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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Dated: October 08, 2015 SUIT NO. NICN/OW/106/2014 Between Dr. Kenneth Nkuma-Udah - Claimant And 1. Abia State Teaching Hospital Board 2. Abia State University Teaching Hospital Defendants Representation: I. A. Agwa for the Claimant Nnamdi Ahunanya for the Defendants RULING/JUDGMENT The Claimant filed this action on the 27th day of November 2014, seeking the following reliefs against the defendants: 1. A declaration that the Claimant is still in the employment of the Defendants. 2. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all his salaries, allowances and entitlements at the rate of N90,506.95 per month, totaling the sum of N5,068,336.00 from the month of January 2009 to August 2013. 3. An order compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the said sum of N5,068,336.00 being his salaries, allowances and entitlements from January 2009 to August 2013 and all salary increments/arrears. 4. An order compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant his salaries, allowances and entitlements at the rate of N90,506.95 from August 2013 until judgment. 5. 10% interest on the judgment sum until final liquidation of the entire judgment sum. 6. An order compelling the Defendants to recall the Claimant to work immediately. By a notice of preliminary objection filed on the 27the day of February 2015 brought pursuant to Order 11, Rule 1 (3) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, Counsel for the defendants/applicants prayed the Court for an order dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction of the Court. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is based are as follows: a. The action is statute barred as the cause of action is predicated on contract and the suit was filed outside the 5 years period stipulated under the Limitation Law of Abia State. b. Once a cause of action is statute barred, the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court to entertain same is ousted. In support of the application is a 13 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Ogechi Ogu, upon which the applicants placed reliance. In the accompanying written address, counsel for the defendants counsel articulated a sole issue for argument; to wit: “Whether the action is statute barred as the cause of action is predicated on tort/contract and the suit was filed outside the 5 years period stipulated under the Limitation Law of Abia State. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted, on the authority of ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) SC 76 at 117 that, an objection to the jurisdiction of the court can be raised at any time, even when there are no pleadings filed and a party raising such an objection need not bring an application under any rule of the court. The application can be brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court”. Furthermore, a point of law can be raised on a preliminary objection, if the point of law will be decisive of the whole litigation. Even if it is raised on ground of jurisdiction, the court looks at the plaintiff’s statement of claim and not on the defence. The issue of jurisdiction is determined on the plaintiff’s demand and not on the defendant’s answer. There is no gain saying the fact that the jurisdiction of a court is very fundamental to the adjudication. If a court lacks jurisdiction, it lacks the necessary competence to entertain the claim before it. Where an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an action, the court at that stage has to enquire whether in fact is jurisdiction has been ousted. See Aremo II vs. Adekanye (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) SC 572 at 589 – 590. Counsel urged the Court to hold that irrespective of the means through which it was raised, the issue of jurisdiction once raised will be determined. See Lawal vs. Oke (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 88. It is also the submission of counsel that, the claim of the claimants as endorsed on paragraph 15(i) to (vi) of the statement of facts, is based on the employment of the claimant by the defendants, and the consequences emanating from the directive by the defendants that the claimant should stop work. The said claim consists of two declaratory arms; three orders to compel the defendants to pay the salaries and entitlements of the claimant/recalling the claimant to work and interest hence the heads of claim are under contract and Section 18 of the Limitation Law Chapter 114 Laws of Abia State of Nigeria 2005 Vol. 5 which reads: “No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in parts 2 and 3 of this law shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.” Counsel urged the court to hold on the strength on the above section, that, the claim of the claimant relates to contract. According to counsel, the question to be resolved at this juncture is: when did the cause of action regarding the claimant’s claim arise? The claimant averred that, he was offered employment on the 2nd of November 2007. The claimant further asserted in his statement of facts that he duly continued to work in the employ of the defendants until sometime in September 2009 when he was directed to stop work by the defendants (paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said statement of facts). Deducing from the above stated paragraphs, counsel urged the Court to hold that, as at September 2009 and thereafter, the claimant had obeyed the defendant’s directive which predicates the cause of action within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Law. The logical conclusion therefore is that, the cause of action accrued immediately after the claimant stopped work. Furthermore, the claimant averred that he duly received his salaries from the defendants from the date of his employment until December 2008 and that the defendants have refused to pay him since January 2009. The cause of action as regards the non-payment of, or refusal to pay, the claimant’s salaries therefore commenced from January, 2009. It is trite that, where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period of time; in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. An action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. See INEC vs. Okoronkwo (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 488) 227 at 247. Counsel submitted that, in the present action, the statute (i.e. the limitation law) specified that the right of action in respect of cases bothering on contract/tort lapses after Five (5) years hence the claimant’s right of action having accrued since January 2009 (for salaries owed him) and September, 2009 (in respect of the directive issued to him to stop work) definitely has lapsed and the action is no longer maintainable against the defendants. Counsel referred to and relied on, paragraphs 6 - 10 of the affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, in respect to the computation of time, from the date of action of the causes of action to the date the suit was filed. As stated in Elabanjo vs. Dawodu (supra) at page 132 thus: “a statute of limitation removes the right of action; the right of enforcement, the right of judicial relief and leaves the plaintiff with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce where an action has become statute barred by operation of the Limitation of Law or Act, the effect is that the cause of action becomes extinguished by operation of law and can no longer be maintained in the courts.” Counsel urged the Court to uphold the preliminary objection on this ground and dismiss this suit for want of competence, being statute barred by virtue of the Limitation Law afore stated. In conclusion, counsel submitted that, the law is, where the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit, its duty is to strike out the suit for want of jurisdiction. More so, where a defendant raises an objection, as in the instant case, that the claimant’s action is caught by Limitation Statute; the proper order that should be made in the given circumstance is not one of striking out, but of dismissal of the said action because there is nothing to be saved or salvaged there from. See NPA. vs. LOUIS PLASTICS LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158. In response to the Defendants’ motion for dismissal, counsel for the Claimant filed a reply dated the 16th day of June 2015 and filed on the 17th day of June 2015, wherein counsel submitted that; the doctrine of Statute of Limitation creates an exception where the injury complained of is a continuing one. He referred the court to the case of Kwara State CSC vs. Abiodun (2010) 11 NWLR 52 @ 112 – 114 where it was held that; in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action the court must examine the plaintiff’s claim as expressed on the writ of summons. The law is trite that where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. See also Offoboche vs. Ogoja Local Govt. (2001) Vol. 8 MSJC 153. In paragraph 13 of the statement of facts establishing the cause of action, the claimant averred of a letter written by his Solicitor dated 20/3/13 and delivered to the defendants on 4/4/13 by courier. The said letter was for demand of the salaries and entitlements of the claimant; the letter was not acted upon by the defendants. It is the submission of counsel that, the cause of action arose from the date of letter written by the claimant since it is a continuing injury which emanated from September, 2009 and continues to run till the letter of demand by the claimant. Counsel equally argued that, the injury is still ongoing and have not ceased, going by the directive of the defendants to the claimant to stop work until “further directives”. Such further directives that could have terminated, expelled or suspended the claimant officially would have given the claimant the exact cause of action never came, therefore making the injury continuous. Counsel made further reference to the case of Dr. Charles Oladeinde Williams vs. Madam Olaitan Williams (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) pg. 364 at 383, where the Supreme Court per Musdapher JSC. relying on the Old English case of Board of Trade vs. Cayzer Iryine & Co. Ltd. (1927) AC 610; held that “time begins to run when there is in existence a person sued and all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The Supreme Court in the Williams case (supra) relying on its earlier case of Lasisi Fadare & Ors vs. AG Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1 @ 7 went on to define the term cause of action as “denoting every fact (though not every piece of evidence) which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed to support his Right to the judgment of the court”. In the instant case, counsel argued that, the claimant’s letter of 30/3/2013 was the last fact that gave the claimant the cause of action. The claimant also pleaded in paragraph 8 of his statement of claim that in September 2009 the defendants asked him to stop work until “further directives” are received. He did not state anywhere that he was sacked or his employment determined in September 2009. The said “further directives” are yet to be received till date (that is the date of filing the suit) and this is part of the cause of action. It is therefore obvious that till date, the cause of action is still continuing. Furthermore, it is from the date, the demand was made for the payment that time began to run. This is the position with debts, as in the instant case. Also from the pleadings, it is clear that the claimant neither sued for breach of contract nor that his employment has been terminated. Counsel submitted that, it is a settled principle of law that for the purpose of determination of whether or not the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case, it is the claim of the claimant that the court must look at. See Alhaji Usman Magaji vs. Maidorowa Matari (2005) 5 SC 46 at 47. The claimant is claiming an order of the court, compelling the defendants to pay him his salaries, entitlements and allowances thus being within jurisdiction of this court. Also, that the defendants’ application is misconceived. It is trite that time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who be sued and all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. See Fadare & Ors vs. AG Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1. It is also settled that in order to determine whether a suit is statute barred, it is the statement of claim that the court would look at. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of his statement of claim, the claimant clearly pleaded as follows:- “Following the above position, the claimant, along with some other members of staff by a letter dated 20/3/2013 written through their solicitor made a complaint of the non-payment of their salaries and other entitlements due to them and requested that some be paid to them. The claimant shall at the trial rely on a copy of the said letter which was sent by courier to the defendants and duly delivered on 4/4/2013”. Also, a look at paragraph 15 of the statement of claim shows that the claimant is claiming his salaries from January, 2009 to August 2013.It is therefore obvious that the entire facts pleaded and being relied upon by the claimant occurred between: (i) November 2007 (paragraph 3 of the statement of claim.) (ii) 6/11/2007 (paragraph 6 of the claim) (iii) September 2009. (iv) 4/4/2013 (Paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim; and (v) August 2013 (paragraphs 15 (ii) & (iii) of the Statement of Claim). Counsel submitted that, the defendants’ argument can only be upheld if, the position of the law in determining whether an action is statute barred is to look at when some of the facts occurred, and not when the entire facts occurred. The position of the law at however, is that the court would look at when the entire facts occurred. Five years from 4/4/2013 would end on 4/4/2018. The suit filed on 27/11/2014 is therefore well within time. The court was urged by counsel, to discountenance the objection by the defendants. Equally, Section 7(1) (a) paragraphs (i) & (ii) of NIC Act 2006 confers on the Court the jurisdiction to entertain this matter. It provides for this court to exercise and have exclusive jurisdiction on matters of industrial relations. This is a clear case of industrial relationship as it is a matter between employer/employee. The applicants contend that this suit is statue barred regard being had to Section 18 of Limitation of Action of Abia State. It has been held in plethora of cases that claims for salaries and wages of workers cannot become statute barred by limitation of action laws. See Captain Tony Oyhide & Ors. vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd. unreported suit No. NIC/3/2008. Similarly, in John Ovoh vs. The Nigerian Westminister Dredging and Marine Ltd. unreported Suit No. NIC/9/2002, the court held thus relying on the decision of FGN vs. Zebra (2003) 3 WRN 1 @ 33 the court held: “Assuming we are wrong in all we have said so far and it is that issues of limitations of action actually go to jurisdiction, the point remains whether labour rights are covered by the Limitation laws. The respondents seems to think so, arguing in the process that collective agreements are contracts and so covered by the limitation laws. We do not share the view of the Respondent. Consequently, we do not think that the rights of workers are caught up by the limitation laws, for to think otherwise would mean that even rights as to salaries and entitlements of an office would be time barred”. It is the submission of counsel, that from the claims endorsed in our complaint and statement of facts that the reliefs being sought for is salaries, entitlements and have shown that the claimant was paid one month salary. Therefore, since the case of the claimant is for salaries and entitlements, Section 18 of limitation laws of Abia State does not affect their claims. See FGN vs. Zebra (2003) 3 WRN 1 at 33. It was equally contended in See FGN vs. Zebra (supra) that whenever an action is brought upon contract, the Section (Limitation) does not apply, for the Section will not apply to an action brought for something done or omitted to be done under an express contract because the refusal or omission to pay would be a failure to comply with the terms of the contract and not with the provisions of the statute. Therefore, this is a dispute in relation to labour or work done by the claimants for the applicants and this matter is a civil cause that relates to labour or matters incidental thereto as per Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act 2006 for which this court has jurisdiction to try it. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to hold as follows: 1. That this court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 2. That this suit is not statute barred. 3. That the defendants/applicants application be dismissed with excruciating cost. In the defendants/applicants in their dated and filed on the 1st day of July 2015, counsel submitted that, the argument of learned respondent’s counsel on the point that; the instant action is not statute barred because the injury giving rise to the cause of action is still ongoing, is misplaced and misconceived. The stoppage of payment of salaries was on a defined/definite date as admitted in paragraphs 1.1 of the argument of the respondent’s counsel as same “Emanated from September 2009”. The date of accrual of the cause of action cannot be predicated on the date the letter of demand was made. It is the view of the defendants/ applicants’ counsel that the Learned counsel for the respondents is “confusing” the continuance of the injurious effect of the legal injury that occurred from September 2009 with continuance of that act which caused the injury or damage. As enunciated by this Honourable Court in the unreported case of NICN/OW/38/2013 Ugoala Chindinma Joy (Mrs.) vs. ASUBEB & 4Ors (unreported Judgment of Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe (J) on 28/4/2014): “Continuance of injury or damage has been held in a plethora of cases to mean the Continuance of the act which caused the injury or damage, and not merely continuance of the injurious effect of a legal injury. It means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It doesn’t mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See Olaosebikan vs. Williams (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 437 @ 456; Obiefuna vs. Okoye (1961) All NLR 357”. The legal injury could not have commenced on the date the letter of demand was written. Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that this case does not fall within the ambit of continuing injury as contended by learned respondent’s counsel. Finally on this issue, in a sister case wherein the issue of when the cause of action arose. In the judgment in suit No: NICN/EN/218/2013 Dr. Okocha Sunday K. vs. Absuth Board & Anor (unreported judgment of Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe (J) delivered on 4th December 2014) the Honourable Court held inter-alia thus: “Therefore from September 2009 when the defendants directed the claimant to stop work and exhibited other conducts suggestive of termination of the claimant’s employment, the claimant’s employment was deemed terminated from that month…I find and hold that the claimant’s employment is no longer subsisting effective from September, 2009”. The above case is in pari materia with this present case. Hence, the finding of the Court holds as regards the date of accrual of the cause of action. See also the other cases of: 1. NICN/EN/217/2013 Dr. Nwachi vs. Absuth Board; 2. NICN/OW/26/2013 Dr. Micheal vs. Absuth Board; and 3. NICN/OW/27/2013 Dr. Chidi vs. Absuth Board (all unreported judgments of Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe (J) delivered on 4th December 2014). Also, counsel contended that, the instant case does not border on industrial relationship and urge the court to so hold. It is rather, a relationship of master and servant, which can be terminated orally, or in writing or by conduct. Similarly, it is the submission of counsel that, the cases of Oghide & Ors vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd (unreported) Suit No: NIC/3/2008); Ovoh vs. The Nigerian Westminister Dredging and Marine Ltd. unreported Suit No. NIC/9/2002) and FGN vs. Zebra (2003) 3 WRN 1 @ 33; (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 to the effect that claims for salaries and wages of workers cannot become statute barred by limitation of action, are not applicable to this case as the facts and issues adumbrated therein are different. In the case of FGN vs. Zebra Energy Ltd. (supra), the apex court considered whether the Public Officers Protection Act applied to cause of contract and held that the Act was not intended by the legislature to apply to contracts. The Apex Court did not consider the limitation law (of Abia State) and the Section 18 of the Limitation Law Cap. 114 Laws of Abia State is not in pari materia with the Public Officers Protection Act considered by the Apex Court. The Honourable Court was urged to discountenance the argument based on the said case. The case of Ovoh vs. NWDM Ltd. (supra) as decided on the 17th of July, 2007 was with respect to the interpretation of the provisions of the terminal benefits of the Junior Staff of the defendant company under a collective agreement of 30th June, complemented by the Agreement of 31st August, 1994. The ruling on the motion to set aside the main judgment in the above case Ovoh vs. NWDM Ltd. was delivered on 1st April, 2008. And the arguments were predicated on, whether the Honourable Court could review its judgment based on the fact that as at the time the suit was instituted, the cause of action was statute barred regards being had to Section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State. While the applicants argued that collective agreement was a simple contract caught by the said limitation law, the respondents argued to the contrary that the collective agreement was between a trade union and an employer hence is a peculiar one and a specialized area of law regulated by its peculiar laws – labour law. The Hon. Court held inter alia that it had power to review its judgment but that the issue of limitation laws “should be raised as a defence to an action for a court may have jurisdiction to entertain a matter but may nevertheless Rule in favour of the defence on the ground that the matter is statute barred”. It was on this basis that the pronouncement cited by learned respondent’s counsel was made. Indeed the Honourable Court did not delve into the merits or otherwise of the applicability of the limitation laws to cases of simple or quasi contracts. The full statement of the Honourable Court reads as follows: “Assuming we are wrong in all we have said so far, and it is that issues of limitation of action actually go to jurisdiction, the point remains whether labour rights are covered by the limitation laws. The respondent seems to think so, arguing in the process that collective agreements are contracts and so covered by the limitation laws. We do not share this view of the respondent. The limitation laws cited by the respondent talk of simple or quasi-contracts. We do not think collective agreements can be so branded. It is wrong for the respondents to go to the dictionaries for the definition of a collective agreement when the Trade disputes Act (TDA) Cap 432 LTN 1990 in Section 47(1) and the NIC Act 2006 in section 54(1) have statutorily defined a collective agreement. A collective agreement is not a simple or a quasi-contract, but one that is specialized, dealing with matters statutory laid down, and for which this court has interpretative jurisdiction specifically provided for in section 7 of the NIC Act. Consequently we do not think that the rights of workers are caught up by the limitation laws, for to think otherwise would mean that even rights as to salaries and entitlement of an office would be time barred” Hence, counsel submitted that the issue of limitation laws as it pertains to a simple or quasi-contract (as is the situation in the present application) was not an issue canvassed and determined in the above ruling of the Court. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. With respect to, the case of NIC/3/2008 Oghide & Ors vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd & Ors, counsel urged the Court to distinguish the above cited case from the present case because the sections of law under consideration are not the same. Thus, the case of Oghide vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd cannot be an authority for this present case. According to Counsel, Section 8(1) of the Limitation Law Cap 118, Laws of Lagos State and Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Abia State are materially different. The case of Oghide vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd cannot be an authority for this present case. As was stated in the said case, “It is the contention of Learned Counsel to the Claimants that the contract of employment between the claimants and defendants is a specific contract and not a simple contract. Looking at paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, the contract of employment was not in writing. It is therefore a simple contract. The case of F.G.N. vs. Zebra Energy Ltd (Supra) cited by counsel in support of his contention is not applicable. The following cases cited by both counsel; Donatus Onumalobi vs. NNPC & anor, CBN vs. Adedeji, NPA vs. C.G.A.C. spa and FGN vs. Zebra energy are not relevant to the determination of this application as the facts and statutes considered therein are not similar to Section 8(1)(a) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State and have no bearing on this application.” This same argument is equally being extended to the unreported decisions of this Honourable Court in suit Nos: NICN/EN/217/2013 – Dr. Nwachi vs. Absuth Board; NICN/EN/218/2013 Dr. Okocha vs. Absuth Board ; NICN/OW/26/2013 – Dr. Michael vs. Absuth Board and NICN/OW/27/2013 – Dr. Chidi vs. Absuth Board (all unreported judgments of Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe (J) delivered on 4th December, 2014), in which the Hon. Court held that Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia State did not apply to rob the court of jurisdiction. Counsel contended that the issue canvassed and dealt with was only the Public Officers Protection Law of Abia state and did not extend to the Limitation Laws of Abia State. Both Sections under consideration are also not in pari materia with each other. Counsel also urged the Court to hold that the ambit of Section 18 of the afore-stated Limitation Law of Abia State does not provide for any divisions or classifications into simple contract, contract under seal or statutory contract etc. A judge is enjoined to interpret the provisions of the law and give it its grammatical and ordinary meaning and not to distort its construction. See Bakare vs. N.R.C (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 391) 1579 @ 1619 ratio 10. Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Abia State is clear and unambiguous. Hence, the duty of the Court in such a situation is simple - to give the words their ordinary meaning. See A.D.H. Ltd vs. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 392) 1781 @ 1825 ratio 9. In conclusion, counsel urged the Court to discountenance the entire arguments of claimants/respondent counsel and uphold the objection on the following grounds: a. The Honourable Court had already held in sister cases that the cause of action accrued from September, 2007 hence it is not a case of continuing injury. b. The cases cited by Learned Respondents counsel are distinguishable from the contention in the present case. c. The Honourable Court is enjoined to interpret the statutory Provision of Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Abia State by giving it their ordinary meaning. Having carefully considered the ground of this Preliminary Objection, the defendants’ affidavit in support thereof and the submissions of counsels to the parties in their respective written addresses for and against the objection, one issue arises for determination. It is whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred? The defendants pray this court to dismiss the claimant’s suit for the reason that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. The lack of jurisdiction, according to the defendants, is because the claimant’s action, which is predicated on contract, is statute barred having been filed outside the 5 years period stipulated under the Limitation Law of Abia State. In the affidavit in support of the NPO, it is averred that from the facts in the claimant’s statement of facts, the suit is predicated on contract and the claimant’s cause of action arose sometimes in January and September, 2009 when the defendants issued a directive asking the claimant to stop work and refused to pay the claimant his salaries and entitlements since January, 2009. The claimant filed this suit on the 27th day of November, 2014 and that the period from when the claimant’s cause of action arose to 27th November 2014 is more than 5 years. It was deposed further that the action is statute barred having been filed outside the 5 years period stipulated under the Limitation Law of Abia State. In his written address, the defendants counsel cited Section 18 of the Limitation Law, Chapter 114 Laws of Abia State 2005 and argued that the claimant’s suit is predicated on the contract of employment with the defendants and his cause of action arose in January and September 2009. The defendants Counsel submitted that by the provision of the limitation law, the claimant ought to have initiated this action within 5 years from the date of the cause of action. As at the date of filing of this action, the defendants counsel further argued, the claimant’s suit has become statute barred. The claimant did not file any counter affidavit to challenge the facts deposed in the defendants’ affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection. The claimant’s counsel only filed a reply to the written address of the defendants counsel. In his submissions, the claimants counsel stated that in determining whether an action is statute barred, the court is to examine the plaintiffs writ and statement claim. He cited the reported cases of KWARA STATE CSC vs. ABIODUN ALHAJI USMAN and MAGAJI vs. MAIDOROWA MATARI on this point. By this line of submission, the claimant’s counsel appears to urge this court to determine this application upon the claimant’s Complaint and the facts as pleaded in the statement of facts. It is even trite that in order to determine if a party’s action is statute barred, the court is only enjoined to look at the plaintiffs’ claims. The period of limitation is determined in a case by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim which alleges when the wrong suffered by the plaintiff was committed and placing it side by side with the date on which the writ was issued. See AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506-507; JSF INV. LTD vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902. In his written address, the claimant’s counsel raised some issues of law and facts in his contention that the claimant’s suit is not statute barred. These points or issues raised by counsel will be considered, when appropriate, in the course of this ruling. Section 18 of Limitation Law of Abia State provides as follows: “No action founded on contract, tort, or any other action not specifically provided for in PARTS II and III of this law shall be brought after the expiration of five (5) years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”. This provision of the Limitation Law of Abia State is to the effect that actions founded on contract are statute barred if they are not instituted within 5 years of the accrual of the cause of action. By the provision, this action of the claimant, which is founded on contract of employment, ought to be commenced against the defendants within five years of the accrual of the cause of action. It is trite law that suits instituted outside the time stipulated by the limitation law is statute barred and cannot be entertained by the courts. Where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period of time proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. An action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (PT 328) 604; INEC vs. OKORONKWO (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 488) 227 at 247. In order to determine whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred, there is the need to determine when the cause of action arose and when this suit was filed. There appears to be no dispute as to when the suit was filed. The defendants’ affidavit state the date of filing of this suit to be 27/11/2014. An examination of the endorsement on the Complaint reveals that the Complaint was filed at the Registry of this court on 27/11/2014. The area of disagreement between the parties is the exact time the claimant’s cause of action arose. In paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the defendants aver that it is disclosed in paragraphs 8 and 14 of the claimant’s statement of facts that the cause of action arose sometime in September, 2009 when the defendants issued a directive asking the claimant to stop work and/or in January, 2009 when the defendants refused to pay the claimant his salaries and entitlements. By this deposition, the defendants appear to be saying the claimant’s cause of action arose either in January 2009 or in September 2009. The claimant’s counsel however is of the view that the claimant’s cause of action arose in April 2013 when the defendants received the claimant’s demand letter. In his submissions, the claimant’s counsel said the cause of action arose from the date of the letter written by the claimant since it is a continuing injury which emanated from September, 2009 and continues to run till the letter of demand by the claimant. The test of determining when a cause of action accrues is when it can be said or there exist in the person who can sue and another who can be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. In DAWODU vs. AJOSE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 580) 1334 at 1348 it was stated that- “Time begins to run for the filing of an action when the cause of action arose. This means that once there exist two people with interest at variance to each other over a subject matter, then the aggrieved party must go to court timeously.” Also, it was held in BANK OF THE NORTH vs. GANA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 296) 862 at 881 that cause of action arises at the date or time when a breach or any act that will warrant the person who is adversely affected by the act to take action in court. The reliefs sought by the claimant are as follows: 1. A declaration that the Claimant is still in the employment of the Defendants. 2. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all his salaries, allowances and entitlements at the rate of N90,506.95 per month, totaling the sum of N5,068,336.00 from the month of January 2009 to August 2013. 3. An order compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the said sum of N5,068,336.00 being his salaries, allowances and entitlements from January 2009 to August 2013 and all salary increments/arrears. 4. An order compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant his salaries, allowances and entitlements at the rate of N90,506.95 from August 2013 until judgment. 5. 10% interest on the judgment sum until final liquidation of the entire judgment sum. 6. An order compelling the Defendants to recall the Claimant to work immediately. From these reliefs, it is observed that the claimant seeks orders and declarations touching on the status of his employment and payment of salaries and entitlements. The claimant seeks orders for payment of salaries in reliefs 3 and 4 while in relief 4, he seeks an order for his recall to work. The question at this point is when did the acts which led to these claims occur? I have read the claimant’s statement of facts and I find that the disputes or acts of the defendants which lead the claimant to claim the above reliefs from the defendants are contained in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the statement of facts. It is pleaded in these paragraphs as follows: “9. However, sometimes in September 2009, the defendants issued a notice/directive asking the claimant and some other members of staff to stop work until “further directives” are received. 10. The defendants have up until date not yet issued any further directive and have not paid or been paying the claimant his salary and entitlements till date 11. The claimant has not and did not at any point in time breach any of the terms of his employment and has not done any wrong to warrant suspension.” In view of the principle of law enunciated in DAWODU vs. AJOSE and BANK OF THE NORTH vs. GANA, the reliefs sought by the claimant and the facts of the claimant’s case set out above, it is my view that the cause of action of the claimant’s suit arose in September 2009. From these averments and the reliefs sought by the claimant, it is obvious that his complaint in this case is about non-payment of his salaries and the directive to stop work issued by the defendants in September 2009. The claimant averred that in September 2009, he was directed to stop work until further directives but the “further directives” never came and he didn’t breach any term of his employment to warrant suspension. That is to say as at the day the claimant was directed to stop work, he knew it was a “suspension” and he knew he did not commit any breach of the terms of the employment to deserve being suspended. A cause of action had accrued to the claimant from the moment he was directed to stop work. It is because a wrong has been done to him since the day of the stop work directive that is why he claims a relief for his recall back to work. Before the stop work directive, the claimant’s salaries, which he claims in this suit, were not paid to him. Therefore, from the day of the stop work directive in September 2009, all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed in his claims. From the facts, the claimants’ cause of action accrued in September 2009 and the time started counting against him from that day. In paragraph 14 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded a letter dated 20/3/2013 written to the defendants demanding payment of salaries. The claimant’s counsel has argued on the strength of that pleading that the claimant’s cause of action arose from the date of the demand letter written to the defendants and time began to run from the dated the demand was made for the payment. It must be pointed out here that it is not the letter which gave the claimant the cause of action but rather it is the act or acts of the defendant complained about. The cause of action accrues and time begins to run when the defendant committed the act which is the subject matter of the suit. A cause of action is said to accrue on the particular date which gave rise to the incident in dispute. The incidence in dispute in this case is non-payment of the claimant’s salary and the stop work directive. These incidences culminated in September 2009 by the stop work directive of the defendants from which the claimant has not been recalled till date. The claimant’s letter was a mere demand after the cause of action had arisen. The letter is not what gave the claimant a cause of action. The claimant’s counsel has further argued that the injury is still ongoing and have not ceased going by the directive of the defendants to the claimant to stop work until “further directives”. Counsel submitted that since the “further directives” are yet to be received till date, it makes the injury continuous and the cause of action is still continuing. With respect to the claimant’s counsel, “continuance of injury or damage” as used in judicial authorities as exception to application of statute of limitation has also been interpreted to mean Continuance of the act which caused the injury or damage, and not merely continuance of the injurious effect of a legal injury. It has been held to mean the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See OLAOSEBIKAN vs. WILLIAMS (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 437 @ 456; OBIEFUNA vs. OKOYO (1961) All NLR 357. Therefore, with respect to the claimant’s case, I do not see any continuance or repeat of the acts of the defendants complained of in this suit as to imply a continuance of injury. In fact, the averments of the claimant in paragraph 10 of the statement of facts show that since September 2009, the defendants never took any other step in the matter “till date.” In a related argument, the claimant’s counsel submitted that the doctrine of Statute of Limitation creates an exception where the injury complained of is a continuing one. According to counsel, the law is that where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. He cited OFFOBOCHE vs. OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT. As I have held in the preceding paragraph, there is no continuance of injury present in the circumstance of the instant suit. Therefore, the principle of law relied on by the claimant’s counsel does not apply to this case. Furthermore, the OFFOBOCHE case relied on by the claimant’s counsel was decided on the basis of Section 2 (a) of POPA which expressly provided that where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. The said provision of Section 2 (a) of POPA is quite different from the provision of Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Abia State which is being examined in this ruling. The claimant’s counsel did question whether claims for salaries and wages of workers can become statute barred by limitation of action. The claimant’s counsel expressed the view that claims for salaries and wages of workers cannot become statute barred by limitation of action and that since the case of the claimant is for salaries and entitlements, Section 18 of limitation laws of Abia State does not affect the claimant’s claims. He relied on FGN vs. Zebra, Captain Tony Oyhide & Ors. vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd. unreported suit No. NIC/3/2008. and John Ovoh vs. The Nigerian Westminister Dredging and Marine Ltd. unreported Suit No. NIC/9/2002. In his reply on point of law, the defendant’s counsel submitted, quite correctly in my view, that the cases as cited by the claimant’s counsel are not applicable to this case. In the FGN vs. Zebra Energy Ltd case, it was considered whether the provision of Section 2 of POPA applies to cases of contract, and the Supreme Court held that POPA does not apply to cases of breach of contract and claim for work or labour done. I have indicated earlier in this ruling that the provision of Section 2 of POPA is not the same with the provision of Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Abia State. Therefore, the FGN vs. Zebra Energy case did not involve a statute similar to the one applicable in this suit. The cases of Ovoh vs. NWDM Ltd. and Oyhide & Ors vs. Shona Jason (Nig.) Ltd & Ors, were decided by the NIC. The facts and circumstances of those cases and the limitation statutes considered are not the same with this instant suit. The cases cannot be authority for this present case From the foregoing, all the points canvassed by the claimant’s counsel in arguing that the claimant’s suit is not time barred have failed. The fact remains that the claimant’s cause of action arose in September 2009 and he filed this suit on 27/11/2014. From the time the claimants’ cause of action arose and time this suit was filed, is a period of 5 years, 2 months. By the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation of Law of Abia State, the claimants’ suit is clearly statute barred having been filed more than a period of 5 years from the time the cause of action arose. Consequently, the suit is statute barred and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. The suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge