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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT OWERRI BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.Y ANUWE Date: October 02, 2015 Suit No: NICN/EN/126/2014 Between Mr. Chibuzo Patrick Egbuchere - Claimant And Nigerian Bottling Co. Plc. (Now Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd.) - Defendant Representation: Enyioko O.Chiemele for the Claimant/Respondent E.J. Obi for the Defendant/Applicant RULING/JUDGMENT The Claimant took out a Complaint on the 24th day of May 2013, claiming the following reliefs against the defendant: 1. A declaration that the relationship between the parties herein is guided only by: a. Managerial Service Agreement entered into by the parties on 12/11/90 when the Claimant was a Trainee Manager. b. Nigerian Bottling Company Plc. Senior Staff Handbook which the Claimant signed for to acknowledge its receipt and his acceptance of its contents as demanded by the Defendant. c. Nigerian Bottling Company Plc. Code of Conduct and Grievance Procedure which the Claimant also signed for as in (b) above. d. Car Acquisition Scheme Agreement dated 31st July 2001 made between the Claimant and the Defendant. 2. A Declaration that the documents in paragraph 1(a) to (d) immediately above do not provide for any form of demotion whatsoever as punishment for any offence against the Defendant and so the purported demotion of the Claimant from his confirmed Salary Grade level SM3 to MM1 is null and void. 3. A Declaration that there cannot be any formal appraisal of the Claimant by the Defendant outside the rules and condition of service afore-stated and where any is so conducted, that it is void and of no effect; that the last authentic formal appraisal by the Defendant on the Claimant was carried out in February 2005. 4. A Declaration that the Claimant is still an employee of the Defendant as the Defendant has not validly terminated the Claimant’s appointment with it and the purported letter of termination issued by the Defendant to the Claimant is null and void. 5. A Declaration that the Claimant is not required under the Staff Car Acquisition Scheme Agreement to return his car to the Defendant, the Claimant having fully paid for its value as the balance yet unpaid before the purported termination was deducted from the purported gratuity paid to the Claimant. 6. A Declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant on Salary grade level SM3 has not been validly terminated by the Defendant and an Order that the Claimant is entitled to his full salary and emoluments and other entitlements including annual salary increases and regular upward salary reviews as Senior Manager on SM3 grade from July 2005 till the final determination of this case. 7. An Order that the Defendant pays the Claimant 20% of his annual basic salary as his medical allowance from August 2005 till the final determination of this suit. 8. An order that the Defendant pays the Claimant 25% interest per annum on the Claimant’s Total Annual Salary and Emoluments and their subsequent upward reviews and increases and all other monetary entitlements of the Claimant and compounded from July 2005 till the final determination of this suit. 9. An Order that the Defendant pays the Claimant his correct gratuity based on his employment with the Defendant and on his salary grade level SM3 and calculated from 2nd May 1990 till the final determination of this suit excluding the purported sum paid by the Defendant to the Claimant as his gratuity in November 2005. 10. An Order that the Defendant pays the Claimant the cash equivalent of the Defendant’s mandatory contribution to the Claimant’s Pension Fund based on the Defendant’s policy on this and calculated from August 2005 till the final determination of this case. In addition, an order that the Defendant should also pay the Claimant 25% annual interest on this claim and compounded from August 2005 till the final determination of this suit. 11. An Order directing the Defendant to hand over the car documents of Honda Accord with Registration Number BQ 325 KTU to the Claimant. 12. An Order that the Defendant pays N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as General Damages to the Claimant. By a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on the 23rd day of April, 2015, the Defendant/Applicant urged the court to dismiss this action in its entirety. In the said objection, counsel raised the following issues: 1. That this action is incompetent in that it failed to comply with Mandatory Provisions of Section 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Laws of the Federation 2004. 2. The contract cause of action in this suit was entered in Lagos and performable in Lagos or at Jos at all times material to this action regard being had to the pleadings. The proper court with jurisdiction to entertain claimant’s suit is the National Industrial Court Lagos or Jos. This action filed in the Registry of the National Industrial Court Enugu and later transferred for hearing at the National Industrial Court Owerri, amounts to forum shopping and an abuse of the process of court. 3. The claimant’s employment with the defendant was determined on 1st day of August, 2005. This action was commenced on 24th day of May 2013 i.e. about 7 years and 9 months afterwards. By the relevant limitation laws, this action founded in contract commenced more than 7 years afterwards, is statute barred and thus robs the court of jurisdiction to hear or entertain same. In the accompanying written address, counsel formulated the following three issues for the determination of the Court: 1. Whether this action is not incompetent claimant having failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law as well as Order 7 Rule 10 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. 2. Whether this action filed before the Owerri Division of the National Industrial Court whereas the contract cause of action in this suit was entered in Lagos performable in Lagos or at Jos does not rob this court of the jurisdiction to entertain it. 3. Whether claimant action for alleged breach of contract which occurred on 1/8/2005 and this suit filed on 24/5/2013 i.e 7 years and 9 months afterwards, is not statute barred and robs the court jurisdiction to hear or determine same? In arguing issue one, counsel contended that the claimant failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process law as well as Order 7 Rule 10 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. The endorsement on the complaint, as it relates to the defendant’s address which reads thus: “To Nigerian Bottling Company Plc (Now Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd) NBC House Ebute-Metta, Lagos” It is not in doubt that the defendant resides in Ebute-Metta Lagos State outside the territorial jurisdiction of this National Industrial Court Owerri. And it is trite law, that to compel the attendance of a party resident outside the territorial limits/jurisdiction of a court to submit to the jurisdiction of the said court outside his state of residence, leave of court is required as the jurisdictional powers of a court is circumscribed within its territorial limits. Counsel argued that it is now settled that the words “Out of jurisdiction” in the Rules of court (including the National Industrial Court Rules 2007) has now been interpreted and limited to mean “Out of the territorial/geographical jurisdiction of the State” in which the court is sitting or situate. Consequently, the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act need to be complied with. Also the decision in Owners of the MV Arabella vs. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182 is also applicable to National Industrial Court, pages 220-221 of the said decision reads: “The Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap 407, Laws of the Federal of Nigeria, 1990), according to its heading, is “an Act to make provision for the appointment and duties of Sheriffs, the enforcement of judgments and orders, and the service and execution of civil process of the court throughout Nigeria”. In Section 19(1) of the Act, which is the interpretation section, “Court” is defined as “includes a High Court and a Magistrate Court”. It is not in doubt that the provisions if the said Section 97 of the Act are applicable in all High Court including the Federal High Court .The said provisions, in my view having nothing to do with the coverage of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, which is nation-wide. It is therefore a total misconception to believe that the provisions of the section are inapplicable to the Federal High Court because the jurisdiction of that court covers the entire nation”. It is counsel’s submission, that a proper interpretation of the phrase, “the court may allow service of the process or such document out of jurisdiction in Order 7 Rules 10 of the National Industrial Court Rules” presupposes that no process for service out of the jurisdiction of this court can be served without application to the court to allow or grant leave to the claimant to serve the said processes on the defendant, who resides outside the jurisdiction of the issuing court. Thus, there is need for the claimant to apply for and obtain the leave of this court to serve the defendant who resides outside the jurisdiction of this court with the originating process in this suit. In the instant case, there is nothing on the face of the originating process or in the court case file that the claimant sought leave of this court to serve the defendant the originating process in this suit out of jurisdiction and no such leave was granted. Therefore, counsel submitted, and urged the court to hold, that the claimant having not obtained leave of court to serve this suit filed at the National Industrial Court Registry Enugu (but transferred to Owerri) on the defendant who resides in Lagos outside the territorial/geographical jurisdiction of this court this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit for being incompetent. In arguing issue two, counsel submitted that it is now trite law that in action for breach of contract, the place to institute the action are where the contract was entered, where the contract was performed or was to be performed and or where the defendant resides or does business. See E.B. Co. Ltd. vs. Amobi (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) p 381 at 402 paras. A – C see also F.B.N. Plc vs. Ibraham (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 172. In the instant case, it is not contestable that the defendant resides in Lagos and that the contract offer for employment to the claimant emanated from the defendant’s Head Office in Lagos, it is also not in contest that the claimant’s appointment with the defendant was terminated while he was working at the defendant’s plant in Jos Plateau State where the contract was being performed based on the acceptance of the transfer. Counsel submitted that none of these events took place in Owerri Imo State within the territorial jurisdiction of this court; the National Industrial Court Owerri Division lacks territorial/geographical jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract was not entered in Owerri or the territorial/geographical jurisdiction of this court but in Lagos or Jos. Thus, the action of the claimant amounts to forum shopping and an abuse of court process. Arguing issue three, counsel referred the court to paragraph 30 of the Statement of Facts, wherein the claimant admitted that he received the defendant’s termination letter dated 27/07/2005 terminating his contract of employment on 1/8/2005, this action was filed on the 24/5/2013, a period of over 7 years and 9 months afterwards. Section 8 (1) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State as well as Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Plateau State both provides, that no action for breach of contract shall be brought after six years or five years respectively from the date on which the cause of action accrues. The consequence of an action filed outside the limitation period is that, that action brought becomes statute barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an action that is statute barred. From the above, counsel urged the court to hold that this action is statute barred having been filed outside the limitation period of the relevant states, uphold defendant’s preliminary objection and dismiss this suit in its entirety. The claimant in opposition, on the 22nd day of May 2015, filed a reply to the defendant’s preliminary objection. The said reply raised counsel raised three issues in response to the three grounds of the defendant’s Preliminary Objection as follows: 1. Whether the provisions of Sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act apply to the National Industrial Court and if failure to comply with it makes this suit incompetent? 2. Whether this action filed at Enugu Division and later transferred to Owerri Division of the National Industrial Court robs this court of its jurisdiction to entertain this matter? 3. Whether this action that emanated from a purported termination of the claimant’s employment with the defendant on 27th July, 2005 and an action was commenced in 2006 at Abia State High Court, Aba and was struck out by the court for want of jurisdiction by virtue of the Amendment of the 1999 constitution. (The Third Alteration) Act 2010 can be said to be statute barred. In arguing issue one, counsel submitted that the National Industrial Court has only one territorial jurisdiction and that is the whole Federation. Section 21 (1) of National Industrial Court Act provides inter alia: “The court shall have an exercise jurisdiction throughout the Federation and for that purpose the whole area of the Federation shall be divided by the president of the court into such number of Judicial Division, as the president may, from time to time, by instrument published in the Federal Gazette or decided, and may, designate any such judicial division or part thereof by such name as he thinks fits”. Thus, the Sheriff and Civil Process Act did not and does not contemplate the National Industrial Court, which is a special court. On its interpretation of court, ‘court’ is defined as “includes a High Court and a Magistrate’s court see (Part II) section 2 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act (supra) defines court to include the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja or of the State. Section 95 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act (Part VII) , the part that deals with issue of service, provides that ‘Court’ means a court to which parts iii, iv, v and vi apply. It is counsel’s submission that the express mention of one or more things in a statutory provision automatically excludes the other and urged the court to so hold. See Agundi vs. Commissioner of Police (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 660) pg. 1247 para E – F. Assuming the Sheriff and Civil Process Act applies to the National Industrial Court, counsel submitted, it must be subject to the Rules of this court especially as connects to the issue of issuance and service of summons. Section 94 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act which provides inter alia that: “The Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja with the approval of the President, and the Chief Judge of a State with the approval the State Governor, may make rules of court in respect of any of the following matters:- (a) The condition precedent to the issue of any process (b) The issue of process against to or against any person or class of persons. (c) Anything to be done by any person in respect of the issue or execution of process..” Also, Section 96(2) of Sheriff and Civil Process Act shows that the provision of Section 96(1) is subject to the Rules of the Court where the writ to be served is issued. A cursory look at Sections 96, 97, 98 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act and the National Industrial Court Rules do not provide for leave of the court before issuance or service of a writ, hence leave of court is not necessary before a writ is issued or served. It is counsel’s opinion that, the case of Owners of the MV “Arabella” vs. N.A.I.C (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 443) pg. 1208, cited by the learned counsel for the defendant/applicant does not apply to the instant suit. The court in the case of Owners of the MV “Arabella” held inter alia; that the provisions of the Federal High Court Act guide the service of the processes of the Federal High Court as a court established by the National Assembly. See Pg. 1216 (supra). The court also held that ‘service of a writ out of jurisdiction as in the instant case is not a matter of the discretion of the court. Not only is it provided for in the Rules of the Federal High Court (Order 10, Rule 14 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976 which provision must be obeyed, it is crucial to the prosecution of an action in the court….’ See p. 1228., paras. E – F. Whereas, the matter was decided based on the Federal High Court Act and Rules that provides for leave, in this present case the National Industrial Court Act and Rules do not provide for leave before a writ is issued or served. Counsel urged the court to hold; that the Sheriff and Civil Process Act does not apply to the National Industrial Court and failure to make the prescribed endorsement on a writ of summons for service outside a state is a procedural irregularity. In other words, it is not an issue that affects the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate in a matter. See Christaben Group Ltd & Anor vs. Oni (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 504) pg. 1438 R4 at pg. 1442. On issue two, counsel submitted that a suit can be filed in any registry of the court where the defendant or respondent resides, carries on business, or has presence. Order 2 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 provides: “Subject to the provisions of the Act on transfer of suits, an originating process in respect of a matter in which the court has jurisdiction shall be filed in any registry of the court nearest to where the defendant or respondent resides or has presence or in which the defendant/respondent carries on business”. Paragraph 2 of the claimant’s statement of fact provides that “the defendant is a Multinational Public Company (now, a private) Ltd. Liability Company that has offices, plants and presence in all parts of Nigeria including Aba, Abia State and Enugu in Enugu State within jurisdiction of this honourable court”. This position was expressly admitted by paragraph 3 of the defendant/applicant in his statement of defence. Hence any originating process filed against the defendant in the registry of any of these divisions of National Industrial Court does not amount to forum shopping or abuse of court process. Counsel submitted that assuming, that this suit was filed in a wrong judicial division, it can only be viewed as a mere irregularity and may also be tried in this division unless the president of this court otherwise directs. See Order 2 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. The third issue was argued by counsel, by recounting brief facts that led to the emergence of this suit. The claimant filed a suit sometime in 2006 before Abia State High Court, holden at Aba as Suit No. A/338/06 which was already at the hearing stage before it was struck out on 4th March, 2013 for want of jurisdiction by virtue of the amendment of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration Act 2010), especially, Section 254 of the (Third Amendment Act 2010) which enlarged the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. The writ of summons is already before the court. See paragraph 3 of the claimant’s statement of fact. The Third Alteration Act 2010 has its commencement date as 4th day of March, 2011. On 24th May 2013, the claimant re-filed this suit before the National Industrial Court. He argued that, the concept of limitation of an action is based in the principle of equity that a person who is aware of his rights, but allows them to go stale shall not be allowed to revive the said stale action to the detriment of an adversary. It is based on one of the principles of equity that states thus: Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Thus, the principal question to be considered by the court; is whether the claimant/respondent has folded his hands and allowed his right to go stale. In other words, whether the claimant/respondent has been vigilant or indolent in this matter? Counsel submitted that the claimant has not been indolent in this matter, but has taken steps to ventilate his right at Abia State High Court which had jurisdiction over this matter until 2011 when the 1999 Constitution was amended by the (Third Alteration Act 2010). According to counsel, there is no fault, negligence or indolence on the part of the claimant/respondent, but an act of government, independent of the claimant, see the cases of Chukwu vs. Amadi (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 472) @ pg. 1193, ratios 4 & 5,and P.N. Uddoh Trade Co. Ltd vs. Abere (1996) NWLR pg. 479 @ paras. E – G. This matter has been a subject of litigation since 2006 until 4th March, 2013 when it was struck out by Abia State High Court due to lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the Amendment of 1999 Constitution by (third Alteration Act 2010) and was re-filed on 24th May 2013. It was at the hearing stage before it was struck out for want of jurisdiction by virtue of the Amendment of the 1999 Constitution. (Third Alteration Act 2010). Counsel submitted that based on the history and peculiarity of this case, striking out this case at this point will amount to an infringement of the claimant/respondent’s right for fair hearing as embodied in section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, that reads: “In the determination of the civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law in such manner as to secure the independence and impartiality”. At all material time, from when the cause of action arose, the claimant has not been indolent to ventilate his right and cannot be deprived of that right by virtue of any act without the fault of the claimant and counsel urged the court to so hold and save this suit, and discountenance the Objection of the defendant/applicant. In the defendant/applicant’s reply on point of law filed on 9/6/2015, counsel submitted that it is settled that in other to determine whether a claimant action is statute barred or not, the only document the court is obliged to look at is the Statement of Claim or the Statement of Facts as in the instant case to the see when the cause of action arose and when the suit was filed. See Ibekwe vs. I.S.E. M.B. (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1134) 234. By paragraphs 28 and 30 of the Statement of Facts the claimant clearly pleaded and admitted that he received the letter dated 27th July, 2005 on 23/9/2005 terminating his appointment with the defendant. A perusal of the complaint before the Court show that the claimant filed this action at the registry of this National Industrial Court on 24/5/2013 (a period of almost eight years) after the cause of action arose. The claimant did not deny that the said cause of action accrued in 2005, thus the claimant’s contention that he filed suit No. A/338/2006: Chibuzor Egbuchere vs. Nigerian Bottling Company over the same subject matter before the High Court Abia State cannot avail the claimant as Abia State High Court is not the same as the National Industrial Court. Secondly, the suit before this court was instituted as a fresh suit and was not transferred from Abia State High Court to the National Industrial Court. Thus, the said suit no. A/338/2006: Chibuzor Egbuchere vs. Nigerian Bottling Company not being a suit pending before this court. Counsel submitted that this Court has no power/jurisdiction under the National Industrial Court Act or the Rules to take cognizance of such suit to determine whether this present suit is statute barred or not. It is now the law that parties cannot by their own act/agreement confer jurisdiction on a court where the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a matter. The import of statute of limitation law is not to deprive a plaintiff his right of action but that the said action no matter how meritoriously it may become is now stale and no court has jurisdiction to revive an action that is statute barred. Counsel finally urged the court to uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the action for been statute barred. Having heard the submissions of learned counsels to the parties on the defendant’s Notice of preliminary objection, two issues evolve for determination: 1. Whether this court is the proper division of the NIC to entertain this suit. 2. Whether the suit is competent. Grounds 1 and 3 of the defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection touch on the very existence of the claimant’s suit and it should have been more appropriate to determine them first. But the implication of ground 2 of the Notice of Preliminary Objection is whether it is this court that should hear or determine those issues. In the said ground 2 of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the defendants contended that the cause of action in this suit was entered in Lagos and performable in Lagos or at Jos. The proper court with jurisdiction to entertain claimant’s suit is the National Industrial Court in Lagos or Jos. In effect, the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of this Division of the NIC to take any step in this suit. I shall therefore consider that ground of the Notice of Preliminary Objection first. I have to determine if this court is the proper court to even determine this application or the suit itself. I have observed that the Notice of Preliminary Objection is not supported by affidavit evidence. The defendants opted to rely on pleaded facts and other processes of the parties on record. In his written address, the defendant’s counsel submitted that National Industrial Court Owerri Division lacks territorial/geographical jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract was entered in Lagos and was being carried on in Jos at the time the cause of action arose. According to counsel, in an action for breach of contract, the place to institute the action are where the contract was entered, where the contract was performed or was to be performed and or where the defendant resides or does business. In resolving this issue, there is need to bring out some vital facts shown on the pleading of the claimant and in the record. In paragraph 2 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that the defendant “has offices, plants and presence in all parts of Nigeria including Aba, Abia state and Enugu in Enugu State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.” The claimant served in the defendant’s Aba and Owerri plants before he was transferred in June 2005 to the defendant’s Jos plant. The claimant resumed in Jos and worked in the defendant’s plant until September 2005 when his employment was terminated. The claimant filed this instant suit on 24th May 2013 in the Enugu Judicial Division of the NIC and by a directive of the Presiding Judge of the Enugu Division made on 9/9/2013, the suit was assigned to this division of the NIC, which is now seized of the matter. From the foregoing facts, the defendant does business in, among other places, Aba, Enugu, Owerri and Jos and the claimant did serve the defendant in these places. Order 2 Rule 1 of the NIC Rules 2007 provides thus: “Subject to the provision of the Act on transfer of suits, an originating process in respect of a matter in which the court has jurisdiction shall be filed in any registry of the court nearest to where the defendant or respondent resides or has presence or in which the defendant or respondent carries on business.” The claimant’s cause of action arose from the contract of employment he had with the defendant. Judicial authorities have also made the point that in determining the forum in which to commence an action in contract against a defendant, the suit may be commenced where the contract was entered, where the contract was performed or was to be performed and or where the defendant resides or does business. The case of E.B. CO. LTD. vs. AMOBI (SUPRA) and F.B.N. PLC vs. ABRAHAM (SUPRA) cited by the defendant’s counsel are on this point. Now, by the rules of this court and the judicial authorities, the forum in which the claimant may commence his action is not limited to where his cause of action arose or where the defendant resides. The law has given him the options to file the suit either where the defendant has presence or where the defendant carries on business. The places disclosed in the claimant’s pleading where the defendant carries on business among others, are Aba, Enugu, Owerri, Jos. The employment contract between the parties was also performed, at different times, in these locations. Any of the divisions of the NIC whose jurisdiction covers Aba, Owerri, Enugu or Jos can entertain this suit. In addition to the fact that the defendant has presence and does business in Owerri, which fact alone confers this court with jurisdiction under the rules to try this suit, this division of NIC also entertains cases from Abia State, Enugu State and Rivers State, among others. It was on the basis of this geographic jurisdictional spread of this division that this suit was assigned to this division in the first place. It is my strong view, and I so hold, that this division of the NIC can entertain and try this suit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, assuming without not so holding that this suit was filed in the wrong Judicial Division of the NIC, the jurisdiction of this court to continue to hear the suit is not affected as a result. Rule 3 of Order 2 of the Rules of this court states: “where any suit is commenced in the wrong judicial Division, it may be tried in that Division unless the President of the court otherwise Directs.”. It is thus clear that the fact that a suit is filed in a Judicial Division, in which it ordinarily ought not to be filed, is not a valid ground to object to the jurisdiction of the court. Such suit may only be transferred from that court at the instance of the President of this court. Issue one is accordingly resolved against the defendant. The coast is now clear for this court to proceed to examine other issues in this matter. ISSUE TWO: Whether the suit is competent. Grounds 1 and 3 of the Notice of Preliminary Objection challenge the competence of the claimant’s suit. While it is contended in ground 1 that the action is incompetent for failing to comply with Sections 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Laws of the Federation 2004, ground 3 seeks to dismiss the suit for being statute barred. Let me first look at ground 3 of the Notice of Preliminary Objection. The ground states that the claimant’s employment with the defendant was determined on 1st day of August, 2005 while he filed this suit on 24th day of May 2013. Taking the relevant limitation laws into consideration, the claimant’s action, founded in contract, is statute barred. In his written address, the defendant’s counsel was unsure which of the limitation laws apply. To him, it can either be that of Lagos State or that of Plateau State because the contract of employment was entered into in Lagos and was performable in Lagos or at Jos. Whichever of the laws apply, counsel submitted that the claimant’s suit is statute barred as he filed the suit more than 7 years after his cause of action arose. To determine whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred, the limitation law under which it is statute barred or in relation to which the issue can be considered, has to be first ascertained. The complaints of the claimant upon which he seek reliefs in this suit are in relation to his demotion and the termination of his employment. See also paragraphs 18 and 28 of the statement of facts where the claimant referred to the medium through which the transfer/demotion and termination of his employment were communicated to him. I have looked at the documents; Transfer letter, email and termination letter; all front loaded with the complaint and I see that they emanated from the defendant’s head office in Lagos. The claimant did also state the defendant’s address for service, as endorsed on the Complaint, to be its head office at “NBC House Ebute-Metta, Lagos”. Therefore, it is not in doubt that the acts of the defendant which the claimant complained about in this suit took place in Lagos. The claimant only received the transfer letter and termination letter in Owerri and Jos respectively. In my view, whether the suit is statute barred should be considered in relation to the law of the place where the alleged wrong was initiated or done. The limitation law of Lagos State is the law to be applied to determine this issue. Section 8 (1) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State provides that no action for breach of contract shall be brought after six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The above provision of the law is very clear. Its effect is that actions founded on contract are statute barred if they are not instituted within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. Such suit instituted outside the time stipulated by the law cannot be entertained by the courts. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604. Going by this provision, this action, which is founded on contract of employment, ought to be commenced against the defendant within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. The question to ask at this point is: Was this suit commenced within 6 years from the time the claimant’s cause of action accrued? In determining whether this action is statute barred, there is the need to determine when the cause of action arose and when this suit was filed. The defendant counsel submitted that the claimant’s cause of action arose on 23/9/2005 when he received the letter terminating his employment and this action was filed on the 24/5/2013. On his part, the claimant’s counsel neither disputes the fact that the claimant’s cause of action commenced on 23/9/2005 when he received his termination letter nor the fact that this instant suit was filed on 24/5/2013. The point the claimant’s counsel contends however in refuting the applicability of statutory limitation to this action is that the claimant had earlier filed Suit No. A/338/06 in 2006 before the Abia State High Court, sitting at Aba and the suit was struck out on 4th March, 2013 for reason of lack of jurisdiction. Both parties are therefore agreed that the claimant’s cause of action accrued on 23/9/2005 and this instant suit was filed on 24/5/2013. The period lapse between these dates is 7 years and 8 months. Taking this issue from the date of filing of this suit, the claimant’s suit is clearly statute barred by One year and 8 months. But that is yet the conclusion until the contention of the claimant’s counsel is taken into consideration. In paragraph 3 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that he had earlier filed Suit No. A/338/06 in 2006 before the Abia State High Court, sitting at Aba and the suit was struck out on 4th March, 2013 for want of jurisdiction upon the coming into effect of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010. It was on the basis of this averment that the claimant’s counsel argued that by effect of the earlier suit, the claimant had commenced an action against the defendant timeously and therefore this action is not statute barred. From the submissions of the claimant’s counsel, it is clear to me that his argument is that the date of commencement of his action should be taken from the date of the earlier suit that was struck out and not from the date of this suit. As pleaded by the claimant and as has been submitted in his counsel’s argument, suit No. A/338/06, which was filed before the Abia State High Court, was struck out. The Abia State High Court is a different court from this court. This instant suit is not a relisting of the struck out suit nor is it a suit transferred from Abia State High Court to this court. As it is, this instant suit is a fresh action commenced by way of a Complaint before this court. Therefore, this suit is a different suit from the one struck out. The claimant’s counsel has said the earlier suit was struck out because the jurisdiction of the Abia state High court was ousted by the enactment of the Third Alteration Act in 2010. But statute has provided for situations where State High Courts subsequently lacking jurisdiction in respect of matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NIC, to transfer such matters to the NIC. Section 24 (3) of the NIC Act provides that “no cause or matter shall be struck out by the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was not brought in the appropriate Court in which it ought to have been brought, and the Court before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Division of the Court.” The significance of this provision is to avoid a situation of this nature that the claimant’s suit now finds itself. The earlier suit not having been transferred to this court as statutorily required, the claimant’s present situation cannot be helped. I cannot recall any law that allows the date of a fresh suit to be taken to be the date of a similar suit earlier filed in a different court but was struck out by that court. In any case, this instant suit is a fresh suit on its own and by the effect of the Limitation Laws, time started running from the date the cause of action arose and the limitation period must be determined against the date this suit was filed and not on the date the struck out suits were filed. See ADAX PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT (NIG) LTD vs. EMEF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 621) 1585. Therefore, the claimant’s earlier suit that was struck out never stopped the time from running right from the date his cause of action in respect of this suit accrued. In view of the forgoing, it is clear that the claimant’s suit is statute barred. The claimant’s counsel had gone further, in his address, to whip up sympathy for the claimant when he submitted that the claimant’s suit was struck out by operation of law and for no fault of the claimant. In his submission, counsel said the law is meant to serve justice and not meant to deny justice or to perpetuate injustice and that considering the history of this case; the claimant cannot be adjudged to have been lazy in approaching the court to seek redress. In as much as this court also sympathises with the claimant, I must say that the effect of a limitation law is that it removes the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to any judicial relief. Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. Hence, when an action is statute barred the claimant who might have a cause of action, losses his right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the right has been extinguished by law. See AJAYI vs. ADEBIYI (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 634) 1 at 21; ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (supra). In such a situation, as this, there is nothing the court can do than to apply the law as it is. In this case, the claimant’s right to prosecute his case has become statute barred. In conclusion, I find and hold that this suit is statute barred. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s case. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to consider the 2nd ground of the Notice of Preliminary Objection as it will amount to a mere academic exercise. Consequently, this suit is dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is delivered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge