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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ABUJA Before His Lordship: HON. JUSTICE O. A. SHOGBOLA JUDGE Date:18TH FEBRUARY, 2015 Suit No. NICN/ABJ/195/2012 BETWEEN 1. MONDAY GOODHEAD OKPARA CLAIMANTS 2. BANKONG AUGUSTINE ODOK 3. FRANCIS OYONG EKPANG AND 1.THE FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY COMMISSION DEFENDANTS 2. THE CORPS MARSHAL, FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS 3. FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS REPRESENTATION Idris Abubakar Esq with M. I. Talle Esq and Khoni Bobai (Miss) for the Claimants. N. I. Okpor Esq with Princewill Ebere Esq, Laura Esuka Esq and Linda Egbule Esq for the Defendants. JUDGMENT The claimants commenced this suit by way of a complaint dated and filed on 10th July, 2012 wherein they claim against the defendants as follows:- a. A Declaration that the purported termination of appointment of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, claimants is unlawful, unconstitutional, illegal, invalid, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. b. An Order of this Honourable Court directing and compelling the defendants jointly and or severally whichever is applicable and or appropriate to reinstate the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd claimants and to also restore all their lost rights, benefits and privileges, such as salaries, promotion, etcetera. c. Any other order(s) this Honourable Court deems fit to make in the circumstances of this case. Attached to the complaint are the joint statement of facts, witnesses statement on Oath, list of witnesses and list of document’s to be relied upon. The defendants filed a memorandum of appearance dated and filed on 12th September, 2014. Thereafter by a Motion on Notice granted the defendants filed and served their defence and other accompanying process. Later the defendants filed the witness statement on Oath. The matter went on trial, the 2% claimants testified and tendered Exhibits while the defendants called five witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial parties filed their final written addresses. In adopting their joint final addresses, the learned counsel for the defendants formulated two issues for the determination of the Honourable Court as follows:- 1. Whether the trial and termination of the claimants’ appointment was not done in accordance with the Federal Road Safety Commission Establishment Act 2007 and the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulation, maintenance of discipline rules 2005. 2. Whether the apprehension and confessional statement made by the claimants to collection of bribe from Motorists was one done under duress (use of gun). The learned counsel for the defendants on issue 1 which is:- Whether the trial and termination of the claimants’ appointment was not done in accordance with the Federal Road Safety Commission Establishment Act 2007 and the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulation, maintenance of discipline rules 2005. The counsel submitted that the Federal Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline 2005 is the relevant law that regulates the conduct of officers of the Corps. Section 2(b) of the regulations makes the provisions of the regulation binding on all members of the corps. By virtue of Section 3 (1) of the Regulations, the word ‘Bribe’ is defined as:- …..any gift or material offered or received from a person or parents solicited or unsolicited before patrol and during patrol, or in the course of any official duty or assignment, intending to sway or include a person to do or omit to so something in the discharge or performance of his duty. Counsel submitted that on the 13th day of September, 2009, the claimants were caught receiving gratification from motorists along Calabar – Akamkpa Road by the surveillance team. After several hours of close investigation and surveillance, the surveillance team devised a means to take the claimants out of the ambit of the soldiers who worked closely with the FRSC patrol team (claimants) and apprehended them. Counsel submitted further that the sum of N13,000 (Thirteen Thousand Naira) Exhibit M5 was recovered from the socks of the PW2 (Bankong Odok) who stated that the money belonged to all of them, thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 21(e) of the Regulations. That the claimant were taken to the Sector Commander’s office where they voluntarily gave their statements in writing denying ownership of the money (N13,000 Exhibit M5) found on PW2 (Bankong). PW2 in his written statement; admitted that the money found on him belongs to all them and pleaded for forgiveness. Continuing, counsel submitted that the money found on PW2 (2nd claimant) even if he had denied that the money belongs to him or is for any or all the patrol team members (claimants), the presumption of the regulations on Maintenance of Discipline is that were nobody owns up for any money in excess, of N100 found in the patrol car or anywhere around the patrol members, such money shall be deemed money fraudulently obtained and the entire team upon conviction shall have their appointment terminated. So, the money would have been deemed belonging to all of them. Counsel went further to submit that in accordance with the regulations, a BOI (Exhibit E) was set up to investigation the allegations of bribery leveled against the claimants by the surveillance team, the BO1 made their finding known by recommending that the claimants be tried by an FDC in accordance with Section 69 of the regulations. The FDC was properly constituted (on receipt of the report of the Board of inquiry) having a Judge Advocate, a Prosecutor and 4 members namely:- 1. Kayode Olagunju, PhD (CC) ……. President 2. E. G. Dung (ACC) …… Member 3. H. N. Igwe (ACC) …… Member 4. I. Kyari (CRM) …… Secretary 5. E. E. Uzoma (SRC) …… Prosecutor 6. F. E. Ighile (DRC) …… (Judge Advocate, and E. Odiete appeared as the defence counsel for the claimants in line with Section 64 (2) of the regulations which provides for the FDC’s constitution to hear and determine the allegations against corps members. The FDC report (Exhibit A) was tendered and relied on by both parties in this suit. The counsel further submitted that the concept of appeal as enshrined in the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline is not like the conventional appeal as practiced in our courts in Nigeria, this is because the appeal is not logged with another administrative court where several persons will seat, hear and review the appellant’s case. Counsel contended that in as much as the Regulation provides for right to appeal under sub paragraph (24) of the Schedule 1 pursuant to Section 68 of the regulation which reads:- Either party shall have a right to appeal against the finding, punishment or recommendation by the FDC to the REVIWING AUTHORITY (emphasis mine). Any such appeal shall be lodged by the appellant with the FDC that awarded the punishment within seven (7) days of the delivery of the Judgment. Counsel said that reviewing authority in this instance, is the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive (COMMACE), no other person, since it is a case dealing with termination of appointment. He referred the court to sub paragraph (29) (d) of Schedule 1 to Section 68 of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline which states categorically that such appeal shall be logged with the Corps Marshal. Continuing, the counsel submitted that the FDC complied with the regulations on all grounds and the claimant cannot be heard saying they were not given an opportunity to be heard, the regulations gave the appellate authority to hear the appeal based on the documents before it without necessarily hearing the appellant in person. Paragraph (26) (a) Schedule 1 to Section 68 of the FRSC regulation on Maintenance of Discipline provides:- (26) On receipt of the FDC report the appellate authority shall within its powers to confirm, reduce or annul any punishment imposed in respect of any offence(s) against discipline and may:- (a) Deal with or without hearing the appellant in person. To the counsel for the defendants the claimants were given the opportunity to be heard by an independent and unbiased body from the stage of Board of Inquiry (BOI), Federal Road Safety Disciplinary Court (FDC) and the Appeal to the Corp Marshall. That the claimants’ limited knowledge, understanding and or ignorance of how appeal form the FDC COMMACE works, should not be a yardstick for adjudging the hearing and subsequent termination of their appointment by the defendants as unlawful. The claimants never complained that they were nor heard during the BOI and the FDC, their only grievance is that there was no appeal in their case. Assuming but not conceding the argument of the claimants as valid (which we totally disagree), the proper complaint should have been unlawful termination (which is not conceded) and not unlawful termination of appointment, as the court can only grant then relief in damages and not reinstatement. See the case of MALIKI V MICHAEL IMODU INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 491) 974 CA. To the counsel contrary to paragraph 38 of the Joint statement of fact of claimants wherein the claimants contended that the proper procedure was not followed in terminating the appointment of the claimants, the appeal logged with the Corp Marshall was heard, as stated in paragraph 4.15 supra, with emphasize once more that paragraph (26) (a) of Schedule 1 to Section 68 of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline 2005 allows the COMMACE to determine appeal logged with it, which is just a review (strictly speaking) of the recommendation). The defendants counsel then submitted that sequel to the foregoing supra, the defendants laid evidence calling DW4 (Mr. A. A. Abu) who testified and tendered Exhibit A3 (response to the recommendation for the termination of appointment of the entire team) which dealt with the issue of appeal logged with Corp Marshall in this case). The counsel submitted that the law is trite on the issue that whoever desires any court to give Judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. See Section 131 of the Evidence Act (as amended). The claimants in this case failed to convince this honourable court that their appeal was not heard. The burden to prove the relief sought in a statement of claim to obtain Judgment lies on the plaintiff. That burden does not shift. See the case of THE ATTORNEY – GENERAL ANAMBRA STATE V THE ATTORNEY – GENERAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 931) 572. See also the case of OJOH V KAMALU (2005) 18 NWLR (PT. 958) PG. 523. That the claimants did not inform the court what the appeal after an FDC depending on the nature of offence entails, since the FDC proceeding is not a regular court proceeding that the court should take judicial notice of. On this issues the counsel for the defendants urged the court to discountenance the claim of the claimants on the grounds supra while holding our argument on Issue 1. In respect of issue 2 Whether the apprehension and confessional statement made by the claimants to collection on bribe from motorists was one done under duress (use of gun). The counsel submitted that the defendants state that the apprehension and confessional statement giving rise to the trial and subsequent dismissal of the claimants in this suit were done without the use of force (gun) intimidation, nor was it induced by any form of fear, favour or promise. That in order to save their faces, the claimants came up with an after-thought that the surveillance team made use of gun in the events that proceeded their trial (BOI and FDC) as well as subsequent termination of appointment. The defendants aver that the surveillance team does not engage the use of gun in its surveillance. On the fateful day the claimants were apprehended, the surveillance team presented themselves freely for search by the patrol team, contrary to the averments contained in paragraph 15 and 16 of the claimants’ joint statement of fact stating that they were refused search by the surveillance team. On the contrary, Exhibit F1 (video clip) played inside the courtroom during the hearing of this case showed quite vividly that Monday Goodhead, the leader of the patrol team actually and did search the surveillance team. The defendants expressly denied the claim by the claimants that they (the patrol team) were not allowed to search the surveillance team. Also evident in the video clip (Exhibit F1) were the peaceful search, discovery of money (N13,000 Exhibit M5) from the patrol team, the feeling of guilt and anxiety that gripped the 2nd claimant, Mr. Bankong Augustine Odok in whose socks the bribe money N13,000 Exhibit M5) was found, and above all, no gun was used. The court should not that at no point at the time the money was recovered did the 2nd claimant show any sign of surprise or denial at the fact that the Exhibit M5 was found on him. He never protested. Rather, he was crestfallen, with his countenance ridden with guilt and none of his colleagues looked surprised. In their joint statement of facts dated 9th July, 2012, paragraph 16 made it clear that the head of surveillance team. Officer S. O. Mohammed shouted them down when they tried searching the surveillance team and he (Officer Mohammed) added that if anyone of them moves, he would be shot, pointing a short gum at them. Also in the witness statement on Oath filed in this court for PW2 (Bankong Odok), PW2 deposed that when they requested to search the surveillance team, the head of the surveillance team shouted at them saying if anyone of them moves, he will be shot, while pointing a gun at them. See paragraph 10 of the witness statement of PW2. In a bid of strengthen a very weak and cheap fabrication of theirs, PW1 tired corroborating the statement made in paragraph 10 of the witness statement on Oath of PW2 and the averment contained in their joint statement of fact albeit unsuccessfully stating that DW2 (Office S. O. Mohammed) did point a gun at them. See paragraph 10 of PW1’s witness statement on Oath. On the contrary, the efforts of the claimants to conceal the truth cannot stand the test of time as Exhibit F1 (video clip) showed otherwise of their assertions, furthermore in page 19 of the FDC report (Exhibit C), an Exhibit relied heavily by both parties, showed during the trial that PW2 claimed the gun was pointed at them by Okeke (DW3) upon cross examination contrary to the assertions that Officer Mohammed was the one who pointed the gun at the patrol team none of which was accurate as there was no use for a gun. Under cross examination, the PW1 gave himself out showing he is not a witness of truth when he said it was only Officer Mohammed who presented himself for search while the other members never did. (We are bound by the court’s record). This is totally inconsistent with the earlier averments in the joint statement of complaints and the witness statement on Oath deposed before this court. Furthermore, it is a known principle of law that the essence of cross examination is to teat the veracity of the witness. On getting to the sector command, the claimants were made to give their various statements freely without any form to inducement, force, intimidation, promise or otherwise, as the statements were all taken freely in an open place (the reception) and there was no force from any quarters to influence them. Whatever that was written was done of their freewill. The learned counsel submitted the it is the case of the defendants and they strongly contended that the statements made by the claimant which is attached to the FDC report, Exhibit C was contended during the FDC and a trial – within – trial was conducted and then the Disciplinary court overruled the claimants then stating that the statements were not received under duress. Furthermore, the claimants never contested the inadmissibility of such piece of evidence. The law is trite that a confessional statement is the best evidence …. It is a statement of guilt by the accused person and the trail court must admit it in evidence unless it is contested at trial. See the case of NWACHUKWU V STATE (2007) 17 NWLR (PT. 1062) S.C. The defendants at the trial did not oppose the tendering of the statements of the claimants and PW2 wrote unequivocally that the money (N13,000 Exhibit M5) belongs to all of them. Section 21 (i) of the FRSC maintenance of Discipline provides that while on Patrol, any money in excess of N100 which is undeclared and found anywhere around the patrol team, where nobody owns up, is deemed to be for the entire team. The claimants are therefore jointly responsible and guilty of the offence for which they were charged and tried. In conclusion the learned counsel submitted that the presumption for the action of the claimants not objecting to the confessional statement and other related documents herein means admission of regularity. Counsel therefore urged the Honourable Court to uphold the argument canvassed by the statement in this case and dismiss the case of the claimants in its entirety. The learned counsel for the claimant submitted on their behalf three issues for the determination of the court to wit:- a. Whether this Honourable Court can be invited, as the defendants have done in their 2nd issue submitted for determination to make a pronouncement on the allegation of collection of bribe money from motorists against the claimants. b. Whether given the sum total of evidence so far led in this case, the claimants’ inalienable right to Fair Hearing was exhaustively upheld and observed by the defendants before terminating the claimants’ respective appointments. c. Whether in the event this Honourable Court resolves issue (b) above raised in favour of the claimants, they will be entitled to the reliefs sought. In arguing issue A The learned counsel for the claimants asked on whether Honourable Court can be invited, as the defendants have done in their 2nd issue submitted for determination to make a pronouncement on the allegation of collection of bribe money from motorists against the claimants, this submitted in the negative. To the learned counsel the claimants’ assertion that they were tried and convicted by the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court, referring to paragraphs 31 – 34 of the joint statement of facts of the complainants clearly demonstrate that the claimant were indeed tried by the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court over the allegations of collection of bribe money from motorists alongside the ancillary allegation of behaving in a manner unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman and possession of money beyond N100 (Hundred Naira) undeclared before proceeding on patrol. The counsel also referred to paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 31 of the statement on Oath of G.O. Monday, the 1st claimant and CW1 and paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 31 of the statement on Oath of Bankong Augustine Odok are instructive. Paragraphs 31 – 33 and 36 of the joint statement of defence are also indisputable on this point. So also are paragraphs 9 – 11 of the statement on Oath of A. A. Abu, DW4. The learned counsel then submitted that the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court is a product of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline, Part V Section 64 of the said Regulations. He further submitted that the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline is rooted, grounded and was originated by virtue of Section 5(e) of the Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) Act 2007. This undoubtedly and unarguable makes the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court a quasi judicial body. He submitted it is though not like a regular court as the instant one, but it is a tribunal. Counsel referred the court to pages 1364 and 1646 of the Blacks Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, for the definition of “quasi judicial” respectively. He also referred to the cases of AGBANELO V UNION BANK OF NIG (2000) NSCQLR VOL. 2 PG. 415, A. G. LAGOS STATE V EKO HOTELS LTD (2006) NSCQLR VOL. 27 PG. 623. Counsel then cited the provisions of Section 36(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides thus:- No person who shows that he has been tried by any court of competent jurisdiction or tribunal for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence save upon the order of a superior court. That for the undisputed facts that the claimants herein had preciously being convicted by a tribunal, the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court, this Honourable Court, ought to no longer hear the defendants make a case over same allegations. In that majority of the defendants’ joint statement of defence (from paragraph 3 to 23 thereof) dwells on the 2 (two) cardinal allegations of bribery and being in possession of money beyond N100.00 (Hundred Naira) undeclared while on patrol and behaviour unbecoming of an officer and a gentlemen. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 13 of the statement on Oath of T. G. Esenyi (DW 1), paragraphs 4, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 18 of the statement on Oath of Suleiman Mohammed (DW2), paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the statement on Oath of A.C. Okeke (DW 3), paragraphs 3, 6 and 8 of the statement on Oath of A. A. Abu (DW 4), paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 18 of the statements on Oaths of F. F. Mike (DW 5) respectively and Exhibits:- E1 - Constitution of BOI dated 22nd November, 2012. MI - Report on Surveillance dated 22nd November, 2012. M2 - Statement for Monday G. O. dated 22nd November, 2012. M3 - Statement for Bankong dated 22nd November, 2012. M4 - Statement for Francis dated 22nd November, 2012. M5 - Notes of money extorted dated 22nd November, 2012. Certificate of Authenticity, tendered in evidence by the defendants are all squarely in relation to the above referred twin allegations for which the claimants were tried and convicted by the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court. It is therefore the submission of the counsel that a consideration of the above referred paragraphs of the defendants’ joint statement of defence and those of the various defendants witness’ statements on Oaths above referred would tantamount to a flagrant violation of the provision of S. 36 (9) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). That such act, which the counsel believes this Honourable Court would not lend itself to, would amount to subjecting the claimants to double jeopardy. But the apex court of the land in a galaxy of cases has seriously cautioned courts to restrain from such acts. He commended to this Honourable Courts the cases of OKOEBOR V POLICE COUNCIL (2003) NSCQLR VOL. 14 PG. 434 AT 439, CHIEF OF AIR STAFF V IYEN (2005) NSCQLR VOL. 21 PG. 646,. NIGERIAN ARMY V AMINUN KANO (2010) NSCQLR VOL. 41 PG. 76 AT 83 AND 84 RATIOS 10 AND 12 AND N.I.I.A V AYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR Pg. 246 AT 256 RATIO 17. He then submitted that the claimant having been convicted by the FRSC Disciplinary Court, should this Honourable Court make a finding on any of the twin allegations raised in the defendants’ defence as portrayed by paragraphs 3 – 23 of the statement of defence and the above referred paragraphs of the statement on Oath of DW1 – DW5 double jeopardy would have been foisted on the instant claimants. The learned counsel went further to submit that are not unaware of the likely temptation the defendants might run into, that is the temptation of arguing that S. 36 (9) of the CFRN 1999 (as amended) only relates to Criminal cases and therefore restricted to the PRINCIPAL AUTHREFOIS CONVICT AND AUTREFOIS ACQUIT. The counsel answered to this sort of argument in two folds:- a. The allegations of bribery and possession of the sum of N13,000.00 (Thirteen Thousand Naira), raised in the defendants’ defence for which the claimants had already been tried by the FRSC Disciplinary Court are criminal in nature and they so remain even if they are raised in civil suits such as the one at hand. b. Secondly, the rule against double jeopardy is not only a constitutional matter, but the same constitution also applies it to cases of civil nature. See the cases of OKOEBOR V POLICE COUNCIL, CHIEF OF AIR STAFF V IYEN, NIGERIAN ARMY V AMINUN KANO and N.I.I.A. V AYANFALU supra. These cases are all civil in nature, yet the doctrine of double jeopardy was upheld in all of them by the Supreme Court and that became the saving grace of all the victims of abuse of the inalienable right not to be tried twice or more on one wrong doing. The learned counsel contended that on the basis of the arguments so far canvassed on this issue, he submitted that issue 2 raised by the defence determination is indeed an affront on the provision of S. 36(9) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). We are confident that the court would not lend himself to such affront on the grundnorm of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Counsel therefore, urged the court not to place reliance on any of the above referred paragraphs of the Joint Statement of Defence and those of the statements on Oath of DW1 – DW5. In also arguing issue B The claimants counsel submitted that on whether given the sum total of evidence so far led in this case, the claimants’ inalienable right to Fair Hearing was exhaustively upheld and observed by the defendants before terminating the claimants’ respective appointments. He submitted in the negative. The counsel argued that by virtue of the provision of S. 29(d) of SCHEDULE 1 PURSUANT TO SECTION 68 of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline, there can be no disputation as to the very fact that it is “the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive” of the 3rd defendant that is the Appellant Authority in respect of the claimants’ case. This is so because the sum total of evidence on both sides of the divide, to wit; the side of the claimants and the side of the defendants are at ad idem on the fact that the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court trial of the claimants was at the Road Safety Headquarters level and that the punishment meted out on the claimants is termination of their respective appointments. The learned counsel aside from the overwhelming and non-conflicting evidence of both camps of the claimants and the defence pointing to the fact that the FRSC Disciplinary Court held at the Road Safety Headquarters, Abuja, both Camps are also at ad idem on the fact that the claimants appealed against the decision of the FRSC Disciplinary Court. Paragraphs 34, 35, 38 and 39 of the Joint Statement of Facts of the claimants, paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the complainant’ 1st and 2nd witnesses on record (G. O. Monday and Bankgong Augustine Odok) all go to show that indeed the claimants appealed the decision of the FRSC Disciplinary Court convicting them of the offences they were charged with. To the claimant counsel the joint statement of defence of the defendants and all the statements on Oath of all their witnesses, from the DW1 – DW5, all maintained that the procedures for appeals as provided for by the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of discipline were fully exhausted. Counsel submitted that this is an admission that has even gone beyond the ordinary admission of the fact and existence of appeal by the claimants. That paragraphs 22 and 23 of the statement on Oath of T. G. Esenyi (DW1), paragraphs 24 and 25 of the statement on Oath of Muhammed Suleiman (DW3), paragraphs 10 and 11 of the statement on Oath of Mr. A. A. Abu (DW4) and paragraphs 23 and 24 of the statement on Oath of Mr. F. F. Fowoyo (DW5) all maintain that the appeal of the claimants was exhaustively heard before the termination of the appointment of the latter. Counsel submitted that there can be no better admission of the fact that the claimants indeed appealed against the decision of the FRSC Disciplinary Court. Facts admitted need not be proved. He commended the court to the cases of N.I.I.A. V AYANFALU (2007) 2 NWLR (PT. 1018) PG. 246 AT PG. 255 RATIO 15, U.B.A. V JARGABA (2007) NSCQLR VOL. 31 PG. 145 AT 148 RATIO 6 AND REYNOLDS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY V ROCKONOH (2005) NSCQLR VOL. 22 PG. 1005 AT 1007 RATIO 1 and the provisions of 131 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. He urged the court to hold indeed that there is no disputation between the parties on the fact that the claimants actually appealed against the decision of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court. What the defendants dispute is that the claimants’ Appeal against the decision of the FRSC Disciplinary Court was exhaustively heard. He referred to S. 20(d) of SCHEDULE 1 PURSUANT TO SECTION 68 of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline is explicit on the fact that the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant is the Appellate Authority of and in cases filed at the level of the Road Safety Headquarters, which is what obtains in the instant case as the trial of the claimants at the FRSC Disciplinary Court was at the Headquarters level of the Federal Road Safety Corps. Moreso, the Appeal bothers on termination of appointments of the claimants. Counsel submitted that on the 12th day of December, 2011 when the claimants were respectively convicted, the office of the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant was not vacant. It was occupied by Mr. Osita Chidoka who so remained until sometime around July 2014 when he now got appointed as a Minister of the Federal Government of Nigeria by President Goodluck Jonathan. Counsel submitted that as the claimants filed their appeal against the verdict of the FRSC Disciplinary Court two days after the said verdict of the FRSC Disciplinary Court, the appropriate person to have heard the said appeal of the claimants was the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive, which was Mr. Osita Chidoka, as at the time. That throughout the pieces of evidence led by the defendants, from Exhibits E1 to F2 which they tendered in evidence in the course of trial, there is NOT one single document to show to this Honourable Court that indeed the said Mr. Osita Chidoka who was the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive as at the time in question made a decision one way or other over the Appeal lodged by the complaints against the Judgment of the FRSC Disciplinary Court. Of all the Exhibits tendered by the defendants in this suit, there is non that emanates form the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the FRS Corps let alone relating to a decision of the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the Federal Road Safety Corps on the Appeal of the claimants against the decision of the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court. Exhibits A2 and A3 are documents respectively emanating from the duo of A. A. Abu and Chidi D. Nwachulwu. They are recommendations from the said two officers of the FRS Corps to the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the Federal Road Safety Corps recommending termination of the claimants’ appointments. Throughout the evidence before this Honourable Court, there is nothing showing the reply of the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the Federal Road Safety Corps who is the Appellate Authority in this case to the above referred recommendations or even to the Appeal of the claimants. The said Exhibits A2 and A3 (and even A1) which learned counsel for the defendants has mistaken for the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the FRS Corps’ decision over the Appeal lodged by the claimants are indeed correspondences emanating from Assistant Corps Marshal/CLA Chidi Nwachukwu and Deputy Corps Marshal A. A. Abu to the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the FRS Corps. Both Exhibits recommended the termination of the claimants’ appointments. There was no response front he Corps Marshal as to the Appeal filed by the claimants. He urged the court to take Judicial Notice, in line with the provision of 122 of the Evidence Act 2011, of the fact that the office of the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant is an official body. It is even moreso as it exercises its Appellate Authority over the Appeal lodged by the claimants, without conceding that the Corps Marshal actually considered the claimants’ Appeal. Therefore, he submitted that if the Corps Marshal had sat on or considered the Appeal of the claimants, such act would have being official, formal (as it is not a family affair or personal business as to have been informal) and would have been in writing. Counsel submitted that just like the recommendations in Exhibits A1, A2 and A3 recommending the termination of appointments of the claimants to the Corps Marshal were in writing, the response of the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant would definitely have been in writing too, “confirming”, “reducing” or “annulling” the punishment that had been meted on the claimants by the Judgment of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court, in line with S. 26 of SCHEDULE 1 PURSUANT TO S. 68 of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline. This would have been the case even if the Corps Marshal had decided to treat, hear and or determine the claimants’ Appeal, with or without the Appellants (claimants herein) being heard in person. Now, out of all the exhibits tendered and evidence so far led in court, there is nothing before this Honourabel Court depicting an act or the action let alone decision of the Corps Marshal on the Appeal filed by the claimants. There is nothing at all of this nature before this Honourable Court emanating from Mr. Osita Chidoka, the then Corps Marshal. The learned counsel argued that the absence of any such proof before this Honourable Court, the mere and blanket assertions contained in the defence that the Appeal process/procedure contained in the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline was complied with cannot hold water. Otherwise, the court is now been left to speculate on what the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant did with and after receiving the recommendations asking for the termination of the claimants’ appointments, Exhibit A1, A2 and A3. What the Corps Marshal did after receiving the Appeal of the claimants herein, if any, is nowhere before the court. In the worst case scenario, if the Corps Marshal had merely ORALLY communicated his Appellate decision confirming the Judgment of the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court, the defendants should have pleaded this fact and led evidence to same in the court of trail. Counsel urged the court in line with the provision of S. 122 of the Evidence Act 2011 to take Judicial Notice of the fact that this could not have been the case as public offices such as that of the Corps Marshal of the 3rd defendant could not have passed its verdict on the Appeal lodged against the decision of the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court merely by parol i.e. ORALLY. If officers Junior in rank than the Corps Marshal sent their recommendations seeking the termination of the appointments of the claimants in writing as seen in Exhibits A1, A2 and A3, the Corps Marshal’s decision on the Appeal filed before him by the claimants, against the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court would also, willy nilly, be in writing. Failing which this Honourable Court would only be left with the option of speculating on what decision the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant’s decision was over the Appeal filed by the Appellants. But the law bitterly prohibits courts from speculations. He commended to the Honourable Court in this regard the cases of OBASI V MERCHANT BANK (2005) NSCQLR VOL. 21, PG 276 AT PG 279 RATIO 4 and DENNIS IVIENAGBOR V HENRY OSATO BAZUAYE & ANOR (1999) NSCQLR PG. 349 AT PG. 352, RATIO 5. This is even moreso, that Mr. T. G. Esenyi, the DW1, during his cross examination, when asked whether Mr. Osita Chidoka actually sat over the claimants’ Appeal he answered “I do not know”. It is the submission of the counsel that those who put positive assertions before the courts have an obligation of proving such allegations unless they are admitted by the adversary. To this end, he commended to the court to S. 131 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the cases of IYERE V BFFM LTD (2001) FWLR (PT. 37) 1166 CA AND G & T INVEST LTD V WITT & BUSH LTD (2011) 8 NWLR (PT. 1250) 500 SC. He therefore submitted that the positive assertion that the Appeal procedure was exhausted by the defendants before terminating the claimants’ appointments is to be proved by them especially that the said assertion is being firmly rebutted by the claimants. Now that the Appellate Authority in this regard is an officer of the 3rd defendant, onus is on the defence to lead credible, cogent and compelling evidence that indeed the claimants’ Appeal was determined by the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant. This onus of proof they did woefully fail to discharge as there is indeed nothing before this Honourable Court to show and or prove that the Corps Marshal of the 3rd defendant who was as at the time Mr. Osita Chidoka, actually sat on, entertained, heard and or determined howsoever termed, the claimants’ Appeal against the decision of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court’s decision, even though the claimants repeatedly maintained that their Appeal against the decision of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court was not exhaustively heard and or determined by the Appellate Authority in this regard, that is the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant. Counsel therefore urged the court this point, to hold that the defendants who owe it a duty to prove to this Honourable Court that the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant actually acted upon, heard (with or without the Appellate, claimants in this case) and or determined the claimants Appeal have indeed failed to discharge the said obligation. At any rate, counsel argued in the manner above on this issue, assuming but firmly without conceding that Mr. Osita Chidoka indeed heard the Appeal of the Appellants (claimants herein) and arrived at a decision, the said decision can only be presumed to be in favour of the claimants and on disfavour of the defendants who have decided to keep the said decision away from this Honourable Court even where and when the claimants have been vehement and consistently so in the rebutted of the existence of such decision. To this end, he commended to the court the unequivocal and unambiguous provision of S. 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimants. Issue C On whether in the event this Honourable Court resolves issue B above raised in favour of the claimants, they will entitled to the reliefs sought, he submitted in the positive. It is the counsel submission that flowing from counsel submissions of issues 1 and 2 herein raised, it is only crystal clear that the provisions S. 36 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) particularly S. 36 (9) thereof have been flouted in the course of presentation of the defendants’ defence and in the course of the internal trial of the claimant’s at and by the defendants at the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court, before the termination of the appointments of the claimants. Counsel submitted that S.5(e) of the Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) Act 2007 which gives rise and birth to the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline, particularly S. 26 thereof, has also indeed been flouted by the defendants who refused, ignored and or failed to entertain the claimants’ Appeal before terminating their appointments. He therefore submitted that the termination of the appointments of the claimants herein were respectively done in contravention of the trio of the statutory provisions immediately herein above (the 2 constitutional provisions and the combined provision of the statute establishing the 1st defendant and the Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline of the 1st defendant). Counsel submitted that in view of the fact that claimants’ appointment were terminated against the spirit of the provisions of S. 36(1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and by implication S. 5(e) and S.26 of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline and in view of the defence of the defendants being largely against the spirit of S. 36(9) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) the claimants respective appointments were unconstitutionally and unlawfully terminated. He submitted that acts of quasi or full fledged judicial bodies which contravene the tenants of Natural Justice are ab initio unlawful, unconstitutional and therefore null. The termination of the respective appointments of the claimants he submitted have been done unlawfully, unconstitutionally and could only, naturally, be a nullity ab initio. This is moreso, that the claimants’ appointments is regulated by statute i.e. SS 11, 12, 13 , 17 and 18 of the Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) Act 2007 and the termination of same also regulated by statute i.e. S. 5(e) of the FRS Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline. He commended to the court the case of N.I.I.A V AYANFALU (SUPRA) at ratio 15. In conclusion the claimants counsel submitted that aside from the effort so far made by the claimants in proof of their case, the defendants have absolutely admitted the crux of the claimants’ case as the former admitted that the claimants actually appealed against the decision of the FRS Commission Disciplinary Court, and then further maintained that the said Appeal was exhaustively determined. The said fact that the claimants actually Appealed against the FDC Judgment therefore needs no proof by the claimants. Now that the claimants have been able to demonstrate before this Honourable Court that their appeal was not heard before their appointments were terminated in contravention of Ss. 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Ss. 5(e) of the FRS Commission (Establishment) Act and Ss. 26 of the Schedule Pursuant to Section 68, of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline, the appropriate thing for this Honourable Court to do is to grant the reliefs of the claimants as per their complaint and joint statement of facts. Counsel urged the court to uphold same. Defendants reply on points of law Whether this Honourable Court can be invited, as the defendants have done in their 2nd issues submitted for determination, to make a pronouncement on the allegation of collection of bribe money from motorists against the claimants. My in his submission, learned counsel for the claimants submitted that by virtue of Section 5 (e) of the Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) Act 2007 and Part V, Section 64 of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline, the Federal Road Safety Disciplinary Court is a “quasi-judicial” body more also a tribunal and which the learned counsel strongly contended with reference to the Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition and cases of AGBANELO V UNION BANK OF NIG. and A. G. LAGOS STATE V EKO HOTELS LTD. Citation is supplied in Page 7 of his final written address in support of his contention. Learned counsel for the claimants further submitted albeit erroneously that the FDC being a tribunal convicted the claimants for the offence charged before it. Thus inviting this Honourable Court to exercise its powers on the same subject matter will amount to double jeopardy which runs contrary to Section 36 (9) of the Constitution. In support of the submission, learned counsel cited the cases of OKOEBOR V POLICE COUNCIL, CHIEF OF AIR STAFF V IYEN, NIGERIAN ARMY V AMINU KANO and N. I. I. A. V AYANFALU urging the court not to place reliance on the second issue raised in the defendants final written address. My lord, while the reluctantly agree that the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court is a quasi-judicial body, we submit sir, and it is our very strong contention that it is NOT a court of competent jurisdiction or a tribunal and cannot so be referred as a tribunal. Part 1 Regulations 3(1) of the FRSC Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline defined the term ‘FDC’ which is produced below:- FDC means Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court which is an Administrative Panel (emphasis mine) constituted to determine allegation(s) of misconducts against members of the Corps and makes recommendations to the appropriate authority. The law is trite in the interpretation of an enactment. The courts have always been enjoined to adopt the literal mode of construction particularly where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous. See the cases of EMEMSIM V NWACHUKWU (1999) 6 NWLR, (PT. 605) 154. ACTION CONGRESS V KAIGAMA (2008) 8 NWLR, (PT. 1088) 165 AT 178 PARAS A – B. My lord, the above provisions of the FRSC regulations referred above is clear without any form of ambiguity whatsoever. The imposition of tribunal by learned counsel to the clear provision of regulation 3(1) where it is not so provided is most misleading and should be discountenanced. If the regulations intended it (FDC) so to be, it would have referred to it as a tribunal. It is apt to state that nowhere was the word “tribunal” mentioned in reference to any act done by or in relation to the FDC, rather the regulation described it as a panel and went on to define the scope of its authority. Furthermore, Section 36(9) of the CFRN (1999) can only be invoked where a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction or tribunal has been reached. The FDC is not a court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of CHIEF OF AIR STAFF V IYEN cited by learned counsel but wrongly applied, the learned justice of the apex court per Edozie J.S.C. in (p. 26 paras C – D) opined. According to Section 36(9) of the 1999 constitution, it is a conviction or acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction that can found a plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit. The principal of double jeopardy is a criminal law protection created by the constitution to save a person accused of criminal offence from facing same charges or charges with similar ingredients. See the case of BARMO V STATE, (2000) 1 NWLR (PT. 641) 424 AT P. 440. See also IMADE V IGP (1993) 1 NWLR (PT. 271) 608. The suit before the Honourable Court is a civil suit and even more a special one that deals with labour issues which is brought in the same of the claimants viz:- 1. Monday Goodhead Okpara 2. Bangkong Odok 3. Francis Oyong Ekpang The suit was brought against the Federal Road Safety Commission and its Chief Executive as the defendants. It is not the suit of the defendants, thus it beats the imagination of wisdom or better still “common sense” to state that the claimants are being prosecuted for the second time by the defendants. Relying on the case of NIGERIAN ARMY V AMINU KANO which was cited by the claimants counsel in which the learned counsel fruitlessly argued that the doctrine or principle of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit (double jeopardy) also relates to civil suit, the court in that suit states:- This lays down the principle of criminal law that where a person accused of committing a criminal offence(s) which are recognized by law and where he had shown that he has either been pardoned of that offence(s) by the appropriate authority or that he has been tried by a court of law or a tribunal setup by law, he cannot be subjected to any further prosecution or trial by any court or tribunal on that same offence(s). Per I.T.M. Muhammed J.S.C. (P. 40, Paras B – D). The Supreme Court made it clear that the application of the principle is criminal in nature. My lord we submit that the defendants 2nd issue formulated in their final written address is but a fragment of several issues evidencing compliances with the rules of fair hearing by the FDC in their decision and subsequent termination of the claimants’ appointment with the FRSC. It is in line with the defence to the claim of the claimants and does not stand tall setting an entirely new suit. It is and remains part of the answer to the claims against FRSC and was formulated to aid or assist the court in reaching a just conclusion. The law is trite that you cannot give what you don’t have “Nemo dat quod non habet”. Can it then be right that the claimants should also be the defendants in the same suit? Our answer is NO. The claimants urged this Honourable Court not to hear the defendants because according to them, doing so will be tantamount to a flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 36 (9) of the CFRN (1999). See page 9 of the claimants’ final written address. Our answer to the above is that the provision of that Section was not violated and that the Honourable Court should not allow itself to be used as an instrument to sanction injustice. We implore this Honourable Court with the deepest humility as a fact-finding court to examine the evidence of the parties before it and do justice in the circumstances. Conclusion We finally submit that the argument of the learned counsel if applied in the circumstance of this case we breed injustice, as he argued that the defendants should not be heard even when they have brought a claim against the defendants and we ask, it this suit an ex-parte application? Our answer is No., justice as we know it is not a one-way traffic but a tripartite thing. See the case of OJUKWU V YAR’DUA (2009) 12 NWLR (PT. 1154) 50 S.C. We therefore urge this Honourable Court to hold that the FDC is not a “tribunal” as described by the claimants and uphold the argument canvassed by the defendants as the proper position in this case and discountenance the argument of the claimants and dismiss this suit. Having read carefully the submissions, the authorities cited and the evidence adduced at the trial the issue for the court to determine is:- Whether the court can grant the reliefs sought by the applicant in this suit. The claimant is seeking for two reliefs, which are:- a. A Declaration that the purported termination of the 1st, 2nd & 3rd claimants is unlawful, unconstitutional, illegal invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. b. An Order of this Honourable Court directing and compelling the defendants jointly and or severally which ever is applicable and or appropriate to re-instate the 1st, 2nd, & 3rd claimants and also to restore all their lost rights, benefits, and privileges such as salaries, promotion etc. Before I consider the two reliefs mentioned above it is necessary to comment on the issue raised by the claimants counsel that the claimants are being prosecuted for the same offence before this court after they had faced the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court on the same offence with same ingredients. The counsel for the claimants in the final written address, raised the issue of double jeopardy. Double Jeopardy connotes the procedure of subjecting a person to a trial on two separate occasions for the same offence with same ingredients. The learned counsel for the claimants claimed that the claimants had previously being convicted by Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court in the allegation of bribery and being in possession of money beyond N100.00 (One Hundred Naira) undeclared while on patrol. That the court ought not to hear the defendants make a case over same allegation that it would tantamount to a flagrant violation of the provision of S.36 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) as amended. The Section provides that: no person that has been tried once by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence, and convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence having the same ingredients. The contention of the learned counsel for the claimants is that the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court had convicted the claimants for the offence of bribery and being in possession of money beyond (N100.00) One Hundred Naira Only undeclared while on patrol, that for this court to hear the defendants over the same allegation would amount to double jeopardy contrary to Section 36 (9) of the Constitution. However, the learned for the defendants’ position is that the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court is a quasi – judicial body and not a court of competent jurisdiction to be referred to as a court but an Administrative Panel. The counsel referred to part 3(1) of the Federal Road Safety Commission regulation on Maintenance of Discipline. The learned counsel for the defendants added that the principle of double jeopardy is in the realm of criminal law created by the constitution to save a person accused of criminal offence from facing same charges with similar ingredients. That this principle is not applicable to civil suit as in the instant case, which deals with labour issues, which is brought in the name of the claimants by the counsel for the claimants. That this is not a suit of the defendants but that the suit was brought against the defendants by the claimants. Without wasting much time in dealing with this issue it is my view that the claimants are not facing another trial at the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for the same offence with same ingredients after they had been found guilty by the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court. It is a fact and it is very evident that this suit is instituted by the claimants and not the defendants. I am in agreement with all the submissions of the learned counsel for the defendants on this issue. The claimants are not being tried again before this court for the same offence they had earlier being tried for before the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court. The claimants are in the court to challenge the outcome of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court and the termination of their appointment on the allegation of bribery and in possession of money beyond N100 while on patrol without their appeal been heard. It is also my believe that the learned counsel for the claimants is wrong to have equated the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court to a regular court even though the word court is used. The Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court is not a court in the real sense of it but an administrative panel. For this reason the issue of double jeopardy does not arise in this matter. The 1st relief sought by the claimants is the declaration that the termination of their appointments is unlawful, unconstitutional, illegal, null & void and of no effect. When an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, that employee has the onus to prove the wrong doing by:- a. Placing before the court the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. b. Proving in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. The claimants were employees of the Federal Road Safety Corps posted to the Cross Rivers Sector Command before their appointments were terminated. In this suit the relationship between the claimants and the 3rd defendant is regulated by the FRSC conditions and scheme of service and other rules and regulations of the Commission Exhibit 4. These documents will be applied in determining the terms of the contract to see whether the terms were complied with when the claimants appointments were terminated. This is because the terms of contract are the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment calls for determination. In Amodu V Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 365, Agbaje JSC, who read the leading Judgment observed at page 370 as follows:- It appear clear to me that since it is the Plaintiff’s case that his dismissal by the defendants is not in accordance with the law terms and conditions of contract of service between them, it is for the Plaintiff to plead and prove the conditions of service regulating the contract of service in question. The question to answer is whether the termination of the claimants was done in accordance with their conditions of service using the rules governing the employment relationship between the claimants and the defendants. The regulations in question is the Federal Road Safety Corps Regulations and Maintenance of Discipline 2005. The contention of the claimants is that the claimants’ inalienable right to fair hearing was not exhaustive by the defendants before the appointments were terminated. The claimants claimed that the procedure for appeals as provided for by the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations in Maintenance of Discipline was not exhausted and conclusive before the appointments were terminated by the defendants. In that their appeal against the termination of the appointments did not reached the Chief Executive of the 3rd defendant, the appellate authority in this case. The position of the defendants is that the claimants appeal against the decision of the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court was exhaustively heard. The defendants relied on the provision of Section 20(d) of the Schedule 1 Pursuant to Section 68 of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline. Under cross - examination Mr. A. A. Abu one of the witnesses for the defendants testified under cross – examination this way when asked some questions as follows by the claimants counsel:- Counsel - Having told the court you are conversant with the regulations. Please see schedule 1 Section 24 at Page 30, read out and read Section 29 at page 31. In this case the appellate authority for the complainants is the Corps Marshal, and the Chief Executive given the fact that their matter was tried here in Headquarters. Witness - It is the Corps Marshal Counsel - It is the complainants that will appeal not that you will appeal to the Corps Marshal. Witness - Yes. Counsel - Look at Exhibit A1, this document emanated from Deputy Corps Marshal to the Chief Executive. Witness - Yes. Counsel - Please see Exhibit A2 findings of the LDC is not a document emanating from the complainants. Witness - Yes. Counsel - Please see Exhibit A3 that is a document emanating from the Corps Legal Adviser not a document emanating from the complainants to the Corps Marshal. Witness - Yes. What this mean is that what the claimants ought to do by themselves was done by the Deputy Corps Marshal, as seen in Exhibit A3 and Exhibit A2. There is no record that Mr. Osita Chidoka the Corps Marshal participated or even delegated the powers to other officer. This he cannot even do as the Exhibit A4 does not allow this. It is on record however, that the defendants did not produce or tender any documents showing that the Corps Marshal or the Chief Executive of the Federal Road Safety Commission the body responsible for reviewing any punishment or recommendation made by the Federal Road Safety Commission Disciplinary Court ever got to him. The contention of the claimants is not that they were not heard by the FDC or Board of Inquiry (BOI) but that the last body that should have the last say on the matter never had opportunity of reviewing their matter, either confirming, reducing or annulling the punishment impose on them. In other words, the appellate authority did not have the opportunity to comply by the provisions of Section 26 of the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations. It is my view that any act carried out by the Federal Road Safety Commission without exhausting all provisions relating to discipline of erring staff of the Commission and the provision for their removal from office will be unlawful. The Commission did not complete the proceeding for removal of officers before the letters of termination of the claimants were issued and signed by A. A. Abu Deputy Corps Marshal for the Corps Marshal and Chief Executive. At that particular time the Corps Marshal was Mr. Osita Chidoka, but a look at what the defendants presented as the report did not mentioned or stated that the Corps Marshal participated with the review of the appeal of the claimants. It is trite that there is need to observe fair hearing where the body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or executive from inception, acts judicially in the sense that it is to determine the civil rights and obligations of a person or to find him guilty or liable of fault, then he must be given a hearing before the issue can be properly decided. That is the intendment of Section 36(1) of the Constitution. Indeed that is the essence of fair hearing as a constitutional right. In such cases the hearing body must be seen to have observed all the implications and attributes of fair hearing. The claimants contended that the defendants’ assertion that they complied with the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations on Maintenance of Discipline cannot hold water. In other words, the claimants are asking and demanding for the recommendation or the action taken by the Corps Marshal to the appeal which they claimed was not tendered before the court. That Exhibits A2 and A3 are the recommendations of A. A. Abu and Chidi D. Nwachukwu the Corps Marshal for the termination of the claimants’ appointments. What can be deduced from the cross examination already reproduced above is that the procedure laid down in the Federal Road Safety Commission Regulations and Maintenance of Discipline was not followed by the defendants. I resolve this issue in favour of the claimants. I will now proceed to consider the 2nd issue which is:- Whether the defendants have been able to establish the allegation for bribery and claimants being in possession of money beyond N100.00 (One Hundred Naira) allowed. The allegation by the defendants against the claimants in this suit is that they were caught taken bribe while on patrol by the surveillance team at the Calabar Sector Command and according to the surveillance team when they were searched the sum of N13,000.00 was found on one of them. The money was tendered as Exhibit at the trial. The claimants denied the allegation and claimed that they were forced to make confessional statement under duress. The defendants called five witnesses to prove the allegation against the claimants. A video recording of how the arrest and the search was conducted on the claimants was shown in the court room. I must say that all effort to prove that the money was found on the body of one of the claimants by the video recording was not successful. That portion of the video showing when the money was recovered from the body of one of the claimants was not captured by the Video recording. The N13,000.00 money claimed that was found was held by one of the surveillance team member and that was the only area of the video recording relating to the alleged N13,000.00 was ever seen. It would have been easier for the court to come to the conclusion that actually the money was found on one of the claimants in patrol that faithful day, but the video did not bring out such picture. The claimants claimed they were threatened with gun. As such they were afraid and that they were forced to agree that N13,000.00 was found on one of them. In the course of watching the video clips the voice of the Sector Commander was heard where he threatened to slap the claimants if they talked again. This in my view could put fear in the minds of the claimants and it is difficult for the court to conclude that the claimants were not threatened. It would therefore be difficult for the court to found the claimants guilty of the offence. I also resolve this issue in favour of the claimants and their letters of termination dated 22nd March, 2012 are hereby set aside, and they are to be reinstated to their former positions, their salaries and allowances be paid to them from the date of the termination of their appointments. For the reasons given above, the claimants claims succeed and Judgment is entered in their favour. Judgment is entered accordingly. _________________________________ HON. JUSTICE O. A, SHOGBOLA JUDGE.