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<p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><b><u><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">REPRESENTATIONS:<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif""> </span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">C. K. EMELE (MISS) FOR THE CLAIMANT<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">ABU IBRAHIM FOR THE DEFENDANT<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif""> </span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" align="center" style="text-align:center"><b><u><span style="font-size:18.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The suit was commenced on the 6<sup>th</sup> May 2015 via an Originating Summons. The reliefs sought in the Consolidated Originating Summons are as listed hereunder:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-.5in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">i)<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">A DECLARATION that the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.1 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 providing that female applicants for employment into the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, NDLEA must be unmarried, and shall remain unmarried for not less than 2 years after enlisting with the agency is discriminatory and constitutes an arbitrary limitation on married women seeking employment into the agency, and is contrary to Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Article 2 and 3 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, and Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Right on Rights of Women in Africa.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-.5in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">ii)<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">A DECLARATION that the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.2 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 requiring female officers of the agency desiring to get married to obtain the permission of the Chairman of the agency and provide details of the prospective husband before getting married amount to discriminatory practice contrary to section 42 of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, and Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right on Rights of Women in Africa.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-.5in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">iii)<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">AN ORDER quashing the provisions of Part II, Paragraphs 5.1 & 5.2 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Order, Vol. 1 of July, 2002 in its entirety.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-right:.5in;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">In the written address in support of the originating summons, the claimant’s counsel submitted the following questions for the determination of the case:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-.5in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">i.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Whether</span></b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.1 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 providing that female applicants for employment into the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, NDLEA must be unmarried, and shall remain unmarried for not less than 2 years after enlisting with the agency is discriminatory and constitutes an arbitrary limitation on married women seeking employment into the agency, and is therefore contrary to Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, and Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Right on Rights of Women in Africa?<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-.5in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">ii.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Whether </span></b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.2 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 requiring female officers of the agency desiring to get married to obtain the permission of the Chairman of the agency and provide details of prospective husband before getting married amount to discriminatory practice contrary to Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, and Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right on the Rights of Women in Africa?<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The learned counsel to the claimant: <b><u>Chinonye Edmund Obiagwu</u></b>, made a joint submission on the two questions together. Counsel submitted that the law is trite that any provisions of a statute in conflict with the 1999 Constitution must be declared invalid. Counsel cited section 1(2) & (3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended to buttress his point. Counsel thereafter reproduced the provisions of section 42(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, Articles 2 & 3 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act [African Charter], and cited Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [Protocol]; and argued that, Article 2 of the Protocol, though ratified, but not domesticated, but by virtue of the domestication of the parent statute, that is the African Charter, it has a persuasive force in Nigeria. Counsel submitted that the effect of the NDLEA regulations under investigation is discrimination against female applicants to the agency, more so, when male staffers do not face the same restrictions. Counsel went further to cite the provisions of the NDLEA regulations in dispute to buttress his argument; and submitted that, in the context of this inconsistency with the 1999 Constitution, as amended and the African Charter and its Protocol, they, be declared null and void. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Counsel urged the Court to give literal interpretation to the provisions of the statutes in question vis-à-vis section 42 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Counsel cited <b>Standard Trust Bank Plc v. O.K Contract Point Ltd (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 514) CA</b> to anchor his argument in this regard; and submitted that the effect is that the NDLEA regulations in issue discriminated against female applicants and employees without lawful justifications. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Counsel finally urged the Court to find for the claimant against the defendant. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I now move to the written address filed by the defendant’s counsel in support of the counter affidavit in opposition to the originating summons. <b><u>Abu Ibrahim, Esq</u></b>. settled this address. He distilled a lone issue for the determination of the case. The issue is as reproduced hereunder:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:40.5pt;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Whether the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.1 of the Defendant’s NDLEA ORDER is contrary to Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 with respect to appointments of female employers [sic] into the service of the Defendant in light of Section 42(3) of the said Constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:40.5pt;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Arguing this lone issue, <b><u>Abu Ibrahim</u></b>, of counsel to the defendant said the provisions of the NDLEA Order in question is not discriminatory to either married or unmarried ladies. Counsel said section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution allows deviation from the provisions of section 42 of the 1999 Constitution, and that the provisions of the NDLEA Order in question are secured therein. Counsel argued that the NDLEA is in the same footing with the Nigerian Police and both are subjected to the same service conditions and restrictions. On this, counsel cited section 4(4) of the NDLEA Act. Counsel argued further that since the NDLEA Act is an existing law preserved under the provisions of section 315(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, the NDLEA Act is therefore not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution. Counsel also argued that by a combine construction of sections 42(3) and 315(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, and section 4(4) of the NDLEA Act, the NDLEA Order in issue is not contrary to the provisions of section 42(1) of the of the 1999 Constitution, as section 42(3) excludes the application of section 42(1) to officers of the Police Force, which by extension applies to officers of the NDLEA. Counsel submitted further that, the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitutions do no confer absolute rights, which section 42(3) has just proved. Counsel cited <b>Edeh v. FRN (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 706) 326</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Counsel argued that while the African Charter is part and parcel of the <i>corpus juris</i> of Nigeria, it is nevertheless subservient to the 1999 Constitution. Counsel further submitted that Article 2 of the Protocol, being undomesticated, is not part of the law of this country. Counsel referred to <b>Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 at 288 – 289</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Counsel finally brought his address to an end by urging the Court to find in favour of the defendant. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">I turn to the reply on points of law filed by the claimant’s counsel, <b><u>Chino Edmund Obiagwu, Esq</u></b>. This include address on Notice of Preliminary Objection, which objection had been dismissed in the Court’s ruling of 2<sup>nd</sup> March, 2016. So, the address shall only now be treated for the purposes of the reply on points of law. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">In the address; counsel argued that the counsel to the defendant missed the main gist of the contention that the NDLEA regulation in issue infringed the provisions of section 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution by arguing that section 42(3) allows the defendant to discriminate, but that the real issue is that, while the NDLEA regulation in issue imposes restriction against women, it does not do the same thing for their male counterparts. And this raises the issue of discrimination on ground of sex. Counsel argued that the tenor of section 42(3) does not extend to discrimination on the ground of sex; and section 42(3) is not a blanket waiver for all discriminations. Counsel said the grouse, which the counsel to the defendant did not appreciate, is that, this policy, which might not ordinarily have been discriminatory, were it to apply to both sexes at the same time, is discriminatory because it applies to only female employees or applicants of the defendants. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Counsel also argued that the provisions of section 42(3) only exempt laws and not administrative practices, as contained in the NDLEA regulation in issue. Counsel argued that the NDLEA regulation in question is neither a law in force nor subsidiary legislation as envisaged under section 315 of the 1999 Constitution, in that, it was not made pursuant to any parent law conferring the power to make subsidiary legislation in that behalf. Counsel referred to paragraph 7(i) & (ii) of the defendant’s counter affidavit where it is expressly admitted that the regulation in issue was not made under any enabling law but is simply an internal administrative policy devised by the agency. Since this is so, counsel submitted, the internal administrative policy is not exempted by section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel also submitted that since a law is a legislation passed by the a legitimate legislative body, the NDLEA Board or Director-General, which is not a legislative body is incapable of making a law or subsidiary legislation as in this case. Thus, the reply on points of law was brought to an end. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:.5in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The next thing is to apply the laws to the facts of this case and resolve the case, one way or the other. Meanwhile, let me state that I have most painstakingly read and digested the originating summons, the affidavit in support, the counter affidavit and the written addresses filed by the two sides. In resolving the case, I adopt the issue formulated by the defendant’s counsel, albeit slightly corrected, to with:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:40.5pt;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Whether the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.1 & 5.2 of the defendant’s NDLEA Order is contrary to section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 with respect to appointments of female employees or applicants into the service of the Defendant in light of other relevant provisions of the said Constitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> First of all, let me settle an initial issue, which is central to going further in the determination of this case. This has to do with the traverse of paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the counter affidavit of the defendant. Now, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons provide thus:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5. Section 9(1) of the Act establishing the Defendant enables the making of a general policy guideline from time to time for effective operation of the agency.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">6. Pursuant to the above provision, a policy guideline tagged “NDLEA ORDER” Vol. 1 No. 1 was made in July, 2010.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">6. Paragraph 5, Part II of the NDLEA ORDER, VOL. 1 NO. 1 of July, 2002 provides as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:67.5pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5.1. “All female applicants shall be unmarried at the point of entry, and shall upon enlistment remain unmarried for a period of not less than 2 years”<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:67.5pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5:2 “All unmarried female staff that wish to marry shall apply in writing to the Chairman/Chief Executive, asking for permission, stating details of the intended husband.”<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">7. I am informed by the lead counsel to the claimant and I verily believe that some female candidates seeking employment [sic], usually seek the Claimant’s legal advice in respect of the above and in pursuant of its mandate as human rights organisation focusing on rights of women, among others.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:4.5pt;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:4.5pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:31.5pt"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit traversed the above in the following manner:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;tab-stops:22.5pt"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">6. That paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons are not true.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">7. That I am informed by Abu Ibrahim Esq, a Legal Pracritioner in the service of the Defendant on the 21<sup>st</sup> May 2015 at about 2.00pm at the above address and I verily believe him as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(i) that section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act Cap N30, LFN, 2004 did not provide for making a general policy guideline from time to time for effective operation of the Agency.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(ii) that the ‘NDLEA ORDER’ Vol. 1 No. 1 of July 2002 was not made pursuant to section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(iii) that the provisions of Part 11, Paragraph 5.1 of the NDLEA Order Vol. 1 No. 1 of July 2002 is not discriminatory against married women seeking appointment with the Defendant or female officers of the Defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(iv) that the Defendant is a corporate body established by the NDLEA Act Cap N30, LFN, 2004.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(v) that officers and men of the Defendant have the same powers, authority and privileges (including power to bear arms) as are given by law to members of the Nigerian Police.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-4.5pt;tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Reading paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, four things are discernable, (1) that section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act enables the making of a general policy guideline for the NDLEA, (2) that the NDLEA Order in issue is made pursuant to the said section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act, (3) the verbatim reproduction of the specific wordings of paragraph 5.1 & 5.2 of the NDLEA Order in issue, (4) that female applicants to the NDLEA or employees have sought the advice of the lead counsel in this matter on the provisions of the Order quoted. Perusing paragraphs 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit, which are the traverse of paragraphs 5 – 7 of the affidavit in support, the following come out clean, (1) that paragraphs 5 – 7 of the affidavit in support are false, (2) that section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act did not provide for making policy guideline, (3) that the ‘NDLEA ORDER’ Vol. 1 No. 1 of July 2002 was not made pursuant to section 9(1) of the NDLEA Act, (4) that the provisions of Part II, Paragraph 5.1 of the NDLEA Order Vol. 1 No. 1 is not discriminatory against females, (5) that the NDLEA is a corporate body established pursuant to the NDLEA Act, and (6) that the NDLEA has the same privileges as the Nigeria Police. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Let me observe that I shall not bother myself now with the paragraphs dealing with whether or not the order in issue is made pursuant to the NDLEA Act. Why? This is because such is strictly a matter of law. I shall come to it later in the course of this judgment.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> It is not clear what paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit traverses. I find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is a general traverse of specific and essential averments, which deserve specific responses. The Supreme Court in <b>Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Chimaeze (2014) LPELR – 22699 (SC) p. 48, paras. A – B</b>, has said, “A general traverse is not an effective denial of essential or material averments in the opposing party’s pleading”. The contents of paragraphs 5 – 7 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons are very germane to the issue at stake. Construing the content of paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit, which give teeth to paragraph 6, the confoundedness is only heightened. Paragraph 7(iii) admitted, by implication, that there is actually NDLEA Order as claimed by the claimant, but that the provisions of Part II, paragraphs 5.1 are not discriminatory against women. Now, it is not clear whether the defendant is saying the provisions of paragraph 5.1 of the Order as quoted are not the exact wording or that by their construction, they are not discriminatory, admitting the wording is correct or what? <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> <u>Note that defendant did not react at all to paragraph 5.2 as quoted by the claimant</u>. It should be noted that paragraph 5.2 contained equally essential prima facie discriminatory wordings as paragraph 5.1, not specifically traversing it, would leave the case as potent, even if paragraph 5.1 were successfully traversed. It is surprising that the defendant who initially said at paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit that everything contained in paragraphs 5 – 7 of the affidavit in support is untrue, has turned round in paragraph 7 to admit that there is actually NDLEA Order and the paragraphs as cited by the claimant. The Court of Appeal has said about ambivalent traverse in <b>Ibacehm (Ibafon Chemicals) Ltd v. Visa Investment & Securities Ltd (2009) LPELR – 4273 (CA</b>):<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The basic rule of pleading is that a traverse whether by denial or refusal to admit, must not be evasive but must answer the point of substance. The pleader must deal specifically with every allegation of fact made by his opponent; he must either admit it frankly or deny it boldly. Any half-admission or half-denial is evasive. …Thus, if it be alleged that the defendant received a certain sum of money, it will not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular sum, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof or else set out how much he received. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> In <b>Zenith Bank Plc v. Bankolans Investments Ltd & Anor (2011) LPELR – 9064 (CA) 36, paras. A – E</b>, the Court of Appeal also said:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Furthermore in another related case of Agbakoba v. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 489 at 549 the Supreme Court stated thus: -<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">“In actions initiated by originating summons, the affidavits filed by the parties in the matter take the place of pleadings and so any material paragraphs of the affidavit not specifically denied are taken as having been admitted, that is an unchallenged evidence upon which the court could act. As in pleadings the denial must not be evasive but frontal.” <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; tab-stops:0in"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-right:4.5pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:31.5pt"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">It is very clear from the above that the purported denial of the essential paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, as attempted in the counter affidavit, is nothing but evasive and cloudy. When the claimant cited and reproduced verbatim the alleged provisions of paragraphs 5.1 & 5.2 of the Order in issue, in traversing them, the defendant was expected to say specifically whether the provisions were in existence and quoted correctly or if not, say what the exact wordings were, attaching a copy thereof. The defendant instead, was playing a game of hide-and-seek with the depositions. Being bound by the authorities cited above, the legal effect is that paragraphs 5 – 7 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons have not been controverted. They therefore remain unchallenged and the Court is at liberty to act on them; and I so hold.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-right:4.5pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:31.5pt"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">Besides, the Court is at liberty to resort <i>suo motu</i> to documents in its custody to aid it in arriving at resolution of conflicts in affidavit – see <b>Congress For Progressive Change (CPC) v. Lado & Ors. (2011) LPELR – 3997 (CA) 44, paras. D – F</b>. This being so, even if it were said that conflict actually exists in the two affidavits in issue, the claimant had, in compliance with the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Practice Direction, 2012 [Practice Direction] Order 3, Rule 5(a)(2)(b), accompanied the originating summons with a copy of the very NDLEA ORDER, VOL. 1 NO. 1, JULY, 2002. In paragraph 5 therein, under the title “RECRUITMENT OF FEMALE OFFICERS”, sub-paragraph 5.1 – 5.2 are exactly as reproduced verbatim by the claimant. It should be noted that the defendant did not in any way react to this document. This document becomes relevant and the Court can legally rely on it by virtue of section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. This resolves whatever purported conflict there is in favour of the claimant and against the defendant. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Be that as it may, let me observe that there is no scintilla of disagreement on the hard facts of this case: that is, parties are agreed on the facts of the case. What is in contention is strictly the application of the laws to the facts in issue. That is, construction of the provisions in issue with regard to the relevant laws. Therefore, the crux is anchored on whether the NDLEA Order in issue is saved by the provisions of section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution. This being so, the first thing to do is to examine the provisions of the NDLEA Order in issue together with that of section 42(1) & (3) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered]. The regulation in issue is contained in Order 5(1) – (3). They are hereby reproduced:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5. RECRUITMENT OF FEMALE OFFICERS<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5.1 All female applicants shall be unmarried at the point of entry, and shall upon enlistment remain unmarried for a period of not less than two years.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5.2 All unmarried female staff that wish to marry shall apply in writing to the Chairman/Chief Executive, asking for permission, stating details of the intended husband.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5.3 An unmarried female staff that becomes pregnant within the first two years of employment shall be discharged from the service of the Agency. If however an unmarried female officer becomes pregnant after three years or more with the Agency, authority may be granted for continuation of service on approval of the Chairman.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Now section 42(1) & (3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended provides, and I quote:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">42. (1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person: -<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions are not made subject; or <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(2)…<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes restrictions with respect to the appointment of any person to any office under the State or as member of the armed forces of the Federation or a member of the Nigeria Police Force or to an office in the service of a body corporate established directly by any law in force in Nigeria.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> This is the very section, which the defendant relied on as validating the Order in issue, even though, by its ordinary tenor, it is discriminatory of the female sex, subjecting it to restrictions to which its counterpart male is not subjected. The catchword therein is the phrase “any person”. This is because the counsel to the claimant had submitted in his reply on points of law that section 42(3) does not save the NDLEA Order in issue because it purports to affect only female and not male, in effect that section 42(3) does not contemplate discrimination on account of sex. The phrase is defined to be coterminous with ‘anybody’, and ‘anybody’ is defined as “any person whatever” – see p. 67 of the <i>The New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language</i>, (2013). Synonymous with the phrase, are “any body’ and any one” – see p. 67 [supra]. The word ‘any’ that prefixes ‘person’ is central to an understanding of the phrase as a term. ‘Any’ is defined as, “one (person, thing, or part) indefinitely and indifferently” – see the same p. 67 [supra]. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> The tenor of the phrase would seem to be governed by no-advance specification of the sex of the persons to be affected by such restrictions: that is, the exemption contemplated is non-gender or sex sensitive. And it also seemed to suggest that such restrictions contemplate any individual person of the human race and not group. But then, if the restriction targets characteristics mainly appertaining to a particular group of individuals, i.e., the female or male group, the problem arises as to what exactly is intended by this very section. But this does not seem to be the problem here, as the NDLEA Order in question specifically mentioned a group: the female group, from which, it singled out those so-restricted. Be that as it may. The argument has equally been canvassed by the claimant’s counsel that the exemptions granted by section 42(3) is limited to laws and not administrative policies, and that the Order in question was purely a policy devised by the defendant without any legal backing of the NDLEA Act. Counsel equally argued that the fact that the defendant deposed in the counter affidavit that the NDLEA Order in issue was not made pursuant to any law but merely an administrative policy supports his argument. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I have checked paragraph 7(i) & (ii) of the counter affidavit and found that the defendant actually admitted that the Order in question was a mere administrative policy not done pursuant to any law. What is the effect in law? This does not in anyway affect the validity of the Order in issue if validly made pursuant to any statute, and is not in conflict with the Constitution. It is my duty to check the NDLEA Act to confirm if indeed the order in question was made pursuant to it. Whatever the result, I would come back to the question of the validity of the order.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I have combed through the whole gamut of the NDLEA Act. Two sections attracted my interest with regard to the issue at hand. They are sections 10(1) & (2) and 50. Section 10 provides that:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:40.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-22.0pt;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">(1)<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The Attorney-General of the Federation may, from time to time, give general policy guidelines to the Agency.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:40.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph;text-indent:-22.0pt;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"">(2)<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Attorney-General of the Federation may give the Agency directives of a general nature or specific directives relating generally to a particular matter or case, as the case may be.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Section 50 provides that:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The Attorney-General of the Federation may make rules or regulations with respect to the exercise of the duties, functions or powers of the Agency under this Act.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I have carefully read through the whole of the NDLEA Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002. I agree with the defendant’s counsel that the NDLEA Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 was not made pursuant to any law or statute. What I found is that it is only the Attorney-General of the Federation that has the duty and power vested by law to make this type of rules and policy guidelines for the NDLEA. Sections 10 and 50 as cited and reproduced above clearly bear this out. The rules or orders contained in paragraph 5 of this NDLEA Order is, to say the least, in the nature of a byelaw, that is why it is termed “NDLEA ORDER”. I therefore agree completely with the counsel to the claimant that the provisions of paragraph 5 of the NDLEA ORDER, VOL. 1 NO. 1 JULY, 2002 are <i>ultra vires</i> the defendant. They are therefore neither law nor policy instrument since the NDLEA by itself or any of its officers lack the vires to make either. I also agree with the counsel to the claimant that the exemptions granted in section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution only relate to laws and not mere administrative policies. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I think the Constitution places high premium in the protection of the rights granted under section 42; and hence, while constrained to recognise that there may be situations when it might be necessary to deviate from strict adherence to the observance of these rights, such deviations must be seriously considered and debated by the representative of the people: the legislature, to arrive at a just and reasonable cause, and not just left to the whims and caprices of the chief executives of institutions and agencies. That is the essence of section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution, which essence, the NDLEA Order in question made at the whims of its chief executive completely negates. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Let me now turn to another aspect of the arguments. I shall return to the issue of the validity or otherwise of the order in question <i>vis-à-vis</i> section 42(1) - (3) of 1999 Constitution and the African Charter. First, like I have stated earlier on, the word ‘any’, which prefixes ‘person’ in section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution does not etymologically countenance group marked out by sex or otherwise, it follows that discrimination on the ground of sex is not <u>ordinarily</u> included in the exemptions granted under section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution. In interpreting the provisions of section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution, it must always be borne in mind the mischief which section 42(1) & (2) sought to cure. It must be taken that section 42 presumed equality of sex and gender; and that, where section 42(3) would be construed as derogating from the rights granted under section 42(1) & (2), the derogation or restriction would apply to both sexes equally and would not create the superiority of one sex over the other. Hence, where the constitutional provision, as in section 42(3), is capable of divergent interpretation, the one that safeguards the rights granted under section 42(1) & (2) must be preferred, especially where no objective criterion justifies such derogation or restriction.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I would like to point out that in resolving the contentions herein, cognizance must also be taken of section 254C – (1)(d), (f), (g), (h) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered]. This suit was filed on 6<sup>th</sup> May, 2015 and therefore comes directly under the effect of the provisions of the Third Alteration Act, by which the above cited sub-sections of section 254C of the 1999 Constitution were brought alive. The cumulative effect of these new provisions is that the Court is now bound to look at the standard practices of the International Labour Organisation [ILO] on the issue of discrimination on ground of sex to determine the extent of the exemption granted under section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered], when the issue, as in this one, relates to employment. The Court is also thereby bound to ascertain the fairness of the exemption and best practices in industrial and employment relations. What I am saying, is that, in interpreting section 42 of the 1999 Constitution [as altered], regard must be had to the provisions of section 254C – (1)(d), (f), (g) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered] when the issue relates to employment. In this regard, the ILO The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) becomes relevant.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> In regard to this Convention, it was observed in the ILO book, <i>Giving globalization a human face: International Labour Conference 101<sup>st</sup> Session</i>, 2012 at p. 345, paras. 827 - 828, that:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Convention, any “distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discriminatory.” …<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">The concept of “a particular job” refers to a specific and definable job, function or tasks, and any limitation must be required by the characteristics of the particular job, in proportion to its inherent requirements. Systemic application of requirements involving one or more of the grounds of discrimination set out in the Convention is inadmissible. In no circumstances should the same requirement involving one or more of the grounds of discrimination be applied to an entire sector of activity or occupation, especially in the public service.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Now, the argument of counsel to the defendant is that the entire sector of security outfits, inclusive of the NDLEA in the country are exempted from the requirements of section 42(1) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered] by virtue of subsection (3) of section 42 of the 1999 Constitution. As it is, this argument is wrong, the Court has a duty to examine each and every restriction on its own merit, and see whether there are justifiable reasons for such restriction. The Supreme Court of Madagascar, in <b>Dugain & Ors. v. Compagnie Air Madagascar, 5 September 2003, Judgment No. 231</b> held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">(…) given that, furthermore, the international conventions on women’s rights include not only the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (…) but also ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Employment and Occupation: (…) and, finally the ILO Declaration on Principles and Fundamental Rights at Work, including the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation, which apply automatically; given that, within the meaning of these international standards it is not <i>per se</i> discriminatory to stipulate an age limit or a restriction based on sex, but that such stipulation could only be justified if the employer can prove that the sex of the employee is a vocational requirement inherent in the job, particularly in jobs entailing risks, that requirement being justified for reasons of safety, and proof of the effects of age on safety in consideration of sex thereby being required (…)<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">In the case at hand, blanket restrictions are placed on the female sex and gender without reason given for the restriction. It has not been shown how these restrictions are inherently linked to the performance of the female sex or gender in the duties of the NDLEA. It would appear therefore that these restrictions were just arbitrarily imposed without any good justification; and neither is it shown how non-restriction would negatively affect the NDLEA or even the female sex. If marriage would disturb the female sex in the performance of their functions in the NDLEA, then, it must also disturb their male counterparts, since marriage in Nigeria presupposes the union of two opposite sexes, so banning all female applicants or employees from getting married two years after securing employment with the NDLEA and banning all married women from securing employment with the NDLEA when their male counterparts are not similarly banned, would appear to be without basis. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Getting married does not mean getting pregnant. One can get married and willfully delay getting pregnant. If training requirements would be interfered with by pregnancy, which would be understandable as inherent requirement of the job, what is needed is ban on getting pregnant for two years, and not ban on getting married. May be, that is what paragraph 5.3 of the Order in issue partly intends to take care, one cannot say, as the paragraph goes further to say even after three years, the female employee can only get pregnant, at the mercy of the Chairman of the NDLEA. And I think, likewise, requiring a female officer who intends to get married to seek the permission of the Chief Executive of the NDLEA, and giving the details of the prospective husbands, without similar restrictions placed on the male counterparts without any justifications whatsoever seemed to me totally indefensible. Thus, these restrictions are very discriminatory in the highest order and are not justifiable under the umbrella of section 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I have noticed that the claimant did not attack paragraph 5.3 of the Order in issue. This paragraph deals with restriction that female officers of the NDLEA should not get pregnant within two years of being employed and that if she does, her appointment would be terminated, and further, that if she gets pregnant after three years, her employment remains at the mercy of the Chairman. This means the claimant is satisfied with it and since it is not an issue before me, I shall therefore not deal with it.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> Be that as it may, the concomitance of my reasoning above is that the provisions of paragraphs 5.1 & 5.2 of the NDLEA Order, Vol. 1 No. 1 of July, 2002 are null and void and of no effect absolutely. I therefore herby strike them down for being discriminatory and unfair against the provisions of sections 42(1) & (2), 254C – (1)(d), (f), (g), (h) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered] and the ILO Convention 111. In the circumstance, I grant all the reliefs claimed by the claimant in their entirety.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> I make no order as to cost. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" align="center" style="margin-right:.5in;text-align:center; tab-stops:409.5pt"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> <b>…………………………………….<o:p></o:p></b></span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" align="center" style="text-align:center"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" align="center" style="text-align:center"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">President,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" align="center" style="text-align:center"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"">National Industrial Court of Nigeria<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify: inter-ideograph"><br></p>