Download PDF
REPRESENTATION:- Adebayo Jegede for the Claimant I.O Shitta-bey,with him are D.A.degor and Miss I. Onyenuforo for the defendant. JUDGMENT A complaint dated 8th January, 2003 was filed by the claimant at the Federal High Court and was transferred to this court in view of the third alteration Act, on the 4th of February, 2014. The claimants claims against the defendant are as follows: 1. A declaration that the purported verbal termination of the claimants appointment with the defendant on 8th November, 2000 is wrongful and of no effect whatsoever as the same constitute a flagrant breach of the terms and conditions of employment contained in the claimant’s letters of appointment. 2. Declaration that the contract of employment between the claimants and defendant is still subsisting as the same is yet to be determined in accordance with the terms and conditions regulating the said employment. 3. An order directing the defendant to pay the claimants their monthly uniformly adjusted salary of N11,886.59 per month from October 2000 to 31st March, 2010 (114 months) at the rate of N1,335,071.2 per claimant totaling N35,231,586 to their firm of solicitors ADEBAYO JEGEDE OF ADEBAYO JEGEDE & CO of No 22 Montgomery Road, Yaba, Lagos. 4. 21% interest per annum on the judgment sum in this suit from 1/4/2010 till the final liquidation of the judgment debt. It is the claimants' claims that they were at various times employed by the defendant as locum staff in the Engineering department of the defendant. That the claimants were asked to undergo medical examination contrary to the provisions of their contract of employment, they were made to pay the bills of the medical examination. That from 1996 to 1998 the claimant discharged their duties assiduously and at no time were they issued query. That in September 2000 the net salary of each of the claimant was adjusted to the sum of N11, 886.59 by the defendant. That on the 14th of December, 2000 the claimants were verbally informed by the defendant that their services were no longer required. They averred that the defendant refused to pay their October 2000 salaries. That despite the termination of the claimants they continued to report at their duty post while agitating for salaries and allowances. On the 25th of June 2001 claimants were issued their purported letter of termination back dated to the 14th December, 2000. That vide the letter 11/4/2000 and 3/5/2002, the defendant advised the claimants to liaise with the Assistant Director of Administration to collect their one month salary in lieu of notice of termination without reference to the unpaid arrears of salaries due, but the defendant later refused to pay them their one month salary in lieu as stated in the said letter. That no salary or one month salary in lieu of notice were collected till date by them. That the purported termination of the appointment of the Claimants in the service of the Defendant is wrongful, illegal, null and void and of no effect. The claimants during trial testified through its representatives, CW1 and CW2 Messrs. Adetona Adesina and Itoro Orok. They tendered documents which were admitted and marked as Exhibits OA1-OA11 and IO- IO2. CW1 testified that he is the Labour secretary and represents the claimants on labour issues. That he was invited for a meeting held on the 13th of October 2000 where they discussed about their verbal termination. That he was not present at the meeting between the claimant and the defendant held on the 8th of October, 2000. He went on to state that he was verbally informed of the meeting dated 8th of October 2000. That he came to know of paragraph 14 of his witness statement on oath vide the uniform adjustment of salary which he saw with the claimants. That he is not aware that the claimants were overpaid. The CW2 stated that the claimant had been reporting for work since October, 2000 when their appointments were allegedly terminated. That Exhibit OA4 was written to the 16th claimant and received in his presence on the 25th of June, 2001. That he couldn’t collect all the other claimants’ letters but he is representing them and also in touch with them all. That no letter was pasted on the Notice Board of the defendant. That on the 8th of November, 2000 a letter was read to them by one Mr. Olademo informing them of their termination. He admitted that a letter was written to them but disagrees on the date the defence counsel posit it to have been received by them. He stated that they refused to accept their one month salary in lieu of notice as they were not paid their salary for the month of October 2000 and also did not agree with the sum about to be paid. He admitted not to be entitled to a benefits of a permanent worker. That the overpayment of salary by the defendant is no fault of theirs. He admitted going to CRP and several communications between him and CRP. That all the claimants are aware of the pendency of the case. He stated that all the salaries of the claimants were uniformly adjusted and his pay advice is the same as all the other claimant. That there has been disagreement between him and the defendant since November, 2000. That he doesn’t think the defendant has been fair to him. That he never knew he was overpaid by the defendant and he admitted that by Exhibit IO2 he discovered the termination on the notice board. The defendant on the other hand denies the averment of the claimants stating that the claimants were former Locum staff in its' Engineering Department, whose appointments were terminated on 31st of October 2000. That the claimants were described as a Locum basis without the full privileges accorded to permanent employees under the usual terms and conditions of employment. That via a notice in writing placed on the hospital notice board on the1st of October, 2000, the Locum Staff were terminated. That vide a letter dated 5th February, 2001 the Claimants admitted knowledge of the termination of their employment on 31st October, 2000. That the Claimants initially protested the termination of their employment on the allegation that it was procured through the Chief Engineer. That consequent upon the refusal of the Claimants to accept their termination, the Chief Engineer was directed to notify all Locum staff again that their appointment had been terminated as previously advertised on 31st October, 2000. Defendant avers that it had significantly complied with any formalities reasonably required to bring to an end the employment of temporary staff within its establishment. It admitted that the claimants are ordinarily entitled to payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice but the defendant found that for years the Claimants had been receiving payments far in excess of their contracted salary due to an administrative error between the personnel and accounting departments. That all Locum workers were always placed on appropriate salary grade of EUSS 03 based on the calculations of the amount they were to receive daily as Locum workers. This amount varied from one Locum worker to another since they performed varying tasks as the 1st Claimant, a Locum Labourer, was placed on a salary of =N=l1,408.00k per annum, the 16th Claimant, a Locum Painter, was placed on a salary of =N=829.00k per month. That the net salary of each of the Claimant was not adjusted uniformly in September 2000. It averred that by its' letters dated 11/04/02 and 03/05/02 approved payment of one month salary in lieu of notice to all the Claimants but Claimants refused till date to collect their approved one month salary in lieu of notice. it averred further that the termination of the Claimants' employment was done in pursuance of its public duty and accordingly the Claimants' claims are statute barred, not having been commenced within three months of the accrual of the supposed cause of action. That the Claimants suit is frivolous, annoying, and an abuse of court process and urged the court to dismiss this suit with substantial costs. The defendant testified through one Olusesan Olajide. He testified that he does not know how many claimants are in this suit. That two of the claimant were recalled and offered a pensionable employment. That he is aware that the two persons recalled back to its employment were already in court against it. That he wrote to them upon been informed and they replied that they never instructed anyone to sue the defendant on their behalf. That all the claimants were all locum staff of the defendant. The claimant in reply to the defendant’s statement of defence averred that as at 30thSeptember 2000, the defendant uniformly adjusted salary of all the Claimants' particularly the 16th Claimant was N11,886.59 per month excluding the N500 monthly Cooperative contribution per Claimant. That the claimants were not informed that they had been receiving payments far in excess of their contracted salary due to administrative error between the personnel and accounting departments. That the total amount involved is the sum of N530, 964 as contained in the Defendant's letter to Constitutional Rights Project dated 23rd May 2001. That 19 of the Claimants were involved in the excess of money erroneously paid by Defendant to the Claimants. That the termination of the claimants is wrongful and is not covered by the provision of Public Officer Protection Law Cap 279 Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 1990 as claimed by the Defendant. PARTICULARS OF MALICE OF THE DEFENDANT (1) That the Defendant's letter of termination dated 14th December 2000 written to the 16th Claimant and received by them on 25/6/2000 was written in bad faith. (2) The said letter back-dated the termination of the said Claimant to take effect from 31st October 2000. (3) The administrative error and erroneous payment of excess salary by the Defendant to the Claimants was used as an excuse by the Defendant and was only discovered at the last hour when the Defendant had completed all arrangements to terminate the Claimants from its service. The defendant on the 29th October, 2015 filed its final written address and posed six issues for the court’s determination 1. Do the 26 named Claimants have a collective right to sue or be represented as joint Claimants in this suit? 2. Whether an employee whose employment has been terminated is entitled to a declaration that his or her employment still subsists in an ordinary master and servant relationship and if not, what remedy can he or she seek? 3. Has each of the Claimants proved that the termination of his employment was in breach of contract and therefore a wrongful termination of employment? 4. In a claim for wrongful termination of employment, can a Claimant claim wages for services he never rendered? 5. Whether the Claimants' suit discloses a reasonable cause of action, the Claimants having rejected all overtures made to them to collect their unpaid October 2000 salary as well as one month salary in lieu of notice? 6. Are the Claims contained in this Suit statute barred by reason of the provisions of Section 2(a} of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap 379, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. On issue one, counsel citing the case of CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK (NIG) PLC V. ROSE [1998] 4 NWLR (PT. 544) 37where the court held that “where a person has jointly with other persons have a ground for instituting a suit, all those other persons ought ordinarily to be made parties to the suit" submitted that the relationship which existed between the Defendant and each Claimant in this case was a personal one based on each Claimant’s individual and distinct contract of employment, notwithstanding that their conditions of service may be the same and which would not give rise to a joint interest or joint ground with other employees to sue in the event of a breach as they do not have collective right to sue or be represented in a suit. The Claimants in joining their distinct causes of action in this suit have evidently approached the court wrongly. Thus counsel urged the Court to order an amendment of this Claim by striking out the names of the 2nd to 26th Claimants for misjoinder, whilst allowing the suit to survive in the name of 1st Claimant. On issue two, counsel submitted that the Claimants neither pleaded nor proved that their employment went beyond the ordinary master and servant relationship and thus the relationship was nothing more than a common law relationship governed by a written contract alone and not subject to any statutory restriction or limitation. Hence the Claimants are not entitled to a declaration that their employment still subsists since such remedy is not available under common law contracts of employment. That even in the unlikelihood that the court finds the defendant’s termination wrongful, it is settled Law that an employee's remedy only lies in damages as the Court will not foist a willing employee on an unwilling employer. The measure of damage is therefore no more than salary for the month of November, 2000 since this is the remaining salary the 1st Claimant (or indeed any other Claimant) would have earned had his employment been terminated at the end of the contractual period of notice. He urged the court to so hold. On issue three, counsel submitted that during trial, Defence Counsel drew the attention of the Court to the persistent absence of the 22 named Claimants. Counsel submitted orally that their absence demonstrated a lack of interest and more likely a lack of real involvement in this case. Counsel for the Claimants, Mr. Jegede, in response said that all the Claimants were interested but that all of them could not attend Court due to financial restraints and he held meetings with them once they formed a quorum of 6. However he neither produced a letter of authority or minutes of a meeting to back up his claims. Both CW1 and CW2 also insisted that all the named Claimants were actively involved in the case. Counsel stated that despite claims to be Secretary and Union representative of all the Claimants, Mr. Adetona did not know enough about the Claimants to know that Samuel Okodi and Oyewole Olademo (20th and 25th Claimants) were re-employed by the Defendant in August, 2001 and therefore could not have been involved in a suit against the Defendant. Also the CW2 under oath when asked why the other claimants did not produce their contract of employment letters replied thus; "I couldn't collect all the letters of my colleagues". Yet CW2 said next that "I am representing the Claimants, I am in touch with all my colleagues". Counsel submitted that up till now the letters of 22 remaining claimants are not before the court. He cited the case of MOROHUNFOLA V. KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY [1990] 4NWLR (PT. 145) 506. Counsel urged a complete dismissal of the claims of the 2nd to 26th Claimants. Counsel on the question of breach of employment, the 1st claimant stated that in September 2000, the Defendant discovered an administrative error which had resulted in excess payment of salaries to Locum staff over the years. That it informed the claimants’ of its erroneous calculation and that subsequent adjustments were to be made to reflect the true salary entitlement of each Locum worker in line with their contracts of employment without asking them to refund the amount received in excess. That as part of a re-organization exercise, the Defendant subsequently terminated the Claimants' employment on 31st October, 2000 but without a month's notice and without payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. He submitted that the defendant from the above has every right and justified in Law not to pay one month salary in lieu of notice as the Claimants were still indebted to it after deductions and the subsequent termination of the Claimants' appointment under the circumstances of this case was therefore lawful and not in breach of contract. He urged the court to so hold. On issue four, counsel submitted that claimants' claim for salary not earned must fail having not pleaded nor proved that are entitled to same. He cited the case of UDEGBUNAM V. F.C.D.A. [1996] 5 NWLR (PT. 449) 474 AT 485 where the court held that a claim for earned salary; "is in the nature of special damages which must be pleaded and proved strictly". Also, he cited the case of LAGOS UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL (LUTH) & MANAGEMENT BOARD VS. PRINCE M.B. ADEWOLE, [1998] 5 NWLR (PT. 550) 406,where the court held that such a claim of arrears of salaries from the date his employment was terminated to the date he filed his action in Court by the claimant was misconceived as arrears of salary can only be claimed up to the date of termination as debt owed. He urged the court to hold so. On issue five, counsel submitted that the defendant admitted owing the claimants but offered to pay the Claimants their October, 2000 salary without the excess amounts previously paid this the claimant rejected. This was also admitted by the CW2. That the Claimants had no reasonable claims in Court since it was really the Claimants who were indebted to the Defendant, notwithstanding that the Defendant magnanimously offered to pay them October, 2000 salary and one month salary in lieu of notice. Counsel respectfully urged the court to dismiss the Claimants' suit in its entirety for lack of a reasonable cause of action. On issue six, counsel posited that by the provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap 379, Laws of the Federation 1990 which provides that; "2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect - (a)the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof" He submitted that by the above cited provision, defendant is a public officer and thus protected by the Act having acted in pursuance of its lawful duty, the Defendant is protected from litigation under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap 379, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 which is not brought within three months of its accrual. That by 8th January, 2003 when the Claimants sued, their claims had become statute barred. In all, counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Claimants suit and award cost in favour of the Defendant. On the 4th of November, 2015 the claimants filed their final written address. They distilled eight issues for the court’s determination; 1. Whether the claimants have a collective right to sue or be represented as joint claimants in this suit. 2. Whether failure to tender letters of appointment of claimants in this suit is fatal to their claim. 3. Whether the salaries of the claimants were uniformly adjusted at the time of the commencement of this suit against the defendant. 4. Whether defendant has proved before the Honourable Court that the 20th claimant MR OKODI and 25th claimant MR OLADEMO have been re-absorbed back into service of the defendant. 5. Whether the claimants whose employment has been unlawfully terminated are entitled to declaration that the employment still subsists until lawfully terminated. 6. Whether the claimants have proved that their employment was wrongfully terminated. 7. Whether the claimants’ suit discloses reasonable cause of action having rejected overture made to them to collect their unpaid October salary as well as one month salary in lieu of notice. 8. Whether the claimants’ suit is statute barred by reasons of provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection of Nigeria 1990. On issue one, counsel submitted that by virtue of Sections 12(b) and 13 of the National Industrial Act and Order 13 Rule 12 (1) of the High Court of Lagos State Civil procedure rules, the claimants are properly before the court. He urged the court to so hold. On issue two, counsel citing the case of KADUNA TEXTILE MILL V UMAR [1994] 1 NWLR (PT 319) 143 CA (156-157)posited that the failure to tender the letter of employment in evidence will not necessarily be fatal to the plaintiff’s case so long as there is otherwise ample evidence to establish the tenures of the contract of employment between the parties. He urged the court to hold so. On issue three, as at the time of filling this suit the claimants were placed on the same salary in the sum of N11, 886.59 per month. That the pay slip of the 2nd claimant placing him on N9, 682.59 was wrongly computed and this he complained to the defendant who now uses this as a basis to state that the claimants were not under a uniformly adjusted salary. On issue four, counsel stated that there is no evidence on record to show that the 20th and 25th claimant were taken back into the service of the defendant since August 2001. However since the defendant has informed the court of this they have no alternative than to support the striking out of the names of the 20th and 25th claimant. That in response to the defendant issue three, it posited that the CW1 was employed by the claimants to represent their case as a union leader. On issue five, counsel submitted that since issue five is one over ten years it would be unreasonable for claimants to insist on declaration that their employment still exists with the defendant. Thus counsel urged the court to mitigate damages for losses suffered by the claimants as per its claim. On issue six, counsel posited that a cursory look at Exhibit O4 letter captioned termination letter back dated on 14th of December, 2000 received on the 25th of June 2001 and Exhibit OA5 and Exhibit OA6 dated 11th of April, 2002 and 3rd of May, 2002 informing 1st and 7th claimant to receive their one month salary in lieu of notice evinces that there is a lag of seventeen months between when their employment was terminated and when the defendant asked them to collect their salary in lieu of notice, also the claimant were during all these period at their duty post working. Hence the claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated. On issue seven, counsel stated that claimant deserve at least payment for seventeen months' salary as they, while agitating for one month salary in lieu of notice, were working for the defendant. On issue eight, counsel submitted that the argument of the defence counsel that this suit is statute barred is not plausible as the act of the defendant back dating Exhibit O4 is wrongful and the defendant never heeded to the claimants’ complaints until 17 months above the three months the suit ought to have been filed. That the defendant cannot be heard that this suit is statute barred. He urged the court to so hold. Having carefully considered the processes filed on record, the documents tendered and the submissions of both counsel to the parties, it is obvious that the main issues requiring verdict in this case are; whether or not this suit is competent before the court as constituted; whether the claimants' employment was wrongfully terminated and whether or not the claimants' are entitled to reliefs sought. As regards issue one, it is the defendant's contention that this suit is not competent as constituted because same is statute barred and the parties cannot file a joint suit for their claims. It is however the position of the claimants' that this suit is competent as they had similar contract of employment with the same salary with the defendant and thus entitles them to bring a joint action against the defendant. As regards the limitation of time, it is submitted that the claimants' were still in the defendant's employment 6 months after the alleged termination as the letter was not served on them until after 17 months and yet their salaries in lieu of notice has not been paid. As regards the first question, how competent is this suit before the court? It is now beyond any shadow of doubt as stated in plethora of case law authorities, that competence of a court depends entirely on whether it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See the case of MADUKOLU V NKEDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587 AT 595, SHELL PETROLEUM DEV. V ISAN (1997) 6 NWLR (PT. 508) 236 AT 246 PER KATSINA-ALU, JCA (AS HE THEN WAS); PDP V INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (PT. 626) 2000 AT P. 24; WESTERN STEEL WORKERS LTD. V. IRON AND STEEL WORKERS UNION (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 30) 617; Any defect in competence of a court is fatal, and ultimately affects the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the matter. The existence or absence of jurisdiction goes to the very root of the matter so as to sustain or nullify the court's decision or order in respect of the relevant subject matter. See on this the case of SEGUN V. KAYODE & ORS [2008] LPELR-4939 CA. Now, as regards joinder of suit, whether or not the Claimants can jointly file a single suit and not an individual suit having been employed by the defendant with the same condition of employment. In considering the merit of the submissions of both counsel for and against this application, It is pertinent to state the position of the law in that regard. This Court by Sections 36 of Trade Dispute Act 2004 and Section 12 of National industrial Court Act 2006, is empowered as far as practice and procedure are concerned, to do such things as are necessary or expedient for dealing speedily and justly with a matter before it, in order to serve the best interest of justice. Be that as it may, the claims of the Claimants in this suit are one and the same and that is for wrongful termination as locum staff who all served in the Engineering department of the defendant. Their employment was terminated at the same time as could be gleaned from the complaint and the statement of facts filed on record. Their terms of contract are one and the same. There is a common question of law binding them all together. I equally agree with the claimants counsel that all the Claimants agreed to file this suit. It is trite that several parties could file a single suit for purpose of convenience. It should be noted that the specialized nature of disputes before this Court requires speed, flexibility and a certain measure of informality. Hence Section 14 of NICA 2006 permits the Court to regulates its proceedings in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, the onus is thus on this Court to exercise its discretion as it is in this case to be in line with the above provisions of statutes. This Court in HON. RUNYI KANU & ORS V A.G. CROSS RIVER STATE & ORS UNREPORTED SUIT NO NICN/CA/39/2012; DELIVERED ON 13TH MARCH, 2013, held-- '' I agree with the submission of the Claimants that it will be tedious to come individually in this claim of the claimants given that what gave rise to the claims of the Claimants is same for the Claimants...'' I place reliance on the above decision of this Court the facts of which is similar with the instance case. Additionally, it is the law that a person cannot be made a party to a suit without his consent. It is the considered view of this Court that the parties in this suit are in agreement to institute this action against the defendant in order to avoid multiplicity of suit, where parties have same interest they could jointly file an action as it is in this case. See FADAYOMI V SODIPE [1986] 2 NWLR ( PT 25) 736. In fact the law permits the court, if satisfied that some common questions of law or fact arise in all of the causes or matters, or the rights to relief are claimed in respect of or arise out of the same transactions or for some other reasons it is desirable to make an order under the rules of court. The court can order for parties to file a single suit. It is obvious that this case qualifies for a joint suit as constituted by the claimants and thus competent. Next, is whether or not this suit is against Section 2(a) of Public Officer Protection Act and thus statute barred as alleged by learned defence counsel, it is his contention that the claimants' suit was filed above the 3 months period required by law to institute an action against the defendant which is a public office. It is the claimants' argument in opposing this stance that their termination letters were not served on them until after 7 months and that they were not equally paid their one month salary in lieu of notice and October 2000 salary. That claimants' were still going to work during this period. To counsel the claimants case is a continuing injury, which revives itself at the end of every month in anticipation of their salary and salary in lieu of notice. It is trite that in when confronted with a question on whether a suit is statute barred or not, Courts are to simply consider the originating processes, i.e complaint and statement of facts to determine whether or not this matter is statute barred, by comparing the date the matter was filed vis a vis when the cause of action arose. See DR. CHARLES OLADEINDE WILLIAMS V. MADAMOLAITAN WILLIAMS [2008] 4-5 SC(PT11) 253. This action was filed as stated above on the 8th January, 2003. By paragraph 6 of the amended statement of fact, the claimant averred that the defendant verbally informed them in November, 2000 that their service is no longer required. At paragraphs 7 and 8 that they have not been paid their October salary and one month salary in lieu of notice. That on the 25th June, 2001, the claimants' were each given a purported letter of termination of appointment but backdated to 14th December, 2000, this I must say is wrongful as the law is settled that termination of employment cannot be retrospective. Paragraph 10 states that by letters dated 11th April, 2002 and 3rd May, 2002, the defendant urged the claimants' to liaise with the Director Administration to collect their one month salary in lieu of notice of termination without reference to their salary arrears and that they kept on going to work in anticipation of receiving their October salary and one month salary in lieu . It is obvious from the averments in the claimants' amended statement of facts that the claimants employment were terminated on 25th June, 2001 when their letters of termination was received by them. However, their one month salary in lieu of notice was not given to them immediately and their arrears of salary has not been paid. Would it be right to hold that the cause of action or the circumstances leading to the filing of this suit arose on 25th June, 2001 on receiving their letters of termination? The answer is in the negative, this is so in view of the facts as revealed in the claimants statement of facts which is to the effect that the claimants anticipates every month that they would be paid their October salary as well as their one month salary in lieu of notice as provided for in their terms of contract of service which provides that appointment may be terminated by either side giving one month notice or salary in lieu of notice. In other words for an appointment to be effectively terminated a month notice or salary in lieu must be given. In the instance case, the claimants' have not been paid their one month salary in lieu of notice, See exhibit OO6 as well as their October 2000 salary. The import of which is that the defendant has not effectively terminated the claimants' employment. In effect the claimants cause of action is continuing and revives itself every month. This is thus an exception to Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act. As it is a continuing injury which means the cause of action in this case arises each month when the claimants' salary is to be paid. See the case of A.G. BAYELSA STATE V. A.G.RIVERS STATE [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt.1012) 596. It is in this light that I find and hold that this suit is not caught up by Public officers protection Act. This issue is resolved in favour of the claimants and accordingly, this suit is competent and thus confers jurisdiction on this court. I so hold. Now, the pertinent question that requires an answer is, is the termination of the claimants' employment wrongful? It is the claimants' contention that their appointment as locum workers of the defendant has not been effectively terminated, their position is strengthened by the fact that they have not been paid their one month salary in lieu of notice which was to be paid immediately their appointment was terminated against the terms of their contract of employment. The defendant on the other hand posits that the defendant may chose to determine the claimants employment and relying on exhibit OA1, counsel admits that the defendant may terminate the claimants employment by either giving one month notice or a month salary in lieu of notice and that the measure of damages for its failure to pay the claimants' a month salary in lieu of notice is not more than the one month salary in lieu. It is beyond paradventure in master servant relationship that an employer may terminate its employees appointment but must have to do so in tandem with the contract of service. The root, the source and foundation of the terms of employment are as contained in the claimants' employment letters. In F.M.C. IDO EKITI V. OLAJIDE [2011] 11 NWLR (PT. 1258) 256. In AKINFE V. U.B.A PLC [2007] 10 NWLR (pt. 1041) 185, the appeal Court held that in a written or documented contract of service the Court will not look outside the terms stipulated or agreed therein in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties. And Courts are enjoined to interpret these document stricto sensu. See also FRANK JOWAN & 77 ORS V DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD [2013] ACELR PG18 AT 20; AZENABOR V BAYERO UNIVERSITY, KANO [2009] 17 NWLR (PT.1169) 96. The contract of service of the parties are as evinced in exhibit OA1, OO4, and in it either party may chose to determine the relationship by giving a month notice in writing or one month salary in lieu of notice as admitted by the defence counsel. This is not in contention and it is in consonance with the position of the law that facts admitted need no further prove. It is in consequence that I find and hold that the defendant ought to have paid the claimants' one month salary in lieu of notice at the time it terminated the claimants' appointment and letters written to each of them and not by writing a memo pasting it on the notice board, that is in contravention of the terms of contract. It is on record that claimants' saw the notice on the 25th June, 2001. The effect of this is that in law the termination of claimants' employment was wrongful for being in breach of the contract of service. By U.B.N V. CHINYERE [2010] 10NWLR PT. 1203, 453 CA, where the court held that an employment can be said to have been wrongfully terminated if it was done contrary to the conditions governing the contract of service or in a manner not contemplated by the stipulations in the conditions of service. The defendant's failure to write each claimant a letter of termination of employment and equally failing to give them one month salary in lieu of notice was an infraction of the contract of service. what more the back dating of the letters of employment is wrongful as held above in this judgment. See STOCCO V. MAJA [1964] ALL NLR. 51; MICAHEL OLADIPO OLAYINKA V. OAK PENSIONS & ORS Unreported suit no. NICN/LA/176/2013, judgment delivered on 26th January, 2016. It is in the light of this that I find and hold that the termination of the claimants' employment by the defendant is wrongful. I so find and hold. Next pertinent question is, are the claimants entitled to reliefs sought. It is the claimants claims that the court should declare that their contract subsists as same is yet to be determined. It is not in doubt that the claimants employment is determined by the defendant. The only question is in the light of the decision of the court supra, what then is/are the remedies in damages for the claimants? The claimants are praying for their monthly adjusted salary of N11,886.59 per month as from October 2000 to 31st March 2010 and 21% pre judgment interest. The measure of damages in a breach of contract is entrenched in this Latin words Ubi Jus Ibi remedium, i.e. where there is a wrong, there is a remedy, claimants' have established that their rights under the contract of employment were violated and that their employment was wrongfully terminated, and the Court is obliged to award general damages in favour of the Claimants including any other entitlements and against the Defendant. The principle for the assessment of damages in an action for breach of contract is restitution in intergrum. See STRABAG v. ADEYEFA [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 1 at 26 . It is also the law that where the termination of a contract of service is wrongful as held supra, the measures of damages the employee would be entitled to would be salaries for the length of time during which notice of termination would have been given in accordance with the contract of employment as well as other terminal benefits. See also the case of U.B.N V. CHINYERE supra. what are the claimants' entitlements. It is on record by exhibit OO9 the defendant by a letter dated 1st February, 2001 directed that the claimants should be paid their October salary but alleged that the claimant's one month salary in lieu should not be paid reason being that they were overpaid their salaries. It is a basic principle of law that he who asserts must prove, the onus of proving that the claimants were overpaid their salaries was on the defendant who would want the court to believe it. It is however, evident on record that the defendant has failed to show any document in prove of this assertion. Rather all that it tendered are documents stating that the claimants were overpaid and so they should not be paid their salary in lieu of notice, it did not substantiate this fact as to when they were overpaid and how much each claimant was overpaid by presenting their payslip or any pay advice in prove of same. Assuming that the claimants were overpaid, the act of overpayment was not as a result of the claimants making or knowledge, it is the negligence of the defendant and its agents, this was admitted by the defendant that it was as a result the negligence of their Administrative and Personnel staff. The burden or effect of which should not be borne by the claimants rather the defendant is to bear the brunt of such negligent on its own part. it is on this premise that I find and hold that the defendant has failed to prove its assertion that the claimants were overpaid, consequently, this assertion is discountenanced. The defendant also admits that the claimants are entitled to October salary, thus admitted facts need no further prove, it is in this regard that I find and hold that the claimants are entitled to one month salary in lieu of notice and salary for October 2000. It is evident on record vide exhibit OA3, CW2 pay advice that the claimants' monthly salary as at September, 2000 was N11,886.59, I therefore order that each claimant is to be paid the sum of N23,773.18 as their October salary as well as their one month salary in lieu of notice. It is also in the overall interest of justice and equity of this case to award compensation to the claimants whose salaries and entitlements were withheld by the defendant for more than 16 years. It is in the light of this and pursuant to Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, that I award compensation to each claimant two years salary in the sum of N285,278.16. This is to be paid together with the October salary and one month salary in lieu of notice which amounts to a total sum of N309,051.34 to each of the claimants. I so hold. It is germane to state that the claimants who were re absorbed back into the defendant's service i.e Mr. Okodi and Mr. Olademo as evinced by exhibit OO13 are excluded from this judgment. Sum awarded in this judgment is to be paid to each of the claimants' by the defendant personally and not through their counsel within 30 days of this judgment, failing which it shall attract 21% interest. Costs accessed at N50,000 each. Judgment accordingly entered. HON. JUSTICE OYEWUMI O.O