Download PDF
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: "Comic Sans MS"">Representation</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">:<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Chief B. N. Chukwu for the Claimants/Respondents<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Chief E. O. Onyema with S. U. Eke for the Defendants/ Applicants</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:2.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-indent:.5in; line-height:normal"><b><u><span style="font-size:8.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-ansi-language:EN-US"> </span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:2.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-indent:.5in; line-height:normal"><b><u><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-ansi-language:EN-US">RULING/JUDGMENT<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">This suit was commenced by way of complaint on April 1 2015 with the Claimants seeking against the Defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs: <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:63.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.5in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"">1.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">A Declaration that the purported termination of the employment of the Claimants as drivers in the Imo Municipal Transport Service (IMTS) or Government of Imo State Mass Transit Company (MTC) as it is currently renamed by the defendants was baseless, unlawful, and motivated by malice, cruelty, bad faith and prejudice and therefore without effect.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:63.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.5in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"">2.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">An Order of court restoring the Claimants to their jobs as drivers in the Imo Municipal Transport Service (IMTS) or Government of Imo State Mass Transit Company (MTC).<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:63.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.5in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"">3.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">An order to pay the Claimants their arrears of salary from the date of purported termination to the date of the restoration of their employment is ordered and implemented as the purported termination was null and void ab initio; or in the alternative 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:63.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.5in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"">4.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">The sum of Fifty Million Naira only (<s>N</s>50,000,000.00) Naira being general damages for the unlawful and improper displacement of the Claimants from their employment and traumatic and distressing pains and hardships suffered by the Claimants as a result of the wrongful, malicious, unreasonable and unconstitutional acts of the Defendants against the Claimants.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">By a<b> </b>motion on notice filed on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2016 and brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this court as preserved by Section (6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, The defendants/applicants’ counsel sought an order of court dismissing this suit for being incompetent and statute barred, and that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. The grounds upon which the application was made are <a name="_GoBack"></a>as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <ol style="margin-top:0in" start="1" type="i"> <li class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;line-height:normal;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">This suit was filed on 1/4/2015 in respect of a cause of action alleged to have arisen on 27/2/2012.<o:p></o:p></span></li> <li class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;line-height:normal;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">The 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendants against whom the suit was filed are Public Officers under the Provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act.<o:p></o:p></span></li> <li class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;line-height:normal;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">This suit is improperly constituted as a representative action.<o:p></o:p></span></li> <li class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;line-height:normal;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo2"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">The claimants are not entitled to maintain an action that is statute barred and the Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain such action.<o:p></o:p></span></li> </ol> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">The motion was supported by an affidavit of 5 paragraphs deposed to by one Olivia Ezeala, upon which the applicants have placed reliance.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">In the Written Address in support of the application, the Defendants/Applicants’ Counsel nominated two issues for the consideration of the court, which are:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:27.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l4 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family: "Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">1.<span style="font-style: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></i></b><!--[endif]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Whether this suit is statue barred having regard to the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:27.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l4 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family: "Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">2.<span style="font-style: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></i></b><!--[endif]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> Whether this suit is properly constituted to give the Honourable Court jurisdiction to entertain same. <o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;font-family: "Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">In arguing the first issue, counsel submitted that challenge to the competence of an action on the ground that an action is statute barred is, unarguably, a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the action. The question therefore is; at what stage of the proceedings can such a challenge be raised? The Supreme Court per, Uwaifo JSC, answered this poser in <b>N.D.I.C. vs. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA</b> <b>(2002) 95 LRCN 389 at 400 – 401</b> as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:27.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">“It is now beyond argument that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal….It is plain from the authorities that at any stage sufficient facts or materials are available to raise the issue of jurisdiction, or that it has become apparent to any party to the action that it can be canvassed, there is no reason why there should be delay in raising it…..It depends on what materials are available. It could be taken on the basis of the Statement of Claim……it could be taken on the basis of the evidence received…, or by motion supported by affidavit giving the full facts upon which reliance is placed …But certainly it could be taken on the face of the Writ of Summons where appropriate.” <o:p></o:p></span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">See also<b> </b>the cases of:<b> <o:p></o:p></b></span></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:25.1pt;mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family: "Comic Sans MS"">1.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">COMFORT vs. ALMO GASES LTD. (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 335) 93 at 103,<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:25.1pt;mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family: "Comic Sans MS"">2.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">NASIR vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2010) 1 – 2 SC 65; <o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:25.1pt;mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family: "Comic Sans MS"">3.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">NPA vs. AJOBI (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 471.<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:25.1pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align: justify;text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";mso-fareast-font-family: "Comic Sans MS";mso-bidi-font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">4.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">FRANK vs. ABDU (2003) FWLR (Pt. 158) 1330</span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Similarly, counsel submitted that this suit was commenced by a Complaint filed by the Claimants on 1/4/2015. A perusal of the court processes also shows that the Defendants on record are Public Officers within the purview of the Public Officers Protection Act. This is so because, it is now settled law that “Public Officers” for the purposes of the Act include both natural and artificial persons. See:<b> IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (1998) 64 LRCN 504; OFFORBOCHE vs. OGOJA LOCAL GOVT (2001) 90 LRCN 2782 at 2798-2799</b>. Counsel submitted further that by the provisions of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, it is provided that any action, prosecution or other proceedings against any Public Officer in respect of any act or any alleged neglect or default done or made in the pursuance or execution of any law or public duty or authority must be commenced within three (3) months of the act, neglect, or default complained of. In explaining what the claimants’ cause of action is, counsel referred to the case of <b>EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (NO. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 20</b> where a cause of action was defined as “the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action. It is the factual situation which gives a person a right to judicial relief.” It is the opinion of counsel that the Claimants’ cause of action arose when their employment as project drivers was terminated on 27/2/2012. See <b>EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1996) 6 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 71 @ page 78; (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 </b>and<b> IWEKA vs. S.C.O.A. NIG. LTD (2007) 76 LRCN 572 at 592.</b><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Further, counsel contended that comparing the date the cause of action arose to the date this action was filed, 1/4/2015 makes it a period of 3 years and 1 month; a period clearly outside the period of 3 months stipulated by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. It is counsel’s submission that this action is manifestly statute barred. See the cases of<b> YARE vs. NATIONAL SALARIES, WAGES AND INCOME COMMISSION (2013) 219 LRCN (Pt. 2) 53</b>, and <b>NASIR vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (supra)</b>. It is the further contention of counsel that the consequence for the Claimants who failed to file his action within the time frame prescribed by law; is that their action is not maintainable. See <b>EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (supra)</b>. In which case, counsel argued that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. See <b>RALEIGH INDUSTRIES (NIG.) LTD vs. NWAIWU (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 760 at 772</b>. In view of the foregoing, counsel submitted that this action ought not to be allowed to continue as the same is statute barred and the Court lacks jurisdiction to continue hearing the same. See the case of <b>WILLIAMS vs. WILLIAMS (1995) 27 LRCN 147 at 162</b>, where the Supreme Court stated as follows: <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;line-height:normal"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">“Where therefore, it is obvious from the facts before the court that no further proceedings would help a case, there is inherent jurisdiction in the court to dismiss or strike out the claim as the case may be on submissions made to it….”<o:p></o:p></span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Counsel urged the Court to resolve the sole issue for determination in the affirmative by holding that this suit is statute-barred and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction to continue hearing the same and to make the proper order of dismissal. See <b>NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY PLC vs. LOTUS PLASTIC LTD (2006) 134 LRCN 549 at 579</b>. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;font-family: "Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that a perusal of the originating processes reveal that this suit was filed by the claimants in a representative capacity <b><i>“for themselves and 22 others”</i></b>. Counsel further submitted that this suit is not properly constituted because the Claimants did not clearly define the group or class they are representing. Counsel cited the English case of <b>MARKT& CO LTD vs. KNIGHT STEAMSHIP LTD (1910) 2 KB 1021 at 1034</b> where it was held that <i>“it is impossible for the court to give any judgment as to the right of parties by virtue of their being members of a class without it being defined what constitutes membership of the class”</i>. Again, counsel argued that the law is settled that the real party in a representative action is the group which the named persons represent. In the instant case, the group represented is imprecise which is incapable of maintaining an action. See <b>ENANG vs. ADU (1981) 11-12 SC 25 at 32; SHARON PAINTS AND CHEMICAL LTD vs. EZENWANKU (2001) FWLR (Pt. 43) 290</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Similarly, counsel submitted that a representative action properly lies when the cause of action sought to be ventilated accrues to the group as a whole and not to the individual members of the group. See UKATTA vs. NDINAEZE (1997) 49 LRCN 884. It is counsel’s further submission that from the processes filed, it is evident that the cause of action is an alleged breach of contract of employment. The Claimants were employed and paid individually. Therefore, there is no common interest to justify a representative action. More so, counsel argued that it is improper and bad for misjoinder of parties and cause of action; for several employees to join in one suit for termination of their respective personal employments. See <b>ADEDIRAN vs. INTERLAND TRANSPORT LTD (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 155</b>, and <b>NBC PLC vs. EDWARD (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1443) 201</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">In conclusion, counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in the defendants’ favour and grant this application.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">On 25/5/2016, the Claimants/Respondents in opposition have filed a counter affidavit of 7 paragraphs deposed to by the 1st Claimant, upon which they have placed reliance as the factual basis for opposing the application. In the accompanying written address, counsel for Claimants/Respondents’ adopted the issues formulated by the Defendants’ counsel.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">In arguing the first issue, counsel contended that the arguments of the Defendants’ counsel departed from the wrongful assumption that the Defendants are public officers. Counsel contended further that in doing so, the defence failed to establish the conditions enumerated in <b>CBN vs. UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 998) 555</b>. One of the said conditions is that to be protected by the POPA, the defendants have to establish that they are public officers within the meaning of Section 318(i) of the 1999 Constitution. It is counsel’s further contention that the meaning of public service in the Constitution is service of the state in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State. That is to say, public service means non-political offices to the State Government. In the same vein, counsel cited the case of <b>ABIODUN DADA vs. PROFESSOR ADEYEYE & 5 ORS (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 913) 1 at 19-20</b>, where it was held that the Governor of a state and other political office holders are not in the public service of the state within the meaning of Section 318(i) of the 1999 Constitution. See also <b>MOMOH vs. OKEWALE (1977) 6 SC 81</b> where the court held that anyone not employed by the Federal or state Public Service Commission is not a Public Officer to be protected by the POPA. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Again, counsel argued that the defendants counsel’s argument that the cause of action in this suit arose on 27/2/2012 is erroneous because after that date, the claimants embarked on several measures to pressure the defendants to reinstate them before filing this action. Those measures in counsel’s opinion constitute a set of facts giving rise to enforceable claims.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Regarding issue two, counsel argued that the common interest in this suit is evident from the fact that all the claimants’ employment were terminated on the same day, for the same reason, and in the same manner. Counsel argued further that the rule of representative actions was derived from the Chancery Courts in England in order to forestall multiplicity of suits. See OMOREDE vs. ELEAZU (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 183) 85 where it was held that:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify"><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt; line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">“Even though the interests of individual members of a family… are not exactly identical in content and quality, a member can properly represent the family…” <o:p></o:p></span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">See also <b>ANATOGU vs. AG EASTERN NIGERIA (1978) 11 SC 109</b>. Thus, counsel submitted that if the named parties in this suit are proper parties, the submission of the defendants’ counsel that the entire suit be struck out on the ground of irregular description of unnamed parties is not supportable. This is owing to the fact that the proper order for the court to make if the proper parties are not before it is to direct that all parties likely to be affected by the outcome of the suit are joined; and not to strike out the suit as urged by the defendants’ counsel. Counsel urged the court to base its decision on justice and not technicality and dismiss the defendants’ application with cost.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">In reaction on 7/6/2016, the Defendants filed a Reply on points of law. In his Reply, counsel argued that the claimants counsel’s processes are not properly filed because no approved Legal practitioners’ seal was affixed as required by Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal practitioners 2007. See <b>YAKI vs. BAGUDA (2015) 249 LRCN 1</b>. Counsel urged the court to strike out and discountenance the written address.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Similarly, counsel submitted that the Claimants’ counter affidavit was filed outside the 7 days prescribed by Order 11 Rule 1(2) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, without any court order granting an extension of time regularizing the processes. On this ground, counsel urged the court to strike out the processes. Also, counsel contended that in <b>IBRAHIM vs. JSC</b> the Supreme Court held that the POPA applies when a person is acting in discharge of a public duty or authority. See also <b>SULGRAVE HOLDINGS vs. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309</b>. Counsel urged the court to disregard the DADA’s case cited by the claimant’s counsel. Again, counsel argued that the case of <b>MOMOH vs. OKEWALE (supra)</b> was departed from in <b>IBRAHIM vs. JSC (supra)</b>. Counsel argued further that the Defendants are public officers even though they are not public service’s employees. See <b>ADAMU vs. TAKORI (2009) 1 NMLR 83</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Claimants’ counsel did not dispute the fact that the claimants’ employments were terminated on 27/2/2012. Relying on <b>EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (supra)</b>, counsel contended that time did not stop to run against the claimants because they were involved in reinstatement efforts. It is counsel’s further contention that the competence of the representative capacity of this suit is not a mere defect but a critical one affecting the constitution of the suit itself, making it incompetent and leaving the court no option than to strike it out. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:2.0in;text-align:justify;text-indent: .5in"><b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">COURT’s DECISION<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">One of the objections raised by the defendants against the suit is that the suit is statute barred. Let me first examine this aspect of the objection. <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">The grounds of the application contain, among others, that this suit was filed on 1/4/2015 in respect of a cause of action which arose on 27/2/2012 and that the defendants are Public Officers under the Public Officers Protection Act. In the affidavit in support of the motion, it was deposed that the Claimants filed this suit on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015 while the claimants stated in the statement of facts that their cause of action, which is the termination of their employment, arose on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2012. The suit is statute barred as a result. In the counter affidavit of the Claimants, it is deposed that the Defendants are not public officers as to be protected under the Public Officers’ Protection Act and that the Claimants struggle to get justice continued up to 2014 after which they resorted to court action.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">In his submissions, the Defendants counsel cited Section 2 of the Public Officers’ Protection Act and argued that the Claimants’ suit is statute barred not having been instituted within 3 months of the accrual of their cause of action. The said Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act provides:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;line-height:normal"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">“Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect:<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom: 0in;margin-left:.75in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify; text-indent:-.25in;line-height:normal;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo5"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">(a)<span style="font-style: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-family: "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></i></b><!--[endif]--><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">The import of the above provision is that an action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or of public duty or any default in respect of same must be commenced within 3 months from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Where the suit is not commenced within 3 months from the date of the cause of action, the action will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the action. See <b>IBRAHIM VS. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 36; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 599; NTUKS vs. N.P.A. (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) 392; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 417) 155 at 182</b>. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">A requirement of the above provision before a Defendant can seek to take advantage of the protection under the section is that it must be shown first that the defendant is a public officer. In their counter affidavit, the claimants averred that the defendants are not public officers and their counsel argued in his written address that the defendants failed to establish that they are public officers within the meaning of Section 318 (i) of 1999 Constitution. The Claimant’s counsel cited the case of <b>ABIODUN DADA vs. PROFESSOR ADEYEYE </b>where it was held that the Governor of a state and other political office holders are not in the public service of the state within the meaning of Section 318(i) of the 1999 Constitution. Having considered the arguments of the claimant’s counsel on this point, it appears to me he has confused “public service” with “public officer”. Counsel has also mistaken this suit to come under Section 308 (i) of the Constitution. The 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant is sued in his official capacity as Governor of Imo State and not in his private capacity as to bring the suit under Section 308 (i) of the Constitution. Secondly, the term “public officer” under the Public Officers Protection Act radically departs from the term “public service”. Officers in the public service are not necessarily public officers and a public officer must not necessary be in the public service. The meaning of the term “public officer” or “any person” as used in Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act has been defined extensively by the Supreme Court in <b>IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (supra) </b>to include persons occupying public offices or natural persons invested with performance of duties of a public nature and public institutions established by law. At page 44 of the report, it was held thus:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">“In the case on hand, I did hold that the words “Public Officer” or any “person” in public office as stipulated in section 2 of The Public Officers (Protection) Law, 1993 not only refer to natural persons or persons sued in their personal names but that they extend to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles. It seems to me plain that my observation in the Alhaji Nunku case with regards to the protection of public officers as individuals was not meant to refer to natural persons only but also covered artificial persons alike.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Also in <b>N.I.I.A vs. ANYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 246 at 263</b>, it was held that:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">“It is now settled law that an artificial person set up by the state to perform functions of a public nature is “a person” within the contemplation of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Further at page 268, it was observed thus:<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify"><b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">“The seal of finality having been placed on the interpretation of the words “public officer” to the effect that it extends to and includes a “public department” and consequently an artificial person, a public office or a public body, I am bound to follow same.” </span></i></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">It need not be stressed further that any person or office acting in discharge of a public duty or authority is a public officer within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act. This has no bearing with being employed in the Public service. That having been said, the question at this point is: Are the Defendants’ in this case public officers? In the 2<sup>nd</sup> ground of the application, the Defendants stated that the Defendants are public officers. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendants in this case are the Governor of Imo State and the Attorney General of Imo State respectively. In paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Claimant’s statement of facts, they were described as the Executive Governor of Imo State and the Attorney General of Imo State. These bodies are created in Section 176 (1) and 195 (1) of the 1999 Constitution</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%; font-family:"Comic Sans MS""> and they are sued in their official names or titles. They are no doubt public officers going by the meaning assigned to the term. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant was sued in his personal name and has been described in paragraph 3 of the statement of facts as a former Special Assistant to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant is not a public officer within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act. I find that the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants are public officers and the reason for which they were sued in this suit is in respect of their default in their public duties to the Claimants. </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">The 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendants can therefore seek to take protection under Section 2 of the Public Officer Protection Act in this suit.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">The question at this point is whether this suit is statute barred. In in answering this, it has to be determined when the Claimants’ cause of action arose and when they eventually filed this suit. In the affidavit in support of the application, it was deposed on behalf of the Defendants that the Claimants filed this suit on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015 while their cause of action, which is the termination of their employment, arose on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2012. The Claimants on the other hand, although denied the Defendants averments, did not give any contrary date when the cause of action arose or when the suit was filed. In any case, I have looked at the record and I see that the suit was filed on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015. I have also observed that the Claimants’ suit is challenging the termination of their employments. This is apparent in reliefs 1 and 2 sought by the Claimants. Upon going through the averments in paragraphs 17 to 21 of the Claimants’ statement of facts, it is clear to me that the termination of the Claimants’ employment occurred on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2012. That is to say the Claimants’ cause of action in this suit arose on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2012. The Claimants counsel has argued however that the contention that the cause of action in this suit arose on 27/2/2012 is erroneous because after that date, the Claimants embarked on several measures to pressure the Defendants to reinstate them before filing this action. Perhaps, it is counsel’s view that those measures taken by the Claimants’ amount to extension of the limitation period. It must be mentioned that once a statute prescribes a time for doing an act, there cannot be a valid performance of the act outside the prescribed time. It is the law that where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period of time, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. This is because an action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. See <b>ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604;</b> <b>INEC vs. OKORONKWO (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 488) 227 at 247. </b>Therefore, the alleged measures or steps taken by the Claimants to get themselves reinstated cannot stop the time limited by statute within which to institute action against the Defendants from running.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size:4.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Comic Sans MS";color:red"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Between the time the Claimants’ cause of action arose and the time they filed this suit was period of over 3 years. It is clear from the foregoing that this suit was filed more than 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. The Claimants did not commence this suit against the Defendants within the statutorily prescribed period. By the effect of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, the Claimants suit is clearly statute barred having been filed outside the statutory period. It is trite law that suits instituted outside the time stipulated by the statute of limitation is statute barred and cannot be entertained by the courts. This suit is not competent and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. Consequently, the suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 4pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Ruling is entered accordingly.<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 8pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 8pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 13pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe<o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Comic Sans MS";">Judge<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;line-height:normal"><br></p>