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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: November 17, 2015 SUIT NO: NICN/OW/109/2014 Between Ugochukwu Temple Nwachukwu - Claimant And 1. The Governor of Abia State 2. The Head of Service Abia State 3. The Civil Service Commission, Abia State Defendants 4. The Attorney General of Abia State Representation: U. T. Nwachukwu for the Claimant C. Ogwo, Assistant Chief State Counsel Ministry of Justice Abia State, for the Defendants RULING The claimant’s claims as endorsed on the complaint filed on the 1st day of December 2014 are as follows: 1. A declaration that the Claimant is still in the employment of the Government of Abia State by virtue of the Establishment Circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 of September 10, 2014 and that the refusal or neglect of the Defendants to re-instate him is wrongful illegal and unlawful. 2. A declaration that the purported retirement of the Claimant pursuant to the Abia State Circular No. HAS/S.0074/11/91 of August 1, 2011 is null and void having been superseded, abrogated modified or amended by Circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 of September 10, 2014. 3. An Order directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant his full salary of the sum of N352, 000.00 (Three Hundred and Fifty Two Thousand Naira) as director from the 1st day of January, 2012 till his statutory retirement age of 35 years or 60 years. 4. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to 100% computation of his gratuity as Director on Salary Grade Level 17 Step 9. 5. A declaration that the Claimant is also entitled to 100% computation of his Monthly Pension as Director on Salary Grade Level 17 Step 9. 6. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to be paid his Severance Allowance of 300% of his annual salary for the premature termination of his career and service and for loss of expectation. By a motion on notice filed on 24th August, 2015, brought pursuant to Order 3 Rule 1(3) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the claimant/applicant prayed the court for the following orders: (a) Granting leave to the claimant to amend his complaint, list of documents and statements of facts in the manner shown in the underlined paragraphs in the complaint, list of documents and statements of facts attached herewith as Exhibits A, B and C, respectively. (b) Granting leave to the claimant to re-swear his witness deposition in the manner shown in the underlined paragraphs in the witness deposition attached herewith as Exhibit D. (c) Deeming the amended complaint, list of documents, statements of facts and witness deposition already filed as properly filed. In support of the motion is a 9 paragraph affidavit, upon which counsel placed reliance. In the accompanying written address, the claimant’s counsel referred to Order 3 Rule 1(3) of the Rules of this Court which states that: “claimant may alter, modify or extend the claim without any amendment of the endorsement on the Complaint: provided that the Claimant may not completely change the cause of action endorsed on the Complaint without amending it". Counsel submitted that an application for amendment is a party’s right to enable him present his case in the way it appears best to him once it does not occasion injustice to the other party. See U.B.N. Plc vs. Dafiaga (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt.640) 175; Aigbe vs. Erhabor (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt.557) 255. It is settled that unless a respondent to an application for amendment has can establish prejudice, unnecessary expense, irreparable inconvenience or lack of good faith, the court is free to grant an amendment. He referred to the cases of: 1. Shell B.P Dev. Co. Ltd vs. Jammal Engineering (Nig.) Ltd. (1974) 4 SC 33; 2. Ogidi vs. Egba (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 621); 3. Chief of Defence Staff vs. Adhekegba (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 332, 364-365. Counsel referred further to the case of Amanso vs. Registered Trustees of Deliverance Temple Church (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1170) 207, 215 where the Court of Appeal summarized the principles in this area of law like this: “In a judicial proceeding a party's case must be presented in consonance with the pleadings predicated on the originating process in spite of the detection of errors of omission and/or commission or new and more material facts. Amendments checkmate injustice that may result from the principle that parties and indeed the courts are bound by the pleadings and amendments are necessary for the purpose of identifying the real issues in controversy between the parties.” See also Ojah & Ors. vs. Ogboni & Ors. (1976) 1 NMLR 95. It is the argument of counsel, that although the grant or denial of an amendment is subject to the judicial and judicious exercise of the discretion of the court, a plethora of cases seem to indicate that the courts tend to err on the side of caution and will allow amendment unless it will entail injustice to the respondent or the application for amendment is brought in bad faith. See the cases of: Ojah & Ors. vs. Ogboni & Ors. (supra); Tildesley vs. Harper (1878) 10 CH. D 393, 396; Oguntimehin & Ors vs. Gubere (1964) 1 All NlR 176; Amadi vs. Thomas Aplin & Co. Ltd (1972) 1 All NLR 409. From the above arguments, counsel urged the court to grant the amendments as prayed. In opposition to the claimant’s application, counsel for the defendants filed a written address on 23/9/2015, wherein Counsel stated that the instant application is not one to be granted readily by the Court. The amendments sought for by the Claimant/Applicant are allegedly to have happened or taken place after the instant suit has been filed (16/04/2015 and 21/04/2015). Ordinarily, it should be a different cause of action, which cannot be brought into life through this amendment sought by the Claimant/Respondent. He referred the court to the English case of Eshelby vs. Federated European Ltd (1931) All ER 840 at 844, paragraphs D-H where it was stated thus: The Court has amended the Statement of claim which is endorsed upon the writ, but it has not amended the writ itself; and indeed, it could not have done so, because in order to make this action on the second instalment one that which would come within the writ, the date of the writ would have had to be altered from Nov.,27 1930, upon which it was served to some date after Jan. 15, 1931. I do not think the Court could possibly alter the writ in that way. It could not make an amendment to say that the writ had not issued until some date after Jan., 15 1931. It seems to me, therefore that this amendment ought never to have been made, and that this judgment, so far as it is for than the £471.65 which was originally claimed, is bad and must be set aside. The first point which has been discussed arose during the hearing by the official referee. In spite of vigorous protests made on behalf of the defendants, who wanted no such amendment, he amended the claim by allowing the plaintiff to add a claim for the second instalment under the contract, which was due on Jan. 15, 1931. By March 1931, that in statement under the contract had become due, and so he said. "We will try the case as though the two in statements were due at the date of that writ". But they were not, and so what he did in fact, against the will of the defendants was to make an amendment which related to a cause of action which did not exist at the date when the writ was issued. It has been argued that he had power to do this, but it is perfectly plain that in Tottenham Local of Health vs. Lea Conservancy Board (1886) 2 TLR 410; Digest 20,157, the Court was very clear as to the impropriety of amendments of this sort being made and he said he “had a very strong opinion that the amendment should not be allowed, in as much as it related to a cause of action which did not exist at the time when the writ was issued”. Counsel argued that the documents pleaded in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the proposed statement of claim dated August 24th, 2015 were published on April, 21st, 2015. The time for redress of these documents were published on April, 16th 2015. The instant motion for amendment was filed on the 24th day of August, clearly in breach of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State. Therefore, the court is barred from allowing the Claimant/Applicant from using this application to incorporate an action that is statute barred. In support of this position, Counsel referred to United Bank of Nigeria Plc vs. Abdullahi (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 807) 359 at 378-38, paragraphs H-B, where it was held: “The 10 years period of limitation time expired on 25th May 1988 if the respondent is desirous of instituting an action in respect of time barred remedy he no longer has the right of action. He could not introduce it surreptitiously by amending the writ as well as pleading in an existing suit in order to give validity to an otherwise dead or stale cause of action. In this connection, the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition at Pg.200 said: “A plaintiff will not be allowed to amend his pleadings to introduce a cause of action which is barred by the statute at the time of attempted amendment…The court will refuse to allow a writ to be amended by the addition of a party when the effect of the amendment will be to defeat the operation of the statute.” See also Civil Procedure in Nigeria by Fidelis Nwadialo at page 385. It is the opinion of counsel that the amendment sought by the claimant’s counsel, is devoted entirely to an attempt to over reach the Defendants/Respondents. See the cases of: 1. Mabro vs. Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Co. Ltd (1932) ANER 441 at 412 2. Marshal vs. London Passenger Transport Board (1936) 3 All ER 83 at 86-87 3. Hall vs. Meyrick (1957) 2 All ER 722 at 728, paragraphs A-G. From the foregoing, counsel urged the court to dismiss the Motion on Notice of the Claimant/Applicant for amendment. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on the 24th day of August 2015, and brought Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State (2005) and Order 11 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules as amended by Paragraph 5(3) of the NIC practice direction 2012, the defendants sought for an order dismissing this suit for being statute barred. The grounds upon which the application was brought are: a. That this suit was brought outside of the time limited by Section 2(a) of the public officers protection law of Abia State (2005). b. That this suit is incompetent as the Claimant no longer has a right of Action. c. That this suit is incompetent and this honourable court cannot assume jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. In the written address filed on 23/9/2015, in support of motion of preliminary objection raised by the defendants; counsel raised one issue for determination, thus: Whether the Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Suit by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap 140, Laws of Abia State 2005 Counsel in his argument cited the Supreme Court case of Egbe vs. Adefarasin (1987) 18 NSCC 1 at 17; (1987) ANLR 1 at 20; wherein the court disclosed how a statute barred action is known, thus: “how does one determine the period of limitation- the answer is simple by looking at the writ of summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is statute barred.” It was held further that: “However meritorious the other issues in the appeal might be, if the action was barred by statue, no amount of report to the merits of the Appellant's contention will serve to keep the action in being.” Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law Provides: Where any action/ prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuable or execution of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect. a. The action/ prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act; neglect complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury; within three next after the ceasing there of: In Onuorah vs. Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co. ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 at 408, paragraphs C-E, it was held that: “It is settled law that the order to determine the claim before the court and consequently entertain the action, it is necessary to have recourse to the writ of summons and the Statement of Claim…and not on the Defendant's Statement of defence.” Following this rule above, counsel referred the Court to paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Statement of Claim of the Claimant which clearly shows that the cause of action arose on 17th October, 2012, particularly Reliefs 14(a), (b), (c), (f). This action instituted by the Claimant is an offence to the above- mentioned provisions. In the case of Sani vs. Okene Local Government Traditional Council (2008) 34(2) NSCQR 979 at 990, paragraphs A-B, the Supreme Court in giving direction on how a statute barred action is determined, stated thus:- “I take the second issue. The cause of action in this matter arose on 15th January, 1998 when the respondents served a letter on the appellant removing him from office as a member of the Okene Local Government Traditional Council. The Appellant filed the action on 11th June, 1998, a period of more than four months when the cause of action arose.” The Court further in discountenancing the need to pry into or inquire about the facts or merits of the case stated thus at 991 paragraphs A-C: “At this stage, the Court cannot go unto the merit or demerit of the case, hence it cannot determine whether or not the defendants acted outside the colour of their office or outside their statutory or constitutional duties. I entirely agree with the learned trial judge. The issue before the Court was whether the action was statute barred or not; and that involved calculation of months and days. The learned trial judge did the calculation and came to the conclusion that the action was statute barred” See also Nasir vs. Civil Service Commission Kano State & 2 Ors (2010) 41 (1) 267 at 289, paragraphs A-C. With respect to the assertion on the circular document titled “RETIREMENT POLICY BASED ON TENURE OF OFFICE RE: LAW OFFICERS IN ABIA STATE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE” signed by one G.C. Adiele, Esq dated September 10, 2014 and the alleged doctrine of the relation-back, in paragraphs 9 of the statement of claim and 9 and 10 of the written deposition, counsel referred the court to the case of Sosa vs. Ekpo (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt 693) 16 at 30, paragraphs B-D, where it was held that the repeal of an enactment cannot affect the previous operation of the enactment. See also the cases of Lipede vs. Sonekan (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt 374) 668, Bakare vs. Nigerian Railway Corporation (2007) 32 NSCQR 176 at 215 para. G. Counsel argued that an enactment or circular shall not be construed with retrospective effect unless the language of the circular says so. It is not presumed or implied as it is not a letters of administration granted by the probate Division of the High Court where the doctrine of the relation-back operates. Based on the above arguments and cases cited, counsel urged the court to dismiss the instant suit. In the written address filed on 28/9/2015 in opposition to the preliminary objection, claimants’ counsel distilled one issue for determination, thus: “Whether this suit is statute barred.” Counsel submitted that the defendants’ argument that the instant suit is statute barred in breach of the Public Officers Protection Act because it was filed over three (3) months after the cause of action in this case arose on 17th October, 2012. Counsel argued that the publication of September 10 2014 has no bearing on the cause of action. He argued that in arriving at the decision that a case is statute barred, the court has to have recourse to all the documents, pleadings, contracts, judgments and all materials affecting legal relations construed as a whole. See Babale vs. Eze (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1257) 48, Abubakar vs. Nasamu (No.2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 523, Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil & Allied Products Ltd (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 362) 1855 at 1888 para C - D. More so, the statement of claim read as a whole evinces that this cause of action arose on 10th September 2014 when the circular of that date was published. The cause of action is the refusal to re-instate and not the retirement. In response to paragraph 1.4 of the written address of the defendants, counsel submitted such argument is an invitation to the court, at this interlocutory application, to delve into issues that arise in the substantive suit for resolution. Again, the circular of 10th September 2014 upon which this suit is hoisted is not an enactment or a subsidiary legislation. Thus, the doctrine against retrospective construction contained in Section 6 of the Interpretation Act does not apply to it. The legislation governing retirements in Abia State is the Pensions’ Law of that State. The circular of 10th September 2014 did not purport to be made under the Pensions’ Law of Abia State. It could not have been so made because it is only the House of Assembly that can amend that law. The Head of Service cannot competently amend the Pensions Law. It is counsel’s contention that the defendants counsel’s argument that the doctrine against retrospective construction applies to the notice or circular of 10th September 2014 is without legal foundation. It is owing to the fact that, only an enactment published pursuant to the Pensions Law that can pass as a subsidiary legislation for which Section 6 of the Interpretation Act can apply. Again, the doctrine of relation-back is not limited to administration of estate. It is a principle of our jurisprudence that, except in cases of enactments and legislations all amendments take effect both prospectively and retrospectively. Counsel referred to the following cases: 1. Vulcan Gases Ltd vs. G.F Industries AG (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 610, 2. Mobil Oil Nig Ltd vs. Yusuf (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1304) 47, 57, 3. Bello vs. INEC 2010 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 342, 385 A-B, 4. Rotimi vs. Macgregor (1994) 11 SC 113, 5. Oseyomon vs. Ojo (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 344. Counsel stated that if the circular is held to be an enactment or statutory instrument, the preliminary objection is bound to fail for the reason that a suit to interpret legislations cannot be statute barred because legislations are living documents which can be challenged at any time as long as it is in force. In the case of Obi - Akejule vs. Delta State Government (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1170) 292, the Court of Appeal said: "In any event, litigation on the interpretation of constitutional provisions cannot in my humble view be statute barred. If a law is contrary to the provisions of the constitution, I think it can be challenged at any time. In Plateau State Government of Nigeria v. A-G., Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) pg. 346, the Supreme Court held that issues relating to the interpretation of the constitution which is a living document are serious issues. There can be no limitation in my view to the challenge of the validity of any legislation as any law and indeed the Constitution is a living document and as long as it is in force; its validity can be challenged". From the foregoing, counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection and proceed to hear the suit on its merits. It is shown in the foregoing synopsis of the written addresses of the counsels to the parties that two applications are involved in this ruling. They are the defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection and the claimant’s motion for the amendment of his processes. Having carefully considered the applications, I will determine the defendants Notice of Preliminary Objection first. In the defendants Notice of Preliminary Objection, the defendants have urged this court to dismiss the claimant’s suit for being statute barred by reason of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia State 2005. In his written address, the learned Assistant Chief State Counsel for the defendants, C. Ogwo Esq., referred this court to paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the claimant’s statement of claim and argued that from the facts in the said paragraphs, the claimant’s cause of action arose on 17th October 2012. Counsel further submitted that taking the date the claimant’s suit was filed into consideration, the suit has become statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia State 2005. On his part, the position of the claimant’s counsel, David Onyeike Esq., in his written address in opposition to the preliminary objection, is that the claimant’s suit is not statute barred because from the reliefs sought by the claimant and the facts of his case, the claimant’s cause of action arose on the publication of circular No: HAS/EST/RR/222/16 on 10th September 2014. The said Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia State, under which the defendants brought this objection, provides- “Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or any public duty or authority, in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, Duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained or, or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The above provision of the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia State is in pari material with Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. It has been judicially held that the effect of the provision is that any action against any public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty of authority the or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act or law, duty or authority, must be commenced within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury in which the complainant must institute the action within 3 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. It is the law that actions not instituted within the prescribed 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action are statute barred and can no longer be entertained by the courts. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 417) 155 at 182. There is no dispute in this application that the defendants are public officers and they have been sued in this action in respect of their refusal to re-instate the claimant to service after circular No: HAS/EST/RR/222/16 was published. The facts are clear that the defendants were sued in respect of an alleged default in the execution of their public duty and authority. It appears to me therefore that the defendants can seek to take protection under the Law. The question, however, is whether the claimant filed this suit against the defendants within 3 months from the date his cause of action arose? In order to determine whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred, there is the need to determine when the cause of action arose and when this suit was filed. There appears to be no dispute as to when the suit was filed. It is clear from the record that the suit was filed on 1st December 2014. The area of disagreement between the parties is the date the claimant’s cause of action arose. While the defendants contend that the cause of action arose on 17th October 2012, the claimant maintains that his cause of action arose on 10th September 2014. There is need at this point to examine the claimant’s pleading in order to discover what his cause of action was and the time the cause of action arose. The claimant made the following averments in the statement of claim- “4. The claimant avers that on the 1st day of August, 2011, the 2nd Defendant acting for the other defendants published circular No. HAS/S.0074/11/91 of the same date directing inter alia that ‘all serving permanent secretaries, Head of Non-Ministerial Departments and Directors who would have spent eight (8)years or more on the post by 1st December, 2011,the effective date of this provision, are hereby notified for the purpose of commencing their pre-retirement activities, when due. 5. The claimant in concert with other affected directors petitioned the Defendants by his letter dated 26th October, 2011, titled “Re: Retirement of Directors from Service: Exemption of Legal Directors from Ministry of Justice “which petition the Defendants spurned. 6. Based on the above circular, the 2nd Defendant purported to retire the Claimant from service by his letter dated Ref No. HAS/EST/RR/113/V.1/T8/210 dated 17th October, 2012 with the commencement date from 1st January, 2012. 7. On the 10th September, 2014, the 2nd Defendant by his letter ref No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 of the same date amended or rescinded the tenure policy of eight years for the solicitor General/Permanent Secretary and Directors who are Law officers in Abia State Ministry of Justice. 8. The Claimant shall show that in law all amendment, modification or alteration are construed retrospectively on the doctrine of relation back. 9. Based on the doctrine of relation back, the Claimant on the 24th day of November 2014 by his letter of the same date requested the permanent secretary Ministry of Justice of the 4th Defendant to allocate a department to him and pay all his arrears of salary with effect from the date of that of that failed retirement which request the 4th defendant spurned. 10. The claimant shall show that even if established circular No. HAS/S.0074/11/91 of August 1, 2011 was not rescinded the same was ultra vires the powers of the Defendants under the Pension Law of Abia State and Abia State Harmonization Law. 11. The Defendants had no power in law to retrospectively alter the terms of the terms of employment contract as the right of the Claimant had become vested at the time of the publication of the circular 12. The Defendant’s refusal to reinstate or re-absorb the claimant is wrongful and unlawful.” From these facts, it is apparent that the claimant’s complaint in this matter is about the refusal of the defendants to re-instate him after circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 dated 10th September, 2014 was published. See particularly the averments in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 12 of the statement of claim. The claimant had been retired when on 10th September, 2014 Circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 was published wherein the policy of eight years tenure for the solicitor General/Permanent Secretary and Directors who are Law officers in Abia State Ministry of Justice was rescinded. It was on the basis of that circular the claimant filed this suit claiming, in the main, “a declaration that the claimant is still in the employment of the Government of Abia State by virtue of Establishment Circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16 dated 10th September, 2014 and that the refusal or neglect of the defendant’s to re-instate him is wrongful, illegal and unlawful.”. The dispute is this action, as I see it, is the refusal of the defendant’s to reinstate the claimant despite circular No. HAS/EST/RR/222/16. I therefore agree with the position of the claimant’s counsel that the claimant’s cause of action is the defendants’ failure to re-instate the claimant and not the retirement itself. It is clear from the facts that the claimant’s cause of action arose from the date of the publication of the said circular which is on 10th September 2014. Since the claimant’s case is founded on the circular, he was expected to commence this suit against the defendants within 3 months from the date of the circular. The period from the date of the circular, that is 10/9/2014, and the date of filing of this suit, that is 1/12/2014, is a period of 2 months 20 days. This period is less than 3 months. It thus implies that the claimant filed this suit within 3 months from the date his cause of action arose. I find that the suit is not statute barred. Therefore, the Notice of Preliminary Objection has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. I can now consider the claimant’s motion. The claimant seeks the leave of this court to amend the Complaint, the statement of facts, list of documents and the witness deposition. The reasons for seeking the amendment are stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit in support of the motion as follows- a. The reference numbers and dates of the documents front loaded to the suit were wrongly typed b. The defendants have published fresh circulars to undermine this suit. c. The reference numbers and dates on the list of documents frontloaded to the suit were wrongly typed. The defendants did not file a counter affidavit to dispute the facts deposed in the affidavit in support of the motion. Annexed to the affidavit as Exhibits A, B, and D are copies of the processes to be amended reflecting the proposed amendments. The paragraphs of the processes which are to be amended were even underlined. In the Complaint (Exhibit A), two new reliefs were added as numbers 3 and 4 while in the statement of claim (Exhibit B), paragraphs 3, 14 and reliefs 15 (a) and (b) were amended while paragraph 10 contain fresh facts. In paragraphs 3 (b) of the supporting affidavit, it is deposed that one of the reasons for seeking the amendment is that after this suit was filed, new circulars were published by the defendants. From the totality of the amendment sought, it is observed that it is the fact of this new circulars that form the additional reliefs 3 and 4 in the proposed amended Complaint and also constitute the proposed amendments to reliefs (a) and (b) and paragraph 10 of the statement of claim. Generally, courts have the inherent powers to allow amendments to pleadings of the parties at any stage of the proceedings. The exercise of this power to allow amendment is at the discretion of this court which discretion is to be exercised in favour of doing justice in each particular case. See IGWE vs. KALU (2002) FWLR (Pt. 97) 677 at 712. The principle has been emphasised that the court will normally not grant leave to amend where- i. The application for amendment is made mala fide, ii. If it will entail injustice to the respondent, iii. The proposed amendment will cause undue delay or is irrelevant or useless or merely raises a technical point, iv. The amendment has done some injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated for by cost, v. The application is designed to overreach the respondent, vi. The amendment will result in a party being confronted with an entirely new case at an extremely late stage of the trial or is in conflict with the evidence already given in the trial. See AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 658; IGWE vs. KALU (SUPRA) at 717; LAMBU vs. ISYAKAU (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 640) 1295 at 1329-1331 I have looked at the proposed amendments to the processes and it seems to me that none of the circumstances for refusing amendment is present in the application. No counter affidavit was filed by the defendants so the defendants have not alleged that the amendment is malafide or that it will prejudice their case. The defendants have not even filed a defence yet so the issues of overreaching or causing injustice to the defendants do not come to play. The defendants counsel merely filed a written address where he made arguments opposing the grant of the amendments sought. The Learned Assistant Chief State Counsel’s main grouse is that the amendment sought cannot be granted because it relates to facts which happened after this suit has been commenced. According to him, the amendment sought constitutes a new cause of action which cannot be incorporated into this suit by way of amendment of the complaint. The introduction of the fact of the new circulars, although a fact which came to being after this suit was filed, is a fact on the same cause of action as disclosed on the complaint and statement of facts sought to be amended. The amendment flows from the same set of circumstance giving rise to the facts already before this court. The amendment is not a new cause of action neither does it change the character of the claimants’ case. In such a situation, an amendment is permissible. In IREPODUN-IFELODUN L.G vs. BALEMO (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 420) 708 it was held that where an amendment relates to facts which arose out of the same set of facts or transaction, it would be desirable to incorporate it into the original suit so as to be tried and the issues in controversy determined at once. Per AGUBE JCA, relying on the Supreme Court in decision in FOKO vs. FOKO 1968 NMLR 441, held at pages 732-733 as follows: “…a trial court would be within its power to grant an amendment even if to do so would be to add to the existing cause of action or substitute therefore a new cause provided that the additional or the new cause arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as the cause of action in respect of which the plaintiff has already claimed relief.” See also OGUMA ASSOCIATED CO. LTD. vs. I.B.W.A LTD (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 658. In this case, the amendment sought is in respect of the same cause of action already before the court. The defendants have not shown any reason why the amendment should be refused. In any case, it is the law that an amendment should be granted for the purpose of determining the real questions or issues in controversy between the parties. The amendment sought by the claimant in this application is only to enable the claimant put before this court the whole facts of his case so as to avoid a possible multiplicity of suits. In my view therefore, the amendment should be allowed. Accordingly, the claimant’s application is granted. Leave is granted to the Claimant to amend his processes and re-swear the witness deposition. Consequently, it is ordered that clean copies of the processes hereby amended shall be filed in the registry of this Court within 7 days from today. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge