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Representation: U. E. Chionye for the Claimant/Respondents Grant Osu for the Defendants/Applicants RULING This suit was commenced by way of complaint dated and filed the 25th day of June 2015, wherein the Claimant claims against the Defendants as follows: 1. A Declaration that the termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants based on the letter of appointment issued to the Claimant as a “student nurse” dated 24/10/79 instead of the letter of appointment issued to her as a “staff nurse” dated 30/6/83 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A Declaration that the appointment of the Claimant as a “staff nurse” on 30/6/83 and her subsequent confirmation on 6/8/85 and promotion to the post of Deputy Director of Nursing Services with the 1st Defendant is still subsisting. 3. An order setting aside the purported termination of the appointments of the Claimant by the Defendants which was based on letters of appointments issued to her as a student nurse. 4. An Order directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant her full salary for the month of October 2014 and other subsequent months until her appointment is properly terminated. 5. An Order directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant her promotion salary arrears from the 1st of January 2014 to the date of judgment in this suit. 6. An Order directing the Defendants to recall the Claimant to her duty post as Deputy Director of Nursing Services at the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia. 7. The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) being general damages against the defendants for unlawful termination of the appointment of the Claimant from the services of the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia. 8. An order of injunction restraining the Defendants from further terminating the appointment of the Claimant from the services of Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia based on the letter of appointment issued to her as a student nurse. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection brought pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1 (1) & (2) and Order 5 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, the Defendants/Applicants’ Counsel sought an order striking out this suit on the ground that this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain same. The grounds of objection are as follows: 1. That the Claimant initiated this suit by a writ of summons dated 25/06/2015 and filed the same day. 2. That the act of the Defendants the Claimant is seeking redress against or complaining about occurred or happened in the month of October 2014. 3. That all the Defendants against whom the Claimant initiated this suit on 25/06/2015 are Public Officers. 4. That the Defendants performed the act the Claimant are complaining against in their capacity as Public Officers. 5. That the Claimant commenced this suit against the Defendants more than 3 (three) months after its occurrence. 6. That the Claimant by not commencing this suit within 3 (three) months next after the act, her originating processes is a nullity and failed to clothe this Honourable Court with jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In support of this application is an affidavit of 12 paragraphs deposed to by Miss Chibuzo Ogbonna, a Litigation Clerk in the Defendant/Applicant’s Law Office. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Applicants stated that the Claimant/Respondent is a former staff of the 1st Defendant; she was retired from the employment of the 1st Defendant a public institution in the month of October 2014. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are public officers. Counsel then raised one issue for the determination of the court, which is: “Whether bearing in mind the facts pleaded by the Claimant in her Statement of Claim and the provisions of Section 2(a) of POPA, this Honourable Court can be said to be clothed with the jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.” Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) Cap P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigerian (LFN) 2004, which states that: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or irrespective of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison." He submitted further that the proviso of Section 2(a) POPA does not avail the Claimants, as the act they are complaining against is not of a continuous nature and they did plead the fact that they were not held in a prison facility as a convict prisoner since March, 2014 and October, 2014 when their cause of action accrued. In determining the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether an action is statute-barred the Court has to consider the facts as deposed to in affidavits, the writ of summons, the Statement of Claim and the relevant statutes of limitation. Counsel referred to the case of AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt.1310) 137 at 169-170 paras O-A, where the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines in determining an action which is statute- barred thus: "The yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute-barred are: (a) The date when the cause of action accrued (b) The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the writ of summons (c) Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question. Time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues.” Counsel submitted that from the writ of summons and the Statement of Claim filed in court, the cause of action for the 1st Claimant accrued in the month of March 2014 and for the 2nd Claimant, the cause of action accrued in the month of October, 2014 while they commenced this suit on 03/03/2015, beyond the three months period contemplated by Section 2(a) of POPA. Counsel referred to the case of AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra) where the Supreme Court at Page 169 held as follows: “The essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action.” It is Counsel’s further contention that the scope of Section 2 (a) of POPA covers both natural and artificial persons, such as the defendants in this case, and it affords them protection when they have acted pursuant to their duties as public officers irrespective of their motive. See IBRAHIM vs. J. S. C. KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC & ORS. vs. F G. N. & ORS (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309. Jurisdiction being a threshold issue can be raised and taken even before the defendant files his statement of defence. Thus, this application challenging the jurisdiction of this court transcends the provisions of the rules of this court and can be rightly taken at this stage of trial. From the foregoing, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for being incompetent on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In opposition to the preliminary objection, the Claimants filed a counter-affidavit of 8 paragraphs. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Claimants submitted that limitation of action is the principle of law which requires the Plaintiff as a matter of obligation to seek prompt remedy for the breach of his right in a court of law within the time limited by the law, otherwise his right of action or cause of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. He submitted further that the challenge of the Claimants' suit on the ground that the suit is statute barred cannot be done by way of preliminary objection. The law requires that it must be sufficiently pleaded or otherwise it is deemed to have been waived. See the case of BAKARE vs. NRC (2007) 32 NSQ, 306 at 577 (2005). Counsel referred to the case of U.B.R.B.D.A. vs. ALKA (1998) 2 NWLR (Part 537) 328 at page 339 paragraphs G-H, where it was held that “where a defendant relies on a special defence like statute of limitation, it is trite that such a defence has to be specifically pleaded". It is Counsel’s contention that the 1st Defendant is not a natural person that can be protected by the Public Officers’ Protection Act. See U.B.R.B.D.A. vs. ALKA (Supra) at pages 341-342 paras H-B, NATIONAL BANK (NIG) LTD vs. SHOYEYE (NIG) (1972) 5 SC 181 and SKENCONSULT (NIG) vs. UKEY (1981) l SC 6. The extant case involves termination of appointment and non-payment of salary, which borders on contract and not tort. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection. Sequel to this Preliminary Objection, the Claimants filed a motion on notice pursuant to Order 11(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 seeking as follows: 1. An order granting leave to the claimants/applicants to amend their statement of facts establishing the cause of action in terms of the underlined in the proposed amended statement of facts establishing the cause of action exhibited as 'A' in the affidavit in support of the motion. 2. An order deeming the amended statement of facts establishing the cause of action exhibited as 'B' in the affidavit in support of this motion as properly filed and served appropriate filing fees having been paid. 3. An order permitting the claimants/applicants to withdraw the first written statement on oaths dated 25/6/2015 and replace same with written statements on oath of the claimants exhibited as ‘C’ & ‘C1’ in the affidavit in support of his motion and to deem same as having been served, appropriate filing fees having been paid. The motion for amendment is supported by an affidavit of 8 paragraphs deposed to by Barrister Jessy Ezekwe, a legal practitioner in the Claimants’ Counsel’s Chambers. In the accompanying address, counsel submitted that an amendment of court process can be made at any time even on appeal. See the case of AKINKUOWO vs. FAFIMOJU (1965) NMLR 349. He went further that in litigation, it is the duty of the court to aim at and to do substantial justice and allow formal amendments as are necessary for the ultimate achievement of justice. Counsel referred to the case of ADEWUNMI vs. AG EKITI STATE (2002) 9 WRN 51 at 71 and urged the Court to grant the application for amendment. Learned Counsel for the Defendants opposed the Claimants’ motion for amendment by filing a 12- paragraph counter affidavit denying the Claimants’ averments in their affidavit in support of their application, and also opposing the Claimants’ application to amend their processes in this suit. In the accompanying address, Counsel distilled one issue for the determination, which is: “Whether the Claimant, if allowed to amend her processes in this suit at this stage, the amendment will not take away the defendants’ right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to the defendants.” It is the argument of Counsel that if this Court grants the Claimants' application to amend their processes at this stage of the trial, such amendment would have the effect of taking away the Defendants right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to the Defendants. He submitted further that the right of the defendants being referred to here, which has vested, is the right to protection from prosecution, conferred on the defendants who are all public officers by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) Cap P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC (supra); AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra) 11 NWLR; A.G ADAMAWA STATE vs. A. G. FEDERATION (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1428) 515. The extant amendment sought by the Claimants would take away the defendants existing right at the time of the amendment. Counsel referred to the case of UBA PLC vs. ABDULLAHI (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt.807) 359 at 379- 380 paras H-B, where it was held thus: “It is therefore, settled that amendment of writ of summons or pleading which will have the effect of reviving a cause of action which is barred by the Statute of limitation at the time of amendment is not permissible. It is not permissible because it would take away the defendants' right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to him. The proposed cause of action is different from the existing ones and its introduction is intended respectfully to over-reach the appellant. An amendment which will prejudice the other party will not be accepted. The courts are created to do substantial and not cloistered justice”. Counsel submitted that substantial justice in this case will be met if the Court dismisses the Claimants’ application to amend their Statement of Facts and written statements on oath. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimants’ cause of action accrued in the months of March and October, 2014 and not in February 2015 as proposed by paragraph 7 of their proposed amended statement of facts and paragraph 8 of the 1st Claimant’s written Statement on Oath. It is Counsel’s further submission that the preliminary objection ought to be taken first before the court considers the propriety of the amendment the Claimants seek. Counsel referred to the cases of: 1. A.G. FEDERATION vs. FAFUNWA ONIKOYI (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) 51; 2. NIGERIAN NAVY vs. GARRICK (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 969) 69; 3. OKOROCHA vs. PDP (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1406) 213. Counsel urged the Court to refuse the amendment of processes sought by the Claimants and dismiss the Claimants’ application. The Defendants filed a further affidavit of 11 paragraphs in answer to the new issues raised in the Claimants’ Counter affidavit. A Reply on Points of Law was filed alongside this further affidavit. In reply to the Claimants Counsel’s submission that an objection to a suit being statute barred cannot be done by way of preliminary objection, the Defendants’ Counsel submitted that the Claimants' submission is no longer the true position of the law. He referred to the case of HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 619, where the Supreme Court held that a preliminary objection predicated on Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, is a point of law touching on the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate upon a matter before it. And that the objection (point of law) being a fundamental and a threshold issue, should, in the best interest of justice, where it is raised in any proceedings, be dealt with at the earliest opportunity. He also referred to the case of ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. l001) 76 at pages 135-136 Paras H-A. Counsel submitted further that the Rules of this Court has no provisions for the filing of statement of defence alone with or before a preliminary objection on a point of law touching on the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate upon a matter before it can be raised. In the event such provisions exist, the law is settled that even mandatory Rules of court are not as sacrosanct as mandatory Statute or Act; and that Rules of Court do not override Statutory provisions of the law. See KOTOYE vs. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126; AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra); ALHAJI EDUN vs. ODAN COMMUNITY & ORS (1980) 11 SC103 at 124. Also, contrary to the Claimants Counsel’s submission that the 1st Defendant is not a natural person that can be protected by the Public Officers’ Protection Act; counsel argued that the scope of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act covers both national and artificial persons. Counsel submitted further that the position of the law is that Section 2(a) of POPA applies to all cases whether the case is founded in contract or in tort. The exceptions to the protection a public officer enjoys under Section 2( a) of POPA is when it is shown that the public officer acted in bad faith, or acted in abuse of office or maliciously or with no semblance of legal justification or acted outside the scope of his authority. See HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547, C.S.N vs. OKOJIE (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt 882) 488. See SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC &ORS vs. FGN & ORS (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 337 to 338 paras H-C. In the light of the foregoing arguments, Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the Claimant’s submission and make the following holdings: 1. That the defendants rightly filed their notice of preliminary objection without filing their statement of defence in this suit. 2. Flowing from the above pronouncements of the court in the foregoing cited cases on this issue as to the scope of Section 2(a) POPA, the 1st Defendant in this suit is protected by Section 2(a) of POPA. Court’s Decision From the foregoing summary of the submissions of the counsels to the parties in their written addresses, it is evident that two applications are involved in this ruling. They are the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection and the claimant’s motion for the amendment of the statement of facts and substitution of the witness statement. My record shows that the defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection was filed first and the ground of the Preliminary Objection is that the claimant’s suit is statute barred because it was not filed within 3 months from the date of the cause of action. After the claimant was served the application, she filed the motion to amend the statement of facts. Both applications were heard together. It is the law that in determining whether a suit is statute barred or not, the processes to which recourse should be had are the writ and the statement of claim. It is from these processes the date of accrual of the cause of action and the date the suit was filed can be deduced. The principle was stated in AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506-507 as follows- “In order to determine if a party’s action is statute barred, the court is only enjoined to look at the plaintiffs’ claims. The period of limitation is determined in a case by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim which alleges when the wrong suffered by the plaintiff was committed and placing it side by side with the date on which the writ was issued”. See also JSF INV. LTD vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902. I observed that the contention in the Preliminary Objection is based on the averments in the claimant’s statement of facts filed on 25th June 2015. The claimant has now put up an application to amend the statement of facts. I see a need to first determine which of the statement of facts is to be examined in determining the Preliminary Objection. Therefore, notwithstanding the trite law that issue of jurisdiction be considered first, in the circumstances of the applications under consideration however, it is my view that the claimant’s motion should be determined first. The reliefs sought by the claimant in her motion have earlier been set out in this ruling. The sum of the reliefs is that the claimant seeks the leave of this court to amend her statement of facts and to substitute the statement on oath filed on 25/6/2015 with the statement on oath annexed as Exhibit ‘C’ to the motion. In the affidavit in support of the motion; deposed to by one Barrister Jessy Ezekwe, a counsel in the law firm representing the claimant in this suit; it is deposed that upon going through the Statement of Facts and the Statement on Oath of the Claimant filed on 25/6/2015, he discovered some errors which were caused by his office and which were not the fault of the Claimant. The said errors have now been corrected as reflected in the exhibited Amended Statement of Facts and that there is also need to substitute the Statement on Oath of the Claimant with another written statement on oaths of the Claimant which contained the amended facts. The deponent averred that the application is not intended to over-reach and is not brought in bad faith but only to correct the mistakes made by his office in preparing the process. The defendant, in opposing the claimant’s motion, filed a counter affidavit which was deposed to be one Chibuzo Ogbonna of Okey Amechi, SAN &Partners. It is averred therein that there are no errors at all in the Claimants Statement of Facts and written statement on Oath as alleged in the affidavit in support of the motion. The deponent then went on take on the averments in paragraph 10 of the proposed statement of facts and stated that the amendment the claimant seeks to introduce by paragraph 10 of her proposed amended Statement of Fact is a figments of the Claimant's imagination because since the month of October 2014 when the Claimant retired from the employment of the 1st Defendant, she has never come to work in any capacity in any of the offices or departments of the 1st defendant and that since the month of October 2014, the 3rd Defendant has not seen nor had any interaction with the Claimant. The deponent further stated that the 3rd defendant did not orally inform the Claimant on 15/06/2015 to stop work as falsely alleged by the claimant in paragraph 10 of her proposed amended Statement of Facts. It is also averred that the office and position the Claimant vacated in October 2014 by reason of her retirement has since been occupied by other qualified Nurses and Mid-wives who have been promoted and posted to occupy same. It is further deposed that the amendment the Claimant seeks to introduce is aimed to defeat the defendants notice of preliminary objection and that by bringing this application after the defendants have filed their Notice of Preliminary Objection, is a show of bad faith and the application is intended to overreach and prejudice the defendants. The deponent concluded that it will not be in the interest of justice to allow the claimant to amend her processes at this stage of the trial. Let me state here that what is to be considered with respect to the claimant’s motion is whether the application should be granted or not and not whether the facts to be introduced into the statement of facts by the amendment sought are true or not. What the defendant has done in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit is to descend into the facts of the amendment sought. The defendant almost turned the counter affidavit to a statement of defence. In my view, to consider those facts averred by the defendant in these paragraphs of the counter affidavit will entail that the merit of the facts to be introduced by the amendment sought will be examined in this ruling. This is not the stage to do that. The defendants will have their opportunity to express these facts stated in the counter affidavit in a statement of defence if at all this motion is eventually granted. I will therefore discountenance the averments in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit in the consideration of the application. Generally, courts have the inherent powers to allow amendments to pleadings of the parties at any stage of the proceedings. The exercise of this power to allow amendment is at the discretion of this court which discretion is to be exercised in favour of doing justice in each particular case. See IGWE vs. KALU (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 677 at 712. The principle has been emphasized that the court will normally grant leave to amend unless- i. The application for amendment is made mala fide, ii. If it will entail injustice to the respondent, iii. The proposed amendment will cause undue delay or is irrelevant or useless or merely raises a technical point, iv. The amendment has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated for by cost, v. The application is designed to overreach the respondent, vi. The amendment will result in a party being confronted with an entirely new case at an extremely late stage of the trial or is in conflict with the evidence already given in the trial. See AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 658; IGWE vs. KALU (SUPRA) at 717; LAMBU vs. ISYAKAU (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 640) 1295 at 1329-1331. Thus, an amendment of pleading is allowed for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties and it can be made at any stage of the proceeding unless such amendment will entail injustice or surprise to the other party or the applicant is acting mala fide or by his blunder the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by cost. SEE NIGERIAN DYNAMIC LTD vs. DUMBAI (2002) FWLR (Pt. 105) 823 at 831. Exhibit A annexed to the affidavit in support of the motion is the proposed amended statement of facts. The amendments introduced therein have been underlined and it can be seen that the amendment affects only paragraphs 4, 10 and relief 1. The new facts introduced to the paragraphs read as follows- Paragraph 4- The Queen Elizabeth Specialist Hospital now known as Federal Medical Centre Umuahia was also part of the Health management Board of Imo State before it was taken over by the Federal Government. Paragraph 10- The claimant avers that upon receiving the said letter of promotion aforesaid on 17/2/2015, she continued to discharge her duty until she was orally informed by the 3rd defendant on behalf of the other defendants on 15th June 2015 that she should stop work without any written letter of termination of appointment given to her. The claimant was not paid her full salary for October 2014 and her salaries for the subsequent months up to June 2015. Relief 1- The date 15/6/2015 was inserted as the date of termination of the claimant’s employment. These are the same facts introduced into the witness statement on oath which is to substitute the existing one. Having looked at the proposed amendments to the statement of facts, it is clear to me that the facts averred therein are materially on the same cause of action as the statement of facts sought to be amended and the facts flow from the same set of circumstance giving rise to the facts already before this court. The facts have not departed from or changed the character of the claimants’ case. The reliefs sought on the amendment have not changed from the original relief sought on the Complaint. I have also observed that this is the first time the claimant seeks to amend her processes in this case, which case has not proceeded to hearing stage. I have also observed that the defendants have not filed any statement of defence in this case. I cannot thereof see any injustice or injury which will be caused to the defendants nor how they will be overreached by the amendments sought to be made. The defendants have urged this court, in their counter affidavit, to refuse the amendment because it is aimed at defeating the Notice of Preliminary Objection filed by the defendant. The fact that the defendants have filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection which seeks to take advantage of a defect in the claimant’s case is not a reason to refuse an amendment to the statement of facts if it has merit. Even at that, the position of the law is that it is better to grant an application which seeks to cure a defect in a suit to save it than the one which seeks to destroy the suit. Upon a thorough look at the facts of this application, it appears to me that none of the situations for refusing an amendment as enumerated above is present in this application. The reason for seeking the amendment has been given in the affidavit in support as being a result from the errors of the claimant’s counsel while preparing the processes. It is settled principle of law that mistake of counsel should not be visited on litigant. In AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 676, the Supreme Court, Per ADEREMI JSC, held as follows- “In the preparation of pleadings, counsels are bound to or may be prone to make mistakes. Then must a party lose his right to have the dispute between him and his adversary decided on its merit simply because a mistake has been made in the preparation of the pleadings? I think not. It must always be remembered that the object of the court is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for the mistake which they may make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise in accordance with their rights… After all, courts do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of deciding issues in controversy” It is also trite law that in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to amend pleadings, the court is to focus at doing substantial justice to all the parties in the matter. Therefore, the whole essence of amendment of pleading is to enable the court decide the rights of the parties and not punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases. Leave to amend pleadings ought to be allowed if by so doing the real question between the parties can be raised between the parties. In BANK OF BARODA vs. IYALABANI COMPANY LTD (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 494 at 527 it was held that- “An amendment should be granted as may be proper for the purpose of determining the real question or questions in controversy between the parties”. The amendment sought by the claimant, as I see it, can only be for the purpose of determining the real issues in dispute between the parties. In my considered view also, the amendment sought will not in any way overreach the defendants nor result in injustice to them. It is only to enable the claimant put before this court, the whole facts of her case. It appears to me to be in the interest of justice to grant leave to the claimant to amend the statement of facts and the substitute the witness statement. The Claimant has also filed a copy of the amended statement of facts in line with the proposed amendment in Exhibit A. It is for the foregoing reasons that the claimant’s application is granted. The court hereby orders as follows- i. Leave is granted to the Claimant to amend the statement of facts and to substitute the witness statement on oath filed on 25/6/2015. ii. The amended statement of facts filed along with this application and the witness statement on oath filed on 14th October 2015, are deemed as properly filed and served. The defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection can now be considered. The defendants want this court to strike out this suit on the ground that it is statute barred by effect of the Public Officers protection Act. The depositions in the affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection are to the effect that the claimant’s suit was filed on 25/06/2015 in which the Claimant is seeking redress against an act that occurred in October 2014. It is further averred that the Defendants are Public Officers and the acts of the defendants being challenged in this suit was done in the official capacity of the defendants as Public Officers. It is also stated that the Claimant did not commence this suit within 3 (three) months of the cause of action, hence this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The counter affidavit of the claimant in opposition to the Preliminary Objection contain that the act of the Defendants against which the Claimant brought this suit occurred on 15/6/2015 and that this action was commenced within the stipulated three months. The learned counsel for the defendants have cited Section 2 (a) of POPA and argued that by that provision, the claimant’s suit is statute barred. The said Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides- “Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or any public duty or authority, in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, Duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained or, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The effect of the above provision of the Public Officers Protection Act is that where actions against public officers in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty of authority the or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act or law, duty or authority, is not instituted within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action, the action will be statute barred and can no longer be entertained by the courts. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 417) 155 at 182. There is no dispute in this application that the defendants are public officers and they have been sued in this action in respect of the termination of the claimant’s employment and refusal to pay her salaries. The facts are clear that the defendants were sued in respect of alleged default in the execution of their public duty and authority. The question, however, is whether the claimant filed this suit against the defendants within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose? In order to determine whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred, there is the need to determine when the cause of action arose and when this suit was filed. There appears to be no dispute as to when the suit was filed. It is clear from the record that the suit was filed on 25th June 2015. The area of disagreement between the parties is the date the claimant’s cause of action arose. While the defendants contend that the cause of action arose in October 2014, the claimant maintains that her cause of action arose on 15th June 2015. There is need at this point to examine the claimant’s pleading in order to discover when her cause of action arose. I have stated earlier that the cause of the claimant’s action is the termination of her employment. When did this occur? In paragraph 7 and 10 of the amended statement of fact, the claimant averred that she was promoted on 31st January 2015 and she received the letter on 17th February 2015. She continued to discharge her duties until on 15th June 2015 when the 3rd defendant told her to stop work. The claimant claims in relief 1, a declaration that the termination of her employment on 15th June 2015 is unlawful, null and void. It is clear from these facts of the claimant’s case that her cause of action arose from the date she alleged her employment was terminated, being 15th June 2015. The period from the date of the termination of the employment and the date this suit was filed is a period of 10 days. This period is less than 3 months. It thus implies that the claimant filed this suit within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. I find that the suit is not statute barred. Therefore, the Preliminary Objection has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge