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REPRESENTATION: R. C. Nwigwe Esq. appeared for the Claimants. G.N. Igwebuike Esq. appeared for the Defendant. RULING/JUDGMENT The Claimants sued the Defendant on the 4th day of November, 2014. In the Complaint and Statement of Facts they claim against the Defendant the following reliefs: (a) An order for the immediate release and payment of N2.4m (Two Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira) only, each being the sum due to each claimant as severance allowance for the second tenure totaling N16.8M (Sixteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Naira) only, for all the claimants. (b) An order for the immediate release and payment of N900,000.00 (Nine hundred Thousand Naira) only, each being balance of sum due to each claimant a severance allowance totaling N6.3m (Sixteen (sic) Million Eight Hundred Thousand Naira) only, for all the claimants. The Complaint was accompanied with the Statement of Facts, list of witnesses of the Claimants, Written Deposition of the witnesses, and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial. Upon being served with the processes of the Claimant, the Defendant filed a preliminary objection dated 7th April, 2015 on the same day praying the Court for the following relief: 1. An order dismissing this suit for lack of jurisdiction by the court. And for such further order(s) as the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The ground of the objection were given as: 1. The claimants’ action is statute barred. 2. The claimant’s action offends section 254C (1)(K) CFRN 1999 (3rd Alteration) Act 2011. 3. The claimants are not in this court as a body/Association to bring this action jointly. 4. The action and reliefs sought are personal to each claimant and cannot be joint. 5. There is misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The preliminary objection was supported by an affidavit of 7 paragraphs deposed to by Comrade Sunday Ogbonna, the Secretary to the Defendant. There is also a written address dated 7th of April, 2015. The learned Claimants’ counsel filed a Counter-affidavit of 13 paragraphs deposed to by the 4th Claimant in this suit. There is also a written address in opposition to objection dated 16th April, 2015. Thereafter the Defendant’s counsel filed a reply on points of law along with a Further affidavit of 6 paragraphs with two attachments. The learned Defendant’s counsel formulated and argued the following issues for the court’s determination: 1. Whether the claimants’ suit is not statute barred? 2. Whether the claimants’ can jointly file this action when the reliefs sought are per individual? On his own part the learned claimants’ counsel formulated and argued the following similar issues for determination: 1. Whether or not the suit is statute barred? 2. Whether or not the claimants can jointly file this suit as co-claimants? Having considered the processes, arguments and submission of learned counsel to the parties, the issues for determination are: 1. Whether or not the suit is statute barred? 2. Whether or not the claimants can jointly file this suit as co-claimants? The facts of the case briefly are that the claimants were elected and served as councilors of the defendant for two terms to wit: 2008/2009 and 2010/2011. They finished their second term at the end of December, 2011. They were not paid their Severance allowance and that is why they have brought this action. On the first issue, a suit is said to be statute barred where the party bringing it has not brought it timeously within the time stipulated by the law. In the instant case the defendant is saying that by virtue of section 136 of the Local Government Law Cap 109, Laws of Enugu State 2004, the Claimants should have brought the suit within six months from the date of accrual of cause of action. To the defendant the payment of Severance Allowance is a public duty which the claimants alleged that defendant neglected to perform. Further that the law is that in the event of such failure to perform such public duty an action can be commenced within six months after the breach, neglect or failure to perform the said public duty. Thus the defendant contended that the claimant ought to have commenced this action on or before 30th June, 2012. This was not done by the claimants until after about two years. The suit is therefore statute barred.Counsel relied on the case of Williams vs Williams (2008) 34 NSCQR (Pt.2) 846 at 868, Per Musdapher JSC (as he then was). On his own part, the Claimants’ counsel argued that since time begins to run from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, then the cause of action in this suit accrued on 2nd September, 2014. This is because it is the date on which the Defendant wrote the claimants stating unequivocally its unreadiness to pay the claimants their statutory allowance, i.e. the severance allowance. He referred to a letter which was written by the claimants’ counsel to the defendant, essentially a pre-action notice (dated 19th August, 2014), to which the defendant replied with a letter dated 2nd September, 2014. The letters he attached to further affidavit filed by the Defendant. The Claimants counsel added that even if the action as filed was belated, the defendant is not entitled to the protection to limitation law because it did not act in good faith by not paying the claimants their severance allowance. He also referred to Fasein vs Oyerinde (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) at 553 SC. It is trite that cause of action is the cause, injury or damage done to person for which he can seek for judicial relief. The procedure for determining a cause of action is to look at the originating processes of the Claimant, precisely his Statement of Claim to see when the cause of action arose and also when the action was filed in court.If the date on which the action was filed in court is beyond the date allowed by law based on the provisions of the law being relied upon, then the suit must be declared statute barred. See Ezean vs Nigerian Railway corporation (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1445) p. 139 at 159. In this case the obligation of the Defendant to pay the Severance Allowance arose on 31st of December, 2011. This suit was filed on 4th of November, 2014. It must therefore be statute barred. However, the Claimant has argued that because the defendant had made promises to pay the severance benefit sometime in 2012, and in fact only categorically said it was not paying on 2nd September, 2014, the cause of action must be held to have arisen in 2014. I do not accept this argument of the claimants. The law is quite clear that negotiations between parties cannot stop the limitation time from running. See the case of Ezeani, supra, at page 165, para F and Eboigbe vs NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649.This means that time in this case was running. I so find. There is also the point of bad faith alleged by the Claimants. The point made by them is the non-payment itself. I do not see this alone as evidence of bad faith. The claimants were to come to court within time so that any issue in relation to the payment could be determined by the court. However, the Claimants did not do. So what they have is a valid cause of action but which cannot be enforced by the courts because of the statute bar. On the second issue which is the point of misjoinder of the Claimants. I have considered the arguments of the parties. To the defendant, each of the claimants has his own distinct entitement and so they all cannot come to court and sue jointly as they have done. Learned defendant’s counsel added that by his understanding of the provisions of Section 254C(1)(K) of the 1999 Constitution, the Claimants cannot bring this suit. This is because the suit talks of individual suits and not joint suits. He cited also the case of TASHA vs UBN (2003) 36 WRN 64 at 68 ratio 5 per Uwaifo JSC. On his own part the Claimants’ counsel argued that where persons have common reliefs they should sue jointly as co-plaintiffs or claimants as in this case. He relied on many cases including Ayankoya vs Olukoya (1996) NWLR (Pt. 440) p. 1 Sc. Having considered the arguments and submissions of the parties in this case, I am of the view that there is nothing wrong with this suit as presently brought jointly by the Claimants. The fact is that they have a common injury cause by the defendant, in the form of non-payment of their severance allowance. And the reliefs they are asking for are all similar. There is therefore no misjoinder of parties or causes of action to occasion incompetence of the suit. Furthermore, the submission of the learned defendant’s counsel on the fact that the suit infringes the provisions of Section 254C(1)(K) of the 1999 Constitution is misconceived. That section of the Constitution makes possible for parties to approach the for court reliefs. It does not define how parties should file their action. The issue is resoled against the Defendant. On the whole I find and hold that this suit is statute barred. It is accordingly dismissed. I make no order as to costs. Rulling entered accordingly Hon. Justice A. Ibrahim, PhD Presiding Judge