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REPRESENTATION: Adeyemi Adesibikan Esq. appeared for the Claimant/Respondent. Chukwuma Edeh Esq. appeared for the Defendant/Applicant. RULING This is a transferred matter to this Honourable Court made pursuant to the Order of Honourable Justice C. I. Nwobodo of the Enugu State High Court on 3rd day of April, 2012. The Claimant’s suit was filed on 26th day of November, 2003. By the Writ and Statement of Claim of the Claimant he seeks the following reliefs against the Defendant: 1. A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment by the Defendant via a letter dated 1st day of February, 2001 and captioned “REORGANIZATION” and signed by the Registrar of the Defendant is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect, in that it is contrary to the provisions of the Enugu State University of Science and Technology Edict No. 9 of 1996 (i.e. Statute 22 Paragraph 1-8) as amended by Amendment Edict No. 2 of 1999 and Regulations governing the service of senior staff (as approved by the council on 26th of March 1992). 2. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is still in the employment of Enugu State University of Science and Technology. 3. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant back into the employment of Enugu State University of Science and Technology. 4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the defendant, his servants, agents, privies whosoever or howsoever called from preventing the Claimant from performing any of the functions/duties of his office or interfering with his employment and rights and benefits attached to his office. 5. A MANDATORY ORDER compelling the defendant to pay the Claimant all his salaries, benefits and allowances accruing to him as an employee of Enugu State University of Science and Technology with immediate effect from February 2001 until judgment is delivered. Before the transfer of the matter to this Honourable Court, the Defendant entered appearance, filed statement of defence and other accompanying processes. Then after the transfer and precisely on 13th day of October, 2014 the learned Defendants counsel brought a motion on notice dated 14th day of August, 2014 praying the court for the following relief: a. An order striking out this suit for want of jurisdiction; AND b. Such other order as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds upon which the application is based are as follows: a. The claimant/respondent claims that he got to know about the termination of the appointment with the defendant/applicant on 8/2/2001. The claimant/respondent, challenging the termination of his appointment aforesaid, instituted this action on 26/11/2003. b. The claimant/respondent’s action was instituted outside the period of 12 months after the termination of his appointment with the defendant/applicant. Thus, the claimant/respondent’s action is statute barred. The motion is supported by an affidavit of 11 paragraphs deposed to by one Mrs Beatrice Chidobem, a legal officer of the Defendant University. There are two exhibits attached as well as a Written Address in support of the application. Upon receipt of the said motion on notice the Claimant/Respondent filed a Counter affidavit, with leave of court on 25th day of August 2015, of 16 paragraphs with Exhibits 1, 1A, 2 and 3 attached. There is also accompanying the Counter-Affidavit a Written Address dated 24th August, 2015. The Defendant/Applicant did not file any reply on points of law. In his written address in support of the Preliminary Objection, learned Defendant’s Counsel stated that the Claimant/Respondent was an employee of the Defendant/Applicant. That the employment was terminated by a letter dated 1/2/2001. The claimant/respondent in paragraphs 19 and 20 of his Statement of claim in this suit pleaded that it was on 8/2/2001 that he got to know about the termination of his appointment by the defendant/applicant. Counsel stated further that it could be gleaned from the date on the stamp of the Registry of the Enugu State High Court of Justice that the claimant/respondent instituted this action on 26/11/2003 to challenge the termination of his appointment. That was about 33 months and 16 days after he got to know about the aforesaid termination. The action was instituted outside 12 months after the termination of the claimant/respondent’s appointment. Arguing the objection, learned counsel stated that the State Proceeding Law of Enugu State, 2004 is the law regulating proceedings in court against Institutions and public Officers of the State. That Section 11(1) thereof provides that: No action or proceeding shall lie or be instituted under this law unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof… Learned counsel continued that the claimant/respondent’s cause of action in this suit is the alleged wrongful termination of his appointment by the defendant/applicant. This could be gleaned from his pleading in paragraph 21 of Exhibit A. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said exhibit, he pleaded that he got to know about the fact of the termination of his said appointment on 8/2/2001. The Claimant/Respondent’s cause of action accrued on 8/2/2001. Exhibit B bears a stamp clearly depicting that the claimant/respondent instituted this action on 26/11/2003 to challenge the action of the defendant/applicant. That Section 11(1) of the Enugu State Proceedings Law reproduced above prescribes a period of twelve months within which an action could be commenced to challenge any act, neglect or default of an institution or Public Officer of the State by any aggrieved party. The defendant/applicant is an Institution of Enugu State. This action ought to have been instituted between the period of 8/2/2001 and 8/2/2002. It was not so instituted. The claimant/respondent’s action was commenced long after the twelve months prescribed had elapsed. Learned counsel then submitted that having failed to commence this action within the period prescribed by Section 11(1) of State Proceedings Law (supra), the claimant/respondent has forever lost the opportunity to approach this Honourable Court in ventilation of whatever may be his grievance regarding the termination of the appointment by the defendant/applicant. That Section 11(1) of State Proceedings Law is a limitation law. In Chief Paul Adeshi vs Chief Patrick Ade Oko & Anor (2010) LPELR-3612(CA) the Court of Appeal held that: Indeed, limitation Act or Law removes the right of the plaintiff of (sic) judicial reliefleaving the plaintiff with bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if such cause of action is found to be statute barred. That the apex Court in Amadi vs INEC & Ors (2012) LPELR-7831 (SC) held that: The purport and essence of a imitation law is that where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is statute barred. Counsel submitted further that the action of the claimant/respondent is statute barred. In the circumstance, the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such an action, referring to the case of Babatunde vs Eluwa (2011) LPELR-88299(CA) where it was held that: Any action brought against a Public officer after the stipulated limitation period is said to be statute barred and the effect is that the court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain such an action. That in Nwaka vs Head of Service Ebonyi State (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 402) 1156 at 1169 para. G, the Court held that: Once an action is caught up by the limitation Act, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. In conclusion learned counsel urged the Court to strike out this suit in that the claimant/respondent did not institute it within the prescribed period of twelve months envisaged by Section 11(1) of state Proceedings Law (supra). Thus the Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain such an action. In reaction to the submissions of the Defendant/Applicant’s written address, learned Claimant/Respondent’s counsel in his own written address formulated and argued the following issues for the court’s determination: 1. Whether State Proceedings Law Cap 146 (Revised Laws of Enugu State) 2004 is applicable to the Claimant/Respondent’s suit? 2. That assuming without conceding to the fact that State Proceedings Law (Revised Laws of Enugu State) 2004 is applicable to this suit, whether Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Laws Cap 146 (Revised Laws of Enugu State) 2004 could benefit the Defendant/Applicant in the circumstances of this case? 3. Whether a Declaration relief can be statute barred? 4. Whether the court has made any pronouncement s it concerns statute of limitation and labour matters. 5. Whether the statute or limitation can affect labour matters? On issue No. 1 learned counsel submitted that the State Proceedings Law Cap 146 (Revised Laws of Enugu State) 2004 is not applicable to the suit of the Claimant/Respondent. He then referred the Court to the Preamble and Sections 2, 5, 8, 9, 11(2) of the law. He then reproduced the said provisions and stated that there is no mention of Enugu State University of Science and Technology in those provisions or any reference to it. He then submitted that it is a well settled rule of interpretation of deeds and statutes that expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The principle is ably expressed in Latin Maxim: expression unis est exclusion alterius. Or expressum facit cessare taciturr. That the term means the expression of one person or thing implies the exclusion of other persons or thing of the same class but which are not mentioned. He referred to Akintan JSC in Agbareh vs Mimra NSCQR Vol. 33 2008 at p. 970. He further submitted that Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law cannot be applicable in isolation, without sections 8, 9 and 11(2) with equal heft. That Enugu State University of Science and Technology is a creation of law, referring to Edict No. 9 of 1996 as amended by Edict No. 2 of 1999 and now Enugu State University of Science and Technology Law, Cap 74, Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004. That Section 3(3) of the said law states as follows: The University shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall have power to sue and be sued in its corporate name and to acquire, hold, dispose of movable and immovable property for the purpose of its function under this law. Learned counsel continued that it simply means that ESUT is not an adjunct of Enugu State whereby the staff of the defendant derive their means of livelihood from the consolidated fund of the State. The staff of the defendant are appointed directly or indirectly by the civil service commission of the state. He referred to Section 5(c) of the State Proceedings Law, Cap 146 of the Revised Laws of Enugu State 2004. Therefore the staff of ESUT who have any dispute with respect to its employment or contract or service are not meant to petition Attorney-General of the State, relying on Section 8(1) of (2)(3) of the State Proceedings Law Cap 146 the Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004. That the staff does not have to give pre-action notice to the Secretary to the Government of Enugu State, as in Section 11(2) of State Proceedings Law, rather the pre action notice goes to the University. He referred to Sections 44, 45 (4) (5) of ESUT Law cap 74 of the Revised Laws of Enugu State. Learned counsel added that because the State Proceedings Law does not apply to the Claimant’s suit the defendant/applicant’s counsel could as a private legal practitioner defend this suit without obtaining the authorization (fiat) of the Attorney-General of the State which if they have they would have pleaded it. He referred to section 9(1)(c) of the State Proceedings Law, supra. On Issue No. 2 learned counsel stated that the supposed lateness in filing this suit is traceable to two complementary factors, viz:- (a) The Defendant’s fraudulent deceit and concealment in its reply to the Claimant’s protest letter. (b) The Claimant’s subsequent illness of psychological disequilibrium and near blindness. On the first factor that caused the delay in the claimants’ filing of this suit, learned counsel referred to the same section 11(1) of the state Proceedings Law, Cap 146, Laws of Enugu State 2004 which states that: No action or proceeding shall lie or be instituted under this law unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof… Learned counsel submitted that the defendant’s fraudulent deceit and concealment was the cause of the late filing. That the claimant protested immediately in his letter of 6/3/2001 but it took the defendant a whopping eight months to reply to the said letter of protest with promising but deceitful words as: …I write to acknowledge receipt of your petition regarding your re organization and to inform you that council will be dispose (sic) to look into such petitions as soon as the on-going re organization exercise is completed. Please exercise some patience as the outcome of your petition will thereafter be communicated to you. Counsel then stated that in the final analysis, both the contents of Exhibits 1, 1A and 3 and the promises in the quotation above, especially the last paragraph thereto of softly and romantically begging the claimant to “please exercise some patience…” all turned out to be morally fraudulent, deceitful, malicious and a hocus-pocus means to distract the claimant and waste the time of the claimant. That in Sani vs Okene LGA (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 44) 60 at 74-75, it was held that: A party would not be allowed to take advantage of limitation law where there is compelling evidence of disability, mistake, fraud and personal injury or death. Or where the public officer in question acts with malice or outside the colour of his authority. See ABUBAKAR vs GOVERNMENT OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (PT. 797) 553 at 557 ratio 1. Counsel then stated that it is of importance to note that it will be fool hardiness for the claimant to go to sue his employer (defendant) to court after his employer (defendant) has lavishly romanced him (claimant) with sweet words like: (a) I…write to acknowledge receipt of your petition regarding your Re organization… (b) …To inform you that council will be disposed to look into such petition as soon as the ongoing Reorganization exercise is completed. (c) Please exercise some patience… That the Claimant was still “exercising patience” in hunger and ennui, when the inevitable happened. He was afflicted with a life threatening and disabling sickness in October, 2001. This led to the second reason for filing the suit late. That when on 8/11/2001 the defendant finally replied to the protest letter, the claimant had hitherto been struck with psychological disequilibrium (illness of the mind) in October 2001 and was consequently admitted in a Herbal Healing Home at Enugu-Ezike. He referred to paragraphs 12, 13, 14 of the Counter-Affidavit and paragraph 34 of the Claimant’s Statement of Claim. That as soon as the claimant’s illness abated around 18/10/2013 (sic) he instituted this suit on the 26th of November 2003 and the sickness/mental/nervous breakdown was due to the abrupt disengagement of the claimant without any kobo after 18years of meritorious service, as well as the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of it true reason for its inhuman treatment of the claimant. That it is the Claimant’s submission that the exception to the rule in Section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law Cap 146, Laws of Enugu State 2004 which says “…or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after ceasing thereof…” automatically protects and empowers the claimant in bringing this suit when he did. This is because the damage, that is (stopping the claimant’s work prematurely, without prior notice and without retirement entitlements) was still continuing (even after his protest letter) for about eight months before they replied it. Secondly, in their reply, they still deceitfully gave him hope “…That the council will be disposed to look into such petition as soon as the ongoing re organization is completed. Please exercise patience…” Thirdly, the 2nd exception to this rule, stated above, that is injury (the claimant started suffering from psychological disequilibrium) excuses his filing when he did. Counsel urged the Court to resolve the second issue in favour of the claimant and hold that the claimant is protected under the said section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law to file this suit when he did. On Issue 3, whether a declaratory relief can be statute barred, learned counsel for the claimant/respondent stated that courts regard declaratory relief as being esoteric outstanding and equitable unlike some species of reliefs sought in litigations. It is an equitable relief granted ostensibly to cushion the hard effects of common law principles on litigants and therefore, not affected by statute of limitation. He referred to Godwin Ogori & Anor vs Madam Fefina Ogwudu (2005) 2 F.. 179 @ 192. He therefore urged the court to find this 3rd issue in favour of the Claimant and pronounce his suit as properly before the Honourable Court. On Issue 4, learned counsel submitted that the matters of labour law are not affected by statute of limitation, referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Chief Akaruaven Enwenede vs Solomon Ajomata Ala & 2 Ors, (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/EN/149/2012 where the Court quoted with approval the case of NUPENG vs GECO PRAKLA Nig. LTD (2010) NLLR (Pt. 57) 361. He then urged this Honourable Court to hold that issue No. 4 is in favour of the Claimant. He finally submitted that because contract of employment is contractual in nature, Action Law of Enugu State (S. 20(1)(a) Cap 4 Revised Laws of Enugu State should apply and not State Proceedings Law. In conclusion, counsel urged the Court to hold that section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law Cap 146 Revised Law of Enugu State does not apply to the case of the Claimant. And to hold that the Claimant’s case falls within the exception, hence the court has the jurisdiction to entertain this matter. I have carefully considered the processes filed as well as the arguments and submissions of the parties in this case. The sole issue for determination is whether or not the suit of the claimant is statute barred. The defendant/applicant has submitted that the claimant’s suit is statute barred for having been instituted outside the twelve months prescribed by section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law Cap 146, Revised Laws of Enugu State, 2004 (hereinafter State Proceedings Law). The duty of the court in determining the issue of statute bar is simply to look at the date of the accrual of the cause of action and compare same with the date on which the suit was instituted. If the date on which it was instituted is beyond the period stipulated in the limitation law being relied upon by the Objector, then the suit must be declared statute barred. This is of course subject to the applicable exceptions stated in the limitation law or as established by judicial precedent. See Ezeani vs Nigerian Railway Corporation (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1445) p. 139 at 159; C.B.N. VS Okojie (2004)10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488; Lagos City Council vs Ogunbiyi (1969) SCNLR 94 and Ayinde & Ors vs Adigun (1993)11 SCNJ 1. In the instant case the Claimant’s cause of action was said to have arisen on the 8th day of February, 2001 when he was served his letter of disengagement from the services of the defendant on grounds of “Reorganization” dated 1st February, 2001. See paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Statement of Claim of the Claimant. The cause of action of the Claimant is the act of the defendant for which he seeks the reliefs outlined in his Statement of Claim. See Julius Berger Nigeria Plc vs R.I. Omogui (2001) LPELR-1638 (SC). In this case the disengagement is the cause of action and I so find. The next point is the date on which the action was filed. It was filed on the 26th day of November, 2003.This means that the Claimant came to court well outside the twelve months stipulated in Section 11(1) State Proceedings Law of Enugu State. The said provision reads: No action or proceeding shall lie or be instituted under this law unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof… In the circumstance the Claimant came to court after the expiration of the limitation period set by the State Proceedings law. It must therefore be statute barred. However, the Claimant has argued strenuously that the said State Proceeding Law does not apply to this case. Reliance was placed by the Claimant on the Preamble to the Law, sections 2, 5, 6, 9 and 11(2) of the State Proceedings Law. The fulcrum of the Claimant’s case here is that the Defendant is a University with its own law and cannot be subject to the State Proceedings Law. Rather, Claimant submitted, it is Section 20(1) of the Actions Law of Enugu State that should apply. I have read the provisions cited and arguments of counsel thereon. I am not convinced that he is right. The State Proceedings Law applies to public officers of Enugu State and the Defendant is being sued for the act of disengagement of the Claimant pursuant to the carrying out of public duty. As pointed out, rightly in my view, by the defendant, institutions, like public officers, are entitled to protection under limitation law. In Ezeani vs Nigerian Railway Corporation (2015), supra, the law was reiterated that those who are entitled to protection under limitation law are not limited to natural persons or human beings, but includes artificial persons, corporation sole, company or anybody or persons, corporate or incorporate. See also Ibrahim vs Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584)1 and Gyang vs N.S.C. (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 791) 54. Therefore, the limitation set by the State Proceedings Law of twelve months, do avail the Defendant so that the Claimant was bound to have filed his suit within twelve months. Furthermore, the Claimant has argued in the alternative that the delay of the Claimant in filing his action within the twelve months was occasioned by the defendant’s fraudulent deceit and concealment in its to reply the Claimant’s letter of protest. He also added that his unfortunate health deterioration as the cause for the delay in instituting the action on time. In his argument learned counsel referred to Sani vs Okene LGA (2005), supra, and Abubakar Vs Government of Gombe State (2002), supra. The Claimant has predicated his argument on fraud on the reply to his letter of protest in which the Defendant acknowledged receipt and promised to look into the issue. Here the point must be made that the cause of action will continue to run even where parties are engaged in negotiations or discussions. Such negotiations do not extend the limitation period talk less of a promise to look into the issue as the defendant did in this case. See Eboigbe vs NNPC 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649.It is therefore difficult to see how the claimant’s failure to file his suit within the time stipulated by law can be excused in this case. I am therefore not persuaded to accept the claimant’s exceptions here. The Claimant has equally raised the point of continuing injury in this case by which he submitted that the injury his suffered was continuing and therefore his suit is not statute barred. Here, continuing injury has been well articulated by the authorities and this court too has pronounced on it. See INEC vs Ogbadigbo Local Government & Ors (2015) LPELR-24839; A-G Rivers State vs A-G Bayelsa State & Anor (2012) LPELR-9336; Victor vs Federal University of Technology Akure & Anor (2013) LPELR-22887 (CA);Alhassan vs Aliyu & Ors (2009) LPELR-8340 (CA).In all of these decisions the point made is that “continuance of damage or injury” refers to continuation of the act that causes the damage or injury and not the continuance of the effects of damage or injury. The claimant in this case is saying that the stoppage of his work (the damage or injury) had continued or is still continuing as at the time he filed the action and therefore the defendant cannot be protected. However, the judicial interpretation of this phrase is that for it to apply the claimant must show that there is a repeat or repetition of the act that causes the damage or injury. His Lordship Okoro JSC had occasion recently to espouse the principle in the case of INEC vs Ogbadgbo, supra,at pages 57-59 paras, C-C, thus: I remember that during my sojourn on the Bench of the Court of Appeal, I had occasion to examine the meaning of an act which damage or injury is a continuing one. In Alhaji Alhassan Aliyu & Ors (2009) LPELR-8340 (CA) at pp. 31-32 paras F-G, I said as follows: Where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run for the purpose of the application of a limitation law until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. In other words, “continuance of injury” means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury………. I have had to reproduce part of the judgment in extensor in order to underscore the meaning of the phrase “continuance of damage or injury” as used in Section 2(a) of the Act. In 1996, the appellant excised and suppressed the respondents’ State Constituency. There was no other act of excision or suppression. It was a completed act. What the respondents and the two courts below relied upon was the “continuance of the injurious effects of a legal injury”. Clearly this is where the mistake came about. It was therefore wrong for the two lower courts to hold that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Act did not apply to the suit of the Respondents. In the present case the act of the Defendant was that of disengagement of the Claimant and it was completed. He had continued to feel the effect of the injury but it is not continuance of the injury as understood in the limitation law. This I so find and hold. There is also the point made by the Claimant that limitation law does not apply to labour cases, in which he placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of Solomon Ajomata, supra.Here I have to say straight away that the position of the law now is that labour matters are amongst matters that may be affected by statute of limitation. In the case of Hon. Runyi Kunyi & Ors vs A-G & Commissioner for Justice Cross River State (2013) 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) this court held as follows: The claimants had further referred this Court to its decisions in John Ovoh vs The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and Ors vs Shona Jason Nig. Ltd. While it is true that in these cases this Court had held that the limitation laws do not apply to labour rights issues as to the claims for salary and entitlements/benefits, the truth is that this Court had had to change that stance in cases other than those relating to salary and benefits given the weight of the Court of Appealand Supreme Court authorities to the effect that limitation laws apply to employment cases as of other cases, all of which are binding on this Court. In cases of claims for salary and allowances, the decisions of this court in John Ovoh vs The Nigerian Westminster Dredging & Marine Company Ltd and Captain Tony Oghide and Ors vs Shona Jason Nig. Ltd would appear to be good law if the test on “continuance of damage or injury” laid down in the recent Supreme Court decision in AG, Rivers State vs AG Bayelsa State & Anor (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 is met. This decision thus shows that labour matters especially employment matters are subject to limitation laws. The only instance in which limitation, may not apply is when the test of continuance of damage or injury is won by the Claimant. In the instant case he has not. This I so find and hold. In the circumstance and for all the reasons given, I hold that there is merit in the preliminary objection of the defendant and I hereby uphold same as I declare the suit statute barred. The suit is accordingly dismissed. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.