Download PDF
Representation: E. I. Uwadi for the Claimant/Respondent M. L. Mohammed for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Respondents P.C. Ike for the 5th defendant/applicant; and holding the brief of Lawal Hassan for the 4th defendant/applicant. RULING By a Motion on Notice filed on 29th day of September, 2015 brought pursuant to Order 5 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Honourable Court and Section 6(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), counsel for the 4th Defendant/Applicant sought the following orders: 1. AN ORDER striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 2. AN ORDER striking out the suit for non-disclosure of cause of action against the 4th Defendant. The ground for this application is that this Honourable Court is not competent to entertain this suit. This application is supported by a 5 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Elizabeth Funmi Bello, a Litigation Secretary in the chambers of the 4th Defendant/Applicant in this application. In the accompanying address, counsel identified two issues for determination: 1. Whether the claimant has complied with the mandatory condition precedent for service of processes on the 4th Defendant who is outside jurisdiction. 2. Whether having regard to the entire facts of the case, the claimant has disclosed a reasonable cause of against the 4th Defendant/ Applicant. Regarding issue one, the 4th defendant/respondent’s Counsel urged the court to answer this issue in the negative. Counsel submitted that service of court processes outside jurisdiction is guided by Section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act 2004, which reads: Every writ of summons for service outside the state or the Capital Territory in which it was issued shall, in addition to any other endorsement or notice required by the law of such state or the Capital Territory, have endorsed thereon a notice to the following effect (that is to say)- 'This summons (or as the case may be) is to be served out of the ---- state (or as the case may) and in the ----- state (or as the case may be)' " Section 95 of the Sheriffs Civil Process Act defines writ of summons as follows: "Writ of summons" includes any writ or process by which a suit is commenced or of which the object is to require the appearance of any person against whom relief is sought in a suit or who is interested in resisting such relief. Similarly, Order 1 Rule 3 of the Rules of this court defines originating process as follows: "Originating process" means a complaint or any other court processes by which a suit is commenced.” Counsel submitted that the complaint used in initiating this action clearly falls within the definition of a writ of summons by virtue of Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Thus, every initiating processes such as the claimant's complaint in the instant case which is for service out of the state in which it was issued, must be in compliance with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. See KIDA vs. OGUNMOLA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 327) 402 AT 416 PARAS E-F, See paragraph 3(e) of supporting affidavit. Counsel urged the court to strike out the complaint for being incompetent because this suit was not endorsed in accordance with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that the claimant has not disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the 4th Defendant/Applicant. Counsel referred the court to REGISTRAR C.O.E KATSINA-ALA vs. GBANDE 2015 5 NWLR Pt. 1401 Pg. 589 at 601 PARS D-G where it was held thus: Now, a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It is the fact or combination of facts, which give rise to sue and it consists of two elements, viz: the wrongful act of the Defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint and the consequent damage ...” Counsel argued that in determining the cause of action in a suit the only documents which the court will look at are the complaint and statement of claim. See the case of SOCIETY BIC SA vs. CHARZIN IND. LTD (2014) 4 NWLR Pt. 1398 Pg. 491 at 555 PARS E-F. Throughout the claimant's complaint and statement of claim, the claimant has been unable to disclose any fact or circumstance pointing to any action of the 4th Defendant/Applicant which gave rise to the claimant's claim which can be enforced against the 4th Defendant/Applicant. Paragraph 3(f) of the supporting affidavit. It is counsel’s submission that the claimant’s averment in paragraph 4 of the claimant's statement of claim that the 4th Defendant is the Chief Law Officer of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is not sufficient to create a cause of action. It is counsel’s submission that joining the 4th Defendant in this suit is a clear case of misjoinder and the name of the 4th Defendant has to be struck out. Counsel cited ADEFARASIN vs. DAYEKH (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 89 at 121 where the court held thus: “However, where there is a misjoinder as in this case, the court is empowered at any stage of proceedings ... to order that the name or names of any party or parties, whether as plaintiffs or Defendants improperly joined, be struck out ... in the instant case therefore, the name of the 2nd Defendant which was earlier improperly joined as 2nd Defendant to the suit was rightly struck out by the lower court as there was no justifiable cause to make him a party to the action in the first instance.” Counsel contended that the Federal Government is not a party in this suit. The 4th Defendant/Applicant is therefore improperly joined in the matter and is name ought to be struck out. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit and strike out the suit in its entirety for non-compliance with condition precedent or in the alternative strike out the name of the Applicant for non-disclosure of any cause of action against it. In opposition to this application, the Claimant/Respondent filed a counter affidavit of 4 paragraphs deposed to by Miss Cynthia Israel the Litigation Secretary in the Law Firm of the claimant’s counsel. In the accompanying written address, counsel raised two issues for determination thus: (a) Whether the Claimant has complied with the mandatory condition precedent for service of processes on the 4th Defendant/Applicant as provided for by the National Industrial Court Rules of Court. (b) Whether the 4th Defendant Applicant having regard to the entire facts of this case, can be made a party to this suit. With respect to the first issue, counsel submitted that the issue of endorsement in line with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act raised by the 4th Defendant/Applicant is not applicable to matters commenced in the National Industrial Court. The issue of endorsement is only applicable to suits instituted by the state courts and regulated by the Rules of such state courts. See Order 4 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules of 2007 and OWNERS OF THE M.V. "ARABELLA" vs. NIGERIAN N.A.I.A (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 443) 1208 at 1228, at paragraph D. It is counsel’s contention that the essence of service of court processes on the opposing party is to get him to come to court to participate in the trial so the that rule of fair hearing will be fully observed. The 4th Defendant/Applicant has been served with the Claimant’s complaint and has accordingly filed a conditional memorandum of appearance through which he has disclosed his intention to participate in the trial. Thus, the issue of endorsement raised by the 4th Defendant cannot avail him, the court was urged to resolve the Claimants issue(i) in the positive and discountenance the 4th Defendants arguments and accordingly dismiss that particular issue. Regarding issue two, counsel urged the court to hold that the 4th Defendant/Applicant ought to be a party in any matter where the Federal Republic of Nigeria has a role to play directly or indirectly, the 4th Defendant being the Chief Law Officer of the Federation. By the combined effects of Sections 147(1) and 148(1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has the constitutional right to appoint ministers, he can delegate some of his functions to them. Also, Section 2(1 )(a) of the National Teachers' Institute Act, makes the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Education of Nigeria or his representative members of the Governing Council of the National Teachers' Institute. Similarly, by virtue of Section 4(1) & (2) of the same NTI Act the Director of NTI is appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister for Education. It is counsel’s argument that in all actions against the Government whether Federal or State, the Attorney General being a corporation sole that lives in perpetuity should be the most proper party to any such suit touching on the government. See Section 20 of Supreme Court Act. Cap. S. 16 FLN. 2004, see also A.G (FED) vs. ANPP (2004) FWLR (Pt. 190) 145 at 1474-1475 and CARLEN NIG. LTD. vs UNIJOS (1994) I NWLR (Pt. 323) 631. In the light of the foregoing, counsel submitted that the Federal Attorney General ought to be a proper part in this suit and urged the court to accordingly dismiss this motion filed by the 4th Defendant/Applicant for being frivolous and lacking in merits. By a notice of preliminary objection brought pursuant to order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007, section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and under the inherent jurisdiction of the honourable court; the 5th Defendant/ Applicant’s counsel sought the following orders: 1. AN ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE COURT striking out the 1st, 2nd, 3rdand 5th Defendants from the Complaint in these proceedings. 2. AN ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE COURT declining jurisdiction to entertain the substantive suit herein. The grounds upon which this objection is brought are as follows- 1. That the 1stDefendant herein has been wrongly joined, there being no reasonable cause of action against it in this Suit and is liable to be struck out; 2. That the 2nd Defendant herein has been sued in his personal capacity, but not in official capacity as required by law; 3. That the 3rdDefendant herein is not a juristic person/ office known to law; and 4. That the 5thDefendant/ Applicant herein is not a juristic person/ office known to law. In support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection an 8 paragraph Affidavit was deposed to by one Joseph Alafin. Counsel formulated four issues for the determination of the Honourable Court as follows: 1. Whether the 1st Defendant is an appropriate Defendant in this Suit? 2. Whether the 2nd Defendant is sued in his personal capacity as against official capacity in this Suit? 3. Whether the 3rd Defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued as such in these proceedings? 4. Whether the 5th Defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued as a Defendant in this Suit? Counsel submitted that the answers to the foregoing issues are to be resolved in the negative. He stated that for a Court of law to be seised of jurisdiction to entertain a matter brought before it, the said Suit must be initiated by due process, in compliance with the Rules of Court or fulfillment of any condition(s) precedent to commencing same as prescribed by law. See MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) All NLR 589 and ALTINE vs. AFRIBANK PLC (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 687) 181; MARK vs. EKE (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865), 54. It is counsel’s submission that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental, such that whenever raised, the Court must consider same first before delving into the substantive case on the merits. See the following cases of: 1. NASIR vs. CSC, KANO STATE [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt.1190) 253, at 276 2. ANYA vs. IYAYI (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 305) 290; 3. KOTOYE vs. SARAKI (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357), 414, 446; 4. KATTO vs. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126. Thereafter, counsel proceeded to his argument on issue one, where he stated that the law is settled that for a person to be joined as a defendant, the person must be an appropriate party to be made a defendant. In counsel’s words, for any person to be made a defendant to an action the claimant must have a claim against him. The Court may not proceed against a party as a Defendant where upon a scrutiny of the Claimant's claim/ reliefs, it is disclosed that there is no reasonable cause of action made out against a Defendant in the Suit. See OLUWANIYI vs. ADEWUMI [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104), 396. Counsel submitted that the corporate personality embodying the 1st defendant is revealed by virtue of Section 1 (1) of the National Teachers Institute Act. The said section reads as follows: (1) There is hereby established an institute to be known as the National Teachers Institute (in this Act referred to as lithe Institute"). (2) There shall be established for the management of the affairs of the Institute a council to be known as the National Teachers' Institute Council (in this Act r referred to as lithe Council") which shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Thus, the Act’s intendment is that the 1st Defendant must act and discharge its functions through the Council and in any event where the 1st Defendant is to institute a claim in a court of law or is to be sued as well the proper party shall be the Council and not the 1st Defendant as sued in the instant case. The legal implication of the Council being a corporate entity makes it sui generis, with distinct and separate personality from the 1st Defendant. Counsel referred the court to the following cases: 1. SALOMON vs. SALOMON [1877] AC 22; 2. HABIB (NIG) BANK LTD vs. OCHETA [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 699) 114; 3. OKOLO vs. UNION BANK OF NIG. PLC [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 859) 8 4. MARINA NOMINEES vs. FBIR [1986] 2 NWLR 48; 5. DANIELS vs. INSIGHT ENGINEERING CO. LTD [2002] 10 NWLR (Pt. 775) 231, 248. Counsel also cited the case of FAWEHINMI vs. NBA (NO.2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558, at page 640 where the Supreme Court held as follows: “The most fundamental difference between a corporation and an unincorporated association are that the corporation has perpetual succession. It maintains its identity and its personality not withstanding changes in its membership. But the property of an unincorporated association does belong to its members from time to time". It is counsel’s assertion that the mere creation of an entity by a statute without more does not confer legal personality as such statute shall confer on such a creation such legal personality either expressly or by necessary implication where it is intended to do so. Thus in the case of BAGWAI vs. GODA [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt.1245), 28 at 57 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The law is that no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or persons unless such a party has been given by statute, expressly or implicitly or by common law: (a) A legal persona under the name by which it sues or is sued, and (b) The right to sue or be sued by that name.” See also NIGERIAN NURSES ASSOCIATION vs. AG FEDERATION (1981) 11-12 SC, 1. From the foregoing authorities cited, counsel submitted that so far the 1st Defendant was wrongly sued because in the Act conferring any such juristic personality expressly or impliedly from the holistic construction of the Act. Also, there are no designated functions conferred on the 1st Defendant but any functions/ duties to be so discharged have been vested wholly in the Council. Thus, any person aggrieved by the discharge of the duties/functions of the Council may only proceed against the Council, and never the 1st Defendant. Thus, there is no cause of action against the 1st defendant by the Claimant's claim in these proceedings. Counsel urged the court to strike out the 1st Defendant from this suit. On issue two, counsel argued that when an alleged cause of action arose from the official dealings in a defendant’s official capacity; any civil actions brought against such party must be brought in the name of such a person in such official capacity as against his personal capacity. See HOPE DEMOCRATIC PARTY vs. INEC & 4 ORS [2009] 3 KLR (Pt. 264) 623; (2009) 3-4 SC 106. It is counsel’s submission that the 2nd defendant was wrongly sued in his personal capacity. Section 4 of the National Teachers' Institute Act expressly establishes the office of the 2nd Defendant. Thus, any suit such as the instant case ought to have been brought against the official name/designation by which the statute has thereby christened it; which is the Director of the NTI. Counsel asserted there is no office of Director-General under the Act. On the strength of the foregoing arguments, counsel urged the court to strike out the suit because the 2nd Defendant was sued in his personal capacity over his official dealings arising out of his juristic office. Regarding issue three, counsel reiterated his argument on issue two and added the fact that, Section 5 of the Act empowers the Council to appoint the 3rd Defendant who shall not be a member of the Council, unlike the 2nd Defendant (Director) whose office is created by the Act. Indeed, the position of the 3rd Defendant, just like the office of a Minister of the Government of the Federation is not a creation of statute but merely a floating body. Furthermore, a holistic construction of the Act reveals unveils that there is nothing in the Act to confer a juristic personality on the 3rd Defendant whether expressly or implicitly. See Section 5(2) of the Act. On this assertion, counsel urged the court to strike out the 3rd Defendant since he is neither a creation of a statute nor a juristic office. With respect to issue four, Counsel referred the court to Sections 147(1) and 148(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) which reads: Section 147(1): "There shall be such offices of Ministers of the Government of the Federation as may be established by the President". Section 148(1): "The President may, in his discretion, assign to the Vice President or any Minister of the Government of the Federation responsibility for any business of the Government of the Federation, including the administration of any department" He urged the court in accordance with the reasoning in UGWU vs. ARARUME [2007] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048), 367 at 498 to interpret the foregoing Constitutional provisions literally and hold that the 5th Defendant/Applicant in these proceedings is neither a creation of statute nor a person who has the right to sue and be sued has been conferred by any rule of Common Law. The community construction and combined effect of Sections 147(1) and 148(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended) is to leave the act of creation of the offices and/ or the portfolios of Ministers of the Government of the Federation within the widest ambit and discretion of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. See the cases of: 1. AWOLOWO vs. SHAGARI (1979) 6-9 SC 73, 91; 2. KUUSU vs. UDOM (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 421; 3. ABIOYE V. YAKUBU vs. ABIOYE (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 190) 130; 4. BABATUNDE vs. P.A.S. & T.A. LTD (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 113; 5. LADOJA V. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 119; 6. AG FEDERATION vs. ABUBAKAR (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1. Similarly, in the case of PGSS IKACHI vs. IGBUDU [2005] 12 NWLR (Pt. 940), 543 the Court held that the Commissioner for Education, Benue State is not a creation of a statute but merely an office created at the pleasure of the State Governor who may competently merge the portfolio with another Ministry if he so wishes at any time. In the same vein the Court of Appeal in AGBOOLA vs. SHAIBU [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 566 held that a Ministry of the Government of the Federation is not a juristic person capable of suing or be sued in its name except created by a statute. See also TIJANI BAMBE &ORS vs. YESUFU ADETUNJI &ORS (1977) 1 SC, 1 at 7-8. Counsel urged the court to follow the reasoning in the preceding cases and hold that the 5th defendant is not a juristic person and strike out the names of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Defendants in these proceedings because of the foregoing reasons. The claimant/respondent on 27th October 2015 in opposition, filed a 5-paragraph counter-affidavit deposed to Miss Cynthia Israel. In the accompanying written address, counsel raised four issues for determination, thus: 1. Whether the 1st Defendant is an appropriate Defendant in this suit. 2. Whether the 2nd Defendant is sued in his personal capacity as against official capacity in this suit. 3. Whether the 3rd Defendant is a juristic person capable of being sued as such in these proceedings. 4. Whether the 5th Defendant/Applicant having regard to the entire facts of this case, can be made a party to this suit. Arguing issue one, counsel stated that the 1st Defendant is a proper and appropriate party in this suit. This is owing to the fact it is the 1st Defendant that unlawfully dismissed the Claimant/Respondent for which this action was instituted. Counsel referred to the case of KPEBIMOH vs. BOARD of GOVERNORS, WESTERN IJAW TTC (1966) NMLR 130 where it was held that an unincorporated body created by statute which is empowered by statute to do certain acts which can result in injury to others must impliedly be taken to have power to sue and be sued for those acts. See also the case of the Thomas vs. Local Government Service Board (1965) NMLR 310. With respect to issues two and three, counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant is the Director and Chief Executive of the 1st Defendant while the 3rd Defendant is Registrar and Secretary to the council. It was the Defendant acting on the Directives of the 2nd Defendant, who signed the Dismissal Letter that prompted this action. In the dismissal letter with Reference No. NTI/S/PER.747/1 dated the 19thday of May 2015, one Abubakar Mohammed Sadiq A.G. Registrar/Secretary to the council signed the said dismissal letter for the Director General and Chief Executive of NTI. Thus, in the event the claimant’s dismissal letter was signed by officers who lacked the legal capacity to do so, it means that the dismissal letter is null and void. Again, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants were sued as agents of the 1st Defendant; their absence does not affect the validity of the instant suit, the 1st Defendant having been sued. Counsel urged the court not to dwell on any technicality and be minded to do the justice that is required in this matter. On issue four, counsel urged to hold that the 5th Defendant/Applicant is a juristic person capable of being sued as a Defendant in this suit. By the combined effects of Sections 147(1) and 148(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the President, the Vice President and Ministers are creations of the 1999 constitution , thus the 5th Defendant ought to be a juristic person capable of being sued and also has the right to sue. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant/Applicant can also be said to be sued in this action as a Nominal Party. A nominal party can be joined in a by virtue of the office they hold. In PADAWA vs. JATAU (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 813) 247. It was held that a nominal party is a party who though, having some interest in the subject matter of a suit will not be affected by any judgment of the court but is nevertheless joined in the suit to avoid procedural defects. In the light of the foregoing, counsel urged the court to dismiss the 5th Defendant/Applicant's preliminary objection for being Frivolous and lacking in merit. Court’s decision I will now proceed to determine the two applications together. The grounds of the two preliminary objections involved in this ruling can be grouped into two. These are: i. Competence of the suit for reason that the provision of section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Processes Act 2004 was not met, and ii. Competence of all the defendants to this suit. The applications will be considered under these two categorized grounds of the objections. The 4th defendant has prayed this court to strike out this suit for reason that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is contended in paragraph 3 (e) of the affidavit in support of the application that the claimant did not endorse the complaint for service on the 4th defendant outside jurisdiction of the court. The argument of the 4th defendant’s counsel on this point is that the 4th Defendant is outside jurisdiction of this court but the claimant failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Processes Act 2004 which requires every writ of summons for service outside the state of issue to have endorsed on it a notice showing it is to be served out of the state of issue. It is the further argument of the 4th defendant’s counsel that the complaint is liable to be struck out for being incompetent because of the failure to endorse it as required by Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. This issue of the applicability of the provision of section 97 of Sheriff and Civil Processes Act to the processes issued from this court has received judicial pronouncements in several rulings and judgments of this court. I will therefore state briefly the prevailing position as there is no need to waste time dwelling on the same issue in this matter. The position of this court is that the provisions of Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act do not apply to to processes emanating from this Court. See the judgment in Suit NICN/CA/75/2012: BRIGHT CHINEDU WODI vs. DIFFERENTIAL ALUMINIUM AND STEEL COMPANY LTD & ANOR delivered on the 21st day of January 2014; the ruling in Suit No. NICN/OW/38/2013: UGOALA CHIDINMA JOY (MRS.) vs. ABIA STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD delivered on 28th April 2014; Suit No: NICN/EN/14/2012: IFINEDO NORRIS EBIBUM vs. AFRIBANK NIGERIA PLC. (NOW MAINSTREET BANK LTD) delivered on the 24th day of August, 2012 and in Suit No: NIC/LA/46/2009. DR. AINA SIMEON ADEODUN & 3 ORS. vs GOVERNING COUNCIL, OYO STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION delivered on 8th February, 2011. The basis for the view of this court is Section 21(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which makes it very clear that the whole of the Federation of Nigeria is a single jurisdiction for the NIC. The divisions of the NIC in various states are for administrative convenience only and as such, they do not have exclusive territorial jurisdiction restricted to the division or state as we have with the States High Courts. Therefore, service of the processes of this court on any defendant in other states is not service out of jurisdiction as to require the endorsement in Section 97 of Sheriffs and Civil processes Act. Therefore, in view of the position of this court on the application of Section 97 of Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to the originating process issued from this court, I find no merit in this ground of the 4th defendant’s application. There is the 2nd classified ground of the preliminary objections which is about the competence of the parties sued as defendants in this suit. I have also read the affidavits of the parties for and against this issue of the competence of the defendants to this suit. While the 4th defendant wants it to be to be struck out for non-disclosure of cause of action against it, the 5th defendant seeks to have the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th defendants struck out of the suit. The 5th defendant did set out, both in the grounds of the application and the affidavit in support of the application, the reasons for seeking the striking out of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th defendants from the suit. They are that- i. The 1st Defendant was wrongly joined because there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against it. ii. The 2nd Defendant has been sued in his personal capacity and not in his official capacity as required by law. iii. The 3rd Defendant is not a juristic person or office known to law. iv. The 5th Defendant is not a juristic person or office known to law. v. In determining the objection to the competence of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants in this suit, it is necessary to examine the provision of the National Teachers Institute Act, CAP N79, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Section 1 of the Act provides: (1) There is hereby established an institute to be known as the National Teachers' Institute (in this Act referred to as "the Institute"). (2) There shall be established for the management of the affairs of the Institute a council to be known as the National Teachers' Institute Council (in this Act referred to as "the Council") which shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. This section established the National Teachers Institute and also established the National Teachers Institute council “for the management of the affairs of the institute”. It is clear from this provision that the NTI is established by law. The case of the claimant is that he was employed by the 1st defendant and he was unlawfully dismissed from that employment. The claimant is challenging his dismissal in this suit. The body who employed him and from whose employment he was allegedly dismissed is sued as the 1st defendant in this suit but it is the 5th defendant who is now crying foul as to whether reasonable cause of action is disclosed against the 1st defendant. I have read the claimants statement of facts and I find therein ample cause to make the 1st defendant, who is also a juristic body, a party to this suit. The 2nd defendant is sued in his personal name meanwhile the claimant’s cause of action arose from the official acts of the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant ought to have been sued in the official name ascribed to his office. Furthermore, the claimant has described the 2nd defendant as “Director-General & Chief Executive of National Teachers Institute”. The office created in section 4 of the NTI Act is the office of “Director” of the NTI and not the office of Director-General. Even the official description of the 2nd defendant raises a doubt as to whether the claimant refers to the same person. The 3rd defendant on the other hand is the “registrar/secretary” of the NTI. This office is not neither a creation of NTI Act nor a juristic office. Section 5 (1) of the Act merely permitted the NTI Council to appoint a registrar to the Institute. This appointment cannot confer juristic personality on the office. I agree with the 5th defendant that the 2nd and 3rd defendants cannot be competent defendants in this suit. They are hereby struck out. With regards to the 4th and 5th defendants, although it is my view that the offices are juristic, I do not see their relevance in this suit. No cause of action has been disclosed against them. More so, the NTI and its council, being establishment of an Act of the National Assembly, have duties and can bear liability for their acts. They are sufficient to answer the claimant’s claims without the necessity to proliferate defendants. I will also strike out the 4th and 5th defendants. The 5th defendant’s counsel has further argued that the proper defendant should have been the NTI Council. I do agree that by the provision of Section 1 (2) of the NTI Act, the Council ought to be a necessary and proper party to this suit. The Council manages the affairs of the Council and by that duty, this matter may not be effectively and completely settled unless it is made a party to the suit. Its presence in this matter is also necessary so that it should be bound by the result of the action. See DAAR COMMUNICATIONS (NIG.) LTD. vs. WASA DELMA NIG. LTD. (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1287) 370. Where a court observes the necessity to make a party to a suit, it has the inherent and discretionary power to suo motu make the order of joinder. See MBANEFO vs. MOLOKWU (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 742) 1665 at 1686. In view of the establishment of the NTI Council and the facts of this case, I am inclined to join the NTI Council to this case as a defendant. In the result, the 2nd to 5th defendants are struck out from this suit while the National Teachers Institute Council is joined as the 2nd defendant. The claimant is directed to amend the processes accordingly and serve same on the new 2nd defendant. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge