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REPRESENTATION Mr. Babatunde Irukera, and with him are Mr. Ikem Isiekwena, Mr. Adegoke Adedoyin, Mr. Chinedu Anene, Ogochukwu Odum and Femi Oyewole, for the claimant. C. A. Candide-Johnson SAN, and with him are Miss A. Agunbiade, Mr. F. O. Abbas, Ferdinard Olufemi, Mrs. O. Aleshinloye, Mr. T. Adesioye, Damilola Amore and Khalid Abbas, for the defendants. JUDGMENT The claimant commenced an action by a complaint against the defendants dated and filed on February 10, 2012, by which the claimant is challenging her summary dismissal by the defendants for not following the due process of the law and the 1st and 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct. Accompanying the complaint is the statement of facts, the list of claimant’s witness, and the list of the claimant’s documents together with copies of the documents. In reaction, the defendants filed their memorandum of appearance on 21st March 2012. The defendants also filed their statement of defence dated 27th July 2012, to which the claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence dated 4th November 2013. In addition to these processes are the witness depositions on oath of the claimant dated 7th December 2012 and 8th November 2013 which were adopted and admitted in evidence on the 11th of February 2014, and the defendant’s deposition on oath dated 24th September 2013 adopted and admitted in evidence on the 29th of April 2014, as the parties’ evidence-in-chief. The claimant is seeking the following reliefs – a) A declaration that the investigative process by both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant leading up to the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant is wrongful, null and void, not having complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. b) An order setting aside the findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant as being perverse and contrary to the claimant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing. c) A declaration that any purported implementation of the findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant is unlawful, invalid, null and void. d) A declaration that the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the defendant vide the letter of December 6th, 2010, is wrongful, null and void, not having complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. e) An order setting aside the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant, vide the letter of December 6th, 2010, for being wrongful, null and void, having not complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. f) A declaration that the purported letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010 is unlawful, invalid, null and void and incapable of having any legal consequence whatsoever, having been signed by a person who is neither a member nor a director of the 1st defendant. g) An order setting aside the purported letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010. h) An order restraining the defendants, jointly and severally, from giving any effect whatsoever to letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010. i) An order compelling the 1st defendant to pay over to the claimant the unpaid balance of the claimant’s terminal benefit from the employment and services of the 1st defendant as at December 6th 2010. j) An order compelling the 1st defendant to pay over to the claimant the sum total of the claimant’s unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December 2010. k) Interest on the sums in (i) and (j) above at the rate of 21% per annum, from December 6th, 2010 till the date of judgment in this suit, and thereafter at 10% per annum till the final liquidation of the sum thereof. l) Exemplary damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira Only) against the defendants, jointly and severally, for breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing. m) General damages in the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira only) jointly and severally against the defendants in this suit. At the trial of the case, the claimant, Mrs. Titilayo Akisanya, testified on her own behalf as CW on 11th February 2014. She first adopted her written statements on oath dated 7th December 2012 and 8th November 2013 as her evidence in chief. Her documents were then admitted in evidence as Exhibits C1 – C25 before she was cross-examined by the defence counsel. The documents admitted through CW are – 1) Exhibit C1 – The claimant’s Letter of Employment dated 31st October 2001. 2) Exhibit C2 – Commendation and Bonus Letter dated 28th April 2005 addressed to the claimant. 3) Exhibit C3 – Commendation and Bonus Letter dated 9th May 2007 addressed to the claimant. 4) Exhibit C4 – Compensation Review Letter dated 27th May 2002. 5) Exhibit C5 – Compensation Review Letter dated 21st May 2004. 6) Exhibit C6 – Salary Review Letter dated 18th April 2008. 7) Exhibit C7 – Letter from Susan Githuku dated 3rd September 2006 addressed to the claimant. 8) Exhibit C8 – Letter from Susan Githuku dated 13th February 2008 addressed to the claimant. 9) Exhibits C9(a) – C9(e) – Electronic Mail exchanges between the claimant, Steve Istvan, Moira Puncheon and Christine Heaven. 10) Exhibit C10 – Email from the claimant to Anna Geraci dated 10th November 2010. 11) Exhibit C11 – Claimant’s curriculum vitae (CV). 12) Exhibit C12 – 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct. 13) Exhibit C13 – 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. 14) Exhibit C14 – Letter of Dismissal dated 6th December 2010. 15) Exhibit C15 – Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 31st December 2010. 16) Exhibit C16 – Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 16th January 2011. 17) Exhibit C17 – Letter from Connie McDaniel dated 9th February 2011 addressed to the claimant. 18) Exhibit C18 – 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters. 19) Exhibit C19 – The 2nd defendant’s Travel and Entertainment policy. 20) Exhibit C20 – Email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated 20th May 2010. 21) Exhibit C21 – Email of Seye Dosunmu dated 13th October 2010. 22) Exhibit C22 – Letter of the claimant’s appointment as CPS Human Resource Director dated 23rd March, 2007. 23) Exhibit C23(a) and C3(b) – Email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated 20th May 2010 and Peju Oloyede’s email of 27th April 2010. 24) Exhibit C24 – Claimant’s email to Peju Oloyede dated 16th March 2010. 25) Exhibit C25 – Claimant’s email to Peju Oloyede dated 15th March 2010. At the close of the claimant’s case, the defendants opened their case and led evidence through a single witness, Mr. Orok Effiom (DW), the Operations Counsel and employee of the 1st defendant. He adopted his written statement on oath of 24th September 2013 as his evidence in chief. The documents in support of the defendants’ case were tendered through DW, and were admitted and marked as Documents 1 – 24. The documents admitted through DW are – 1. Document 1 – Claimant’s Letter of Employment dated 31st October 2001. 2. Document 2 – Letter of Compensation Review Dated 21st May 2004. 3. Document 3 – Letter of Compensation Review dated 27th May 2002. 4. Document 4 – Letter Salary Review dated 13th April 2006. 5. Document 5 – Letter of Compensation Review dated 25th April 2003. 6. Document 6 – Letter from the Ethic & Compliance Committee dated 9th February 2011. 7. Document 7 – Letter of Acknowledgement of Code of Business Conduct dated 17th March 2003. 8. Document 8 – Letter of Dismissal dated 6th December 2010. 9. Document 9 – Email from the claimant to Anna Geraci dated 10th November 2010. 10. Document 10 – Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 31st December 2010. 11. Document 11 – Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 16th January 2011. 12. Document 12 – Email from Stuart Martin to Anna Geraci dated 30th September 2010. 13. Document 13 – Email from the claimant to her husband dated 25th October 2010. 14. Document 14 – Claimant’s Expense Report with Trip No 165013618 and Airline E-Tickets in respect of her trip to Atlanta. 15. Document 15 – Report of the Audit Panel dated 29th November 2010. 16. Document 16 – Email from Sofia Liakou dated 20th May 2010 to participants at the training session of the 2nd Defendant in Madrid. 17. Document 17 – Email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated 21st May 2010. 18. Document 18 – Email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated 20th May 2010. 19. Document 19 – Email dated 27th and 28th April 2010 from the claimant to Omotoye Akisanya. 20. Document 20 – Email exchange dated 3rd November 2010 between Anna Geraci and the claimant. 21. Document 21 – Email from Anna Geraci to the claimant dated 25th October, 2010. 22. Document 22 – 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters. 23. Document 23 – 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct. 24. Document 24 – Email dated 29th July 2010 from Jide Alakija to Omotoye Akisanya copied to the claimant. The following exhibits coincide and as such are duplicated – a) The claimant’s Letter of Employment dated 31st October 2001 – Admitted as Exhibit C1 and Document 1. b) Compensation Review Letter dated 27th May 2002 – Admitted as Exhibit C4 and Document 3. c) Compensation Review Letter dated 21st May 2004 – Admitted as Exhibit C5 and Document 2. d) Email from the claimant to Anna Geraci dated 10th November 2010 – Admitted as Exhibit C10 and Document 9. e) 2nd defendant's Code of Business Conduct – Admitted as Exhibit C12 and Document 23. f) Letter of dismissal dated 6th December 2010 – Admitted as Exhibit C14 and Document 8. g) Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 31st December 2010 – Admitted as Exhibit C15 and Document 10. h) Claimant’s Memorandum of Appeal dated 16th January 2011 – Admitted as Exhibit C16 and Document 11. i) 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters – Admitted and marked Exhibit C18 and Document 22. j) Email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated 20th May 2010 and Peju Oloyede’s email of 27th April 2010 to the claimant – Admitted as Exhibit C20, C23(a) and C23(b) and Document 18. For purposes of this judgment, any reference to either of the exhibits is necessarily a reference to the other. In other words, reference to the exhibit admitted through CW is necessarily reference to the corresponding exhibit admitted through DW. CLAIMANT’S CASE To the claimant, the 1st defendant employed her in December 2001 as Region/Division Human Resources Manager by a letter of employment dated October 31, 2001. That while she performed her duties as Human Resources Manager, she also doubled as Manager of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ plant at Otta. That as a result of her contributions to the growth of the 1st defendant’s business, she was in 2007 appointed Acting Head of Total Rewards, Coca-Cola Africa, Strategic Business Unit (SBU) to provide strategic direction and thought leadership in the area of Total Rewards for the SBU. In the same period, she was responsible for the role of Human Resources Director, Commercial Product Supply (CPS), Pan Africa and Human Resources Manager, CPS Nigeria. That she reported directly on human resources issues to Melissa Heggie in Atlanta, the 2nd defendant’s head office. She, however, had a general reporting obligation to the 3rd defendant. Based on the undisputed record before this Court, as Human Resources Director of CPS, that her work and performance were consummate. The claimant’s case against the defendants consists of a number of issues. They are – 1. As per paragraphs 36 and 37 of the claimant’s witness statement, her complaint is that she was a target of undue pressure from Melissa Heggie who was her superior. That just about the time that the audit of travel expenses commenced, Melissa Heggie called her to ask questions relating to “rest and relaxation” claims in her expense report. That at the end of the call, Melissa said “I’ll get off your back now”. CW also testified that, during this period, Melissa Heggie would make several calls to her and utter very intimidating statements such as “you should take this investigation very seriously” and “Someone who was investigated just as you was dismissed from employment only recently”. That this testimony was never controverted by the defendants. 2. The defendants’ non-adherence to the principles of fair hearing and natural justice. To the claimant, sometime in October 2010, she travelled to Atlanta for a Human Resources Conference and arrived on Sunday ahead of the conference, which was scheduled to hold on a Tuesday. On Monday, October 25, 2010 at 02:03pm, she received an email from Anna Geraci (Exhibit D21) where Anna Geraci specifically requested the claimant to meet with her tomorrow i.e. on Tuesday, October 26, 2010 at 8:30 in the USA Building 2025. That DW admitted, under cross examination, that the claimant was indeed given less than 24 hours notice to meet with Anna Geraci to discuss the audit. That unknown to the claimant, the purported audit meeting turned out to be investigative proceedings. At the meeting with the Corporate Auditors, the claimant was asked several questions, several of which she could not immediately respond to considering that she was not informed before leaving for Atlanta that she would be required to appear before a panel. That the Audit panel further informed the claimant that their report would be forwarded to the Ethics and Compliance Committee for necessary action and that the Ethics and Compliance Committee was billed to meet on November 9, 2010. Meanwhile, under cross-examination, that DW testified that the audit report dated November 29, 2010 (Exhibit D15) was sent to the Ethics and Compliance Committee on same November 29, 2010. That the claimant never saw the report of the Audit panel which was forwarded to the Ethics and Compliance Committee on November 29, 2010. That the Ethics and Compliance Committee makes all decisions about code violations and discipline (referring to Exhibit D23 at page 42). That contrary to the 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (Exhibit D23 at page 42) which entitles any employee undergoing investigation to be heard prior to any final determination, the Ethics and Compliance Committee (E&C Committee) failed to afford the claimant any hearing opportunity prior to her dismissal. During cross-examination, DW testified that he does not know whether the claimant was afforded any opportunity to make a representation to the E & C Committee. On December 6, 2010, the claimant received a letter on the 1st defendant’s letter headed paper, but signed by the 3rd defendant, who is not an official of the 1st defendant, summarily dismissing her from employment. According to the letter, it was alleged that she violated the company’s Code of Business Conduct by “submitting non-business related expenses for re¬imbursement from the Company” and disclosing confidential company information to a third party. In paragraph 49(a) of the claimant’s statement on oath, she testified that: “Throughout the period of my investigation by the Audit panel and subsequently by the Ethics and Compliance Committee, I had no knowledge of any specific allegations made against me, until the letter of Summary dismissal of 6th December 2010 was delivered to me”. The claimant further testified that she had no knowledge of what expenses in her expense report constitutes “non-business-related expenses” (referring to paragraph 49(c) of CW’s statement on oath dated 7th December 2012). Again, during cross-examination, DW testified that he has no idea whether there was an allegation against the claimant at the time the audit meeting was held. 3. The defendants’ allegation of breach of 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (COBC) by the claimant is speculative and unreasonable. DW gave evidence that the claimant submitted an expense report to the management of the 1st defendant seeking reimbursement for airline charges related to Human Resources meetings which she claimed to have attended in Atlanta (referring to paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath). Continuing, DW testified in paragraph 22 of his witness statement that “upon review of this expense report, it was discovered that the ticket which the claimant sought a reimbursement from the 1st defendant was not issued in her name, but in the name of a member of her family”. That during cross-examination, DW was shown Exhibit D14 (claimant’s Expense Report with Trip No. 165013618 and Airline E-Tickets regarding her trip to Atlanta). That contrary to the defendants’ unfounded allegation that the claimant attended Human Resource meeting in Atlanta, Exhibit D14 shows “Evacuation of Mr. & Mrs. Akisanya” as reason for Mr. and Mrs. Akisanya’s trip to Atlanta at the instance of the 1st and 2nd defendants. That even DW testified under cross-examination that it is not stated anywhere in Exhibit D14 that the ticket was for a meeting at Atlanta. The claimant went on that DW testified that “the claimant avoided a direct flight to Madrid for an official event scheduled for 21st – 24th June 2010, but routed her trip through London remaining abroad till the 27th of June 2010 for the purpose of attending a pre-scheduled wedding fixed for the 26th June in London. The direct flight was fixed for N387,500 whilst the latter option opted for by the claimant was N839,616 and the claimant carved no part of the airfare as personal in her expense report” (paragraph 30(b)(i) of DW’s witness statement dated September 24, 2013). DW further testified that the claimant arrived in Madrid 2 days prior to the event to attend a pre-scheduled personal shopping session with her daughter and charged both nights through the 1st defendant (referring to paragraph 30(b)(ii) of DW’s statement on oath dated September 24th, 2013). That during cross-examination, DW was confronted with Document 19 (email from Akisanya Omotoye to Titilayo Akisanya, the claimant, dated April 28, 2010) which he (DW) relied on as justification for his assertion. That contrary to DW’s assertion, in Exhibit D19, Akisanya Omotoye (the claimant’s daughter) unequivocally indicated her unavailability to travel with the claimant the weekend of June 18 and 19, 2010. Under cross-examination, DW testified that he did not know if the weekend referred to in the mail at page 1 of Exhibit D19 is the weekend of June 18 and 19, 2010 when the claimant was to arrive in Madrid. Additionally, that in paragraph 30(b)(ix) of his witness statement, DW testified that the claimant also extended a business meeting in London from 26th July 2010 – 3rd August 2010 without any justifiable reason and for the purpose of attending with her daughter a pre-scheduled appointment with a photographer in London. During cross-examination, DW testified that aside Document 15, he cannot find any other proof of the assertion contained in paragraph 30(b)(ix) of his witness statement. On the contrary, that Exhibit D24 (email exchanges dated July 28 and 29, 2010 between Jide Alakija, the photographer, and Omotoye Akisanya copied to the claimant) evidently shows that the photographer’s pre-wedding photo session referred to by DW was held only with the claimant’s daughter (Omotoye Akisanya) and her fiancé. Even DW corroborated the content of Document 24 when he testified that whether the claimant overstayed cannot be deduced from Document 24. Interestingly, that DW again testified that he did not know whether the statement that the claimant extended her stay in London in order to hold a photograph session is true or false. 4. The defendants’ investigative process was contrived to indict the claimant. That Document 15 (the Audit Report) is absolutely unreliable and must be discountenance by this Court for many reasons. That Document 15 cannot be genuine document of a properly coordinated investigation conducted by the defendants. First, Document 15 clearly shows that it is unsigned. That it is elementary law that an unsigned document has no probative value and therefore void, referring to A. G. Abia State v. Agbaraya [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 362 at 377 and Fasehun v. A. G. Federation [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 141. On the assumption that Exhibit D15 is an electronic mail, the defendants have failed to comply with the conditions in section 84(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 on certification of computer-generated evidence, citing Kubor & anor v. Dickson & 2 ors [2012] LPELR¬-15364. Secondly, Document 15 is so patently defective and ultimately unreliable that the choice of words does not in any way reflect the report of a legitimate panel. Reference to ‘My’ and ‘I’ rather than ‘Our’ and ‘We’ in Document 15 clearly points to the undeniable fact that Document 15 is a finding of one person rather than of a panel which the 2nd defendant’s policy designed it to be. It is undeniably clear that Anna Geraci (COBC Supervisor) and Paul Docekal (COBC Director) authored Document 15. However, Document 15 reads: “Additionally, I conducted an email review...My review found that...Below is summary of my findings...”, referring to page 1 lines 14 – 18 of Document 15. Additional findings of the purported panel which highlights this irregularity include – • My review of the expense reports found that TA arrived Madrid two days prior to the event... (page 1 lines 19 – 20 of Document 15). • In follow-up inquiries with the local travel agent, I learned that Iberia is... (page 2 line 17 of Document 15). • On November 29, 2010, I obtained a refresh copy of TA’s email file. During my review I found an email... (page 4 lines 14 – 15 of Document 15). • On December 2, I interviewed TA about this issue (page 4 line 28 of Document 15). • My investigation found TA has exhibited ... When reviewing her expenses, I found that... (page 5 lines 1 and 2 of Document 15). Thirdly, DW under cross-examination testified to the fact that Document 15 dated November 29, 2010 was forwarded by the Panel to E & C Committee on same November 29, 2010. Meanwhile, that the author of Document 15 states that: “On November 25th and 29th November I had discussions with a member of the local Finance team, Mr. Mark Osemene. Mr. Osemene was able to confirm that TA made change to her per diem...” (page 3 lines 33 – 35 of Document 15). Again, that Document 15 which was claimed to have been sent to E & C Committee on November 29, 2010 made reference to an interview conducted with the claimant on December 2, 2010 regarding the alleged disclosure of official information to the claimant’s husband. Document 15 reads: “On December 2, I interviewed TA about the issue...” (page 4 line 28 of Document 15). Under cross-examination, DW testified that he has no idea why for a document sent on November 29, 2010 an interview of December 2, 2010 is being referred to. That Document 15 is skewed, unreliable and must be disregarded by this Court. As a matter of law, that the fact that a document is admitted in evidence is not conclusive of its evidential value. Put differently, although a document may be admissible in evidence under the provisions of the Evidence Act, 2011, the weight to be attached to its content is a different question. For every piece of evidence that has been admitted in the course of proceedings is subject to be tested for credibility or cogency by the trial court before it becomes acceptable, citing Yakubu v. Omaiboje [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 559) 708 at 719. That Document 15 and the testimony of DW are patently defective and inconsistent that this Court cannot rely on them, urging the Court to so hold. Additionally, that Document 15 made reference to several emails, documentations and communication between the author of Document 15 and none of these documentations was attached to Document 15. For instance, Document 15 referred to the claimant’s emails to the defendants’ travel agent where she (the claimant) clearly stated that she needs to be in London over the weekend and cannot depart until Monday or Tuesday (page 1 lines 28 – 30 of Document 15). The author of Document 15 stated that “In follow-up inquiries with the local travel agent I learned that Iberia is recommended for flights to Madrid out of Nigeria” (page 2 line 17 – 18 of Document 15). That this communication exchange was never provided by the author neither was the travel agent presented to the claimant for questioning despite the fact that the travel agent is dedicated to the defendants. In addition, the travel agent, in her email to the claimant dated April 27, 2010, page 4 of Document 19, detailed the three (3) flight options. This email dated April 27, 2010 was never referred to in Document 15. Furthermore, that the audit panel not only withheld several information and documentations derived from the defendants’ travel agent and third parties to assist the claimant's defence but also deliberately concealed the claimant’s response to the defendants’ allegations. In Document 18, email from the claimant to Peju Oduwole dated May 20, 2010, the claimant informed the defendants’ travel agent that: “Kindly take a look at my reservation for my Madrid trip especially OPTION 1. Kindly change my departure date from London to Lagos to Monday, June 28th or Tuesday, June 29th. I guess this being a weekend, will have a reduced impact on the fare – looking for deeply discounted fares of course ...” Notably, that Document 18 was never produced or referred to by the panel in the audit report. Even more appalling is the refusal of the panel to consider and reference the claimant’s defence to defendant’s unfounded allegations. In Document 9, claimant’s explanatory email to Anna Geraci dated November 10, 2010, the claimant specifically informed Anna Geraci that there was no additional cost to her ticket by virtue of her departure from Lagos to London on the night of April 1, 2010. The claimant also explained that her expense claim will also show that no expense claims for the period April 1 to 5, 2010 (page 2, paragraph 2, lines 8 and 9 of Document 9). Again, Document 9 was never referred to or considered by the panel in their report neither was the claimant’s explanation/defence to the allegation articulated in the audit report. Again, in an email from Seye Dosunmu (financial officer) to the claimant dated November 10, 2010 (page 7 of Document 9), the financial officer responded to the claimant’s request regarding the current per diem policy of the Nigeria Travel Policy. Typically, the clarification of the financial officer was never referred to in the audit report. Under cross-examination, DW testified that he could not see the financial officer’s clarification in the audit report. Finally, the panel forwarded its report to the E & C Committee in contravention of the 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters (Document 22). Specifically, Document 22 mandates the Corporate Audit Department (CAD) Manager (not audit panel) to forward to the E & C Committee the results of any investigation finding on COBC violation along with the recommended discipline, referring to page 6 paragraph 4.4 of Document 22. Fatally, that the defendants failed to lead evidence to justify or controvert this inadvertence. During cross-examination, DW merely gave evidence that he does not know if it was the Corporate Audit Department (CAD) Manager that forwarded Document 15 to the E & C Committee. 5. The defendant’s witness testimony is inconsistent with documentary evidence and therefore unreliable. That in paragraph 30 of his witness statement, DW testified on oath that “the claimant arrived in London on the 1st of April, 2010, for a one day meeting fixed for the 7th of April 2010, to accommodate her personal Easter vacation, notwithstanding that the period was holiday period with attendant higher air travel rates charged to the 1st defendant’s account, and overstayed till the 9th of April, 2010, claiming expense from the 4th April to the 9th of April, 2010. The defendants shall rely on a copy of the Audit Report dated 29th November, 2010”. During cross-examination, DW referred to page 3 paragraph 2 of Document 15 as justification for his testimony. On the contrary, page 3 paragraph 2 of Document 15 states that: “Because TA failed to provide support showing the cost of the flight had she not flown in before a holiday weekend, we are not able to determine the incremental cost to the Company, if any, for this flight”. Under cross-examination, DW testified that he does know if it is true that there was incremental cost to the company regarding the airfare of the claimant. When quizzed further, DW also testified that there were no expense reports indicating that the claimant charged expenses for 4th, 5th and 9th April, 2010 contrary to paragraph 30 his witness statement on oath dated September 24, 2013. Without question, that this inconsistency and discrepancy demonstrates clearly that DW should not be regarded as a witness of truth. DEFENDANTS’ CASE The defendants’ case is that the claimant was a highly paid employee holding a model leadership position in a well know national and international company whose entire brand and business model is based on exemplary ethical behavior. That as head of human resources in that organisation, the specific job of the claimant was to implement the business code in employee behaviour. She was the lawful custodian of the business code and more than any other person was bound to exemplify it. That the 1st defendant is a subsidiary of the 2nd defendant (hereafter “Coca-Cola”) and the 3rd defendant is and was at material times the direct line manager of the claimant within the 1st and 2nd defendant national and international organisation. That in 2010 a routine investigation which included verification of employee expense reports revealed a pattern of behaviour by which the claimant abused her authority to arrange travel for company meetings and or training sessions’ trips in order to acquire personal and financial benefit. That dishonestly and directly contrary to her terms of employment, the claimant arranged business trips in order to attend to her personal issues at the expense of Coca-Cola and the cover for this scheme of deception was to submit disguised expenses for business reimbursement without itemizing the personal portions of the trip as personal. To the defendants, records of the claimants official emails (which belong to Coca-Cola) also revealed that in breach of express prohibition in the code of business ethics that she was employed to administer, the claimant disclosed official confidential information to her husband. The information disclosed was additionally injurious because it was the records of an internal report by a “whistleblower” whose report and identity must be specially protected whose handling was subject of stringent regulation also well-known to the claimant in her official capacity. That alerted by these revelations, the central management of Coca-Cola set up an Audit Panel to investigate the activities of the claimant and to resolve matters raised during the routine investigation. The investigation was objective, open and in accordance with Coca-Cola laid down Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters. That at the conclusion of the investigation, the Audit Panel forwarded its private and confidential report to the Ethics & Compliance Committee in accordance with the provisions of Coca-Cola’s Code of Business Conduct. Based on the provisions of Coca-Cola’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters, by which the report of the Audit Panel can only be implemented if it is approved by the Ethics & Compliance Committee. That after reviewing the report of the Audit Panel, the Ethics & Compliance upheld the findings of the Audit Panel and recommended the summary dismissal of the claimant to the management of Coca-Cola. That the claimant’s dismissal was upheld even after considering her detailed “Memoranda of Appeal” which failed to answer cogent and compelling evidence garnered during the investigation and which she could not defend. That the 1st defendant expressly authorized the 3rd defendant to sign the claimant’s letter of summary dismissal dated 6th December 2010 as it is usual practice in the Coca-Cola organisation. It was the same 3rd defendant who was her acknowledged line manager or “boss” who signed her employment contract. DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSION In their written submission, the defendants formulated eight issues for the determination of the Court. They are – 1. Whether in the circumstances of this case the defendants owe the claimant any obligation to avail her fair hearing at all. 2. Whether the defendants have complied with its Guideline for handling code of business conduct matter and have satisfied the duty of fair hearing to the claimant when in it gave her both oral and written opportunities to be heard during the investigation leading to her dismissal. 3. Whether the findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant can be set aside having been done in accordance with the claimant’s contract of employment. 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to a declaration that her summary dismissal from the service of the 1st defendant by the letter of December 6, 2010 is wrongful, null and void having violated the defendants’ Code of Business Conduct and her dismissal thereby justified. 5. Whether the claimant with her knowledge of the working relationship between the 1st and 2nd defendants and their other subsidiaries and having benefited from same is entitled to a declaration that her letter of dismissal from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010 is unlawful, invalid, null and void and incapable of having any legal consequence whatsoever having been signed by the 3rd defendant. 6. Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in paragraphs g) and h) of her Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February 2012 having failed to substantiate same. 7. Whether the claimant is entitled to any monetary claim as contained in her reliefs I, J and K of her Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February 2012 having failed to produce any evidence in this regards. 8. Whether the claimant is entitled to any monetary claim as contained in her reliefs l) and m) of her Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February, 2012. Argument on issue 1 Whether in the circumstances of this case the defendants owe the claimant any obligation to avail her fair hearing at all. To the defendants, the claimant has alleged that she was not given fair hearing during the investigation leading to her summary dismissal from the employment of the 1st defendant. That this is simply not true. That evidence is copious to the fact that the claimant was afforded ample opportunities to defend herself against the allegations leveled against her and that the claimant made use of the said opportunities by making both oral and written representation in defence of the allegations against her to the 1st defendant’s Audit Panel. This notwithstanding, that it is the law that where the misconduct leading to the dismissal of an employee is a willful misconduct the employer is not required to give such an employee any fair hearing, citing Uzondu v. UBA Plc [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 63) 392 at 408, which case also defined willful misconduct as any act prejudicial to the interest of the master or outside the scope of the duties of the servant. That in the instant case the complaint of the 1st defendant against the claimant which led to her summary dismissal by the letter of 6th December 2010 comes squarely within the Court’s definition above as the allegations are not criminal in nature but simply prejudicial to the interest of the 1st defendant and outside of the scope of the claimant’s employment contract with it. The allegations against the claimant by the defendants in their testimony before this Court were that she submitted for reimbursement non-business related expenses, she was in the habit of using the office business travel time to attend to personal issues and that the claimant divulged to an outsider in the person of her husband confidential official information in violation of the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (“the Code”), referring to paragraphs 30(a), (b)(i – x), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the statement of DW, Mr. Orok Efiom, dated 24th September 2013, Arinze v. First Bank (Nig.) Ltd [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663, and David-Osuagwu v. Attorney-General, Anambra State [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 285) 13 where the appellant, a lecturer in Anambra State University of Technology, employed on contract, was removed from office without a hearing. She sought a declaration aimed at reinstating her to office but the Court of Appeal held that she was not entitled to procedural fairness, it being a privilege and not a right. That the courts are consistent in refusing to read into employers’ dismissal power any implied duty to afford employees a fair opportunity to be heard. So long as a termination accords with the terms of the contract of employment, an employee is not entitled to a hearing prior to the termination of the relationship, citing Tomlinson v. LMS Railway Co. [1944] 1 All ER 537. The defendants went on that the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence; it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract. That in Udemah v. Nigeria Coal Corporation [1991] 3 NWLR 477 at 486 – 490, followed in Taduggoronno v. Gotom [2002] 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 453, the appellant was an assistant general manager, having risen to that position after five years of loyal service. In 1982 an administrative inquiry was set up to investigate some allegation of malpractices in the corporation, the appellant was invited twice to appear before the panel but he turned down the invitations. In November 1982 he was suspended and three month’s salary in lieu of notice paid. He unsuccessfully sought a declaration that his suspension was contrary to natural justice and therefore void. To this end, that it is not in all cases that the application of the rules of natural justice will be justifiable. In any event, that the court has stated in a long line of decided authorities that every case must be considered based on its own circumstances, citing Russell v. Duke of Norfolf [1949] 1 All ER 109 at 188 and Olanrewaju v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 691. The defendants accordingly urged the Court to conclude that in this case, where the defendants acted according to the terms of the employment contract and where they had in fact afforded every opportunity for the claimant to answer the clear and unanswerable allegations against her, it is idle and pointless to rely on the principles of fair hearing. Argument on issue 2 Whether the defendants have complied with its Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matter and have satisfied the duty of fair hearing to the claimant when in it gave her both oral and written opportunities to be heard during the investigation leading to her dismissal. The defendants in arguing issue 2 made three points. The first is that the claimant had fair hearing. To the defendants, notwithstanding the fact that the claimant was not entitled to fair hearing as already stated above, the 1st defendant in line with its Guidelines for Handling of Code of Business Conduct (“the Guidelines”) and in fairness to the claimant availed the claimant for hearing. That the 1st defendant discovered several violations of its Code of Business Conduct (“the Code”), Document 23, by the claimant during its routine audit of its employees. The 1st defendant immediately communicated to the claimant requesting her to send to the Audit Panel her expenses submitted for reimbursement over the period under investigation. That the 1st defendant’s audit panel also contacted the claimant informing her of the allegations against her and the seriousness including the consequences of such investigation. During the investigation by an email, Document 21, from Anna Geraci, the Audit Panel invited the claimant for an interview in order for the claimant to defend the allegations of Code violation leveled against her. That the claimant attended the said meeting and responded to questions from the panel. Not being satisfied by her responses to the Audit Panel during the interview, the claimant asked to be allowed to make further representations to the Audit Panel in defence of the allegations against her. That the Audit Panel obliged the claimant and the claimant consequently made the representation, Document 9. Being dissatisfied with the claimant’s explanations both during her interview and as contained in her further representation in writing, the audit panel found her liable. The panel subsequently submitted its report, Document 15, to the 1st defendant’s Ethics and Compliance Committee, which then recommended that the claimant be dismissed by the management of the 1st defendant. By a letter of summary dismissal dated 6th December 2010 the 1st defendant dismissed the claimant from its employment. Aggrieved by the decision of the 1st defendant, the claimant in this suit now complains of not having been given fair hearing. That fair hearing as per section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is a constitutional rather than a contractual right, directed to courts and other tribunals established by law and not to the private contractual relationships between individuals; referring to S & D Const. Co. Ltd v. Ayoku [2011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1265) 487 at 516 – 517 per the concurring judgment of Adekeye, JSC. That the principle of natural justice does not require any particular form of notice whether oral or written nor does it stipulate the form in which the party being investigated should be heard. All that is necessary is that the allegations against the party being investigated are communicated to such person and he is given the opportunity to defend it, citing Yusuf v. UBN Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632 at 644, Hart v. Military Government of Rivers State [1976] 10 NSCC 622 at 632 and Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] AC 120. To the defendants, the objective of fair hearing is not to question whether what has been done was done wrongly but to give opportunity to that person who will be affected by the decision of a higher body to be heard, citing Yusuf v. UBN Ltd (supra) at page 646. That fair hearing in effect requires giving all parties to a dispute the opportunity to be heard. That notwithstanding that the claimant is not legally entitled to constitutional fair hearing, in this case, the facts and evidence before this Court clearly shows that she was treated as though she was. She was, therefore, given successive and ample opportunities to make representations in defence of allegations leveled against her. That the law is trite as held in Jirgbagh v. UBN [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 11 at 26 that once the employee whose employment is terminated was given due opportunity to be heard and indeed had his say, he cannot be heard to complain. The defendants continued that by her own admissions in paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41 of her statement on oath dated 7th December 2012, the claimant admitted the fact that she was notified of the allegations against her and that she attended a meeting of the Corporate Auditors in Atlanta for interview on the allegations. That to take full advantage of the opportunity, the claimant sent a detail representation of her position on the allegations of Code violation leveled against her in her e-mail of 10th November 2010 to the Audit Panel, Document 9. In the said mail the claimant expressly revealed that she was not only aware of the investigation against her, she was aware of the specific allegations against her having been communicated to her by the Audit Panel. That specifically in the opening paragraph of her mail she stated thus – In the past few weeks, my travel expenses claims and other matters relating to my local R & R entitlements have been the subject of an audit investigation. Further to this investigation, I have exchanged some emails with you and had a similar number of oral interrogations both in person and by telephone. Several purported lapses were brought to my attention for which I provided some explanation. That at the time of her email the claimant was still in the employment of the 1st defendant and the specific issues mentioned. That in the mail are the issues she was investigated for and for which she was subsequently dismissed. It is, therefore, quite dishonest for the claimant belatedly to claim ignorance of the allegations against her or claim that she was not heard in the face of glaring and compelling evidence to the contrary, urging the Court to so hold. To the defendants, it is the evidence of the claimant as per her statement on oath dated 7th December 2012 and Documents 20, 21 and 9 that she received a mail inviting her for an interview with the Audit Panel; that she was informed on several occasions through e-mails and phone conversations that allegations pertaining to her travel expenses and disclosure of official information were made against her which is a subject of investigation; that she attended the interview, responded to questions and followed it up with written representation. That the Audit Panel is not a court and it is not required to follow any rigid procedure once it complies with the claimant’s contract of employment, citing Agbor v. CBN [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 370 at 379 and Baba v. CATC [1991] 5NWLR (Pt. 192) 388. That it is, therefore, false for the claimant, to contend that the allegations against her were not communicated to her or that she was not given an opportunity to be heard. In any event, that in the instant case the claimant was heard both orally and in writing; she cannot, therefore, be heard to complain, urging the Court to so hold. The second point made by the defendants is that the claimant admitted that she was given fair hearing. To the defendants, it is trite and settled law that facts admitted require no further prove, citing section 122(2) of the Evidence Act 2011, Zenith Bank Plc & anor v. Ekereuwem & anor [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 207, Babatunde v. Popoola & anor [2012] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299) 302, Honika Sawmill (Nig.) Ltd v. Hoff [1994] 2 NWLR (Pt. 326) 252 at 265 – 266 and Odjegba v. Odjegba [2004] 2 NWLR (Pt. 858) 589 at 583. That the claimant has expressly admitted in her own evidence that she was given fair hearing and to that extent the rule of audi alterem partem was not breached by the 1st defendant if at all it applies in this instant case and her summary dismissal is, therefore valid, urging the Court to hold so. The third point is that the 1st defendant complied with its Guidelines for handling code of business conduct matter. That the proper and legally effective procedure as between the present parties is the Coca Cola Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct matters. This is agreed between the parties, more so by the claimant who contends to make her case that Coca Cola did not comply with the procedure in the Guidelines. On the sanctity and binding nature of the terms of the employment contract, the Court was referred to Union Bank of Nig. Ltd v. Chukwelo Charles Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647 at 664 and Amodu v. Amode [2011] 23 NLLR (Pt. 66) 352 at 376. The defendants went on that it is significant that the claimant has not told this Court in what manner the Guidelines were not complied with. That the 1st defendant complied fully with the procedures laid down in its Guidelines in dismissing the claimant from its employment. It is a matter of fact. That the defendants led evidence before this Court in paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the statement on oath of DW, Mr. Orok Efiom, dated 24th September 2013 clearly stating the stage by stage events that led to the dismissal of the claimant from the 1st defendant’s employment. That the 1st defendant’s Code prescribes the type of conduct that may be subject of investigation, while the Guidelines dearly provides for the procedures to be followed in investigating any violation of the Code. It is the procedure contained in the Guidelines for the handling of code of business conduct matter that the claimant now alleges that the 1st defendant did not comply with in summarily dismissing her from its employment. That although it is again important to note the significant absence of any specific contention or fact as to how the guidelines were breached, the defendants then proceeded to outline the compliant procedure/events. The defendants then submitted that the claimant has not complained about any of the stages of the investigation save for the defeated contention that she was not given fair hearing and the unfounded one that the Guidelines do not provide for dismissal. That the complaint of the claimant can be squarely placed within paragraphs III and V of the Guidelines which are the third and fifth stages of the procedures laid down in the Guidelines i.e. Notification and Interview stage. By the Guidelines an employee is only to be notified when preliminary investigative steps indicates that the employee is likely to have violated the Code. That the law is settled that parties are bound by the contract they entered into, citing Amodu v. Amode (supra); and since the claimant signed to be bound by the Guidelines the Court is obliged only to view compliance according to the provisions of the Guidelines. The Court cannot, therefore, look beyond the Guidelines in corning to a decision whether or not it was complied with. To the defendants, as already stated, the audit conducted by the 1st defendant is a general routine audit of its entire employees. That it is only when any particular employee is suspected of violations of the code that the right of notification arises. The Guidelines provide in paragraph III(b)(1) that – In general, there is no need to notify the subject of the investigation that the review is on-going unless and until preliminary investigative steps indicate that this employee is likely to have violated the COBC. Local law and custom may dictate otherwise... In most cases, the subject of investigation should not be notified until the time of his/her interview in order to avoid anxiety and minimized the opportunity for fabrication, potential destruction of evidence or retaliation. That in compliance with this provision the claimant was notified that an investigation had been commenced against her relating to expenses report submitted by her for reimbursement. She was also informed several times that she has contravened the provisions of confidentiality contained in her employment contract, referring to Document 9 and the testimony of the claimant herself. The defendants continued that the remaining relevant part of the Guidelines relate to conduct of interviews and the responsibilities of the interviewers which were all complied with by the 1st defendant. Amongst these is preparation of interviewing documents, in compliance with which the Corporate Auditors requested the claimant to forward all her expense report from 2009 till the period of the investigation to the Atlanta office and the claimant complied. That this was confirmed by the claimant herself in her evidence before this Court when in paragraph 35 of her witness statement on oath she stated – Sometime during the period, l received a call from the corporate auditors directing that I forward all my expenses reports from 2009 till the period of the investigation to Atlanta l complied with the directive. That in similar fashion, all other steps of the investigation as laid down in the Guidelines were complied with. After the investigation the outcome of the investigation as required by the Guidelines was submitted to the Ethics and Compliance committee for their decision, referring to Document 15, “Summary of Potential Violation”. It was after these serial steps were followed that the claimant was summarily dismissed as per Document 8, letter of summary dismissal. That in line with the provisions of the Code the claimant appealed the decision of the Ethics and Compliance Committee. Documents 10 and 11 are the claimant’s Memoranda of Appeal dated 31st December 2010 and 16th January 2011, which appeal was considered. The Ethic and Compliance Committee communicated to the claimant the outcome of her appeal, upholding the findings of the Audit Panel that the claimant violated the Code, referring to Document 6 being a letter dated 9th February 2011 from the Ethics and Compliance Committee. These clearly show to the Court that the entire procedure as laid down in the Guidelines was faithfully followed by both parties. That this compliance is a complete answer to the spurious complaints of the claimant. The Court was then referred to NEPA v. El-Fanti [1986] 3NWLR (Pt. 32) 884 at 898. To the defendants, the 1st defendant has shown convincingly that it complied with the procedure laid down by the terms governing the employment of the parties; as such the Court will not enquire into the guilt or innocence of the claimant. This is so, as the court is not meant to sit as an appellate Court on the decision of the Audit Panel, citing NEPA v. El-Fanti (supra). That the position of the law is well settled that the Court must constrain itself to the terms of the parties’ contract as already stated above, referring to Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 504 at 521 – 522. As to the contention that the Guidelines do not provide for dismissal, the defendants submitted that this is entirely fallacious. That the law is well settled that an employer reserves the right at any time to dismiss an employee for misconduct, citing Layade v. Panalpina World Trans (Nig.) Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544 and Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd v. Mr. G. O. Dudusola [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt. 957) 292. That it is, therefore, not necessary in law to expressly provide for a right to dismiss in the terms of the agreement of the employee. That the right to dismiss is an implied term of any contract of employment. That the law is that where an employee complains that the employer failed to follow the terms of the contract of employment between the parties, the onus is on that employee to show to the Court how the procedure was not followed. More particularly, it is the duty of the claimant in this case to show to this Court how the 1st and 2nd defendants’ “Guidelines” was breached, citing Raphael Ogumka v. CAC [2010] LPELR 4891(CA) and Indoniboye-Obu v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 at 630 SC. That throughout the entire proceedings before this Court, the claimant has led no evidence whatsoever to show to this Court that any specific provisions of the procedure was not complied with. Argument on issue 3 Whether the findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant can be set aside having been done in accordance with the claimant’s contract of employment. To the defendants, the law is settled that once an employer complies with the terms of the employee’s employment in dismissing an employee, the Court lacks the power to overrule/set aside the verdict of the administrative panel which dismissed such an employee, citing Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt.1031) 565, Chuma v. Shell Petroleum [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 and NEPA v. El-Fandi (supra) per Akpata JSC. That as exhaustively outlined in issue 2 above, the 1st defendant complied in totality with the step by step procedure provided in the guidelines in the investigation leading to the claimant’s dismissal from employment. That being the case the decision reached by the Panel set up by the 1st defendant cannot be set aside, relying on all arguments advanced as to issue 2 in this regard. Argument on issue 4 Whether the claimant is entitled to a declaration that her summary dismissal from the service of the 1st defendant by the letter of December 6, 2010 is wrongful, null and void having violated the 1st defendant’s code of business conduct and her dismissal thereby justified. Assuming but not conceding that there is any modicum of evidence before this Court in proof of the claimant’s claim for declaration that her dismissal was wrongful, it is the defendants’ contention that the claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the 1st defendant is valid, lawful and in accordance with the terms of the claimant’s employment contract with the 1st defendant. That the claimant was dismissed from the employment of the 1st defendant on the ground of violation of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code of Business Conduct which forms part and parcel of her conditions of service in the 1st defendant. To show that the claimant’s dismissal was not wrongful, the defendants made five points. 1. That the claimant’s dismissal is not wrongful. To the defendants, contrary to the misguided reliefs couched and sought by the claimant, a wrongful termination/dismissal cannot be declared null and void. That wrongful termination only entitles the aggrieved employee to damages where such wrongful termination/dismissal is proved, citing Union Beverages Ltd v. Owolabi [1988] 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 128, NNB v. Obevudiri [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 29) 387 and NNB v. Osunde [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 511 at 521. Accordingly, that the claimant’s complaint that her dismissal was wrongful is baseless since an employer reserves the right to dismiss an employee with or without a reason and an employer has a common law right to dismiss an employee, referring to Serke v. Ridley (1831) 28 LT 411 and Arinze v. First Bank (Nig.) Ltd [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78 at 102. That the claimant seeks from this Court a declaration that her summary dismissal by the letter of December 6, 2010 is wrongful, null and void, not having complied with either the “fair hearing requirement of the law” or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. That no fact or law has been placed before this Court to support such a radical claim. On the contrary, that the defendants have demonstrated in fact and according to law that that the summary dismissal of the claimant by a letter dated December 6, 2010 (Exhibit D8) is valid and in accordance with the Code and Guidelines (Documents 22 and 23) and in total compliance with the rules of natural justice. That Document 8, the claimant’s letter of summary dismissal, stated clearly the reasons for the dismissal of the claimant, which reason is the violation of the Coca Cola Company Code of Business Conduct by submitting non-business related expenses for reimbursement from the company and disclosure of confidential company information to an outside party. That the letter dismissing the claimant having stated the reasons for the dismissal, all that is left for the defendants particularly the 1st defendant to justify the dismissal is to show that it complied with the terms’ of the contract of employment of the claimant. In University of Calabar v. Essien [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 477) 225 at 26. That the legal basis of any employment remains the contract of employment between the employer and the employee, citing Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 at 669, Iyase v. University of Benin Teaching Hospital Management Board [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 643) 45 at 59, Ezekiel v. WMDNL [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 248 at 256 – 257, UBN v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 530, Mr. Emmanuel Hezekiah Uboh v. Seawolf Oil Field Services Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/600/2012 (the date the judgment was delivered is not disclosed), Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 997) 276 at 287 – ¬288, BFI Group Corporation v. Bureau of Public Enterprises [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209 and Amodu v. Amode (supra). To the defendants, there is no contention between the parties as to the terms governing the relationship between them. That it is in evidence before this Court that the terms of agreement in the relationship of the claimant and the 1st defendant are as contained in Documents l, 22 and 23 which are the claimant’s letter of appointment dated 31st October 2001 (Document 1), the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct and Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters (Documents 23 and 22). Specifically, that paragraph 8 of page 2 of the claimant’s letter of appointment expressly identified and incorporated the signing of a non-disclosure agreement and the 1st defendant’s code of business conduct as terms of the contract. The said paragraph states – You are not to be directly or indirectly engaged or concerned in any other employment or afterwards discuss with any person any information as to the practice, business dealings or affairs of the Company, or any matter which may come to your knowledge or attention, To this end you will be required to sign a non-disclose and our agreement and our code a/business conduct. That it is also in evidence before this Court that the claimant admitted during cross-examination that she signed for Documents 22 and 23 and the non-disclosure agreement when she stated as follows – Yes, I signed for the Code of business conduct and knew that it was binding on me. Yes I believe I signed a document on non-disclose of information. Further on this point, the defendants referred to Document 7 which is a copy of the document where the claimant acknowledged receipt of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code of Business Conduct. That there is, therefore, a consensus between the parties in this suit as to what terms governed their relationship. The defendants went on that the task of this Court is to construe rightly the intention of the parties as contained in the contract governing their relationship. In doing this, that all the documents forming such contract must be holistically read together for the Court to come to a decision, citing CBN & anor v. Igwillo [2011] 24 NLLR (Pt. 6) 299 at 336. That it is also trite that in an action where an employee complains of wrongful dismissal all that the employer needs to do is to show that the dismissal was done according to the terms of the employee’s contract of employment, citing Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 at 610, where the Supreme Court held that in a dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee it is not necessary for the employer to prove the reasons stated in the notice of dismissal or termination; the only obligation being to show that the contract was terminated in accordance with the express or implied terms of the contract regardless of whether the appointment is on permanent or probationary (temporary) basis. That the defendants have shown abundantly while arguing issue 2 all the procedures required by the contract between the parties to be followed and same was complied with by the 1st defendant. 2. The claimant violated the 1st defendant’s Code. It is the evidence/submission of the defendants that upon the employment of the claimant by the 1st defendant she signed to uphold the integrity of the 1st defendant and not to violate the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code, which was given to her as part of her conditions of service, referring to Document 7 showing the claimant’s acknowledgement of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code of Business Conduct. That the law is trite that an employer reserves the right to do away with an employee whose misconduct/violation is capable of undermining the trust reposed in the employee by the employer, citing Olanrewaju v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731 691 at 714. That this Court per Ngboye v. Obat Oil and Petroleum Limited [2011] 25 NLLR. (Pt. 71) 247 at 266 – 267 held that where an employee is guilty of gross/willful misconduct he could be lawfully dismissed summarily without notice and without wages. Also referred to this Court are UBN Ltd v. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 669, Boston Deep Sea Fishing v. Ansell [1988] 39 Ch.D. 339, Babatunde v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd & ors [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 577 and Omoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 504 at 526. The defendants continued that during the course of the claimant’s employment the 1st defendant embarked on a routine audit of the conduct of its employees. That the said audit is a usual practice in the 1st defendant as acknowledged by the claimant in her evidence before the Court. That in the course of the audit some suspicion and concerns were raised relating to the travel expenses of the claimant submitted for reimbursement from the 1st defendant (Document 14). That it was also discovered that the claimant was in the habit of using company travels to attend to personal issues by deliberately routing her trips through locations where her personal engagements are to be attended to thereby causing the 1st defendant to pay more in terms of flight ticket, hotels, meals and other expenses. That Documents 17, 18, 19, 24, 30, 31, 32 and 33 all give credence to this dishonest scheme. That it was also discovered that the claimant disclosed non-public information of the company to an outsider (per Document 13). That all these are in violation of the 1st and 2nd defendant’s Code which the claimant duly signed for at the point of her employment in the 1st defendant and which by her own employment she was the chief custodian and executor. To be sure that the claimant violated the Code, that DW gave evidence in paragraphs 30(a), (b) (i – x), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and 31 of his statement on oath that the claimant submitted an expenses report to the management of the 1st defendant seeking reimbursement for airline charges related to human resource meeting which she claimed to have attended in Atlanta (Documents 14 and 30). That it was however discovered that the ticket for which the reimbursement was sought for was not issued in the name of the claimant but that of a member of her family in violation of the Code. Similarly, that the claimant was also discovered to have made a habit of arriving business meeting venues unnecessarily earlier than scheduled and departing late, long after such meeting when others have returned. That the claimant would then submit for reimbursement expenses including her personal expenses without itemizing which of the expenses is personal as required by the 1st defendant’s Travel and Entertainment policy (Exhibit C19). That the Audit Panel also discovered a pattern, which the claimant had established of routing her trips through and overstaying in London to enable her attend to personal engagements and without official authorization. Particularly, the claimant avoided a direct flight to Madrid for an official event scheduled for 21st – 24th June 2010, but routed her trip through London remaining abroad till the 27th of June 2010 for the purpose of attending a pre-scheduled wedding fixed for 26th June 2010 in London (Document 31). That the direct flight was fixed for N387,500 whilst the latter option opted for by the claimant was N339,616 and the claimant carved no part of the airfare as personal in her expenses report before this Court is Documents 19 and 17 evidencing the conversation between the claimant, her daughter and one Akinleye Makinde on the one hand and the 1st defendant’s travel agent on the other on her planned visit to London, her desire to have her daughter join her to Madrid and the fact of her readiness to pay for her daughters air ticket. In the said mail, that she also confessed to the duo, who she called “love birds”, that her business was actually scheduled to hold between June 21 and 24. That this is a confirmation of the defendants’ position. To further show that she also deliberately planned her early arrival in Madrid ahead of the sessions in order to spend time with her daughter for a pre-scheduled shopping spree, that Document 16 is the email containing the invitation for the programme in Madrid. The mail specifically stated the date of arrival as Sunday June 20, afternoon. But the claimant decided to leave from Lagos first to London and then Madrid all at the expense of the company when the company had no business for her in London at all “and she was not expected in Madrid until 20th”. That although the claimant was given the option of traveling straight to Madrid at a lower cost she elected to travel at an exorbitant cost to the detriment of the 1st defendant in order to prosecute her personal businesses. It is also the case of the defendants, which to the defendants the claimant has not challenged, that she arrived Madrid 2 days before to attend a pre-scheduled personal shopping session with her daughter and charged both nights through to the 1st defendant. Also before this Court is the conspicuous fact that the claimant stated categorically to the travel agent that she needed to be in London over the weekend of 26th and 27th June 2010 and cannot depart until Monday or Tuesday 28th and 29th June 2010 respectively, referring to Document 17, the mail containing conversation between the claimant and the 1st defendant’s travel agent. To the defendants, it is also a fact before this Court that the claimant also extended her stay while attending a business meeting in London from 26th July 2010 to 3rd August 2010, without any justifiable reason and for the purpose of attending with her daughter a pre-schedule appointment with a photographer in London. That the claimant was scheduled officially for a one day meeting in London on the 7th of April 2010 but in her usual manner she arrived London on the 1st of April 2010 and did not depart London until the 9th of April 2010. That this was in order to accommodate her personal Easter vacation notwithstanding that the period was holiday period with the attendant higher air fare and she charged the rate to the 1st defendant’s account. The defendants went on that DW in his evidence in paragraph 30(c) stated that the claimant sought to charge her daily monetary allowances for all the trips mentioned above including her various personal engagements to the 1st defendant as business related expenses when the expenses were clearly non-business related. To the defendants, the above and many more were the violations by the clamant against the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code of Business Conduct which the claimant signed to uphold, referring to the Code at pages 16, 19, 20 of Document 23. At page 16, the Code provides expressly against the theft of company assets. The Code defines theft of company assets thus – Whether physical theft such as unauthorised removal of company product, equipment or information or theft through embezzlement or intentional misreporting of time or expenses may result in termination and criminal prosecution. The company treats work place theft of assets belonging to other employees the same way it treats theft of company assets. The defendants continued that the claimant contravened this provision when she submitted for reimbursement non¬-business related expenses i.e. personal expenses to the 1st defendant, intentionally misreporting her expenses to the 1st defendant. In the same vein, that the claimant was found to have violated the provision relating to use of information both as contained in the above provision and at page 19 of the Code when the Code provides – Do not disclose non-public information to anyone outside the company including to family and friends; except when disclosure is required for business purposes. Even then, take appropriate steps, such as execution of a confidentiality agreement. That the claimant clearly violated this provision of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Code amongst other violations and was unable to provide satisfactory explanation for the breaches. The defendants then referred to Callo v. Broun (1831) 4 C & P 518, Spain v. Arnott (1817) 2 Slarke 25, Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd v. Mr. G. O. Dudusola (supra) and Momoh v. CBN (supra) at 530. To the defendants, it is a settled common law principle that an employer has the liberty or right to dismiss the employee thereof summarily, for gross or willful misconduct. However, that what constitutes a serious or gross misconduct of an employee is a question of fact and degree. That the misconduct in every given circumstance must be such as to undermine the relationship of trust and confidence supposedly existing between the employer and the employee. That in considering what constitutes gross misconduct the courts have held that it is for the employer to determine, citing Oyedele v. Ife University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board [1996] NWLR (Pt. 155) 194 at 199. That in the instant case the employer of the claimant considered the allegations made against the claimant as misconduct and they so defined it within the Code. In compliance with the provisions of its Guidelines these allegations were investigated and upon a true finding the claimant was liable to dismissal. That having discovered the above 1st defendant in compliance with its Guidelines, Document 22, initiated an investigation. During the investigation by the Audit Panel, the claimant was confronted with all the allegations above. Specifically at the interview which was held by the Audit Panel with the claimant, when confronted with the fact that she routed her flight to Madrid through London she falsely stated that her decision was based on the advice of the 1st defendant’s travel agent. That this falsity was contradicted by the travel agent on interrogation by the Audit Panel and the claimant did not provide any evidence in establishing the alleged advice of the travel agent during her interview or any time during the investigation despite making both oral and written representation to the Audit Panel, referring to Document 18. Upon confronting the claimant with the fact that she overstayed in London on the 9th of April, that she stated that she overstayed in London to attend a meeting but she was unable to provide the details of the meeting when she was probed by the Audit Panel. Also, on the claimant’s overstay in London from 26th July – 3rd August 2010, that she stated that she had the approval of a superior officer (Ms. Sefton) to assist her on a project, but this fact was denied by the said Ms. Sefton and her superior Stuart Martin. Document 12 is Stuart Martin’s mail to Ana Geraci on 30th August 2010 where she stated that the claimant was to be in London only between 19th and 24th July 2010. On the allegation of submission of non-business expenses for reimbursement to the 1st defendant, that the claimant stated that she has submitted a subsequent expenses report to correct the error claiming that the Finance Associate who assisted her in submitting the expense report had put through per diem for the Brussels trip when he was supposed to put through per diem for another trip. However, that when she was requested by the Audit Panel to indicate the corrections made in a mail dated 3rd November 2010 she could not, referring to Document 20, mail exchange between the claimant and Ana Geraci. To the defendants, the relationship between the claimant and the 1st defendant is that of master and servant and it is subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. That the relationship is, therefore, governed strictly by the letter of employment dated October 31, 2001, 1st defendant’s Code and the Guidelines (Documents l, 22 and 23). On this point, the defendants relied on their submissions relating to issue 3 above. It is the further contention of the defendants that the 1st defendant confronted the claimant during its investigation with the fact that she forwarded mail containing confidential/non-public information of the 1st defendant to her husband in violation of the Code (Document 13). That the claimant in defence stated that she believed that her husband does not form part of family as contained in the non¬disclosure agreement she signed and in the code. That this claim is unsupported by plain understanding of English language and usage and for that matter human reasoning and time need not be wasted on it. That the Code clearly mentioned family as part of the group to whom non-public information should not be disclosed. That the claimant’s husband is of course a member of her family; the argument that they became one in marriage as to exclude them from the definition of family is unfounded, lame, unknown to law and too pedestrian. That the claimant as employee of the 1st defendant signed to uphold the integrity of the 1st defendant and to adhere to the provisions of the Code and the non-disclosure agreement signed by her is part of her contract of employment. That the claimant expressly sated under cross-examination thus – Now that I understand the question better, I would say yes dishonesty and breach of corporate policy would ground dismissal of an employee. Yes, I was aware that the defendants placed high premium on employee integrity. Yes, I signed for the code of business conduct and knew it was binding on me. I believe I signed a document on nondisclosure of information. It is the case of the 1st defendant that the claimant deliberately in order to short-change the 1st defendant failed in her responsibilities. That in other to ensure that the claimant is given fair hearing the Audit Panel proceeded to investigate the activities of the claimant. During the said investigation the claimant was afforded all necessary avenues to defend the allegations against her. That the claimant made use of the avenues as already shown in the claimant’s evidence and the evidence of the defendants. However, that the claimant’s numerous explanations were not acceptable to the 1st defendant hence the dismissal of the claimant. 3. The claimant violated the 1st defendant’s travel and entertainment policy. As part of her defences to her violations, that the claimant alleged that she was covered by the 1st defendant’s travel and entertainment policy. However, that the claimant utterly failed to show to this Court the provisions of the policy where her improprieties are excused. It is thus the case of the defendants that the claimant’s activities which led to her summary dismissal negate the provisions of the 1st defendant’s travel and entertainment policy. That at page 10 of the policy (Exhibit C19) as tendered by the claimant, it provides thus – Combined business and personal travel is acceptable when the incremental cost of personal travel is paid by the associate. Business trips should not be planned solely for the purpose of facilitating personal travel. Where personal travel is combined with business travel, it is the associate’s responsibility to request the travel agency to include, in the remarks section of the travel itinerary, the cost of the business element of the combined trip (i.e. calculation of the cost of the business trip only). Reimbursements to associates will be based on the cost provided by the travel agency. If travel is primarily for personal purpose and business objectives are accomplished secondarily, you may be reimbursed only for expenses directly attributable to business. Basic transportation, lodging and other costs are not pro-ratable or reimbursable. Associates are responsible for fully documenting the costs allocation between personal and business expenses. To the defendants, this provision is simple and very clear. Against the facts established and admitted, that they make stark the violations of which the 1st defendant found the claimant guilty. That it is in evidence that the claimant submitted for reimbursement expenses that were purely personal and that she planned business trips in order to accommodate her personal travels. These are clear contraventions of the provisions of the 1st defendant’s travel and entertainment policy which the claimant purports to rely upon. That nowhere in the expenses submitted for reimbursement to the 1st defendant by the claimant is any itemization of her personal expenses made in as required by the policy made, referring to “Exhibits D30, D31, D32 and D33”. That the claimant also failed to instruct the travel agency as required by the policy to deduct cost that is directly as a result of her personal arrangement and travel plans. But instead she charged everything to the 1st defendant. That it is remarkable in the light of her position that the head of human resources and ipso facto chief executor of this policy would lamely claim her violation was the mistake of an unnamed associate who allegedly assisted her. That it is abundantly clear that the actions of the claimant are deliberate and a willful misconduct calculated to take advantage of the 1st defendant. That there is nothing in the contract of the parties which allows such misconduct, urging the Court to so hold. 4. The motive of the claimant’s summary dismissal is not relevant. To the defendants, the claimant also alleged that she was been witch-hunted by some persons in the employment of the 1st and 2nd defendants. That this claim is obviously an afterthought calculated to prejudice this Court. That even in her oral testimony the claimant persisted in referring to “foreigners” and “Egyptians” and an unsubstantiated witch-hunt. That it is actually quite disgraceful that the claimant being employed at very high level by an international corporation and after accepting huge salary increments will take refuge in prejudice and xenophobia only when she has been caught in illegality and dishonest violations of her voluntary contract. That this resort does not avail her even so for the law is trite as held in NEPA v. EI- (supra) and Amodu v. Amode (supra) that the motive which led an employer to lawfully terminate/dismiss his servants employment is not a relevant factor and the Court will have no business with such motive but will only give effect to the contract of the parties. Also referred to is Ajayi v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR 577 at 593. That so long as the termination/dismissal of an employee as that of the claimant herein is in accordance with the contract of employment the motive is irrelevant, citing Calabar Cement Co. Ltd v. Daniel (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 750. 5. The claimant failed to prove her case. Here, the defendants submitted that the claimant is not entitled to a declaration that her dismissal from the 1st defendant is wrongful as the claimant failed to prove that her dismissal is wrongful. That the law is settled that he who asserts must prove, citing section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, Yusuf v. Adegoke [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 332 and Texaco (Nig.) Plc v. Kehinde [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224 at 239. That where an employee in a master and servant relationship alleges wrongful dismissal, he has the onus of proving the assertion. That the employee has to place and plead his terms of his employment and the way and manner the terms were breached by his employer, citing FLRAPSSA v. MBNL [201l] 19 NLLR (Pt. 53) 175 at 211, Francis Katto v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390, Amodu v. Amode (supra) at page 370, Borishade v. Bank of Nigeria Ltd [2007] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1015) 217 at 255, Alaja v. UBA Plc [2011] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 337 and Raphael Ogumka v. CAC (supra). That the law is that the evidence of the claimant must be substantiated before the Court, which the instant claimant has failed to do so as there is nothing before the Court to show how the dismissal of the claimant was wrongful. Also referred to are Mba Ede v. Okufo [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 SC, which held that if the plaintiff cannot succeed on the strength of his claim he should fail, more so where the claimant seeks declarations from the Court; and Ibekwe v. Imo State Edu Mgt. Board [2011] 24 NLLR (Pt. 68) 159 at 175, which held that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course but on credible evidence led, even where the other party admits the claims or defaults in pleadings. That in the instant case the claimant seeks for declaration that her summary dismissal vide the letter of 6th December 2010 from the service of the 1st defendant was wrongful, illegal, null and void and of no effect. That it therefore behooves her to tender credible evidence in Court before such declaration can be made in her favour, citing David Fabunmi v. Agbe [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 299. That there is no shred of evidence before this Court showing how the terms of the claimant’s contract of employment was breached in dismissing her from the employment of the 1st defendant. Argument on issue 5 Whether the claimant with her knowledge of the working relationship between the 1st and 2nd defendants and their other subsidiaries and having benefitted from same is entitled to a declaration that her letter of dismissal from the services of the defendant dated December 6, 2010 is unlawful, invalid, null and void and incapable of having any legal consequence whatsoever, having been signed by the 3rd defendant. To the defendants, the claimant seeks a declaration that her letter of dismissal from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010 is unlawful, invalid, null and void and incapable of having any legal consequence whatsoever having been signed by the 3rd defendant who is not an employee or Director of the 1st defendant. That it is trite that the 1st defendant is endowed with the power to act through any of his member of staff, Directors, agent or any person delegated by it under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. That it is the evidence of DW as per paragraphs 35, 36, 37 and 38 of his statement on oath that the claimant had taken benefit of letters signed by person whose relationship with the 1st defendant is similar to that of the 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant. And that all the three officers including the 3rd defendant signed at those different times on the instructions of the 1st defendant as its agents for that purpose. It is also the evidence of DW that it is in the usual practice of the 1st defendant to authorise employees of subsidiaries to carry out one duty or the order including signing of documents. That these pieces of evidence were neither denied nor rebutted by the claimant. That DW was not cross-examined by the claimant’s counsel on these pieces of evidence. That it is trite that where evidence given by a party to any proceedings is not challenged or controverted in any way by the opposite party who had the opportunity to do so, the Court is obliged to accept such evidence as truth and to so act on it, citing Odjegba v. Odjegba [2004] 2 NWLR (Pt. 858) 566 at 583 and CBN v. Igwillo [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 393. Furthermore, that any evidence that is not challenged under cross-examination is deemed admitted, citing Provost LACOED v. Edun [2004] 6 NWLR (Pt. 870) 476. That in the claimant’s evidence before this Court she showed that she is well aware of the practice of the 1st and 2nd defendants as it relates to the engagements of their staff. That the claimant told this Court in her evidence in chief that she has obligation to report to the 3rd defendant at paragraph 18 when she said – As Human Resource Director of CPS, Pan African I reported directly on human resources issues to Melissa Heggie in Atlanta, the 2nd Defendant’s head office. I, however, had a general reporting obligation to the 3rd Defendant in his role as CPS Africa General Manager based in Cairo, Egypt. That the claimant also admitted under cross-examination that the 3rd defendant was her boss. That it is also the evidence of the claimant that at different times during her employment, she performed functions for the 2nd defendant and other subsidiaries of the Coca-Cola group. That in paragraph 31 of her evidence in chief the claimant revealed that she was also in her usual line of operation to submit her expenses to the 3rd defendant for approval. The defendants went on that the claimant cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time. She cannot rely on documents signed by these individuals on the one hand and then reject them when they do not suit her on another, referring to Mbanaso v. 0ttor & ors [2012] LPELR-19683(C.A). That the question of who signed the letter of the claimant’s summary dismissal dated 6th December 2010 is a pointless and unnecessary venture. That what the claimant may validly contest is the authority issuing her letter of dismissal as the 1st defendant reserves the right to delegate any person at all whether or not such person is in its employment to sign a letter on its behalf. That the claimant has not challenged the authority from which her dismissal emanated. She is at all times in agreement that it was the 1st defendant who ordered her dismissal through its Ethics and Compliance Committee. That there is no contesting the fact in this instant case, the claimant was dismissed by the appropriate authority and the claimant has not challenged this. That the only contention of the claimant is that her letter of dismissal was signed by the 3rd defendant who according to the claimant is not an employee of the 1st defendant. The claimant, however, has led evidence before this Court stating her working relationship with the 3rd defendant. She also told this Court in her evidence that it is the usual practice of the 1st and 2nd defendants and their other subsidiaries to delegate their staff to perform one way or the other task in one another. That the claimant specifically exhibited in this Court documents that were signed in her favour in the same circumstances as her letter of summary dismissal which was never contested by her. She cannot now be heard to complain. The claimant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time, citing Ejigini v. Ezenwa & ors [2003] LPELR-10329 (CA). It is the evidence of the claimant in this case that her salary was reviewed by the 1st defendant by a letter dated May 27, 2002 (Document 3) signed by one Nathan Kalumbu as Region Manager on behalf of the 1st defendant. Again by another letter dated May 21, 2003 signed by Nathan Kalumbu as Region Manager (Document 2) the 1st defendant reviewed the claimant’s salary and similarly, the 1st defendant reviewed the salary of the claimant by a letter dated 13th April 2006 (Exhibit D4) signed by Lawrence M. Drake II. Similarly, the claimant was promoted to the post of CPS Africa HR Director by a letter dated 23rd March 2007 (“Exhibit D27”) signed by Evan Taylor. She was given bonus by the defendants’ letter dated 17th March 2013 (“Exhibit D28”) signed by Rafik Cressaty. The claimant notwithstanding that all these letters were signed by employees in the co-subsidiaries and parent company of the 1st defendant under the instruction and delegation of the 1st defendant accepted the letters and appropriated the benefits. In the same fashion, that the 3rd defendant whom the claimant expressly agreed was her boss was instructed by the 1st defendant to sign the letter of her summary dismissal dated 6th December 2010 addressed to the claimant. That it is important to state that the claimant has not contested by any positive evidence the fact that the 3rd defendant was instructed to act by the 1st defendant. It is also not contested that the 3rd defendant had the express authority of the 1st defendant to sign the letter of summary dismissal dated 6th December 2010. The said letter of summary dismissal dated 61h December 2010, therefore, subsists. In any event, that the claimant is not in a position to state whether or not the 3rd defendant was authorized; it is only the company that can state whether it gave such authority which is what the 1st defendant has done. To that extent, that the dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the 1st defendant remains valid, urging the Court to so hold. Argument on issue 6 Whether the claimant is entitled to the relief« sought in paragraphs g) and h) of her Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February 2012 having failed to substantiate same. To the defendants, the reliefs sought by the claimant in paragraphs g) and h) of her current complaint dated 10th February 2012 are unknown to law. That assuming without conceding that the dismissal of the claimant was wrongful she is still not entitled to the reliefs sought in paragraphs g) and h) of her complaint. That the law is settled that the Court will not force a willing employee on an unwilling employer. That what the claimant is asking for by her reliefs g) and h) is to invalidate her dismissal and compel specific performance which is impossible for this Court to do. That the common law rule which is applicable in Nigeria is that the courts will not grant specific performance in respect of breach of contract of employment, citing Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1956] 1 All ER 1. That the principle is that where there has been a purported termination/dismissal of contract of employment a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsists will not be made except in an employment with statutory flavour. That this is what the claimant purports by her reliefs g) and h). That it is the law that her employment not being with statutory flavour once it is terminated stands effectively terminated, citing NEPA v. EI-Fandi (supra). That the court has no power to set aside such decision of an employer as doing so will amount to forcing a willing servant on an unwilling employee, citing UBN. Plc v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 at 578 and lyase v. UMTHMB [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 643) 47 at 59. To this end, that reliefs g) and h) of the claimant’s concurrent complaint asking for an order of Court setting aside the dismissal of the claimant by the 1st defendant and seeking to restrain the defendants from giving any effect whatsoever to letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated December 6, 2010 is tantamount to asking the Court to compel the 1st defendant to retain her in its employment. That this is impossible in law, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance the contention of the claimant in this regard. Argument on issue 7 Whether the claimant is entitled to any monetary claims as contained in her reliefs i) – k) of the Claimant Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February 2012 having failed to produce any evidence in this regard. The claimant by her reliefs i), j) and k) is asking the court for the unpaid balance of her terminal benefit from the employment and services of the 1st defendant as at December 6, 2010; the sum total of her unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December, 2010; and interest on these said sums at the rate of 21% per annum from December 6, 2010 till the date of judgment in this suit, and thereafter at 10% per annum till the final liquidation of the sum thereof. To the defendants, it is instructive to distinguish between termination of employment and a dismissal as these are two different things, referring to Union Batik of Nigeria v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 at 572, which held dismissal to be a disciplinary measure that carries no benefit. That the claimant’s relief i) is unfounded for having been dismissed from the employment of the 1st defendant she is not entitled to any terminal benefit. As for her claim for unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December 2010, this is a specific claim, which must be substantiated her claim, citing Zenith Bank Plc v. Ekereuwem [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 207 at 238. That it is common place that when a plaintiff seeks specific damages from the Court he must specifically show the Court the amount claimed and how the amount is arrived at. That the claimant here is sending the Court on an errand to fish for facts and evidence having placed nothing before the Court to justify her claim; not even the amount claim is before the Court, referring to OMT Co. Ltd v. Imafidon [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 332 at 346. Similarly, that the claimant having failed to substantiate the claims upon which she seeks interest, her relief k) will suffer the same fate as i) and j). That interest is a species of special damages that must be specifically pleaded and proved by concrete evidence, citing A. G. Ferrero & Co. Ltd v. H. C. (Nig.) Ltd [20011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1265) 592 at 608, which held that the relevant facts upon which a claim of for pre judgment interest is based must be pleaded, because facts not pleaded ground to no issue; the plaintiff must adduce evidence in trial in proof of the facts. That the claimant did not plead in her statement of facts any shred of evidence which could have necessitated the grant of pre=judgment interest. That she equally failed at the trial to adduce any evidence in this regard; as such the claim for interest must fail, referring to ACB v. Okorie [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 350) 1399 at 1406. Argument on issue 8 Whether the claimant is entitled to any monetary claim as contained in her reliefs l) and m) of the Claimant Concurrent Complaint dated 10th February 2012. The claimant’s relief l) is for exemplary damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only against the defendants jointly and severally for breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing. To the defendants, the claimant failed to establish the breach of her fundamental right before this Court hence all her reliefs must fail; as such she is not entitled to any exemplary damages. That exemplary damages, also known as punitive damages, are intended to punish and deter blameworthy conduct and thereby prevent the occurrence of the same act in future. It follows necessarily that before a litigant can be entitled to this type of damages he must have shown to the Court that a wrong has been committed against him for which the person liable must be punished, citing Zenith Bank Plc & anor. v. Ekereuwem & anor (supra) and University of Calabar v. Oji [2012] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 418 at 431 – 432. That no wrong has been established by the claimant against the defendants to merit any exemplary damages, citing Onagoruwa v. IGP [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 193) 593 at 647 – 648, Ezeani v. Ejidike [1964] 1 All NLR 402 and AREC v. Amaye [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 653. Similarly, that the claimant in relief m) claims for the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) only jointly and severally against the defendants in this suit. To the defendants, the claimant is not entitled to general damages. That general damages are not granted as a matter of course; it is not an omnibus claim. That general damages are those damages which the law implies in every breach and every violation of a legal right, referring to Olakunlade v. Ademilaya [2011] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 72 at 104. That it suffices, therefore, that to be entitled to general damages there must exist an established right upon which there is a breach. That the law is settled that where a claimant is unable to prove special damages his case crumbles, and he cannot be compensated in default by general damages, citing OMT Co. Ltd v. Imafidon [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 332 at 346. The defendants continued that the above is the lot of the claimant in this instant case; since she failed to substantiate her case for the various declaratory reliefs sought in her complaint, her case must fail and the Court is not permitted to compensate her by general damages, citing Gamba v. Ikechukwu (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 567 at 565. That the claimant having failed to establish any breach and more particularly having not pleaded or led evidence to substantiate her claim for exemplary or general damages her claim is baseless and cannot stand, urging the Court to so hold. In conclusion, the defendants urged the Court to dismiss the case of the claimant with substantial cost same being frivolous, gold-digging, vindictive and lacking in substance. CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSION The claimant commenced her submission by contending that the Court is to draw an adverse inference from the non-production of documents that the Court ordered to be produced. The claimant had presented a motion on notice dated March 12, 2013 but filed on March 14, 2013 requesting an order of this Court to compel the defendants to produce all the documents including emails listed in the schedule to the motion. These documents are: Report of the Audit Panel; All Expense Reports submitted by the claimant/applicant between 2009 and 2010; All E-mail Exchanges between Mrs. Akisanya and the Travel Agents of the defendants between 2009 and 2010; All E-mail Exchanges between Ms. Anna Geraci and Ms. Sefton between July 2010 and December 2010; and All E-mail Exchanges between Ms. Anna Geraci and Mr. Istavan between July 2010 and December 2010. On March 22, 2013, the defendants filed a 9-paragraphed counter-affidavit and written address dated March 22, 2013 challenging the claimant’s request for discovery on the basis that the documents are voluminous and contains the defendants’ confidential business information. On May 15, 2013, this Court granted the claimant’s request for discovery. By a letter dated September 13, 2013, the defendants’ counsel sent to the claimant’s counsel the Report of the Audit Panel dated November 29, 2010 and nothing more. Apparently, the defendants’ have refused to comply entirely with the order of May 15, 2013 compelling them to produce all the documents listed in the claimant’s application. To the claimant, the withholding of these outstanding documents by the defendants raises a legitimate and strong inference that the concealed documents are adverse to their interest, citing section 167(d) of Evidence Act 2011, which provides as follows – The court may presume the existence of any fact which it deems likely to have happened, regard shall be had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relationship to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The claimant accordingly requested the Court to infer that all the documents that were retained by the defendants and not produced are all adverse to their interests. The claimant then proceeded to frame three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, was there a reasonable ground to believe that the claimant was guilty of misconduct against the defendants? 2) Whether the facts and circumstance of this case evinces a reasonable investigation in the context of natural justice and fair hearing. 3) Whether the claimant is entitled to an award of damages. Regarding issue 1), the claimant made 4 submissions. a) There is no reasonable ground for the defendants to believe that the claimant breached the 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (COBC). That it is elementary law that, although an employer is not obliged to give any reason for dismissing his employee, nonetheless, where the employer has proffered any reason at all, he is obliged to satisfactorily prove the same as the onus is on him in that regard, otherwise the termination/dismissal may be wrongful without more, referring to IHABUHMB v. Anyip [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1260) 19 SC. Instructively, that the English case of British Home Stores v. Burchell [1980] ICR 303n; [1978] IRLR 379/EAT contains useful guidance on the test of fairness for a misconduct dismissal. In what has now evolved as the Burchell’s test, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (similar to the Court of Appeal in Nigeria), succinctly stated that an employer has to show that at the time of dismissal: (a) it believed the employee to be guilty of misconduct; and (b) that it had reasonable grounds for believing this; and (c) that the grounds for holding that belief were established after an investigation that was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. Typically, that the purport of the Burchell’s test is that the employer must genuinely believe in guilt of the employee and such guilt must be based on reasonable grounds. In addition, it also connotes that the belief should be supported by objective evidence. Without question, this test constitutes the foundation of any disciplinary procedure to be conducted by an employer. Where an employer, as in the instant case, failed to satisfy the fundamental test of “reasonable belief in employee’s guilt”, any disciplinary procedure and outcome on the basis of such unreasonable belief will be a nullity. That the entire facts and circumstances of this action clearly demonstrate this assertion. There is absolutely no reasonable ground for the defendants to believe that the claimant submitted non-business related expenses for reimbursement from the 1st defendant and indeed disclosed confidential company information to a third party. b) Defendants’ unfounded allegation of the claimant’s reimbursement for travel ticket issued in her husband’s name. That in paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath dated September 24, 2013, the defendants claimed that the claimant submitted an expense report to the management of the 1st defendant seeking reimbursement for airline charges related to Human Resources meetings which she claimed to have attended in Atlanta. Continuing, in paragraph 22 of DW’s statement on oath, the defendants claimed that upon review of this expense report, it was discovered that the ticket which the claimant sought a reimbursement from the 1st defendant was not issued in her name, but in the name of a member of her family. That during cross-examination, however, DW was shown Document 14 (the claimant’s Expense Report with Trip No. 165013618 and Airline E-Tickets regarding her trip to Atlanta). That contrary to the defendants’ unsupported claim that the travel ticket which the claimant sought a reimbursement from the 1st defendant was in the name of a member of her family, Document 14 clearly shows “Evacuation of Mr. & Mrs. Akisanya” as reason for Trip No. 165013618 to Atlanta. Even DW testified under cross-examination that it is not stated anywhere in Document 14 that the ticket was for a meeting in Atlanta. Exhibit D14 states the reason to be for evacuation. Clearly, that the defendants failed to furnish this Court with any modicum of evidence to substantiate their allegation of the claimant’s reimbursement for travel ticket issued in her husband’s name. That the defendants have, therefore, failed to discharge the evidentiary burden placed on them by law. That it is the law that averments in pleadings are not evidence and, therefore, a party who wishes to place reliance on facts pleaded must produce evidence in support of the pleaded facts, citing Ogoja Local Government Area v. Offobochie [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 458) 48 at 264 – 265. c) Defendants’ unfounded allegation of claimant’s travel to attend a pre-scheduled shopping session with her daughter. That the defendants alleged that the claimant avoided a direct flight to Madrid for an official event scheduled for 21st – 24th June 2010, but routed her trip through London remaining abroad till the June 27, 2010 for the purpose of attending a pre-scheduled wedding fixed for the June 26th in London. According to the defendants, the direct flight was fixed for N387,500.00 “whilst the latter option opted for by the claimant was N839,616.00” and the claimant carved no part of the airfare as personal in her expense report, referring to paragraph 30(b)(i) of DW’s witness statement dated September 24, 2013. Interestingly, that without travelling with the claimant, the defendants alleged that the claimant arrived in Madrid 2 days prior to the event to attend a pre-scheduled personal shopping session with her daughter and charged both nights to the 1st defendant, referring to paragraph 30(b)(ii) of DW’s witness statement dated September 24, 2013. That during cross-examination, DW was confronted with page 1 of Document 19 (email from Akisanya Omotoye to Titilayo Akisanya, the claimant, dated April 28, 2010) where Akisanya Omotoye (the claimant’s daughter) unequivocally indicated her unavailability to travel with the claimant the weekend of June 18 and 19, 2010. When quizzed further, DW testified that he did not know if the weekend referred to in the mail at page 1 of Document 19 is the weekend of June 18 and 19, 2010 when the claimant was to arrive in Madrid. Again, that the defendants have failed to furnish any evidence to substantiate their unfounded allegation that the claimant travelled to attend a pre-scheduled shopping session with her daughter. The claimant then urged the Court to dismiss the defendants’ allegation as being unfounded. d) Defendants’ unreasonable allegation of the claimant’s extension of business meeting in London to attend her daughter’s photography session. That the defendants again claimed that the claimant extended a business meeting in London from 26th July 2010 – 3rd August 2010 without any justifiable reason and for the purpose of attending with her daughter a pre-scheduled appointment with a photographer in London, referring to paragraph 30(b)(ix) of DW’s witness statement. That during cross-examination, DW testified that aside from Document 15 he cannot find any other proof of the assertion that the claimant extended a business meeting in London to attend her daughter’s photography session. On the contrary, that Document 24 (email exchanges dated July 28 and 29, 2010 between Jide Alakija, the photographer, and Omotoye Akisanya copied to the claimant) evidently shows that the photographer’s pre-wedding photograph session referred to by the defendants (which constitutes one of the defendant’s basis for imputation of guilt on the claimant), was held only with the claimant’s daughter (Omotoye Akisanya) and her fiancé. That even DW corroborated the content of Document 24 when he testified under cross-examination that whether the claimant overstayed cannot be deduced from Document 24. Interestingly, that DW again testified that he did not know whether the statement that the claimant extended her stay in London in order to hold a photograph session is true or false. That the reasonable conclusion from the defendants’ statement of defence dated 27th July 2012, the cross-examination of DW and analysis of Documents 14, 19 and 24 is that there is absolutely no reasonable ground for the defendants to believe that the claimant contravened the COBC to justify investigation and her subsequent summary dismissal from the 1st defendant’s employment. In sum, the claimant invited the Court to hold that the imputation of misconduct on her by the defendants is specious, unsupported and meritless and a premeditated attempt to eliminate the claimant from the company. On issue 2) i.e. whether the facts and circumstance of this case evinces a reasonable investigation in the context of natural justice and fair hearing, the claimant made 9 submissions. a) The defendants are bound to observe the principles of fair hearing and natural justice. That it is the law that in all situations where the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations is in question, such person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its fairness, independence and impartiality, referring to section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended). That whilst interpreting section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court in Judicial Service Commission of Cross River State & anor v. Dr. (Mrs.) Asari Young [2013] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 1 held as follows that in a judicial or quasi-judicial body, a hearing in order to be fair must include the right of the person to be affected: a) to be present all through the proceedings and hear all the evidence against him; b) to cross-examine or otherwise contradict all the witnesses that testify against him; c) to have read before him all the documents tendered in evidence at the hearing; d) to have disclosed to him the nature of all relevant material evidence including documentary and real evidence; e) to know the case he has to meet at the hearing and have adequate opportunity to prepare for his defence; and f) to give evidence by himself, call witnesses if he likes and make oral submissions either personally or through counsel of his own choice. Also referred are Baba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 and PRMB v. Edosa [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 612. That compliance with fair hearing and natural justice rules is not a technical point but one deeply rooted in every employment contract, citing Haruna Gyang & anor v. Commissioner of Police, Lagos State & ors [2013] LPELR-¬21893(SC), Mr. Isa A. Saibu v. Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin [2008] LPELR-4524, Sakare v. Lagos State Civil Service Commission [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 262) 641, Saba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 and Yusuf v. UBN Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632 SC. The claimant continued that the defendants appear to ineffectively argue that they (the defendants) do not owe the claimant any obligation to avail her fair hearing prior to her wrongful dismissal by the defendants. That the defendants’ argument on this point is misconceived and represents a clear but unhelpful attempt to approbate and reprobate. The reasons are simple. First, Documents 22 and 23 which contain the guidelines for administration of the 2nd defendant’s Code articulates the disciplinary/administrative procedures to be systematically followed in dealing with violation of the company’s Code by its employees. Having not complied with Documents 22 and 23, it will amount to a situation of ‘medicine after death’ for the defendants to turn around and then argue that the claimant shouldn’t have been afforded hearing in the first place. Secondly, Exhibit D23 which contains the procedural guidelines applied by the E & C Committee contains no requirement for summarily dismissing an employee of the company, referring to page 43 of Document 23. That by summarily dismissing the claimant without any such punishment prescribed in its Rules, the defendants are in fundamental breach their Code, citing Samuel Isheno v. Julius Berger Nig. Plc [2008] LPELR-1544(SC), which held that firing of an employee must be within the four walls of the contract between the parties. That having failed to comply with its own Rules by summarily dismissing the claimant, the defendants are estopped from claiming or deriving any justification or benefit under the same Rules. That it is a rule of equity that “he who comes to equity must come with clean hands”. The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance the defendants’ argument that the claimant is not entitled to fair hearing. The defendant had relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Uzondu v. UBA Plc [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 63) 392. To the claimant, this is flawed as the facts and circumstances in that case are completely different from this case. That contrary to the defendants’ assertion, the Supreme Court clearly pointed out in Yusuf v. UBN Ltd (supra) at pages 644 and 646 before an employer can dispense with the services of his employee under the common law, all he needs to do is to afford the employee full opportunity of being heard before exercising his power of summary dismissal, even where the allegation for which the employee is being dismissed involves accusation of crime. In sum, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the defendants’ submission denying the claimant’s entitlement to fair hearing prior to her summary dismissal. b) The claimant had no knowledge of the specific allegations against her prior to her summary dismissal. To the claimant, one underlining principle of fair hearing is that a subject of investigation must be notified of the specific allegations against him/her to enable him/her present his defence appropriately. That failure of an employer to notify his employee of the specific allegation against him/her prior to dismissal is a breach of the fair hearing principle, citing Federal University of Technology, Yola v. Maiwuya & ors [2010] LPELR-9001, which held that an employee’s wrongdoing must be specific and he is entitled to a formal notice of such wrongdoing and a hearing on that specific act. Also referred to is Baba v. Civil Aviation [1991] 2 NSCC Vol. 22 (Pt. 11) 158 (which held that the points made out by a panel of inquiry must be given to the employee to enable him/her refute, explain or contradict them or otherwise exculpate him/herself by making any representations or defence thereto, before the employer can lawfully use those points as basis for dispensing with his services) and Eigbe v. NUT [2011] 22 NLLR (Pt. 62) 258. The claimant went on that a critical evaluation of the facts of this case undeniably demonstrates the defendants’ failure to comply with this fundamental requirement of the law. That the defendants’ default in this regard is in two (2) prongs. First, there is uncontroverted evidence before this Court that throughout the period of investigation by the audit panel and subsequently by the E & C Committee, the claimant had no knowledge of any specific allegations made against her until she received Exhibit C14. That Document 21 from Anna Geraci inviting the claimant for a meeting to discuss audit clearly states as follows – Titilayo, Hello. As you know, we are conducting a review/audit of your expense reports. I am aware you will be in Atlanta this week for HR meetings and would like the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the audit. I would like to meet tomorrow at 8:30 in the USA Building 2025. I have informed Melissa of this meeting and she has approved your absence from your currently scheduled meetings. To the claimant, the Document 21 which the defendants have rigorously highlighted as constituting notice to the claimant falls short of the basic requirement of fair hearing. Specifically, that Document 21 did not disclose any specific allegation to justify the initiation of a disciplinary action against the claimant. The claimant had no knowledge of what expenses in her expense report constitute non¬-business related expenses neither was she aware of the official communication alleged disclosed to a third party. That the failure of the defendants to notify the claimant of allegations against her prior to the investigative process in Atlanta is a fundamental breach of the fair hearing rule. Further, that the investigative proceedings held in Atlanta in October 2010 revealed that the claimant was asked general questions regarding her travels and expenses and nothing more. That the claimant could not immediately respond to these general questions considering the fact that she was not informed before leaving for Atlanta that she would be required to appear before the Audit panel. Even her subsequent explanation to the Audit panel in Document 9 clearly shows the generic posture of her response which was based on conjectures and inferences deduced from the areas that were subject of the interview in Atlanta. That throughout this period, the claimant still was not aware of the non-business related expenses alleged to have been submitted for reimbursement from the 1st defendant as well as the official communication divulged to a third party. Secondly, that the claimant was also denied the opportunity of knowing that an investigative procedure had been commenced against her by the defendants in Atlanta. The claimant gave uncontroverted evidence that she travelled to Atlanta sometime in October 2010 for a Human Resources Directors’ meeting called by Melissa Heggie and not an audit meeting, referring to paragraph 39 of CW’s statement on oath dated December 17, 2012. She arrived in Atlanta for the H/R Directors’ meeting on Sunday, October 24, 2010 only to receive an email from Anna Geraci (Document 21) inviting her (the claimant) for an audit meeting with her (Anna Geraci). That the purported audit meeting stated in Document 21 turned out to be investigative proceedings which interviewed and recommended the claimant’s dismissal. This is a clear case of ambush against the claimant. Surprisingly, that the 2nd defendant’s policy supports this illegality. That a closer examination of Document 22 demonstrates that it is the internal policy of the 2nd defendant not to notify the subject of an investigation that a review is ongoing unless and until preliminary investigative steps indicate that the employee is likely to have violated the COBC. Document 22 also reveals that it is the policy of the 2nd defendant not to notify the subject of an investigation until the time of his/her review in order to avoid anxiety and minimize the opportunity for fabrication, potential destruction of evidence or retaliation, referring to paragraph III(B) (l and 2), page 17. Without question, that Document 22 demonstrates a surreptitious attempt by the defendants to circumscribe the fair hearing right guaranteed by section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). On the analysis Documents 9, 21 and 22 as well as the facts of this case, the claimant urged the Court to hold that the defendants are in contravention of the fair hearing rule guaranteed by section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). c) The claimant was denied reasonable time and resources to prepare and present her defence. To the claimant, another fundamental requirement of the fair hearing principle is that an accused person must be afforded reasonable time and opportunity to present her case without any form of interference. Specifically, section 36(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) expressly requires that an accused person be given adequate time and facility for the preparation of his defence, citing Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 SC, which held that in every case of dismissal or termination of appointment which may vitally affect a man’s career or his pension, it is important that the employee is given ample opportunity to defend his conduct, Akumechiel v. Benue Cement Co. Ltd [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt. 454) 695 at 703, Yusuf v. UBN Ltd (supra) and British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 287, which held that it is not within the competence of the parties to outlaw the rules of natural justice in a contract of service. That a close analysis of paragraph III(B) (l & 2), page 17 of Document 22 demonstrates that the 2nd defendant’s policy is designed to ambush any potential defaulter of the defendants’ Code of Business Conduct. That an evaluation of the entire facts reveals that the claimant was never notified of or invited for any investigative process prior to her departure to Atlanta on Monday, October 25, 2010 for an audit meeting. Document 21 dated October 25, 2010 from Anna Geraci merely requested the claimant to meet with her (Anna Geraci) on Tuesday, October 26, 2010 at 8:30 (less than 24hours) to discuss the audit and nothing more. That the purported audit meeting, however, turned out to be an investigative procedure which recommended the dismissal of the claimant. Under cross-examination, that DW admitted that the claimant was indeed given less than 24 hours notice to meet with Anna Geraci to discuss the audit. What is more, that there is absolutely nothing reasonable about a less than 24 hours notice afforded to an employee such as the claimant to defend herself against allegations which were absolutely unknown to the claimant at the point of travelling to Atlanta for a different official engagement. To the claimant, the ability of an accused person to sufficiently prepare and present his/her defence will depend on his/her understanding of the specific allegations against him/her. Where, as in the instant case, an accused person has no knowledge of the specific allegations against him/her, it is practically impossible to sufficiently and effectively present his/her case to establish his/her innocence. Section 36(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) clearly recognises this principle when it expressly requires that an accused person be given adequate time and facility for the preparation of his defence. That the defendants have strenuously argued that the claimant was offered the opportunity to present written explanation (Document 9) which was considered by the E & C Committee. The question now is: can the claimant be deemed to have been given opportunity to defend herself when apparently she was unaware of the specific allegations against her? Certainly No. CW gave uncontroverted evidence that she has no knowledge of the specific allegation against her throughout the period of her investigation by the Audit Panel and subsequently by the E & C Committee until she received her dismissal letter, referring to paragraph 49 (a) and (c) of CW’s statement on oath dated December 7, 2012. That the defendants’ argument in this regard is flawed, meritless and must be disregarded by this Court. d) The claimant was denied the opportunity to test the veracity of the witness against her. That in the determination of an employee’s civil right and obligation, the fair hearing rule forbids an employer from obtaining evidence in the absence of the employee. Even where this is done, the law requires that such employee must be afforded the opportunity to confirm or controvert such evidence including testimony of witnesses, citing Judicial Service Commission of Cross River State & anor v. Dr. (Mrs.) Asari Young [2013], Federal University of Technology, Yola v. Maiwuya & ors (supra), Afribank Nigeria Plc v. Osisanya [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 599 at 613 – ¬614, Nze v. NPA [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt. 528) 210, NEPA v. Ango [2001] 17 WRN 142; [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 627, which held that it is not only in law, but also morally wrong to shut out the person accused from the room of trial and later use the material obtained behind his back to find him liable. Fair hearing even before an administrative or domestic tribunal, implies the right of the accused to know what and what are being urged against him, what evidence or statements had been made concerning him and is entitled to the opportunity to correct or challenge them. This means that the tribunal must not receive evidence behind his back. That a critical evaluation of the entire facts of this case, the testimony of DW under cross-examination as well as analysis of Document 15 undeniably demonstrate the shambolic nature of the investigative process purportedly conducted by audit panel. That Document 15 shows that the audit panel retrieve and relied on documentary and oral testimony of third parties in the absence of the claimant and more importantly denying the claimant the opportunity to know the testifiers and test the veracity or otherwise of the testimony obtained during the investigation. Regarding the claimant’s Madrid trip from June 21 – 24, 2010, that the defendants erroneously alleged that the claimant routed her flight through London for personal engagement at the expense of the 1st defendant. At page 2 of Document 15, the author stated that: “With regards to the lowest cost fare, TA claimed that Iberia was not a preferred choice in airlines for employees because they are “not reliable”. In follow-up inquires with the local travel agent I learned that Iberia is recommended for flights to Madrid out of Nigeria” (lines 15 – 18 of Document 15). Fatally, that the author of Document 15 failed or refused to inform the claimant that this enquiry was made from the travel agent. DW testified under cross-examination that he does not know if the claimant was informed or confronted with the follow-up inquiries from the travel agent. That even after the receipt of the travel agent’s response, the author of Document 15 and/or the audit panel failed to provide any evidence (oral or documentary) to show that the claimant was indeed confronted with the purported response of the travel agent. In respect of the claimant’s CBS Training meeting in Brussels from July 10 – 16, 2010, the defendants alleged that the claimant’s itinerary showed that she (the claimant) flew to London after the Brussels meeting where she stayed until August 3, 2010 for no business reason. Again, that the author of Document 15 stated at pages 3 and 4 that: “During discussions with management regarding TA’s time in London from July 18 – August 3, I was informed by Mr. Stuart Martin and Ms. Denise Sefton, CBS HR Operations Manager, that TA was assisting with HR Transformation support from London during the week of July 19 – 23. When I specifically asked Mr. Martin about the week of July 26 – August 3, Mr. Martin stated that TA would have been supporting the “go live” from Nigeria. I followed up with TA’s direct manager, Mr. Sherif Tobala, General Manager CPS Africa, who provided me with an email from TA stating she would be working with Denise Sefton on the “go live” from London...Ms. Seton stated she did not request or require TA to be in London and seemed surmised to hear TA was working from London that week” (page 3, line 39 of Exhibit D15). That in utter disregard of the fair hearing rule, the author of Document 15 never informed the claimant that he/she made enquiries from Mr. Stuart Martin, Ms. Denise Sefton and Mr. Sherif Tobala. Even more ludicrous is the fact that the claimant was never confronted with the indicting statements of Mr. Stuart Martin, Ms. Denise Sefton and Mr. Sherif Tobala to enable her verify the accuracy or otherwise of the statements. Again, that during the purported investigation, the author of Document 15 claimed to have received an email from Mr. Sherif Tobala wherein the claimant stated she would be working with Denise Sefton on the “go live” from London. The claimant was never confronted with the email to enable her verify the existence or otherwise of the email and/or the authenticity or otherwise of its content. More so, that CW gave uncontroverted evidence that she was never given the opportunity to know what anyone said about her neither was she informed of the specific allegations against her during investigation by the 1st and 2nd defendants’ agents. CW further testified as follows that: “In fact, I am unaware that anyone testified, including the purported denial from any travel agent or testimony of Ms. Sefton” (page 20 of CW’s additional witness statement on oath dated September 16, 2013). That during CW’s cross-examination, she denied Stuart Martin’s statement in Exhibit D12 where he stated that the claimant was not on official business in London on April 6, 7 and 8, 2010. Unfortunately, that the audit panel never confronted the claimant with Document 12 (Stuart Martin’s email to Anna Geraci) to enable her controvert the Stuart Martin’s adverse statement. DW under cross-examination merely testified nothing more. Interestingly, that the audit panel relied on these same statements and document in recommending the summary dismissal of the claimant. Furthermore, the audit panel failed and or refused to provide the claimant with a copy of its report to enable her know the specific allegations against her as well as the adverse statements/document procured from third parties, citing Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 and NEPA v. Ango (supra). That the claimant had to present a formal application dated March 12, 2013 to this Court therein requesting the defendants to produce the audit report amongst other documents. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the defendants’ conduct amounts to denial of the claimant’s right to fair hearing and, therefore, unconstitutional and void. e) The audit panel was not constituted to achieve independence and impartiality. To the claimant, the concept of fair hearing in section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) also captures the essence of the two (2) fundamental principles of natural justice i.e. (a) that no person should be a judge in his own case (nemo judex in causa sua) and (b) that the parties to a case should be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard (audi alterem partem), citing The Attorney¬-General of Kwara State & ors v. Alhaja Kike Ojulari [2006] LPELR-6151(CA), Dr. Tunde Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290; [1999] 6 SCNJ 295 and NEPA v. Ango (supra). That a factual analysis of the entire investigative process clearly demonstrates the defendants’ deliberate ploy to get rid of the claimant from the company by all possible means. That prior to the investigation, CW testified that she experienced veiled threats from Melissa Heggie calculated to harass and cause an apprehension in her and to threaten her sense of security at work. CW further testified that Melissa Heggie would call her to ask questions relating to “rest and relaxation” claims in her expense report and at the end of the call, Melissa would say “I’ll get off your back now”. CW also testified that during this period Melissa Heggie would make several calls to her and utter very intimidating statements such as “you should take this investigation very seriously” and “someone who was investigated just as you was dismissed from employment only recently” (paragraphs 36 and 37 of CW’s witness statement dated December 7, 2012). The claimant continued that a cursory examination of Document 15 will reveal that Melissa Heggie, whom the claimant reported directly to, was part of the investigation panel. In fact, Melissa Heggie was specifically mentioned in Document 15 as one the persons that furnished the recommendation upon which the E & C Committee summarily dismissed the claimant (page 5, line 18 of Document 15). That as an interested party, Melissa Heggie should not have participated in the investigative panel let alone recommend the claimant’s dismissal. That the audit panel, therefore, cannot be said to have been constituted in a manner that will secure its independence and impartiality, referring to SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 SC. The claimant then urged the Court to nullify the composition of the audit panel as well as its outcome (i.e. Document 15) on the basis that it offends the natural justice rule that “a man shall not be a judge in a matter in which he is an interested party” (nemo judex in causa sua), referring to Eigbe v. NUT (supra). f) The claimant was denied hearing opportunity by the E & C Committee before its final decision. To the claimant, it is the law that an employee must be afforded opportunity to defend himself/herself prior to any final decision being taken by the employer, citing Mshelia v. Nigerian Air Force & anor [2014] LPELR-23732 and Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 545. That DW testified under cross-examination that there are at least two (2) stages in the 2nd defendant’s disciplinary process namely: (1) the investigative stage which is composed of the audit report with its conclusion and recommendation; and (2) the final stage which is composed of the final determination by the E & C Committee. That on November 29, 2010, the audit panel forwarded its report including its recommendation to the E & C Committee for final decision. Exhibit C12/Document 23 provides that – Employees who are being investigated for potential Code violation will have an opportunity to be heard prior to any final determination (page 42, lines 16 and 17 of Exhibit C12/Document 23). That going by this requirement of Exhibit C12/Document 23, the E & C Committee is required to set down the report of the audit panel (Document 15) for hearing before any final decision. That the claimant was indeed informed that the E & C Committee will meet on December 13, 2010 to consider the report of the audit panel. In Exhibit C15 (Memorandum of Appeal dated December 31, 2010), the claimant specifically stated as follows that – Furthermore, to date, I have not been advised of, or presented with, a formal indictment concerning any purported Code violations, beyond the allusions made in the course of my interrogations in connection with the investigations and audit. I was neither advised of the conclusions reached at the end of the investigations and audit nor was I afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity formally to respond thereto. Indeed, I was advised that there would be a meeting of the Committee on the 13th of December, only to then receive a letter purportedly dismissing me from the Company on the 6th of December (pages 3 and 4, paragraph V of Exhibit C15). The claimant went on that whilst he was awaiting the December 13, 2010 meeting of the Committee, she (the claimant) was summarily dismissed on December 6, 2010 by the 1st defendant (Exhibit C14/D8). Apparently, that the December 13 meeting was never convened by the E & C Committee. Under cross-examination, DW could not confirm whether or not the E & C Committee met to discuss Document 15. On the basis of the several unfounded allegations of theft and disclosure of official information to a third party against the claimant as well as procurement of adverse statements from third parties during the investigation, the claimant argued that she ought to have been afforded opportunity to respond to all the unfounded allegations and also controvert adverse evidence. That failure to do this is a gross violation of the 2nd defendant’s COBC (Document 23) and ultimately a denial of the claimant’s right to fair hearing. The claimant then urged the Court to so hold. g) The defendants did not comply with the disciplinary procedure for dealing with centrally managed matters as contained in the COBC Guidelines. To the claimant, it is the law that an employer in terminating or dismissing its employee for misconduct, the employer must follow the prescribed disciplinary guideline for dealing with such misconduct, citing Calabar v. Essien [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 447) 225 at 262, NlMASA v. Odey [2013] LPELR-21402(CA), Federal University of Technology, Yola v. Maiwuya & ors (supra), Eze v. Spring Bank Plc [2011] LPELR-2892(SC), Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Adedeji v. Police Service Commission [1968] NMLR 102, Nwobosi v. ACB Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 104) 677 and Ekunolav v. CBN & anor [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224. The claimant continued that Appendix B of the 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters provides an eight-step disciplinary procedure for dealing with centrally managed matters (pages 14 – 19 of Exhibit C18 or Document 22). These procedures are: (I) Receipt of Allegations; (II) Review of Matters and Development of Investigative Plan; (III) Notifications; (IV) Document Review; (V) Interviews; (VI) Course of Investigation; (VII) Investigation Close Out; and (VIII) Decision of E & C Committee. That a critical analysis of these disciplinary procedures clearly demonstrates the defendants’ non-compliance with the COBC. That the following points highlight some of the defendants’ violations of the 2nd defendant’s Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters (Exhibit C18/D22) and the 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (Exhibit C12/Document 23). h) The claimant was denied opportunity to controvert adverse evidence. To the claimant, the 2nd defendant’s Investigative Guidelines for Centrally Managed COBC Matters (Exhibit C18/Document 22) mandates the investigator to interview the subject of investigation so that the employee will have an opportunity to respond to all the evidence (page 18, paragraph V(B)(I) of Exhibit C18/Document 22). Additionally, that paragraph V(G)(1 and 2) of Exhibit C18/Document 22 provides that investigator should determine what evidence to present to the interviewer, ask questions prior to presenting documentary evidence to the interviewee, and documents should be used to verify the truth or question the veracity of information provided verbally. That there may be a point where it will be necessary to confront the subject of the investigation with documentation/evidence of potential misconduct and avoid being intimidating, either physically or verbally (page 19, paragraph V(G)(1 and 2) of Exhibit C18/Document 22). The claimant went on that a cursory analysis of the facts and Document 15 clearly reveal that the audit report was not forwarded by the Corporate Audit Department (CAD) Manager to the E & C Committee contrary to the specific requirement of paragraph 4.4 of the COBC. That the result of the investigation was forwarded by Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal whose designations were described as COBC Supervisor and Director respectively. That at no point in the defendant’s pleadings or during cross-examination of DW was any CAD Manager acknowledged or referred to. In fact, that during cross-examination DW gave evidence to the effect that he does not know whether or not it was the CAD Manager who forwarded Document 15 to the E & C Committee. Fatally, that the defendants in their final address surreptitiously avoided the critical and compulsory requirement that only the CAD Manager is mandated to submit the outcome of an investigation to the E & C Committee. That the claimant’s objection on this point is not technical but one which goes to the root of the claimant’s wrongful dismissal. It will, therefore, be untenable and meritless for the defendants to argue that the decision of the E & C Committee would have remained the same even if Document 15 was forwarded by the CAD Manager as required by Document 22, citing Adigun v. A.G of Oyo State [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 SC, where it was held that if the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is, indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice; the discretion must be declared to be no decision. On the basis of the above submission, the claimant urged the Court to hold the defendants liable for breach of the 2nd defendant’s COBC. i) The 2nd defendant’s COBC does not provide for summary dismissal. To the claimant, the 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (Exhibit C12/Document 23) provides that – The Company strives to impose discipline that fits the nature and circumstances of each Code violation. The Company uses a system of progressive discipline, issuing letters of reprimand for less significant, first-time offenses. Violations of a more serious nature may result in suspension without pay; loss or reduction of merit increase, bonus or stock option award; or termination of employment (page 43, line 6 of Exhibit C12/Document 23). That it is the law that any disciplinary measure adopted by an employer upon an allegation of misconduct, such as termination or dismissal must be in accordance with the laid down procedure as provided in the condition of service. Undoubtedly, that the claimant argues that her summary dismissal by the E & C Committee is not specifically prescribed by the claimant’s terms of employment as contained in Exhibit C18/Document 23, citing Dornier Aviation Nig. AIEP Ltd v. Oluwadare [2011] 23 NLLR (Pt. 66) 403, which held that any disciplinary measures taken by an employer against his employee upon an allegation of a misconduct, such as termination of employment or dismissal, must be in accordance with the laid down procedure as provided in the condition of service. The claimant went on that Exhibit C12/Document 23 contains no provision for summarily dismissing an employee. Rather, Exhibit C12/Document 23 prescribes a system of progressive discipline to an employee who has violated the Code of Business Conduct. For more serious offences, the Code simply provides for termination of employment and not summary dismissal. That the wordings at page 43 line 6 of Exhibit Cl2/D23 are clear and unambiguous and, therefore, must be given their ordinary meaning, citing Wilson v. AG Bendel State and ors [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572; [1985] NSCC (Vol. 16) 191. Indeed, that if summary dismissal was contemplated as additional punishment, the 2nd defendant would have expressly stated it in the Code. Undeniably, that termination and summary dismissal are two distinct modes of dispensing with the services of an employee. The defendants had argued that this Court must constrain itself to the terms of employment between the parties and nothing more, relying on Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 504 at 521 – 522 to further reinforce their argument that a Court does not have the power to look elsewhere for the terms of contract regarding the termination of a contract other than the written contract between the employer and employee. Surprisingly, that the defendants shifted position by subsequently but unconvincingly arguing that a contract of employment need not expressly provide for a dismissal right. That the defendants argued that it is an implied term of any employment contract and, therefore, the Court may look elsewhere in conferring a dismissal right on an employer. Clearly, that this is a case of approbation and reprobation by the defendants which the Courts forbid. The defendants also relied on Layade v. Panalpina World Trans. (Nig.) Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544 and Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd v. Mr. G. O. Dudusola [2005] 18 NLWR (Pt. 957) 292, which to the claimant is misplaced and clearly irrelevant to the postulation the defendants attempt to foist on this Court. That aside from the fact that both cases bear no factual semblance with the instant case, the question of summary dismissal was never raised or canvassed by parties or considered by the Court in both cases. If anything, that both cases support the claimant’s position as Layade v.Panalpina World Trans. (Nig.) (supra) held that where parties have embodied the terms of their agreement or contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. From the foregoing, it is the argument of the claimant that the defendants’ contention that this Court reserves the right to imply a non-existent term into Exhibit C12/Document 23 is misconceived, flawed and meritless and must be discountenanced by this Court. In sum, the claimant submitted that the defendants’ allegation of theft and disclosure of confidential information to a third party is baseless and unmeritorious. Also, that the defendants’ investigative process and subsequent processes that led to the summary dismissal is contrived, unconstitutional, unreliable and a nullity, urging the Court to so hold. Regarding issue 3) i.e. whether the claimant is entitled to an award of damages, the claimant submitted that she is entitled to the reliefs she seeks in her statement of facts. That damages are the normal remedy for breach of contract, and the usual contractual measure is the wages and benefits that the employee would have earned if due notice had indeed been given. That the general principle underlying the assessment of damages in contract is that of restitutio in integrum but this principle is restrictively applied to cases of wrongful dismissal. That the measure of loss for an employer’s breach of contract in dismissing an employee without following a contractual disciplinary procedure is based on an assessment on the time for which, had the procedure been followed, the employee’s employment would have continued, citing Janciuk v. Winerite [1998] IRLR 63. The claimant continued that the applicable principle for assessment and award of damages in an action for wrongful dismissal was stated in Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565 SC where it was held that in a claim for wrongful dismissal, the measure of damages is prima facie the amount that the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to contract. Also that Imoloame v. WAEC [1993] LPELR-1500(SC) held that in cases of wrongful dismissal the measure of damages is prima facie the amount the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to contract subject to a deduction in respect of any amount accruing from any other employment which the plaintiff, in minimizing damages, either had obtained or should reasonably have obtained. To the claimant, in the instant case, her claims are for specific damages against the defendants. That in establishing her entitlement to damages, she relied on Exhibit C6 (Salary Review Letter dated April 18, 2008) which undeniably shows her annual wages prior to her dismissal on December 6, 2010, which is N17,368,486.00 as at April 1, 2008. That as a matter of law, a document tendered in Court is the best proof of the contents of such document and no oral evidence will be allowed to discredit it or contradict the contents thereof except in cases where fraud is pleaded, citing MTN Nig. Communications Ltd v. Sadiku [2013] LPELR-21105. On the strength of this case law, the claimant then urged the Court to award her damages on the basis of the N17,368,486.00 per annum between December 6, 2010, when she was wrongfully dismissed till the date of delivery of judgment in this action. Additionally, the claimant requested for exemplary damages and general damages. To her, exemplary damages are in nature awards made with a possible secondary object of punishing the defendant for his misconduct. That they are made in addition to the normal compensatory damages. In order to justify an award of exemplary damage, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has not only committed the wrongful act complained of but that the defendant’s conduct is high-handed, outrageous, insolent, oppressive, malicious and showing contempt of the plaintiff’s rights, or disregarding every principle, which actuates the conduct of civilized men, citing Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd v. Mbadiwe [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47, Odiba v. Azege [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 370 at 386 and Odogwu v. A.G of the Federation [1996] LPELR-2228(SC). In essence, that this Court is entitled to grant exemplary damages in a case such as this where the claimant has sufficiently established that the defendants’ allegations of theft and disclosure of official information to a third party is unfounded, malicious, unconstitutional and meritless. That the claimant has demonstrated that the defendants’ entire disciplinary procedure was contrived to impeach and dismiss the claimant. That this is a case where the award of exemplary damages is justified. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that she has proved her case on the preponderance of evidence, praying the Court to grant her reliefs as presented in the originating processes. DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW In their reply on points of law, the defendants first submitted that the claimant persistently misstated the position of the law on a succession of issues raised in her final address; and she also misstated the facts and misrepresented the records by ascribing admissions to the defendants and their witness, Orok Efiom (DW) which they have not made. The claimant has made two preliminary submissions i.e. that the Court should draw adverse inference from the documents which the defendants did not produce as requested by the claimant in her motion on notice dated 12th March 2013; and the claimant’s objection as to the admissibility and relevance of the Audit Report (Exhibit D15) and/or the probative value to be ascribed to it based on the fact that it is unsigned, as such failing the test of authenticity according to section 84(2) of the Evidence Act and the choice of words used in the body does not “reflect a legitimate panel”. As for the call for adverse inference on the documents not produced by the defendants, the defendants contended that it is the law that the adverse inference that may be drawn from the fact that a party does not produce a document, which is that if such document is produced, it would be unfavorable to him is not applicable where the party who ought to produce provides proper explanation for his inability to do so, citing Oceanic Securities International Limited v. Balogun [2012] LPELR-¬9218(CA), which held that – Where a party relying on a document in an action fails to produce the document and there is no proper explanation as to his inability to produce the said document the court may upon his failure to produce it presume that the document, if produced would have been unfavourable to that party. To the defendants, section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 applies to found an adverse inference only where the party asked to produce the document does not give reasonable or proper explanation. In the present case, that the claimant in her final address conceded that the defendants gave a proper and reasonable explanation for their inability to produce to the extent that the documents are voluminous and contains the defendants’ confidential business information. That the 1st defendant, as rightly noted by the claimant, produced the only document which this explanation may not cover i.e. Document 15, urging the Court to deem this explanation as reasonable and proper. The defendants went on that more importantly the claimant cannot tell this Court the point in her favour which any purported adverse inference will prove. That assuming without conceding that the failure to produce bulky, voluminous and mostly non-probative proprietary material leads to the inference that the defendants “are hiding something”, the live and vital question is what is this thing? Merely failing to produce an amorphous body of documents, none of which is alleged to be specifically probative of any fact in issue cannot assist the claimant to discharge the burden of proof which is entirely upon her. That having something to hide, which is the best adverse inference that the claimant can generate adds nothing whatsoever to the claimant’s case. That Boniface Ezeadukwa v. Maduka [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) 635 at 663 held this – A trial Judge cannot draw inference in vacuo or in a vacuum but in relation to facts which justify such inference. And since an inference is an act of deducing or drawing a conclusion from existing premises by way of facts, the facts upon which the inference is deduced or drawn must be in proximity or intimacy with the inference. Where an inference is at large, it cannot perform inferential function of drawing a conclusion from premises. The defendants continued that the request for production made by the claimant was a fishing expedition which cannot assist the Court in drawing any material conclusion as to the facts of this case. That all relevant facts and documents needed for the proper determination of this case are already placed before the Court in evidence. In fact, that the claimant has not shown to this Court what the possible content of the documents are or how the documents are related to this case, urging the Court to accordingly disregard the claimant’s argument. Regarding the claimant’s objection to the audit report, the defendants submitted that Document 15 was duly signed by the maker (Anna Geraci) on behalf of the panel that investigated the claimant. A brief look at Document 15 reveals that the name of Anna Geraci the maker is clearly inscribed on the document. This being an electronic signature is in law sufficient signature. That section 93(3) of the Evidence Act admits the electronic signature of documents in the following terms – (2) Where a rule of evidence required a signature, or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed; an electronic signature satisfies that rule of law or avoids those consequences. (3) An electronic signature may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which it is necessary for a person, in order to proceed further with a transaction to have executed a symbol or security procedure for the purpose of verifying that an electronic record is that of the person. That the Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition, page 1508 defines electronic types of signature to include: a typed name at the end of an email, a Digital image of a handwritten signature, and the click of an “I accept” button on an e-commerce site. More so, the text, Electronic Evidence by Stephen Mason, England & Wales at page 331 describes electronic signature as consisting of different types which include: typing a name into a document; an email address; clicking the “I accept” icon; PIN; biodynamic signature; scanned signature; and digital signature. To the defendants, Document 15 is an internal memorandum of the 1st and 2nd defendants. It could not have been signed by the company not being a natural person, but if at all, by natural persons. That it is clear on its face that Anna Geraci (a natural person) typed her name in Document 15 and this suffices as her signature on behalf of the 1st and 2nd defendants and thus satisfies the condition of signature, urging the Court to deem it so for the reasons given. In any event, that the law is very clear that the lack of signature on a document will only affect the probative value of the document where such a document is required to be signed. That where such requirement is not provided, the document will be ascribed its full probative value. That this is the case here. That Document 15 is not required by any law or rule to be signed; as such the failure to sign the document is not fatal, citing Abeje & anor v. Apeke [2013] LPELR-20675(CA) where the Court of Appeal following the Supreme Court’s decision in Awolaja v. Seatrade Groeningen BV [2002] NWLR 4 (Pt. 758) 520 stated clearly that it is not everything that goes under the rubric of document that will lose its evidential worth simply because it was not signed, urging the Court to attach due evidential value to Document 15. Furthermore, that contrary to the argument that Document 15 is a computer generated document which fails the test of authenticity according to section 84 (2) of the Evidence Act, the defendants in fact filed a Certificate of Authenticity dated 20th September 2013 for all computer generated documents tendered including Document 15. The defendants then urged the Court to find and hold that Document 15 is properly admitted in evidence and the probative value necessary should be attached to it. Lastly, on the choice of words used in the body of Document 15, the defendants submitted that the use of ‘I’ or 'me' in the body of Document 15 cannot deter the probative value and relevance to be placed on this piece of evidence. That the use of these words show no more than the fact that Anna Geraci wrote the document in a representative capacity for both members of the Panel. That it is instructive to state that the claimant also understands and acknowledges the focal role that Anna Geraci had to play in the investigation having been assigned by the defendants to do so. That she stated in paragraph 41 of her witness deposition dated 7th December 2012 that she was to direct all correspondence on the investigation to Anna Geraci. That this further buttresses the point that Anna Geraci was purely performing an official role as assigned by the defendants and had no personal interest whatsoever to the claimant’s investigation. It is the facts that were found against the claimant that are relevant and not any misplaced paranoia about being witch-hunted. It is her own conduct which condemned her and not the entity of the people who exposed her. The defendants the pointed out that this Court is given wide power to discover the true facts of a case notwithstanding a party trying to hide behind the Evidence Act. That section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act, allows this Court to depart from the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. That it would be invidious in a case such as this, for the head of human resources of an ethical company to persistently and unapologetically breach ethical rules and standards of conduct that she was employed at high salary to model, and then to taunt her employers, this Court and the notion of justice by suppressing highly probative material. This would indeed be a cynical manipulation of law and the height of injustice. The defendants then proceeded to address what they termed the merit issues i.e. the absence of reasonable ground for the 1st defendant to believe that the claimant was guilty of misconduct; there was no fair hearing and natural justice afforded the claimant in deciding her dismissal; and the claimant is entitled to damages. On whether there was reasonable ground for the 1st defendant to believe that the claimant was guilty of misconduct, the case of the defendants is that the evidence copiously establishes that there was abundant ground for the conclusion that the claimant was guilty of misconduct. The defendants then went on to rehearse the arguments they advanced in their main written address, effectively going beyond the pale of a reply on points of law. On whether fair hearing was afforded the claimant, the defendants answered in the affirmative and then once again simply rehearsed the arguments they canvassed in their main written address. The defendants, however, submitted that they need not strictly follow the procedure for dismissal since the employment contract was not one that is statutory, referring to Francis Arinze v. First Bank of Nigeria Limited [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663, Noble Drilling (Nig.) Ltd v. Mr. Brownson Edemekong [2009] LPELR- 8708(CA) and Union Bank of Nigeria Limited v. V.C. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647. The claimant had submitted that she was denied the opportunity to test the veracity of witness testimony against her. In response, the defendants submitted that nowhere in their case was it stated that any person was physically invited for questioning. That findings were made from the persons mentioned via telephone conversation and email correspondences. In the same manner, that the said findings were related to the claimant to which she responded one way or the other though not satisfactory to the 1st defendant. That the claimant never demanded any opportunity to have oral testimony and neither was it required on any legal or rational ground. That this argument is a mere afterthought. That the claimant says the Audit Panel was not constituted to achieve impartiality and independence. To the defendants, there is no iota of proof offered to substantiate this allegation. Indeed, that the investigation of the claimant was conducted by a panel which consisted of Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal. That there is no offer of proof as to why these persons will be prejudiced or partial. The use of ‘I’ or ‘me’ in the body of Document 15 shows no more than the fact that Anna Geraci wrote the document in a representative capacity for both members of the Panel. No adverse or viable inference can be drawn from this. That in realization that there is no evaluative weight deducible from the manner of the wordings of Document 15 save an employee (Anna Geraci) performing the instructions of her employer (the 1st and 2nd defendants), the defendants urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the defendants. The defendants concluded on this point by urging the Court to hold that the claimant’s misconduct deserved more than mere termination of her appointment; rather, it was meted out with the appropriate disciplinary measure (dismissal) after the Audit Panel found her guilty of misconduct. On whether the claimant is entitled to damages, the defendants submitted that the claimant made a misguided submission that she is entitled to damages in the amount that she would have earned had the employment continued according to contract. That tacitly, she means that her salary should be paid from 6th December 2009 when she was dismissed till date of judgment, relying on Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt.1031) 565. To the defendants, it is important to note that the reliefs set out in the claimant’s pleadings did not specifically pray for the salary purportedly due to her from the date of dismissal till date of judgment and the Court in a plethora of cases have held that courts do not grant reliefs not asked by the parties, and a court should not and ought not to make a case for the parties different from that put up by parties in their pleadings, citing AP Plc v. Aborishade [2013] LPELR-20362(CA). That it is, therefore, futile to pray in the written argument for the first time for the claimant’s salary by tagging it “SPECIFIC DAMAGES” which is nowhere to be found in her pleadings or by any other name. That it is settled law that a counsel’s address can never substitute for pleadings or evidence, citing Okwejiminor v. Gbakeji [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) 172 at 223. The defendants went on that in the unlikely event that this Court takes the view that the dismissal of the claimant is wrongful, the only damages that the claimant would be entitled to under the contract of employment is restricted to what she would have earned had her employment been determined normally which is her salary for one month in lieu of notice as clearly contained in her contract of employment, referring to Osisanya v. Afribank (supra) at pages 578 and 579. That in the instant case, the only damages the claimant would be entitled to, if at all, is the amount she would have earned if her appointment was terminated, which is one month’s pay in lieu of notice. That the claimant is neither entitled to any exemplary damages nor general damages because it is established law that “a plaintiff in an action for wrongful dismissal is not entitled to general damages because such general damages belong to the realm of claims in tort, while actions for damages for wrongful or unlawful dismissal are based on contract”, referring to Wilbros Nig. Ltd v. Onwume Macaulay [2009] LPELR-8507(CA) and PZ Ltd v. Ogedengbe [1972] 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 2002 at 205 – 206. The defendants concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the claimant’s action with substantial cost. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. Before going into the merit of the case, I need to make a preliminary remark. In paragraphs 8.23, 8.24, 8.27 and 8.51 of the defendants’ final written address, the defendants variously referred the Court to Exhibits D30, D31, D32 and D33. In like manner, in paragraph 9.13 of same final written address, the defendants referred to Exhibit D27 and Exhibit D28. As far as this case is concerned, there are no such exhibits before the Court known and marked as Exhibits D27, D28, D30, D31, D32 and D33. I do not know where the defendants got these from. The exhibits known to this Court in this case are the claimant’s Exhibits C1 – C25, and the defendants’ Documents 1 – 24. This means that all arguments of the defendants based and relying on “Exhibits D27, D28, D30, D31, D32 and D33” all go to no issue in this judgment. This remark made, there is the need to then remark on the reliefs (13 in all) of the claimant as couched. Relief d) seeks for “a declaration that the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the defendant…is wrongful, null and void…” Relief e) seeks for “an order setting aside the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant…for being wrongful, null and void…” These two reliefs as couched seek a declaration and an order of this court that the claimant’s dismissal is wrongful, null and void. Can a dismissal be both wrongful and null and void? The Supreme Court has made a distinction between a wrongful dismissal and one that is invalid or null and void. In BCC Plc v. Ager [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 292 SC, for instance, it was held that there is a distinction between mere wrongful dismissal and an invalid or null dismissal. That where the Court makes a finding of wrongful dismissal, a payment in lieu of notice will apply; but where the finding is that the dismissal or termination was null and void, then there is no dismissal or termination as what the employer did was a nullity before the law. What this case tells is that a dismissal cannot be both wrongful and null and void as the claimant seems to think. In other words, a claimant cannot have his/her dismissal branded wrongful and null and void by a court of law at one and the same time. As couched, reliefs d) and e) are incapable of being granted in their whole. In the second place, relief i) prays for “an order compelling the 1st defendant to pay over to the claimant the unpaid balance of the claimant’s terminal benefit from the employment and services of the 1st defendant as at December 6th 2010”. The very fact that the claimant is seeking for the “unpaid balance of [her] terminal benefit” means and can only mean that she was paid part of her terminal benefit, is now asking for the balance, and so has accepted the fact of her dismissal by the defendants having of course accepted part of her terminal benefits – note that she is seeking for the “unpaid balance”. See Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc v. Nwagwu [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 518 CA, which held that where an employee receives his terminal benefits after his employment is brought to an end, he cannot be heard to complain later that his contract of employment was not properly determined because the acceptance of payment by the employee renders the determination mutual. See also Morohunfola v. Kwara College of Technology [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 SC, Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 426; [1993] 7 SCNJ (Pt. II) 307, John Holt Ventures Ltd v. Oputa [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 470) 101 CA, Iloabachie v. Phillips [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 264 CA, Etim Okon Ante v. University of Calabar [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 231 and Umoh v. ITGC [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 281 CA, which held that where an employee accepts salary in lieu of notice of termination of his employment, he may not be heard to complain later that his contract was not validly and properly determined. Having thus accepted the fact of her dismissal, it is curious what dismissal the claimant is seeking a nullification of in this suit as can be seen in reliefs d), e), f), g) and h). The claimant had objected to the admissibility and relevance of the Audit Report (Document 15) and/or the probative value to be ascribed to it based on the fact that it is unsigned, as such failing the test of authenticity according to section 84(2) of the Evidence Act; and that the choice of words used in the body does not “reflect a legitimate panel”. In answer, the defendants contended that Document 15 was duly signed by the maker (Anna Geraci) on behalf of the panel that investigated the claimant. A look at Document 15 will reveal that it is a typed document with the date, November 29, 2010, written on top of it. It is stated to be from “Anna Geraci- COBC Supervisor” and “Paul Docekal- COBC Director” to “Ethics & Compliance Committee”. The subject matter is put as – CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 20108-2328 Titilayo Akisanya- Human Resource Director CPS Nigeria It consists of 5 pages (sheets) made up of the following main headings: “SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL VIOLATION”; “BACKGROUND AND INVESTIGATION”; “BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY”; “PRECEDENT”; “AGGRAVATING FACTORS”; “MITIGATING FACTORS”; “SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS”; “BREAKDOWN IN INTERNAL CONTROLS”; and “US DOLLAR IMPACT”. At the end of each page (sheet) are the words: “Classified - Confidential”. This is the document objected to by the claimant and which the defendants argue otherwise. Document 15 has no signature on it; as such it is unsigned. The defendants, however, argue that the name of Anna Geraci is inscribed on it. Beyond the fact that “Anna Geraci- COBC Supervisor” is written as one of two names from which the document emanates, I saw no inscription of the name “Anna Geraci” on the document. The defendants also contended that the inscription of Anna Geraci’s name is an electronic signature and so satisfies the requirement of section 93(3) of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that – An electronic signature may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which it is necessary for a person, in order to proceed further with a transaction, to have executed a symbol or security procedure for the purpose of verifying that an electronic record is that of the person. In the first place, for section 93(3) of the Evidence Act to apply, there must be a signature for which the status of it being electronic can be ascribed. The argument of the defendants is that “typing a name into a document” qualifies as electronic signature, relying as it were on Stephen Mason’s Electronic Evidence. If this were so, then any name can be typed on a document and authorship of the document will simply be said to be that of the person whose name was so typed on it. Now, by definition, “an electronic signature, or e-signature, is any electronic means that indicates either that a person adopts the contents of an electronic message, or more broadly that the person who claims to have written a message is the one who wrote it (and that the message received is the one that was sent by this person). By comparison, a signature is a stylized script associated with a person. In commerce and the law, a signature on a document is an indication that the person adopts the intentions recorded in the document. Both are comparable to a seal”. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_signature as accessed on April 2, 2016. To start with, Document 15 is a typed document, not an electronic message i.e. one sent through any electronic channel, including email, social media, voicemail, text and instant messages. As frontloaded, tendered and admitted, Document 15 is not an email (there is no email address on it, nor does it indicate that it is an attachment to any email). So the contention of the defendants that the typing of Anna Geraci’s name on it is the signature (an electronic one at that) does not and cannot thereby arise. The further contention of the defendants that Document 15 is an internal memorandum of the 1st and 2nd defendants, and because it can only be signed by natural persons, the typed name of Anna Geraci (a natural person) in Document 15 suffices as her signature on behalf of the 1st and 2nd defendants and thus satisfies the condition of signature, is accordingly neither here nor there. I do not know by what rule the defendants are coming to contend that internal memoranda of artificial entities such as the 1st and 2nd defendants do not require signatures of the person(s) who wrote or released such internal memoranda, and that merely typing a name on it would suffice as signature. The logic of this argument is that anyone can simply write out a name on a typed document and the document would be said to have been signed by that person whose name is typed on the document. It must be noted that Document 15 was not even on the letter-headed paper of either the 1st or 2nd defendant as to lay a modicum of authenticity to it. At least, the defendants acknowledged that lack of signature on a document will affect the probative value of the document, although they qualified this by submitting that this will be so only where such a document is required to be signed; and that since Document 15 is not required by any law or rule to be signed, the failure to sign the document is, therefore, not fatal. No authority was given by the defendants for the proposition that Document 15 is of such a character that it is not required by any law or rule to be signed. I stated earlier that Document 15 is a typed document said to emanate from Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal. It is meant to be the report of the investigation panel that looked into the concern raised regarding the claimant’s expense report (i.e. “certain expenses submitted for reimbursement that appeared to be airline tickets for her family members, but submitted as business expenses”) and breach of confidentiality by the claimant. How can the defendants argue that a report of this sort does not require a signature? Or that it was duly signed by the maker (Anna Geraci) on behalf of the panel that investigated the claimant? In fact, the report requires not just a signature but the signatures of both Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal to show not just that they are the authors but that there is agreement between the two of them as to the contents of Document 15. A signature does not just authenticate a document it also proves that there is agreement as to its content. How is this Court to know that both Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal are agree on the contents of Document 15 if the two do not sign it? Merely typing out the names of Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal on Document 15 cannot establish that. On the argument that Document 15 is a computer generated document which failed the test of authenticity according to section 84(2) of the Evidence Act, the defendants had contended that they filed a Certificate of Authenticity dated 20th September 2013 for all computer generated documents tendered, including Document 15. No doubt, Document 15 was typed or retrieved from a computer. On record, the defendants filed on 4th October 2013 a certification as to the authenticity of computer-generated documents pursuant to section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. The certification was by Orok Efiom (whose identity was not disclosed as per the certification – it was not disclosed whether he is a staff of the defendants) and was on paper having the defendants’ counsel (Strachan Partners’) address. The certification is accordingly unconvincing more so as the IBM Lenovo Computer from which the information was said to be retrieved and the Kyocera Printer from which the information was said to be printed were not even shown to be the defendants’. As it is, they could be from a business centre. The defendants called on this Court to rely on section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which allows this Court to depart from the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. While it is true that this Court can depart from the Evidence Act when the interest of justice demands, this has never been the case where the authenticity of a document is in issue. An unsigned document calls to question its authenticity. The interest of justice in that regard cannot justify this Court departing from the Evidence Act in that regard and in the manner canvassed by the defendants. The authenticity of Document 15 has been called to question. This Court cannot answer that question by jettisoning the Evidence Act and its rules as to authenticity. This Court cannot accordingly call to aid section 12(2)(b) of the NIC Act 2006 as canvassed by the defendants. On the whole, it is my finding and hence holding that Document 15 requires the signatures of Anna Geraci and Paul Docekal but were not so signed. As an unsigned document, Document 15 has no evidential value. See the cases of Nwancho v. Elem [2004] All FWLR (Pt. 225) 107, Aiki v. Idowu [2006] All FWLR (Pt. 293) 361; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 984) 47 and Sarai v. Haruna [2008] 23 WRN 130, which held that any document which ought to be signed and is not signed renders its authorship and authenticity doubtful; and Global Soaps & Detergent Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 599) 1025 at 1047 and Udo & ors v. Essien & ors [2014] LPELR-22684(CA), which held that it is the law that unsigned and undated document has no evidential value. There is also the issue whether the choice of words used in the body of Document 15 does not deter the probative value and relevance to be placed on Document 15. All through Document 15, it will be found littered such words as ‘I’, ‘me’ and ‘my’ indicating that the investigation was conducted and the report written by one person, two as made out by the defendants. In other words, Document 15 is supposedly authored by 2 persons yet all through the narration is in the first person. At page 1 of Document 15, it will accordingly be found phrases such as: “it was communicated to me”, “I conducted an email review”, “My review found”, “Below is a summary of my findings”, “during my interview”, and “email I received”. At page 2, we have “In my interview”, “In the interview I asked TA”, “When I asked if she carved out any of the airfare” and “I learned that Iberia is”. At page 3, we have “TA sent me an email”, “TA sent me her expense reports”, “When I specifically asked Mr. Martin” and “I followed up with TA’s direct manager”. At page 4, we have “During a follow-up conversation I had with TA”, “my email review”, “On November 29, 2010, I obtained a fresh copy of TA’s email file”, “During my review, I found an email sent to TA’s husband’s work email”, “after I had sent TA an email requesting a meeting”, and “I interviewed TA about the issue”. And at page 5, and even under the summary and recommendation, we have “My investigation found TA has exhibited a pattern of behaviuor which shows she is often combining personal and business travel without carving out any personal costs” and “Based on emails provided and conversations I have had with her direct manager”. The answer of the defendants to this is that the use of these words shows no more than the fact that Anna Geraci wrote the document in a representative capacity for both members of the Panel. I do not think that the defendants are any serious with this contention. How can a categorical assertion such as “My investigation found TA has exhibited a pattern of behaviour which shows she is often combining personal and business travel without carving out any personal costs” be said to be by Anna Geraci and for and on behalf of a panel of two as argued by the defendants? This is certainly turning logic on its head. If anything, all of this further supports the doubts as to the authenticity of document 15; and I so find and hold. There is a further spurious thing about Document 15. At page 4 under the heading “Breach of Confidentiality”, the writer of the document said he/she obtained a refresh copy of TA’s email on November 29, 2010. Document 15 itself is dated November 29, 2010. Yet the last sentence of the paragraph on breach of confidentiality states: “On December 2, I interviewed TA about this issue. She did not provide any logical explanation as to why she sent this confidential document to her husband”. Now, if Document 15 was written on November 29, 2010, what interview of December 2, can it is refer to here? When DW was asked under cross-examination he said he has no idea why for a document sent on November 29, 2010 an interview of December 2 is being referred to. In all, Document 15 has no probative or evidential value whatsoever; and I so find and hold. In fact, the evidence of DW under cross-examination as it relates to Document 15 leaves much to be desired. A look at the evidence will show that DW did not know if Document 15 contained ALL the recommendations or conclusions of the audit panel, DW does not know whether the E & C Committee has any other document other than Document 15, DW does not know if Document 15 was ever shown to the claimant, DW does not know if the claimant was afforded any opportunity to make a representation to the E & C Committee, DW does not know whether the review of the recommendations at page 5 of Document 15 took place, etc. In short, most of the answers of DW to questions asked under cross-examination are simply that he does not know. This being so, what it means is that the supposed actions taken by the defendants on the basis of Document 15 have no basis at all. The claimant had argued, citing section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011, that this Court should infer that all the documents that the Court ordered the defendants to produce (upon the claimant’s motion to that effect) but which were retained by the defendants and not so produced are all adverse to their interests. To the defendants, section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 applies to found an adverse inference only where the party asked to produce the document does not give reasonable or proper explanation. In the present case, that the claimant in her final address conceded that the defendants gave a proper and reasonable explanation for their inability to produce to the extent that the documents are voluminous and contains the defendants’ confidential business information. That the 1st defendant, as rightly noted by the claimant, produced the only document which this explanation may not cover i.e. Document 15, urging the Court to deem this explanation as reasonable and proper. The law as to the import of section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 has been stated in a number of case law authorities. For instance, by Egwu v. Egwu [2007] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1014) 71 at 92 CA, referring to Olufosoye v. Fakorede [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 752, the provision of section 149(d) of the Evidence Act (now section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011) is concerned with the withholding of evidence. That the Court will readily presume that the evidence to be elicited through a document pleaded but which was not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to him who withheld it. Additionally, by Lawal v. Magaji & ors [2009] LPELR-4427(CA) per Sankey, JCA, a party who is in possession of a document but fails to produce it after notice to produce has been issued and served on him may be giving room for the invocation of the presumption; however, the trend of judicial opinion is that there is a need to exercise caution in making presumptions unless such a presumption is irresistible and overwhelming. And in The People of Lagos State v. Umaru [2014] LPELR-22466(SC), the Supreme Court held as follows – I shall now consider Section 149(d) of the Evidence Act that is, on withholding of evidence…What paragraph (d) of Section 149 of the Evidence Act stipulates is that where a party claims to have evidence that goes to show the existence of a document in proof of his case, the document should be tendered. Where such evidence could be produced but it is not produced, it is presumed to be against the interest of the party withholding it. See: EBOH v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED [1987] 2 QLRN 167; GEORGE v. THE STATE [2009] 1 NWLR (Part 1122). In the latter case, the Police investigated the facts of ALIBI relied on by the accused but the result of the investigation was withheld by the prosecution raising, thereby, a presumption that the evidence if produced would have been unfavourable to the prosecution. See further: AKINTOLA v. ANYIAM [1961] All NLR 508; AKINFE v. THE STATE [1988] 7 SCNJ 236; AREMU v. ADETORO [2007] 16 NWLR (Part 29) 471; AWOSIKE v. SOTUNBO [1989] 3 NWLR (Part 29) 471; ADEDERAN v. ALAO [2001] 18 NWLR [245] 408. The thing with all these case law authorities is that the evidence sought to be presumed must be identifiable, clear and known to the Court. In the instant case, the claimant seeks refuge under section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011. All the claimant prayed for is that this Court should infer that all the documents that were retained by the defendants and not produced are all adverse to their interest. Beyond this, nothing else was said. The Court was not told what the withheld documents evince which is then to be presumed against the defendants. In the case law authorities cited, the nature of the evidence to be presumed was known to the Court. In The People of Lagos State v. Umaru, for instance, the evidence in issue was one of alibi; and Lawal v. Magaji & ors advised that the trend of judicial opinion is that there is a need to exercise caution in making presumptions unless such a presumption is irresistible and overwhelming. I have not been shown anything “irresistible and overwhelming” to warrant my making the presumption that the claimant prays for here; and I so find and hold. Whether it is the termination or dismissal of an employee from employment, the law is that once an employer gives a reason, the burden lies on him to justify the said reason to the satisfaction of the Court. See SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] LPELR-3046(SC); [2008] 12 SC (Pt. III) 27 and Angel Shipping & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 685) 551 CA; and by George Abomeli v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451, relying on Ogunsanmi v. C. F. Furniture (W.A.) Co. Ltd [1961] 1 All NLR 224, an employer while not bound to give any reason for lawfully terminating the contract of service must nevertheless give reasons for summarily dismissing the servant. The defendants do not seem to agree with this as they placed great reliance on Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 at 610, where the Supreme Court held that in a dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee it is not necessary for the employer to prove the reasons stated in the notice of dismissal or termination; the only obligation being to show that the contract was terminated in accordance with the express or implied terms of the contract regardless of whether the appointment is on permanent or probationary (temporary) basis. However, the latter authority of Mr. Kunle Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 360) 1480 SC at 1491; [2007] 1 – 2 SC 317 held that “an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. Where the employer gives reason for the termination, the onus lies on the employer to establish that cause of reason”. I must, however, right away dismiss two arguments advanced by the claimant. First, the claimant had submitted that the 2nd defendant’s Code of Business Conduct (COBC), Exhibit C12/Document 23, does not provide for summary dismissal; as such the defendants cannot summarily dismiss her. However, by Simon Ansambe v. Bank of the North Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 650, the fact that there is no specific provision as to termination or summary dismissal in the terms of the contract will not prevent the employer from exercising his right to so terminate or dismiss e.g. for gross misconduct; and that fair hearing does not necessarily mean an oral representation – it is enough if it is in writing. Secondly, the claimant had also argued that the letter summarily dismissing her (Exhibit C14) was signed by a person who was not an employee of her employer. Under cross-examination, the claimant had testified that the dismissal letter was signed by Sherif Tobala who is an Egyptian not working for Coca Cola Nigeria Ltd, the 1st defendant; as such that when he signed as General Manager, he was actually not the General Manager of Coca Cola Nigeria Ltd. The defendants owed up to the letter of dismissal; as such they owed up to its signatory. That suffices to give the letter of summary dismissal legal validity. The argument of the claimant in that regard is accordingly not sustainable and so is hereby discountenanced. Exhibit C14 dated 6th December 2010 is the letter summarily dismissing the claimant from her employment with the defendants with effect from 6th December 2010 i.e. with immediate effect. The reason given for the summary dismissal is the violation of The Coca-Cola Company Code of Business Conduct. Specifically, the claimant was stated to have violated the Code by submitting non-business related expenses for reimbursement from the company and the disclosure of confidential company information to an outside party. In stating these as the reasons for summarily dismissing the claimant, the defendants are duty bound (not the claimant) to justify these reasons as the grounds upon which they summarily dismissed the claimant; otherwise, the summary dismissal would be wrongful. It is to justify the reasons for the dismissal of the claimant that the defendants relied on Document 15, which I already held had no evidential or probative value. As it is, there is accordingly no evidence before the Court showing that the defendant justified the reasons for summarily dismissing the claimant. In other words, other than Document 15, have the defendants justified the reasons for dismissing the claimant? From a review of the evidence before the Court, the answer is in the negative. All through the trial, the claimant consistently maintained that she did not know what she was indicted for by the company. Exhibit C10 consists of emails written. In it, the claimant acknowledged that her travel and expense claims and other matters relating to her local “Rest and Relaxation” (R & R) entitlements have been the subject of an audit investigation and several purported lapses were brought to her attention, for which she provided explanations. She then complained that the invitations to such interrogations were often at short notice, which did not afford her the opportunity to properly recollect details of relevant events and circumstances. She further complained that the investigation instead of being an objective inquiry in good faith to establish facts, largely presumed her guilt. In other words, that instead of an investigation, what she had was an inquisition. I find these complaints by the claimant timely and in consonance with the required prelude needed to later raise issues of fair hearing, which the claimant did in the instant case. To show that the claimant was appropriately given fair hearing all through the said investigation, the defendants relied on Document 21 from Anna Geraci to the claimant as constituting notice to the claimant. Document 21 simply states as follows – Titilayo, Hello. As you know, we are conducting a review/audit of your expense reports. I am aware you will be in Atlanta this week for HR meetings and would like the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the audit. I would like to meet tomorrow at 8:30 in the USA Building 2025. I have informed Melissa of this meeting and she has approved your absence from your currently scheduled meetings. I agree with the claimant that an invitation to meet tomorrow at 8:30 in the USA Building 2025 cannot satisfy the fair hearing requirement in terms of affording the claimant ample time and opportunity to offer any reasonable explanation that may be required. It accords with the claim of the claimant that what the defendants were doing was more of an inquisition than an investigation. The defendants would, however, argue that by her own admissions in paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41 of her statement on oath dated 7th December 2012, the claimant admitted the fact that she was notified of the allegations against her and that she attended a meeting of the Corporate Auditors in Atlanta for interview on the allegations. I indicated earlier that the claimant vide Exhibit C10 had vigorously complained of the process/procedure adopted by the defendants in investigating her, and held that I find her complaints to be timely and in consonance with the required prelude needed to later raise issues of fair hearing. Recounting what transpired as per “paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41 of her statement on oath” cannot amount to admission as submitted by the defendants given Exhibit C10; and I so find and hold. The major plank of the claimant’s case is that she was not given fair hearing by the defendants before she was summarily dismissed from work. The defendants, however, argued otherwise. One of the submissions of the defendants here is that they acted according to the terms of the employment contract and in fact afforded every opportunity for the claimant to answer the clear and unanswerable allegations against her. Accordingly, that it is idle and pointless to rely on the principles of fair hearing. In any event, that fair hearing as per section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is a constitutional rather than a contractual right, directed to courts and other tribunals established by law and not to the private contractual relationships between individuals. In other words, the claimant is not legally entitled to constitutional fair hearing. The defendants even went on to argue that the audit panel is not a court and it is not required to follow any rigid procedure once it complies with the claimant’s contract of employment. Here, I understand the defendants to be saying that in employment relationships, employees are not entitled to fair hearing. Can this be the law or is this Court being led off course and astray? Ziideeh v. RSCSC [2007] LPELR-3544(SC); [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554; [2007] 1 – 2 SC 1 was emphatic when it held that “it is now firmly settled that in statutory employment, just as in private employment, an employer can summarily dismiss the servant in all cases of gross misconduct provided of course, the employee is given the opportunity of fair hearing”. With decisions such as Ziideeh v. RSCSC, I really do not know where the defendants got the idea that the fair hearing requirement of the law has no application to employment relationships. Fait hearing is about opportunity to be heard. The authorities are clear on this. For instance, once a Court makes a finding that the employee was given ample opportunity to defend himself/herself on the allegations in issue, then such an employee cannot complain of not being given fair hearing. See A. R. Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 508 CA at 527, Benedict Hirki Joseph v. First inland Bank Nig Plc [2009] LPELR-8854(CA), Gukas v. Jos International Breweries Ltd [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 614, Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 SC Avre v. NIPOST [2014] LPELR-22629(CA), Kayode Agbolade v. Ecobank Nig. Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/34/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 30th October 2013 and Mr. Adewale Aina v. Wema Bank Plc & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/162/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on January 28, 2016. CF: ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725. The fair hearing requirement does not insist on oral testimonies so long as the employee had the opportunity to explain himself/herself by way of a query and reply. See New Nigeria Bank Ltd v. G. O. Oniovosa [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 327 and Isong Udofia v. Industrial Training Governing Council [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 281. The common feature running through all these cases is that the exact nature of the infraction(s) which the employee is expected to answer to were disclosed to the employee. In the instant case no query as such was issued to the claimant to indicate that she committed a misconduct for which she was being investigated. Document 21 as couched cannot amount to such a query. Even at this, the reliance on Document 22 (the Guidelines for Handling Code of Business Conduct Matters) by the defendants cannot be helpful to the defendants. Document 22 in paragraph III(B) of Appendix B reveals that it is the internal policy of the 2nd defendant – 1. Not to notify the subject of an investigation that a review is ongoing unless and until preliminary investigative steps indicate that the employee is likely to have violated the COBC; and 2. Not to notify the subject of an investigation until the time of his/her review in order to avoid anxiety and minimize the opportunity for fabrication, potential destruction of evidence or retaliation. I agree with the claimant that as couched Document 22 demonstrates a surreptitious attempt by the defendants to circumvent the fair hearing right guaranteed by section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Document 22 itself enjoins that local law and custom may dictate otherwise and that company legal counsel be consulted. What then is the local law and custom as to the requirement of fair hearing in Nigeria? In SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] LPELR-3046(SC); [2008] 12 SC (Pt. III) 27, it was held that “the employee who was dismissed or otherwise punished for gross misconduct need not prove that the proceedings of the domestic panel that investigated him were indeed prejudicial to him, it is sufficient that it might. The risk of any prejudice is enough”. And in Olabode Adewunmi v. Nigerian Eagle Flour Mills [2014] LPELR-22557(CA), Dongban- Mensem, JCA delivering the lead judgment had this to say – The management held a hide and seek inquisition from which a few facts were extracted and flung at the Appellant with executive fiat demanding replies. The Appellant obediently responded to the letters sent to him. The case of Adingun & ors v. A.G. Oyo State & Ors (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.53) 678 @ 758 clearly held that the rules of natural justice must be observed in an administrative enquiry. Such was not done in the proceedings leading up to the dismissal of the Appellant. A procedure where an accuser is shielded from the accused all through the inquiry is certainly not one in compliance with natural justice. Presence and direct confrontation has a lot of impact and produce different results from a one sided inquisition by an executive of his subordinate. In the instant case, it really cannot even be said that the claimant was told what her misconduct was as she was being investigated. Everything was shrouded within the policy garb of Document 22 which enjoins secrecy in investigation. The claimant from the onset complained vide Exhibit C10 that the process was not transparent enough; and under cross-examination was emphatic in stating that it was in 2013 when she got the audit report that she even knew what she was indicted for. DW under cross-examination acknowledged that going by Document 21, the claimant was given less than 24 hours to appear at the review/audit meeting; and that he has no idea whether there was an allegation against the claimant at the time the meeting as per Document 21 was held. I had already ruled against Document 15, the supposed audit report that was supposedly done by two persons, when even from its face and content it was the assumed work of one person bent on finding the claimant guilty. I reiterate, from the evidence before the Court, the claimant cannot be said to have been afforded fair hearing in the investigation of the claimant in terms of the submission of non-business related expenses for reimbursement from the company; and I so find and hold. There is, however, the charge of the disclosure of confidential company information by the claimant to an outside party. Under cross-examination, the claimant acknowledged that Document 13 consists of emails between her and her husband; and that from Document 13, she discussed via email a case she was investigating with her husband. She then rationalized that she does not consider her husband as coming within the definition of family as she and him are one. Document 23 at page 16 provides for use of information, and in respect of nonpublic information, states as follows – Do not disclose nonpublic information to anyone outside the Company, including to family and friends, except when disclosure is required for business purpose. Even then, take appropriate steps, such as execution of a confidentiality agreement, to prevent misuse of the information. Do not disclose nonpublic information to others inside the Company unless they have a business reason to know, and communications have been classified according to the Information protection Policy. At the Court’s sitting of 11th February 2014 when the documents frontloaded by the parties were marked, the Court had noted that Document 13 consists of email communication from a wife (the claimant) to her husband, which thus raised the issue of admissibility. Parties were asked to address the Court on this issue if they so wish. Incidentally, none of the parties did. The email in issue had actually been sent to the claimant by Anita M. DeMyers and deals with a new workplace rights case filed in Cairo. The claimant was told in the email that the matter will require an investigation in accordance with the WR policy. She was then asked to investigate and provide a summary of her findings. The workplace rights case was the decision of an employee to leave his employment because of the overbearing attitude of his manager who was inconsiderate, who incessantly complains about low performance, not easily accessible, does not give good example, does not accept criticism, etc. It was this matter that the claimant forwarded to her husband and which the defendants held to be a breach of the confidentiality agreement between the claimant and her employers. Section 187 of the Evidence Act 2011 dealing with communications during marriage provides that – No husband or wife shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him or her during marriage by any person to whom he or she is or has been married nor shall he or she be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it. or that person’s representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceeding in which one married person is prosecuted for an offence specified in section 182 (1) of this Act. Section 187 of the Evidence Act 2011 recognises the spousal unity between husband and wife and so does not compel the disclosure of any communication made between the two during marriage. The section, however, is not absolute and so does not foreclose the disclosure of such information through means other than from the husband or wife, or where the maker consents to such a disclosure. It should be noted that section 187 of the Evidence Act actually deals with the issue of compellability of either a husband or wife to disclose communication made between them. See Adisa v. State [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 168) 501 and Oniya v. Koliko [1992] 7 NWLR (Pt. 254) 507, which acknowledged the compellability of a wife to give evidence in certain circumstances. In the instant case, the email detailing the communication between the claimant and her husband was frontloaded (hence disclosed) by other than the claimant or her husband. It was disclosed by the defendants. In any event, under cross-examination, the claimant acknowledged Document 13 and then rationalized that she does not consider her husband as coming within the definition of family as she and him are one. In other words, there was no objection on her part as to the admissibility and hence evidential value of Document 13. As it is, therefore, Document 13 was properly admitted and has evidential value in this suit; and I so find and hold. What, therefore, remains is to determine the question whether the communication between the claimant and her husband as evidenced by Document 13 amounts to breach of Document 23 by the claimant as to justify her dismissal by the defendants. I quoted earlier that Document 23 at page 16 bars employee from disclosing “nonpublic information to anyone outside the Company, including to family and friends, except when disclosure is required for business purpose”. At page 17, Document 23 then goes on to give examples of nonpublic information to include information related to employees amongst others. Is the communication between the claimant and her husband as evidenced in Document 13 one relating to employees? Given the narration I made earlier as to the issue in Document 13, the answer is in the affirmative. Was the disclosure to the claimant’s husband one for business purpose? I do not think so. The Court was not told that the claimant’s husband also works for the defendants. Even if he did, Document 23 also bars disclosure of “nonpublic information to others inside the Company unless they have a business reason to know”. The only defence of the claimant is that she does not consider her husband as coming within the definition of family as she and him are one. This defence to my mind is lame. How can spousal unity (the idea that the husband and wife are one) be said to mean that the husband does not thereby come within the definition of family? Once it is noted that even under section 187 of the Evidence Act 2011 spousal unity was not used as an absolute proposition, then the claimant’s argument that she did not regard her husband as coming within the definition of family cannot be sustained. In this sense, the claimant in making communication of the sort of Document 13 to her husband breached Document 23; and I so find and hold. Her letter of appointment (Exhibit C1) barred her from discussing with any person information as to the affairs of the company and enjoined her to sign a non-disclosure agreement and the Code of Business Conduct. Under cross-examination, the claimant acknowledged signing the Code of Business Conduct and knew that it was binding on her, and that she believed she signed a document on non-disclosure of information. There is no question, therefore, that the claimant breached her obligation as to non-disclosure. The question that, however, remains is whether she was given fair hearing on this issue before she was dismissed. Document 21 which invited the claimant to a meeting to discuss audit did not even mention anything as to breach of the obligation as to non-disclosure. I have already discountenanced Document 15, the so-called report of the audit panel, which also indicted the claimant for breach of the obligation as to non-disclosure. Document 23 at page 39 dealing with investigation of potential code violations stipulates that “employees who are being investigated for a potential Code violation will have an opportunity to be heard prior to any final determination”. There is no evidence before the Court that the defendants did this in relation to the claimant’s breach of the obligation as to non-disclosure. Consequently, despite the claimant’s breach of the obligation as to non-disclosure, it is my finding that she was not given any fair hearing before she was dismissed on the said ground. In all, I find and hold that the claimant was not given fair hearing by the defendants before she was summarily dismissed. This being the case, her summary dismissal was accordingly wrongful; and I so hold. Since her summary dismissal was wrongful, the issue remaining is what reliefs she is entitled to. Here I must dismiss a submission made by the defendants. The defendants had contended that dismissal is termination by way of disciplinary action entailing forfeiture of all benefits of separation, relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Union Bank of Nigeria v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 at 572, which held dismissal to be a disciplinary measure that carries no benefit. Accordingly, to the defendants, the claimant’s relief i) is unfounded for having been dismissed from the employment of the 1st defendant she is not entitled to any terminal benefit. As for her claim for unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December 2010, that this is a specific claim, which must be substantiated by her. The defendant’s stance that dismissal carries no benefit represents the old dispensation. In Kasali Olugbenga v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/430/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on December 3, 2015, this Court held as follows – It used to be that dismissal in carrying with it infamy/ignominy deprives the dismissed employee from any benefit even if earned. See Abomedi v. NRC [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 372) 451 CA and Ante v. University of Calabar [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 239 CA. However, today whether termination or dismissal, the employee is entitled to all earned salaries and emoluments. I alluded earlier to Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd v. Dubefon where the Supreme Court held that an employee’s salary becomes due and his right to it is vested at the end of each month; hence, the employer cannot dismiss or terminate his employee’s employment with retrospective effect with a view to denying him his vested right to his salary; and Udegbunam v. FCDA where the Supreme Court further held that in a claim for wrongful termination of appointment, an employee can also claim for salaries, leave allowances, etc, earned by the employee but not paid by the employer at the time of the termination. So despite the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant, he is still entitled to be paid all his earned salary and emolument. And in Mr. Adewale Aina v. Wema Bank Plc & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/162/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on January 28, 2016, this Court also held that “whether dismissal is earned or not, the new dispensation is that all earnings of an employee prior to the dismissal must be paid by the employer to such an employee”, referring to Udegbunam v. FCDA [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 SC and Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd v. Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 156 SC. There is accordingly no doubt that if the claimant proves any earning due to her but not paid by the defendant, she would be entitled to a verdict from this Court in that regard. The question presently is, therefore, whether the claimant has so proved the reliefs she prays for from this Court. In this regard reliefs i) and j) are the claims in issue. Relief i) is for “an order compelling the 1st defendant to pay over to the claimant the unpaid balance of the claimant’s terminal benefit from the employment and services of the 1st defendant as at December 6th 2010”; and relief j) is for “an order compelling the 1st defendant to pay over to the claimant the sum total of the claimant’s unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December 2010”. Beyond merely stating these as reliefs, the claimant said nothing about them and there was no attempt whatsoever to even prove them as entitlements. I accordingly agree with the defendants that these reliefs were not proved and so cannot be granted. For instance, the claimant is claiming for the unpaid balance of her terminal benefit, and the Court was not told the part she received in other to determine the balance due to her. The Court was also not told the quantum of the “unpaid expenses in reports and claims submitted to the 1st defendant between June and December 2010”. Reliefs i) and j) are accordingly dismissed. Relief k), which accordingly is for “interest on the sums in (i) and (j) above at the rate of 21% per annum, from December 6th, 2010 till the date of judgment in this suit, and thereafter at 10% per annum till the final liquidation of the sum thereof” must equally fail; and so is hereby dismissed. This leaves out relief l) and m). Relief l) is for “exemplary damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira Only) against the defendants, jointly and severally, for breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing”; and relief m) is for “general damages in the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira only) jointly and severally against the defendants in this suit”. By section 19(d) of the NIC Act 2006, this Court may where necessary make any appropriate order including an award of compensation or damages in any circumstances contemplated by the NIC Act or any Act of the National Assembly dealing with any matter that the Court has jurisdiction to hear. I made a finding that the claimant was not given fair hearing and that what she was put through was more of an inquisition than an investigation; as such her summary dismissal was wrong. In UMTHMB v. Dawa [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 424, the Court of Appeal cautioned that every employer, including every public body, must be careful not to abdicate or abuse its powers. That employers and public bodies are required by law, at all times, to act in good faith, reasonably and fairly towards people and matters under their charge in all circumstances. That in the determination of the employment of employees, they must at all times allow themselves to be guided by the rule of natural justice. They should know of and be guided by the provisions of the Constitution entrenching the rule of natural justice; and that the law does not permit employers to act arbitrarily. In denying the claimant fair hearing, the defendants did not act in good faith, reasonably and fairly towards the claimant. For this reason, I find the claimant entitled to an award of damages or compensation as enjoined under section 19(d) of the NIC Act 2006. The claimant was summarily dismissed on 6th December 2010. She filed this action on 10th February 2012, and judgment is being delivered in the matter today. I indicated earlier that in framing relief i), the claimant acknowledged the receipt in part of terminal benefits, though the Court was not told the quantum, and that this also amounts to acceptance of the fact of the dismissal, at last in terms of the cessation of employment. This means that though the summary dismissal of the claimant is wrong, the claimant nevertheless ceases to be an employee of the defendants since their relationship has broken down irretrievably. It used to be that in computing compensation to be awarded an employee against an employer, this Court previously settled for an award of six months’ salary even when the contract of employment provided for one month’s salary in lieu. See, for instance, Industrial Cartons Ltd. V. National Union of Paper and Products Workers 1980 – 81 NICLR 54. But His Lordship the Honourable President of the Court, Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo, has upped the scale when in Mrs. Folarin Oreka Maiya v. The Incorporated Trustees of Clinton Health Access Initiative, Nigeria & 2 ors [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 76) 110 NIC he awarded as compensation one year’s gross salary, which came to Five Million, Five Hundred and Seventy-Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Seventy Naira (N5,576,670.00), to the claimant. I am guided by this and so will award as damages/compensation one year’s gross salary to the claimant. Exhibit C6 shows the claimant’s annual salary to be N17,368,486. I accordingly award this sum of N17,368,486 as damages/compensation to the claimant to be paid by the defendants within 30 days of this judgment, failing which the sum shall attract interest at 10% per annum until fully paid. Given that I held the summary dismissal of the claimant to be wrong on the ground of lack of fair hearing, for the avoidance of doubt, I hereby declare and order as follows – a) The investigative process by both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant leading up to the summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant is wrongful not having complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. b) The findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant are set aside they being perverse and contrary to the claimant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing. c) Any purported implementation of the findings of both the Audit Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee of the 1st defendant is wrong. d) The summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the defendant vide the letter of 6th December 2010 is accordingly wrongful, not having complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines. e) The summary dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant vide the letter of 6th December 2010, for being wrongful, having not complied with either the fair hearing requirements of the law or the 1st defendant’s Code of Business Conduct Procedural Guidelines, is hereby set aside. f) The purported letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated 6th December 2010 is hereby set aside. g) The defendants, jointly and severally, are restrained from giving any effect whatsoever to letter of dismissal of the claimant from the services of the 1st defendant dated 6th December 2010. h) The claimant nevertheless ceases to be an employee of the defendants as from 6th December 2010 since their relationship has broken down irretrievably. i) Damages/compensation in the sum of Seventeen Million, Three Hundred and Sixty-Eight Thousand, Four Hundred and Eighty-Six Naira (N17,368,486.00) only is to be paid by the defendants to the claimant within 30 days of this judgment, failing which the sum shall attract interest at 10% per annum until fully paid. Cost was not asked for; and so I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip