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REPRESENTATION S. B. Fiola, with Miss O. A. Babalola, for the claimants. V. M. Ibhaze, for the defendants. JUDGMENT On 19th July 2012, the claimants took up a complaint (along with other accompanying originating processes: the statement of facts, list of witnesses, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th claimants’ statements on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents) against the defendant praying for the following reliefs – i) A declaration that the 1st claimed (sic) is entitled to the sum of N52,000.00 (Fifty Two Thousand Naira) only from the defendant per month representing his salary and allowance from the month of January 2007 until the final determination of this suit. ii) A declaration that the 1st claimant is entitled to the sum of N28,000.00 (Twenty Eight Thousand Naira) only being the amount due to the 1st claimant as leave allowance from Jan. 2007 until the final determination of this suit. iii) A declaration that the 2nd claimant is entitled to the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira only) from the defendant per month representing his salary and allowances from the month of Jan. 2007 until the final determination of this suit. iv) A declaration that the 2nd claimant is entitled to N28,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira) only as leave allowance from 2007 until the final determination of this suit. v) A declaration that the 3rd claimant is entitled to the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) only from the defendant per month representing his salary and allowances from the month. vi) A declaration that the 3rd claimant is entitled to N28,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira) only as leave allowance from 2007 until the final determination of this suit. vii) A declaration that the 4th claimant is entitled to the sum of N35,000.00 (Thirty Five Thousand Naira) only from the defendant per month representing his salary and allowance from Jan. 2007 until the final determination of this suit. viii) A declaration that the 4th claimant is entitled to N20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira) only as leave allowance from 2007 until the final determination of this suit. ix) An order nullifying the unlawful and forceful indefinite suspension of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th claimants services with the defendant. x) An order that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th claimants are entitled to the sum of Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N2,500,000.00) as damages resulting from the defendant failure to honour its contractual obligation to the claimant. xi) 21% interest per annum on the outstanding balance effective…….2009 until the final determination of this suit. xii) Cost of this action. The defendants jointly entered formal appearance and then also jointly filed their statement of defence, witness statement on oath and list of documents indicating that no document will be frontloaded and relied upon. In reaction, the claimants filed a reply to the statement of defence and an amended list of documents. At the trial, the 1st claimant testified and was cross-examined for all the claimants as CW1. By agreement of the parties the sworn depositions of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th claimants were deemed adopted because their evidence was similar to that of the 1st claimant. By this act, the defence counsel informed the Court that there will be no need to cross-examine the 2nd, 3rd and 4th claimants since the cross-examination of the 1st claimant would be sufficient and the case is essentially documentary. At the close of the claimant’s case, the defence counsel on his part informed the Court that his witness is no longer in Nigeria having left for Canada, a fact he only got to know the Monday before the Court sat on 29th October 2014. However, the claimant’s counsel intervened that since the witness statement on oath of the defendant is already in the case file and approximates to affidavit evidence, he prayed that it be taken as adopted, prepared to forego cross-examination so that the Court can order addresses. The defence counsel did not object to adopting this procedure. I must state that the legal justification for all of this can be found in section 12 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 which permits this Court to adopt an informal and flexible procedure in resolving disputes brought before it. The Court then proceeded to order parties to file and serve their respective written addresses staring with the claimants as per Order 19 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules 2007, which they did. The claimants’ written address is dated 3rd December 2014 but filed on 9th December 2014, while that of the defendants is dated and filed on 29th December 2014. The claimants’ reply on points of law is dated 12th February 2015 but filed on 13th February 2015. CLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS To the claimants, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd claimants were employed at various dates by the 3rd defendant, a subsidiary of the 1st defendant, while the 4th claimant was employed by the 2nd defendant. However, and specifically from Exhibits C1(a) C1(b) C1(c) and C1(d), the 1st defendant’s employment vide Exhibit C1(a) with the 3rd defendant became effective on March 15, 2005 as Printing Manager. The 2nd claimant was employed by DAAR Communications Limited (Publishing & Printing Division), a name that is neither the 1st defendant nor the 2nd defendant, vide Exhibit C1(b) on 2nd January 2006 as Estimator/Printing Manager. The 3rd claimant was employed vide Exhibit C1(c) by the 3rd defendant as Printing Supervisor on March 15, 2005. And the 4th claimant’s employment as Administrative Officer by DAAR Communications Limited (Publishing & Printing Division), a name that is neither the 1st defendant nor the 2nd defendant, took effect on 1st February 2006. By Exhibits C2(a), C2(b), C2(c) and C2(d), all dated 8th September 2006, the claimants were respectively confirmed by DAAR Communications Limited (Publishing & Printing Division). On 11th June 2009 the claimants were all placed on indefinite suspension by DAAR Communications Limited (Publishing & Printing Division) vide Exhibits C3(a), C3(b), C3(c) and C3(d), all dated 11th June 2009, even when there are no criminal charges against them or any panel set up or previous queries issued on them. Since then, the defendants have refused the claimants a return to their place of work (duty post), which is unfair and tantamount to constructive dismissal, and hence an unfair labour practice. To the claimants, there were no terms and conditions of service nor handbook that guide the defendants to take the decision of indefinitely suspending them without pay as the defendant did not file any document despite notice to produce. The claimants then framed three issues for the determination of the Court, namely – 1. Whether the defendants have power where there is no terms and conditions of service in place to suspend its staff indefinitely without pay. 2. Whether the actions of the defendants shutting the doors of employment against the claimants constitute an unfair labour practice. 3. Whether in the circumstance of this case the claimants are entitled to any remedy, and or damages. Regarding issue 1, the claimants, relying on the Blacks Law Dictionary 6th Edition at page 1447 and Akinyanju v. Unilorin [2005] 7 NWLR (Pt. 927) 87, first defined what suspension is and then submitted that even in suspension, the contract of employment subsists and it is not open to an employer to terminate it retrospectively. The claimants urged the Court to note that Exhibits C2(a), C2(b), C2(c) and C2(d) relied upon by the defendants as containing the terms and conditions of service states: “Please take note that other terms and conditions of service are being worked out”. That these other terms and conditions were never supplied to the claimants; as such the defendants cannot suspend indefinitely the claimants. To the claimants, unless there is a condition of service that says one can be suspended without pay, anything contrary is an illegality and an unfair treatment, urging the Court to so hold more so as the claimants are still in possession of their respective identity cards. On issue 2, the claimants submitted that the actions of the defendants depriving them of their source of livelihood from 11th June 2009 till date is unfair and thus constitute an unfair labour practice for which the claimants are entitled to damages as per their claims. That till date, the defendants have not said why they prevented the claimants from entering their place of work since 11th June 2009. The claimants then urged the Court to grant their prayers in their entirety. In respect of issue 3, the claimants submitted that in the circumstances of this case, they are victims of unfair labour practice. That no panel was ever set up to try them nor were they detained or charged to court. That for the defendants to place then on indefinite suspension, they ought to have placed the claimants on at least half salary, citing NUHPSW v. Pink Peacock Restaurant, Kano unreported Suit No. NIC/17/89 delivered on 29th May 1990. The claimants then urged the Court to not that the defendants did not file any document, did not object to those tendered by the claimants and instead relied on them. The claimants thereafter proceeded to calculate what they think their entitlements are. They came up with a total sum of N17,849,000.00 using 91 months for salaries and allowances, and 8 years for leave allowance. The individual claimants accordingly are claiming as follows – 1. 1st claimant – N52,000 x 91 months (N4,732,000.00) plus N28,000 x 8 years (N224,000). Total of both comes to N4,956,000.00. 2. 2nd claimant – N50,000 x 91 months (N4,550,000.00) plus N28,000 x 8 years (N224,000). Total of both comes to N4,774,000.00. 3. 3rd claimant – N50,000 x 91 months (N4,550,000.00) plus N28,000 x 8 years (N224,000). Total of both comes to N4,774,000.00. 4. 4th claimant – N35,000 x 91 months (N3,180,000.00) plus N20,000 x 8 years (N160,000). Total of both comes to N3,345,000.00. The claimants accordingly submitted that the defendants are owing them the sum of N17,849,000.00. The claimant went on that should the defendants wish to disengage them from service, having put in 9 years of unbroken service (2006 – 2014), they are entitled to 4 weeks gross pay for each completed year of service. That since their outstanding salaries is N17,849,000.00, they are accordingly entitled to the additional sum of N1,683,000.00 calculated as follows – 1. 1st claimant – N52,000 x 9 years = N468,000.00. 2. 2nd claimant – N50,000 x 9 years = N450,000.00. 3. 3rd claimant – N50,000 x 9 years = N450,000.00. 4. 4th claimant – N35,000 x 9 years = N315,000.00. The claimants continued that they are entitled to damages far and above that of ordinary disengagement, being the result of a criminal allegation labeled against them in the course of their employment, citing British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) at 287 – 288, Ezekiel v. West Minster Dredging (Nig) Ltd [2006] 5 NLLR 411 and Alh. Ahmadu Gari v. Serifina Nig. Ltd & anor [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) at 19. To the claimant, since the defendants accepted that the claimants are on suspension for about 5 years now, it cannot turn around to say that a wrong has not been done on the claimants, which amounts to unfair labour practice. The claimants concluded by urging the Court to grant all the reliefs they claim. DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS The defendants denied the claims of the claimants contending that the claimants’ appointments were subject to and regulated by the terms and conditions of service as circumscribed and contained in their respective employment letters without more. The defendants denied that they owe the claimants any arrears of salary, allowances, leave allowances and remunerations whether on or before January 2007 and or thereafter or till date. That the claimants were not suspended unlawfully or forcefully as alleged but rather on various grounds of malfeasances extremely prejudicial to the overriding interests of the defendants. The defendants framed three issues for determination of the Court, namely – a) Whether the claimants have established the fact of arrears of salary, allowances and leave allowances from January 2007 to date; b) Whether the indefinite suspension of the claimants by the defendants is a breach of the terms and conditions of employment; and c) If the answer to issue a) is in the affirmative, whether the claimants are entitled to the fullness of their claims to the date of judgment. On issue a), the defendants referred to paragraphs 14, 18, 19, 21 and 27 of the claimants’ statement of facts, paragraphs 13, 17, 18, 20 and 26 of CW1’s sworn deposition and Exhibits C4, C5, C7 and C8 as the basis upon which the claimants claim for arrears of salary, allowances and leave allowance, all of which the defendants denied in paragraphs 11, 14 and 18 of the statement of defence. To the defendants, a look at the averments of the claimants and the relevant documentary evidence they frontloaded will show an ominous lack of particularity in terms of the actual amount of salary per month, the type of allowances to which they are entitled, when same was last paid among other matters. That by this failure of particularity, the claimants have foisted upon the Court the onerous task responsibility to sift through the pleadings and exhibits in order to speculate and make conjectures as to the facts stated. That no court decides issues on conjectures and speculations as urged by the claimants; and contrary to paragraphs 25 and 26 of CW1’s sworn deposition which state that the defendants have not paid him since January 2007, Exhibits C7 and C8 say otherwise. Exhibit C7, a letter from the claimants’ solicitor, is dated 7th December 2009 and states: “each of them confirmed that September, 2007 salary is indeed outstanding”; while Exhibit C8, CW1’s pay-slip dated 03/02/2009, reveals payment of salary, allowance amongst others for the month of February 2009. To the defendants, Exhibit C8 cancels out and excludes Exhibit C7, both exhibits dealing a death blow to the relevant averments in the pleading grounding the allegation of unpaid salaries, leave allowances and other remunerations since January 2007. That the claimants did not explain the material inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in these exhibits and pleading during the trial. The defendants continued that the tabulated salary structure contrived by counsel to the claimants in his written address is most pathetic as counsel completely disregarded the principle of law that a counsel’s written address however brilliant, artistic and logical cannot constitute evidence in a matter, referring to Tapchang v. Lakret [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 684) 381. That the settled principle of law is that he who asserts has the onus to prove his assertion by calling credible evidence consistent with his pleadings to prove his case, referring to section 133 of the Evidence Act 2011. That any evidence given contrary to the pleadings goes to no issue, citing Kalu Njoku & ors v. Ukwu Eme & ors [1973] 5 SC 293 and Salzgitter Stahi GMBTH v. Tunji Dosunmu Industries Ltd [2010] 3 – 5 SC (Pt. II) 54 at 96. On Exhibit C5, the Staff Salary Arrears from 2007 – 2010, the defendants submitted that a close look at it will reveal the grotesque mutilations, alterations and distortions of the columns relating to and concerning the claimants. That there is no endorsement or counter-signature of the author of Exhibit C5 to give credibility or validity to the handwritten portions of the said exhibit. That CW1 could not adduce any explanation for the mutilated and altered portions of the said exhibit either during his examination-in-chief or cross-examination. That CW1 did not adduce evidence to the effect that the alteration or mutilation was done with the consent of the defendants or that same occurred before the completion of the said Exhibit C5, referring to section 160(30 of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that no person producing a document which upon its face appears to have been altered in a material part can claim under it the enforcement of any right created by it, unless the alteration was made before the completion of the document or with the consent of the party to be charged under it or his representative in interest. Also referred to the Court is Ivienagbor v. Bazuaye [1999] 6 SCNJ 235 at 243 – 244 which denounces speculation. Regarding issues b) and c), which the defendants argued together, the defendants referred to Exhibit C1(a) which provides that “…either party shall upon confirmation of the appointment be required to give one-month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof to terminate the contract…” That there is no doubt that the claimants were confirmed staff. That aside from the claim for arrears of salary, allowances and remunerations, the case of the claimants is the prayer to nullify their suspension from work. The defendants then referred to Walter v. Skyll (Nig) Ltd [2000] FWLR (Pt. 13) 2244 at 2275 – 2276, which held the principle governing termination to be similar to that of suspension; and that an employer is not obliged to give a reason for suspending an employee. The defendants then asked, even on the assumption that the indefinite suspension of the claimants was to be wrong, what the claimants’ status is given their claims. The defendant went on to refer to Mr. Babatunde Ogunsowo v. Dana Motors Limited unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/117/2011 decided on 10th July 2013, where this Court held the suspension of the claimant to be amount to a repudiation of the contract of employment effective, however, from the date of judgment with the claimant entitled to the backlog of salary and allowances and other entitlements less any indebtedness the claimant may have to the defendant. To the defendants, while this decision may be correct on the basis of Olafimihan v. Nova Lay-Tech Nig. Ltd [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 608 in terms of the length of the suspension amounting to repudiation of the contract of employment, it cannot stand Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 2 – 3 SC (Pt. III) 61 at 129, which held suspension to be a prelude to dismissal, wherein neither work is done nor remuneration paid, and operates to suspend the contract rather than terminate the contractual obligations of the parties to each other. The defendants continued that like termination, the master has the right to suspend his employee; and even where this is wrongful that the measure of damages is what the employee could have earned for the period of notice agreed upon for ending the employment without notice, citing Daudo v. UBA Plc [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 276 at 295. That the claimants’ indefinite suspension has transmuted to a repudiation of their appointments for which the measure of damages failing the notice period of one-month is one-month’s salary in lieu. The defendants went on to reiterate that it is the duty of an employee to prove that his termination was wrongful, not the employer’s to prove that it is not wrongful. That the claimants failed to show how their indefinite suspension was wrongful. Despite this, it is the submission of the defendants that the indefinite suspensions of the claimants were for various malfeasances that were extremely prejudicial to the interest of the defendants, referring to Exhibits C3(a), C3(b), C3(c) and C3(d), which summarize the reasons for the indefinite suspension of the claimants. Also referred to the Court is Exhibit C9, written by the claimants and addressed to the Chairman, Board of Directors of the defendants, wherein the claimants laid out their grouses against Mr. Rock Arcoven, their Superior Officer and Managing Director (MD). That in Exhibit C9, the claimants themselves agreed unanimously that at sometime during their employment, they had cause to be summoned by the Police where they signed an undertaking to be of good behavior; and in same exhibit, they equally accused the MD of diverting commission due to the 2nd claimant to one Miss Nneka whom they accused of having a robust indecent sexual relationship with the said MD. The defendants went on that the commissions the claimants routinely received from the defendants as depicted in Exhibit C9 in addition to their regular salaries, allowances and remunerations were not contemplated by or within the purview of their terms of employment with the defendants; as such the said commissions are in gross violation of section 65 of the Criminal Law of Lagos State 2011 and for which the claimants are automatically liable to imprisonment for 2 years or a fine of N360,000.00 or both. The defendants cited Uzoho v. Task Force, Hospital Mgt. [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt. 867) 627 at 644 and NAB Ltd v. Shuaibu [1991] 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 450 as allowing an employer to dismiss an employee for misconduct. Next, the defendants referred to Exhibit C7, the letter the claimants instructed their solicitor to write to the 1st defendant on their behalf. In the said Exhibit C7, the claimants’ solicitor referred to a “termination benefit worksheet” issued by the accountant of the defendants and “computations…agreed to by parties”. To the defendants, the documents actually evidencing these were never brought before the Court during trial thus showing a willful failure on the part of the claimants, citing section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011. In any event, to the defendants, by Exhibit C7, the claimants became fully aware that their employments had suffered a repudiation/termination as a result whereof they accepted the termination benefit worksheet from the defendants’ accountant. The defendants then pleaded section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that – When one person has, either by virtue of an existing court judgment, deed or agreement or by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed, in any proceeding between himself and such person or such person's representative in interest, to deny the truth of that thing. The defendants concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the claims of the claimants as spurious, groundless, frivolous, vexatious and a veritable exercise in gold-digging. CLAIMANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW In their reply on points of law, the claimants mainly rehashed the factual points they made earlier in their written address. There is no pint repeating all that again. I shall accordingly reiterate issues of law that they reacted to. In this regard, the claimants urged the Court to note the rule of pleadings which is that a general evasive denial is not a denial; to constitute such, the denial must be apt, precise, succinct, full and complete, not evasive, rigmarole, vague and bogus, citing El-Tijani v. Saidu [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 268) 246 and Jacobson Engineering Ltd v. UBA Ltd [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt. 283) 586. The claimants then submitted that the defendants could not specifically deny all the pleaded facts in respect of salary arrears. The claimants went on to urge the Court to note that all the letters of employment of the claimants do not state conditions for indefinite suspension; and that the defendants cannot approbate and reprobate in terms of their reference to Exhibits C2(a), C2(b), C2(c) and C2(d) and C1(a), C1(b), C1(c) and C1(d), citing Sky Bank Plc v. Akinpelu [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 187 at 198 and HKSF v. Ajibawo [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1087) 511 at 530. The defendants then urged the Court to discountenance any purported argument in support of any justification for indefinite suspension by the defendants as no such condition exists in the defendants’ handbook or letter of appointment. The claimants continued by citing this Court’s decision in Lasisi Gbadegesin v. Wema Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NIC/57/2008 delivered on 23rd February 2012, wherein this Court held that an empoloyee is not to be kept under suspension indefinitely without initiating and concluding disciplinary proceedings against him as this puts him under undue hardship and makes it impossible for him to seek some other employment. Also referred to the Court is Mrs. Dayo Buluro v. Nigeria Institute of Public Relations unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/23/2009 delivered on 14th April 2011. And that the Court of Appeal in Olafimihan v. Nova Lay-Tech Nig. Ltd [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 608 read an indefinite suspension without pay with restriction of the employees from entering the premises of the respondent company as a clear intention of the respondent to dispense with the services of the employee in question. But the Supreme Court in Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 held that suspension is neither a termination nor a dismissal; it operates to suspend the contract rather than terminates the contractual obligations of the parties to each other. That an employee suspended with or without pay remains an employee and so is entitled to accumulated salaries and allowances during the suspension period from 11th June 2009 until judgment. In conclusion, the claimants urged the Court to discountenance the defendants’ address and grant the reliefs the pray for. COURT’S DECISION I heard learned counsel and considered all the processes filed in this suit. Essentially, and in the main, the claimants are asking for three sets of reliefs: declarations as to their entitlements in terms of arrears of salaries, allowances and leave allowance; an order nullifying the indefinite suspension of the claimants’ services by the defendants; and damages in the sum of N2,500,000.00 as a result of the defendants’ failure to honour their contractual obligations to the claimants. The fourth set of relief is that for “21% interest per annum on the outstanding balance effective…2009 until the final determination of this Suit”. The last relief is that for cost. I must at once dismiss the claim for 21% interest. For one, it is not clear what the claimants meant by “outstanding balance” upon which the interest if to be paid. Secondly, I do not know what the claimants meant with “effective…2009”. Lastly, by Mr. Kurt Severinsen v. Emerging Markets Telecommunication Services Limited [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 374 NIC, this Court does not award pre-judgment interest. For these reasons, relief xi) as couched fails and so is dismissed. Before delving into the merit of the principal reliefs of the claimants, I need to point out a thing or two. First, the claimants throughout their written submissions kept saying that the defendants misunderstood the claimants’ case (see e.g. paragraphs 5.2 and 7.4), but did not state how. I really do not know what to make of this. Secondly, as would have been seen, in their reliefs, the claimants are claiming for salary, allowances and leave allowance from 2007 until the final determination of this suit; yet in their final written address, under common grounds between the parties, and paragraph 1.26 of the reply on points of law, they indicated that they have not received any salary and allowance from 11th June 2009 till date as they are still under indefinite suspension. The claimants repeated this fact in paragraphs 4.6 and 4.9 of their final written address when they submitted that they were suspended indefinitely without pay on 11th June 2009 and so their outstanding arrears of salaries and other entitlements should be calculated and paid to them from 11th June 2009 till date. The claimants in paragraph 7.7 of their final written address, however, proceeded to calculate their entitlements using June 2007 – 2014 as the base period. This kind of oscillation by the claimants does not show them to be serious even in their claims. These points made, I now proceed to the principal reliefs of the claimants; and here, I intend to first treat the issue of the indefinite suspension of the claimants by the defendants. In that regard, the argument of the claimants is that their indefinite suspension is forceful and unlawful. The power to suspend and its ambit is a function of law and/or the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. In other words, it is to the contract of employment of the claimants that one must look in order to determine whether their indefinite suspension was valid or not. See Mr. Bisiriyu Adegoke Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Cooperative Society Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/532/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on 1st July 2015. There is no disagreement between the parties as to the fact of indefinite suspension of the claimants. Exhibits C3(a), C3(b), C3(c) and C3(d) are the letters suspending the claimants indefinitely. They are all dated 11th June 2009. They all indefinitely suspended the claimants without pay; they all advised the claimants not to enter the company’s premises during the period of suspension; and they all indefinitely suspended the claimants as from the date of the letters i.e. with immediate effect. I must state right away that, like dismissal and termination, suspension can be with immediate effect but certainly cannot be retrospective; however, the law remains that suspension either pending enquiry or as a punishment is not termination. See Bisiriyu Adegoke Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Cooperative Society Limited (supra). The only difference in the letters of suspension is as to the reason given for the suspension of the claimants: for the 1st claimant, it was “for refusing to obey your superior orders”; for the 2nd claimant, it was for “your recent activities in the company which bore down to gross indiscipline”, which “action has caused decline in productivity”; for the 3rd claimant, it was “for your gross misconduct, non challant attitude, recalcitrant and nebulous character displayed on the 2nd of June 2009 thereby causing the company to loose her potential customers”; and for the 4th claimant, it was for “your recent activities in the company which bore down to gross indiscipline…[causing] decline in productivity”. Exhibit C10 dated 13th October 2009 reminded the 1st – 3rd claimants that their “indefinite suspension without pay is still on and it will remain so till further notice”. The law is that, in the interest of the organization or institution, an employer has the right to discipline an erring staff (and suspension is one such disciplinary measure). See University of Calabar v. Esiaga [1999] 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 719 at 739 – 740, Boston Sea Fishing Co. v. Ansell (1886-90) All ER 65 at 67, Lewis v. Heffer & Sons [1978] 3 All ER 254 and The Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd v. Lawson-Jack [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 249). It may, however, be otherwise if the contract of employment either expressly or impliedly rules out recourse to discipline by the employer. See NEPA v. Olagunju [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) 602. See generally Mrs. Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & anor [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt. 103) 40 NIC, where this Court had cause to review the law on suspension. Suspension, itself takes two forms: it may be one pending enquiry or it may be meted out as a punishment – in any of these forms, it is not termination. The manner in which the letters of suspension, Exhibits C3(a), C3(b), C3(c) and C3(d), were couched suggest that the suspension was more of a punishment than that it was one pending enquiry. The letters of suspension simply placed the claimants on indefinite suspension and advised them not to enter the company’s premises. Each of the letters indicated the wrong for which the concerned claimant was indefinitely suspended. None of the suspension letters indicated that the claimants would stand any disciplinary enquiry. It took the letter of complaint of the 1st – 3rd claimants directly to the defendants’ Chairman, Board of Directors, for the defendants to write Exhibit C10 in reply stating that the issue of indefinite suspension will be looked into and appropriate action taken at the right time with the claimants advised never to again write directly to the Chairman, Board of Directors of the defendants, but to the undersigned (the Managing Director/CEO, Mr. Rock Arcoven). Of course, other than the instant suit, there is nothing to show that the matter was actually looked into and the appropriate action was taken. What all of this means is that the claimants were indefinitely suspended more as a punishment than that it was one pending disciplinary enquiry; and I so find and hold. I indicated earlier that the power to suspend and its ambit is a function of law and/or the terms and conditions of the contract of employment; and it is to the contract of employment of the claimants that one must look in order to determine whether their indefinite suspension was valid or not. This is because employers cannot suspend without pay where there is no express or contractual right to do so. The rationale is that in suspending an employee without pay, the employer has taken it up upon itself to assess its own damages for the employee’s misconduct at the sum which would be represented by the wages of the days the employee remains suspended. See the English cases of Hanley v. Pease & Partners Ltd [1915] 1 KB 698 and Marshall v. Midland Electric [1945] 1 All ER 653, and Mrs. Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & anor, Ms. Claudia Ojinmah v. Coxdyn Nigeria Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/111/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on March 27, 2014. The contracts of employment of the claimants do not have any provision authorising the defendants to suspend them without pay. Exhibits C2(a), C2(b), C2(c) and C2(d), all dated 8th September 2006, and all of which confirmed the claimants, urged the claimants to “note that other terms and conditions of service are being worked out”. It is actually not the case of the claimants that no such other terms and conditions of service were ever given to them. In paragraph 19 of the statement of facts, the claimants pleaded the staff handbook has been hidden by the defendants as no staff could lay hands on any; and in paragraph 21 of the statement of facts, the claimants pleaded that “since their unlawful and forceful indefinite suspension from the Defendant employment, the defendant refused to pay their remunerations since Jan. 2007 and all outstanding due allowances in accordance with the provisions of the Defendant staff manual or letter of Appointment”. The claimants then proceeded to plead that they shall be relying on a number of documents at the trial, the 2nd of which is the “Claimants Staff Manual”. By this, the claimants have shown to the Court that there in existence a staff manual. The claimants accordingly have the duty to frontload this staff manual, but they did not. Instead, they argued that there were no terms and conditions of service nor handbook that guide the defendants to take the decision of indefinitely suspending them without pay as the defendant did not file any document despite notice to produce. In this argument, the claimants appear to assume that the fact of a notice to produce means an adverse finding against the party asked to produce. The rule is that service of a notice to produce only entitles the party serving the notice to adduce secondary evidence of the document and not that it relieves the person serving the notice of the burden of producing the document if he can or of proving its contents. See UBA v. Ogochukwu [2014] LPELR-24267(CA) per Obaseki-Adejumo, JCA. The duty is on the claimants to prove their case. Two cases decided by this Court stand to be distinguished in order to ascertain the true legal position of the claimants in terms of their indefinite suspension. The first is Ms. Claudia Ojinmah v. Coxdyn Nigeria Ltd, where this Court held as follows – Since there is no ‘conditions of service’ providing for suspension (Exhibit A did not provide for it either) it means that there is no express or contractual right of the defendant to suspend without pay. The defendant was accordingly wrong to have suspended the claimant without pay…Even when the defendant argued that…an employer can suspend an employee without pay, the defendant did not address its mind to the fact that this is possible only when the conditions of service so provide. Specifically, ACB Ltd v. Ufondu [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169 held that where there is no justification for putting an employee on suspension in the first place, the employee ought to be paid his salary or the other half of his salary if he is put on half salary; and Yussuf v. VON Ltd (supra) held that it is not improper for the employer to suspend on full pay an employee pending inquiries on a suspension that may rest on the employee. It is not in doubt that an employer has an unfettered right to suspend, but the scope of that right is contingent on the contract of service and/or conditions of service making the necessary provisions in that regard. In the instant case, therefore, since the defendant did not make any express provision as to suspension without pay, while it can suspend the claimant, it certainly cannot suspend her without pay as it did in the circumstances of this case; and I so find and hold. This stance may be contrasted with the second case, which is Mr. Osamota Macaulay Adekunle v. United Bank for Africa Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/20/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 21st May 2014, where this Court held that – In the instant case, no “conditions of service” was frontloaded by the claimant. So when Exhibit D suspended the claimant with immediate effect and without pay, there is no conditions of service against which this Court can determine the legality or otherwise of having to suspend the claimant without pay. It is the claimant who asserted that his suspension is wrongful. So, it is the claimant that must frontload the conditions of service in order for the Court to determine whether or not the suspension conforms to the conditions of service for it to be lawful. This duty, the claimant has not discharged. The “UBA Employee Handbook” upon which relief 2, for instance, is based was not frontloaded by the claimant. The difference, and hence explanation, between Ms. Claudia Ojinmah v. Coxdyn Nigeria Ltd and Mr. Osamota Macaulay Adekunle v. United Bank for Africa Plc is that in the former, there was no conditions of service at all, whereas in the latter, there was “conditions of service” (the “UBA Employee Handbook”) relied upon by the claimant but not frontloaded and tendered in evidence. The instant case falls within the Mr. Osamota Macaulay Adekunle v. United Bank for Africa Plc scenario. The claimants pleaded that there is a staff manual. It is accordingly their duty to frontload the staff manual so that the Court may establish whether or not the defendants have the contractual right to indefinitely suspend without pay. The claimants did not do this; as such the claimants have not been able to prove that their indefinite suspension is unlawful – I so find and hold. Relief ix) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. The next principal claim of the claimants is the claim for salaries, allowances and leave allowance. In proving these heads of claims, the claimants relied on amongst others Exhibits C4 (solicitor’s letter demanding the payment of the claimants’ salaries, allowances and other entitlements), C5 (a tabulation of staff salary arrears from 2007 – Feb 2010) and C7 (solicitor’s letter on terminal benefits of the 1st – 3rd claimants). I must state that a claimant cannot rely on his solicitor’s letter as proof of his entitlement to a claim. At best the solicitor’s letter is proof of the demand for the entitlement, not proof of the entitlement itself. So to the extent that the claimants are relying on their solicitor’s letters to prove their entitlement to salaries and allowances including leave allowance, the claimants cannot be said to have thereby succeeded in proving same; and I so hold. Exhibit C5 (relied upon by the claimants – see paragraphs 16 and 18 of the statement of facts) was signed by the Managing Director on 11/02/2010 and shows the names of staff and sums against their names indicating salary arrears from 2007 to Feb 2010. The 2nd claimant is listed as number 48, the 3rd claimant is listed as number 49, the 1st claimant is listed as number 50, and the 4th claimant is listed as number 51. Incidentally, the net sums indicated against the names of the claimants have been cancelled and new sums in ink indicated. These alterations have not been counter-signed. Akyen & anor v. Mu’azu & ors [2009] LPELR-3697(CA) held that a certified document that bears on its face an alteration made after the date it was certified has by that very fact destroyed the presumption of genuineness attributed to it by law; and Kanu Orji v. I. Emovon & ors [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 168) 168 at 476 held amongst others that where alterations are patent on the face of a document tendered in evidence there is need for the party tendering it to provide explanation in respect of the alterations. This was not done in the instant suit by the claimants regarding the alterations on Exhibit C5. I cannot accordingly rely on Exhibit C5 as authenticating the defendants’ indebtedness as to salary arrears from 2007 to Feb 2010 as it seeks to do. Exhibit C5 has no evidential value; and I so find and hold. I indicated earlier how the claimants prevaricated as to the actual period they said the defendants owe them arrears of salary and other allowances i.e. whether it is from 2007 (even at this, when in 2007) or 2009. In paragraph 14 of the statement of facts, the claimants pleaded that prior to their indefinite suspension, their salaries, allowances and leave allowances have not been paid for several months. In paragraph 19, they pleaded that the defendants have not terminated their appointments as the defendants never deemed it fit to pay salaries due to them since the indefinite suspension of June 2009. In paragraphs 21, 26 and 27, they pleaded that the defendants refused to pay the said outstanding salaries and allowances from the month of January 2007 till date. Aside from this prevarication in the date, there is also the issue of the quantum of this “outstanding salaries and allowances”, which the claimants have not proved to the Court. The tabulation of their entitlements, which can be seen in paragraph 7.7 of their written address of 9th December 2014, is nothing but evidence by counsel in a written address. The law is that no matter how brilliant the address of counsel is, it cannot be a substitute for pleadings or evidence. See Edward Okwejiminor v. G. Gbakeji & anor [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) 172 at 223. Exhibit C8, the pay-slip of the 1st claimant for the month of November 2008 is unhelpful; if anything it shows that salary was paid up to November 2008. The pleading that salaries and allowances have not been paid since January 2007 is accordingly false and misleading. I stated in Mr. Israel Anyanwu v. ADIC Insurance Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/291/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on 19th February 2016, and I shall repeat it here, that courts are adjudicators, not investigators. On no account must counsel dump documents on a trial court as no court would spend precious judicial time linking documents to specific areas of a party’s case. See Ucha & anor v. Elechi & ors [2012] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 330 SC, ANPP v. INEC [2010] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1212) 547, Eze v. Okolagu [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1180) 183 at 211 and Belgore v. Ahmed [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 60 at 99 – 100. The claimants had argued that the defendants’ denial of the claimants’ averments in the statement of facts was evasive, rigmarole, etc and so must be held not to be a denial but an admission. Of the 12 reliefs prayed for by the claimants, eight, reliefs i) to viii), are for declarations. The rule is that “the Court does not make declaration just because the parties to litigation have chosen to admit something. The Court declares what it has found to be the law after proper argument not merely after admission by the parties. There are no declarations without arguments, that is quite plain”. See Akaninwo & ors v. Nsirim & ors [2008] LPELR-321(SC); [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt.1093) 439. In any event, aside from relief x) wherein the claimants seek N2,500,000.00 as damages resulting from the defendants’ failure to honour their contractual obligation to the claimants, in seeking declarations for salaries and allowances as well as leave allowance, the claimants did not ask for any accompanying order in that regard. In other words, even if this Court were to grant the declarations sought in relief i) to viii), the declarations will merely be in vain as the claimants did not seek any order in their regards. This is because, a declaration merely declares the rights of the parties and is dormant beyond that; without more, it has no force of execution. See Albion Const. Ltd v. Rao Invest. & Pro. Ltd [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) at 511 – 622, Govt. of Gongola State v. Tukur [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592, Construzioni v. NPA [1972] 12 SC 107 and Akunnia v. AG Anambra State [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 215) 75. On the whole, the claimants have failed to prove their case. This case is accordingly dismissed. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD