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Representation: I. C. Achara for the Claimant. J. I. Ogamba, with him, V. N. Onyeonoro (Mrs.), R. C. Obijuru (Miss) and E. C. Diala (Mrs.), for the Defendants. JUDGMENT The Claimant brought this suit on the 4th day of March, 2015, claiming against the Defendants, jointly and severally the following reliefs: a. A Declaration that the purported disengagement of the Claimant from the service of the 1st and 2nd Defendants by the 3rd Defendant, a non-party to the Claimant’s contract of employment, without sufficient notice to the Claimant and on the alleged ground of restructuring is wrongful, irregular, unlawful, ultra vires, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. b. A Declaration that the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants is still valid and subsisting having not been lawfully and properly determined. c. An Order that the Claimant be reinstated to the status quo ante and be paid all his salaries, benefits and entitlements accruing under his contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants from the date of his purported termination of employment on the 28th day of June, 2013 till date. d. An Order of Injunction perpetually restraining the Defendants, their agents, workers and servants from henceforth acting adversely towards the Claimant in the cause of his employment or otherwise victimizing and or unlawfully terminating the claimant’s contract of employment. e. In alternative to reliefs (b), (c) and (d) above, an order compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as damages for wrongful determination of the Claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants and incalculable hardship caused the Claimant in the circumstances. f. A Declaration that the 1stand 2nd Defendants were under a lawful duty to provide a safe and efficient system of work as well as adequate plant and equipment plus proper supervision for the Claimant in the course of his employment with them, and that the failure of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to provide the Claimant with a bullet proof bullion van and full security escort details of 2 escort vans of not less than 14 policemen for the movement of huge sums of money from Onitsha to Benin city on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Defendants on 7th day of February 2008 is a breach of that duty owed to the Claimant as an employee. g. A Declaration that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are personally liable for the injuries sustained by the Claimant during the inter-state money movement on the 7th day of February 2008, the 1st and 2nd Defendants having failed in their lawful duty to provide a safe system and adequate plant/equipment for the Claimant to convey such huge sums of money inter-state, and thereby exposed the Claimant to the near fatal armed robbery attack on the money convoy along Asaba-Benin express way. h. A Declaration that the deliberate abandonment, refusal, insensitivity and neglect of the Claimant by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in very bad health conditions since the date of the armed robbery attack in February 2008 till date is unconscionable, inequitable, inhumane, negligent and constitutes an unfair labour practice that offends against international best practices in labour and industrial relations. i. A Declaration that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are, by the non- delegable nature of their personal liabilities for the injuries sustained by the Claimant, under lawful obligation to provide the Claimant with all necessary support as well as an unfettered access to specialized medical treatment and facilities as may be medically advised to ensure that the Claimant is fully rehabilitated and gainfully empowered to assume his erstwhile family and other responsibilities. j. An Order compelling the Defendants to forthwith provide the Claimant with all necessary support as well as an unfettered access to specialized medical treatment and facilities as may be medically advised to ensure that the Claimant is fully rehabilitated and gainfully empowered to assume his erstwhile family and other responsibilities. k. The sum of N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) as general aggravated and exemplary damages for all personal injuries, loss of amenities, loss of earning ability, sustained permanent disability, incalculable damage and injury to family and professional life, wanton loss of income, recurrent medical expenses, untold sufferings and hardships to the Claimant arising from the Defendants deliberate and negligent breach of the lawful duty owed to the Claimant as an employee. l. The sum of N750,000.00 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) as cost of this suit. The complaint was filed alongside a Statement of Facts, the Claimant’s written deposition, list of witnesses, list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. Upon being served with the originating processes, the Defendants entered appearance on the 24th day of March 2015 and on the 22nd day of April 2015, vide a motion for extension of time, the Defendants filed a Statement of Defence and written deposition of the Defendants’ witness. These were accompanied by the Defendants’ list of witnesses, the Defendants’ list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial. These were deemed filed and served on the 23rd day of April 2015. The Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on the 6th day of May 2015. Hearing commenced on the 20th day of May 2015. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1 while Olutayo Babajide Salako, a Human Resources Administrator and the Head of Operations of the 3rd Defendant testified as DW1. Hearing ended on the 10th day of November 2015 and parties were ordered to file their Final Addresses in accordance with the rules of this court. The Defendants filed their Final Written Address vide a motion for extension of time on the 8th day of December 2015. The Claimant’s Final Address was filed on the 9th day of February 2016 vide a motion for extension of time. Parties adopted their respective written addresses on the 23rd day of February 2016. In the Defendants’ Final address, three issues were distilled for determination as follows: 1. Whether or not, in all the circumstances of this case, the Claimant is entitled to any of his claim in this suit. 2. Whether the Defendants were negligent to the Claimant at all times material to this case. 3. Whether the facts before the Court show that the Defendants, failed in its duties towards the Claimant at all times material to this suit. Counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any of his claims in this suit. He argued that the Defendants are distinct, separate and independent legal personalities though under a group. He went further that in a case founded on this type of contract of master and servant, the onus is always on the Claimant employee to found his claim on the contract of service and show in what manner the wrong was done. He has to prove the contract of service which is the bedrock of his case. It is not the duty of the employer as defendant to prove that the termination was not wrongful. See the cases of: 1. DAUDU vs. UBA (2004) 29 WRN 53 at 60 2. AMODU vs. AMODE (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 356 3. NIMASA vs. ODEY (2014) 2 WRN 83 at 117 It is the argument of Counsel that in this case, the Claimant failed woefully to plead and prove the contract of employment. The court is therefore handicapped as to what to interpret as the Court is not entitled to look outside the contract of service to ascertain the terms and conditions of the employment. See KWARA STATE C. S. C. vs. ABIODUN (2010) 14 WRN 52 at 101. He submitted that the claim of the Claimant that the termination of his employment is wrongful, irregular and unlawful, ultra vires, null and void and of no effect whatsoever is not supported by the pleadings and evidence before the Court. The onus is always on the Claimant to plead the contract of employment and show by which means the contract was breached by the Defendants. That Exhibit A tendered by the Claimant made the Claimant a non-staff of the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants on the other hand pleaded and proved that the 1st Defendant in its original state was in business as both stock brokers and outsourcing of personnel and human resource management to needing customers. See paragraph 3 of the Statement of Defence. The Claimant did not join issues on this fact. This amounts to admission. See ORJI vs. O. ORJI (2010) 5 WRN 32 at 54. It is counsel’s submission that the tenor of Exhibits F and G point to the fact that the Claimant gave his consent and had full knowledge of the fact that he is a staff of the 3rd Defendant. He submitted that the conduct of the Claimant in denying the knowledge of the 3rd Defendant as his employer amounts to approbation and reprobation, which the Court is not allowed to acknowledge by reason of Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011. See also ADETORO vs. UBN PLC (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 225. In the present case, counsel is of the opinion that the conduct of the Claimant in Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7A, D7B, D8, D9, D14 and D16 precludes the Claimant from denying in these proceedings, the knowledge of the fact that the 3rd Defendant, at all times material, was his employer. Counsel referred to EKEAGWU vs. THE NIGERIA ARMY (2006) 47 WRN 95 at 113-116, where the Court of Appeal held that where an employee accepts salary or payment after employment is brought to an end he cannot be heard to complain later that his contract of employment was not properly determined. Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s first four reliefs are unmaintainable in an employment contract devoid of statutory flavour. See Olarenwaju vs. Afribank (2001) 37 WRN 41 at 59. Thus, since the Claimant’s employment is not with statutory flavour the court cannot declare the action of the Defendants unlawful. On issue two, counsel argued based on the decision in UBA PLC vs. OGUNDOKUN (2009) 50 WRN 1 at 37 that the Claimant has failed to prove: (a) The existence of a duty to take care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. (b) Failure to attain that standard of care prescribed by the law. (c) Damages suffered by the plaintiff which must be connected with the breachof duty to take care. Counsel contended that the Claimant's purported "This Day Live" Publication pleaded in paragraphs 6 a, b, c of the Statement of Claim, which contains a purported statement purportedly made by one Barr. Joseph Ahmed Ibi and credited to a Former Inspector-General of Police Mr. Mike Okiro who was in office between 2007-2009 is not admissible to prove the content of the said publication. This is owing to the fact that the Claimant failed to produce the exact document containing the exact statement of the then Inspector-General of Police for the Court to determine the exact maker and content of the Statement as required by Sections 85 and 87 of the Evidence Act, 2011. See KUBOR & ANOR vs. DICKSON &ORS (2012) LPELR-9817. Moreso, the banks, herein represented by the 2nd Defendant receive instructions from the Central Bank of Nigeria. See Sections 2 and 52 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act. No. 7 of 2007 and not from the Inspector-General of the Nigerian Police Force. In line with the foregoing, counsel submitted that the Defendants was right in law when it consigned the responsibility of the Security of cash and personnel in transit to the Nigerian Police Force who with their ministerial Powers (power coupled with duty) determine what and what are needed in terms of personnel and material for effective policing of the cash and personnel in transit including the cash and personnel in transit on the unfortunate day of 7/2/2008. The functions, duties and powers of the police cannot be supervised by any non-member of the force including the Defendants. He submitted further that based on the foreseeability test, the Claimant cannot recover from the Defendants in the circumstances of this case. This is owing to the fact that the Defendants were not negligent to have consigned the issue of security to the Nigerian Police Force who determine the what, when and how to secure the Claimant and the cash in transit and which task the police had carried on successfully since 2004 when the Claimant began to convey cash for the Defendants. The event and the degree of injury occasioned on the Claimant on the 7/2/2008 was not foreseeable and the Defendants were therefore not liable in negligence. According to counsel, the Claimant also failed to prove that the failure of the Defendants to attain that standard of care prescribed by law led to his damage as no higher standard was in fact prescribed by any law at all times material. He submitted that the non-joinder of the Nigeria Police Force as a party in this suit is fatal to the case of the Claimant. On issue three, counsel submitted that the Defendants did not fail in their duties towards the Claimant at all times material to this suit. To counsel, the Claimant failed to produce any contract between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant or even with the 1st Defendant, to enable the Court determine the presence of any breach. The 3rd Defendant, despite the incapacity of the Claimant, retained the Claimant in its employment with full salary for about 5years from the 7th day of February 2008 when the Claimant became incapacitated to the 28th day of June 2013 when the Claimant was disengaged from the services of the 3rd Defendant due to the re-organization in the 3rd Defendant which also affected other persons not incapacitated. See Exhibit D15. The Workmen Compensation Act provided for a period of less than two (2) years for a person with permanent incapacity in employment even without full salary. See Section 9 of the Act. (Supra).The 3rd Defendant sponsored the Claimant and his wife to all the overseas medical trips to India. In addition and in due compliance with Sections 5 and 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, CAP 470, LFN 1990, the 3rd Defendant paid the Claimant the sum of N1,702,749.60 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Two Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty-Nine Naira, Sixty Kobo). See Exhibits D8 and D9. Counsel referred to the case of AUSTRIAN-NIGERIAN LACE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD vs. NATIONAL UNION OF TEXTILE, GARMENT AND TAILORING WORKERS OF NIGERIA (1978-2006) DIGEST OF JUDGMENT OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT PAGE 37 where this Court held that: “Workers who on being issued with letters of termination, accept the letters and receive their terminal benefits have, by their action, discharged the employer from further liability to payment of wages under their contracts of service with effect from the dates of the letters” Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit in its entirety, the claims being bogus, unproved, unmaintainable and gold digging. In the Claimant’s Final address, counsel argued his objection to Defendants’ Exhibits D7, D7B, D8, D13A, D13B, D13C and D13D. He submitted that Exhibits D7 and D7B are inadmissible having failed to meet the 3 main criteria for admissibility as laid down in the Supreme Court case of OKONJO vs. NJOKANMA (supra) that the documents ought to be pleaded, must be relevant and admissible in law. Regarding Exhibit D8, counsel argued that the said document was not frontloaded and consequently robbed the Claimant of the opportunity to react to the said document thus springing an undue surprise prejudicial and overreaching to the Claimant in the course of proceedings in this suit. It is trite law that any document sought to be relied upon by a party during hearing/trial of a suit should be frontloaded by the party alongside the originating processes and served on the other party. See Order 3 Rule 4 (ii) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. With respect to Exhibits D13A, D13B, D13C & D13D, counsel argued that the Defendants witness (DW1) is not a party to or maker of the email trails and as such the document cannot be tendered through him without the relevant foundation having first been led in evidence in line with Section 83 (b) of the Evidence Act (supra). Secondly, the documents are electronic documents and there are no evidence led to lay foundation for admissibility of same as computer generated documents in line with the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act (supra). Counsel relied on the case of KUBOR vs. DICKSON (supra) and urged the Court to reject the said documents as inadmissible. Finally, counsel urged the Court to expunge from its record, Exhibits D7, D7B, D8, D13A, D13B, D13C & D13D and mark them rejected for being ab initio inadmissible in law and having been properly objected to. After these submissions, counsel proceeded to propose four issues for determination thus: a. Whether there existed any contract of employment between the 3rd Defendant and the Claimant to validate the purported disengagement letter dated 28/6/2013 (Exhibits H & D15). b. Whether the Defendants are not liable in damages to the Claimant for unlawful termination of Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendant and for unfair labour practices against the Claimant. c. Whether the 1st and 2nd Defendants are not personally liable to adequately compensate the Claimant for the injury and complete paralysis resulting from the armed robbery incident of 7/2/2008. d. Whether the Claimant has proved his claims on a preponderance of evidence and entitled to judgment of this court. On the first issue, counsel submitted that there never existed any contract of employment between the 3rd Defendant and the Claimant such as to validate the purported disengagement letter dated 28/6/2013 (i.e. Exhibit H &D15). He submitted that from the state of the pleadings and evidence led by both parties in this suit it is not in dispute that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant on 6/2/2004 to work for the 2nd Defendant as a bullion van driver. It is also not in dispute that the Claimant was confirmed a permanent staff of the 1st Defendant on 31/7/2006. These facts were expressly admitted by the Defendants in paragraph 2 of the Joint Statement of Defence. Counsel submitted further that it is trite law that facts admitted need not be proved. See Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also the case of EGBUNIKE vs. A.C.B LIMITED (1995) 2 SCNJ 58. It is Counsel’s contention that the onus lies on the Defendants to prove that sometime in December 2006 the Claimant's employment was transferred to the 3rd Defendant when the 1st Defendant was split and decomposed into the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant. See Sections 133 &136 of the Evidence Act (supra). It is also trite in law that the Defendants having initially admitted that the Claimant was employed by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the evidential burden therefore shifted and rest squarely on the Defendants to prove the alleged subsequent transfer of Claimant's employment to the 3rd Defendant. See ADEGOKE vs. ADIBI (1992) 5NWLR (Pt 242) 410 @ 423. Counsel submitted that the Exhibits D1 - D6 do not qualify as an employment contract as envisaged in law, to discharge the burden of proving that the 3rd Defendant had any contract of employment with the Claimant. It is Counsel’s further submission on the issue that the onus of proving the alleged splitting and or decomposition of the 1st Defendant into the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant, as well as the alleged transfer of the Claimant’s employment to the 3rd Defendant, could not be discharged by the oral testimony of the DW1 in his written deposition. He submitted that credible evidence required in the circumstances to discharge that onus of proof must and can only be documentary, evidencing the actual decomposition and splitting of the 1st Defendant into Zenith Securities and Peoples Plus Management Services Limited, and or transfer of Claimant's employment to the 3rd Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to hold in accordance with the earlier decision of this court in the unreported judgment delivered by His Lordship Hon. Justice B. B. KANYIP on 16th October 2012 in suit no. NICN/IL/01/2012 between OYEWUMI OYETAYO vs. ZENITH BANK PLC. On the strength of the above submissions, state of the pleadings and evidence led counsel argued that the 3rd Defendant was never an employer of the Claimant. The only valid contract of employment that existed in the circumstances of this case is the Claimant's employment by 1st Defendant to work for the 2nd Defendant as established by Exhibits A and B in this suit. Therefore, the alleged disengagement letter from the 3rd Defendant to the Claimant on 28/6/2013 purporting to terminate an alleged employment with the 3rd Defendant is null and void and of no significance whatsoever to the circumstances of the Claimants valid contract of employment with 1st and 2nd Defendants. Regarding issue two, counsel submitted that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Claimant in damages for unlawful termination of the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants, and for unfair labour treatment against the Claimant. He submitted further that it is firmly settled on the pleadings of parties and weight of credible evidence before the court that the Claimant had an established contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants (as shown in Exhibits A and B). Even under cross examination the Claimant maintained that he was a staff of the 1st Defendant working for the 2nd Defendant, and he remained so. The Defendants failed to controvert and or impugn this piece of credible evidence having failed entirely to prove the alleged subsequent transfer of Claimant's employment to the 3rd Defendant such as to establish the alleged prior determination of the Claimant's employment relationship with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Counsel submitted further that from the nature and terms of the Claimant's employment whereby the Claimant was employed a staff of the 1st Defendant to service the 2nd defendant, particularly as the Claimant was seconded to and came under the direct control and service of the 2nd Defendant as a bullion van driver from 2004 until the purported termination of his employment in 2013, there was an established co-employer status of the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of the claimant. Counsel relied upon and referred the court to the unreported judgment of this court in OYEWUMI OYETAYO vs. ZENITH BANK (supra) where His Lordship Hon. Justice B. B. KANYIP while evaluating a similar situation, as in this instant case, concerning Zenith Securities Limited and Zenith Bank PIc, found that the former is a subsidiary of the latter and as such were co-employers to the Claimant. This court in that case cited with approval and relied upon the case of See also UNION BEVERAGES LTD. vs. PEPSICOLA INTERNATIONAL LTD. (1994) 2SCNJ 157 @ 180-181; (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 1, which approved DHN FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS LTD vs. LARDIN BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLET (1976) 3 All ER 462. Counsel urged the Court on the authority of ONUMALOBI vs. NNPC AND WARRI REFINING AND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (2004) 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 304 where the Court of Appeal held that privity of contract will be held to exist between an employee and a subsidiary company of his employer to which he has been transferred where the subsidiary is totally integrated into and under the control of the Parent Company and the subsidiary qualifies to be described as an employer under Section 91 of the Labour Act; to find accordingly that from the circumstances and nature of Claimant's employment both the 1st and 2nd Defendants were co-employers of Claimant. It therefore follows that the 3rd Defendant had no place in the Claimant's contract of employment and as such had no right, authority or vires whatsoever to either terminate or howsoever interfere with the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. It is trite law that only parties to a contract (be it contract of employment or any other) are bound thereto and have the lawful capacity to enforce the contract, including the determination of same. And in the circumstances of this instant case, according to counsel, it is the Claimant (as the employee) or the 1st and 2nd Defendants (as the employers), parties alone to the contract of employment, that can competently terminate it upon expiration of proper notice given to the other party. See Section 11 of the Labour Act (supra). It is the submission of Counsel that the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants still subsists having not been determined at all. It is Counsel’s further submission that the Claimant is entitled to damages against the Defendants for the unlawful termination of his employment constituting in itself a breach of the Claimant's contract of employment. It follows therefore that where a breach of contract is established, damages follow. See CAMEROON AIRLINES vs. OTUTUIZU (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512 at 541 para D. Counsel submitted further that the 3rd Defendant is jointly liable in damages with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. See ALADE vs. ALIC (NIG.) LTD. (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 111 @ 127. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue two in favour of the Claimant and hold that the Defendants are liable in damages to the Claimant for wrongful breach of the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants and for unfair labour practices against the Claimant. On issue three, counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are personally liable to adequately compensate the Claimant for the injury and complete paralysis resulting from the armed robbery incident of 7/2/2008. He submitted that the armed robbery attack on 7/2/2008 occurred in the course of the Claimant's employment while discharging his duties as a bullion van driver conveying the huge sum of N125,000,000.00 from Onitsha in Anambra State over to Benin city in Edo state for and on behalf the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant sustained gunshot injury from the incident which affected his spine and later deteriorated into complete paralysis. More so, the law is trite that an employer owes his employee a non-delegable duty to provide him with a safe system of work, adequate and efficient equipment, competent staff as well as proper supervision. Counsel submitted further that these categories of duty are not absolute but only an aspect of the broad duty to see that reasonable care and skill are exercised. In other words the employer is not merely under a duty to take care but under a direct duty to provide that care is taken, such that the responsibility is personal to the employer and he is not relieved by entrusting its fulfillment to any other person, including an independent contractor, even though selected with utmost care and skill. It is counsel’s submission that the 1st and 2nd Defendants, as co-employers to the Claimant, were under the non-delegable duty principle to provide the Claimant with adequate and efficient plant and equipment as well as a safe system of work and effective supervision, in the circumstances of his employment particularly for the inter-sate cash movement on 7/2/2008. And in the event of failure in the above duty, such as was in this case, the 1st and 2nd Defendants became, and still are, personally liable for the injury and losses sustained by the Claimant in the circumstances of the armed robbery attack on the Claimant's money convoy enroute Benin from Onitsha on same said 7/2/2008. Counsel relied on the following cases: i. GENERAL CLEANING CONTRACTORS LTD vs. CHRISTMAS (1953) AC 180 ii. OBAKORO vs. FOREX C. INC. & ORS (1973) 3 ULR 91; iii. WESTERN NIGERIAN TRADING CO. LTD vs. AJAO (1965) NMLR 17; iv. STRABAG CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD vs. OGAREKPE (1991) NWLR (Pt. 170) 733. Furthermore, counsel submitted that it is settled on the records of this court that CWl was not cross-examined, at all, on the facts and evidence led as to the personal duty and liability of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to the Claimant. Thus, the Defendants’ failure to so cross-examine CWl amounts to an acceptance of the above pieces of evidence, especially on the material points in the legal issue. See the cases of: 1. AMADI vs. NWOSU (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 273 2. DAGGASH vs. BULAMA (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 212) 1666 3. IKUOMOLA vs. ONIWAYA (1990) 7 SCNJ 147 It is the argument of counsel that the Defendants’ allegation that they had duly compensated the Claimant for his injury vide the Zenith Bank Manager Cheques in the sum of N4,013,554.13 (Exhibit J/D9) and led evidence to that effect at paragraph 33 and 35 of DW1's written deposition; which were controverted by the Claimant is contradictory of the facts in paragraph 39 and 40 of same DWl written deposition alleging therein that the said sum in Exhibit J/D9 were Claimant's severance benefits. It is counsel’s submission that the court cannot be found to pick and choose on which of the contradictory evidence it should believe as to the purpose of the said sum in Exhibit J/D9. Counsel further submitted that in such circumstances of substantial contradiction of DW1's evidence, this court is bound to reject same. See DAGAYYA vs. STATE (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 308) 1212 SC. Counsel urged the Court to believe CWl’s evidence under cross-examination that the nature of the said sum in Exhibit J/D9 was tagged part payment of his medical expenses following his several demand letters to the Defendants for assistance. This piece of evidence elicited under cross examination was neither challenged nor controverted. On the issue of providing the Claimant with immediate medical assistance, and the negligent attitude (abandonment of the Claimant) by his employers, the 1st and 2nd Defendants, counsel referred the court to the uncontradicted evidence of CWl in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 &19 of his written deposition and paragraphs 8 & 9 of the additional written deposition by which the Claimant established the fact of non-provision of immediate medical assistance and insensitive neglect of the Claimant in dire health condition sustained in the cause of his employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. From the foregoing, counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant by holding that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are personally liable to adequately compensate the Claimant for the injury and complete paralysis resulting from the armed robbery incident of 7/2/2008. On the fourth issue, counsel submitted that on the state of the pleadings of parties and evidence led in this suit and on the strength of his foregoing submissions under issues 1, 2 &3 above, the Claimant has proved his claims in this suit on a preponderance of evidence and balance of probability, and is entitled therefore to the judgment of this court. See the case of AGBOOLA vs. UBA PLC (2011) All FWLR (Pt 574) 74 SC; EYA vs. OLOPADE (2011) All FWLR (Pt 584) 28 SC. He submitted that the Claimant has proved each and every fact relevant to establish his claims on a preponderance of credible evidence and on the balance of probability. From the foregoing, counsel urged the court to resolve this issue no. 4 in favour of the Claimant and hold that the Claimant has proved his claims on a preponderance of evidence and therefore entitled to the judgment of this court. Court’s Decision Having heard learned counsels to the parties in their final written addresses, I will now consider the case presented before me. In doing that, the facts of the case must first be examined. The Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the 1st Defendant on 6/2/2004 as a utility service (US III) driver and his employment was confirmed by the 1st Defendant in a letter dated 31/6/2006 thereby making him a permanent staff of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant’s employment and confirmation letters were admitted in evidence as Exhibits A and B. The Claimant explained that the 1st Defendant is a subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant bank and after he was employed, he was seconded to the 2nd Defendant's Bridge-Head Branch office in Onitsha Anambra State. In the course of his employment, he was entrusted with the conveyance of huge sums of money from one location to the other. The Claimant stated that the 3rd Defendant, a Human Resources consultancy company, is not a subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant and he had no contract of service with the 3rd Defendant. The 3rd Defendant was only contracted by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to manage the welfare of their staff but it does not include terminating the Claimant’s contract of service with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. About the 7th day of February 2008, the Claimant said he was required to convey the sum of N125,000,000.00 from the 2nd Defendant’s branch at Nkpor in Onitsha to the branch of the Central Bank at Benin, Edo State. The Claimant contended that considering the high risk involved in the task, the 1st and 2nd Defendants were expected to provide him with a contemporary bullet proof bullion van and security escort of about 14 armed policemen in 2 vans. However, the 1st and 2nd Defendants only provided him with the ordinary non-bullet proof bullion van and a security escort of 7policemen in a single van. In the course of the trip, they were attacked by heavily armed robbers on the Benin-Asaba Highway which left 3 of the policemen dead and himself and the other policemen with severe gunshot injuries. The Claimant said notwithstanding his pains from the bullet injuries, he managed to escape and delivered the money he conveyed safely to the CBN Benin. He was rushed to University of Benin Teaching Hospital for medical treatment and then to the University College Hospital, Ibadan the following day. At UCH Ibadan, he was operated to remove the bullets in his body and when he was sufficiently stabilized, he was discharged in April 2008. The Claimant said he was abandoned by the 1st and 2nd Defendants throughout the period of the incidence and hospitalization. He bore the medical expenses by himself with no assistance from the 1st and 2nd Defendant because his efforts to get assistance from the 1st and 2nd Defendants were rebuffed by them. He required expert medical attention in a specialized spinal cord centre for the spinal cord injuries he sustained in the armed robbery incidence which occurred in the course of his employment, but his employers refused to assist him. Thereafter, because he was experiencing weakness in his lower limbs and difficulty in passing urine, he consulted the Federal Medical Centre Owerri where he was diagnosed and advised to undertake immediate intensive rehabilitation. He was able to raise fund from well meaning individuals to travel to the India Spinal Injuries Centre, New Delhi, India for treatment in March 2009. He was discharged in June 2009 with an advice for follow up medical care with specialists but on return to Nigeria, his employers refused to assist him with the funds to do the follow up and as a result, his health deteriorated. He lost total sensation in his lower limbs which consequently led to a fractured right thigh with deformed hip of the right femur. The 1st and 2nd Defendants eventually responded to his plight after 2 years and 3 months. What they did was to put forward the 3rd Defendant as the company responsible for him and the 3rd Defendant sponsored him to Fortis Hospital in Mumbai, India on 23/9/2011. All they did in that hospital was medical examination/investigation of the Claimant’s health condition. No surgery was conducted to correct the femoral fracture. The delay by the 1st and 2nd Defendant to provide timely medical assistance for him resulted to total permanent disability (paralysis) which he now suffers. The Claimant said he wrote letters dated 17/11/2011 and 26/11/2012 to the Defendants for assistance to carry on his life but his employment was instead terminated by a letter dated 28/6/2013 from the 3rd Defendant together with two Zenith bank cheques for the total sum of N4,013,554.13. The Claimant contended that it was an unfair labour practice on the part of the Defendants when they disengaged him without adequate arrangement for his welfare and health and the paltry sum he was paid was unjust. He also contended that termination of his employment is not proper. The Claimant went on to say that the 1st and 2nd Defendants, who are his employers owe him a duty of care and to provide him with immediate medical attention for the injuries he sustained in the course of his employment. They are liable for his permanent disability because they failed to perform their duties to him. He maintained that the 3rd Defendant cannot terminate his employment because he is not an employee of the 3rd Defendant. That he was being paid his salaries by the 1st and 2nd Defendants and not by the 3rd Defendant. The facts of Defendant’s defence to the Claimant’s claims are that the Claimant was employed was employed by the 1st Defendant on 13th February 2004 and also confirmed his employment on 31st July 2006 but in December 2006 the 1st Defendant was split and de-composed into 2 companies which are the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendants. While the 1st Defendant is faced with the business of stock broking, the 3rd Defendant took on the business of human resources and outsourcing. With this de-composition, all staff of the former 1st Defendant were moved to the 3rd Defendant with the same conditions of service. As a result, the Claimant became an employee of the 3rd Defendant. According to the Defendants, the Claimant knows the 3rd Defendant as his employer and also rendered his services to the 3rd Defendant as his employer. To establish the Defendants’ contention that the Claimant was the employee of the 3rd Defendant, DW1 relied on some letters and forms exchanged between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant. The duty of the 3rd Defendant includes management of the personnel involved in movement of cash from one point to the other while the duty of the Claimant includes driving of bullion vans for movement of cash from Onitsha to CBN Benin and other locations. The duty of safeguarding the cash and personnel is that of the police. Neither the 3rd Defendant nor the other Defendants are under any duty to provide a bullet proof bullion van and security detail comprising 2 vans of not less than 14 armed police men. The Defendants duty is no more than provide adequate security for their personnel and cash and the 3rd Defendant performed this duty through the police and also provided the police with the necessary and requested tools in that regard. The police has never requested for a bullet proof bullion van neither has the Claimant ever requested for a bullet proof bullion van throughout his service with the 3rd Defendant or a particular number of police escort. Armed robbery incidence is not a regular occurrence on the Onitsha-Benin highway. The security escorts were able to safe guard the life of the Claimant and the cash on the day of the incidence to the destination even though 3 of the policemen died from the armed robbery attack. The 3rd Defendant also provided the Claimant with adequate insurance cover under both the Workmen Compensation and Group Life Insurance police. The Claimant was adequately compensated for his loss when he was paid the sum of N1,702,749.60 as compensation for his loss. The 3rd Defendant bore all the medical expenses in the treatment of the Claimant both in Nigeria and overseas and sponsored all the medical trips made by the Claimant and his wife to India even though the 3rd Defendant is not under obligation to sponsor the Claimant to any foreign hospital. The 3rd Defendant also paid the Claimant his salaries from February 2008 to the time he was disengaged from the service of the 3rd Defendant in June 2013 with benefits. The 3rd Defendant took adequate care of the Claimant for 6 years until he was lawfully disengaged in June 2013. The Claimant has even shown appreciation to the 3rd Defendant in a letter from his solicitor dated 26th November 2012. The Claimant suffered spinal cord injury from the armed robbery attack. The injury was below the D10 and T10 region leading to loss of sensation, as such, the Claimant could not be resuscitated by both foreign and local experts. When there is no sensation below the T10, treatment is no longer possible but only rehabilitation. The Claimant’s family doctor’s report had revealed loss of sensation below T10 so also the evaluation by the India Spinal Injury Centre in 2010 revealed absence of sensation below D10. The centre advised that the Claimant can only be rehabilitated. The loss of sensation below the D10 and T10 resulted from the gunshot wounds received in the armed robbery attack and not as a result of any delay by the Defendants to provide medical treatment for the Claimant. The Claimant’s trip to Fortis Hospital India was recommended by Me-Cure Medical Facility in Oshodi, Lagos who made the arrangement for the trip and also ascertained the cost implication of the trip. The 3rd Defendant financed the trip. At the Fortis Hospital, the discharge summary shows that the hospital refused to do a customized hip surgery on the Claimant because it will not be beneficial to the Claimant. The 3rd Defendant met all the Claimant’s demands in his letter dated 17th November 2011 by providing the Claimant with a Toyota Corolla saloon car, a bathing wheel chair, physiotherapy programme for one year, the sum of N1,913,556.01 as severance benefits, the sum of N1,702,749.60 as insurance benefits and the sum of N77,239.52 as balance on savings account. The Claimant received these items with gratitude and acknowledged receipt. In addition, the 3rd Defendant provided for the continuous rehabilitation of the Claimant. The Claimant was an employee of the 3rd Defendant who properly disengaged the Claimant from its employment. The Claimant gratefully received his severance package from the 3rd Defendant without protesting. The total sum paid to the Claimant was N4,013,554.14 vide Zenith bank cheques. The permanent disability of the Claimant was not caused by the negligence of the Defendants but it is a direct result of the armed robbery incidence of 7th February 2008. The 3rd Defendant exercised reasonable care. The 3rd Defendant provided the adequate, safe and efficient equipment for the work of the Claimant. There is no duty of care on the 1st and 2nd Defendants to provide the Claimant with immediate medical assistance. This duty was cast on the 3rd Defendant and it effectively discharged same. Even if the Claimant was an employee of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the terminal benefits would still be the same as received from the 3rd Defendant. The Defendants contended in conclusion that the Claimant is not entitled to any of his claims against the Defendants. Having gone through the facts of the parties cases, the issues, which in my view, arise for determination in this suit are these: 1. Whether the Claimant’s employment has been terminated. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case or is entitled to his claims in this suit. During the hearing of this matter, objections were taken to the admissibility of some Exhibits. The learned counsels to the parties have also addressed this court on those Exhibits in their final addresses. The affected Exhibits are those marked Exhibits K, D7a, D7b, D8, D13a, D13b, D13c and D13d. The objections to these Exhibits were hinged on the provisions of the Evidence Act. Let me mention it here that this court is more tilted towards doing substantial justice than dwell on technical matters. Specifically, Section 12 (2) of the NIC Act permit this court to depart from the provisions of the Evidence Act where the interest of justice so demands. I have examined these Exhibits and I see that they are relevant. The objections to their admissibility are hereby overruled. ISSUE ONE: In relief 1 of his claim, the Claimant sought a declaration that his disengagement from the service of the 1st and 2nd Defendants by the 3rd Defendant is wrongful. From the facts of his case, the Claimant’s complaint about his disengagement is that he was employed by the 1st and 2nd Defendant but it was the 3rd Defendant, who was not his employer, who terminated his employment. The Claimant’s other reliefs are primarily against the 1st and 2nd Defendant whom he said were his employers. The Defendants on the other hand said the 3rd Defendant who terminated the Claimant’s employment was the Claimant’s employer. It is the Defendant’s case that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are not the Claimant’s employer. With these varied contentions of the parties, the question arising from these facts is who was the Claimant’s employer? In other to determine the issue whether the Claimant’s employment has been determined, there is need to know who amongst the Defendants was the Claimant’s employer. This task is necessary as it has effect on the overall claim of the Claimant. In his evidence, the Claimant said he was employed by the 1st Defendant, a subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant, on 6/2/2004 as a utility service driver and his employment was confirmed by the 1st Defendant on 31/6/2006. By the said confirmation, he became a permanent staff of the 1st Defendant. The Defendants admitted that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant on 13th February 2004 and confirmed the Claimant’s employment on 31st July 2006. Therefore, it is not in dispute that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant on 6/2/2004 and also confirmed the Claimant’s employment as a permanent staff of the 1st Defendant on 31/7/2006. The Claimant’s employment and confirmation letters were admitted in evidence as Exhibits A and B respectively. Notwithstanding that the Defendants admitted the fact of the Claimant’s employment by the 1st Defendant, I see the need to examine the contents of these Exhibits. The Claimant’s employment letter, dated 6th February 2004 from the 1st Defendant contains these provisions: In the 1st paragraph at page 1, it contain that “… you have been offered employment as USIII (Driver) in the service of this company. You are to resume immediately at our Bridge-Head Branch.” At paragraph 2 of page 1, it states that the 1st Defendant is “at liberty to second your services to any of its customers and/or sister companies. Then at paragraph 1 of page 2, it was written that “you are employed by this company to execute its contract with Zenith International Bank Limited and that this employment does not make you a staff of the bank. Consequently, your condition of service are not identical with those of the staff of the bank and in line with the existing policy; you will not be entitled to profit sharing bonuses usually paid by the bank to its own staff”. In the Claimant's confirmation letter, also by the 1st Defendant and dated 31/6/2006, the Claimant was confirmed as a permanent staff of the 1st Defendant with effect from 31st July 2006. It is clear from the content of Exhibit A and B, in addition to the evidence of the parties, that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant. The point of dispute is the Defendant’s contention that the Claimant’s employment was later transferred to the 3rd Defendant’s employment when the 3rd Defendant was created from the 1st Defendant. According to the Defendants, in December 2006, the 1st Defendant was split and de-composed into the present 1st Defendant and 3rd Defendant. The 3rd Defendant was responsible for the business of human resources as such, all staff of the former 1st Defendant were moved to the 3rd Defendant with the same conditions of service. The Claimant became an employee of the 3rd Defendant as a result. The Claimant explained that the 3rd Defendant, a HR consultancy company, is not a subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant and he had no contract of service with the 3rd Defendant. The 3rd Defendant was only contracted by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to manage the welfare of their staff. In his further evidence, the Claimant stated that the 1st Defendant was never split into or decomposed into the 1st and 3rd Defendants, neither was there any time the staff of the 1st Defendant were migrated into the employment of the 3rd Defendant. The Claimant said his service was never transferred to the 3rd Defendant but he has always been a staff of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The 3rd Defendant is an independent contractor engaged purely as Human Resources management/consultancy Company to assist the 1st and 2nd Defendants manage the welfare and data of their large staff strength. The parties having agreed that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant, the burden of proving the splitting of the 1st Defendant into two companies and the transfer of the Claimant’s employment to the 3rd Defendant rests squarely on the shoulders of the Defendants. In proving that the 3rd Defendant was the Claimant’s subsequent employer, the Defendant put reliance on the documents pleaded in paragraph 5a of the Statement of Defence. The documents are in evidence as Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6. First of all, from the case of the Defendant, it is clear to me that the Defendants want this court to believe that the Claimant was the 3rd Defendant’s employee before the date of the accident in February 2008. From the Defendant’s case, the 1st Defendant was decomposed into 1st and 3rd Defendants in December 2006 and the employment of the Claimant was transferred to the 3rd Defendant about that time. The letters the 3rd Defendant has now attempted to rely on to prove its employment relationship with the Claimant were variously made in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. I observe that the letters were made after the Claimant had been involved in the armed robbery incidence. The Defendants’ assertion in this case is that the 1st Defendant was decomposed into two entities and the staff of the 1st Defendant, including the Claimant, was transferred to the 3rd Defendant. That is to say, there was a legal process in 2006 or thereabout, of the decomposition, registration of the 3rd Defendant and transfer of staff to the 3rd Defendant. The evidence required to support the Defendants’ assertions is the fact or evidence of the decomposition in 2006 and the transfer of the Claimant’s employment to the 3rd Defendant. These Exhibits are not that evidence. They can barely be of help to the Defendants’ case. When the Defendants’ contention is examined closely, it appears that the 3rd Defendant was not in existence at the time of the Claimant’s employment by the 1st Defendant in 2004. That is the more reason proof of when or how the 3rd Defendant came into existence and the transfer of the Claimant’s employment to the 3rd Defendant is required. Merely relying on letters or forms made after the Claimant’s secondary cause of action, the armed robbery incidence, has occurred is not sufficient. Furthermore, the Claimant has said the 3rd Defendant was engaged by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to manage the welfare the staff. It thus implies that the Claimant’s welfare as a staff of the 1st Defendant was handled by the 3rd Defendant. This has created a relationship between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant. I have examined the content of Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7a and D7b and I see that they are usual communication or documentation in such relationship. Exhibits D1 to D7 are not evidence of contract of service between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant. As rightly submitted by the Claimant’s counsel, an employment contract is an agreement between an employer and an employee which agreement is generally to be found in the service agreement or employment letter. In order to convince this court that an employment relationship existed between Claimant and 3rd Defendant, the Defendants are expected to show the service agreement or employment letter issued to the Claimant in that respect. The Defendants totally failed to show any of these nor were they able to explain or substantiate the alleged transfer of the Claimant’s employment from the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant. After studying the evidence adduced by the Defendants, I find that they have not been able to prove that there was any employment relationship between the Claimant and 3rd Defendant. I am not satisfied that the 3rd Defendant came out from splitting or decomposition of 1st Defendant nor that the Claimant’s employment was transferred from the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant. In the absence of these proofs from the Defendants, the Claimant’s assertion that the 3rd Defendant is an independent contractor engaged by the 1st and 2nd Defendants as Human Resources Consultancy Company to manage the welfare and data of their staff is more plausible. The implication is that the Claimant, at all time material to his disengagement from service, was the employee of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant’s counsel submitted in his address that in view of the fact that the 1st Defendant is a subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant and the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant and seconded to work with the 2nd Defendant, makes the Claimant staff of both the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Counsel cited in support the case of OYEWUMI OYETAYO vs. ZENITH BANK PLC delivered by this court; UNION BEVERAGES LTD vs. PEPSICOLA INTERNATIONAL LTD and DHN FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS LTD vs. LARDIN BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLET and urged this court to hold that both the 1st and 2nd Defendants were co-employers of the Claimant. Let me mention here that the Claimant’s employment letter has explained the relationship between the Claimant, the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant has referred to both the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant as his employers. But that does not appear to be the case in Exhibit A. While the Exhibit shows an employment relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, it went ahead to inform the Claimant in the 1st paragraph at page 2 that although the Claimant’s contract will be executed with Zenith International Bank Limited, which the Claimant has averred in paragraph 3 of his statement of fact to be the 2nd Defendant’s former name, the Claimant is not a staff of the 2nd Defendant and his condition of service is not that of the 2nd Defendant. Contrary to the Claimant’s allegation, the 2nd Defendant does not have any contract of service with the Claimant. The relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant is as pleaded by the Claimant in paragraph 5 of his statement of fact. The 1st Defendant seconded him to the 2nd Defendant’s service. This secondment was in line with the terms of the Claimant’s employment. Therefore, the Claimant’s employer in February 2004 was the 1st Defendant only. The Claimant has complained in this suit that the determination of his employment with the 1st Defendant by the 3rd Defendant was wrongful. The letter of disengagement, Exhibit H, was written by the 3rd Defendant to the Claimant terminating the Claimant’s employment with effect from 30th June 2013. The employment of the Claimant which the 3rd Defendant purports to terminate by the letter is obviously the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant. I did find that the Claimant does not have a contract of service with the 3rd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant has not shown that the 1st Defendant has delegated the right to terminate the employment of its staff to the 3rd Defendant. It is the Claimant’s evidence that the 3rd Defendant’s duty does not include terminating the employment of staff of the 1st Defendant. The result is that the 3rd Defendant, not being a party to the contract of service between the Claimant and 1st Defendant, does not have any power or authority to terminate the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant. Furthermore, there is nothing before this court to show that the Claimant’s employer, the 1st Defendant, has terminated the Claimant’s employment. Accordingly, I find and hold that the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant has remained intact and existing till date. ISSUE TWO An examination of the reliefs sought by the Claimant reveals that they can be classified or considered under two groups. Reliefs (a) to (e) are related to the Claimant’s employment while reliefs (f) to (k) are claims in personal injury. The duty of this court on this issue is to consider whether the Claimant has proved his case and entitled to the reliefs he seeks from this court. The gist of reliefs (a) and (b) sought by the Claimant is that this court declares his disengagement from the service of the 1st Defendant as wrongful and that his employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants is still valid and subsisting. He then sought in relief (c) an order for his reinstatement to his employment and payment of all his outstanding salaries and entitlements. As an alternative to these reliefs, the Claimant sought in relief (e) payment of the sum of N50,000,000.00 as damages for wrongful determination of his employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. In these reliefs, as well as the other ones, the Claimant has consistently referred to his employment with the 1st and 2nd Defendants. I have made the observation earlier in this judgment that the Claimant’s employer is the 1st Defendant only. The Claimant does not have a contract of employment with the 2nd Defendant. I shall therefore leave the 2nd Defendant out of the claims. The only persons who had parts to play in his employment are the 1st and 3rd defendants. I will consider the Claimant’s claims in respect of the 1st and 3rd Defendants only. In my conclusion of issue one of this judgment, this court found that the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant has at no time been terminated by the Claimant’s employer. The Claimant’s job has therefore been existing all the while. Accordingly, relief (b) succeeds. However, a declaration of wrongfulness of termination and an order for reinstatement as the Claimant has sought in reliefs (a) and (c) have no basis in the circumstances of this case. A declaration of wrongfulness presupposes that that the employment has been terminated but wrongfully. In this case, the Claimant’s employment has at no time been terminated by his employer. Therefore since there was no termination, the issue of its wrongfulness does not arise. On the other hand, reinstatement is to put an employee back to an employment he has been wrongfully or unlawfully removed from. That is not the case here. I have mentioned it above that the Claimant has remained in his employment with the 1st Defendant till date. There is therefore no basis to make an order for reinstatement. It is clear from the facts that the Claimant, because of the purported disengagement, was paid off his severance benefits. It implies that payment of his salaries have ceased since then. Since the Claimant’s employment has not been terminated by his employer, he is entitled to be paid all his salaries, benefits and entitlements accruing to him from 28/6/2013 till date of this judgment. The other reliefs of the Claimant are his claims in personal injury. These claims are contained in reliefs f, g, h, I, j and k. Although these reliefs have earlier been reproduced at the beginning of this judgment, for the purpose of consideration of the merits of the reliefs at this juncture, there is need to set out only summaries of the reliefs. This is to give a clear view of what the Claimant is seeking. The reliefs are as follows- (f) A declaration that the 1st Defendant was under a duty of care to the Claimant and its failure to provide the Claimant with a bulletproof bullion van and full security escort details of 2 escort vans of not less than 14 policemen for the movement of money on 7/2/2008 is a breach of that duty owed to the Claimant as an employee. (g) A declaration that the 1st Defendant is liable for the injuries sustained by the Claimant from the armed robbery attack of 7/2/2008. (h) A declaration that his deliberate abandonment and neglect by the 1st Defendant is his bad health condition since the date of the armed robbery attack in February 2008 is unconscionable, inhumane and constitutes unfair labour practice. (i) A declaration that the 1st Defendant is under lawful obligation to provide him with all necessary support and access to specialized medical treatment and facilities to ensure that the he is fully rehabilitated. (j) An order compelling the Defendants to forthwith provide him with all necessary support and access to specialized medical treatment and facilities for his rehabilitation. (k) The sum of N500,000,000.00 as damages for personal injuries, loss of amenities, permanent disability, etc. The import of these reliefs sought by the Claimant is clear. His case is that the 1st Defendant is liable for the injuries he sustained in the armed robbery incidence of 7th day of February 2008 because the 1st Defendant, his employer, did not observe the duty of care owed to him by providing him with a bulletproof bullion van and full security escort details of 2 escort vans of not less than 14 policemen. His claims also reveal that he attributed his permanent disability to the failure of the 1st Defendant to provide him immediate and adequate medical treatment. The basis of the Claimant’s claims against his employer is more pronounced in the particularization of liability in Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Facts. In this paragraph, the Claimant particularized the 1st Defendant’s liability to be as follows- i. The 1st Defendant owes him a duty to provide a safe, efficient and effective system of work and supervision as well as adequate and efficient plant and equipment for him to work with. ii. The 1st Defendant was duty bound to provide him with a bullet proof bullion van and full security escort details comprising 2 vans of not less than 14 policemen for the risky interstate cash movement he was required to undertake on 7/2/2008. iii. The failure of the 1st Defendant to provide him with the bulletproof bullion van and full security escort detail comprising 2 vans of not less than 14 policemen is a breach of the duty of care owed to him as an employee. iv. The provision of an ordinary non bulletproof bullion van and a single security escort detail of only 7 policemen were grossly inadequate and did not absolve the 1st Defendant of its duty to him. v. The 1st Defendant failed in their duty to provide him with a safe, efficient and effective system of work and supervision as well as adequate and efficient plant and equipment. vi. The 1st Defendant is personally liable for the injuries he sustained from the armed robbery attack in the course of conveying the money on 7/2/2008. vii. The personal liability of the 1st Defendant for the injuries he sustained on 7/2/2008 conversely imposed a duty of care on the 1st Defendants to provide him with immediate medical assistance and to ensure his health condition is fully stabilized. viii. The 1st Defendant has refused to take responsibility and or discharge its liability to him for the injuries he sustained from the armed robbery attack till date. ix. The deliberate refusal and failure of the 1st Defendant in providing him with support for immediate and proper medical assistance has caused him a permanent total disability, health complications, damages and hardships. In view of the reliefs sought by the Claimant and the above particulars of liability, it seems to me appropriate to first examine his allegation that the 1st Defendant is liable for his injury because it failed in its duty of care owed to him. This flows from reliefs (f) and (g) and items (i) to (vi) of the particulars of liability. It is the Claimant’s evidence that on 7th day of February 2008, he was conveying the sum of N125,000,000.00 from the 2nd Defendant’s branch at Nkpor in Onitsha to the branch of the Central Bank at Benin, Edo State. At the Benin-Asaba Highway, armed robbers attacked them and in the process, he sustained severe gunshot injuries. The Claimant contended that considering the high risk involved in the conveyance and by the safety policy of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st and 2nd Defendants were duty bound to provide him with a bullet proof bullion van and security escort of about 14 armed policemen in 2 vans. He requested for this full security detail but the 1st and 2nd Defendants only provided him with non-bullet proof bullion van and a security escort of 7 policemen in a single van. He was left with no choice than to embark on the trip with what was provided. He contended that had the Defendants provided him with the full security detail, he would not have sustained, perhaps, any injury from the incidence. In his additional evidence, the Claimant said at the time of the armed robbery incidence, use of bullet proof bullion van was common in the banking sector. He also came to know in the course of his driving duties that Mike Okiro, when he was the Inspector General of Police, issued a standing directive that all cash movements must be done with bullet proof vans and all bank managers were to comply on or before 27/10/2007. The Claimant relied on an electronic copy of This Day Live news dated 21/7/2010. This document was admitted in evidence as Exhibit K. The Defendants however contended that they are not responsible or at fault in the occurrence of the armed robbery incidence or the injuries sustained by the Claimant. In his evidence, DW1 told this court that the Claimant’s routine include movement of cash in bullion van from Onitsha to Benin or other locations and he was always under the protection of the Police. The duty of safeguarding the cash and personnel on transit is that of the Police. The Defendants are not under any duty to provide a bullet proof bullion van for conveyance of the cash or security detail comprising 2 vans of not less than 14 armed police men. The Defendants duty is no more than provide adequate security for their personnel and cash and the 3rd Defendant performed this duty through the police and also provided the police with the necessary and requested tools in that regard. The Police has never requested for a bullet proof bullion van neither has the Claimant ever requested for a bullet proof bullion van throughout his service with the 3rd Defendant or a particular number of police escort. Armed robbery incidence is not a regular occurrence on the Onitsha-Benin highway and no commercial bank operated a bullet proof bullion van with 14 policemen for conveyance of cash on the Onitsha-Benin route. It was the security escort who went with the Claimant on the day of the incident that safe-guarded the life of the Claimant and the cash to the destination even though 3 of the policemen died from the armed robbery attack. It was the Defendants’ further contention that they provided adequate police escort in line with standard requirement for movement of cash in the banking system and in view of the daring armed robbery attack, bullet proof bullion van would not have been of assistance. In a claim for personal injury in master servant relationship, the Claimant must prove that the Defendant owes him a duty, the duty was breached and the Claimant suffered injury as a result. Where there exists a service relationship between an employer and an employee, the employer is under duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the employee. The level of this duty is the same as that of the employer’s common law duty of care in the law of negligence. The burden of proof in an action for damages in personal injury rests primarily on the Claimant who must show that he was injured by a negligent act or omission of the Defendant. See IGHOSEWE vs. DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 741. In this case, although the Defendants have continued to deny existence of service relationship between the Claimant and 1st Defendant, the facts are however clear that the 1st Defendant was the Claimant’s employer. In such a relationship, the 1st Defendant owes a duty of care to the Claimant. In this case, the facts are also not in dispute that the Claimant sustained injury in the course of his duties to the 1st Defendant. The area of dispute is whether the 1st Defendant is liable for the Claimant’s injury. In other words; whether the Claimant’s injury resulted from the 1st Defendant’s breach of its duty of care to the Claimant. From the Claimant’s pleading and evidence I am able to see that his allegation that the 1st Defendant is liable for the injury he sustained from the armed robbery incidence is that the 1st Defendant owes him a duty of care to provide him with safe work environment and adequate equipment for his work but it failed to provide him with bullet proof bullion van and 14 armed police men in 2 vans for the cash conveyance on 7/2/2008. The Claimant did state that had these been provided, he would not have sustained the injuries or any injury at all. First of all, it is not the Claimant’s case that the attack by the armed robbers on 7/2/2008 was caused by the 1st Defendant or any of the Defendants. From his evidence, the Claimant’s assertion that the 1st and 2nd Defendants were under duty to provide bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen was hinged on two planks. The first is in paragraph 6b of the Statement of Fact where the Claimant pleaded that by the safety policy of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st and 2nd Defendants are duty bound to provide the Claimant with bullet proof bullion van and a security detail of 2 vans comprising not less than 14 armed policemen. The second is in paragraph 4 (e) of the Claimant’s Reply to Statement of Defence where the Claimant relied on an electronic publication in Thisday Live of 21/7/2010 where a former IGP was quoted as having directed banks to make use of bullet proof bullion van for cash conveyance. The Claimant made mention of the policy of the 2nd Defendant. I must mention that although the money being conveyed belonged to the 2nd Defendant, the 2nd Defendant is not the Claimant’s employer, and so did not owe the Claimant any duty of care in the discharge of his duties to his employer. The Claimant cannot rely on the safety policy of a non party to his contract of employment in this action. Other than the said safety policy of the 2nd Defendant, the Claimant did not tell this court of any condition of service of the 1st Defendant or any policy of the 1st Defendant which requires provision of bullet proof bullion van and a security detail of 2 vans comprising not less than 14 armed policemen for conveyance of cash. In any case, the Defendants denied the existence of any such safety policy which required provision of bullet proof bullion van and a security detail of 2 vans comprising not less than 14 armed policemen for cash conveyance. This denial placed a burden on the Claimant to prove the said policy. The claimant has not placed any material before the court to satisfy the court that such policy existed in the 2nd Defendant. The burden placed on the Claimant to prove that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are bound by a safety policy to provide bullet proof bullion van and a security detail of 2 vans comprising not less than 14 armed policemen has not been discharged. In his further attempt to show that the 1st Defendant was negligent in not providing bullet proof bullion van and a security detail of 2 vans comprising not less than 14 armed policemen for the trip of 7/2/2008, the Claimant said in his evidence that he did request for full security detail and bullet proof bullion van but the management of the 1st and 2nd Defendants refused to oblige his request. The Defendant denied the Claimant’s assertion and averred that the Claimant did not at any time request for full security detail or bullet proof bullion van for the cash movement. The Claimant only said it was the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s who refused his request but he did not tell this court who he made the request to and by what means. There is no evidence of the request or the refusal before this court. The Claimant has not led any credible evidence to prove that he requested for a bullet proof bullion van and two escort vans of fourteen Policemen for the cash movement of 7/2/2008. The Claimant has further relied on Exhibit K as what imposed a duty on the Defendants to provide him with bullet proof bullion van for cash conveyance. The Claimant averred in his reply to statement of defence that there was a standing directive from Mike Okiro, a former IGP that all cash movement must be done with bullet proof bullion van and he relied on Exhibit K. The Exhibit is an electronic print out of an internet publication of This Day live News dated 21/7/2010. The Defendants’ counsel has argued that the Claimant cannot, in his allegation that the Defendant is under duty to provide bullet proof bullion van, rely on the content of the Exhibit. Having examined the content of the Exhibit, I am in total agreement with the Defendant’s counsel. The Exhibit contains that it was an investigation conducted by the Newspaper 4 years earlier which revealed that there was a meeting in Gombe were bank managers were reminded by the Commissioner of Police, Barrister Joseph Ahmed Ibi, that the police stands by the October 27, 2007 deadline issued by then Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro for the banks to provide bullet proof vans for policemen who escort bank monies. This Exhibit does not support the Claimant’s case for a number of reasons. First of all, the Claimant has alleged that there was a standing directive from the former Inspector General of Police. I cannot find the alleged standing directive in the content of the Exhibit. Secondly, the Exhibit is not a circular or regulation or gazette issued by the police. Again, to rely on the newspaper to establish the truth of the directive from the former Inspector General of Police will amount to hearsay. The content of the newspaper is reporting what Barrister Joseph Ahmed Ibi said in a meeting and he too was quoted as reporting a deadline issued previously by the former Inspector General of Police. The content of the newspaper publication is documentary hearsay. When the Claimant relied on the directive by the Inspector General of Police, he is expected to produce the exact formal document containing the directive of the Inspector General of Police. The newspaper was not issued by the Inspector General of Police; neither is the newspaper an official communication containing the alleged directive of the Inspector General of Police. This court can hardly rely on the newspaper publication as the authority which imposed a duty on the 1st Defendant to provide the Claimant with bullet proof bullion van to convey cash. Going by the case presented by the Claimant, the Claimant has not proved any legal duty on the 1st Defendant to provide bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen in 2 vans. His evidence was only able to whip up a moral duty on the 1st Defendant to provide bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen in 2 vans. The most fundamental ingredient of allegation of negligence in personal injury cases is the breach of a duty which is actionable in law and not just a moral duty. Duty, as used in the general parlance means what one is bound by an obligation to do. In the context of this case, it could mean the particular way which the 1st Defendant is placed by law or its condition of service to behave or act as a reasonably careful person would have behaved or acted in the circumstance of the case. The facts are agreed that the Claimant has been conveying cash since 2004 from one location to the other including the route on which they were attacked on 7/2/20108. Now, by what means had he been conveying the cash? The Claimant did not say he has ever used bullet proof bullion van. By his averment that he requested for bullion van and 14 policemen for the cash movement of 7/2/2008, it can be implied that it was not the usual means of conveyance of cash. In effect, the Claimant has always been conveying cash in the usual bullion van and some policemen. He has not also told this court that he has ever been attacked in his conveyances in the bullion van since his employment in 2004. That is also to say armed robbery incidence was not a usual occurrence in the line of his duty. It is clear to me from the facts that the Claimant has never conveyed cash with bullet proof bullion van or 14 policemen. The Defendant could not have anticipated that armed robbers will attack on that day as to change the usual routine to bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen in 2 vans. In my view, the duty of care required from the 1st Defendant is to ensure adequate security for the personnel involved in the cash movement and the cash. This was done when the 1st Defendant got a detachment of 7 armed policemen to accompany the Claimant in the conveyance of the cash. That armed robbers attacked the convoy on 7/2/2008 was an unusual incidence. I do not also see the obligation on the Defendant to provide 14 armed police or a particular number of police men as claimed by the Claimant. Although the 1st Defendant owes the Claimant a duty to ensure he is protected in the course of conveyance of cash, I do not think the 1st Defendant has breached that duty in the circumstance of this case. Besides that the 7 armed policemen provided to accompany him were sufficient protection, the 1st Defendant could not have foreseen that armed robbers will attack them on that day. The fact cannot be overlooked that the Claimant delivered the cash to Benin because the Policemen with him protected him and the cash. In some circumstances, 14 policemen may not even fair better. It was unfortunate they encountered armed robbers on that day. Let me also comment on the Claimant’s averment that conveyance of cash is risky and there was rampant incidence of armed robbery on the Onitsha-Benin highway. His allegation that it was in view of this that made him request for bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen in 2 vans from Defendants but they refused his request is not lost to me. When his request was refused, knowing that the trip was risky, what was the Claimant expected to do? He didn’t say he protested or refused to embark on the trip. He only said he had no choice than to go. He embarked on that trip at his own free will, knowing the risks involved. But now he wants this court to hold his employer liable for his injuries from the armed robbery incidence. In as much as his injury from the incidence is regrettable, the 1st Defendant cannot be said to the responsible for it. The Claimant’s allegation that the 1st Defendant was under duty to provide him with a bullet proof bullion van and 14 policemen in 2 vans has not been substantiated. Therefore, the Claimant has not proved that the 1st Defendant breached the duty of care owed to him. The fact that the Claimant has suffered permanent disability or has become paralysed as a result of the injuries he sustained in the armed robbery incidence is obvious. The other leg of his accusation is that the 1st Defendant is liable for the permanent disability because it failed to give him immediate medical attention. This is contained in items (vii), (viii) and (ix) of the particulars of liability pleaded by the Claimant in paragraph 18 his statement of facts. In his main evidence, the Claimant stated that the 1st and 2nd Defendants totally abandoned him throughout the period of the incidence and hospitalization. He was made to bear the medical expenses by himself with no assistance from the 1st and 2nd Defendants because his efforts to get assistance from the 1st and 2nd Defendants were rebuffed by them. He also said the spinal cord injury he sustained required immediate expert medical attention in a specialized spinal cord centre but the 1st and 2nd Defendants failed to give him any assistance whatsoever. The Claimant further said he sponsored himself to the Indian Spinal Injuries Centre where he underwent surgeries and treatment. His condition improved significantly but was advised on follow up medical care at the centre. He could not get the 1st and 2nd Defendants to assist him do a follow up and it lead to deterioration of his improved condition. The 1st Defendant eventually responded after 2 years and 3 months when they used the 3rd Defendant to sponsor him for a treatment at Fortis Hospital, Mumbai, India on 23/9/2011. The Fortis hospital could not make any improvement to the Claimant’s health as he was already paralysed because of the Defendant’s delay in providing him with timely medical attention. The Claimant surmised that the delay by the Defendants to provide him immediate medical attention was responsible for his present permanent disability. The Defendants however denied the allegation and averred that the 3rd Defendant bore all the medical expenses of the Claimant from the date of the incidence up to June 2013 when he was disengaged from service. The Defendants also averred that the 3rd Defendant bore all the medical expenses in the treatment of the Claimant both in Nigeria and overseas and sponsored all the medical trips made by the Claimant and his wife to India. The Defendants said it was the 3rd Defendant who sponsored the Claimant and his wife to the Indian Spinal Injuries Centre and Fortis Hospital in India and paid all the expenses of the trips and treatments even though the 3rd Defendant is not under obligation to sponsor the Claimant to any foreign hospital. According to the Defendants, the 1st and 2nd Defendants were not under any obligation to give financial assistance to the Claimant. The 3rd Defendant also paid the Claimant his salaries from February 2008 to the time he was disengaged from the service of the 3rd Defendant in June 2013 with benefits. The 3rd Defendant took adequate care of the Claimant for 6 years until he was lawfully disengaged in June 2013. The Defendants relied on a letter written by the Claimant’s solicitors dated 26th November 2012 to show that the 3rd Defendant paid the Claimant’s medical expenses. The Defendants contended that the injury sustained by the Claimant was below the D10 and T10 region leading to loss of sensation, as such, the Claimant can no longer be treated neither by foreign nor local experts. The only thing that could be done for the Claimant’s condition is rehabilitation. From the facts, the gun shot injuries sustained by the Claimant was in the course of discharging his duties to his employer, the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant therefore owes a duty to the Claimant to ensure the Claimant received immediate and extensive treatment in view of the nature of the injuries. The question arising from the above facts of the parties on this issue is whether the 1st Defendant discharged this duty to the Claimant. From the totality of the averments of the Claimant on the delay in giving him medical assistance, he made the allegation specifically against his employer, which is the 1st Defendant. The Claimant didn’t make the complaint against the 3rd Defendant. In their defence, the Defendants have averred that it was the 3rd Defendant who took the responsibility of the Claimant’s medical care as the Claimant’s employer. The issue of the Claimant’s employer has been settled in this judgment. The obvious dispute here is that while the Claimant expected the 1st Defendant to have attended to his medical needs, the Defendants said the 3rd Defendant was the one who attended to the Claimant’s medicals. In paragraphs 4 of the statement of facts and paragraphs 2 (b) of reply to statement of defence, the Claimant pleaded the fact that the 3rd Defendant was contracted by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to manage the welfare of the staff of both the 1st and 2nd Defendants. That is to say it is the Claimant’s case that by the agreement between the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant, the issues of the Claimant’s welfare is the responsibility of the 3rd Defendant. I must mention it that the issue of welfare includes health and medical attention. When the Claimant said the 1st Defendant did not give him medical attention but also said the 1st and 2nd Defendant handed over staff welfare to the 3rd Defendant, I think we need to look to see if the 3rd Defendant did anything about the medial need of the Claimant after the incidence. Whether or not the 1st Defendant should be held liable for the allegation of the Claimant will depend on whether the 3rd Defendant performed its welfare obligation under the contract with the 1st Defendant to the Claimant when the Claimant was injured in the armed robbery incidence. The Claimant’s case is that he sustained the terrible injuries on 7/2/2008 while working for the 1st Defendant. The bullet wounds were such that affected his spinal cord and bladder. The Claimant also said the 1st Defendant abandoned him to take care of himself until more than 2 years later when the 3rd Defendant sponsored his trip to Fortis Hospital in September 2011. In paragraph 5 of the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, the Claimant denied the Defendants allegation that they provided medical assistance to the Claimant since the time of the injury and put the Defendants to proof. The Claimant insisted that the first medical assistance given to him by the Defendants was the trip to Fortis hospital India. This averment placed on the Defendants the burden of proof of the medical assistance they rendered to the Claimant. The Defendants have not been able to extricate themselves from the Claimant’s allegation. When the Defendants averred that the 3rd Defendant bore all the expenses and bills of the Claimant’s medical treatment from the date of the incidence up to June 2013, I expected the Defendants to show evidence of such paid expenses and at which hospital. It is such proof that will convince this court that the 1st and 3rd Defendants assisted the Claimant medically. The Defendants reliance on the letter dated 26th November 2012 by the Claimant’s solicitors does not assist the Defendants’ case. The content of the letter even indicts the Defendants for failing to give attention to the Claimant’s condition. The Defendants were categorical only about the payment made to Fortis Hospital in paragraph 25 of the statement of defence. The only evidence of payment of the Claimant’s medical bill tendered by the Defendants is Exhibits D13c and D13d. The Exhibits show payment made to Fortis hospital in September 2011. The Defendants have not placed any proof before me on which to believe they paid any of the Claimant’s medical expenses before the trip to Fortis hospital in September 2011. The Defendants have also not shown this court evidence of hospital the Claimant was taken or attended to before the trip to Fortis in 2011. I am unable to believe that the Defendants attended to the Claimant earlier than the trip to Fortis hospital in 2011. I find that the Defendants took proactive action with respect to the Claimant’s medical needs by the trip to Fortis only, by which time, the Claimant said, he had already been paralysed. In view of the terrible nature of the injuries sustained by the Claimant in the course of his employment, the 1st Defendant was under duty to immediately take the Claimant to a suitable hospital for treatment. I have considered the time lapse before the 1st and 3rd Defendants attended to the Claimant’s medical needs. It was too much of a time to attend to a staff who got injured in the course of safeguarding money that was not his own. In fact, I find from the facts that notwithstanding that he was shot and in pains, he still drove the bullion van to its destination at Benin. That was courage and such a person should not have been treated the way the 1st and 3rd Defendants have treated him. The Defendants have alleged that the paralysis is a result of the gunshot wounds and not because of the delay in treatment. The Defendants’ contention is hinged on the immediate cause of the paralysis but they appear to be oblivious of the remote cause. The gunshot injury might have been the immediate cause of the permanent disability but the fact that the Claimant’s condition might not have become unsalvageable if he had received immediate expert and extensive medical attention cannot be overlooked. After the armed robbery attack in February 2008, the UCH Ibadan only removed the bullets, stabilized the Claimant and discharged the Claimant in April 2008. In view of the nature of the Claimant’s injuries and the permanent disability he now suffers, the initial treatment at the UCH Ibadan was not the nature of treatment he was entitled to receive. An immediate treatment at a specialized hospital would have mitigated the Claimant’s present situation. I have noted the Defendants’ averment that the Claimant was provided means for rehabilitation. This is beside the point. The 1st or 3rd Defendant was expected to take immediate action in the treatment of the Claimant and not to try to administer medicine after death. The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendants did not meet up with their responsibilities to the Claimant. I agree with the Claimant that the 1st and 3rd Defendants’ conduct towards his condition was inhuman, unconscionable and unfair. The Claimant has now become permanently incapacitated. He can no longer be his usual vibrant self. In his present condition, he has family to cater for, medical expenses to pay and other responsibilities. To add salt to injury, the 3rd Defendant purportedly disengaged the Claimant from employment and paid him a paltry N4,013,554.14 for what the Defendants said was severance benefits. The Claimant has sought for general damages in this suit as compensation for the various conditions occasioned by his permanent disability. Although the 1st Defendant cannot be held liable for the occurrence of the injury, its failure to provide immediate and specialized medical treatment for the Claimant at the time of the incidence is a breach of its duty to the Claimant. It is on this ground I find the 1st Defendant liable to compensate the Claimant for his permanent disability. The Claimant has pleaded the fact that when the 3rd Defendant issued him the ill advised disengagement letter, the sum of N4,013,554.13 was also paid to him as his final benefits. The Defendants too did rely on this payment made to the Claimant. According to the Defendants, the sum is broken down into severance benefits, insurance benefits and balance on savings account. In addition, the Claimant was given a car, bathing wheel chair and physiotherapy programme for one year. Exhibits D9, D14, D15 and D16 are the evidence tendered by the Defendants to show that these items and payments were made to the Claimant. The breakdown of the sum of N4,013,554.13 is contained in Exhibit D16. N1,913,553.01 was meant for severance benefits, N200,000.00 as cost of bathing wheel chair, N120,000.00 for physiotherapy programme for one year, N77,239.52 as balance on savings account and N1,702,749.60 as insurance benefit. There is no sum for compensation for the Claimant’s permanent disability. Since the Claimant is still in the 1st Defendant’s employment, save for the wheel chair, physiotherapy programme and the car which are necessarily the duty of the 1st and 3rd Defendants to provide for the Claimant in his rehabilitation, the terminal payments made to him had not arisen at the time. In view of the nature of injury and disability the Claimant is confronted with, I am unable to hold that the sum constituting the severance benefits is sufficient compensation for the disability he suffered in the 1st Defendant’s employment. In my assessment, taking into consideration the Claimant’s present health condition and the many disadvantages attending it, N15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) is a fair compensation for the Claimant. In the sum of this judgment, I find that the Claimant succeeds in some of his claims. Reliefs (a) and (c) are unnecessary for the reasons already given in this judgment. Reliefs (d), (e), (f) and (g) have not been established and they are hereby are dismissed. Reliefs (b), (h), (i), (j) and (k) are granted in the following terms: i. It is hereby declared that the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant is subsisting till date. Accordingly, the 1st Defendant is ordered to pay the Claimant all his salaries, allowances and entitlements from the date the 3rd Defendant purported to have terminated the Claimant’s employment. ii. It is also declared that the failure of the 1st Defendant to ensure that the Claimant was given immediate specialized and extensive medical treatment for his gunshot wounds sustained in the course of his employment was a breach of the 1st Defendant’s duty to the Claimant. iii. The 1st Defendant is ordered to provide the Claimant with specialized medical treatment and facilities in his continued rehabilitation while in the employment of the 1st Defendant. iv. The 1st Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of N15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) to the Claimant as compensation for his permanent disability. The sum of N100,000.00 is also awarded to the Claimant as cost of this action. The Defendant is hereby ordered to immediately comply with the orders made above. The monetary orders must be complied with within 30 days from the date of this judgment; failure of which post judgment interest shall begin to run at the rate of 10% per annum, until it is fully liquidated. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge