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<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><u>REPRESENTATION<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Mrs. Bolanle Komolafe, for the claimants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Mohammed Adamu, and with him is Shamsideen Olaleye, for the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Chigozie Iwuoha, for the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">No legal representation for the 4<sup>th</sup> defendant.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><u>RULING<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimants by a complaint dated and filed on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014 (together with the accompanying originating processes) are claiming against the defendants for the following reliefs –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->a.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->A declaration that the defendants are bound to pay the weigh-in-allowance to staff of the National Theatre irrespective of membership of any trade union.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->b.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order of this Honourable Court that the defendants pay forthwith weigh-in-allowances to members of staff of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant who are members of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant from November 2013 till date of judgment.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->c.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their privies, servants and/or agents from excluding members of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant who are on Grade level 13 and above from being part of union leadership.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->d.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their privies, servants and/or agents from further acts of victimization, oppression and unfair labour practice on the defendants.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->e.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->An order that any purported suspension, dismissal or any other disciplinary action carried out by the defendants against the claimants are unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and therefore null and void.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->f.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->The sum of N2 Million as general damages against the defendants jointly and severally.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2"><!--[if !supportLists]-->g.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Cost of this action.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants entered formal appearance by filing its memorandum of appearance and then filed a notice of preliminary objection. The preliminary objection is dated and filed on 6<sup>th</sup> May 2014. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants proceeded to join issues with the claimant by filing their statement of defence/counterclaim, list of witness, witness statement on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants’ notice of preliminary objection is brought pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. By the objection, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants are challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and determine this suit as presently constituted. The grounds for the preliminary objection are –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->1.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->That this suit is statute-barred by virtue of the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->2.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->That going by the nature of the claim, the suit is premature.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->3.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->That the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is not a juristic person upon which the Honourable Court can exercise jurisdiction.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->4.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->That the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has no <i>locus standi</i> to institute this action as presently constituted.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><!--[if !supportLists]-->5.<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->And for such other or further orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In support of the preliminary objection is a written address. The claimants reacted by filing their written address titled “Claimants’ Reply to Preliminary Objection”, to which the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants filed a reply on points of law.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On its part, the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant entered formal appearance and then filed a motion urging the Court to strike out the name of the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant from this suit for non-disclosure of a reasonable cause of action. The motion is supported by an affidavit and a written address. However, the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant never came to court to move it.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In arguing their preliminary objection, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants framed four issues for the determination of the Court, namely –<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]-->a)<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Whether this suit is caught up by the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41 LFN 2004 and therefore statute-barred.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]-->b)<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Whether going by the claim of the claimants, the suit is premature.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]-->c)<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Whether the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in; mso-list:l2 level1 lfo3"><!--[if !supportLists]-->d)<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-size: 7pt;"> </span><!--[endif]-->Whether the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has the <i>locus standi</i> to institute the present action.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Regarding issue a), the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that going by the claimants’ averments in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12(i) and (ii), 13, 14, 15, 16 and 22(2) of the statement of facts dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014 this suit is statute-barred. Furthermore, that paragraph (b) of the complaint and paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14(vi), (vii) and (x), 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the witness statement on oath clearly shows that the matter was commenced 3 months as provided by the said Act. That this action is for the payment of weigh-in-allowances which have been due since November 2013; and since this action was filed on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014, it means that it was filed 5 months after the cause of action arose and so the action is statute-barred, citing section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, <i>Obiefuna v. Okoye</i> [1961] All NLR 357, <i>AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 144 and <i>British Airways Plc v. Akinyosoye</i> [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 722 at 730.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">As for issue b) i.e. whether the suit is premature, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that the averments of the claimants point towards a trade dispute between the claimants and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants the resolution of which this Court cannot be a court of first instance, citing sections 1 and 2 of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) Cap. T8 LFN 2004.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">As relates to issue c) i.e. whether the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that there is no body or agency of government established under such name. That in the claimants’ list of documents accompanying their complaint, the last document so listed and titled “Complaint…between National Theatre and the National Troupe of Nigeria Board…” clearly states the registered or established name under the Act. Relying on <i>Nkpornwi v. Ejire</i> [2019] All FWLR (Pt. 499) 450 at 482 (wrong citation as to year), the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants contended that no legal action can be instituted by or against any party other than a natural person unless such a party is accorded personality by a statute, expressly or impliedly of by common law. In any event, that suing the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant who is an agent of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is uncalled for as the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant worked and executed his duties under the supposed 1<sup>st</sup> defendant.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On issue d) i.e. whether the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has <i>locus standi</i> to institute this action, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants answered in the negative. That there is nothing before the Court to show that the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant ever exist. That there is no evidence of registration or incorporation, no single list of its members, nothing like its constitution or rule book before the Court, and also that there is nothing like the amount claimed. That since the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has not shown to the Court its interest and connection with the defendants, then it lacks the locus to institute this action, citing <i>Emezi v. Osuagwu</i> [2005] 30 WRN 1 at 19.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In reacting to the preliminary objection, the claimants did so as per the issues framed by the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants. Accordingly, as per issue a) i.e. whether the case is statute-barred given section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, the claimants submitted that this Act was intended to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation and not to deprive a party of legal capacity to ventilate his grievance in the face of stark injustice. Therefore, that it does not provide a comprehensive cover for public offices and public officers as there are exceptions provided under the law such as the continuance of damage or injury and acting outside the colour of office or outside statutory or constitutional duty exceptions, referring to <i>AG of Rivers State v. AG of Bayelsa State & anor</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 and <i>CBN v. Amao & anor</i> [2011] 23 NLLR (Pt. 66) 313. Additionally that abuse of office and bad faith on the part of a public officer are factors which will rob a public officer of protection under the Act, citing <i>Offoboche v. Ogoja LG</i> [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458. That there is no graver instance of blatant abuse of office and bad faith than in the instant case where the defendants are using their public offices to wrought acts of victimization on the claimants in total contradiction of our labour laws that allow for union membership without victimization. The claimants then cited and relied on <i>CBN v. Amao & anor</i> [2011] 23 NLLR (Pt. 66) 313; as well as <i>Abiodun & ors v. Governing Council, College of Education Oyo & anor</i> [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 62) 316, where this Court held the ventilation of labour/employment rights not to be covered by the limitation laws.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">That in the instant case, a cursory look at the statement of facts will disclose that the claims of the claimants come squarely within the exceptions set out by the Court to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act. In the first place, that the weigh-in allowances of the members of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant are still being illegally withheld from them by the defendants while members of their sister union with the same work specifications are paid weigh-in allowances; hence the unsavory acts of victimization, unfair labour practice and discrimination are causing continuous injury to the claimants. Secondly, that the actions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant are clearly personal and an abuse of his office as it is not his duty to embark on recruitment of members for the other union within the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In reply to issue b) i.e. whether the suit is premature, the claimants submitted that given their reliefs, the suit clearly falls within the jurisdiction of this Court on entitlements. Citing section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. That the grouse of the claimants is that it is unlawful and an unfair labour practice for members of a trade union to be deprived of their weigh-in allowances on the basis of being members of a trade union. That the claimants are also seeking injunctive reliefs against the defendants in the interest of justice. That it is clearly misconceived of the defendants to argue that these are not claims which cannot be entertained by this Court, referring to <i>Mandah v. Olukoya & ors</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/156/2012 the ruling of which was delivered on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2013.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Regarding issue c) i.e. whether the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued, the claimants submitted that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant being a creation of statute is unequivocally and undoubtedly capable of suing and being sued, referring to section 1(2)(a) of the National Theatre and the National Troupe of Nigeria Board Decree 47 of 1991, which provides that there shall be established under the general supervision of the Board a National Theatre, citing <i>Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd</i> [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429 at 445 – 446, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are bodies generally regarded as quasi or near corporations on whom statutes expressly or impliedly confer a right to sue or be sued though unincorporated. That it is noteworthy that in one breath the defendants argue that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is not accorded a personality by statute and in another breath they are arguing that the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant is an agent of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant and ought not to be sued along with the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant. That this is approbating and reprobating on the part of counsel, which should not be allowed, citing <i>CAC v. AUPCTRE</i> [2005] 2 NLLR (Pt. 2) 157 and <i>Haruna v. Modibbo</i> [2004] 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 487 at 568.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On issue d) i.e. whether the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has the locus to sue, the claimants submitted that it is an elementary and trite principle of law that a registered trade union has the locus to sue on behalf of its members. The claimants concluded by urging the Court to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain this matter.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">In reacting on points of law, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that the cases cited by the claimants in terms of issue a) were all misapplied as there is no feature to indicate that the case of the claimants falls within the exceptions to the rule; nor is the case of the claimants one of pension rights as to make the cases applicable. That the claimants did not show by any document or statute how they are entitled to their claims and how much is denied to each individual either monthly, quarterly or yearly.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">As for issue b), the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and <i>Mandah v. Olukoya & ors</i> (<i>supra</i>) cited and relied upon by the claimants are not relevant to the claimants’ present argument. That the reliefs of the claimant clearly point to a trade dispute as was defined in <i>Uzoaru & anor v. Dangote Cement Plc & anor</i> [2013] 31 NLLR (Pt. 89) at 322 – 323 as well as section 54 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006. That disputes involving trade unions must pass through the processes of conciliation and arbitration before any approach to this Court can be made, urging the Court to so hold.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On issue c), the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants submitted that the cases cited and relied upon by the claimants were all misapplied. That the basic truth is that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant derives its legitimacy through Decree 47 of 1991, which provides for the establishment of The National Theatre and the National Troupe of Nigeria Board. That there is nothing known to law as “The national Theatre of Nigeria”.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Regarding issue d), the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants merely rehashed their main arguments on the issue; and concluded that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><u>COURT’S DECISION<o:p></o:p></u></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. In considering the merit of this preliminary objection, I need to dispose of quickly some wrong assumptions of counsel. In addressing the issue whether this case is statute-barred, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants repeatedly contended that the claimants did not show by any document or statute how they are entitled to their claims and how much is denied to each individual either monthly, quarterly or yearly; and in relation to the issue whether the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant has <i>locus standi</i> to institute this action, they argued that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. All of this is unnecessary as arguments such as these all go to the merit of the case. They have no place in a preliminary objection such as the one under consideration.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Secondly, it is the argument of the claimants that the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants were approbating and reprobating when they argued that the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant is an agent of the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant even when their argument is that the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant has no legal personality to be sued as named. I think that the claimants are here making a mountain out of an anthill. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants very clearly indicated the context in which they raised that argument. They clearly referred to the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant as a “supposed 1<sup>st</sup> defendant” when they made their argument in that regard. The claimants chose to ignore this vital point insisting on seeing and reading things their own way.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Thirdly, when the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants argued that this case is premature, it was in the context of this Court not having original jurisdiction over the case. In other words, the question was whether this Court can assume original jurisdiction over the case. Once again, the claimants chose to ignore this vital point and instead argued as if the contention of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants was that this Court had no jurisdiction <i>at all</i> over the issues. The argument of the claimants as to the exclusivity of this Court’s jurisdiction over entitlements and the reference to section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, accordingly misses the point.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">These points made, I now proceed to the merit of the preliminary objection. The first issue raised by the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants is that the case is statute-barred given section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. The claimants did not contest the fact that their cause of action (the claim for weigh-in allowances) arose in November 2013 and that filing this case on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014 means that they filed the case 5 months after the cause of action arose. The claimants are also not contesting that the Public Officers Protection Act is accordingly applicable and that the defendants are public officers for purposes of the Act. The case of the claimants is that the exceptions in terms of continuance of damage or injury, acting outside the colour of office or outside statutory or constitutional duty, and abuse of office and bad faith on the part of a public officer apply to make this suit properly before this Court.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">It is accordingly the argument of the claimants that there is blatant abuse of office and bad faith in the instant case where the defendants are using their public offices to wrought acts of victimization on the claimants in total contradiction of our labour laws that allow for union membership without victimization. However, <i>Rahamaniyya United (Nig.) Ltd v. Ministry for Federal Capital Territory & ors</i> [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at 146, applying <i>Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd</i> [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to <i>Egbe v Adefarasin</i> [2002] 14 WRN 57 and <i>Aremo II v. Adekanye</i> [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC. It is in the attempt to show that the defendant acted <i>mala fide</i> and so come under the exception to the limitation rule that the claimants are making an issue as blatant abuse of office and bad faith. This argument, of course, turns the principle over its head as it is the very fact of the said blatant abuse of office and bad faith that brought the claimants to this Court in the first place. If the claimant’s counsel turns round to say that for this reason, the defendant cannot enjoy the benefit of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004, then there is some warped reasoning on his part in that regard. See <i>Joshua Mnenge v. Nigerian Army</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/22/2012 the ruling of which was delivered on 18<sup>th</sup> December 2012. A claimant who suffered abuse of office and bad faith cannot just sit at home and wake up when he wants outside of the limitation period, come to court and then say because of the abuse of office and bad faith, the defendant cannot raise the defence of the limitation law. The cause of action itself is the abuse of office and bad faith. Litigating it must be within the time frame allowed by the law. Any other thing would be indulging an indolent litigant, the very thing that the limitation law is set to guard against. The argument of the claimants in this regard goes to no issue and so is rejected.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimants placed reliance on <i>Abiodun & ors v. Governing Council, College of Education Oyo & anor</i> [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 62) 316, where this Court held the ventilation of labour/employment rights not to be covered by the limitation laws. I only need to point out here that the claimants appear dated. This Court has long discountenanced this stance given recent Supreme Court decisions that have continually held that the limitation law applies to employment cases. See, for instance, <i>Mr. Iyede Onome Festus & anor v. Management Board of Delta State University Teaching Hospital & anor</i> unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/312/2013 the ruling of which was delivered on July 3, 2014 where this Court reviewed the authorities.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The claimants also argued that the continuing damage or injury exception applies in their favour, relying on<i> AG of Rivers State v. AG of Bayelsa State & anor</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 148 and <i>CBN v. Amao & anor</i> [2011] 23 NLLR (Pt. 66) 313. Reliefs a) and b) claimed by the claimants are for a declaration and order as to payment of weigh-in allowances from November till date of judgment. The claimants are not asking for weigh-in allowances beyond the date of judgment. So how can they argue that this claim relates to an injury or damage that is continuing in order to enjoy the continuing injury or damage exception to the limitation law? The claim for weigh-in allowances arose in November 2013. This suit was filed on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014 i.e. over three months after the accrual of the cause of action. The test on continuance of damage or injury laid down by the Supreme Court in<i> AG, Rivers State v. AG, Bayelsa State & anor</i> [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 is one that relates to periodical payments, not one-off payments as is the case with especially relief b) as claimed by the claimants. See also<i> Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & ors v. The Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State & ors</i> [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 NIC. It is accordingly my finding and holding that the continuing injury or damage exception to the Public Officers Protection Act is not applicable in the instant case as to warrant this case not being statute-barred. The instant case was filed outside of the limitation period allowed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and so is statute-barred; and I so find and hold. This court accordingly has no jurisdiction over it; and I so hold.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Assuming I am wrong in holding that the case is statute-barred, does this Court even have original jurisdiction over it? By paragraph 1 of the statement of facts, the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant is a registered trade union. It is listed as items 2 of Parts A and B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap. T14 LFN 2004. By this fact, the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. The law had long recognized the capacity of trade unions to sue and be sued in their name. See, for instance, <i>Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions</i> [1985] LPELR-2792(SC); [1985] NWLR (Pt. 4) 755; [1985] 5 SC 343. The argument of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants as to the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant not having the locus to sue accordingly goes to no issue having no merit, and so is hereby discountenanced.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The second claimant is the Chairman of the branch of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant in the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant. See paragraph 2 of the statement of facts. The combination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of facts means that the actual party before the Court is the trade union in its corporate status, not its individual members. The complaints of the claimants relate to actions of the defendants towards the members of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant of which the 2<sup>nd</sup> claimant is the chairman. In paragraph 10 of the statement of facts, the claimants complained of acts of victimization, intimidation and harassment of their members; in paragraph 11, the complaint is inducement of members to change their union membership; in paragraph 12, the complaint is the oppression and intimidation of members who refused to cross-over to the rival trade union (with instances of the oppression and intimidation given including non-payment of weigh-in allowance); in paragraph 14, the complaint is members being forced to renounce their membership of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant; in paragraph 15, the complaint is victimization and unfair labour practice against members of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant; and in paragraph 16, the complaint is denial of the 1<sup>st</sup> claimant’s right to peaceful assembly. All of these complaints are then reinforced in paragraphs 17 to 22 of the statement of facts.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Do these complaints qualify as a trade dispute? The answer is resoundingly in the affirmative. Section 48 of the TDA defines “trade dispute” to mean “any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person”. In this definition, a trade dispute is a collective labour dispute. The instant case no doubt is a collective labour dispute. The law is that a trade dispute (collective labour dispute) must go through the dispute resolution processes of mediation, conciliation and arbitration before adjudication before this Court arise. See Part I of the TDA. In other words, as relates to trade disputes, the jurisdiction of this Court over such disputes is one that is appellate, not original; and this remains so despite section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. This is because, the jurisdiction of this Court has not in any way been taken away by insisting that such disputes go through mediation, conciliation and arbitration before adjudication before the Court is undertaken. The jurisdiction of this Court is merely contingent on the processes of Part I of the TDA being exhausted first before this Court can be approached. It is accordingly my finding that the complaints of the claimants in this case qualify as a trade dispute. This being the case, this Court has no original jurisdiction over it; and I so hold.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">The last issue calling for determination is whether the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued. The argument of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants is that the appropriate body to sue is the “National Theatre and the National Troupe of Nigeria Board”, not “National Theatre of Nigeria” as has been done by the claimants in the instant case. The test laid down in <i>Pfizer Incorporated & anor v, Prof. Idris Mohammed</i> [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1379) 155 is that a party incorrectly named can be corrected by an amendment, but not when the mistake is one of identity. In <i>Kayode Ajani Jokosenumi v. Nigeria Customs Service</i> unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/111/2014 the ruling of which delivered on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2015, this Court held it to be an error, not one of identity but one of simply incorrectly spelling a name when the claimant in that case sued “Nigeria Customs Service” instead of “Nigerian Customs Service Board”. See also <i>Omisore v. Aregbesola</i> [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 202. In the instant case, having to sue “National Theatre of Nigeria” and not “National Theatre and the National Troupe of Nigeria Board”, to my mind is merely an error as to a party incorrectly named and which can be corrected. The error is one of identity. The argument of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants in that regard accordingly goes to no issue and so is hereby discountenanced.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">On the whole, and for the avoidance of doubt, I hold that this case is statute-barred and so this Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Even if the case were not to be statute-barred, the dispute in issue and as couched is a trade dispute for which this Court has no original jurisdiction over the case. The case is accordingly dismissed.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify">Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center">……………………………………<o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center">Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD<o:p></o:p></p>