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REPRESENTATIONS: Benjamin Nduka Esq. appeared for the claimant. A. R. Agbo- Anike (Miss) with A. Y. Akintade (Miss) appeared for the defendant RULING/ JUDGMENT The defendant in this suit filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 5th November, 2014 on 5th November, 2014. The defendant’s sole prayer is that the suit is statute barred for having been filed outside the three months period after the alleged cause of action arose. The notice is supported by an affidavit of five (5) paragraphs, and a written address. In the written address the defendant’s counsel cited and relied on the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 379 LFN 1990, which stipulates that actions must be filed within three months after the accrual of the cause of action of the claimant. Learned counsel stated that the cause of action of the claimant occurred on 27th August, 2009, when his employment was terminated by the defendant. That he instituted this suit on 20th May, 2014 well outside the three (3) months period, even as he added that the claimant stated in his statement of claim that he received his letter of termination on 31st August, 2009. Learned defendant’s counsel then submitted that the claimant having come to court on the 20th of May, 2014 has done so late and his suit cannot be entertained as it has become statute barred. He cited numerous judicial decisions in support of his position. He referred to EKEOGU vs. ALIRI (1991) 3 NWLR (pt. 175) 258 (SC), NEPA VS. OLAGUNJU (2005) 3. NWLR (Pt.913) 602 and NWANKWO BLESSING N. vs INEC (Unreported) Suit No. NICN AWK/04/2013 Judgment delivered on 5th May, 2014. On his own part the learned claimant’s counsel, Mr. Nduka Esq. argued that the suit is not statute barred. He submitted in his Written Address in opposition to the Preliminary Objection filed along with a 16 paragraph Counter-Affidavit, that, the suit is not statute bared because the defendant was not entitled to the defence of Section 2(a) the Public Officers Protection Act, has acted in bad faith, in abuse of office and acted without semblance of legal justification. He relied on HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt 1223) 347 (SC), NWANKWERE V. ADEWUNMI (1966) 1 ALL NLR W 134 and IBRAHIM vs JSC, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) per IGUH JSC. Replying on points of law, the learned Defendant’s counsel, Miss Agbo-Anike, submitted that there is nothing before the court to show that the defendant has acted in bad faith, in abuse of office or acted without semblance of legal justification. I have carefully considered the processes filed as well as the arguments and submissions of the parties in this application. The issue for determination is whether or not the suit is statute barred having been commenced outside the statutory period of three (3) months from the accrual of the cause of action of the claimant. It is quite clear that the parties are not in dispute about the fact that the cause of action arose on 31st August, 2009. What the parties are contesting basically is whether the defendant is not entitled to the defence on the ground of bad faith and for having acted outside the colour of its authority. The claimant was terminated in August 2009. He stopped being a staff of the defendant from then. His defence to the issue of statute barred is that the defendant acted in bad faith and with no semblance of legal authority or outside the colour of its office. I have looked at the paragraphs of the Counter Affidavit of the claimant as well as the paragraphs of his claim. It does not in my humble view show that the defendant acted in bad faith or outside the colour of its authority. The exceptions to the statute of limitation which have been built on continuing damage or injury do not avail the claimant in this case. This is because, for him to have employed same he would have to be in employment which means that for every ,month that he was in employment, he had a legitimate exception to be paid whatever he was owed. And for every month that he was not paid, the cause of action is renewed afresh and could approach the court. But where as in this case he is terminated, the act is completed and not continuing. He cannot be heard by the court if he fails to come to court within the stipulated time set by the relevant statute in this case, section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. See A-G RIVERS V. A-G BAYELSA & ANOR (2012) LPELR – 9336 (SC). See also BAUCHI STATE GOVT V. NPC & ANOR 2014 LPEAR – 2372a (CA); and AKWA IBOM STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISION & ORS VS. ANIEKAN WILSON AKPAN (2013) LPELR – 22105 (CA). In the circumstance, and for all reasons given, it is my view and I so hold that the suit of the claimant’s statute barred. It is accordingly hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs. HON. JUSTICE A. IBRAHIM PRESIDING JUDGE