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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Date: January 13, 2016 SUIT NO: NICN /PHC/69/2013 Between 1. MR. SAMPSON NNOSIRI 2. MR. MELODY AFAM ONYEBUENYI 3. MR. NDUBUISI MOSES 4. MR. GODWIN TITUS Claimants 5. MR. OBIOMA CHIBOR (For themselves and on behalf of the disengaged Casual/ Contract staff of the EASTERN BULKCEN CO. LTD). And EASTERN BULKCEM CO. LTD. ….. …… Defendant Representation: G. A. Elechi for the Claimants C. S. Ezem for the Defendant JUDGMENT This suit was commenced on the 30th day of May 2013 by way of Complaint, wherein the Claimants sought the following against the Defendant: 1. A DECLARATION by the honourable court that the engagement of the Claimants as casual or contract staff of the Defendant for a period between l (one) and 14 (fourteen) years without proper employment or guarantee of steady employment is dehumanizing, unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and tantamount to slavery. 2. AN ORDER of the honourable court compelling the Defendant to pay to the Claimants all their accumulated entitlements and benefits in the form of proper monthly salaries, allowances and bonuses as from their respective dates of engagement to the date of judgment in this case in terms with the memorandum of collective agreement between the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers Federation, and the National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic Products Employees. 3. A FURTHER ORDER of the honourable court compelling the Defendant to reinstate and regularize the employment of the Claimants by the Defendant in the form of proper and steady employment. Reinstate and regularize the employment of the claimants. 4. GENERAL DAMAGES in the sum of N10, 000,000.00 (TEN MILLION NAIRA) only. Accompanying the Complaint were the Claimants’ affidavit in verification of the Claimants’ Claims, the Statement of Facts, Written Deposition on Oath, list of witnesses, list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the hearing. The Claimants on the 26/03/2015 filed an Amended Statement of Facts made pursuant to the order granted by the court on 19/03/2015. The Defendant filed its Statement of Defense on the 28/10/2013 vide a Motion for extension of time filed on the 28/10/2013. Hearing commenced on the 11/03/2014. Messrs. Sampson Nnosiri, Ndubuisi Moses and Prince T. Babba testified as the Claimants’ witnesses as CW1, CW2 and CW3 respectively and through them Exhibits 'CA1' to 'CA20(i)' were admitted in evidence. The Defendant opened its case on the 25/06/2015 and fielded its sole witness, Miss Loveth Aguwa. Hearing closed on 25/06/2015 and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the rules of this court. Parties adopted their final addresses on the 22nd day of October 2015. The case of the Claimants as can be deduced from their Amended Statement of Facts is that they are disengaged staff of the Defendant, the Eastern Bulkcem Co. Ltd. That the Defendant engaged their services and they have been in that position ranging from 1 (one) to 14 (fourteen) years. Sometime in the course of its operations, the Defendant engaged the services of Labour Contractors to which it gave the administrative functions of an intermediary between her and the Claimants. The Labour Contractors were S. A. Hanny Nigeria Limited, and Manpower and Marine Management Services Limited. The Claimants averred that they were members of the National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber and Non-Metallic Products Employee and the Defendant is a member of the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers' Federation and accordingly bound by the conditions of service also contained in the memorandum of collective agreement entered into by the parties. Upon being relieved of their jobs in 2012, the defendants failed to pay the claimants their entitlements despite several demands. In the claimants’ final written address, counsel raised one issue for determination, thus: whether the claimants from the facts pleaded and evidence before the honourable court have established that they were employees or staff of the defendant to be entitled to the reliefs sought? Counsel submitted with respect to the issue above that, it is a settled principle of law that the standard of proof required in civil cases is proof on the balance of probabilities based on the preponderance of credible and cogent evidence. The burden of proof in a civil case is on the party who will lose if no evidence is adduced at all. See the cases of AWOFOLAJU vs. ADEDOYIN (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt 260) Page 492, and YUSUF vs. DORNIER AVIATION NIG LTD (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt 880) Page 1. In the case of AYOOLA vs. YAHAYA (200S) 7 NWLR (Pt 923) page 122, the court held thus: “In civil cases, the Standard of Proof is on the balance of probabilities and the burden of first proving the existence or non- existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regards however being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings. Cases are proved not by the number of witnesses called but by the quality of evidence produced in proof of the averments in the pleadings” In Paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Facts, the Claimants averred thus: “Further evidence shall be led to show that the Defendant had already engaged the services of many of the Claimants represented in this case long before 2002 when the concept of labour contractors was introduced. The Defendant issued Staff Identification Card to each Claimant as its staff. Claimants shall rely on the available identification cards issued to them by the Defendant to also prove the foregoing facts…” By this amendment, the Claimants pleaded the fact that a Staff Identification Card issued to each of them by the Defendant. Unfortunately, the Defendant did not file consequential denial to the said weighty issue introduced by that amendment. The implication therefore is that the Defendant admitted the facts as amended and by the function of pleadings, parties and the court are bound by it and it must be accepted as true. See CHARLIE vs. GUDI (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt 1017) page 91 at 95. The issue aforesaid which was introduced by the amendment apart from its not been challenged in the Statement of Defence of the Defendant, it was equally not shaken or contradicted by the Defendant under cross examination of Claimants' witnesses. It has been held in OGUNDIPE vs. A.G. KWARA STATE (1993) 8 NWLR (pt 313) page 558 that evidence which is not challenged nor controverted and is supported by the pleadings and by its nature not incredible leaves the trial judge with no option but to accept it and act on it. Counsel urged the court to accept the evidence of the Claimants on this point and act on same. Counsel stated that the court is entitled to believe and act on evidence that is uncontroverted or not effectively challenged during cross-examination. See also NWANKWO vs. ABAZIE (2003) 12 NWLR (pt 834) page 381. This is because where evidence is led by a party and there is no contrary evidence from the other party, the evidence is deemed to be true and accepted. See OKOEBOR vs. POLICE COUNCIL (2003) 12 NWLR (pt 834) page 444. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimants have established firstly by their pleadings which was not denied or traversed that they were employees or staff of the Defendant. Similarly, apart from pleading Staff Identification Cards issued to each of them by the Defendant, the available identification cards issued to them by the Defendant to prove the facts as pleaded were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits 'CA20(a) to (i)'. This evidence was not contradicted by the Defendant. The exhibit speaks for itself and in strengthening its probative and evidential value, the DWl Miss Loveth Aguwa who is an employee or staff of the Defendant on the 25/06/2015 testified under cross examination as follows: Question: One of your means of identification is that you are issued a staff 10 Card by the Defendant? Answer: Yes. Question: Other Staff are also issued with Staff ID Cards by the Defendant? Answer: Yes all Staff or employees are issued an ID Card by the Defendant." Counsel is of the opinion that this piece of evidence supports the case of the Claimants that they were employees or staff of the Defendant in view of the Exhibits 'CA20(a) to (i)' in evidence before the court. It is the law that evidence elicited from another party's witness under cross - examination forms part of the case for the party cross-examining. Therefore, where a counsel, by skilful application of the weapon of cross examination, is not only able to destroy the case for the other party, he can legitimately rely on such facts in establishing his own case. See AYOOLA vs. YAHAYA (2005) 7 NWLR (part 923) page 122. In this case, the Claimants also rely on the answers of the Defendant's witness to establish that they were staff of the Defendant. Counsel urged the court to hold again that the Claimants have established by evidence on record that they were employees or staff of the Defendant by cogent, credible and unchallenged evidence. Furthermore, it is a general practice that employers keep and maintain records of her staff or employees. By the written deposition of the DWl filed on the 17/03/2015, she alluded in paragraph 3 that the Claimants' claims are all unfounded and false. She stated under cross examination on the 25/06/2015 that the Claimant's names are not contained in the said list of their staff. She also admitted that the said records are not before the court. It is counsel’s submission that such records in the circumstances of this case constitute the bedrock of the Defendant's case and ought to have been tendered in this case for the court's inspection if the Defendant is to be believed. The court was urged by counsel to invoke Section 149(d) of the Evidence Act to presume that the said records would have been damaging to the Defendant's case. This is owing to the fact that the said records constitute the bedrock of the Defendant's case that the Claimants' claims are all unfounded and false. See NIGERIAN GAS CO. LTD. vs. DUDUSOLA (2005) 18 NWLR (pt. 957) p. 279. Similarly, it is the case of the Defendant that it has no employment relationship with the Claimants, that the Claimants were employees or staff of the Labour Contractors. (See paragraph 17 of the Statement of Defense filed on 28/10/2013 and DWl's evidence under cross examination on 25/06/2015). See also Exhibit 'CA18' i.e. letter of the Defendant in response to the Claimants’ Lawyer's letter. Also, counsel stated that the defendant admitted in paragraphs 18 of the Statement of Defence and Witness deposition of Miss Loveth Aguwa (DWl), thus: “That when the ownership of the company changed, a lot of re-organization took place which affected staff strength. Some affected staff approached the Defendant for certain gratuitous payments but when the Defendant failed to comply they consulted a lawyer who wrote to the Defendant demanding for the said payments.” Counsel submitted that from the testimony of the DWl under cross examination, the Staff referred to in the said paragraphs 18 of the Statement of Defense and Witness deposition of Miss Loveth Aguwa (DWl) are the Claimants. The law is trite that parties are bound by their pleadings. See CHARLIE vs. GUDI (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt 1017) page 91. A party cannot be allowed to move out of pleadings to make a case; as facts in pleadings not proved by evidence will not be given substance by the court. See ENEOLI vs. ORAEKWE (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt 961) page 342. It is also the opinion of counsel that the foregoing circumstances support the case of the Claimants that they were staff of the Defendant. He stated that the case of the Defendant is fraught with contradictions, with paragraph 17 of DW1's Deposition stating that the claimants were not the defendant’s staff; yet paragraph 18 of the same Deposition states they were staff. The Court of Appeal held in AJADI vs. AJIBOLA (2004) 16 NWLR (part 898) page 91 that a piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other affirms. It is counsel’s submission that the court cannot pick and choose which set of the witnesses' story to believe but to disbelieve them all together. The Defendant's case as shown in this paragraph is contradictory, unreliable and should be rejected accordingly. See the following cases of: 1. AJUDUA vs. NWOGU (NO.2) (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt 898) page 56, 2. UNIPETROL (NIG) PLC vs. ADIREJE (W.A.) LTD (2005) 14 NWLR (part 946) page 563 at 579. 3. NGIGE vs. OBI (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 999) page 1. Furthermore, in the event the court resolves the foregoing issue above in favour of the Claimants, according to Counsel, the Claimants' claims succeed on the following grounds, including: 1. The Defendant accordingly does not have defence to the claims of the Claimants. There are long lines of authorities to the effect that if there is nothing to put on the one side of the imaginary scale of justice, minimum evidence of the other side satisfies the requirement of proof. See BURAIMOH vs. BAMGBOSI (1989) 3 NWLR (pt 109) page 352, EGWA vs. EGWA (2007) 1 NWLR (pt 1014) page 71, and IBADAN LGPC vs OKUNADE (2005) 3 NWLR (pt 911) page 45. 2. The Claimants were members of the National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber and Non-Metallic Products Employee. The Claimants averred that the Defendant as result of the parties' relationship as employer and employees is a member of the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers' Federation and accordingly bound by the conditions of service also contained in the memorandum of collective agreement entered into by the parties. This was admitted by the Defendant (See Paragraph 9 of its Statement of Defence). Parties are bound by their pleadings. See CHARLIE vs. GUDI (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt 1017) page 91 and facts admitted need no further proof. See also N. A. S. LTD VS UBA PLC (2005) 14 NWLR (pt 945) p 421. 3. The Claimants’ sudden disengagement in 2012 was an unfair labour practice. This is owing to the fact that the defendant’s treatment of the claimants was contrary to the laid down rules and procedures as provided for under Section 20 of the Labour Act. In other words, the way and manner the Claimants were disengaged is questionable, unlawful and illegal upon which the court can also make an order of compensation or grant the reliefs sought. 4. The Nigeria Labour law frowns at or abhors unfair labour practices. It is unfair to hire or engage employees' services for periods ranging from 1 (one) to 14 (fourteen) years without proper employment or guarantee of steady employment. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to find for the Claimants by holding that they have satisfactorily and adequately discharged the onus of proof required of them to be entitled to their claims before the court. In the defendant's final address filed on the 28th day of October 2013 vide a motion for extension of time, counsel proposed the following issue for determination, as follows: Whether the claimants have proved their case against the Defendant in law and by a preponderance of credible evidence? In his argument on this issue, counsel submitted with respect to the claimant’s first relief that it is not in evidence that any of the Claimants was in the Defendant's employment at all or for 14 years. Again, there is nothing before the court upon which it will pronounce an employment willingly taken up by the claimants which they have not repudiated and which they have immensely benefited from, as “dehumanizing unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and tantamount to slavery”. It is counsel’s submission that an illegal contract is unenforceable. In other words, once the court reaches the conclusion that the employment is illegal and unlawful, it cannot go further to order any benefit to any of the parties in the instant case, for one is not expected to benefit from an illegality. More so, the Claimants having benefited from their said employment cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time by urging this court to declare their former employment as illegal and unlawful. The point was made by counsel that casual employment has not been outlawed in Nigeria as at 2002 when Claimants said they were disengaged by the Defendant. Consequently, this first relief has not been proved by the claimants. Counsel submitted with respect to the second relief that the identity cards tendered by the claimants as a proof of their employment were mere gate passes. A fact admitted by CW2, on 9th December, 2014 that the identity cards were gate passes issued to enable them enter the Defendant's premises and do their jobs. In addition to this, there is no document exhibited showing that any of the Claimants were employed directly by the Defendant. Instead, all the Claimants’ witnesses maintained that their employment was oral. Thus, mere possession of a company's identity card without more is not conclusive proof of employment; this is more so in the instant case where all the parties have agreed that the cards were mere gate passes. With the question of the Collective Agreement, counsel submitted that it has long been settled through a long line of cases that the relationship between employer and employee is governed or regulated by the service agreement or contract of service as the case may be, and not the collective agreement. See: 1. ACB NIG.LTD vs. NWODIKA (1996) 4 NWLR (pt. 443) 470; 2. UNION BANK OF NIG vs. EDET (1993) 4 NWLR (pt. 287) 288; 3. SHUAIBU vs. UNION BANK OF NIG. (1995) 4 NWLR (pt. 388) 173. It is counsel’s contention that an extraneous agreement not made by the parties to a contract of service cannot be made the basis of an action by an employee, unless it is incorporated into the contract of service agreement of such an employee. See CHUKWUMA vs. SPDC 91993} 4 NWLR (pt. 288) 512. In UNION BANK OF NIG vs. EDET (supra) @ page 291 the court held that “Collective agreements, except where they have been adopted as forming part of the terms of employment, are not intended to give, or capable of giving individual employees a right to litigate over an alleged breach of their terms as may be conceived by them to have affected their interest nor are they meant to supplant or even supplement their contract of service” In addition to the fore-going, the time of employment of the claimants as alleged by them range from the late 1990s to 2011. However, the collective agreement which they seek to enforce was made in 2006. Counsel argued that the claimants whose employments precede the making of the collective agreement cannot enforce it. His basis for this argument is the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (2001) 6 NWLR (pt. 708) 224. Also, it is counsel’s further contention that there is nothing before the court indicating that all the 120 claimants are in fact human beings and former staff of the Defendant's. On this basis, counsel urged the court to dismiss the case for being frivolous and gold-digging. Further, counsel stated that the evidence of the Claimants is that, they were employed by third party contractors and not by the Defendant. In fact, they said they were disengaged from direct relationship with the Defendant in 2002 when they were handed over to a third party contractor. It is trite, having since been settled that the court cannot compel an employer to retain any staff or former staff in so far as the termination is in consonance with the employer's terms of employment. There is no contention that any term or terms of their alleged employment was breached. Counsel submitted that the claimants have not proved anything against the defendant. Therefore the ground for the award of general damages does not exist and should be refused. In law an employer cannot be compelled to retain an unwanted employee, no form of wrong has been established on the side of the defendant to warrant the award of damages against it. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the instant case with costs. Court’s Decision Having heard learned counsels in their written addresses, it is my view that the sole issue to be determined in this suit is whether the claimants have proved their claims against the defendant. The claimants brought this suit for themselves and the disengaged casual and contract staff of the defendant. CW1 and CW2 are respectively the 1st and 3rd claimants on record while CW3 says he is one of the represented claimants. The evidence given by these witnesses are all the same. In their evidence, these witnesses said that the claimants represent more than 120 disengaged contract or casual staff of the defendant. They said that the defendant engaged them at various times as either casual or contract staff and they have served the defendant in those capacities for upward 1 year and 14 years. In the course of its operation, in 2002 the defendant engaged the services of Labour Contractors to take over its manpower supply. The labour contractors engaged by the defendant included S.A Hanny Nigeria Ltd and Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd to which the defendant transferred the administrative function of intermediary between the claimants and the defendant and payment of the staffs. Many of the claimants were directly engaged by the defendant and were already in the employ of the defendant before the 2002 Labour contactors’ arrangement. When the defendant engaged the Labour Contractors, the workforce of the defendant was distributed to the 3 labour contractors who documented the workers and issued them provisional employment letters. The witnesses identified the appointment letters of some of the claimants and they were admitted in evidence as Exhibits CA1 to CA5 and CA19. The witnesses also stated that by virtue of their employment, the claimants became members of the National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber and Non-metallic Products Employees. In 2006, a collective agreement dated 15th November 2006 was reached between the said Union and the Chemical and Non-metallic Products Employers Federation. In the agreement, conditions of service were spelt out. The defendant is a member of the Chemical and Non-metallic Products Employers Federation and it is bound by the collective agreement. However, what the claimants were being paid by the defendant was below what was prescribed in the collective agreement. The claimants wrote several letters to the defendant and the labour contractors on this account demanding for improved condition of service. In April 2012 however, the defendant barred the claimants from entering the premises without notice but told them verbally that they have been disengaged. The claimants wrote letters seeking audience with the defendant but the defendant rebuffed them in its reply. The witnesses further said that the claimants are entitled to sums from the defendant and in paragraph 15 of their respective depositions, proceeded to tabulate what each of the 114 staffs named therein, is entitled to. I have observed that the sums are calculated from the year of employment of each of the named staffs to the year of termination in 2012. Under cross examination, CW2 brought out some identity cards issued to some of the claimants by the defendant which were admitted in evidence as EXHIBITS CA20 (a) to (i). In his deposition filed alongside the amended statement of facts, CW3 referred to identity cards issued to the claimants by the defendant to establish the fact that they were employees of the defendant before their transfer to the labour contractors in 2002. He identified Exhibits CA20 (a) to (i). The witnesses concluded that the defendant has refused to pay the sums to them till date, hence their claims in this suit. Under cross examination, the claimants’ witnesses further gave the following evidence. CW1 said that his letter of employment was issued to him by S.A Hanny Nig Ltd. Exhibit CA1 is his first employment letter. He does not have any employment letter from the defendant to any of the claimants. They were not given employment letters. His first employment with S.A Hanny was in 2002. In 2006, he was employee of defendant but there was no formal transfer back to defendant. Between 2004 and 2006, he was with S.A Hanny. He is still a staff of S.A Hanny from 2012 till date but they have not been paying them salary. The office of his employer, S.A Hanny, is still running. When he was re-examined by the claimants counsel, CW1 said he was employed by the defendant in 2000 and in 2002, he was transferred from the defendant to S.A Hanny. On the other hand, CW2 said under cross examination that they were employed orally as casual staff by the defendant, some of them as far back as 1999. When they were employed, they were initially being paid in cash but later in 2000/2001, they were paid through their bank accounts. He said their appointments were not terminated before they were handed over to the labour contractors who gave them employment letters. On his part, CW3 said under cross examination that he was employed verbally by the defendant in 2001 that was why he was not given employment letter but after their employment, they were issued ID cards. This applied to all the 120 claimants. The transfer of staff from the defendant to the labour contractors was communicated to them verbally. They were gathered and distributed to the various labour contractors. He was assigned to S.A Hanny who gave appointment letters to those staff assigned to it. They were being paid through their bank accounts until 2012 when they were disengaged. The credit alerts did not say who was paying them. The defendant denied the claims of the claimants and called one Loveth Aguwa as its witness. The witness, DW1, introduced herself as the personnel officer of the defendant. She told this court that the defendant entered into contract with labour contractors for the provision of manpower but not that the defendant gave any administrative function of intermediary to such contractors or that the contractors were to take over the defendant’s manpower supply. There were agreements between the defendant and S.A Hanny Nig. Ltd and between the defendant and Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd. The defendant had no direct employment relationship with the claimants and had fulfilled its entire obligation to the labour contractors who employed the claimants. According to DW1, since the defendant has no employment relationship with the claimants or contractual obligation with them, the sums computed by the claimants is baseless and not founded on any agreement. DW1 tendered in evidence the contract for service agreements between the defendant and SA Hanny Nig Ltd and with Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd as Exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibits 3 to 14 also tendered by DW1 are letters written by SA Hanny Nig Ltd and with Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd. When she was cross examined by the claimants counsel, DW1 stated that the claimants are not employees of the defendant but employees of the labour contractors. The idea of Labour contractors started in 2002 for the labour contractors to supply workers to work in the defendant’s facility. Before the labour contractors, the defendant had employees working in the defendant company. The defendant pays the agreed sum to the labour contractors who in turn pay salaries to the workers. The claimants’ names are not contained in the record of the defendant’s employees. DW1 also said she was issued ID card as a means of identification and all employees of the defendant are issued ID cards. From the evidence adduced by the parties, one point that must be examined before any other thing can be looked at is whether the claimants are even employees of the defendant. This is because while the claimants say that they were employees of the defendant, although as casual or contract staff, the defendant says the claimants were not its employees. The whole foundation of the claims of the claimants against the defendant is the existence of a contract of employment between the parties. Therefore, the first task in determining the issue in this suit is to consider whether or not there was a service relationship between the parties. The claimants’ witnesses testified that the claimants were initially employed by the defendant but in 2002, the defendant engaged SA Hanny Nig Ltd and with Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd as labour contractors and transferred the claimants to these labour contractors. These labour contractors gave appointment letters to the claimants. Exhibits CA1 TO CA4 and CA19 are some of the appointment letters. The evidence of the claimants’ witnesses under cross examination further enlightens this court on their employment status. CW1 did tell this court that his letter of employment was issued to him by S.A Hanny Nig Ltd and there is no employment letter from the defendant to any of the claimants. His first employment with S.A Hanny was in 2002 and he is still a staff of S.A Hanny from 2012 till date. CW2 too said they were initially employed by the defendant who, in 2002 handed over to the labour contractors who gave them employment letters. CW3 said they were employed verbally by the defendant. They were gathered and distributed to the various labour contractors in 2002 and he was assigned to S.A Hanny who gave appointment letters to those staff assigned to it. The only appointment letters shown to this court are those marked Exhibits CA1, CA2, CA3 CA4 and CA19. Exhibits CA1, CA2 and CA3 are provisional employments issued to the 1st claimant by SA Hanny Nig. Ltd. They are dated different periods between 2002 and 2004. Exhibit CA19 is the 3rd claimant’s appointment letter by the same SA Hanny dated 30th April 2002. These employment letters contain conditions of service such as remuneration, insurance, offences for dismissal, mode of termination and other covenants. Exhibit CA4 is the provisional appointment letter one Ebenezer Ebenezer issued to him by Manpower and Marine Management Services Ltd. It is dated 1st May 2007. It reads in its first and second paragraphs thus- “We are pleased to offer you employment as a worker in Portharcourt sack department under our contract for provision of labour for Eastern Bulkcem Company Limited, Rumuolumeni site with effect from may 1st 2007. Your wage shall be calculated on hourly rate of seventy five naira (N75.00) per hour. You are required to work 8 normal hours, overtime shall be paid for extra hour worked at the same hourly rate. Your monthly remuneration shall be computed based on approved time sheet showing days you have worked” It must be mentioned that the claimants’ witnesses said all the claimants were given similar appointment letters by the labour contractors. It thus implies that the same terms and conditions as set out above were contained in the appointment letters of all the claimants. From the evidence of the claimants’ witnesses, it is clear to me that they were casual staff of the defendant until 2002 when their service was transferred to the labour contractors who engaged them and gave them employment letters containing conditions of service. The employment letters have the effect of a contract between the claimants and the labour contractors. DW1 also put Exhibits 3 to 11, 13 and 14 in evidence. These were written by either SA Hanny or Manpower in respect of Melody Afam Onyebuenyi, Pricillia Ogbona, Mrs Annet Agge, Godwin Titus, Queen Ajinda, Ndubisi Moses, Solomon Ikere, Samuel Korka, Evarestus Enyielu, Vincent Enyielu, Endurance Wohuruche describing these persons as their staff and requesting the defendant’s assistance for them or informing the defendant of replacements. I find some of these names in the names of the claimants pleaded in paragraph 15 of the amended statement of facts. Now, the claimants did not show any employment letters from the defendant. In fact, the claimants’ witnesses said the defendant did not give them employment letters but employed them orally. The only evidence of a relationship with the defendant is the ID cards in Exhibit CA20. I have taken a look at the ID cards and I find that they were issued In August 2001 and described the holders’ position as “casual”. That is to say, the ID cards were given to the claimants by the defendant before their appointment by the labour contractors. From the moment the labour contractors took over the claimants and issued them appointment letters specifying terms and conditions of the employment, whatever relationship existed between the claimants and the defendant ceased. The claimants became employees of labour contractors, even though they continued to work in the defendant company. In their evidence, the claimants’ witnesses said their services were not transferred back to the defendant before the termination of their employment in 2012. That means between 2002 and 2012, they were not employees of the defendant. The claimants cannot have appointment letter from the labour contractors and claim to remain employees of the defendant. This is because they cannot be employees of both defendant and labour contractors at the same time. The ID cards they relied on as evidence of their employment by the defendant alone is not enough evidence that they were employees of the defendant. They must go further to show the terms and condition of their employment with the defendant which they have failed to do. The fact that the ID cards were even issued to the claimants before their appointment by the labour contractors in 2002, makes it more probable that their employer from 2002 was the labour contractors rather than the defendant. From all the facts available before this court, this court finds that the claimants became employees of the labour contractors in 2002. They remained employees of the labour contractors up till 2012 when their employments were terminated. In effect, the claimants ceased to be employees of the defendant since 2002. Having so found, it stands to reason whether the claimants can pursue the reliefs they seek in this case against the defendant. The duty of the court in issues of this nature is limited to interpreting the contract of employment entered between the parties but never to create a contract for the parties were none existed. See OCEANIC BANK INT’L LTD vs. UDUMEBRAYE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 430) 769. There being no contract of employment between the claimants and the defendant, I cannot now create one for them by granting the reliefs sought by the claimants. It is my view that in the absence of an employment relationship between the parties, then no right has accrued to the claimants which are enforceable against the defendant. As I see it, the claimants’ claims are bound to fail. Assuming, without so holding, there was an employment relationship between the parties, I do not think the reliefs sought by the claimants can still be granted. In reliefs 1 and 3 of the amended statement of facts, the claimants wants this court to make a declaration that their continual engagement by the defendant as casual or contract staff without proper employment is unlawful and for this court to make an order compelling the defendant to reinstate and regularize their employment in the form of proper and steady employment. What the claimants are seeking in reliefs 1 and 3 is for this court to compel the defendant to reinstate them and upgrade them from casual or contract staff. Can the court declare to the defendant the status to ascribe to the claimants or compel the defendant to employ or reinstate the claimants? I think not. If at all there was a relationship between the parties, it can only be one of master and servant. In such a relationship, the court can neither force an employee on an employer nor dictate to the employer the position the employee should occupy. For the court to compel an employer to employ a particular person or make a declaration as to what position or status an employee should occupy is to unwittingly interfere in the internal administration of the employee. Such matters are essentially within the province of the employer and courts do not interfere in it. See SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT vs. NWAWKA (2001) FWLR (Pt. 48) 1363 at 1383. The claimants also want this court to compel the defendant to pay them “proper monthly salaries, allowances and bonuses as from their respective dates of engagement to the date of judgment in this case in terms with the memorandum of collective agreement between the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers Federation, and the National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic Products Employees”. In their evidence, the claimants’ witnesses said they are members of National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber and Non-metallic Products Employees while the defendant is a member of Chemical and Non-metallic Products Employers Federation. In 2006, the National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber and Non-Metallic Products Employees and the Chemical and Non-Metallic Products Employers Federation entered into a collective agreement dated 15th November 2006, which document is in evidence as Exhibit CA6, wherein conditions of service were spelt out. The defendant has however failed to pay them what was prescribed in the collective agreement, hence, they claim from the defendant, payment of the accumulated entitlements. I decided to review the claimants’ evidence on their 2nd relief to emphasise their basis for the claim. From the wordings of the relief and the evidence, the claimants sought the payments referred to in the relief on the basis of a collective agreement between National Union of Chemical Footwear, Rubber and Non-metallic Products Employees and Chemical and Non-metallic Products Employers Federation. It is settled law that collective agreements between employees unions and employers associations are not intended or capable of giving individual employees right to litigate over an alleged breach of their terms as may be conceived by them to have affected their interest nor are they meant to supplant or even supplement their contract of service. Failure to act in strict compliance with collective labour agreement is not justiciable except its provisions have been expressly adopted either in the letter of appointment or in subsequent communication varying the terms of employment before the employee can enforce its content against the employer. See RECTOR, KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC vs. ADEFILA (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 431) 914 at 958-959; BANK OF THE NORTH LTD vs. ADEGOKE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 398) 263 at 289; OGUEJIEFOR vs. SIEMENS LTD. (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 398) 378 at 390; ANAJA vs. UBA (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 600) 1289 at 1300. In this case, the claimants didn’t show any employment letter from the defendant adopting the collective agreement neither did they show that the defendant adopted the provisions of the collective agreement as part of their condition of service in any other communication. In fact, the claimants’ witnesses said the defendant refused to comply with the content of the collective agreement. That is to say the defendant did not, either expressly or impliedly, adopt it. It is thus obvious that the essentials that could give the right to the claimants to litigate on the alleged breach of the terms of the collective agreement have not been shown. The collective agreement on its own does not serve any useful purpose in a claim to enforce its terms without relating it to the letter of employment or other document containing conditions of service of the employment. In either of the angles I have examined this case; I find that the claimants have not proved their case against the defendant. Without wasting any more time on the matter, this suit is hereby dismissed. Both parties are to bear their cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge