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REPRESENTATION Mobisola Akerele Miss with Bolaji Oladipo Miss, Jane Odili Miss, Bolaji Oladipo & Obaloluwa Adeleke for the Claimant. Mrs. E. V. Omotosho with Ada Nkwocha Mrs. for the Defendant. JUDGMENT The Claimant commenced this suit in the Federal High Court as Suit No: FHC/L/CS/1312/97: Mrs. Modupe Aina Kuti v. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board vide her particulars of Claim dated 14th November 1997. By the Order of the Federal High Court made on 28th March 2003, this suit was consolidated with 9 other suits which included - FHC/L/CS/1325/97: Mrs. Laeticia Ebhotemen v. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board; FHC/L/CS/1313/97: Alice Olufolake Olunlade v. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board; and FHC/L/CS1316/97: Mrs. E.O. Famuyide v. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board. Six out of the said 9 suits were discontinued leaving only the suits referred to above. Following the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 this Court was vested with the jurisdiction to determine the subject matter of this suit. Thus, by an order of the Federal High Court, per Liman J made on 20/3/12, the consolidated suits were transferred to this Court where they were given the consolidated Suit No: NICN/LA/350/12: Mrs. Modupe Aina Kuti & Ors v Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board. On 3/12/13, pursuant to an application by learned Counsel to the Claimant the transferred consolidated suits were deconsolidated and the parties filed their respective pleadings in their Suits. The Claimant by her second amended statement of facts filed on 6/5/14 claimed against the Defendant as follows: 1. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24th October, 1997 is null and void. 2. An order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal. 3. Payment to the Claimant by the Defendant of the sum N1,259,401.60 (One Million Two Hundred and Fifty Nine Thousand and Four Hundred and One Naira, Sixty Kobo) being special damages for her wrongful suspension and dismissal from the service of the Defendant. Particulars of Special Damages i. Salaries for the period of July 1997 up till January 19, 2006 (104 months) at =N=2,900 per month: =N=301,600.00. ii. Transport Allowance for the period of July 1997 up till January 19, 2006 (104 months) at =N=2,100 per month: =N=218,400. iii. Lunch Allowance from July 1997 up till January 19, 2006 (104 months) =N=739.20 per month: =N=76,867.8. iv. Utility= Allowance from July 1997 up till January 19, 2006 (104 months) =N=151.20 per month: =N=15,724.80. v. Housing Allowance from January 1997 till January 2006 at =N=51,000 yearly (10 years): =N=510,000. vi. Leave Allowance from 1997 to 2006 (10 years) at =N=3,480 yearly: =N=34,800. vii. Furniture Grant from 1997 till 2006 at =N=51,000 every 4 years: i.e. 2000 & 2004 - =N=102,400. 4. A declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsisted till 19th January 2006, being the date the Claimant ought to have retired by law, having put in 35 years of service. 5. An Order that the Defendant do account for and pay till date, all the accrued pension of the Claimant from 20th January 2006, being the date Claimant’s pension began to accrue, till date. 6. A declaration that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the owner or the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit 24 at “A” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. 7. A declaration that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 8. A perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, it servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any member whatsoever with the Claimants possession and occupation of the said housing unit. The Defendant filed its statement of defence dated 30/1/14 but filed on the 31/1/14 and also counter claimed against the Claimant as follows - 1. A declaration that the National Provident Staff Quarters located at the Satellite Town, were not allocated to staff on owner-occupiers basis. 2. An order directing the Claimant to vacate the flat occupied by her immediately. The hearing of this case commenced on 27/2/14 when the Claimant testified as CW1, adopted her witness depositions made on11/10/13and additional witness deposition made on 28/5/13 as her evidence in chief and tendered 15 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted without objection and marked as Exh. C1-Exh. C15. The case for the Claimant is that she was an employee of the Defendant; that she was the owner or person entitled to ownership of the property allocated to her by the Defendant since same was allocated on owner-occupier basis; that without justification, the Defendant sought to eject her from the property sometimes in 1997; that following her refusal to vacate the property, the Defendant suspended her from duty and subsequently dismissed her without compliance with the conditions of service which regulated her employment with the Defendant and that the acts of the Defendant were illegal, null and void and of no effect. Under cross examination, CW1 testified that by Exh. C6 the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity ordered her dismissal; that she is in Court because of her dismissal; that she is aware that a dismissed staff is not entitled to any entitlement and that is the reason she is contesting her dismissal; that the present staff quarter was built in 1979; that she is aware that Defendant applied for and was granted allocation of land to build the staff quarters; that she was aware that conditions were attached to the granted application; that she moved in to the staff quarters in 1981; that she was given a letter of allocation before moving in; that she was not given any NPF Conditions before moving in; that the house was given to her on owner-occupier basis; that she did not apply for any housing loan from the Defendant but that she applied for was Special Rent Advance of =N=50,000 in 1993; that she applied for the advance due to harassment and intimidation by the Management of the Defendant; that that the 1st quit notice served on her was dated 11/7/97; that the monthly deduction from her salary was =N=25 being the 20% of her basic salary; that the =N=50,000 due to her as Housing Allowance was withheld because she was staying in the staff quarters yet =N=25 was deducted as rent and that she did not collect any Housing Allowance. Witness added that while working with the Defendant she belonged to Association of Senior Staff Bank Insurance and other Financial Institution Employees; that Exh. C7 was issued to all stakeholders for them to comply with Federal Government directives and that she did not elect to buy the house when offer was made because she had been paying for the house and have been denied House Allowance over the years. In re examination, the witness stated that the quarters is part of Federal Government Housing Scheme. One Mr. Obi Osita Oliver testified as CW2. Witness adopted his witness deposition made on 2/5/14 as his evidence in chief and tendered 3 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted without objection and marked as Exh. C16-Exh.C18. Under cross examination CW2 stated that his housing allowance was withheld because he was staying in staff quarters; that the deducted housing allowance was to be paid back if he vacated the staff quarters; that between 1993 when he left the Bank and 2011 when he was given an offer to buy the house the issue of ownership was in contention and this led to litigation but could not remember the suit number; that as at 1993, he paid about =N=24,000 while by the Regulation he was to pay =N=21,500 for the Four Bedroom; that in 2011 he paid =N=400,000 for the property, referring to Exh. C18; that there were terms of settlement between Management and other tenants and this led to his paying =N=400,000 for the property; that he is not aware that offer was made to Claimant to buy her property; that he left UBA in 1993 for another Bank and that the Deed of Sublease was executed by UBA in his favour. In re-examination witness added that Exh. C17 and Exh. C18 refer to housing scheme and that Tenants and Management of UBA sat and agreed on the amount to be paid by Tenants. The Defendant opened its defence on 16/6/15. It called one Ali Shuaibu as its lone witness. Witness adopted his written witness deposition dated 31/1/14 and tendered 29 documents as exhibits which were admitted and marked as Exh. D1-Exh. D29. Witness urged the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant. In brief, the case of the Defendant is that the Claimant was its former employee; that although she was allocated the said property of the Defendant the allocation was not on owner-occupier basis and that following acts of indiscipline exhibited by the Claimant and other staff in disobeying lawful instructions to vacate the said staff quarters, they were suspended from work and subsequently dismissed from the service of the Defendant pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act, Cap. 381, laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Under cross examination, DW1 testified that he was employed on 10/9/90 by the Defendant; that he did not apply for Defendant Housing Scheme; that he lived in his own house built through his savings in 2007; that he was receiving Housing Allowance from the Defendant; that his housing allowance in 1990 was about =N=150,000.00–=N=200,000.00 per annum and that in 2015 it was =N=702,000.00; that he was receiving the allowance because he was not staying in the house built by the Defendant; that the land on which Defendant built its estate is owned by Federal Government; that the Defendant does not have Certificate of Occupancy over the land; that he is not aware that Defendant’s application for Certificate of Occupancy was rejected; that as at 1992 Defendant has allocated several of the apartments to its staff; that Claimant was not dismissed because she was sick, inefficient on her job, for late coming or for sleeping on duty; that he is not aware of any allegation of corruption against her; that the Claimant was not issued a query before being suspended by Defendant, not even a warning letter; that Claimant did not face any Disciplinary Panel before being suspended and subsequently dismissed; that Claimant was represented at the meeting referred to in Exh. D21 though not invited; that when a decision is to be taken against a staff employment the staff ought to be present and that he was not a staff of the Defendant when allocation of the land was made to Defendant. At the close trial, learned Counsel on either were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The Defendant filed its 15-page final written address on 1/9/15 in which it raised the following four issues for determination, viz; 1. Whether the Claimant were (sic) properly dismissed under Public Officers Special Provisions Act. 2. Whether on the totality of evidence before the Court, was the Defendant property given on owner occupier's basis to staff especially to the Claimant in this suit. 3. What is the effect of the purported allocation paper presented by the Claimant dated the 15th day of August 1994, 16 years after the allocation paper dated the 9th day of October, 1978 that was given to the Defendant. 4. Is the Defendant entitled to its counterclaim? 5. Whether the then Minister of Works and Productivity can on his own nullify the terms and conditions as contained in the allocation paper 9th October, 1978 and create a new terms and conditions as contained in the purported allocation paper dated the 15th August, 1994. Arguing issue 1, learned Counsel submitted that the Public Officers Special Provisions Act provides for the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of public officers for diverse reasons and to prevent the institution of any civil proceedings against such action; that the Minister is the appropriate authority under the Act and that all that is required is evidence to satisfy the Court that the decision to terminate the public officer's appointment was taken by the Minister, citing FCDA v. Sule (1994)3 NWLR (Pt. 332) 257. According to learned Counsel, the Defendant by Exh. D20 sought the approval of the Hon. Minister to dismiss the Claimant pursuant to the Public Officers Special Provisions Act; that the Minister gave his approval by Exh. D21 before the Defendant issued Exh.C6 - Dismissal letter to the Claimant. Relying on the case of LGSC v. Dada (1997)8 NWLR (Pt. 516) 293, learned Counsel submitted that termination of appointment of a public officer predicated on the Public Officers Special Provisions Act is valid where the termination letter though not emanating from the Governor but carries out the Governor's instruction. Counsel urged the Court to hold considering Exh. C6, Exh. D21 and Exh. D22 that the Claimant was properly dismissed as allowed by the relevant statute. Counsel further argued that indeed by virtue of section 3(3) of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act, the Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain any suit instituted by any person who is dismissed pursuant to the exercise of power under the Act, citing Dauda v. UNAM (2002)17 NWLR (Pt. 796) 362, Nwosu v. ISESA (1990)2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688 & Shitta-Bey v. A.G. Federation (1998)10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392. Learned Counsel thus prayed the Court to decline jurisdiction in this case. Respecting issue 2, learned Counsel referred to Exh. D1 as showing the purpose for which the Defendant applied for land to build. Counsel also referred to Exh. C2 which contained provisions to the effect that allottees could be ejected for failure to comply with the regulations governing the Housing scheme - Exh. D6. Counsel submitted that it is clear from the reading of all the exhibits that the property was not allocated on owner occupier basis and that there being no ambiguity, the Court should construe the documents within the meaning of the clear words used. Counsel cited Excel Plastic Industry Limited v. FBN (2005)11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 59 & Abalogu v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria (2003)13 NWLR (Pt. 837) 308. Learned Counsel referred to Exh. D7 & Exh. D8 and submitted that the combined reading of these exhibits does not show that the Defendant allocated the property in question on owner-occupier basis. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to hold that the Claimant was not allocated the property on owner-occupier basis and as such was a mere licensee since she occupied the premises in the performance of her contract of service and has no interest or estate in the property, citing Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. (Nigeria) Limited (1993)4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512. Respecting issue 3, learned Counsel referred to the testimony of CW2 in cross examination to the effect that at the time of the allocation of his apartment it was not indicated that it was on owner occupier basis contrary to the averment in paragraph 33 of the Claimant's second statement of facts; that the witness also stated that both he and his former employer negotiated the price and eventually the house was sold to him for =N=400,000.00. According to learned Counsel while most of the staff of the Defendant took advantage of the offer made to them, referring to Exh. D19 & Exh. D25-Exh. D27, Claimant did not. Learned Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant not having followed the modalities laid down to become owner of the property same cannot be awarded to her. On issue 4, learned Counsel submitted that Exh. C7 tendered by the Claimant was a letter written in 1994 against Exh. D1, Exh. D2 & Exh. D3 which were issued in 1977 and 1978 respectively and that Claimant was a party in suit No: FHC/L/CS/1156/94, referring to Exh. D16. Counsel urged the Court to hold that Exh. C7 was made during the pendency of suit No: FHC/L/CS/1156/94 and hence inadmissible by virtue of Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act. Respecting issue 5 whether the then Minister of Works and Productivity can on his own nullify the terms and conditions in the allocation paper of 9/10/78 and create a new terms and conditions as contained in the purported allocation paper dated 15/8/94, learned Counsel submitted that by Exh. C7 the terms of the allocation did not clearly specify that the houses built on the land allocated would be allocated to employees on owner-occupier basis. Learned Counsel argued that the allocation papers i.e Exh. D1, Exh. D2 & Exh. D3 clearly spelt out the conditions upon which the Defendant allocated the property to the Claimant; that parties are bound by the contents of those exhibits and that since the contents are clear the Court will look elsewhere for their construction, citing A.G, Rivers State v. A.G, Akwa Ibom State (2011)8 NWLR (Pt. 1248) 38. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant. Finally learned Counsel to the Defendant urged the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant and order the Claimant to vacate the property forthwith or pay for the property as was done by her colleagues. A 58-page final written address of the Claimant was filed on 13/11/15. In it learned Counsel set down the following four issues for determination - 1. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant is not null, void and of no effect whatsoever for failure to follow the applicable procedure for the dismissal of a public officer. 2. Whether in view of No. 1 above, the Claimant is not entitled to be paid - i. Her outstanding salaries and allowances from 23rd July 1997 when she was suspended or 24th October 1997, when she was dismissed till 19th January 2006 when she would have been due for retirement. ii. Her pension from 20th January 2006 till date of judgment and thereafter. 3. Whether in view of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public housing policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Claimant is not the owner or entitled to ownership of Unit 24, “A” Close National Provident Fund Housing Scheme, Badagry, Lagos. 4. Whether the Defendant’s counterclaim ought not to be dismissed for being unmeritorious. Arguing issue 1, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is a Public Office in accordance with section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 having been employed by the Defendant a statutory body created by a Federal enactment; that the Claimant's employment is thus one with statutory flavour; that the provisions of Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Act and the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Staff Conditions of Service (Exh. C10) that regulate the employment of the Claimant and same must be followed in suspending her. It was the submission of learned Counsel that the purported dismissal of the Claimant pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act was not done or authorised by the appropriate authority referring to Exh. D21 and Exh. D22. Counsel also submitted that indeed the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity was not expressly defined as the appropriate authority in that statute and there being no evidence of the President's delegation or authorisation cannot be said to be the appropriate authority under the Public Officers (Special Provision) Act Cap. 381, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 to be able to exercise the power under it, citing Wilson v. A.G. Bendel State & Ors. (1985)1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572 & Anyah & Ors. v. Iyayi (1993)7 NWLR (Pt. 305) 290 at 319. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Secondly, learned Counsel submitted that the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity did not authorise the Claimant's dismissal. Counsel referred to Exh. D21 in which the Defendant had written thus to the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity - ''Accordingly, the Honorable Minister is prayed upon to approve the Management summarily dismisses the erring staff in accordance with the provisions of the Funds Conditions of Service''; that Exh. D22 was the reply to Exh. D21 and that instead of complying with the instruction in Exh. D22, the Defendant issued Exh. D23 purporting to dismiss the Claimant on the authority of the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity which was neither signed by the Hon. Minister nor by any known person. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the dismissal of the Claimant is void. Thirdly, learned Counsel submitted that the dismissal of the Claimant had nothing to do with her conduct in relation to the performance of her duties within the meaning of Section 1 of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. Counsel referred to the testimony of DW who stated that illness, inefficiency, lateness or sleeping on duty was not the basis for the dismissal of the Claimant. Submitting that the basis for dismissal pursuant to Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act must be one of the conditions set out in the Act, citing Emuze v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Benin (2003)10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 378.According to learned Counsel, Claimant's refusal to vacate her apartment was not in relation to the duties she was employed to perform nor is there any evidence that her continued employment was not in the public interest. Counsel urged the Court to declare the dismissal of the Claimant as null and void and set same aside. Learned Counsel added that the dismissal of the Claimant had nothing to do with her conduct in relation to the performance of her duties referring to the testimony of DW on oath and that it is the law that the basis for dismissal pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act must be one of the conditions set out in the Act, citing Emezue v. Vice Chancellor, University of Benin (2003)10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 378. Counsel prayed the Court to declare the dismissal null and void and set aside same. On the submission of learned Counsel to the Defendant that pursuant to section 3(3) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this suit, Claimant Counsel submitted that the attitude of the Courts has been consistent over the years. Counsel submitted that the Courts would always have the power to look into whether the criteria set out in the Act were met and the provisions of the Act followed in dismissing the Claimant and that it is only then that the jurisdiction of the Court would be ousted, citing Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007)4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423, Federal Capital Development Authority v. Sule (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 332) 257, Anyah & Ors. v. Iyayi (supra) & Garba v. Federal Civil Service Commission (1988)1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 449. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It was also the argument of the learned Counsel to the Claimant that the Claimant's employment was regulated by the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Act and the NSITF Staff Conditions of Service; that they must be followed in ending the employment of the Claimant and that a breach of statutory laid down procedure renders the act of dismissal or termination ultra vires, citing Bamgboye v. University of Benin (1990)10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290, Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (No.2) (1985)2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Olufegba v. Abdulraheem (2009)18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 & Federal Medical Centre, Ido-Ekiti & Ors. (2012)2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 411.According to learned Counsel, by section 43(6) of the NSITF Act, the Claimant is a person who was the holder of an office in the Fund or Management Board prior to the NSITF Act; that by section 43(1), NSITF Act, the obligation of the NPF and the NPF Board to apply the Federal Civil Service Rules to the Claimant is vested in the Defendant and that in dismissing the Claimant the Defendant did not comply with Chapter 4 of the Federal Civil Service Rules, 1974 in that the Claimant was not queried, not given any warning letter, did not face any disciplinary panel and not invited to the Management meeting where she was suspended. Learned Counsel cited Olufe agbga & Ors. v. Abdul-Raheem & Ors (2009)18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384, Bamgboye v. University of Lagos (1990)10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290 SC & Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (No. 2) (1985)2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. Counsel argued that the Defendant by failing to follow its own laid down rules before suspending and eventually dismissing the Claimant, both the suspension and dismissal are null and void and of no effect. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. On issue 2, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant led evidence that she was employed by the Defendant on 19/1/71; that she was suspended by the Defendant without pay from July 1997; that while still on suspension she was dismissed and the Claimant led credible evidence respecting her emoluments at the time of her suspension. Counsel submitted that these pieces of evidence were not challenged or controverted at all and that the Court has a duty to act on them, citing Matanmi v. Dada (2013)7 NWLR (Pt.1353) 219 & Ighrerinovo v. S.C.C & Ors. (2013)10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 138; that public officers employment being regulated by statute does not admit of the private employer's power to hire and fire; that in the absence of any misconduct, death or resignation of the employee, he or she remains in the employment of that agency or parastatal till death and that but for her unlawful dismissal, the Claimant would have continued in service of the Defendant till 19/1/06 by which time she would have spent 35years in service and would be due for retirement in accordance with the Federal Civil Service Rules and the Defendant's Conditions of service. Citing Omidiora & Anor. v. Federal Civil Service Commission (2007)14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 17. & Igbe v. Governor, Bendel State (1983)1 SCNLR 73 learned Counsel urged the Court to award the Claimant from the date of her suspension up till 19/1/06 when she became due for retirement under the law. Counsel submitted further that the termination of the employment of the Claimant having been shown to be ineffectual and same subsisting till 19/1/06 Counsel prayed the Court to hold that the Claimant is entitled to her pension from 20/1/06 the date Claimant would have retired till her death. Issue 3 is whether in view of the Federal Government Guidelines issued pursuant to the Public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Claimant is not the owner or entitled to ownership of Unit 24, ''A'' Close, National Provident Fund Housing Scheme, Badagry, Lagos. On this learned Counsel submitted that the land on which the Defendant's estate was built was allocated to the Defendant pursuant to the Housing Policy of the Federal Government referring to Exh. D3; that the usage of the land in accordance with the Federal Government Guidelines was a condition of the allocation of the land citing Exh. D3; that the said Guidelines were restated by the Hon. Minister of Works and Housing in a circular issued on 15/8/94 (Exh. C7) where it was said to include that the living units are to be allocated on owner-occupier basis with the prospect of the staff owing the house eventually among others; that the Hon Minister of Works & Housing further reiterated the government policy when he stated in paragraph 10 of Exh. C7 that ''The Federal Ministry of Works and Housing has received series of petitions from allottees of the houses and wishes to reiterate the above points to facilitate the resolution of the outstanding disputes''. Learned Counsel submitted that Exh. C7 is evidence of the Federal Government Policy on housing; that the Court, citing Ike v. Nzekwe (1975)2 S.C 1 & Oguebe v. Odunwoke (1979)3-4 SC 58 at 85, must take judicial notice of the declared policy of the Federal Military Government and that there is evidence of the Defendant's willful violation of the terms upon which it was granted the land in question by the Federal Military Government. Learned Counsel further argued that the making of National Provident Fund Management Board Conditions for Occupation of Staff Quarters, Satellite Town and the Federal Civil Service Rules for Occupation of Government Quarters (Exhs. D6 & D7) are of no moment as the requirements of the Federal Military Government's policy are clear and submitted that a similar situation as the present case was decided by the Court in Suit No: LD/26337/2006 Patrick A. Ogbodu v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc - Exh. C15.Counsel urged the Court to be persuaded by that decision and resolve the issue in favour of the Claimant. Arguing issue 4, learned Counsel first submitted that the Defendant failed to formulate issues from its counterclaim as required by Order 20 Rule 5 of the National Industrial Court Rules; that Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed and that Final Written Address is akin to appellate brief where failure to formulate issues has been held sufficient to render a Brief incompetent citing Orji v. Zara Industries Limited (1992)1 NWLR (Pt. 216) 124 & Echo Enterprises Limited v. Standard Bank of Nigeria Limited & Anor. (1989)4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 509 at 512. Counsel thus urged the Court to discountenance all the argument canvassed in support of the counterclaim. Counsel argued further and stating without prejudice to earlier submission that it is clear from Exh. C14 & Exh. C15 tendered by CW2 that although the Bungalow initially allocated to him by his employer was not stated to be on owner occupier basis, same was subsequently allocated to him on owner occupier basis by Exh. C16 and that CW2 testified that he believed the property to be his because he came across documents which led him to that belief on the premise of which he instituted Suit No: ID/3247/95 O.O. Obi v. UBA. Counsel submitted that the evidence of CW2 not having been impinged the Court should rely on same. According to learned Counsel, the Defendant's offer for sale to the Claimant of her 2-Bedroom apartment was made in bad faith as the price was prohibitively high in view of the fact the Claimant's salary which was paid last in June 1997 was =N=1,389 58 apart from the fact that she had no income since then and was also denied her entitlements and that the Defendant ought to have considered all payments made by the Claimant such as her monthly rent and her annual housing allowances which she forfeited. On the contention of learned Counsel to the Defendant that Exhs. C7 was made during the pendency of a previous suit between the parties by person interested, Counsel submitted otherwise. Learned Counsel submitted that the exhibit was made by the Hon. Minister for Works in an official capacity and in the course of carrying out his official duties and that he does not fall within the meaning of ''a person interested'' as stated by the Supreme Court in Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2010)13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 307. It was the submission of the learned Counsel Exh. C7 did not create any new terms of allocation as argued by the Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Learned Counsel concluded by urging the Court to grant the claims of the Claimant and dismiss the counterclaims. The Defendant filed a 7-page reply on pints of law on 15/2/16. In it, learned Counsel argued that the Claimant did not plead anywhere in her amended statement of facts that her employment was one with statutory flavour and prayed the Court to discountenance all submissions made in the final written address respecting same. Secondly, learned Counsel submitted that the employment of the Claimant is not one clothed with statutory flavour as contended. Thirdly, that if the defence of the Defendant fails respecting dismissal of the Claimant, Claimant is only entitled to damages in action for wrongful dismissal; that the Claimant cannot treat the employment as still subsisting citing Ilodibia v. NCC Limited (1997)7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 174. Thirdly, Counsel submitted that the effect of the Defendant's failure to formulate issues from its counterclaim can be treated as a mere irregularity pursuant to Order 5 Rules 1 & 2, National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. Learned Counsel further stated relating to what the Claimant is legally entitled to that the Claimant is entitled to be paid all her entitlement up till July 1997 when she was dismissed and not thereafter and that she could not claim her outstanding salaries and allowances from July 1997 up till 8/8/09. Counsel cited Western Nigeria Development Corporation v. Jumoh Abimbola (1996) NMLR 381 at 382, Nigeria Produce Marketing Board v. A. I Adewunmi (1972)1 All NLR 433 & Katto v. CBN (1999)7 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390. I read carefully and with understanding all the processes filed by learned Counsel on either side. I listened with attention and watched the demeanour of all the witnesses who testified in this case. In addition to all this, I listened and understood the oral submissions of learned Counsel in this case as well as reviewed and evaluated all the exhibits tendered. Having done all this, I narrow the issues for the just determination of this case down to mainly three as follows - 1. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant was not wrongful in the circumstances of this case. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved her claims to be entitled to any or all of them. 3. Whether the Defendant is entitled to a grant of any or all of its counterclaims. Before I delve into the consideration of the issues set down for determination, I deem it imperative to consider a rather salient issue raised by the Defendant in its final written address. It is also open to the Court to feign ignorance of its being of any relevance and consideration to the just determination of this case. Suffices to state however that learned Counsel to the Defendant on page 7 having cited Dauda v. UNAM (2002)17 NWLR (Pt. 796) 362, Nwosu v. I.S.E.S.A (1990)2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688 & Shitta-Bey v. A. G. Federation (1998)10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392 urged the Court to decline jurisdiction in this case. Issue of jurisdiction is of fundamental importance to the hearing and determination of a case. It is said to be akin to blood in human and that as human cannot do without blood so also a Court without jurisdiction over a case cannot thrive. In the absence of jurisdiction therefore, every effort of a Court in a case is nothing but effort in futility. This, the appellate Courts have said, is immaterial the brilliance, the ingenuity or the good intention of the Court respecting the case. The fact however remains that for a Court to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it must first assume jurisdiction to determine same. Section 3(3), Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act Cap. 381, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 states thus - ''No civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any court or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done by any person under this Act and if any such proceedings have been or are instituted before or after the making of this Act, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and void''. Now the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, in section 6 ascribes the judicial powers of the nation to the Judiciary as an arm of government. By that provisions, the Courts established under the Constitution are charged with the responsibility of adjudication over all manner of causes, matters and persons both inter se as well as between individuals and governments and between different levels of governments - Local government, State government and Federal government. The only exception or ouster of judicial intervention relates only to matters stated in Section 6(6)(c) & (d) of the same Constitution. It is imperative to state that the Constitution had early enough declared its supremacy when it provides in Section 1(3) that where any other law in the country is in conflict with any of its provisions such other law remains void and ineffective to the extent of its inconsistency. The Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act by its Section 3(3) ousting the jurisdiction of the Court is undoubtedly inconsistent with the provision of section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. It is therefore bound to give way for the Courts to perform their constitutionally assigned role of adjudication. I have not been requested to declare section 3(3) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act unconstitutional. It is therefore sufficient to simply state that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. As an aside however, it is important to note that the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act was promulgated as a Decree during the dark days of military interregnum in Nigeria. That was during the era when constitutionalism was an aberration just as democracy was. It was in that era when the Constitution and the Courts virtually existed at the mercy of the Military officers and institutions. That era and such laws as the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act, I dare say, have been consigned into the dustbin of history. I have not been moved to declare the provision of the Act ousting the jurisdiction of the Court unconstitutional. It is therefore sufficient for me to simply state that this Court in hearing this matter acts within the adjudicatory power as conferred on it by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. The first issue for determination is whether the dismissal of the Claimant was not wrongful in the circumstances of this case. This aptly encapsulates the first relief of the Claimant which is for a declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24/10/97 is null and void. An employer will continue to retain the power to discipline its employees or any of them. Disciplinary measures to so impose range from issuance of query, warning letter, suspension, termination of employment to dismissal. See Calabar Cement Company Limited v. Daniel (1991)4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 750 Except in some certain circumstances, especially where an employment is one with statutory flavour the Court will not declare either termination of employment or dismissal from employment as null and void. This is because of the consequences that will ordinarily follow such a declaration for instant an order of reinstatement. Again this is premised on the common sense and trite saying that the Court will not force an unwilling employer to retain a willing employee and vice versa. See Adebayo Sunday Joseph & Ors. v. Kwara State Polytechnic & Ors (2013) LPELR-21398. Therefore where an employer has the power to discipline an employee but fails to follow the laid down procedure for such discipline, the step taken by the employer can only be declared wrongful but certainly not null and void. In the instant case, the Claimant was alleged to have been dismissed by the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. Query: Did the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity possess power to so do? If yes, did the Hon. Minister follow the procedure for the exercise of the power conferred by the statute? Exh. C6 was the letter of dismissal from service issued to the Claimant on behalf of the Managing Director of the Defendant and dated 24/10/97. The first paragraph of the two-paragraph letter states that - ''The Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity acting under the authority conferred on him by the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by virtue of section 4(2)(b) of the above Act, has authorised your dismissal from the services of the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board with immediate effect''. It is important to bring to the fore that the Hon. Minister did not just wake up and on his own direct the dismissal of the Claimant along with some other members of staff of the Defendant. For, by Exh. D21 dated 30/7/97, the Defendant had in that exhibit titled ''Request for Approval to Dismiss some Members of Staff on Account of Gross Misconduct'' sought the dismissal of the Claimant among others. In paragraph 2 of that Exhibit, the Defendant had written that - ''The decision of the committee was predicated on the refusal of the staff to abide by series of instructions to vacate the staff quarters at the Satellite town in Lagos culminating in the issuance of an ultimatum by management which was brazenly defiled by the staff. Indeed, the offence committed by staff is punishable by summary dismissal hence we would like to seek your consideration and approval to effect the immediate dismissal of all the erring staff placed on suspension''. The reply of the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity is contained in one-paragraph letter dated 13/8/97 which is page 4 of Exh. D22 personally signed by the Hon. Minister. In that exhibit, the Hon. Minister simply wrote - ''Further to your submission Ref. No. AJ/1/SEC/1 of 30th July, 1997, on the above subject matter, approval is hereby granted for the fund to implement the management's recommendation as requested''. The review of the exhibits as done above becomes imperative so as to appreciate in a clearer form what actually transpired. Now, from the analysis thus far, was the approval sought to dismiss the Claimant pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act? The answer to this question is certainly in the negative. Secondly, was the approval of the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity given to dismiss the Claimant in the exercise of the power conferred on him by the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act? Again the answer to this question can only be and it is in the negative. I need to state further that indeed, nowhere in the correspondences leading to the dismissal of the Claimant was any reference made to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act as contended by the Defendant. I need to reiterate the fact that I found the evidence and testimony of the lone witness for the Defendant instructive. If according to that witness, the Claimant was not dismissed for inefficiency, lateness to work or for any failings in that guise it is difficult to find justification for the dismissal of the Claimant. Added to all this is the fact according to DW1 that the Claimant was not issued Query, Warning letter or invited to face any disciplinary panel before being dismissed. This case and in particular the issue of dismissal is a typical example of the misfortune often suffered by senior and top government officers, holders of top public offices and political office holders. These classes of individuals are more often than not misled and misadvised by those who should ordinarily properly and truthfully advise them in accordance with the established rules of public service and applicable circulars. For instance, it is difficult to understand the rationale for seeking approval to dismiss a staff simply because the staff refused to vacate a staff quarters legitimately allocated to and occupied by the staff. If for instance, dismissal is the appropriate punishment for the ''crime'' of the Claimant in the instant case, what will the punishment be for a civil or public servant who forged certificates or found to have embezzled billions of Naira of pension funds of retirees? Dismissal is the maximum punishment that could be met to an employee. It is akin to capital punishment in criminal trial. Besides, dismissal carries with it infamy and stigma in addition to the fact that a dismissed employee is denied of any form of disengagement entitlement from the employer, see Adeki v. Ijebu-Ode District Council (1962)1 SCNLR 349, Anite v. University of Calabar (2001)3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 239 (CA), Ezenna v. KSHSMB (2011)1 NWLR (Pt. 1251) 89 and UBN Plc v. Soares (2012)29 NLLR 329. May the day never come when such will find its way into labour and industrial relation as punishment for the alleged ''crime'' of the Claimant in this case. I find and hold that the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant is wrongful. The dismissal of the Claimant having been declared wrongful certain necessary consequences ordinarily follow even if the Court does not order them. Firstly the law is trite that a dismissed employee loses all rights and benefits which would have ordinarily been available to him/her. However for the sake of emphasis, I deem it imperative to make those consequential orders which necessarily flow from my finding and holding that the dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant was wrongful. They are said to be consequential orders the need for which arise naturally as a result of substantive relief already granted. They follow as a result of the earlier one which can be called for this purpose as the main order. See Agbaje v. INEC (2015) LPELR-25651 & Kayidi v. Yilibak & Ors Suit No: SC.92/2005 of 13/2/15. I order, firstly, that the Defendant account for and pay all accrued pension of the Claimant from 24/10/97 being the date her employment wrongfully terminated till date. Secondly, the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant all her outstanding salaries and allowances from July 1997 when she was suspended to 24/10/97 when she was wrongfully dismissed. The second issue for determination is: Whether the Claimant has proved her claims to be entitled to any or all of them. I have made consequential orders respecting some of the reliefs sought by the Claimant. Yet to be considered relief sought by the Claimant is an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal. I have held in this Judgment that dismissal is an hybrid of discipline which an employer is legitimately empowered to exercise over an employee. By dismissal, an employer/employee relation is automatically brought to an end even where it is improperly or wrongly done. The law is trite that the Court will not force a willing employee on an unwilling employer, see Obaje v. Nigeria Airspace Management Agency (2013) LPELR-19958(CA). Once an employment relationship is effectively brought to an end, it is not open to an employee to continue to treat same as still existing. See Olatunbosun v. NISER (1988) LPELR-2574. To restrain the Defendant as sought by the Claimant will amount to hindering the power of an employer to discipline its employee. That will spell doom for labour relations in this country. The prayer for an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal is therefore refused and dismissed. The Claimant also sought a declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsists till 19/1/06. I have held in relation to the first relief sought that the dismissal of the Claimant valid, though wrongful. I have also held that once the power to terminate an employment is validly exercised, an employee cannot continue to treat the employment as existing. Again, there is no evidence tendered to prove that the Claimant would remain in employment till her retirement age. Both the Offer of Employment and the Defendant Staff Conditions of Service did not so provide. I note that the learned Counsel submitted in her written address that the employment of the Claimant was one with statutory flavour. This argument is hinged on the legislation establishing the Defendant and the Conditions of Service of the Defendant. When is an employment said to be with statutory flavour? With respect to employment with statutory flavour Adekeye JSC in Dr. Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Prof. Shuaibu O. Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC) put the position of the law as follows - '... where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are specifically provided for by statute or regulations made there under - it is said to be a contract protected by statute or in other words an employment with statutory flavour''. His lordship went further to state that the question of whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute and that the duty to construe the contract or the relevant statute is the exclusive preserve of the Courts. Without much ado, it is trite to state, perhaps for clarity, that for an employment to be one with statutory flavour, it must meet one of two conditions. One, the terms and conditions applicable to that particular employment must have been specifically provided for by a particular statute. Or in the alternative, the regulation which contains the applicable terms and conditions of the particular employment must have been made pursuant to or in the exercise of power conferred by a statute. It is also correct to add that it is not just sufficient that a statute confers power to make such regulations and the regulations are made. The making of such regulations must certainly be expressed to be in pursuance of the power so conferred to make same. The Defendant's Conditions of Service in the instant case did not satisfy any of the two conditions laid down to be qualified as one having statutory clout. That being the case, it is impossible not to hold that the employment of the Claimant is not protected by the statute and I so hold. Not having been proved a prayer for a declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsists till 19/1/06is refused and dismissed accordingly. The 4th relief sought is an Order that the Defendant accord the Claimant all the rights and previleges due to the Claimant as an employee of the Defendant, as if the Claimant's employment contract had never been disrupted or interfered with. This Court has already declared the dismissal of the Claimant wrongful but not null and void. To grant this relief is to foist the Claimant a willing employee on the Defendant an unwilling employer. It will also amount to call to question the power of an employer to discipline an employee. It is certainly not the attitude of the Courts to do either. This Court will also not do either. This relief is therefore refused and dismissed for the reason as stated. Claimant also sought payment to her by the Defendant of the sum of =N=1,259,401.60 being special damages for her wrongful suspension and dismissal from the service of the Defendant. Particulars of the special damages include Salaries, Transport Allowances, Lunch Allowances, Utility Allowances, Housing Allowances and Leave Allowances for the period of July 1997 to January 2006 and Furniture Grant from 1997 till 2006. I have already found and held in this Judgment that the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant from its employment on 24/10/97 was valid though wrongful. The law is trite that once a letter of termination is issued and delivered it effectively brings the hitherto employment relationship between the parties to an end. Once served a letter of termination of employment, it is not open to an employee to continue to treat the employment as still subsisting, except perhaps in relation to employment with statutory flavour. The special damages claimed here by the Claimant are for salaries and allowances during the period when she had ceased to be employee of the Defendant. It is the position of the law still that the Court will not direct or order salaries and allowances to be paid to an employee for services not rendered. To grant the prayer for special damages as claimed will amount to doing just that. This claim has no basis both in law and even equity. The prayer is thus refused and dismissed. Respecting the claim for a declaration that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the owner or the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit 24 at 'A' Close Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. The law is trite that he who asserts must prove. The Claimant is therefore under an obligation to prove the existence of the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government in order to be entitled to a grant of the relief sought. What are the available evidence before me? There is no controversy regarding the fact that the Claimant as a staff of the Defendant was allocated the property she occupied in the Defendant's Housing Estate. She did not force herself into the property. Indeed issues leading to this case arose when the Claimant was issued Quit Notice dated 11/7/97 (Exh. C4) same (A24, A Close) having been allocated to her by Exh. C2. There is also no argument that the land upon which the property was built was allocated to the Defendant by the Federal Military Government at the time at no cost. The area of disagreement is whether or not there was a specific government public housing policy which the Defendant was bound to comply with. Were there any government policy to ensure home ownership to Nigerians? I find some of the exhibits tendered and admitted in this case very instructive and their analysis will provide the much needed response to the various queries raised. The first in this line of exhibits is Exh. C7 dated 15/8/94 and signed by Alh. L. K. Jakande then Hon. Minister of Labour. The exhibit was headed '' The Staff Housing Scheme By Employers of Labour At Satellite Town, Lagos'' . I find it both imperative and instructive to reproduce the first five paragraphs of that exhibit here. They are as follows - 1. The Federal Military Government, pursuant to its Public Housing Policy embarked on the Staff Housing Scheme at Satellite Town, Lagos in 1977, with the objective of facilitating home ownership for Nigerian workers. 2. Under the scheme, the Federal Government constructed over one thousand (1000 No.) modest bungalows, consisting of two, three and four bedroom units, with the cost range of N12,000.00, N16,500.00 and N21,500.00 respectively, which was allocated to its employees on owner-occupier basis. 3. Standard parcels of land, comprising 4 blocks each, were allocated at no cost to Employers who employ a minimum of 500 staff, in an attempt to spread the benefits of the scheme to all categories of workers. 4. The following conditions were also established and govern the scheme:- (i) Any land where actual buildings do not up by 1st June, 1978, would be withdrawn and re-allocated to other organizations who are ready to commence immediate construction. (ii) The building shall be related in designed and cost to the Government’s own housing scheme with which they shall be integrated. In this regard, plans and layouts were made available to the Employers for adoption at no cost. (iii) The title to the land is vested in the Federal Government but the individual parcels will be transferred to the Employers upon completion of development and utilization for the welfare and benefit of their staff in accordance with the Federal Military Government’s guidelines. 5. The Federal Government’s guidelines mentioned in 4(iii) above include the following:- (a) At completion of the buildings, 75% of the units must be allocated to the lower income bracket of the staff, while the rest goes to the middle level management or top management staff. (b) The living units are to be allocated on owner-occupier basis with the prospect of the staff owning the house eventually. (c) Every owner-occupier will enter into a combined Tenancy/Purchase Agreement with the Company/Parastatals and as such the occupier shall not be treated as tenant in the conventional sense but as a prospective owner of the property he occupied. (d) The occupier shall not pay more than 20% of income as rent and such rent paid will be regarded as deposits towards eventual purchase of the living unit. (e) Any occupier who fails to meet the standard of hygiene sanitation and maintenance required on the estate units in default with regard to his financial obligations shall be ejected. (f) Problems connected with transfer of ownership as a result of staff withdrawing their services from the company/parastatals before the date fixed for purchase are to be referred to the Government for sorting out by the Federal Ministry of Labour''. The content of the above exhibit is clear and unambiguous. Indeed by paragraph 5 of the exhibit, the Federal Military Government did not mince words in its determination to ensure that the houses when constructed on the land allocated were allocated to staff of various organisations and establishments concerned (including the Defendant) on owner-occupier basis. Secondly, Exh. C8 is a document addressed to the Director General of the National Provident Fund and dated 10/3/94. The title read thus - ''Re: Employees Housing Scheme At Satellite Town, Lagos Occupants Demand for the Implementation of the Federal Government's Guidelines on Allocated Houses''. It contained the following three paragraphs - '' I am directed to refer to the Conditions established for the implementation of the above scheme, with particular reference to the provision that the completed housing units should be allocated to your Employees on Owner-Occupier basis, with the prospect of the occupants eventually owning the houses. ''2. I am to therefore forward the attached list of allottees, and to request that you confirm the status of both the staff and the houses, as well as your arrangements for the transfer of ownership of the houses to the Allottees. ''3. Please expedite action, to enable the Ministry take a firm decision on the subject. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Allottees through the Association of Satellite Town Residents, in this regard''. Again paragraph 2 of Exh. C11 signed by one C.C. Obi for the Honourable Minister states inter alia, ''... I am directed to bring to your notice that the Honourable Minister has formally approved that organizations in Satellite Town transfer the houses to the residents on owner occupier basis''. The contents of these exhibits are clear and unambiguous and being documentary evidence, it is trite that they constitute the best form of evidence relating to their contents to which no parole evidence will be allowed to vary or contradict. See Rangaza v. Micro Plastic Company Limited (2013) LPELR-20303 (CA) & Bongo v. Governor of Adamawa State (2013)2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 403. From the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to hold that there is an established government policy on housing respecting Satellite Town housing scheme and I so hold. Secondly, there is also evidence before me to the effect that by the government housing policy and the established guidelines, the property constructed in Satellite Town was meant and designed to be allocated the staff of the organizations concerned on owner-occupier basis and I so hold. Thirdly, there is evidence before me to the effect that the Claimant being a staff of the Defendant who was allocated a Flat at the housing scheme of the Defendant is entitled to ownership of the said property on owner occupier basis and I so hold. I deem it necessary to comment that while Exh. C7 & Exh. C8 dated 15/8/94 & 10/3/99 respectively, Exh. D22 was dated 13/8/97. Thus, as at when Exh. D22 was made seeking the dismissal of the Claimant she was by Exh. C7 ought to have been allocated the property on owner occupier basis and Exh. D22 dated 13/8/97 should not have been made ordinarily in an ideal and humane environment. In the light of the foregoing, I declare that the purported Quit Notice dated 11/7/97 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. I must add that the request made for the approval of the Hon. Minister to dismiss the Claimant was made in bad faith and without the milk of human kindness. The Federal Military Government designed a policy on housing which was meant for the benefit of the Nigerian workers. That Policy was meant to be implemented by workers in government service. Yet the same set of workers or some of them for whose benefit the Policy was meant were the same people working against the success of that government Policy. I find and hold that under and by virtue of the Federal Government Guidelines issued pursuant to the public housing policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Claimant is the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit 24 at 'A' Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. The Defendant is ordered and directed to take all necessary steps to ensure quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the said property by the Claimant. What else is there to be said? Having so found and held, I further hold and declare as a consequential order that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. By Exh. C7 dated 15/8/94 the Claimant ought to have been allocated the property on owner occupier basis. If the Defendant had complied with the directive of the Federal Military Government to allocate the property on owner-occupier basis, the need to issue Quite Notice would not have arisen. The final relief sought by the Claimant was for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and occupation of the said housing unit. The relief of perpetual injunction is a consequential order which should naturally flow from the declaratory order sought and granted by the Court. Essentially, the imperative of this hybrid injunction is to prevent permanently the infringement of those rights and to obviate the necessity for bringing multiplicity of suits in respect of every repeated infringement. See Goldmark Nigeria Limited & Ors. v. Ibafon Company Limited & Ors. (2012) LPELR-9349(SC). Perpetual injunction is only grantable after a trial and the applicant has established an actual or threatened infringement of his rights. Having reviewed and evaluated all the evidence tendered and admitted in this case, I find and hold that the Claimant has established and proved her right and entitlement to the property the subject of this action. I therefore issue a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and peaceful occupation of the said housing unit. The third and final issue for determination is whether the Defendant is entitled to a grant of any or all of her counterclaims. The first Counterclaim is for a declaration that the quarter was not allocated to the Claimant on owner-occupier basis. I have already held in this Judgment that the Claimant was entitled to ownership of the property. That being the case, there is no basis for granting this counterclaim as sought. It is therefore refused and dismissed accordingly. The second counter claim is for an order directing the Claimant to vacate the Flat occupied by her immediately. Again respecting this counter claim this Court has granted an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with the possession of the said allocated staff quarter. The second head of counter claim is also therefore refused and dismissed. For the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as stated in this Judgment - 1. I declare that the dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24/10/97 by the Defendant was not null, void and of no effect but wrongful and the Claimant entitled to all her end of service benefits from 24/10/97. 2. The relief sought by the Claimant for an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal is refused and dismissed. 3. Claim for payment to the Claimant by the Defendant of the sum of One Million Two Hundred and Fifty Nine Thousand Four Hundred and One Naira Sixty Kobo being special damages for her wrongful dismissal from the service of the Defendant is refused and dismissed. 4. A prayer for a declaration that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant subsisted till 19/1/06 being the date the Claimant ought to have retire by law, having put in 35 years of service is refused and dismissed. 5. The Defendant is ordered to account for and pay all the accrued and due pension of the Claimant from 24/10/97 till date. 6. I declare that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit A24 at “A” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. 7. I hold and declare as a consequential order that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 10. I issue an order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the said housing unit - A24 at “A” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. 11.. The two counter claims of the Defendant are refused and dismissed. All the terms of this Judgment shall be complied with within 30 days from the date of delivery. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge