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Representation: Godson C. Godspower holding the brief of C. O. Azubuike for the Claimant Dibugu Ogbonnaya (Mrs) with Grant Osu Esq. for the Defendant JUDGMENT By a complaint filed on the 29th November 2013, the Claimant filed this suit against the Defendant and claimed the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration that the termination of the Claimant's appointment or Claimant's compulsory retirement of employment on 17th September 1997 with the Defendant over and in respect of imputations of criminality and or dereliction of duty having been subjected to harsh administrative one sided trial wherein the Claimant was found wanting, punished adequately with monetary mandated refunds later resurrected leading to the termination or compulsory retirement of the Claimant or Claimant employment on the 29th August 2013 hinged on a so called Ministerial Disciplinary Committee wherein the Claimant was equally not given fair hearing and or heard or given the opportunity to defend herself over the aforesaid criminal imputations amounts to double jeopardy, high handedness, after thought, retrospectively vindictive, ultra vires, null and void the Public Service Rules(PSR). 2. An Order compelling or ordering the Defendant to re-call or reinstate the Claimant on account of the Reliefs sought as herein specifically stated The complaint was accompanied by a Statement of Claim and other processes served on the Defendant. The Defendant upon receipt of the Statement of Claim filed a Statement of Defence vide a motion for extension of time filed on the 8th day of May 2014. The Claimant in response to the Defendant's Statement of Defence filed a reply to Statement of Defence filed on the 31st October 2014. The Claimant opened her case on the 3rd day of December. She testified as a sole witness and was cross examined on the 03/12/2014 and closed her case on the same day. At the close of the Claimant’s case, the Court ordered her to furnish the Court with her Statement of Account (Salary Account) from May 2013 to November 2013, same to be tendered from the bar. On 17/11/2015, the claimants' Counsel tendered Exhibit W from the bar, being the Claimant's salary statement of account from May 2013 to November, 2013.The Defendant called one witnesses namely Mr. Chinwuba Maduakor (DW1). The defendant closed his case on the 13/05/2015. The Court ordered that written addresses of parties be filed. The defendant filed its final written address on 30th September 2015, while the claimant filed her written address on 6th November 2015. Parties adopted their respective final address on the 17th November 2015. The brief facts of this case from the Claimant’s pleadings are that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant. The Claimant averred that consequent upon an allegation made against her, she was suspended for two weeks without salary by the Defendant in June 2012. The Claimant averred that she had served a pre-action notice and a letter to the defendants through her Counsel C.O Azubuike demanding her recall and/or reinstatement to which there was no reply. On the Defendant and urged the Court to intervene and order the Defendant's to re-call and or reinstate her. On 29th August 2013, the Claimant’s averred employment was terminated/ or compulsorily retired by the defendant. The Claimant under cross examination on the 3rd day of December 2014 denied that she had collected her retirement benefit, The Court suo motu ordered that her Statement of Account covering the months of May to November 2013 be presented to the Court on the next adjourned date. As the close of the case for both parties on the 13th day of May 2014, the Statement had not been produced. The Court ordered that the Statement be forwarded to the Court before submission of addresses on the 22nd of September 2015. In the defendant’s final written address, counsel proffered six issues for determination, thus: 1. Whether the Defendant as sued, is a juristic person? 2. Whether the Claimant is an employee of the Defendant? 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to be re-called/reinstated as claimed? 4. Whether the Claimant was given fair hearing at the Ministerial Committee convened by the Defendant? 5. Whether or not the Ministerial Panel's decision amounted to double jeopardy? 6. Whether from the pleadings and frontloaded documents, the Claimant as sufficiently proved her case against the defendant in the circumstance? As his introductory argument, counsel stated that the defendant as sued is not a juristic person and as such cannot be properly sued by the Claimant. It is trite Law that only a juristic person has the power to sue and be sued. The defendant is a mere administrative arm of the Federal Ministry of Health which itself is a creation of Statute that can be sued. The Black Law dictionary defines a juristic person as “An artificial person recognized in Law as capable of being sued and suing in its own name”. The Defendant’s counsel submitted that an administrative appendage of the Federal Ministry of Health, the Defendant is not a juristic person known to Law and is therefore not capable of being sued. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue one in favour of the defendant and dismiss the claim in its entirety. Alternatively, counsel argued in respect of issue two that the test for proving an employment that is governed by statute is a legal test and not a matter of admission or denial by both parties. In the instant case, the Claimant tendered her letter of employment, letter of confirmation and her letter of regularization which showed her employer to be the Federal Ministry of Health and not of the Defendant. He contended further that it is trite law that documentary evidence cannot be altered by oral evidence. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue two in the negative and hold that the Claimant is the employee of the Federal Ministry of Health and not of the Defendant. More so, the Claimant did not plead any facts and/or did not exhibit any documents showing that she applied to the Federal Medical Centre Umuahia for either employment, or for transfer of service. The Claimant only pleaded that she was employed by the Federal Medical Centre but did not plead the terms and conditions of this employment. It is counsel’s submission, that the Claimant’s failure to properly establish these above-stated conditions particularly in respect of who exercised powers of discipline over the claimant is fatal to her case. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue two in the negative and hold that the Claimant has failed to prove that she is an employee of the defendant. Furthermore, in the event that issue number two is answered in the negative, it automatically resolves issue number three in the Defendant's favour. That is , the Court cannot make an order that the Defendant reinstates or recalls the Claimant when the Claimant is not an employee of the Defendant then. Counsel cited the case of OKOMU vs. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) 21 WRN 161 at 181 -183, where it was held: “ …it is when it has been satisfactorily established that an employee was appointed under the Federal Government Civil Service Rules as provided above that the question of his removal in compliance with the relevant provisions of the said rules can arise.” Counsel submitted that a declaration that a person is a public officer entitled to benefit from the Federal Public Service Rules is a question of law. The mere admission of such employment by an adverse party is not enough where the facts pleaded by the claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for such a declaration in favour of the claimant. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has not established that she is entitled to benefit from the Rules. Again, counsel argued that the Claimant did not suffer a denial of fair hearing or a breach of the rules of natural justice. In the case of UNICAL V ESIAGA (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 582) 719, it was held that: “Suspension is a normal proceeding and it is to facilitate investigation of an alleged impropriety. The officer affected cannot in the event complain of denial of fair hearing neither can he also complain against breach of the rules of natural justice. The interest of his employer has been held to be overriding at this stage” On the strength of the above-cited case, counsel argued that the Claimant was not denied fair hearing by the suspension meted out by the Defendant. Furthermore, the Claimant confessed to the said serious misconduct and the Courts have held in IMADE vs. IGP (1993) l NWLR(Pt. 271) 608 at 618 that where an employee, in the course of pre-inquiry or investigation freely admits to his employer or the Police that he is guilty of the misconduct, he can face discipline from his employers. Again, the Claimant did not deny the fact that she was part of the Ad hoc Disciplinary Panel and was given the opportunity to put across her case. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant failed to prove that she was denied fair hearing. In arguing the fifth issue, counsel contended that the principle of double jeopardy is laid down in Section 36(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 “(as amended) which reads: “No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence, save upon the order of a superior Court.” In UMEZE vs. STATE (1973) SC 22 the Supreme Court laid down the following criteria to consider when determining whether the principle of double jeopardy applies. The applicant had to show he had been brought before a Court of competent jurisdiction, had appeared before the Court on a criminal charge. He also had to show he had been acquitted or convicted on the charge for which he was brought before the Court. Finally, the Applicant had to prove that the present charge brought before the Court again has the same facts as the offence for which the Applicant had been previously convicted or acquitted. Counsel submitted that the Claimant in the present case had at no time appeared before a court of competent jurisdiction on a criminal Charge. There was no evidence from the Claimant that she was acquitted or convicted of any charge brought by the Defendant. The Claimant did not give evidence of similar facts in relation to two different offences for which she was either acquitted or convicted for. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue 5 in the Defendant’s favour and hold that the findings/decision of the Adhoc committee and the Ministerial Panel does not amount to double jeopardy. With respect to the sixth issue, it is counsel’s submission that the offence of the Claimant was categorized in her Query as a serious misconduct. Rule 030401 defines a serious misconduct as “a specific act of very serious wrong doing and improper behaviour which is inimical to the image of the service, and which can be investigated and if proven may lead to dismissal.” Thus, assuming that the Claimant is an employee of the Defendant, the Rule 030307 of the Public Service Rules provides that: “if upon considering the representation of the officer, the Commission is of the opinion that the officer does not deserve to dismissed from the service but deserves some other punishment, it shall impose on the officer such punishment as it considers appropriate”. Counsel submitted that the Defendant exercised its right in favour of the Claimant by retiring the Claimant instead of dismissing her. See NWAGBARA vs. NIGERIA PRODUCE MARKETING COMPANY LTD (1966) NCLR 196 at 200 cited in Case Law Annotation of the Public Service Rules in Nigeria by Odabi Osaretin Kingsley. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant has failed woefully to prove her case against the Defendant and dismiss the suit as frivolous and vexatious. In the Claimant’s final written address, counsel submitted that the Defendant with a Management Board appointable by the President is a juristic person. The Employment letter of the Claimant was signed by a senior staff of the Defendant on behalf of the Chief Medical Director not the Minister of Health. Submitted further that the victim of the Claimant’s so-called fraudulent action had her purported statement tendered by the DW1 as Exhibit K. He went on that the imaginary Mrs. Peace Emeka’s statement to the Defendant and later disciplinary committee which overnight snowballed into adhoc committee was not corroborated by the said elusive Mrs. Peace Emeka. According to Counsel, it is on record that the said Mrs. Peace Emeka never testified nor was she cross-examined by the claimant’s counsel both at the disciplinary stage and during the hearing of this case in court. Counsel proceeded to raise two preliminary issues thus: 1. Whether a document tendered in evidence by a witness who cannot or is not in a position to answer questions on it is valid? 2. Whether an employee who protests termination yet collects salary has not waived his rights? On the first preliminary issue, counsel submitted that documents will be rightly expunged where the witnesses who tendered the documents were not the makers and cannot be cross-examined on the content of the documents. A court of law is entitled not to place probative value on evidence which does not pass the test of cross-examination. See the case of BUHARI vs. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 415 paras A-B per Tobi JSC in respect thereof. Also, an employee who protests when his contract of employment is terminated, yet collects his or her salary in lieu cannot be said to have waived his right. See the case of NITEL vs. IKARO (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 320) Pg. 350 at Pg. 363 Paras C-E. On the second issue, it is counsel’s opinion that a person cannot waive his salary if he is not aware of certain conditions. Therefore, an employee who was not aware that his appointment was subsisting and that the compulsory retirement was invalid and who asked for payment of three month's salary in lieu of Notice cannot be said to have waived his salary. See ADENIYI vs. GOVERNING COUNCIL YABATECH (1995) 6 NWLR (PT 300) pages 426 at 462. Sequel to these preliminary issues Counsel proffered his arguments on the first three issues for determination raised in the Defendant’s final address as follows: 1. Whether the Defendant as sued, is a juristic person? 2. Whether the Claimant is an employee of the Defendant? 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to be re-called/reinstated as claimed? It is counsel’s contention that the Defendant is a juristic person known to law. This is owing to the fact that the Defendant has a Management Board distinct from that of the Ministry of Health. Also, the employment letter issue to the claimant admitted as Exhibit A stated that “the management of the Federal Medical Centre…has decided to offer you as a messenger…” He submitted further that the Defendant who is in custody of the Claimant’s application ought to have presented the same to the Court to rebut the Claimant’s assertions. Also, it is claimant’s submission that the Claimant was subjected to legally unjustifiable punitive measures only to be compulsorily retired. Thus, Exhibits B and C confirm that the Defendant is a juristic person that can be sued. Furthermore, regarding the third issue, counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to her claims. He stated that the disciplinary measures meted to the Claimant are null and void. He submitted further that the Claimant has no case to answer as she was indeed a victim of extenuating circumstances. He urged the court to resolve this third issue in the Claimant’s favour and grant her reliefs. In the Defendant's reply on points of law to the claimant's final written address filed on 17th November 2015, counsel argued in response to Claimant’s counsel preliminary issues that it is trite Law that admissibility is governed by relevance and that oral testimony is inadmissible to vary, add to or take away from the content of a document. See N.I.D.B vs OLALOMI INDUSTRIES LTD (2002)5 NWLR (Pt. 761)532 RATIO 7. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Exhibits M, N, O, P, Q which the Claimant’s Counsel sought to raise an objection to, are relevant to the case and therefore properly admitted in evidence as Exhibits. Again, it is counsel’s submission that an employee waives his right to protest his termination if he goes ahead to collect his terminal salary which signifies the end of the contract of employment. See Exhibit J, the letter of retirement. In conclusion, counsel submitted that the Claimant has not proffered any credible answer to the final written address of the Defendant. He urged the court to dismiss the suit of the Claimant on the grounds that it is frivolous and vexatious. Court’s decision In the course of evaluating the pleaded facts and evidence adduced by the parties in this matter, my attention was drawn to certain issues raised in the defendant’s defence which I think ought to be considered before delving into the claims of the claimant. One of such issues is the denial by the defendant that it is the employer of the claimant. The import of the facts pleaded by the defendant in paragraphs 3, 4, 10 and 15 of the statement of defence is that the defendant is not the employer of the claimant and in paragraph 16 (b), the defendant contended that it is not the proper party to be sued by the claimant because it is not the claimant’s employer. The claimant’s employer, according to the defendant, is the Federal Ministry of Health. The claimant did plead in paragraph 4 of the statement of the facts that she was employed by the defendant on 17th September 1997. Her employment letter is in evidence as Exhibit A. There is need to examine its content to know who employed the Claimant. In doing that, I do not see the need to set out the entire content of the letter. Only the content relevant to the point at hand will be examined. The letter, which was signed by one R. E. Efuribe, on behalf of the Medical Director and addressed to the Claimant, reads as follows in the 1st paragraph- “OFFER OF TEMPORARY APPPOINTMENT I am directed to inform you that as a result of your interview with the Federal Medical Center (QEH) Umuahia, on 27th August 1997, the management of Federal Medical Centre (QEH) Umuahia has decided to offer you appointment as a messenger on temporary basis at the first instance” The 4th paragraph reads- “During the period of your service with the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia, if it is found you made a false claim/declaration during the interview or that your conduct is found wanting, your services would be terminated without notice. you will obey the rules and regulations of Federal Medical Centre while in the service.” The content of Exhibit A is clear as to who is the employer of the Claimant. There is nothing in the content of Exhibit A suggesting that the Claimant was employed by any other body other than the defendant. Even the defendant could not show any other letter, other than Exhibit A, to this court where the Federal Ministry of Health employed the Claimant. When the Claimant’s employment was regularized in January 2004 vide Exhibit B, it was also the Defendant that regularized her employment. I will not belabor this issue. The employer of the Claimant, as I find in the employment letter, is the Defendant. The learned counsel to the defendant submitted in the 1st issue of his written address, that the defendant is not a competent party to this suit. It is counsel’s further argument that the defendant is only an administrative arm of the Federal Ministry of Health and as such, it is not a juristic person and cannot be sued by the Claimant. This contention of the defendant’s counsel was pleaded in paragraph 5 of the statement of defence where it is averred that the defendant is an administrative creation of the Federal Ministry of Health and the activities of the Defendant is supervised by the said Ministry. In Paragraph 16 (a) of the Statement of Defence, the Defendant categorically averred that it is not a juristic person. DW1 also gave evidence on the fact that the Defendant is not a juristic person in paragraphs 7 and 18 of his evidence. Although there is no evidence to prove the averments contained in the claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, she has pleaded however in paragraph 3 (ii) of the reply, in response to the allegation that the defendant is not a juristic person, as follows: “The defendant is a juristic person under the law whether acting for the Federal Ministry of Health and or Minister of Health…” and in paragraph 3 (v), it was pleaded that “the defendant, Federal Ministry of Health, and the Minister of Health are interrelated, inseparable and have maintained a water tight symbiotic relationship administratively…” The claimant further averred in paragraph 5 (viii) of the reply that the defendant is a legal entity and a juristic person. It is evident in this suit that the parties have joined issues as to whether or not the Federal Medical Center is a juristic person who can be sued. I am aware that this issue is prevalent in most of the suits to which the Federal Medical Centre is a defending party. The FMC is always quick to extricate itself from actions instituted against it by contending that it is not a juristic personality. Generally, the law recognizes two categories of persons who can sue and be sued in the court. They are natural persons or artificial persons or institutions having juristic personality. A party who commences an action in court or who is sued to court must be a person known to law. ZAIN NIG. LTD vs. ILORIN (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 681) 1518 at 1550; N.F.C.A. vs. LALOKO (2003) FWLR (Pt. 144) 482 at 495-496; GENEVA vs. AFRIBANK NIG. PLC (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 702) 1652 at 1678. The concept of legal personality of artificial bodies is that by virtue of their incorporation or establishment, they have acquired rights and subject to obligations and duties and are empowered at law to sue and be sued. The Defendant has contended that it is not a juristic person capable of being sued and, although the Claimant pleaded in paragraph 3 (ii) of her reply to the statement of defence that the defendant is a juristic person under the law, neither the claimant, in her evidence, nor her counsel, in his written address, have been able to point this court to any such law or statute or Act where the defendant was established or created. In the absence of proof of the law establishing the defendant, the defendant’s explanation in paragraph 5 of its statement of defence that it is only an administrative creation of the Federal Ministry of Health, is more plausible. It may appear from the foregoing facts that the Defendant is not a creation of statute but does that imply it cannot be sued? From the facts of this case, the defendant has some functions, undertakes some duties and has taken action against the claimant which resulted in the termination of the claimant’s employment. In the exercise of the defendant’s functions and duties, the rights of other persons will most certainly be affected, as is the complaint in this case. If in the exercise of its functions the right of anyone is infringed can it be said that it cannot be sued simply because it was not created by statute? This question was answered in THOMAS vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE BOARD (1965) 1 All NLR 174 where the Supreme Court observed that with regards to unincorporated bodies which have power to do certain acts which can result in injury to others is that they must impliedly be taken to have power to sue and sued for those acts. See also KPEBIMOH vs. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, WESTERN IJAW TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE (1966) 1 NMLR 130. Thus, the law is that it is not only natural persons or corporation (aggregate or sole) that has the attribute to sue and be sued. There are bodies which are impliedly conferred with right to sue or be sued though unincorporated. They are not legal personae strictu sensu but have a right to sue or be sued by a particular name. The Federal Medical Centre is an establishment of the Federal Government and the name is nationally acknowledged. As a Federal institution with a Management Board, recognized functions, powers, duties, responsibilities and power of discipline over staff, it cannot be doubted that in the exercise of these functions and powers, rights of third parties would necessarily be affected and it will amount to injustice if such third parties cannot seek redress against the FMC for any wrong done to them. In KPEBIMOH vs. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, WESTERN IJAW TEACHERS TRAINING COLLEGE (supra) AT 133, the instance where an unincorporated body can be sued was put, and quite rightly in my view, as follows: "Now, although a corporation and an individual or individuals may be the only entity known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is competent to the Legislature to give to an association of individuals which is neither a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual a capacity for owning property and acting by agents, and such capacity in the absence of express enactment to the contrary involves the necessary correlative of liability to the extent of such property for the acts and defaults of such agents. It is beside the mark to say of such an association that it is unknown to the common law. Also, in CARLEN (NIG.) LIMITED vs. UNIVERSITY OF JOS [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 323) 631, it was held that a thing which can own property, which can employ servants, and which can inflict injury, must be taken to have impliedly been given the power to make it suable in a court of law for injuries purposely done by it. The fact that FMC can be sued, particularly in issues of contract of employment of its staff, was demonstrated in the Court of Appeal decisions in these cases: Federal Medical Centre, IDO-EKITI vs. OLAJIDE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 593) 1944; Federal Medical Centre, IDO-EKITI vs. KOLAWOLE (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 653) 1999; Federal Medical Centre, IDO-EKITI vs. MICHAEL (2012) LPELR 20406(CA). From all I have been saying above, and in view of the Court of Appeal cases cited above, I hold the view that the defendant can be sued for its acts. Having come to that conclusion, the defendant’s contention that it cannot be sued because it is not a juristic person holds no water. I will now consider the case of the Claimant. Having thoroughly examined this case, the simple issue which is to be determined in this judgment is whether the claimant has proved her case as to entitle her to the reliefs sought in this suit? A careful analysis of the long and windy claim in relief 1 of the Complaint will reveal that the summary of it is the Claimant’s allegation that the termination of her employment or compulsory retirement from the defendant’s employment on 29th August 2013 is unlawful, null and void. It is in consequence of the claim she sought from this court, as per her 2nd relief, an order to reinstate her to the employment. The Claimant as CW1 gave evidence in line with facts pleaded in her statement of facts. It is her evidence that she is an employee of the Defendant having been so employed on 17th September 1997 vide Exhibit A. Her employment was later on confirmed on 28th April 2000 and regularized on 5th January 2004 vide Exhibits C and B respectively. As a result of her hard work, she was promoted and her salary was increased in Exhibit D dated 8th December 2010. The Claimant also stated that she did apply to change her name after her marriage and the Defendant approved the change by a letter dated 2nd December 2010 which is Exhibit E. The Claimant went further that upon an allegation received by the Defendant against her, she was suspended for two weeks without payment of her salary. The suspension letter is in evidence as Exhibit F. In the claimant’s words, she stated thus: “In my helpless and frenzied situation, I was maligned, humiliated and irresponsibly caricatured”. The claimant also testified that the defendant terminated and or compulsorily retired her via a letter dated the 29th August 2013, which is exhibit G. According to the claimant, her “administrative trial and judgment thereto by the defendant lacked the modicum of transparency” and she was also “muzzled” by the defendant during trial. Her counsel wrote a letter, Exhibit H, to the Defendant demanding her reinstatement but the Defendant did not reply the letter till date. Exhibit I is the pre-action notice she served on the defendant before instituting this action. The claimant concluded that it is on account of these facts she claims the reliefs sought in this suit. In an action of this nature where an employee complains or alleges that the termination of his or her employment is wrongful or unlawful or null and void, the employee is under duty to plead and prove the terms of the contract of employment and in what manner the said terms of the contract were breached by the employer. It is not the duty of an employer, who is the defendant to an action brought by an employee, to prove that the contract of employment was not breached. See PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE vs. MATTHEW (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 623) 1949 at 1967. The requirement for the burden of proof on the employee was expressed in these words by the Supreme Court in ZIIDEEH vs. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 354) 243 at 258:- “It has been firmly established that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus (a) to place before the court the terms of the contract of employment and (b) to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. The law is that it is not the duty of the employer as a defendant in an action brought by the employee to prove any of these facts” See also KATTO vs. C.B.N (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 at 405; W.A.E.C vs. OSHIONEBO (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 370) 1501 at 1512. The point must be made here that whether the subject of the complaint is termination of employment or compulsory retirement as in this case or dismissal or suspension, the principle on the onus of proof placed on the employee is the same. Therefore, in this case that the claimant has alleged and sought this court to declare that the termination of her employment or her compulsory retirement from employment is unlawful, null and void, the onus is on her to first place before the court the terms of her contract of employment and then prove in what manner the terms of contract of employment was breached in respect of the alleged compulsory retirement/termination of her employment. In other words, the Claimant is expected to relate her employment to a condition of service and then show to this court the way and manner her employment may be terminated under the condition of service and how the laid down procedure was not followed by the defendant in the termination of her employment. The facts of the Claimant’s complaint in this suit about her compulsory retirement from the defendant’s employment or termination of her employment is contained in paragraphs 9 to 11 of the statement of facts. The facts pleaded in these paragraphs are as follow: “9. The claimant avers that the defendant upon allegation received against her as incorporated in an administrative letter and suspension thereto was suspended for two weeks without payment of her salary. The claimant in her helpless and frenzied situation, was maligned, humiliated and irresponsibly caricatured. 10. The claimant avers that the defendant terminated and or compulsorily retired her via a letter dated the 29th August 2013. 11. The claimant aver that her administrative trial and judgment thereto by the defendant lacked the modicum of transparency, more so when she was muzzled by the defendant during trial.” These facts were reproduced verbatim in the deposition of the claimant as the evidence of the allegation of unlawful retirement from the employment of the defendant. The claimant filed a reply to the defendant’s statement of defence on 31/10/2014 but there is no evidence to prove the facts pleaded in the reply. It is settled law that pleadings are not evidence and where no witness is called to substantiate pleaded facts, the pleaded facts are deemed abandoned by the party and are liable to be struck out by the court. See NEPA vs. ADEBGERO (2003) FWLR (Pt. 139) 1556; I.N.E.C vs. A.C (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 480) 732 at 803. This court will therefore deem the Claimant’s Reply to the Statement of Defence as having been abandoned and it is consequently hereby struck out. I have reviewed the Claimant’s pleadings and evidence all over but I find that she did not plead the condition of service. I cannot also find anywhere where she set out the terms of her employment nor how the terms have been breached by the defendant. The entire substance of the claimant’s case against the defendant is as pleaded in the paragraphs set out above. From the Claimant’s pleading and evidence, she merely alleged that her employment was terminated and or compulsorily retired and that “her administrative trial by the defendant lacked the modicum of transparency” and that “she was muzzled by the defendant during trial”. Besides failing to tell this court how these allegations constitute a breach of the terms of the condition of service, the Claimant also failed to give particulars of the alleged lack of transparency in the administrative trial or how she was “muzzled” during the trial. It is a clear principle of law that the burden in this case rest on the claimant and neither the court nor the defendant can help the claimant to establish her case. The claimant’s counsel attempted to window dress the claimant’s case in his final written address. The submission of the learned Counsel to the Claimants contains facts which were not pleaded nor given in evidence by the Claimant. It is the law that the address of counsel cannot take the place of pleading or evidence. See IBIKUNLE vs. LAWANI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 398) 359. Therefore, Counsel’s attempt to develop the Claimant’s case in the final written address is of no use. The cumulative result of the failure by the Claimant to establish the basic requirements placed on her in this case is that the Claimant’s case is insubstantial and lacking in merit. Consequently, I find that the Claimant has failed to prove her case. Her claims fail and the suit is accordingly dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge