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Representation: U. E. Chionye for the Claimants/Respondents Grant Osu for the Defendants/Applicants RULING This suit was commenced by way of complaint dated and filed the 3rd day of March 2015, wherein the Claimants claim against the Defendants as follows: 1. A Declaration that the termination of the appointment of the 1st Claimant MRS. A. C. CHUKWUNYERE by the Defendants based on the letter of appointment issued to the 1st Claimant as a student nurse dated 23/3/79 instead of the letter of appointment issued to the 1st Claimant as a staff nurse dated 4/8/82 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2. A Declaration that the appointment of the 1st Claimant MRS. A. C. CHUKWUNYERE as a staff nurse on 4/8/82 and her subsequent confirmation on 7/11/85 and promotion to the post of Deputy Director of Nursing Services with the 1st Defendant is still subsisting. 3. A Declaration that the termination of the appointment of the 2nd Claimant MRS. SYBIL ONWUDIEGWU by the Defendants based on the letter of appointment issued to the 2nd Claimant as a student Nurse dated 24/10/79 instead of the letter of appointment issued to the 2nd Claimant MRS. SYBIL ONWUDIEGWU as a staff nurse dated 30/9/83 is unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 4. A Declaration that the appointment of the 2nd Claimant MRS. SYBIL ONWUDIEGWU as a staff nurse on 30/9/83 and her subsequent confirmation on 2/6/86 and promotion to the post of Deputy Director of Nursing Services with the 1st Defendant is still subsisting. 5. An order setting aside the purported termination of the appointments of the Claimants by the Defendants which was based on letters of appointments issued to them as student nurses. 6. An Order directing the Defendants to pay to the 1st Claimant her full salary for the month of March 2014 and other subsequent months until her appointment is properly terminated. 7. An Order directing the Defendants to pay to the 2nd Claimant her full salary for the month of October 2014 and other subsequent months until her appointment is properly terminated. 8. An Order directing the Defendants to recall the Claimants to their duty posts respectively as Deputy Directors of Nursing Services at the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia. 9. The sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) as general damages against the defendants for unlawful termination of the appointments of the Claimants from the services of the Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia. 10. An injunction restraining the Defendants from further terminating the appointments of the Claimants from the services of Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia based on the respective letters of appointment issued to them as student nurses. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection brought pursuant to Orders 11(1) (1)&(2) and 5(3) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, the Defendants/Applicants’ Counsel sought an order striking out this suit on the ground that this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain same. The grounds of objection are as follows: 1. That the Claimants initiated this suit by a writ of summons dated 3/3/2015 and filed the same day. 2. That the act of the Defendants the 1st Claimant is seeking redress against or complaining about occurred or happened in the month of March, 2014. 3. That the act of the Defendants the 2nd Claimant is seeking redress against or complaining about occurred or happened in the month of October, 2014 4. That all the Defendants against whom the Claimants initiated this suit on 3/3/2015 are Public Officers 5. That the Defendants performed the act the Claimants are complaining against in their capacity as Public Officers 6. That the Claimants commenced this suit against the Defendants more than 3 (three) months after its occurrence 7. That the Claimants by not commencing this suit within 3 (three) months next after the act, their originating processes is a nullity and failed to clothe this Honourable Court with jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The application was supported with an affidavit of 13 paragraphs deposed to by one Miss Chibuzo Ogbonna, a Litigation Clerk. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Applicants stated that the Claimants/Respondents are former staff of the 1st Defendant and were retired from the employment of the 1st Defendant a public institution in the months of March 2014 and October 2014 respectively. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are public officers. Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) Cap P 41 Laws of the Federation of Nigerian (LFN) 2004, which states that: “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or irrespective of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison." He submitted further that the proviso of Section 2(a) POPA does not avail the Claimants, as the act they are complaining against is not of a continuous nature and they did plead the fact that they were not held in a prison facility as a convict prisoner since March, 2014 and October, 2014 when their cause of action accrued. In determining the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether an action is statute-barred the Court has to consider the facts as deposed to in affidavits, the writ of summons, the Statement of Claim and the relevant statutes of limitation. Counsel referred to the case of AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt.1310) 137 at 169-170 paras O-A, where the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines in determining an action which is statute- barred thus: "The yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute-barred are: (a) The date when the cause of action accrued (b) The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the writ of summons (c) Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question. Time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues.” Counsel submitted that from the writ of summons and the Statement of Claim filed in court, the cause of action for the 1st Claimant accrued in the month of March 2014 and for the 2nd Claimant, the cause of action accrued in the month of October, 2014 while they commenced this suit on 03/03/2015, beyond the three months period contemplated by Section 2(a) of POPA. Counsel referred to the case of AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra) where the Supreme Court at Page 169 held as follows: “The essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action.” It is Counsel’s further contention that the scope of Section 2(a) of POPA covers both natural and artificial persons, such as the defendants in this case, and it affords them protection when they have acted pursuant to their duties as public officers irrespective of their motive. See IBRAHIM vs. J. S. C. KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC & ORS. Vs. F G. N. & ORS (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309. Jurisdiction being a threshold issue can be raised and taken even before the defendant files his statement of defence. Thus, this application challenging the jurisdiction of this court transcends the provisions of the rules of this court and can be rightly taken at this stage of trial. From the foregoing, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for being incompetent on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In opposition to the preliminary objection, the Claimants filed a counter-affidavit of 8 paragraphs. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Claimants submitted that limitation of action is the principle of law which requires the Plaintiff as a matter of obligation to seek prompt remedy for the breach of his right in a court of law within the time limited by the law, otherwise his right of action or cause of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. He submitted further that the challenge of the Claimants' suit on the ground that the suit is statute barred cannot be done by way of preliminary objection. The law requires that it must be sufficiently pleaded or otherwise it is deemed to have been waived. See the case of BAKARE vs. NRC (2007) 32 NSQ, 306 at 577 (2005). Counsel referred to the case of U.B.R.B.D.A. vs. ALKA (1998) 2 NWLR (Part 537) 328 at page 339 paragraphs G-H, where it was held that “where a defendant relies on a special defence like statute of limitation, it is trite that such a defence has to be specifically pleaded". It is Counsel’s contention that the 1st Defendant is not a natural person that can be protected by the Public Officers’ Protection Act. See U.B.R.B.D.A. vs. ALKA (Supra) at pages 341-342 paras H-B, NATIONAL BANK (NIG) LTD vs. SHOYEYE (NIG) (1972) 5 SC 181 and SKENCONSULT (NIG) vs. UKEY (1981) l SC 6. The extant case involves termination of appointment and non-payment of salary, which borders on contract and not tort. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection. Sequel to this Preliminary Objection, the Claimants filed a motion on notice pursuant to Order 11(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 seeking as follows: 1. An order granting leave to the claimants/applicants to amend their statement of facts establishing the cause of action in terms of the underlined in the proposed amended statement of facts establishing the cause of action exhibited as 'A' in the affidavit in support of the motion. 2. An order deeming the amended statement of facts establishing the cause of action exhibited as 'B' in the affidavit in support of this motion as properly filed and served appropriate filing fees having been paid. 3. An order permitting the claimants/applicants to withdraw the first written statement on oaths dated 25/6/2015 and replace same with written statements on oath of the claimants exhibited as ‘C’ & ‘C1’ in the affidavit in support of his motion and to deem same as having been served, appropriate filing fees having been paid. The motion for amendment is supported by an affidavit of 8 paragraphs deposed to by Barrister Jessy Ezekwe, a legal practitioner in the Claimants’ Counsel’s Chambers. Learned Counsel for the Defendants opposed the Claimants’ motion for amendment by filing a 12- paragraph counter affidavit denying the Claimants’ averments in their affidavit in support of their application, and also opposing the Claimants’ application to amend their processes in this suit. In the accompanying address, Counsel distilled one issue for the determination, which is: Whether the Claimant, if allowed to amend her processes in this suit at this stage, the amendment will not take away the defendants’ right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to the defendants. It is the argument of Counsel that if this Court grants the Claimants' application to amend their processes at this stage of the trial, such amendment would have the effect of taking away the Defendants right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to the Defendants. He submitted further that the right of the defendants being referred to here, which has vested, is the right to protection from prosecution, conferred on the defendants who are all public officers by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) Cap P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. See IBRAHIM vs. JSC (supra); AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra) 11 NWLR; A.G ADAMAWA STATE vs. A. G. FEDERATION (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1428) 515. The extant amendment sought by the Claimants would take away the defendants existing right at the time of the amendment. Counsel referred to the case of UBA PLC vs. ABDULLAHI (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt.807) 359 at 379- 380 paras H-B, where it was held thus: “It is therefore, settled that amendment of writ of summons or pleading which will have the effect of reviving a cause of action which is barred by the Statute of limitation at the time of amendment is not permissible. It is not permissible because it would take away the defendants' right which has vested and therefore prejudicial to him. The proposed cause of action is different from the existing ones and its introduction is intended respectfully to over-reach the appellant. An amendment which will prejudice the other party will not be accepted. The courts are created to do substantial and not cloistered justice”. Counsel submitted that substantial justice in this case will be met if the Court dismisses the Claimants’ application to amend their Statement of Facts and written statements on oath. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimants’ cause of action accrued in the months of March and October, 2014 and not in February 2015 as proposed by paragraph 7 of their proposed amended statement of facts and paragraph 8 of the 1st Claimant’s written Statement on Oath. It is Counsel’s further submission that the preliminary objection ought to be taken first before the court considers the propriety of the amendment the Claimants seek. Counsel referred to the cases of: 1. A.G. FEDERATION vs. FAFUNWA ONIKOYI (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) 51; 2. NIGERIAN NAVY vs. GARRICK (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 969) 69; 3. OKOROCHA vs. PDP (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1406) 213. Counsel urged the Court to refuse the amendment of processes sought by the Claimants and dismiss the Claimants’ application. The Defendants filed a further affidavit of 12 paragraphs in answer to the new issues raised in the Claimants’ Counter affidavit. A Reply on Points of Law was filed alongside this further affidavit. In reply to the Claimants Counsel’s submission that an objection to a suit being statute barred cannot be done by way of preliminary objection, the Defendants’ Counsel submitted that the Claimants' submission is no longer the true position of the law. He referred to the case of HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 619, where the Supreme Court held that a preliminary objection predicated on Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, is a point of law touching on the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate upon a matter before it. And that the objection (point of law) being a fundamental and a threshold issue, should, in the best interest of justice, where it is raised in any proceedings, be dealt with at the earliest opportunity. He also referred to the case of ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. l001) 76 at pages 135-136 Paras H-A. Counsel submitted further that the Rules of this Court has no provisions for the filing of statement of defence alone with or before a preliminary objection on a point of law touching on the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate upon a matter before it can be raised. In the event such provisions exist, the law is settled that even mandatory Rules of court are not as sacrosanct as mandatory Statute or Act; and that Rules of Court do not override Statutory provisions of the law. See KOTOYE vs. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126; AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (supra); ALHAJI EDUN vs. ODAN COMMUNITY & ORS (1980) 11 SC103 at 124. Also, contrary to the Claimants Counsel’s submission that the 1st Defendant is not a natural person that can be protected by the Public Officers’ Protection Act; counsel argued that the scope of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act covers both national and artificial persons. Counsel submitted further that the position of the law is that Section 2(a) of POPA applies to all cases whether the case is founded in contract or in tort. The exceptions to the protection a public officer enjoys under Section 2( a) of POPA is when it is shown that the public officer acted in bad faith, or acted in abuse of office or maliciously or with no semblance of legal justification or acted outside the scope of his authority. See HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547, C.S.N vs. OKOJIE (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt 882) 488. See SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC &ORS vs. FGN & ORS (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 337 to 338 paras H-C. In the light of the foregoing arguments, Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the Claimants’ submission and make the following holdings: 1. That the defendants rightly filed their notice of preliminary objection without filling their statement of defence in this suit. 2. Flowing from the above pronouncements of the court in the foregoing cited cases on this issue as to the scope of Section 2(a) POPA, the 1st Defendant in this suit is protected by Section 2(a) of POPA. Court’s Decision From the foregoing summary of the submissions of the counsels to the parties in their written addresses, it is evident that two applications are involved in this ruling. They are the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection and the claimants’ motion for the amendment of the Statement of Facts and substitution of the witnesses statements on oath. My records show that the Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection was filed first and the ground of the Preliminary Objection is that the claimants suit is statute barred because it was not filed within 3 months from the date of the cause of action. After the Claimants were served the application, they filed a motion to amend their statement of facts. Both applications were heard together. It is the law that in determining whether a suit is statute barred or not, the processes to which recourse should be had are the writ and the statement of claim, in this case, the Complaint and the statement of facts. It is from these processes the date of accrual of the cause of action and the date the suit was filed can be deduced. The principle was stated in AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506-507 as follows- “In order to determine if a party’s action is statute barred, the court is only enjoined to look at the plaintiffs’ claims. The period of limitation is determined in a case by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim which alleges when the wrong suffered by the plaintiff was committed and placing it side by side with the date on which the writ was issued”. See also JSF INV. LTD vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902. I observed that the contention in the Notice of Preliminary Objection is based on the averments in the claimants’ statement of facts filed on 25th June 2015. The claimants have now put up an application to amend the statement of facts. I see a need to first determine which of the statement of facts is to be examined in determining the NPO. Therefore, notwithstanding the trite law that issue of jurisdiction be considered first, in the circumstances of the applications under consideration however, it is my view that the claimants’ motion should be determined first. The reliefs sought by the claimants in their motion have earlier been set out in this ruling. The sum of the reliefs is that the claimants seek the leave of this court to amend their statement of facts and to substitute the statements on oath filed on 25/6/2015 with the statements on oath annexed as Exhibit C and C1 to the motion. In the affidavit in support of the motion; deposed to by one Barrister Jessy Ezekwe, a counsel in the law firm representing the claimants in this suit; it is deposed that upon going through the Statement of Facts and the Statement on Oath of the Claimants filed on 25/6/2015, he discovered some errors which were caused by his office and which were not the fault of the Claimant. The said errors have now been corrected as reflected in the exhibited Amended Statement of Facts and that there is also the need to substitute the Statements on Oath of the Claimants with other written statements on oath of the Claimants which contain the amended facts. The deponent averred that the application is not intended to over-reach and is not brought in bad faith but only to correct the mistakes made by his office in preparing the process. The defendant, in opposing the claimant’s motion, filed a counter affidavit which was deposed to be one Chibuzo Ogbonna of Okey Amechi, SAN & Partners. It is averred therein that there are no errors at all in the Claimants Statement of facts and written statement on Oath as alleged in the affidavit in support of the motion. The deponent then went on take on the averments in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the proposed statement of facts and stated that the amendments the claimants seek to introduce by these paragraphs of the proposed amended Statement of fact are all figments of the Claimants imagination because since the months of March 2014 and October 2014 when the Claimants respectively retired from the employment of the 1st Defendant, they have never come to work in any capacity in any of the offices or departments of the 1st defendant and that the 3rd Defendant has not seen nor had any interaction with the Claimants since then. The deponent further stated that the 3rd defendant did not physically stop the Claimants on 23/02/2015 from performing their duties as alleged by the claimant in paragraphs, 5, 6, 7 and 10 of their proposed amended Statement of Facts. It is also averred that the offices and positions the Claimants vacated in March 2014 and October 2014 by reason of their retirement have since been occupied by other Nurses and Mid-wives. It is further deposed that the amendment the Claimants seek to introduce is aimed to defeat the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection and that by bringing this application after the defendants have filed their Notice of Preliminary Objection, is a show of bad faith and the application is intended to overreach and prejudice the defendants. The deponent concluded that it will not be in the interest of justice to allow the claimant to amend her processes at this stage of the trial. Let me state here that what is to be considered with respect to the claimants motion is whether the application should be granted or not and not whether the facts to be introduced into the statement of facts by the amendment sought are true or not. What the defendant has done in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit is to descend into the facts of the amendment sought. The defendants almost turned the counter affidavit to a statement of defence. In my view, to consider those facts averred by the defendants in these paragraphs of the counter affidavit will entail that the merit of the facts to be introduced by the amendment sought will be examined in this ruling. This is not the stage to do that. The defendants will have their opportunity to express these facts stated in the counter affidavit in a statement of defence if at all this motion is eventually granted. I will therefore discountenance the averments in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit in the consideration of the application. Generally, courts have the inherent powers to allow amendments to pleadings of the parties at any stage of the proceedings. The exercise of this power to allow amendments is at the discretion of this court which discretion is to be exercised in favour of doing justice in each particular case. See IGWE vs. KALU (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 677 at 712. The principle has been emphasized that the court will normally grant leave to amend unless- i. The application for amendment is made mala fide, ii. If it will entail injustice to the respondent, iii. The proposed amendment will cause undue delay or is irrelevant or useless or merely raises a technical point, iv. The amendment has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated for by cost, v. The application is designed to overreach the respondent, vi. The amendment will result in a party being confronted with an entirely new case at an extremely late stage of the trial or is in conflict with the evidence already given in the trial. See AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 658; IGWE vs. KALU (SUPRA) at 717; LAMBU vs. ISYAKAU (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 640) 1295 at 1329-1331 Thus, an amendment of pleading is allowed for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties and it can be made at any stage of the proceeding unless such amendment will entail injustice or surprise to the other party or the applicant is acting mala fide or by his blonder the applicant has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated by cost. SEE NIGERIAN DYNAMIC LTD vs. DUMBAI (2002) FWLR (Pt. 105) 823 at 831. Exhibit A annexed to the affidavit in support of the motion is the proposed amended statement of facts. The amendments introduced therein have been underlined and it can be seen that the amendment affects only paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and reliefs 1, 3, 9, 10 and 11. These are the same facts introduced into the witnesses statements on oath which are to substitute the existing ones. Having looked at the proposed amendments to the statement of facts, it is clear to me that the facts averred therein are materially on the same cause of action as the statement of facts sought to be amended and the facts flow from the same set of circumstance giving rise to the facts already before this court. The facts have not departed from or changed the character of the claimants’ case. The reliefs sought on the amendment have not changed from the original relief sought on the Complaint. I have also observed that this is the first the claimants seek to amend their processes in this case, which case has not proceeded to hearing stage. I have also observed that the defendants have not filed any statement of defence in this case. I cannot therefore see any injustice or injury which will be caused to the defendants nor how they will be overreached by the amendments sought to be made. The defendants have urged this court, in their counter affidavit, to refuse the amendment because it is aimed at defeating the Preliminary Objection filed by the defendant. The fact that the defendants have filed a Preliminary Objection which seeks to take advantage of a defect in the claimants’ case is not a reason to refuse an amendment to the statement of facts if it has merit. Even at that, the position of the law is that it is better to grant an application which seeks to cure a defect in a suit to save it than the one which seeks to destroy the suit. Upon a thorough look at the facts of this application, it appears to me that none of the situation for refusing amendment as enumerated above is present in this application. The reason for seeking the amendment has been given in the affidavit in support as being a result of the errors of the claimants’ counsel while preparing the processes. It is settled principle of law that mistake of counsel should not be visited on litigant. In AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 676, the Supreme Court, Per ADEREMI JSC, held as follows- “In the preparation of pleadings, counsels are bound to or may be prone to make mistakes. Then must a party lose his right to have the dispute between him and his adversary decided on its merit simply because a mistake has been made in the preparation of the pleadings? I think not. It must always be remembered that the object of the court is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for the mistake which they may make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise in accordance with their rights… After all, courts do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of deciding issues in controversy” It is also trite law that in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to amend pleading, the court is to focus at doing substantial justice to all the partied in the matter. Therefore, the whole essence of amendment of pleading is to enable the court decide the rights of the parties and not punish them for mistake they make in the conduct of their cases. Leave to amend pleadings ought to be allowed if by so doing the real question between the parties can be raised between the parties. In BANK OF BARODA vs. IYALABANI COMPANY LTD (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 494 at 527 it was held that- “An amendment should be granted as may be proper for the purpose of determining the real question or questions in controversy between the parties”. The amendment sought by the claimants, as I see it, can only be for the purpose of determining the real issues in dispute between the parties. In my considered view also, the amendment sought will not in any way overreach the defendants nor result in injustice to them. It is only to enable the claimants put before this court, the whole facts of their case. It appears to me it is in the interest of justice to grant leave to the claimants to amend the statement of facts and to substitute the witnesses statements. The Claimant has also filed a copy of the amended statement of facts in line with the proposed amendment in Exhibit A. It is for the foregoing reasons that the claimant’s application is granted. The court hereby orders as follows- i. Leave is granted to the Claimant to amend the statement of facts and to substitute the witness statement on oath filed on 25/6/2015. ii. The amended statement of facts filed along with this application and the witness statement on oath filed on 14th October 2015 are deemed as properly filed and served. The defendants Notice of Preliminary Objection can now be considered. The defendants want this court to strike out this suit on the ground that it is statute barred by effect of the Public Officers Protection Act. The depositions in the affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection are to the effect that the claimant’s suit was filed on 3/3/2015 in which the Claimant is seeking redress against an act that occurred in March 2014. It is further averred that the Defendants are Public Officers and the acts of the defendants being challenged in this suit was done in the official capacity of the defendants as Public Officers. It is also stated that the Claimant did not commence this suit within 3 months of the cause of action, hence this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The counter affidavit of the claimant in opposition to the Notice of Preliminary Objection contain that the act of the Defendants against which the Claimant brought this suit occurred on 15/6/2015 and that this action was commenced within the stipulated three months. The learned counsel for the defendants have cited Section 2 (a) of POPA and argued that by that provision, the claimants’ suit is statute barred. The said Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act provides- “Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or any public duty or authority, in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, Duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained or, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The effect of the above provision of the Public Officers Protection Act is that where actions against public officers in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty of authority the or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act or law, duty or authority, is not instituted within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action, the action will be statute barred and can no longer be entertained by the courts. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 417) 155 AT 182. There is no dispute in this application that the defendants are public officers and they have been sued in this action in respect of the termination of the claimants’ employment. The facts are clear that the defendants were sued in respect of alleged default in their public duty and authority. The question, however, is whether the claimants filed this suit against the defendants within 3 months from the date their cause of action arose? In order to determine whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred, there is the need to determine when the cause of action arose and when this suit was filed. There appears to be no dispute as to when the suit was filed. It is clear from the record that the suit was filed on 3rd March 2015. The area of disagreement between the parties is the date the claimant’s cause of action arose. While the defendants contend that the cause of action arose in March 2014 and October 2014, the claimants stated in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit that their cause of action arose on 15/6/2015. There is need at this point to examine the claimants pleading in order to discover when their cause of action arose. I have stated earlier that the cause of the claimants’ action is the termination of their employments as can be seen in the various claims. When did this occur? In paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the amended statement of fact, the claimants averred that they were stopped from performing their duties on 23/2/2015. It is clear from these facts of the claimants’ case that their cause of action arose from the date they alleged their employments were terminated, being 23/2/2015. The period from the date of the termination of the employments and the date this suit was filed is a period of 9 days. This period is less than 3 months. It thus implies that the Claimants filed this suit within 3 months from the date their cause of action arose. I find that the suit is not statute barred. Therefore, the Notice of Preliminary Objection has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge