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<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><u>REPRESENTATION<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">King Wilson, for the claimant.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Abdullahi Abubakar, Senior State Counsel, for the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">M. U. Ibrahim, for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><u>RULING<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">This is a transferred case from the Federal High Court, Lagos Division. The claimant had filed this case at the Federal High Court on 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2009; and by his amended originating processes claimed the following reliefs –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>i.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->A declaration that the Plaintiff having sustained gunshot wound at war front in the course of his professional duty and service to the Nation is entitled to be well catered for and entitled to be treated at the expense of the defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>ii.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->A declaration that the Plaintiff having been wounded as a result of the enemy action and having been recommended by his Command is entitled to Purple Heart Medal Award as provided for in the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Nigerian Armed Forces Officers (2007) Revised.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>iii.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->A declaration that the compulsory retirement of the Plaintiff is <i>mala fide</i> and malicious.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>iv.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order for the payment of the sum of €100,000 (One Hundred Thousand Euro) or its Naira equivalent being the sum incurred by the claimant during his foreign trip for better medical services outside the shores of Nigeria.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>v.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order for the payment of all the allowances and estacodes payable to an official of the same rank and file as the Plaintiff since 1997 and interest of 10 % on the said amount since the date of accrual.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>vi.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order for the payment of the sum of N750,000,000,000.00 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) being the sum payable on loss of income, negligent treatment of the Plaintiff’s injury and cost of procuring drugs.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>vii.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order for the award of gallantry medal (Nigerian Army Purple Heart) to the Plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->viii.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order directing the defendants to release the Course Report of the Plaintiff hitherto withheld by the defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>ix.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order directing the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants to release the Plaintiff’s NOKIA K750i or pay its equivalent value of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira).<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>x.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order for a comprehensive life insurance scheme with a registered insurance company taken by the defendants for the benefit of the Plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>xi.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Payment of gratuities, terminal benefits, pensions accruable to the Plaintiff in compliance with the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Nigerian Armed Forces Officers 2007 (Revised).<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.5in; mso-text-indent-alt:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span>xii.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Cost of this suit.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">It was after the case was transferred to this Court from the Federal High Court that the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants filed on 27<sup>th</sup> August 2014 a preliminary objection, an objection that the counsel to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> defendants also adopted together with submissions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants. By the preliminary objection, the defendants are praying this Court to decline jurisdiction in this case on the ground that the case is statute-barred under the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. To the defendants, it is the statement of claim that outlines a claimant’s case and so it is to it that a court must look in order to ascertain if it has jurisdiction over the case, citing <i>Ekezhi v. Military Governor of Bendel State</i> [1992] 3 NWLR (Pt. 227) 39 and <i>Korau v. Korua</i> [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 212.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The defendants went on that the claimant’s action is predicated on his compulsory retirement from the Nigerian Army on 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008; and this suit was filed on 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2009 i.e. more than three months after the cause of action accrued. As such the suit is statute-barred having been caught by the Public Officers Protection Act. The defendants then referred the Court to <i>Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd v. AG Federation</i> [2008] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 470, <i>Min. FCT v. MH (Nig) Ltd</i> [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 272 at 296 and <i>Nasir v. CSC, Kano State</i> [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253 at 276. The defendants also referred the Court to the claimant’s reliefs i, ii, vi and vii, and paragraphs 15 of the statement of facts, and then submitted that they all show that the cause of action that rise to these reliefs arose on 6<sup>th</sup> January 1998. That the claims must accordingly fail given section 2 of the Public Officers Act. Also that by paragraph 64 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that he was purportedly retired on 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008. That this means that relief iii praying that the compulsory retirement be declared <i>mala fide</i> and malicious cannot also stand on same ground. As for relief iv, that paragraphs 47 – 55 of the statement of facts make it clear that the cause of action arose on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2008; as such relief iv cannot stand on same ground. Aside from this fact, that the claimant pleaded a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> November 2006, which letter indicated that he had made arrangements to procure medical treatment at no cost to the Army. As for relief v, that it arose in 1997 and so is also caught by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. In terms of relief viii, that paragraph 66 of the statement of facts show that the Course Report was withheld since 2005, meaning that this too is caught by the limitation law. As for relief ix, that paragraph 61 of the statement of facts show the cause of action to have arisen on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2008; meaning that this also is caught by the limitation law. Relying on a number of case law authorities, the claimant concluded by calling on the Court to uphold the ground of the objection and strike out this case.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In reacting to the defendants’ objection, the claimant adopted the sole issue raised by the defendants i.e. that this case is statute-barred. To the claimant, assuming without conceding that the claimant’s cause of action arose on 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008, the Armed Forces Act Cap. A20 LFN 2004 negates the claimant approaching the Court until he has exhausted the administrative remedies available to him under the Act, citing section 178(1) of the Armed Forces Act, which provides that –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify">If an officer thinks himself wronged in any matter by a superior officer or authority and on application to his commanding officer does not obtain the redress to which he thinks he is entitled, he may make a complaint with respect to that matter to the Forces Council.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In other words, that time does not begin to run against an officer whose cause of action has arisen but cannot exercise same until he has exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. That complaint made by an officer after he felt wronged must be addressed and resolved one way or the other before approaching the Court. That in the instant case, the claimant took steps after 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008 culminating in the defendants’ letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> December 2008 but which was received by the claimant’s solicitor on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2009. To the defendants then, the right to come to Court became available to the claimant on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2009 and so this case cannot be said to be caught by the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimant then cited section 178(2) and (3) of the Armed Forces Act, which provides as follows –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify">(2) On receiving a complaint under subsection (1) of this section, the Forces Council shall investigate the matter and grant any redress which appears to the Forces Council to be necessary or if the complainant so requires, the Forces Council shall make its report on the complaint in order to seek the directions of the President on the matter.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify">(3) Subject to subsection (1) of this section, an officer who feels he has been wronged in any matter shall first exhaust the administrative remedies available to him under this section of this Act before embarking on any other action.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimant continued that his pleadings expressly show that the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant acted in bad faith in treating his complaint and petition. That the law is trite that the Public Officers Protection Act does not avail or protect officers who acted <i>mala fide</i> or abused their office, citing paragraphs 24, 25, 27 – 32, 34 – 37, 39, 40, 45, 49 – 51, 54, 56, 61 – 79, 81, 82 and 88 of the statement of facts, and arguing that <i>Ibeto Cement Co. Ltd v. AG Federation</i> [2008] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 470 cited by the defendants is not helpful to their case given that the Court of Appeal held that case that proven case of malice on the part of the public officer means that the protection afforded him ceases to avail him.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimant also argued that the injury complained of by him is a continuing act and as such the defendants cannot rely on the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to <i>Abiodun v. AG Federation</i> [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 359 at 412 – 413, <i>Duzu v. Yinusa</i> [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 80 at 124 and <i>AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 – 150. To the claimant, the act of the defendants in this case is a continuing breach against the interest of the claimant as the defendants have refused and or neglected to pay him his due and just entitlements as provided under the Rules of the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant. That section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act would never apply to such case, citing <i>Offoboche v. Ogoja LG</i> [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458 at 485 and <i>Aremo II v. Adekanye</i> [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572 at 593.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Another exception to the limitation law, according to the claimant, is that it will not apply in cases of recovery of land, breach of contract or claims for work and labour done, citing <i>Osun State Government v. Danlami (Nig) Ltd</i> [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66 at 83 – 84 and referring to paragraphs 1 and 10 of the statement of facts, which show the claimant to have a contract with the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant; and an employment contract is first and foremost a contract, citing <i>Iyere v. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill Ltd</i> [2008] 12 NCLR 1. The claimant concluded this argument by urging the Court to hold that the defendants are not protected under the Public Officers Protection Act as the action of the defendants is a breach of contract.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In orally adopting his written address, the claimant’s counsel drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the defendants did not plead the issue of statute-barred in their statement of defence and so cannot raise same at this juncture.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimant then concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection with substantial cost as same is frivolous and meant to cause unnecessary waste of litigation time.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The defendants reacted on points of law. To the defendants, the claimant’s reliance on section 178(3) of the Armed Forces Act and argument that time only begins to run after the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a great misconception. That the letter of 18<sup>th</sup> September 2008 written to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and copied to named officers of the Senate, House of Representatives and Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly, Governor of Akwa Ibom State, Chairman of Itu LGA, the Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of Army Staff, etc is not in compliance with section 178(3) of the Armed Forces Act given that the claimant did not approach the Armed Forces Council nor did he write to his Commanding Officer on the issues of his claim before this Court. That the same applies to the letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2008 addressed to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and copied to Attorney-General of the Federation, Headquarters 9 Brigade, Nigerian Army Cantonment Ikeja, Governor of Akwa Ibom State and Speaker Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly, in that it does not comply with section 178(1) of the Armed Forces Act. That the claimant did not approach the appropriate authority; as such he cannot claim that his action is not caught up by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. In any event, that the letter of 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2008 at page 5 clearly indicated that the claimant was not interested in contesting his compulsory retirement. The defendants concluded by approximating the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as Chairman of the Armed Forces Council to his position as Visitor to a University. Citing <i>Anya v. Iyayi</i> [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 359, the defendants submitted that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is a different person in law from the Chairman of the Armed Forces Council. The defendants then urged the Court to uphold their objection.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><u>COURT’S DECISION<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. The sole issue before the Court is whether this instant case is statute-barred. The defendants think it is, while the claimant thinks otherwise. The argument of the claimant is structured at two levels: reliance on section 178(1) and (3) of the Armed Forces Act as well as that his case comes within the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The argument of the claimant is that by a combined reading of section 178(1) and (3) of the Armed Forces Act, the claimant is enjoined to exhaust the domestic remedies by the Armed Forces Act before he can come to Court; as such the present action is not statute-barred. The problem with this argument is that a claimant relying on that must plead same in his/her statement of facts. This is not the case in the instant suit. The claimant did not plead in his statement facts that he exhausted the domestic remedies before filing this suit to show that he complied with the requirements of the Armed Forces Act as his counsel argues. Paragraphs 69, 70 and 71 of the statement of facts relied upon by counsel to the claimants when orally adopting his written address do not qualify as the pleadings needed to authenticate a claim of exhaustion of domestic remedies before filing an action in Court. In <i>Dr (Mrs.) Mojisola Olubunmi Nkiko v. Federal University of Agriculture Abeokuta</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/385/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2015 this Court held that –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify">I note the case of <i>Yare v. National Salaries, Wages and Income Commission (NSWIC)</i> [2013] 5 – 7 MJSC (Pt. I) 1, which appears to hold that a claimant must not wait for the outcome of an appeal before coming to Court, a position also held by my learned brother [Hon. Justice J. D. Peters] in <i><span lang="EN-GB">Dr Janet Titilayo Bamgbose v. Federal University of Agriculture Abeokuta</span></i><span lang="EN-GB"> [unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/371/2013 delivered on 25<sup>th</sup> March 2014].</span> But a closer reading of <i>Yare</i> will show that the exhaustion of domestic remedies enjoined by statute as is the case in the instant case was not an issue as such and was not so raised. Secondly, even where domestic remedies are enjoined by statute, it would seem that its requirement as such and the facts that give rise to it must be pleaded if a plea of the limitation law is to be defeated by it.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">By these authorities, a claimant is not expected to wait for the outcome of an appeal before coming to Court; and even if he did, he must plead the domestic remedies as such, the facts giving rise to them and the fact of their exhaustion necessitating the filing of the action. All of this was not the case in the instant suit. In any case, I agree with the defendants that writing letters and copying varying officers of Federal, State and Local Governments cannot be the exhaustion of administrative remedies enjoined by section 178 of the Armed Forces Act. I accordingly do not agree with the claimant in terms of his argument as to exhaustion of domestic remedies before coming to Court. That argument is hereby rejected.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimant had all through argued that his case comes under the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act. The arguments of the claimant here as to the limitation law not applying to cases of recovery of land, breach of contract or claims for work and labour done (<i>Osun State Government v. Danlami (Nig) Ltd</i> [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66 at 83 – 84); as to continuance of injury or damage (<i>AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 – 150); as to acting in bad faith; and as to the limitation law being pleaded; have all been canvassed by the law firm of the claimant in the instant case in another case, <i>Mr. Iyede Onome Festus & anor v. Management Board of Delta State University Teaching Hospital & anor</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/312/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2014, where this Court rejected the arguments. I am surprised that the same law firm is here canvassing the same rejected arguments. For all the reasons already given and the authorities cited in<i> Mr. Iyede Onome Festus & anor v. Management Board of Delta State University Teaching Hospital & anor</i>, I equally reject the claimant’s argument in the instant case. I only need to remind the claimant to now and properly note (so as not to repeat the folly of re-canvassing rejected arguments) that the limitation law applies to contracts of employment, the defence of limitation of action need not be pleaded before it can be relied on (<i>Oniode Babajide v. The Nigerian Army & anor</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/61/2014 the ruling of which was delivered on 25<sup>th</sup> February 2016), and the definition of the phrase “continuance of the injury” by case law authorities means continuance of the “act which caused the injury” and not the injury itself. See<i> Okafor v. AG, Anambra State</i> [2001] FWLR (Pt. 58) 1127 at 1146 D – G relying on the English Court of Appeal case of <i>Carrey v. Bermondsey Metropolitan Bourough Council</i> [1903] 675 P. 447; 20 TLR 2, <i>Amamiwe v. The Local School Board</i> [1971] 2 NMLR 57 at 58 and <i>Obiefuna v. Okoye</i> [1961] All NLR 357.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On the whole, I agree with the defendants that this case is statute-barred, the cause of action being the compulsory retirement of the claimant on 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008. Having to file this action in this Court on 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2009 means that it was filed outside of the 3 months enjoined by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. This being the case, the suit is statute-barred and as such this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it. I so find and hold. As enjoined by <i>Nigerian Ports Authority Plc v. Lotus Plastics Ltd & </i>anor [2005] LPELR-2028(SC); 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158, this case is hereby dismissed.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center">……………………………………<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center">Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD<o:p></o:p></p>