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REPRESENTATION: Umunna Uwgu Esq. for the Claimant/Respondent. Mrs C. A. Onaga, Solicitor General Ministry of Justice, Enugu with Mrs U. J. Chime, Senior Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, Enugu State, for the Defendants/Applicants. RULING/JUDGMENT This action was filed by the Claimant on the 12th day of April, 2012. In paragraph 23 of the Statement of Facts the Claimant claims the following reliefs against the defendants jointly and severally: i. An order setting aside the premature retirement letter written by 1st Defendant dated 15/3/2011, ref. NO. ESBS/ENG/PS:21/373 to him and a declaration that same is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. ii. A declaration that his purported retirement from the services of 1st Defendant based on the facts contained in the said letter of 15/3/2011, is PREMATURE and therefore wrongful, unlawful, and illegal hence his appointment subsists, and that he is still occupying his position as Chief Technical Officer of the 1st Defendant. iii. A declaration that the Claimant should be entitled to stay in the services of 1st Defendant until the Claimant attains the mandatory 6o years of age or 35 years of service. iv. An order for his immediate reinstatement into office and payment of all his entitlement for 1st December, 2007 when the purported retirement took effect to the date of re-instatement. v. That sum of (N5m) five million Naira only paid to him within stipulated time as General Damages for wrongful retirement of claimant from the services of 1st Defendant. vi. An injunction restraining the 1st Defendant, agents, servant and privies from interfering with employment, seniority or rank, until the claimant attains the mandatory age of 60 or 35 years of service. The Complaint was accompanied with a Statement of Facts, list of witnesses, statement on oath of CW1, affidavit of verification, list (and copies) of documents to be relied upon at trial. Upon being served with the Complaint, the defendants entered appearance on 24/7/2012 and filed along their statement of defence with accompanying processes which were regularized by the court on 29th day of October, 2012. On the 25th day of November, 2013 the defendants filed a Notice of Objection dated same date praying this Honourable Court for the following reliefs: a. AN ORDER dismissing Claimant’s suit filed on 12thday of April, 2013 (sic) for being statute barred. b. AND for such further order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The particulars of the objection were stated as follows: i. The Public Officers Protection Act requires that the instant suit being one against public Officers be brought within three (3) months of the act or default complained of. ii. The claimant failed to bring this suit within the time limited by law. The Notice is supported by an affidavit of 18 paragraphs deposed to by Sunday N. Edeani, a Secretary to the 1st Defendant in this matter. Annexed to the said affidavit are Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6. It is also accompanied with a written address dated 25th day of November, 2013. In response to the objection of the Defendants/Applicants, the learned Claimant/Respondent’s counsel on the 4th day of February, 2014, filed a written address opposing the Objection. Thereafter, the Defendants/Applicants’ filed a reply on points of law to the Claimant/Respondent’s written address on 4th day of April, 2014. Parties adopted their respective written addresses. In his written address learned defendant’s counsel stated that the Claimant filed a complaint against the Defendants/Applicants on the 12th day of April, 2012 challenging his retirement from the service of the 1st Defendant/Applicant. Claimant alleged that his retirement of 15/3/2011 and 27/5/2011 are pre-mature. Claimant however instituted this action on the 12th day of April, 2012, about eleven (11) months after the letter of retirement dated 27/5/2011 was given to him. By this action, Claimant, inter alia, sought a declaration that his retirement of 15/3/2011 is pre-mature, null and void, and an order of reinstatement and payment of entitlement from 1st December, 2007 when the retirement took effect. The Defendants/Applicants have brought the instant objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court to entertain Claimant’s suit as same is statute barred. Learned counsel thereafter formulated and argued a single issue for determination as follows: Whether this suit is not statute barred having regard to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN 2004? Arguing the said issue learned counsel reproduced the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41, LFN, 2004 which provides as follows: Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect- (a) the action, prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. According to learned counsel, by the authorities, for Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to avail any person, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, it must be established that the person against whom the action is brought is a public officer or a person acting in the execution of public duties. Secondly, the act complained of must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority or the alleged neglect or default concerns the execution of any such law, duty or authority. He referred to Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 38.It is not in doubt in the circumstances of this case that the Defendants are public officers. That according Iguh JSC, delivering the lead judgment in Ibrahim vs Judicial Committee, Kaduna State (1998), supra, held that: It is thus clear to me that the term “public officer” has by law been extended to include a “public department” and, therefore, an artificial person, a public officer or a public body. I do not think that it can be suggested with any degree of seriousness that the Public Officers (Protection) Law Cap 111 of Northern Nigeria, 1963 while it protects public officers, cannot in the same way protect a public department, an artificial person or public body, so long as they are sued for an act done in the execution of their public duties. Nor am I able to accept that Cap 111 does not protect persons, offices, bodies or institutions created by statute or the Constitution or persons sued by their official titles, such as Attorney-General, Inspector-General of Police or Permanent Secretary. As I have repeatedly stated, the words of the section of the law under interpretation are clearly not in themselves ambiguous. There is also nothing in either the long as short title, against the full context of the legislation, which suggests that any special meaning is to be given the words “any person” in that law other than their ordinary and plain meaning. I therefore find myself unable to introduce any limitation words to qualify the words “any person” in the legislation in issue. Learned counsel continued that the 1st Defendant is a statutory corporation established by law. A similar corporation was held to come under the protection of similar provisions as those of the Public Officers Protection Act in Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation vs Bankole (1972) NSCC 220. The 2nd Defendant is an office established by law for the performance of statutory duties. The 3rd and 4th defendants undoubtedly fall within the examples cited by the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. J.S.C. above. It is thus settled that the defendants herein are all public officers within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act and are entitled to protection thereunder. Also, the second condition for the application of the statutory protection is fulfilled in the circumstances of this suit as the acts of the Defendants complained of in this case were carried out in the performance of their public or official duties. An act done in pursuance or execution of any law, duty or authority or an alleged neglector default relating to the execution of any such law, duty or authority one which is done in the course of the day to day functions of the public officer concerned. The 1st defendant is responsible, subject to the oversight powers of relevant officials of the Government of Enugu State, for the appointment, dismissal, remuneration and conditionsof service of its staff. The 2nd Defendant acted in his official capacity in relation to the Claimant at all times relevant to this suit. The 3rd Defendant is the Chief Law Officer of the State while the 4th Defendant exercises oversight functions over the 1st Defendant. The retirement of staff is undoubtedly in the course of the performance by the Defendants of their public duties. Learned counsel stated further that is also beyond argument that the claimant’s suit was instituted outside the three (3) months prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Act. Claimant was retired vide letter ref. ESBS/S.60/T/VOL.II/144 dated 27/5/2011 which confirmed the earlier letter dated 15/3/2011.He instituted this action on the 12th day of April, 2012. According to Supreme Court in F.I.R.N. v. Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 1 per Oputa JSC in Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 20, In determining whether or not an action is statute barred, the court looks at the writ of summons, statement of claim alleging when the wrong which gives the plaintiff a cause of action was committed, and then compares that date with the date the writ of summons was filed….if the date on the writ is beyond the period allowed by limitation law, then the action is statute barred. Thus this action was instituted after the prescribed period and, by the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Act, is statute barred. Counsel continued that a cause of action is said to be statute barred if, in respect thereof, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law was elapsed. He referred to Egbe v. Adefarasin, supra. Thus any action or proceedings instituted after the statutorily prescribed three (3) months after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of continuance of damage or injury, three (3) months after the ceasing thereof, will be statute barred. The Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (Supra) at p. 32 stated the principle thus: The general principle of law is that where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action that is instituted after the period stipulated by the statute is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff or the injured person to commence the action would have been extinguished by such law. He continued that though the Public Officers Protection Act does not prescribe any exceptions, the courts have identified certain exceptions thereto. In the words of de Commarmond S.P.J. in Salako v. LEDB (1953) 20 NLR 169 thus: …section 2 of the Public Offices (Protection) Ordinance does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract, claims for the work and labour done, etc. It is noteworthy however that the exception of contracts and labour claims do not apply to all forms of work or to contracts generally but only to cases of specific contracts. According to the Supreme Court in NPA v. Construzioni F.C.S. (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 463 referred to in the case of F.G.N. v. Zebra Energy Ltd (2002) 18 NWLR (798) 162, We too are of the opinion that de Commarmond S.P.J. has quite rightly stated the law in the passage of his judgment cited above. It seems to us that an enactment of this kind, i.e. S. 97 of the Ports Act is not intended by the Legislature to apply to specific contracts. That the Supreme Court in Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation vs Bankole (1972) NSCC 220 held that where a contract refers to a specific contract enteredinto by the parties with distinct terms and conditions, the statutory privilege under the Public Officers Protection Act will not avail a public officer where there is a breach. However, where the act or decision complained of is in the performance or execution of a public duty, the protection will avail a public officer or public authority. The court found in that case that the dismissal of the plaintiff (respondent) was carried out in the course of the appellant’s performance of its public duty and held that the protection applied to the appellant. He referred to Bakare v. Nigeria Railway Corporation (2007) 17 NWLR 9Pt. 1064) 606. That according to the Court of Appeal in Musa v. N.I.M.R. (2010) 11 NLR (Pt. 1205) 271, Per Ogunbiyi JCA (as he then was), at 292: Their Lordships in their consideration held amongst others that where the contract is specific and entered into by parties with distinct terms and conditions, the statutory privilege provided for will not avail the public officer where there is a breach. A different situation avails however where there is a purported breach in the performance or execution of a public duty as in the case at hand. That while some of the authorities have also held that the Public Officers Protection Act will not protect a public officer where the act complained of is one tainted by malice, bad faith, bias or where there I no legal justification, relying on the case of Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government (2001) 1 FWLR (Pt. 68) 1051, the current position of the authorities is that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, as the section determines whether an action is maintainable and not the liability or otherwise of the defendant. According to Ogunwumiju JCA in Fajimolu vs Unilorin (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) 74 at p. 88: The learned justices of the Supreme Court were unanimous in holding that the words used in S. 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, are plain and ought to be given their ordinary meaning…Furthermore they held that it is not right to read into an enactment an exception which it has not expressed and which will have the effect of depriving the person intended to be protected of that protection. The words “bias” and “malice” are not part of the provision of the statute and should be read into it. It does not require good faith to avail a defendant the special defence of limitation action nor does it require malice to deprive him of the defence provided under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Similarly, the right of any person injured or wronged by the act, neglect or default is not extinguished by the good faith of the public officer. That according to Uwais JSC (as he then was) in Egbe vs Alhaji, supra, at p. 572, paras. E-F, In a civil action, where the defendant invokes protection under section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law…it is not proper for the trial court to infer or conclude from the pleadings that the protection afforded by the law, has been vitiated by malice or bad faith. For what the trial court is obliged to decide at that stage is whether the action is maintainable and not whether the defendant is liable. Learned counsel thus submitted that on the strength of the foregoing authorities that the protection afforded by the Public Officers Protection Act applies to the defendants in this case as they are public officers and the act complained of was carried out in the performance of their public duty. That the claimant’s suit does not fall under any of the exceptions to the application of the Act. The claimant was under a contract of employment as against a special or specific contract. The claimant has not shown bad faith on the part of any of the defendants. The injury alleged by the Claimant is not a continuing injury as his retirement was definite. Thus, by virtue of the provisions of the limitation of limitation law the Claimant’s suit is statute-barred and therefore, not maintainable. Counsel concluded that the instant case is one in which claimant brought his suit outside the statutorily prescribed limitation period. The act of the defendants complained of is one which was done in the performance of a public duty. He urged the court to hold that claimant’s suit statute-barred and consequently dismiss same. On his own part learned counsel for the claimant formulated a sole issue for the court’s determination as follows: WHETHER THE 1ST AND 4TH DEFENDANTS ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 2(a) OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT, CAP. P41, LFN, 2004? Arguing the said issue learned counsel submitted that Enugu State Broadcasting Service is an institution and as such, can be availed with the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act as the proviso uses the word “person”. The 1st Defendant was created by Section 3 of the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law, Cap. 42, revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004 and it reads thus: There is hereby established a body to be known as the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Corporation which shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and with power to sue and be sued in its corporate name and to acquire, hold and dispose of property. That the same law went on to provide in Section 30(1) as follows: 30. (1) No suit against the Government or any staff or servant of the Corporation for any act done in pursuance of, execution or intended execution, of any law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such law, duty or authority shall lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within twelve months immediately after the occurrence of the act, neglect, or default complained of… (Underlining is learned counsel’s). Learned counsel continued that Section 195(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that: 195. (1) There shall be an Attorney General for each State who shall be the Chief Law Officer of the State and Commissioner for Justice of the Government of that State. Counsel submitted that from the foregoing provisions of both the revised laws of Enugu State, 2004 and the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) that the 1st and 4th Defendants are not public officers as contemplated in Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. They are rather institutions that are created by statutes and the statutes that created them, are specific as to their establishment, functions and scope of work. Since the statutes establishing 1st and 4th defendants are plain and unambiguous, courts are to give such statutes an ordinary and plain meaning. This canon of interpretation was espoused by the Supreme Court in the following cases: Awolowo Vs Shagari (1979) All NLR, Adejumo vs Governor of Lagos State (172) 3 SC 47, A-G Bendel State Vs A-G Federation (1982) 3 NCLR 1. In the case of NDIC vs 3Okm Ent. Ltd (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 880) 107 at 196, the Supreme Court said: It is trite law that general principles of interpretation of statutes is that where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless it would be absurd to do so having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. That in respect of the 4th Defendant, that is to say, the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, the Court of Appeal as Katsina Alu JCA (as he then was) in the case of Tafida Vs. Abubakar (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 511 at 523 stated thus: The 6th respondent is the Attorney General of Gongola State. In each state of federation there is an Attorney-General who is the Chief Law officer of the State. Section 176(1) of 1979 constitution provides for the office of the Attorney-General. It states “there shall be an Attorney-General for each state who shall be a commissioner of the Government of that state”. The office of the Attorney-General in my view is an institution of a public office, the holders of the office is a public officer. The present case, no action has been brought against a named individual as the holder of the office of Attorney-General. As I have already stated the public officer’s protection law is intended for the protection of public officers who are defendants. The law assumes misconduct on the part of the public officers and it is designed to protect them even where they have been guilty of misconduct. See Freeborn Vs. Leeming (1926) 1 KB 160 at 164. I am of the opinion therefore that the 4th respondent is not a public officer. Having regard to what I have said, the 1st and 4th respondents not being individuals, cannot claim protection under S.2(a) of the public officers protection act. That assuming but without conceding that the Court under any imaginable situation finds that the 1st respondent is a public officer entitled to the protection of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, the ESBS Law, Cap. 42 of revised laws of Enugu State provides in 30(1) thus:- No suit against the Corporation or any staff or servant…shall lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within twelve months immediately after the occurrence of that act, neglect or default of… Learned counsel continued that the implication is that the claimant is within time in bringing this suit against the 1st Defendant who by the statute creating it stated that the suit against it shall be brought within twelve months immediately after the act complained of. Indeed, the purported letter retiring the claimant was dated 27/5/2011 and on receiving the said letter engaged the services of a counsel who issued pre-action notice to the 1st Defendant, the expiration of which the claimant filed this suit on 12/4/2012, a period less than the twelve months as provided by Section 30(1) of the ESB Law, Cap 42 revised law of Enugu State, 2004. The 4th Defendant arguably joined by the Claimant in this suit as a nominal party because in every suit against the government of Enugu State or any of any of her agencies the 4th Defendant is constitutionally mandated to represent the state. This suit would still be maintained in the absence of the 4th Defendant. After all, the 1st-3rd defendants did not engage a paid legal practitioner in this suit because the claimant joined the 4thdefendant who had provided free legal services to the defendants. That the defendants/applicants in their written address contended that all the defendants are public officers and as such are entitled to the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. This is not correct. Section 2(a) under reference is a statute of general application but in Enugu State there is an instant Law which takes care of this issue of law. The law is section 11 of the State Proceedings Law, Cap 146, revised laws of Enugu State 2004. The section reads: 11. (1). No action or proceeding shall lie or be instituted under this law unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof. This particular section of the law which is of particular application in Enugu State as the suit affecting public officers in the state including the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. It is trite law that where there is an issue of law and there are two laws or statutes governing that aspect or the matter, one is of general application and the other is of special or particular application, it is the law that courts are enjoined to follow that law which is of particular application and not that of general application. Recourse can only be had on the general application if and only if there is a special or particular law which deals on the matter. The public officers Cap P41, LFN, 2004 was received English Law from England with a commencement date of 2/9/16 whilst the State Proceedings Law, Cap 146, revised laws of Enugu State, 2004 was a local law enacted and commenced on 27/8/91 to take care of proceedings against public officers and the State in old Anambra State now Enugu State. In conclusion counsel urged the Court to resolve this sole issue in favour of the claimant/respondent and to hold that the defendants/applicants are not public officers as envisioned by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act of 2004. In alternative to hold that the 1st and 4th defendants are not public officers as provided by the said instant section 2(a) and in circumstance, the court should strike out the 2nd and 3rd defendants on record, because it has the power under the rules of this Court to do so. Replying on points of law, the learned Defendants counsel stated that Section 115(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that:“An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection,prayer or legal argument or conclusion.” The Supreme Court prescribed the test for identifying extraneous matter in an affidavit in Bamaiyi v. The state (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt 715) 270 per Uwaifo J.S.C at 289; The test for doing this, in my view is to examine each of the paragraphs deposed to in the affidavit to ascertain whether it is fit only as a submission which counsel ought to urge upon the court. If it is, then it is likely to be either an objection or legal argument which ought to be left to be pressed in oral argument; or it may be conclusion upon an issue which ought to be left to the discretion of the court either to make a finding or to reach a decision upon through its process of reasoning. But if it is in the form of evidence which a witness may be entitled to place before the court in his testimony on an oath and is legally receivable to prove or disprove some fact in dispute, then it qualifies as a statement of facts and circumstances which may be deposed to in an affidavit. It therefore means that prayers, objections and legal arguments are matters that may be pressed by counsel in court and are not fit for a witness either in oral testimony or in affidavit evidence, while conclusions should not be drawn by witness but left for the court to reach. Furthermore, that in the case of Nigeria LNG Ltd. V. African Development Insurance Co. Ltd. (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt.416) 677 at 699, para. H, the court observed as regards section 87 (now section 115) of the Evidence Act; A conclusion is and must remain an inference drawn from facts known to a person. Counsel further commended to the Court the reasoning of Uwaifo J.C.A. (as he then was) in the case of Nigeria LNG Ltd. V. A.D.I.C Ltd. at pp. 701-702 as follows:– It seems pertinent to remark that counsel or solicitors who draft affidavits for use in court must keep strictly in mind the provisions of sections 86,87, 88 and 89, in particular, of the Evidence Act. Ever so often one reads affidavits studded with highfalutin depositions either condemning the opponent in diverse ways, or engaging in legal argument, or drawing conclusions, or praying for all sorts of assistance from the court and/or warning against the consequences of allowing the opponent to get away with what he is alleged to have done. Instead of deposing to facts and circumstances and their details, the infraction of section 87 of the Evidence Act is usually freely committed. It is time-wasting, it tends to betray professionalism and serves no useful purpose. Affidavits for use in court should contain only a statement of facts and circumstances. Prayers and legal arguments are better pressed by counsel in court while conclusions should be better left for the court to reach. Counsel continued that on the authority of the cases cited above, where an affidavit is found to contain extraneous matter, the offending paragraphs of the affidavit are liable to be struck out. Claimant’s counter affidavit dated and filed on 4/2/14 contains extraneous matter as shown by paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13 and 14 of the said counter-affidavit. In paragraph 2 of the claimant’s counter affidavit of 4/12/14, claimant states “categorically that the deponent to the said affidavit only succeeded in dishing out falsehood to this honorable court….” That is an inference which may only be drawn by the court. In paragraph 3, Claimant states that an exhibit was “stage-managed … aimed at weeding off his perceived enemies.” In paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit, Claimant “further debunk(ed) as false and misleading the fact of Exhibit D1 ….” In paragraph 5, Claimant stated that certain paragraphs “were false, malicious, make-believe and a tissue of lies aimed at compulsory retirement of myself and some of our superiors”. It is not in Claimant’s place to ascertain the aim of any action of any of the Respondents/Applicants or deduce their intention vide an affidavit. In paragraph 6, Claimants argues, “If not that, why is it that it was when … that it became expedient and crucial to …,” he proceeded to take a critical look at exhibit D2 and explain its purport. The arguments and conclusion run the length of the affidavit and paragraph 14 is a prayer. Learned counsel urged the court therefore to hold that paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13 and 14 of the claimant’s counter-affidavit offend the provisions of section 115 of the Evidence Act 2011 and consequently strike out the offending paragraphs The claimant/respondent also contended by paragraph 10 of his affidavit that he served the pre-action notices on the Defendant. The Defendants/applicants have maintained that they were not served any pre-action notice by the claimants/respondent. Counsel referred to the claimant’s originating processes in this matter and urged the court to find that the pre-action notices alleged to have been served failed to indicate service or received thereof. That it is sufficient on this point only that the claimant’s suit be struck out for failing to fulfil a pre-condition to jurisdiction, relying onMadukolu v. Nkemdilim (1964) 2 ALL NLR 589. According to the Supreme Court in Nigercare Dev Ltd. v. Adamawa State Water Board (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt 1093) 498, where a plaintiff fails to serve a pre-action notice as required by law, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and any proceedings taken therein is a nullity. Section 11(2) of the State Proceedings Law, Cap. 146, Laws of Enugu State 2004 provides- “2. No action shall be instituted i. Against the state or ii. Against a public officer, in respect of any act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of, any written law, or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority. Until the expiration of a period of three months after notice in writing has been, in the case of the State delivered to the Secretary to the Government, and in the case of a public officer, delivered to him, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the proposed plaintiff and the relief which he claims and the plaint when eventually prepared shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered and the date on which it was delivered” Furthermore, that section 30(2) of the Enugu State Broadcasting Law, Cap. 42 Laws of Enugu State 2004 requires a one (1)-month pre-action notice. The claimants/respondent failed to satisfy this condition thereby robbing the court of jurisdiction to hear the instant suit.Claimant’s counsel raised the issue in his written address in opposition to thedefendants’ objection- whether the 1st and 4th defendants are Public Officers within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. He thus tacitly admitted that 2nd and 3rd defendants are Public officers within the meaning of the Public OfficersProtection Act and in fact prayed that the 2nd and 3rd respondents be struck out. We humbly submit in fact that all the Respondents/Applicants herein are public Officers within the meaning of the Act by virtue of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). That according to the Supreme Court in Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. F.G.N. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309 at 340, paras. D – F, “This is so even as the term “public officer” has not been defined under the Public Officers Protection Act …. However, in the Fifth Schedule (Part I) paragraph 19 of the 1999Constitution (as amended) has defined “Public Officer” as a person holding any office as specified in Part II of that Schedule. The Attorney-General of the Federation and State and the Fifth Schedule so also other persons in the public service.” He urged this Honourable Court to find in consonance with the reasoning of the apex court that the Defendants/Applicants herein are all public officers and are protected under the Public Officers Protection Act. Claimant’s counsel further contended, relying on sections 3 and 30 of the Enugu State Broadcasting Law and section 195(1) of the 1999 Constitution, that the 1st and 4th respondents are “institutions created by statutes and the statutes that created them are specific as to their establishment, functions and scope of work”. He also contended that the particular provisions of the state Proceedings Law and the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law are of special and particular application to the Respondents in this case. The defendants/Applicants’ answer to claimant’s contention is threefold. Firstly, it has not been suggested, either by the authorities or claimant herein, that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to the State or officials of a State Government in Nigeria. The authorities have identified the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act, to wit, that section 2 of the Public Officers Act does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract, claims for the work and labour done, etc. See NPA v. Construzioni Generals F.C.S. (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt 2) 463; F.G.N v. Zebra Energy Ltd. [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162. Claims against officers of a state Government are not exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act. Secondly, as illustrated by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. F.G.N. (supra), the 1st and 4th Respondents are public officers within the meaning of the 1999 Constitution (particular reference to the Second and Fifth Schedule) and thus consequently fall within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection Act. Finally, counsel submitted that the pertinent question to be considered is whether the National Assembly has covered the field on the subject, in which case, the State House of Assembly may not make any enactment which is at variance with the Federal law. According to Ogundare J.S.C. in A.-G. Abia v. A.-G. Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264 at p. 435, “the doctrine (of covering the field) however renders the paramount legislation predominant and the subordinate legislation remains inoperative so long as the paramount legislation remains operative. Where of course, there is obvious inconsistency, the subordinate legislation is void.”He also referred the court to the case of Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 540 at pp. 656- 658. By virtue of item 34 of the Exclusive legislative list contained in the second schedule to the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, “labour, including trade unions, industrial relation, conditions, safety and welfare of labour, industrial disputes, prescribing a national minimum wage for the Federation or any part of thereof, and industrial arbitrations” are matters over which the National Assembly my exercise its legislative powers. The instant subject of limitation of actions against public officers is one which concerns “labour”, a subject over which the National Assembly has, and has exercised its legislative powers. He referred to A.-G. Abia v. A.-G. Federation (supra). In the circumstances therefore, the Public Officers Protection Act being an act of the National Assembly takes precedence over the State Proceedings Law and the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law upon which claimant’s argument is premised. Claimants counsel cited the case of Tafida v. Abubakar (1992) 2 3 NWLR (Pt.230) 511, quoting the dictum of Katsina-Alu JCA (as he then was). In response referred the Honourable Court to the statement of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 548) 1 at 38 thus:– Nor am I able to accept that Cap. 11 does not protect persons, offices, bodies or institutions created by statute or the Constitution or Persons sued by their official titles, such as Attorney-General, Inspector-General of Police or Permanent Secretary. As I have repeatedly stated, the words of the section of the law under interpretation are clearly not in themselves ambiguously. There is also nothing in either the long or short title, against the full context of the legislation, which suggests that any special meaning is to be given the words “any person” in that law than their ordinary and plain meaning. I therefore find myself unable to introduce anylimitation words to qualify the words “any person” in the legislation is issue.” In the circumstances therefore, learned counsel urged this Honourable Court to find that the Public Officers Protection Act applies to all the Defendants/Applicants and consequently strike out the suit for lack of jurisdiction same having been brought outside the time limited by the Act. I have carefully considered the processes, arguments and submissions of the parties on the defendants’ application in this matter. The issue for determination is whether or not this suit is statute barred having regard to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004? The facts of the case simply put are that the Claimant was the Chief Technical Officer of the 1st Defendant up to 27thday of May, 2011, having started work with the 1st Defendant in 1981 with the then Anambra State Broadcasting Service. On that 27/5/2011 the claimant was retired following an investigative panel report and the said retirement was to take effect from 1st December, 2007. The claimant believes his retirement was wrong because the 1st defendant should not have taken into account the years of service he worked as a casual labourer with the Federal Ministry of Information (Films Division) in determining his actual years of Pensionable service with it (the 1st Defendant). He therefore decided to contest the action of the 1st Defendant. However, the defendants decided to challenge the suit on the ground that he approached this Honourable Court late, having not filed the suit within three months from the date the cause of action accrued. The main argument of the Defendants is that by provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004 (hereinafter “the Limitation Act) the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. The said Limitation Act has provided that for any suit or proceeding to be successfully filed and maintained against a public officer for any discharge of public duty or execution of any law, neglect or default in the discharge of such public duty or execution of law, such suit must be brought within three months. The law is quite clear on how to determine whether a suit is statute barred or not. It is that the court should look at the originating processes of the Claimant, determine when the cause of action arose and compare same with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date on which the suit was filed exceeded the time limit set by the limitation statute then the suit is to be declared statute barred. See Da Dalyop Gyang & Ors vs The Attorney-General Plateau State & Anor (2013) LPELR-20773 (CA), Eteidung Anietimfon Udoh & Ors vs Akwa Ibom State Government & Anor (2013) LPELR-21121 (CA) and Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at pp. 20-21. In the instant case, the Claimant’s cause of action as claimed is the forceful retirement meted out to him on 27/5/2011. See paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 of his Statement of Facts. He then filed this action on 12th April, 2012. This means he filed the suit about eleven months after the cause of action accrued. The defendants have contended that going by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Limitation Act they are relying on, the Claimant should have come to court within three months. He is therefore out of time. Indeed going by the said Limitation Act the Claimant was out of time. However, the Claimant on his part has resisted this position of the defendants. He firstly argued that the 1st and 4th defendants were not persons and so could not be caught up by the said provisions of the limitation Act. To the Claimant the two are bodies and therefore not public officers who could be said to enjoy the protection given by the Limitation Act. Having considered the submissions of both parties it is quite clear that the Claimant is in error in thinking that bodies or institutions cannot have the protection of the Limitation Act. See the case of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) vs All Progressives Congress & Ors (2015) LPELR-25704 (CA) pp. 16-17 paras E-A, Per Mustapha JCA, where His Lordship restated the position of the law in the following words: The protection offered by the Public Officers Protection Act covers and protects all public officers, that is, all civil servants in their individual capacity and all government bodies, public institutions and agencies, ministries, and departments, by whatever name called and whether corporate or unincorporated; see RAHAMANIYYA UNITED NIGERIA LTD V. MINISRY FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS(2008) LPELR-8391. Therefore it is quite a misconception of the correct position of the law for the Claimant to argue that the protection afforded by the Public Officers Protection Act does not extend to the 1st and 4th Defendants/Applicants because they were not public officers. This I so find and hold. The Claimant has also opposed the objection on the ground that the Public Officers Protection Act being relied upon by the Defendants/Applicants is not applicable to the circumstances of this case. This is because the 1st defendant is a creation of the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law and so it is not subject to the Public Officers Protection Law. The Claimant further argued that the limitation period of twelve months created in the Enugu State Law should govern the fact and circumstances of the case and not the Limitation Act which provides for just three months. Similar argument was made in respect of the Attorney-General of Enugu State, the 4th Defendant in this case. That he is not a public officer within the contemplation of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. On the whole the claimant’s position is that the Public Officers Protection Act is of general application while the Enugu State Proceedings Law which provides for a limitation period of twelve months is a particular law and should take precedence over the statute of general application. On their own part, the defendants have argued that the defendants are public officers within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act relying on the case of Sulgrave Holdings Inc. vs F.G.N. (2012), supra. On the issue of the conflict in terms of period of limitation as between the provisions of Public Officers Protection Act and the State Proceedings Law or Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law, the defendants relied on the doctrine of covering the field to argue that the federal legislation has covered the field and the Enugu State Laws cannot therefore function in the circumstances. They referred to the case of A-G Abia vs A-G Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763), supra. and Olafisoye vs FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864), supra. Having considered the arguments and submissions of counsel, the argument of the Claimant that the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to the defendants in this case because they are covered by the State Laws is not convincing. The defendants are public officers even though they belong to the realm of the State Government and not the Federal Government. The determining factor is that they are public officers who have been defined in Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) to include public officers in both the Federal Public Service as well as the State Public Service. See Sulgrave Holdings Inc. vs F.G.N. (2012), supra. Therefore the Defendants are public officers who must be governed by the Public Officers Protection Act. This I so find and hold. Furthermore, the Claimant has argued that the Enugu State Broadcasting Service Law and the Enugu State Proceedings Law should govern the institution of his suit and not the Public Officers Protection Act in terms of the limitation period. The defendants have countered this view by submitting that the doctrine of covering the Field as well as the subject matter of the suit, i.e, being labour matter, upon which the National Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction, make the State statutes inapplicable in the circumstances. Having considered the arguments and submissions of counsel, including the authorities relied upon by them, it is my respectful view that the Defendants are correct in their argument that the federal legislation has covered the field and the state legislation on the issues must give way to the federal legislation. The existence of a federal legislation on an issue that both federal and legislatures may legislate upon, makes the federal legislation paramount and the state legislation on the point goes into abeyance accordingly. See MPP vs INEC & ORS (2015) LPELR-25706 (SC); Dr Olubukola Abubakar Saraki vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2016) LPELR-40013 (SC); INEC vs Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72 and Nwangwu vs Ukachukwa & Anor (2000) I NWLR (Pt. 662). The provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act therefore apply to this case and the defendants are entitled to the protection therein, the Claimant having not field his suit within the stipulated three months. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given, I hold that there is merit in the preliminary objection of the defendants and uphold same. The suit of the Claimant is accordingly declared statute barred and is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice A. Ibrahim, PhD Presiding Judge