REPRESENTATION A. E. EKPE for the claimant A. E. INYANG for the 1st and 3rd defendant OFFIONG OTU for the 2nd defendant JUDGEMENT The Claimant instituted this action via a Complaint with the accompanying frontloaded documents filed on 18th February, 2013 against the defendants for the following reliefs: 1. A declaration that the swearing in of the 2nd defendant as president of Adun District Court when the claimant’s appointment is still subsisting, is null and void of no effect whatsoever. 2. A declaration that the claimant is still the substantive president of Adun District Court. 3. The sum of #3 Million as general damages for the inconvenience and embarrassment caused to the claimant. 4. The sum of #1 Million as cost of action. The MEMORANDUM OF CONDITIONAL APPEARANCE of the 1st and 3rd Defendant was dated 24/10/2013 and filed 31/10/2013. The MEMORANDUM OF APPEARANCE FOR the 2ND DEFENDANT was dated 12/7/2013 and filed 18/7/2013 The 2ND DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE was dated 2/2/2014 and filed 3/2/2014. The 2nd Defendant admitted paragraph 1 of the statement of claim but added that three years after the claimant’s birth, his mother divorced his father and took the claimant along with her to Obubra where he has lived till date, married, built a house and now lives with his family. More so, in relation to paragraph 2 of the statement of claim, he stated that he is the president of the Adun District Court of Ofodua, Obubra Local Government Area. The 2nd Defendant averred that sometime in August 2012 he applied to be president of the Adun District Court of Obubra and after passing the qualifying examination and interview, he was appointed and sworn in as the president for three years. The claimant who was hitherto appointed and sworn in as President of the Adun District Court by the 1st Defendant, was petitioned to the 1st Defendant by certain aggrieved people/communities of Arobom and Ababene Clans of Adun Obubra on the basis that the claimant is not conversant with the native laws and Custom of Adun Clan Obubra as to enable him preside over the Adun District Court. 2nd Defendant stated that the 1st defendant set up a committee to make recommendations on all petitions and the committee duly did same. The claimant was duly invited to make representations in defence of the petition but bluntly refused to appear before the 1st defendant hence the petition against him was undefended and upheld. In consequence of the above, the 2nd Defendant was appointed as President of the Adun District Court and the 1st Defendant wrote approving the Appointment and swearing in of Customary Court appointees with the 2nd Defendant as President of the Adun District Court. The 2nd Defendant stated that he shall during trial, contend that no act or omission of his caused the claimant any damage whatsoever therefore; this cause of action is an abuse of Court process. The CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO 2ND DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE was dated and filed 26/3/2014 In reply to paragraph 1 of the 2nd Defendant Statement of defence, the Claimant stated that his Father and mother are both natives of Ovukwa-Adun in obubra and only left to marry an Abaragba man from Ikom L.G.A of Cross River State in after the death of his Father in 1972. While he remained in Ovukwa with his Grand-Mother and Mr. Adomo, he only had to leave shortly for his primary school education after which he returned. In reply to paragraph 2 of the 2nd Defendant’s Statement of defence, the Claimant states that he is the president of Adun District Court as the due procedure for his removal has not been followed. He put the defendant on NOTICE TO PRODUCE the query, petition or invitation to attend a disciplinary committee which ought to have been served on him. In reply to paragraph 3 of the 2nd Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the Claimant stated that he returned to Ovukwa after his education and became a member of United age Grade of Ovukwa-Adun, after which he was recommended by the Ovukwa people to be appointed by the 1st Defendant, which was duly done and Appointment letter dated 15/7/2005 hereby pleaded. He further stated that he served the court justly without having any minority judgment because of his rich and vast knowledge of the Native law and Custom of Adun people. Based on his performance, he was recommended to go for a second tenure and he was re-appointed on the 24/9/2012. More so, he was appointed to serve for 5 years but was unceremoniously removed from office by the 1st defendant after serving for 5 months on the 11/2/2013. The STATEMENT OF DEFENCE OF the 1ST AND 3RD DEFENDANTS was dated 10/2/2014 and filed 2/4/2014. The 1st and 3rd defendant stated that they are not in a position to admit or deny paragraph 1 and facts therein averred are in the exclusive knowledge of the Claimant. 1st and 3rd defendant’s admitted paragraph 2 of the statement of facts except the words purportedly used and admitted paragraph 3 and 4 as well. The 1st and 3rd defendants admitted swearing in the 2nd defendant, but denied its being done in the most chaotic manner. 1st and 3rd defendants stated that immediately after the appointment of members of the 94 customary courts in the state, aggrieved applicants and communities petitioned the 1st defendant to do a re-consideration on the appointments. The 1st defendant therefore set up a committee for that purpose of which the claimant failed to appear before. The 1st and 3rd defendant further averred that the necessary changes effected were made after due consideration of the reports and recommendations of the committee to the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant was appointed president of Adun District Court, the letter of appointment and swearing in hereby relied upon. A protest letter was written against the claimant and the community invaded the premises of the 1st defendant threatening to have the court shutdown the whole day if the claimant is not removed. This was an action to disrupt peace and order and the 1st and 3rd defendant contend that the claimant is not entitled to the relief sought as it is frivolous and an attempt at Gold digging. At the trial the claimant testified as CW, adopted his statement on oath dated 18th January 2013 and 26th March 2014 which were marked Exhibit C1 and Exhibit C2 respectively, the claimant went on to tender 7 other exhibits one of which was rejected by the court. S/N TENDER BY NICN/CA/41/2013 DOCUMENT’S DATED DATE TENDER MARK 1. Claimant Counsel Witness on oath 8/12/14 CW1 2. Written statement on oath 18/2/2013 “ C1 3. Additional statement 26/3/2014 “ C2 4. Certificate of place of origin 13/4/005 “ C3 5. Statutory declaration of age. 13/4/005 C4 6. Letter of appointment 24/9/2012 8/12/14 C5 7. Letter of appointment 15/7/005 8///12/14 C6 8. Attendance register of Adun 5/11/12 “ Rejected Sign Abo Esor Ekpe Esq. 8/12/14 Under cross examination by the counsel to 1st and 2nd defendant the claimant testified that he was appointed by the Governor of Cross Rivers State in 2005 as the President of the Customary Court Adun and that the terms of his appointment are governed by the Civil Service rules that he held his appointment at the pleasure of the person that appointed him. CW denied that his community rejected him and testified that he was unaware of any protest against his removal or that other 16 Court were equally affected by removals such as his own. The claimant restated that he was not invited to any committee hearing neither was he aware of any committee set up to look into petitions against him CW further testified under cross examination from the Counsel to the 2nd defendant that his appointment was for a term of three years. He further testified that his tenure was renewed, and that if there was no review or removal in the first term the appointee undergoes an interview and an examination and if they succeed they would not be removed. CW testified that the only regulation with respect to customary court was the examination. CW testified that his father died in 1972.The 2nd defendant confronted the claimant with Exhibit C4 purportedly made by the claimant’s father in 2005. The 1st and 3rd defendants called Nsungo Nsungo Ofo an Assistant Executive Officer with the Judicial Service Commission (the 1st defendant) who testified as DW1, adopted his written statement on oath dated 2nd April 2014 which was marked exhibit D1 and went on to tender two (2) other exhibits. Under cross examination DW1 testified that the removal of the claimant was caused by a petition written against him and identified D2 as the only petition they received, they went on to testify that it was the claimant that informed him that the clan head who was supposed to have authored Exhibits D2 was bedridden and later died, looking at the exhibit D2, DW1 testified that no other person other than the clan head signed the exhibit. He also testified that the committee invited the claimant and that he also told the claimant the date of the hearing when the claimant arrived on the wrong day. DW1 testified that there was nothing in Exhibit C5 to suggest the claimants appointment was at the pleasure of the Governor or probationary, and with regards the claimant’s petition for 1st tenure DW testified that there were many oral complaints. The 2nd defendant called the Ikpan Philips, former Customary Court President presently a farmer who testified as DW2 stating that he exhausted his tenure on the 31st of January 2014. As DW2 he went on and adopted his written statement on oath which was marked D4 and tendered one (1) exhibits. Under cross examination DW testified that he applied and was interviewed with the claimant for the job of Customary Court President in 2005 and that the claimant was shortlisted while he was not. He stated that he was unaware that the claimant had ever been a member of the Adun district Court, and with regard to Exhibit D2 the witness DW stated that it was not signed by any member of his clan. In response to claimant counsel question in line with DW statement in paragraph 4(g) of D4 DW testified that he was not in possession of the letter inviting the claimant to the committee hearing and neither did he have a copy of the report. 1. Defendant counsel Witness on oath 28/10/15 2. Written statement on oath 24/4/14 “ D1 3. Letter to the defendant save our soul 2/11///12/ “ D2(1) 4. Letter of approval for the appointment 6/2/13 “ D3(1-2) 5. Witness on oath 28/7/2011 6. Written statement on oath 28/10/15 D4 7. Letter of appointment 6/2/13 “ D5 At the close of trial the parties were directed to file Final written addresses in line with the rules of this court. The 2ND DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was dated 26/11/2015 and filed 27/11/2015. ISSUES: 1. Whether by virtue of applicable laws, the state of pleadings and evidence on records in this case, is there any established wrongdoing against the 2nd defendant rendering him liable to the claims in this suit? 2. Whether from the state of the pleadings and evidence on records the present action against the 2nd defendant is not constituted, prosecuted and maintained in gross abuse of court process. ARGUMENTS Whether by virtue of applicable laws, the state of pleadings and evidence on records in this case, there is any established wrongdoing against the 2nd defendant rendering him liable to the claims in this suit. Learned counsel for the 2nd defendant answering the above in the negative, submitted that the liability of each party in a suit would be determined by the pleadings and evidence led by the claimant in the light of the applicable law. See, BELLO V.INEC (2010) 8 NWLR (PT 1196) 342 AT 416, PARA. H. Learned counsel further stated that looking at paragraph 6 of the statement of claim, paragraph 3 of the claimant’s reply to the 2nd defendant’s statement of defence and the cross-examination of the claimant (as CW1), it is abundantly clear that the claimant’s appointment as president of Adun District Court was terminated by the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant has nothing to do with same and should therefore not be made liable for wrongful removal of the claimant. Counsel submitted that by virtue of Section 6(d) of the Judicial service Commission Law, Cap J2, Vol.4, Laws of Cross-River State of Nigeria 2004, it is the first defendant’s statutory responsibility to appoint, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over member of customary courts in Cross- River State. And since from the pleadings and evidence led, the 2nd defendant has incurred no liability, it is the 1st defendant that can defend the action and not the 2nd defendant. Whether from the state of the pleadings and evidence on records the present action against the 2nd defendant is not constituted, prosecuted and maintained in gross abuse of court process Learned counsel submitted that flowing from the above issue which he answered in the negative and the facts provided to support his position, this suit against the 2nd defendant is frivolous as the 2nd defendant has not been linked to any liability to the claimant and in law when an action is premised on frivolity, it is an improper use of legal process or abuse of court process, this court therefore has the inherent power to prevent such abuse by ordering a dismissal of the suit. See, TSA INDUSTRIES LTD. V. FBN PLC. NO 1 (2012) 14 NWLR (PT1320) 326 at 344, PARAS. B-H; 345, PARAS. A-C; and IDOWU V. FRN (2012) 11 NWLR (PT 1312) 441 RATIOS 4. Learned counsel urged the court from the foregoing circumstances to hold that this action against the 2nd defendant is an abuse of court process and eventually dismiss same with substantial cost as by law, the proper order to make where there is an abuse of court process is dismissal of the action. See, CBN V. AHMED (2001) FWLR (PT 56) 670 t 689. 1st AND 3RD DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS dated9/11/2015 and filed 15/12/2015. ISSUES: 1. Whether the claimant did not hold office at the pleasure of his employer. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the relief’s sought. ARGUMENTS: Whether the claimant did not hold office at the pleasure of his employer. Learned counsel submitted that the fact that the employer is a creation of statute or that the government has shares in it does not elevate employee’s employment into one of statutory flavour. Rather, there has to be a linkage or nexus between its employee’s appointment with the statute creating the employer. In the instant case therefore, although the 1st defendant is a creation of statute by virtue of Section 197 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Judicial Service Commission Law Cap. J2, Laws of Cross River State, it does not elevate the claimant’s employment into one with statutory flavour as there is no nexus between the claimant’s appointment and the statute creating the 1st defendant. See, PHCN PLS V. OFFOELO (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.664)1 Counsel stated that an employer in an employment not governed by statute can terminate the contract of employment at any time for good or for bad reasons or for none and termination of service even if unlawful brings it to the end even relationship of master and servant, employer and employee. See, RIVERS VEGETABLE OIL COMPANY LTD. V. EKUGOLE (2010) ALL FWLR (PT.544) 111 and GARUBA V. KWARA INV. CO. LTD. (2005) 21 NSCQR 412. Learned Counsel therefore submitted that the Claimant’s appointment as the President of Adun District Court cannot by any stretch of imagination be described by having statutory flavour which termination requires strict compliance with statutes. The claimant held office at the pleasure of his employer and thus can be removed with no requirement for cause, notice or hearing. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the relief’s sought. Learned Counsel submitted that the Court will not make an order for declaration of an ordinary Contract of employment which is not regulated by statute. The cardinal rule is that it has not been the policy of Nigerian Courts to foist a servant on an unwilling master, unless such employee is in a permanent or pensionable position. See, NITEL V. IKARO (1994) NWLR (PT.320) 350. Learned counsel stated that where the terms and conditions of service of Master-Servant relationship provides for service of notice of termination as a condition precedent to the termination and the master defaults, the servant whose appointment is terminated without the fulfillment of the condition precedent is only entitled to damages equivalent to the amount he would have earned for the period of the notice of termination. See, VEGETABLE OIL COMPANY LTD V. EGUKOLE (SUPRA); FMC, IDO EKITI V. KOLAWOLE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT.653) 1999. Counsel submitted that by the terms and conditions of the relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, the claimant’s appointment is at the pleasure of his employee who can remove him with no requirement for cause, notice or hearing and is therefore not entitled to a dime. Also, by the terms of the relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, the principle of fair hearing does not avail the claimant. The CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS dated and filed 15/12/2015. ISSUES: 1. Whether there is a special legal status in the claimant’s tenure of office as a public officer in his employment with the 1st defendant. 2. Whether the 1st defendant and its disciplinary committee are bound to observe the rules of natural justice enshrined in Section 36(1) of the 1999 constitution as amended in 2011 while operating as domestic tribunal with quasi- judicial jurisdiction. 3. Whether from the evidence adduced before this honourable court, the Claimant has proved that the termination of his employment with the 1st defendant is unlawful and wrongful. ARGUMENTS: Whether there is a special legal status in the claimant’s tenure of office as a public officer in his employment with the 1st defendant. Learned counsel submitted that where there is a special legal status such as where tenure of a public officer is attached to the employment, the court may decree specific performance of the contract and reinstate an employee whose employment has been terminated. See, IFETA V. SHELL PET. DEV. CO LTD  7 M.J.S.C 123-129, RATIO 4. Citing the case of POWER HOLDING CO. V. OFFOELO  VOL 12 M.J.S.C [PT 11] 106. P.114, RATIO 4. Counsel stated that there are vital ingredients that must co-exist before a contract of employment may import statutory flavour; the 1st defendant is a body set up by statute, the 1st defendant is also vested with exclusive power to appoint and dismiss the claimant which therefore satisfies the two afore- stated ingredients. Counsel stated that the 1st defendant dismissed the Claimant and appointed the 2nd defendant in exercise of its disciplinary powers as contained in Exhibit D3. However, the Claimant’s employment is attached to his tenure of office in his employment with the 1st defendant and this honourable Court has the discretionary powers either to reinstate the claimant or award general damages for unlawful or wrongful termination of his employment. Whether the 1st defendant and its disciplinary committee are bound to observe the rules of natural justice enshrined in Section 36(1) of the 1999 constitution as amended in 2011 while operating as domestic tribunal with quasi- judicial jurisdiction. Citing, ZILDECH V RSCSC  4 M.J.S.C 10- 171, PP. 152 x 153 at RATIOS 1,2 & 3. Learned Counsel submitted that a domestic tribunal with quasi- judicial jurisdiction such as the one set up by the 1st defendant in the instant case, is bound to observe the rules of natural justice enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the 1999 constitution as amended in 2011 and the constitutional rights of the Claimant cannot be waived nor taken away by a statute expressly or impliedly. Counsel further stated that by the breach of such Constitutional right of the Claimant by the 1st defendant, and its Disciplinary committee, the decision reached in terminating his appointment is a nullity and liable to be set aside by this honourable court. Whether from the evidence adduced before this honourable court, the Claimant has proved that the termination of his employment with the 1st defendant is unlawful and wrongful. Learned Counsel answering the above question in the affirmative, cited the case of ZILDECH V RSCSC  4 M.J.S.C 10- 171, PP. 152 x 153 at RATIO 4. Where the apex court held that any employee who alleges wrongful termination of his employment must place before the court the terms of the contract of employment and prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. Counsel submitted that the claimant has adduced sufficient evidence before this Honourable Court to establish wrongful and Unlawful termination of his contract of employment attached to his tenure of office by the 1st defendant. More so, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are necessary parties who will be bound where an order of re-in statement is ordered by this Honourable Court. Learned counsel stated that the claimant having adduced sufficient evidence before this court is entitled to all the reliefs sought before this honourable Court. On the 26th January 2016 the parties adopted their final written addresses accordingly and this matter was reserved for judgement to today. Having carefully summarized the evidence of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement where specific mention would be made to them as and where the need arises. The issues for determination in this suit to my mind are succinctly addressed in the issues as formulated by the claimant and these shall be the issues determining the suit I find and hold, especially as the claimants 1st issue concisely encompasses the preliminary issues raised by the 1st and 3rd defendants counsel. Before I delve in the merits of this case it is necessary to address one part of the argument raised by the 2nd defendant and the issue of whether or not the inclusion of the 2nd defendant in this suit where no of the claimants averment or reliefs are directed to the 2nd defendant does not amount to an abuse of courts processes. In law a party becomes a necessary party to the suit as the question in controversy cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated upon and settled unless he/she is made a party. In the instant suit, I find that the 2nd defendant is a necessary party in this suit and its name cannot be struck out. YUSHAU SHUAIB V. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & 2 ORS  56 NLLR PT 190 1-171 @ (P.135, PARAS A-B) Now to the merit of the case. The issues for determination in this suit are;- 1. Whether there is a special legal status in the claimant’s tenure of office as a public officer in his employment with the 1st defendant. 2. Whether the 1st defendant and its disciplinary committee are bound to observe the rules of natural justice enshrined in Section 36(1) of the 1999 constitution as amended in 2011 while operating as domestic tribunal with quasi- judicial jurisdiction. 3. Whether from the evidence adduced before this honourable court, the Claimant has proved that the termination of his employment with the 1st defendant is unlawful and wrongful. With regard to issue 1, whether there is a special status of public officer in the employment with the 1st defendant. In order to properly address this question it is necessary to determine the nature of the claimant’s appointment. The Supreme Court in the case of LONGE Vs. FBN LTS  LPELR 1793 SC held that “….there are three categories of employment (a) Purely Master and Servant relationship (b) Servants who hold their office at the pleasure of the employer (c) Employment with statutory flavour….” The word Public Officer has been defined in section 7(1) of the Public Officers (Special provision) LFN2004 (formerly Act No. 10 of 1976) to mean;- “ any person who holds or has held office in (b) the public service of a state or federal government… (c) the service of a body whether corporate or unincorporated established under a Federal or State Law. The fact that the claimant’s employer is a creation of statute does not, without more mean that the claimant’s appointment is statutory. The claimant must by fact prove statutory appointment. Learned Author Odabi Osaretin Kingsley in his book Case Law Annotation of Public Service Rules in Nigeria© 2013 Evergreen Overseas Publication Benin City, at page 6 looked at the distinction between a Public Servant and a Political Officer Holder and had this to say “Attempts have been made to liken Public office with Political office, but this would amount to a wrong placement. Prime characteristics of the Public Service office is that they are creation of the constitution, statutes or other enabling legislations. Most of the time, Public Service officers’ functions, duties and powers are well-defined by the laws and other regulations. Besides, unless otherwise defined by the contract the position is one of permanence. The foregoing are clearly traits not found in Political Officers, such as, the Office of the Chief of Staff, Commissioners, Officers of the Governor’s wife, Senior Advisers, Special Assistants etc. for instance political officers are temporal and do not enjoy the permanence experienced in public offices. In ORJI Vs. PDP  14 NWLR (Pt.1161) p310 at p396 para E-H. The Court of Appeal Port Harcourt Division in drawing a distinction between public and political, held that an apparent and distinguishing factor is the permanence of Public service or office as against the temporary nature of political office”. In SULIEMAN ADAMU Vs. MOLAMMMAD SANI TAKORI & ORS  LPELR 3593 CA JEGA JCA held that it is clear that the sole determining factor in determining a public servant is the mode of appointment referring to DADA Vs. ADEYEYE  6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1 at p 19-20. That is why “the courts have held that recourse should be had to the contents of the letter of appointment FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ORS. Vs. OMIDIORA KOLAWOLE O.  LPELR 4149 CA page 15 para B. In the instant case the claimant was appointed by the Governor of the State evidenced in her letter of appointment Exhibit C5. Telophone: 089-230116 Judicial Service Commission Our Ref: JSC/CSD/4/S/93/Vol.I/88 P.M.B 1101 Your Ref: Calabar 15th July , 2005 John Ayo Ojem Adun D/C Obubra L.G.A Sir, LETTER OF APPOINTMENT Following your success in the qualifying examination, and also at this interview recently conducted by the Commission. I am pleased to inform you that the State Judicial Service Commission has approved your appointment as Manager II of Adun District Court in Obubra Local Government Area on salary grade level 04 per annum with effect from 1/8/2005. Subject to good conduct and satisfactory work, your appointment is for the duration of the present court session which ends on 31/7/2008. The Commission congratulates you on your appointment and enjoins you to administer justice fairly to all manner of people without fear or favour. Yours faithfully, Ekpenong E. Okon (Secretary) For: Chairman Judicial Service Commission The position of the law is “that an employment is said to have statutory flavour if the employment is directly governed or regulated by statute or a section(s) of a statute delegates power to an authority or body to make regulations or conditions of service as the case may be”, UJAM V. IMT  2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 470 at 492 B – C. Or where a set of prescribed “Rules govern the service” see Uwa JCA in FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ANOR Vs. ISAAC OLUKAYIDE OLAJIDE  LPELR 4150 CA para C. Now the Judicial Service Commission of a state is a creation of the Constitution Part II which makes it a state executive office. The constitution in paragraph 6 donates power to the Judicial Service Commissions of a state to “(b) appoint, dismiss, and exercise disciplinary control over ……… judges and members of the Customary Court and other members of staff…..” And the Judicial Service Commission Law of Cross Rivers State CapJ2 2004 in Section 6 (d) provides that 3rd defendants is empowered to “appoint, dismiss, and exercise disciplinary control over ………and judges and members of the Customary Courts.” Cap J2 goes on in Section 9 to provide for the independence of the Commission in the following words;- In exercising its powers to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons, the commission shall not be subject to the direction and control of any other authority or person. Now there is nothing in Exhibit C5 the letter above to lend to the claimants assertion that he is a public officer as the letter of appointment does not in any way refer to any legislation or give power to make rules of discipline to any organization or state that the claimants appointment is to be governed by the public or civil service rules so as to create a public service employment. And the clear wordings of Section 9 brook not controversy as neither the claim put of the claimant that his appointment was governed by public service or civil service rules or that of the defendant that the claimant’s appointment is at the pleasure of the State Governor is tenable given the wordings of the Judicial Service Commission Law of Cross Rivers State Cap J2 2004. I am aware that the law has taken cognizance that the letter of employment may not always contain all the terms and conditions governing an appointment DURUGBOR v. ZENITH BANK PLC (2014) 40 NLLR (PT. 122) 225. Following the case of SPECOMILLS TEXTILES, IKEJA v. NATIONAL UNION OF TEXTILES, GARMENT & TAILORING WORKERS OF NIGERIA (DIGEST OF THE NATONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (1978 – 2006 – DJNIC) 334 @ 335, RATIO 1, referred to.] But in the instant case the claimant has not brought forth to this court any other evidence, Law or documents or even pleadings to which this court can accord some authority with respect of terms and conditions. The defendants have argued that the claimants appointment is one of employer/ employee commonly known as Master Servant relationship yet they too have supplied nothing from which the court can draw that conclusion, there are no terms and conditions, no reference overt or implied to termination by either side by payment of one month’s salary or one month salary in lieu of notice or any other evidence from which the court can deduce that the 1st defendant and the claimant had intended to be bound by a Master Servant relationship. Granted the 1st defendant is empowered to enter into Master Servant relationships just as the 1st defendants is competent to appoint political office holders. From the evidence before the court the only deduction legally pronounceable in the circumstances is that the claimant appointment leans more towards a political appointment than a Master servant relationship. I find that the claimant’s appointment is not a statutory one as so cannot equate to public service or public officer. The question however remains does Exhibit C5 create a political office holder which could either be tenured if done in accordance with a statutory provision or created at the pleasure of the appointor. Bearing in mind that the issue before the court is;- whether there is a special legal status in the claimant’s tenure of office as a public officer in his employment with the 1st defendant. I find that there is nothing before the court to support the contention that the claimants employment is a statutory employment with special legal status. I resolve this issue against the claimant. The 2nd issue as to whether the 1st defendant and its disciplinary committee are bound to observe the rules of natural justice enshrined in section 36(1) of the 1999 constitution as amended in 2011 while operating as a domestic tribunal with quasi judicial function. In the context of this suit and the findings of this court this issue becomes academic as the claimant has not shown the court how he is entitled to the procedure consistent with disciplinary committee and the paraphernalia incidental to the statutory appointment. By the law all executive bodies created by the constitution are bound and expected to abide by the provisions of the constitution and their disciplinary committees are in law required to conduct their inquiries in accordance with the principles of natural justice ADENIYI Vs. GOVERNING COUNCIL OF YABA 1993 LPELR 128 SC In that case Karibi Whye JSC held that “our courts have held that although a non-judicial tribunals is entitled to decide its own procedure and lay down its own rules for the conduct of its enquiries regarding discipline” it is of the utmost importance that in doing the give due accord to the rules of Natural justice. This issue does not relate to any relief. The 3rd issue as to whether the evidence as adduced before this court, the claimant has proved that the termination of his employment with the 1st defendant is unlawful and wrongful. Now the law is that it is only statutory employments that can be declared unlawful. See SASEGBON’S LAWS OF NIGERIA, AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF NIGERIAN LAW AND PRACTICE, FIRST EDITION, VOLUME 16.PARAGRAPH 233- Where the learned Author stated …” In other cases governed only by, agreement of the parties and not by statute as in the present case, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to between the parties in the agreement binding on them. Any other form of removal not in accordance with the terms of the agreement connotes only wrongful termination or wrongful dismissal, which cannot be declared null and void. The only remedy available to an employee removed contrary to the terms of his employment is a claim for damages for the wrongful termination or wrongful dismissal”. Furthermore an employee who complains of wrongful termination of his employment must place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and then prove how the terms were breached by the employer. See KATTO V. CBN  6 NWLR (PT. 607) 390 SC The Supreme Court in EKEAGWU Vs. THE NIGERIAN ARMY  LPELR-1076(SC);  16 NWLR 419 per His Lordship Onnoghen, JSC reminded us that in an action for wrongful termination/dismissal/retirement only two primary issues call for determination. These are: whether the termination/dismissal/retirement of the plaintiff is wrongful; and the measure of damages recoverable where the termination/dismissal/retirement is found to be wrongful. Even at this, the rule is that he who asserts must prove; and in employment law, the onus is on the claimant who asserts that his termination is wrongful to show how wrongful it actually is. And to do this, the claimant must place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and then prove in what manner the said terms were breached; it is not for the defendant employer to prove any of this. See AKINFE V. UBA PLC  10 NWLR (PT. 1041) 185 CA and UTC NIGERIA LTD V. PETERS  LPELR-8426(CA). The claimant has not put before the court the mode or manner in which his appointment was terminated the claimant in cross examination by the Counsel to the 1st defendant acknowledged that the 1st Defendant could appoint and dismiss him. However when answering questions from the counsel to the 2nd defendant in cross examination the claimant maintained that the Governor could not dismiss him. The claimant pleaded in C1 that he was no issued any query or given notice of any kind purporting to terminate his appointment. The reference to queries and notice are disciplinary acts all akin to the pre requisites for terminating a statutory appointment or a master servant relationship having found that the claimants appointment is neither of any one of these, these inferences go to no issue as the claimant has not shown the court the instrument which creates his contract of employment and specifically the relevant provisions for the condition and procedure to terminate same by the employer and I such I find that this court has not been given any reason to hold that the procedure of issuing queries and granting notice are applicable to the claimant. In the circumstances from Exhibit C5 the claimant’s appointment was for three years, in order to hold the defendants accountable under a political appointment in these circumstance i.e. to determine that the claimant appointment is actually a political one. Now under the law political appointees are to render their service for the duration of their appointed tenure and if the said tenure is erupted or disturbed in any untoward manner the appointee is entitled to all the due salaries and allowances he would have earned during his un expired term See COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, EKIADOLOR V. OSAYANDE  6 NWLR (PT. 1191) 423 and SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD V. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD  18 NWLR (PT. 1118) 77 being authority for the right of the political appointees to be paid their full salaries and allowances that they would have earned for the unexpired period of their tenure. Referred to in unreported SUIT NO. NIC/LA/32/2011 HON. JOSEPH DAODU & 2 ORS VS. AKOKO-EDO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, EDO STATE &ANOR delivered on the 13th May 2014 But without the prerequite pleading and evidence in support from the claimant this court cannot not make that as a determination, the law is that the burden is on the party that would lose if no evidence is adduced: UKPABIO V. NFVCB  LPELR 4129 CA and UZOKWE V. DENSY INDUSTRIES NIG. LTD 2002 LPELR 3456 SC And in this case it is the claimant who has not adduced the requisite evidence or placed before the court the law and evidence relevant to his case to enable the court properly determine his suit. And more importantly even fact that the claimant did not ask for this relief the court not being Father Christmas would have been unable grant what was not asked for. See UNIVERSITY OF JOS V. DR M. C. IKEGWUOHA  9 NWLR (PT. 1360) 478 SC;  NSCQR VOL. 53.3 PAGE 330 SC. Without express pleading or evidence of how the claimant was terminated, the claimant merely stated that the 2nd defendant was appointed in an embarrassing farcical manner, which in itself would be seen as an interruption of the claimants appointment however, the court is not allowed to speculate on what is not before it See AGBOGUNLERI v. DEPO (2008) 2 MJSC @ 87, PARAS. E-G. From the foregoing I find that the claimant has not shown the court the conditions governing his appointment nor how the defendants breached the conditions governing his appointment to enable the court hold the actions of the defendants wrongful. I resolve this issue against the claimant. With regard to relief A declaration that the swearing in of the 2nd defendant as president of Adun District Court when the claimant’s appointment is still subsisting, is null and void of no effect whatsoever. I find that the claimant appointment not being a statutory one cannot be held illegal null and void and that the claimant’s appointment is susceptible to termination (at will) by the appointer, being an appointment at his pleasure. That being the case and with the appointment of the 2nd defendant by the Governor, the claimant’s appointment is effectively truncated and the remedy available to the claimant has not been sought in this case. Relief 1 and 2 therefore fail. The claimant having been unable to prove his removal was untoward the claims of damages and cost cannot be entertained. Reliefs 3 and 4 consequently fail The claimant has not proved the essential ingredients to substantiate his claims. The claimant’s case therefore fails is accordingly struck out Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to costs. …………………………………… Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba Presiding Judge Calabar Division.