in a letter of the same date but which was served on him on 12/6/2015. The termination letter is in evidence as Exhibit C4. I have set out the content of the letter earlier in this judgment. I will not repeat it again except to mention that the letter was dated 8th June 2015 and the effective date of the termination was the same date. The Claimant’s grouse against the termination of his employment is that the termination was based on allegation of gross negligence but he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the allegation before his employment was terminated. He also stated that the termination of his employment was contrary to the express terms of his condition of employment as he was not given one month’s notice nor paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment was terminated. The Claimant relied on the conditions of employment attached to his letter of employment admitted in evidence as Exhibit C1. The Claimant also contended that the allegation for which his employment was terminated was not established by the Defendant nor was there a valid reason or justification for the termination of his employment. In paragraphs 7 (c) and 11 (b) of the Claimant’s statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that the termination of his employment was wrongful as the Defendant did not comply with the terms of his employment which required that he should be given one month’s notice or paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment can be validly terminated. The Claimant gave evidence along these facts. The Claimant is saying in essence that the Defendant did not give one month’s notice to him nor paid him one month’s salary in lieu before terminating his employment. The Defendant’s position, as pleaded in paragraph 18 of the statement of defence and as stated in the evidence of DW1 is that the Claimant is not entitled to notice or payment in lieu as his employment was terminated for gross negligence. The Defendant further contended that the Claimant’s employment was properly terminated. By this fact, the Defendant has admitted that it didn’t give notice or payment in lieu to the Claimant. Though, the Defendant’s contention is that the Claimant was not entitled to either of them because his employment was terminated for gross negligence. The annexure to the Claimant’s employment letter in Exhibit C1 contains the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment. One of the terms therein provides that either the Claimant or the bank has the right to terminate the employment by giving notice. If the employment has been confirmed, one month written notice or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice must be given. Exhibit C2 is the letter of confirmation of the Claimant’s employment dated 25th August 2014. The Claimant’s employment was confirmed with effect from 1st August 2014. In view of the terms in Exhibit C1 and confirmation of the employment in Exhibit C2, the Claimant was entitled to be given one month’s written notice of termination of his employment or one month’s salary in lieu thereof, he ought to have been paid one month’s salary. The Defendant averred that the Claimant was not entitled to notice or payment in lieu because his employment was terminated for gross negligence. I have scrutinised the conditions of the Claimant’s employment in Exhibit C1 and even the Defendant’s offences and sanctions grid in Exhibit C5 but I cannot find where the Defendant is excused from giving required notice of termination or payment in lieu where gross negligence was the reason for termination of the employment. In my view, for whatever reason the Claimant’s employment was terminated, by the agreed terms of the employment, the Defendant was bound to comply with the requirement of notice or payment in lieu when it decided to terminate the Claimant’s employment. In Exhibit C4, the termination letter, the Claimant’s employment was terminated with effect from 8th June 2015 which was the same date the letter was issued. This letter did not give a month’s notice to the Claimant. Clearly, the Claimant was not given one month’s notice. As indicated in the 3rd paragraph of the termination letter, the Claimant’s entitlements as at the date of termination was attached to the letter. I have examined that attachment but there is no mention of payment in lieu of notice. In any case, as have been admitted by the Defendant, the Claimant was not paid one month’s salary in lieu. The implication is that the Claimant was not given one month’s notice of termination and he was also not paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. This was a violation of the agreed terms of the contract. Failure of the Defendant to comply with the terms of the contract when terminating the Claimant’s employment renders the termination wrongful. I so find and hold. The Claimant has also complained that he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. In paragraphs 7 (b) and 9 (a) of the statement of facts, and in paragraph 3 (a) of the Claimant’s reply to statement of Defence, the Claimant averred that the Defendant was expected to have promptly informed him of the allegation against him and afford him an opportunity to be heard on the allegation before disciplinary action can be taken against him. But his employment was terminated on allegation of gross negligence without being given prior opportunity to be heard thereon. In paragraph 4 (b) of the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, the Claimant also averred that he was expected to be queried on the allegation and allowed to reply to the query before proceeding to the disciplinary committee. None of this procedure was followed by the Defendant. The Claimant further pleaded in paragraph 8 (xii) of the statement of facts, and paragraph 5 (b) of his reply that he went before the Defendant’s disciplinary committee but the proceeding was an accusatory session. He was not given opportunity to be heard nor was he allowed to make any explanation before the committee. The committee continued to accuse him without allowing him to reply or hear him on the allegation until the session ended. These facts are also contained in evidence of the Claimant. In response to the Claimant’s allegation, the Defendant averred that its Disciplinary committee who looked into the matter gave the Claimant an opportunity to be heard and the Claimant did appear before the committee and explained the role he played in the incidence. After the disciplinary committee had concluded its assignment, it recommended the termination of the Claimant’s employment in its report to the Defendant. The Claimant pleaded and proved the circumstances in which he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. He said he was not given any query over the incidence nor was he given opportunity to make written representation on the matter. Although he appeared before the Defendant’s disciplinary committee, the committee did not hear from him or allow him to defend himself. These allegations of the Claimant effectively put the burden on the Defendant to show that the Claimant was heard before his employment was terminated. In master and servant employment, an employee likely to be affected by a disciplinary action must be given fair hearing. To satisfy the rule of fair hearing, the employer must give notice of the allegation to the employee and give the employee opportunity to answer to the allegation or defend himself. See UZONDU vs. U.B.N PLC (supra) at 1399; NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. OMOTAYO (2002) FWLR (Pt. 114) 454 at 466. The Defendant merely said its disciplinary committee gave the Claimant an opportunity to be heard, and the Claimant explained the role he played in the incidence before the committee. Although the Defendant mentioned a report of the committee, the report was not produced in these proceedings. The report ought to show whether the Claimant was given an opportunity to make representation or defend himself before the committee. The presumption raised by the Defendant’s failure to produce the report or proceedings of the committee before this court is that it will be unfavourable to its case. Upon weighing the evidence of the Defendant on this point, I find that the Defendant has not been able to dislodge the Claimant’s averment that he was not given fair hearing before the disciplinary committee. Again, the Claimant said he was not queried or allowed to make written representation on the allegation. The Defendant did not deny this fact and did not produce any query issued to the Claimant or any written representation the Claimant made in defence of the allegation. From the facts, what I observe to have happened was that the Claimant, without being queried or informed of the allegations against him was taken to Lagos and detained by the police. After his release by the police, he was suspended indefinitely without pay. He was later to face the Defendant’s disciplinary committee who did not give him opportunity to defend himself before the committee. There was no time also the Claimant was given opportunity to make written representation on his behalf on the allegation to the Defendant. In the face of this denial of opportunity to defend himself, the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment on 8/6/2015. I am of the view that the Claimant was entitled to fair hearing on the allegations against him before his employment could be terminated. The Claimant’s right to be heard on the allegation was clearly denied him thus breaching one of the rules of natural justice. It is trite that a dismissal or termination is wrongful where it fails to comply with the demands of natural justice. See NIGERIAN GAS COMPANY LTD vs. UNUAVWODO (2003) FWLR (Pt.169) 1196 at 1207; PHCN vs. ALABI (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 557) 698 at 709; S.P.D.C (NIG.) LTD vs. OLAREWAJU (2003) FWLR (Pt.140) 1640 at 1667. Consequently, I hold that the Claimant’s employment was wrongly terminated when he was denied the opportunity to be heard or defend himself on the allegation. The Claimant’s complaint about the termination of his employment includes that the allegation for which his employment was terminated was not established or proved against him and that the allegation of gross negligence does not exist in the Defendant’s disciplinary and sanction grid as a ground for termination of employment. See paragraphs 8 and 9 (b) of the statement of facts. In the Claimant’s termination letter, the allegation disclosed therein for which the Claimant appeared before the disciplinary committee was breach of bank’s policy on transaction processing in the incidence of unauthorized withdrawals from the Rivers State Government account but the disciplinary committee found him guilty of gross negligence in the incident. In Exhibit C5, under the offence of fraud or attempted fraud, the categories include either direct involvement of staff or with no direct involvement but due to negligence, omission or error of the staff. The punishment for indirect involvement includes termination of employment. It is obvious that the Defendant’s sanction grid contemplates offence of negligence. Whether it is stated to be gross negligence or simply as negligence does not matter. The punishment prescribed for this offence includes termination. Therefore, the Claimant’s contention that gross negligence for which his employment was terminated was not contained in the sanction grid of the Defendant does not hold water. As for the Claimant’s assertion that the allegation for which his employment was terminated was not established or proved against him, what he appears to be alleging is that the termination of his employment was not justified. I will not bother myself digging into this assertion. I have earlier mentioned it that a master can terminate the contract of employment with his servant at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. Therefore, the motive or reason which led an employer to terminate the servant’s employment is not normally a relevant fact and the court will not have business with such motive or reason but will only give effect to the contract of service between the parties. See NEPA VS. ENYONG (2003) FWLR (PT.175) 452 at 469. It is already a finding of this court that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful for non-compliance with the condition of the employment. Therefore, whether the Defendant had no justified reason to terminate the employment or is unable to justify the termination of the employment is no longer of any relevance. The fact which is clear is that the employment has been terminated, although wrongfully. From the foregoing, I find that the termination of the claimant’s employment was wrongful. The Defendant did not give the Claimant one month’s notice of termination as required in the condition of employment neither did the defendant pay to the Claimant one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Defendant did not also give the Claimant fair hearing before his employment was terminated. These are the points where this case differs from my decision in a sister case in Suit No: NICN/OW/65/2015 Ezendu Ejike Chukwuemeka vs. Skye Bank Plc. In that other case, in which judgment was delivered on the 5th day of April 2017, the Claimant limited himself to seeking a declaration that his termination was null and void and did not claim for wrongful termination of employment. He also and did not make out any case for non-compliance with the mode of termination of the employment. In that case, the facts also show clearly that the Claimant was given an opportunity to be heard before his employment was terminated. Having found in this case that the termination of the Claimant’s employment is wrongful, the next task is to consider the other remedies or reliefs sought by the Claimant to see if he is entitled to any or all of them. In the Claimant’s relief (c) on the Complaint, the Claimant sought payment of the sum of N2,591,222.62 which sum is stated to be arrears of the Claimant’s unpaid salaries and allowances from date of suspension till date of termination of his employment. In paragraph 10 of the statement of fact, the Claimant categorised this claim as special damages and particularized the sum as follows- i. Monthly salary from January 2015 to June 2015 at N199,219.61 per month= N1,195,317.66. ii. Quarterly allowance of December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015 at N233, 725.10 per quarter=N701,175.30 iii. Upfront allowance for January 2015 and April 2015 at N141,710.66 each=N283,421.66 iv. Cost of passage allowance for the period of January 2015 and April 2015 at N159,547.50 each= N319,095.00 v. Leave allowance= N50,300.00 vi. Thirteenth month bonus= N41,920.00 And in relief (d), the Claimant sough interest on the above sum at 15% from January 2015 until judgment is delivered and at the rate of 10% per annum until the sum is paid. It is indicated in relief (c) that the period for which the said sum accrued was between the date of suspension and date of termination of his employment. I have also examined the dates stated in items (i) to (vi) of the relief and I find that they fall within the period of the Claimant’s suspension and date of termination of his employment. That is to say the said arrears of unpaid salaries and allowances accrued when the Claimant was on suspension without pay. I have held earlier in this judgment that the Defendant has the right under the contract to suspend the Claimant without pay and also that I cannot fault the suspension without pay placed on the Claimant on 12/12/2014. Where the contract of employment permits the employer to withhold payment of salaries and allowances during suspension, the employee will not be entitled to the salaries and allowances which accrued within the period of suspension without pay. See MOBILE PRODUCING NIG. UNLTD vs. UDO (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 482) 1171. Therefore, since the salary and allowances being claimed by the Claimant accrued during the period he was on suspension without pay, it is my view that he is not entitled to them. Consequently, reliefs (c) and (d) fail. The Claimant sought in relief (f) an order to the Defendant to continue to pay to the Claimant his salaries, allowances and full benefits until his contract of employment is validly terminated. Let me reaffirm my earlier finding that the Claimant’s employment has been terminated by the Defendant since on 8/6/2015. The only problem with the termination is that it was wrongful. Notwithstanding the wrongfulness of the termination, it has effectively put an end to the contract from the date of the termination. Therefore, the Claimant cannot ask to be paid nor can he be paid salaries or allowances for the period he was no longer in the employment. See OBOT vs. CBN (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 310) 140; SPRING BANK vs. BABATUNDE (supra) 1205. It is my view and I so hold that the Claimant is not entitled to this claim as the employment had ceased to exist since 8/6/2015. Another relief sought by the Claimant is the one in relief (g) where the Claimant sought for an order for the payment of his full severance benefits and the sum of N20,000,000.00 as general damages for the wrongful termination of his employment. The Claimant sought this relief as alternative to reliefs (e) and (f). Reliefs (e) and (f) having been dismissed in this judgment, I will consider whether the Claimant is entitled to this alternative claim. This relief itself has two aspects. They are the claim for payment of his severance benefits and the claim for N20,000,000.00 general damages. The Claimant averred in paragraph 11 (b) of the statement of facts that he is entitled to severance benefits but he failed however to tell this court, anywhere in his pleading or evidence, what entitled him to severance benefits or what constitutes his severance benefits. I have examined the Claimant’s employment letter and confirmation letter but I cannot find where severance benefit is provided as a condition of service. No other condition of service was shown to this court in which severance benefit is agreed as payable to the Claimant. The Claimant did not prove his claim for severance benefit. The Defendant on the other hand averred that that after the termination of the Claimant’s appointment, the Defendant calculated the Claimant’s entitlements and paid it into the Claimant’s account. As such, the Claimant is not entitled to any further payment from the Defendant. I also observe this statement in the Claimant’s termination letter: “Please find attached your statement of indebtedness/entitlements as at Monday June 8, 2015â€. The attached document to the letter contained the Claimant’s net financial position as at 8th June 2015. What I deduce from the averments of the Defendant and the content of the termination letter is that the Claimant was entitled to some entitlements at termination of his employment which the Defendant has now said has been paid into the Claimant’s account. But the Claimant in his reply and additional evidence denied being paid any entitlement by the Defendant. The Claimant relied on the statements of account of his two salary accounts to support his claim that the Defendant did not pay any entitlement into his account. These statements of account are in evidence as Exhibits C7(a) and C7(b). I have examined these statements of account. The last transaction date of the one which is Exhibit C7 (a) was 23/12/2014 while the last transactions date in Exhibit C7 (b) was 28/5/2015. The Claimant’s termination letter was dated 8/6/2015 and the effective date of the computation in the attachment was 8/6/2015. The statement of account of the Claimant which will suffice is the one from this date upwards. However, the Claimant did not produce any statement of account up to the period of termination of his employment. Although I notice on the 1st page of the statements of account that they were supposed to cover up to 22nd and 23rd June 2015 respectively, I cannot find any entry from 1st June to 23rd June. What happened to the entries for these periods? In any case, the statements of account produced by the Claimant did not disprove the Defendant’s assertion that it paid the Claimant’s entitlements into his account. The Claimant is seeking for payment of the sum of N20,000,000.00 as general damages for the wrongful termination of his employment. I have held in this judgment that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful. In that situation, the Defendant is definitely liable to pay damages to the Claimant for breach of the contract. See NEPA vs. ENYONG (2003) FWLR (Pt.175) 452 at 474; ARINZE vs. FIRST BANK (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78. However, general damages, in the nature sought by the Claimant, is not grantable in an action between master and servant. The measure of damages usually awarded in cases of contract of employment for wrongful termination of the employment is the salary for the period of notice which the employer would have given to lawfully terminate the employment. See IFETA vs. S.P.D.C. (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 314) 305; PIONEER MILLING CO. LTD. vs. NANSING (2003) FWLR (Pt. 151) 1820. The Defendant did not give the Claimant the required one month notice to terminate the contract. The Claimant is thus entitled to be paid one month salary in lieu of notice. In effect, the amount the Claimant is entitled to as damages in this case is his one month salary to be paid in lieu of notice. Therefore, the sum sought by the Claimant as general damages cannot be granted. The Claimant pleaded in paragraph 10 (i) and 11 (b) of his statement of facts that his monthly salary was N199,219.61. This is the sum the Claimant is entitled to as damages being one month salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant claims, in his last relief, payment of the sum of N750,000.00 being cost of instituting the action. The Claimant stated in his evidence that he paid the sum of N750,000.00 to institute this action and he is entitled to recover the sum from the Defendant. Exhibit C6 tendered by the Claimant is a receipt from I. C. Achara & Co., legal practitioners evidencing receipt of the sum of N750,000.00 by the law firm from the Claimant as part payment of professional fee. It is not however disclosed in the receipt whether the fee was paid in respect of this case. The Defendant averred that the Claimant is not entitled to this claim because the decision to engage counsel is entirely that of the Claimant who should also bear the cost. I agree with the Defendant. The Claimant cannot decide to engage counsel of his choice, agree on fee, no matter how outrageous, with the counsel and then seek to recover the sum from the Defendant. The issue of the professional fee is a personal arrangement between the Claimant and his counsel. The Claimant should bear the payment of professional fee which he agreed to pay to his counsel. I dismiss this claim. Let me quickly add that the court has a discretion to award cost. In the sum of this judgment, the Claimant’s relief (a) and (b) succeeds only to the extent that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful. Reliefs (c), (d), (e), (f) and (h) fail and they are accordingly dismissed. I find for the Claimant in relief (g) in part. The court makes the following orders: 1. It is declared that the termination of the Claimant’s employment on 8/6/2015 was wrongful. 2. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N199,219.61 as the damages for wrongful termination of the employment. 3. Cost of N200,000.00 is also awarded in favour of the Claimant. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the sums in 2 & 3 above to the Claimant within 30 days from today, failing which it shall begin to attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum until it is fully paid. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge