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REPRESENTATION G. U. Ugwu (Mrs) appeared for the Claimant/Respondent. P. C. Aneke Esq. appeared for the Defendant/Applicant. RULING By a Complaint dated and filed on the 27th day of June, 2013, the Claimant prays the Honourable Court for the following reliefs against the Defendant: a) N2,400,000.00 (Two Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira Only) being sum due to the Claimant as Severance allowance. b) An order of 15% interest on the Judgment Sum from date of Judgment until the judgment sum is finally paid off. The said reliefs were repeated in paragraph 21(a) and (b) of the Statement of Facts Establishing Cause of Action. The Complaint was accompanied with a Statement of Facts, name of the Claimant as sole witness, the Written Deposition on oath of the Claimant as witness, and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial. The Claimant also filed along with the Complaint a Motion for Summary Judgment. On the 18th day of December, 2013 the Defendant filed a preliminary objection to the suit praying the Honourable Court for an Order: 1. Dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction; the action having been statute barred. 2. And for such further other Orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The preliminary objection is supported by an affidavit of 22 paragraphs deposed to by one Hon. Fredrick Ngwu, the Secretary of the Defendant/Applicant on record. There is also a written address in support of the preliminary objection. In the said written address, learned counsel for the Defendant/Applicant formulated and argued a sole issue for determination. This is whether the Claimant/Respondent’s action is not caught by statute of limitation? Arguing the issue, learned counsel stated that Section 136 of Local Government Law, Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004 provides as follows: Where it is intended to commence a suit against a Local Government for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, such suit shall not be, instituted or commenced unless it is commenced or instituted within six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury within six months next after the ceasing thereof. He then continued that in order to determine the period of limitation, consideration must be given to the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed and comparing with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. Where the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred.The Supreme Court in NWAOGWUGWU V. FRN (2007) 6 NWLR (PT 1130) @ page 237 held that: A legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right limited by statute. After the date on which the applicable statute provides that legal proceedings cannot be taken, any person having a right of action can no longer completely institute an action. If the plaintiff’s action is statute barred, it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of court. In the instant case, the application of the appellant having been commenced after the period specified under section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, which is three month’s was statute bared. It is evident from the above averment that the plaintiff’s action is statute barred’ the suit having been instituted several years after the cause of action arose. Learned counsel then asked the Honourable Court to dismiss this suit in the interest of justice. The Claimant/Respondent in reaction to the preliminary objection on the 27th of December 2013 filed a counter-affidavit of 38 paragraphs deposed to by the Claimant himself. Accompanying the said Counter-Affidavit is a Written Address dated 24th December, 2013. In the said Written Address learned counsel for the Claimant/Respondent formulated and argued the following three issues for the Court’s determination: 1. Whether apart from the Enugu State Directive after January, 2012 Appropriation to all the Local Governments, that all 2010/2011 Councilors be fully paid their Severance Allowance on or before 31/12/2012, the Defendant has not contributed immensely to the time this action is instituted? 2. Whether this action is not statute barred having regard to the Defendant’s action/inactions complained of? 3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application for being incompetent? Arguing the first issue, learned counsel stated that they were relying heavily on paragraphs 11-24 of the counter-affidavit to state that apart from the State Government’s directive that the severance allowance be paid to all the Councilors who served in 2010/2011 on or before 31/12/2012 after the appropriation of January, 2012 which most ofthe local governments in the State had complied with, the Defendant with its untiring but unfulfilling promises contributed immensely to the time this action is instituted. The Defendant cannot therefore hide under the expensive law of Limitation to benefit from its own wrong. Counsel referred to the case of Adams V Umar [2009] 5NWLR, (PT. 1133)p. 41, RATIO 76(C.A.). Furthermore, that the Supreme Court also inin the case of CIVIL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION NIG LTD Vs SCAO NIG LTD (2007) 6 NWLR(PT. 1030) p. 300 at 312, RATIO 12held that “A person or body cannot benefit from or take advantage of his own wrong....”. He continued that the Defendant in paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of its objection admitted owing and making promises to pay the Claimant/Respondent this severance allowance. Also in its paragraph 13, the Defendant admitted paying six of its twelve Councilors. The Claimant/Respondent also in his paragraph 24 of the counter —affidavit averred that the Defendant continued keeping his mind in expectation with its numerous promise until February, 2013 when the Defendant through it Chairman informed him and the other Five unpaid Councilors that he was not bound to pay them as they did not support his Chairmanship candidacy of the Defendant which eventually brought him into the Defendant Executive position. The Defendant has not in any way denied being indebted to the Claimant/Respondent. The Defendant also alleged in paragraph 12 of the supporting affidavit that it failed to pay the Claimant/Respondent and five other because they did not attend an alleged reconciliation meeting called. The question now is if the Defendant is fair to the Claimant/Respondent and honest to this Honourable Court, why not the Defendant pay to the Claimant/Respondent’s account number already supplied to it any amount it felt was the balance due to the Claimant/Respondent at the time of making full payment to the Chairman’s Six disciples? And secondly, why should the Defendant wait till after several months of demand for the payment and in February, 2013 before making it open to the Claimant/Respondent that it is not bound to pay? The truth in this matter counsel continued, remains unchangeable no matter how the Defendant may try to twist it. The Claimant/Respondent did not owe the Defendant at the expiration of his tenure on 31/12/2011 and does not owe the Defendant/Applicant any kobo. The Claimant/Respondent relies on paragraphs 11-24 of the counter affidavit in opposition to this Application. The Defendant at the expiration of the Claimant/Respondent tenure on 31/12/2011 could not pay any of its 12 Councilors a dime. It was in May, 2012 after Enugu State appropriation and after several demands were made that the Defendant paid 6Councilors and left 6 others including the Claimant/Respondent unpaid. The Defendant continued promising the Claimant/Respondent that he would be paid until in February, when the Defendant through its Chairman informed him and the other Five unpaid Councilors that the Defendant was not bound to pay them as they did not support the Chairmanship candidacy of the Defendant’s present Chairman which eventually brought him into the Defendant Executive position. It was after the Defendant failed in its persistent promise to pay the Claimant/Respondent and this openness that the Claimant/Respondent acted immediately by first serving the Defendant Pre-action notice and consequently instituted this action. The Defendant’s allegation of not paying the Claimant/Respondent his severance allowance due to his absence from a reconciliation meeting after fully paying 6 of its 2010/2011 Councilors is a very big lie. The Defendant never called or communicated any meeting date to the Claimant/Respondent which he failed to honour. From the foregoing learned counsel submitted that the Defendant’s persistent and indefinite promise to pay the Claimant/Respondent his severance allowance also contributed greatly to the time this case is instituted. Also the Defendant which had severally promised to pay the Claimant/Respondent and which promise the Claimant/Respondent had acted upon and consequently contributed to the time this action is commenced cannot be shield by any law or equity. That the Court of Appeal while interpreting section 151 of the Evidence Act inKOKOORIN V PATIGI LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2009)15 NWLR, (PT 1164) 205 held thus: By virtue of section 151 of the Evidence Act, when one person has by his declaration, act, or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed, in any proceeding between himself and such person or such person‘s representative in interest, to deny the truth of that thing. In the instant case, the respondent is stopped from denying its liability for the services provided in its behalf by the appellant”. (See also Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011). Also in EKANEM EKPO OTU V A. C. B. INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC& ANOR (2008) 3 NWLR(PT1073) 179,the Supreme Court held as follows: Where a person by his words or conduct, willfully causes another person to believe the existence of a certain state of things and induces the latter to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. In other words, if a man by his words or conduct willfully endeavours to cause another person to believe in a certain state of things,which the first knows to be false and if the second believes in such state of things and acts upon his belief he who knowingly made the first statement is stopped from asserting afterwards that such a state of things does not exist at the time. This is how the rule in estoppel by conduct otherwise known as estoppels matter in pals has been stated... That the Defendant through its Chairman had always promised to pay the Claimant/Respondent his severance allowance until February, 2013 when the Defendant through its Chairman informed him and the other Five unpaid Councilors that he was not bound to pay them the severance allowance as they did not support his Chairmanship candidacy of the Defendant which eventually brought him into the Defendant Executive position. The Defendant who knew his numerous promises to pay the Claimant/Respondent to be deceptive and which promises had induced the Claimant/Respondent from immediately taking action against the Defendant is therefore stopped from approbating and reprobating at the same time and learned counsel urged the court to so hold and dismiss this application. All these untiring promises kept the Claimant/Respondent in continuous hope that the Defendant will pay him as promised only for the Defendant to turn to the Court to allege otherwise. Counsel therefore submitted that the Defendant is estopped from and cannot at this stage deny and be allowed to enrich itself or benefit from what it contributed to. Counsel further contended that this Honourable Court is not only Court of Law but as well Court of justice and where there is conflict between the technical application of Law and doing of substantial justice, the latter prevails. The Court in ADAMS V UMAR (2009) 5NWLR, PT 1133, 41, RATIO 73 held that: Courts must always strive for the ideal of doing substantial justice rather than technical justice. In ratio 74 the Court further held that: Tribunals need not rely heavily on technicality to the detriment of the serious issue needing scrutiny and determination. In a situation where very grave allegation are made by the other party, to shut him up does much harm to the cause ofjustice. Counsel continued that it is a well settled principle of law that a party to a case and in this instance the Defendant cannot be allowed to benefit from its own wrong. He urged the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in Claimant/Respondent’s favour and dismiss this application. On issue 2 which is whether this action is not statute barred having regard to the Defendant’s action/inactions complained of learned counsel conceded that the general rule of Law of Limitation of action is that an action must be brought within the period stipulated for it unless such action will be statute barred. That assuming without conceding that this case at hand is statute barred as the Learned Counsel for the Defendant argued, it is also trite that the protection offered by the law of Limitation period is only available to a party whose action or omission complained of was in good faith and in line with the power conferred to him/her. The law does not protect and frowns at a party who deliberately abuses and uses governmental powers to perpetrate injustice on another only for the perpetrator to turn to the Court of Law and justice to claim a bogus protection. The law of Limitation period is like law of equity which demands a party who seeks equity to do equity, and a party who comes to equity to come with clean hands, referring to the case of Fasesin V Oyerinde(1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 530 at 552 (S.C). The Limitation law also demands a party who sought its protection from any action to act in good faith. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the Defendant had neither acted in good faith in denying the Claimant/Respondent his legitimate entitlement nor did justice to him for it to be availed by the Law of limitation period. The Defendant in May, 2012 fully paid 6 of its Councilors and left 6 others including the Claimant/Respondent unpaid with continuous promise to pay them only for the Defendant to claim again in February 2013 that it is not bound to pay since the Claimant/Respondent and 5 others did not support the Chairmanship candidacy of the Defendant’s Chairman which eventually brought the present Chairman into power. This singular act is therefore entirely inconsistent with the provision of Section 42(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that a citizen of Nigeria shall not be subjected to any disability or restriction which citizens of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person- a) be subjected either expressly by, or in practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative actions of the government, to disability, or restriction to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religions or political opinions are not made subject. This constitution is the enabling law for the Defendant’s creation and a grundnorm of every authority. The Defendant paid 6 of its 2010/2011 Councilors and left other 6 including the Claimant/Respondent unpaid due to their conflicting political opinion of the Defendant’s Chairman during campaigning and electioneering period. The Defendant has not as a matter of fact treated its Councilors fairly and equally. Its action/inactions are therefore in conflict with the law of the land and as such the Defendant cannot be protected by any law of the land. The Defendant has not again fulfilled this promise but decided to cleverly hide under the Limitation Law. Learned counsel submitted that the Defendant’s refusal, negligent (sic) and derogation from its duty to pay the Claimant/Respondent his severance allowance as provided and directed by the Operational Guidelines/Salaries And Allowances for the Executive and Legislative Arms of the Local Government System sent to all the Local Government of the State including the Defendant, was not within the actions of the government or its representative protected by the Law of limitation period. The Defendant did not only act in bad faith, it treated its Councilors unequally. Its action was and till date amounts to unfair treatment to the Claimant/Respondent. The Defendant has therefore not obeyed the said Operational Guidelines of the Enugu State Government which has a force of law and consequently cannot be shielded or protected by the law made by the same State. He urged the Honourable Court to so hold and dismiss this application. Furthermore, that in HASSAN V ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR, PT 1223, PG 547 RATIO 3, the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act which offers similar protection like Section 136 of the Local Government Laws Cap 109 Revised Law of Enugu State, 2004 held thus: Abuse of Office and bad faith are factors that deprive a party who would otherwise have been entitled to the protection of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act of such protection. The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that the defendant had abused his position or that he had acted with no semblance of legal justification. Evidence that he may have been overzealous in carrying out his duties or that he had acted in error of judgment or in honest excess of his responsibility, will not amount to badfaith or abuse of office. Abuse of office is the use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted; for example, for personal gain, to show undue favour or to wreak vengeance on an opponent...” The Court in ratio 4 further stated: The two conditions which must exist before a person can avail himself of the protection provided by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act are: (a) the person must be a public officer; and (b) the act done by the person in respect of which that action was commence was an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of law or public duty or authority. On exception to 3 months Limitation Period for commencement of action against a Public Officer, the Court held in ratio 10 of HASSAN V ALIYU (supra) as follows: Where a Public Officer fails to act in good faith or acts in abuse of office or maliciously, or with no semblance of legal justification, he will not be protected by the provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Actas to the 3 months time limit for commencement of action against him. More so, it is trite that law of limitation of action does not apply to action on recovery of debt or on liquidated money demand more especially where the Defendant acknowledges being indebted to the Claimant. This action is on recovery of debt owed by the Defendant to the Claimant which the Defendant in its paragraph 10 acknowledges and as such cannot be covered by Section 136 of the Local Government Laws Cap 109 Revised Law of Enugu State,2004. In interpreting Section 178 of the Local Government Law Cap 92, Laws of Kwara State, 1994 which is in pari materia with section 136 of the Local Government Laws Cap 109 Revised Law of Enugu State,2004, the Court held in KOKOORIN V PATIGI LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2009)15 NWLR, (Pt. 1164), 205 thus: By virtue of Section 178 of the Local Government Law Cap 92, Laws of Kwara State, 1994, when any suit is commenced against any Local Government for any act done in pursuance or in execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in execution of any such law, duty or authority, such suit shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of continuance of damage or injury, within 6 months after the ceasing thereof. The provision of section 178 of the Law is not intended to apply to debt or liquidated demand as in the instant case. It instead covers the commencement of a suit against a local Government for an act done in pursuance of or in execution or intended execution of any law or of any duty, public duty or authority etc and not in respect of debt or liquidated money demand based on a contractual relationship between the contesting parties. Learned submitted that with the above decisions of the Courts, Section 136 of the Local Government Laws Cap 109 Revised Law of Enugu State, 2004 was not enacted to assist the Defendant in inflicting injustice on another, but to protect the Defendant where its action/inaction was in line with the power conferred to it. The said section can therefore neither avail nor protect the Defendant in this case from being prosecuted anytime, any day since its action/inaction was in bad faith, amount to abuse of powers and has no legal justification, 6 months limitation period notwithstanding. He urgedthis Honourable Court to resolve this issue in the Claimant/ Respondent’s favour and dismiss this application. On Issue 3 which is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this case for being incompetent, learned counsel stated thatthe Claimant/Respondent’s Complaint and other accompanying processes were served on the Defendant on the 20/09/2013. By Order 8 rule 1ofthis Court’s Rules, a Defendant served with an originating process shall within 14 (days) of the service of the originating process, file a memorandum of appearance in the Registry of the Court. The Defendant neither filed its memorandum of appearance nor any other process until more than 70 days after its time had elapsed. It is trite that a party who has a limited period to act must act within the period unless there is leave of the court extending such period. The Defendant/Applicant filed his notice of preliminary objection without first asking and obtaining the leave of the Court to do so. A notice of preliminary objection does not stand without the party canvassing such being properly before the Court. The Defendant ought to have obtained the court’s leave to enter appearance out of time before properly raising its objection and failure to do this rendered the Defendant’s application incompetent. That the Court in ADAMS V UMAR (2009) 5NWLR, PT 1133, 41, at RATIO 82held that: By virtue of the provisions of practice directions, 2007, any infraction or failure to file process within time can be cured by the motion for extension of time being filed on notice to the other side. Also in EKANEM EKPO OTU V A. C. B. INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC& ANOR(2008) 3 NWLR, PT1073, 179, Ratio 3,the Supreme Court held as follows: Where leave is required either in the Constitution or in the rules of Court before filing a motion, and leave is not sought and granted, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the motion as it is incompetent. An order on such an incompetent motion is invalid. The Defendant’s failure to first obtain the leave of this Court to appear before this Court before filing its motion on preliminary objection also makes its application fundamentally defective and incompetent to be adjudicated upon much less granting same. He therefore urgedCourt to resolve this issue in the Claimant/Respondent’s favour and dismiss this application. In conclusion, learned counsel submitted that the Defendant has failed woefully to justify and convince this Honourable Court why this application should be granted. He therefore urgedCourt to exercise its judicious discretion in favour of the Claimant/Respondent and dismiss this application. The law of limitation of an action is not a shield to indolent, weak and non-working government like the Defendant in this case, but a sword in the hands of those carrying out the duties reposed on them. The Defendant/Applicant raised this objection only to mislead the Court, delay the cause of justice and cause more financial difficulty to the Claimant/Respondent and counsel urged the court so to hold and dismiss this application with crushing cost. The learned counsel for the defendant did not file any reply on points of law. I have carefully considered the processes filed as well as the arguments and submissions of the parties on the preliminary objection raised by the Defendant in this case. The sole issue that arises for the Court’s determination is whether or not the Suit of the Claimant is statute barred? The Defendant has relied on the provisions of Section 136 of Local Government Law, Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004 to argue that the suit of the claimant is statute barred. The said Section 136 provides as follows: Where it is intended to commence a suit against a Local Government for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, such suit shall not be, instituted or commenced unless it is commenced or instituted within six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury within six months next after the ceasing thereof. The law is quite certain that in determining whether a suit is statute barred or caught up by limitation law, the court is to look at the date of the accrual of the cause of action and compare same with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on which the suit was filed happens to be outside the limitation period stipulated by the statute of limitation then the suit must be held to be statute barred. See Mr. Joseph Chukwuemeka Mosindi & Ors vs Mr. Ifeanyi Achusi & Ors (2014) LPELR-23767(CA), per IGE, JCA, pp. 26-27 where the Court held as follows: A cause of action is said to be statute-barred if in respect of it proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Law or Act had elapsed. How does one determine the period of limitation? The answer is simple by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed, this can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond allowed by the Limitation Law the action is statute barred. See FRED EGBE VS JUSTICE ADEFARASIN (1987) LPELR-1032 P.1 at 32 paras D-E, per Oputa JSC, of blessed memory. See also (1) ALHAJI JIBRIN BALA HASSANVS DR MUAZU BABANGIDA ALIYU & ORS (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 595 and 619H-620A. (2) DR TOSIN AJAYI vs PRINCESS (MRS) OLAJUMOKE ADEBIYI & ORS (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137 AT 169 A-E, where ADEKEYE JSC, said: The yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute barred are: a) The date the cause of action accrued. b) The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the Writ of Summons. c) Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question. Time begins to run for purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. In this case the Claimant served as Councilor of the Defendant Local Government having been duly elected and returned as such for the period of 2010 to December, 2011. The entitlement of the Claimant, which is his severance allowance which had accrued as at the 31st of December, 2011 was not paid to him. This is what his cause of action is. Part of the Claimant’s averment is that in May 2012 some payments were made by the Defendant but that six out of twelve of the Councilors including the Claimant were not paid but were promised payment by the end of December, 2012. For the purposes of this application it is quite clear to me and I so find that the cause of action of the claimant accrued on the 31st day of December 2011 when his tenure was completed. The Claimant approached the Honourable Court on 26th day of June 2013 when he commenced this suit. Going by the date on which the cause of action arose, 31st December, 2011, and the date of commencement of this suit, i.e. 26th June, 2013, clearly the suit of the claimant is statute barred. This is because it is beyond the six months period within which the suit should have been filed according to section 136 of the Local Government Law of Enugu State, 2004, the limitation law being relied upon by the Defendant. However, the learned Claimant’s counsel has submitted that the Defendant is not entitled to the protection of the Limitation Law in this case because the Defendant had acted in bad faith in refusing to pay the claimant (along with five (5) others) his entitlement while paying off six others with whom they had served. This point of discrimination in the payment of some Councilors while excluding the claimant and others of their benefits was argued by the Claimant to have breached Section 42(1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The claimant also argued that the refusal to pay him and the six others was an abuse of power and he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of HASSAN V ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR,( PT 1223), PG 547 RATIO 3,where it held that: Abuse of office is the use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted; for example, for personal gain, to show undue favour or to wreak vengeance on an opponent..(Underlining is mine for emphasis). The argument and submission of the Claimant was further anchored on the fact that limitation law does not apply to an action for recovery of debt or on liquidated money demand more especially where the Defendant acknowledges being indebted to the Claimant. Reliance was placed on the decision in Kokoorin vs Patigi Local Government (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1164) 205. In addressing the point of the exceptions raised by the Claimant I shall start with the fact that the Defendant acted in bad faith by not paying the claimant his entitlements whereas he had paid others. In this case I am convinced by the argument and submission of the Claimant that there is no good faith in refusing to pay the Claimant while paying some of his colleagues who served for the period as elected Councilors. This discriminatory treatment clearly in my humble view grossly violates the provisions of Section 42 of the 1999 Constitutions as argued by the learned claimant’s counsel. It cannot be said that there is justification for differential treatment of persons who were elected to office by the Defendant. The defendant cannot therefore be allowed to benefit from such an act of discrimination by raising the flag of limitation law. This must be an abuse of office which the decision in the case of Hassan vs Aliyu, supra, refers to above. I so find and hold. Furthermore, the claimant has argued that the Claimant’s entitlement in this case is a debt which cannot be subject to statute of limitation. I have examined the said submission particularly the decision in Kokoori’s case, supra, and I have to state that the facts in Kokoori’s case are not similar to those in this case to the extent that the obligation in that case arose out of contract job executed by the Plaintiff. In this case, it was alleged entitlement arising from holding of an elected office. There is therefore the difference in terms of how the obligation arose as between the two cases. On a further careful consideration however, the claimant’s case has been described as a debt with specific sums of money stated as the entitlement. I am inclined to the view that the amount has become a debt. I refer to the definition of debt given in Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, page 462 as follows: 4. A common law writ by which a court adjudicates claims involving fixed sums of money <he brought suit in debt>Also termed (in sense 4) writ of debt. The action of debt lies where a party claims the recovery of a debt; that is, a liquidated or certain sum of money due him. The action is based upon contract, but the contract may be implied, either in fact or in law, as well as express; and it may be either a simple contract or a specialty. The most common instances of its use are for debts: (a) Upon unilateral contracts or implied in fact. (b) Upon quasi-contractual obligations having the force and effect of simple contracts. (c) Upon bonds and covenants under seal. (d) Upon judgments or obligations of record. (e) Upon obligations imposed by statute. Benjamin J. Shipman, Handbook of Common Law Pleading 52 at 132. (Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed. 3d 1923). Here the point being made is that the claimant’s claim presented is in the form of a debt which has arisen as a result of obligation imposed by statute, since it was the holding of the elected office of Councilor that gave rise to the liability in question. The court is here not saying that the debt has been established. Ratherit is saying that the claim for the recovery of debt owed in this present suit in which the court has already made a finding and holding that the defendant acted in bad faith in refusing to pay the claimant’s entitlement, cannot be caught up by the statute bar. In the circumstance, it is my view and I so hold that the Claimant’s suit is not caught up by the provisions of Section 136 of the Local Government Law of Enugu State, 2004. The preliminary objection fails and same is dismissed. The matter proceeds to hearing. I make no order as costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. The decision in this suit applies to sister suit numbers NICN/EN/142/2013, NICN/EN/144/2013 and NICN/EN/145/2012 respectively. Hon. Justice A. Ibrahim, PhD Presiding Judge