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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J. D. PETERS DATE: NOVEMBER 19, 2015 SUIT NO: NICN/LA/350A/2013 BETWEEN Mrs. Alice Olufolakemi Olunlade - Claimant AND Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board - Defendant REPRESENTATION Miss Mobisola Akerele with Babafemi Adeluola and Temitope Agbolahan (Miss) for the Claimant. Evelyn Omotosho (Mrs) and Mrs. Ada Nkwocha. for the Defendant. JUDGMENT Following the Third Alteration to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, this Honourable Court was vested with the jurisdiction to determine the subject matter of this suit. Thus by an order of the Federal High Court per Liman J made on 20/3/12, the consolidated suits were transferred to this Court where they were given consolidated Suit No: NICN/LA/350/12: Mrs. Modupe Aina Kuti v. Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board. By the order of this Court pursuant to an application by learned Counsel made on 3/12/13, the consolidated suits were deconsolidated of which this case is one. By her second amended statement of facts dated 2/5/14 and filed on 6/5//14, the Claimant sought the following reliefs - 1. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24th October, 1997 is null and void. 2. An order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal. 3. Payment to the Claimant by the Defendant of the sum of N1,160,323.30 (One Million One Hundred and Sixty Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty Three Naira Thirty Kobo) being special damages for her wrongful dismissal from the service of the Defendant. 4. Particulars of Special Damages i. Salaries for the period of July 1997 up till August 8, 2009 (132 months) at N1,667.50 per month. N220,110. ii. Transport Allowance for the period of July 1997 up till August 8, 2009 (132 months) at N1,950 per month: N257,400. iii. Lunch Allowance from July 1997 up till August 8, 2009 (132 months) at N739.20 per month: N97,574.40. iv. Utility Allowance from July 1997 up till August 8 2009 (132 months): N151.20 per month: N19,958.40. v. Housing Allowance from January 1997 till March 2009 (wrongly stated as 2013) at N33,600 yearly (13 years): N436,800. vi. Leave Allowance from 1998 to 2009 (12 years) at N2,001 yearly: N27,680.50. vii. Furniture Grant from 1997 till 2009 at N33,600 every 4 years: i.e. 2000, 2004, 2008: N100,800. 5. A declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsisted till 8th August 2009, being the date the Claimant ought to have retired by law, having attained the statutory retirement age for public servants of 60 years. 6. An order that the Defendant do account for and pay till date, all the accrued pension of the Claimant from 9th August 2009, being the date the Claimant’s pension began to accrue. 7. A declaration that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the owner or the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit D22 at “D” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. 8. A declaration that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 9. A perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and occupation of the said housing unit. Parties filed and served all processes as required by the Rules of this Court. The Defendant also counterclaimed as follows - 1. A declaration that the quarter was not allocated to the Claimant on owner- occupier basis. 2. An order directing the Claimant to vacate the Flat occupied by her immediately. The trial of this case commenced on 10/4/14 when the Claimant testified as CW1, adopted her written witness deposition made on 3/12/13 as her evidence in chief and tendered 16 documents as exhibits one of which tendered and admitted during cross examination. The documents were admitted as exhibits and marked as Exh. C1-Exh. C16. The case of the Claimant, who was a former staff of the defendant, is that she is the owner of the property allocated to her by the Defendant since the allocation was done on owner and occupier’s basis; that without any justification, the Defendant decided to eject her from the said apartment sometimes in 1997; that following her refusal to vacate the house the Defendant suspended her from duty and subsequently dismissed her from its service; that that her dismissal was not done pursuant to the staff condition of service that regulated her employment with the Defendant and that the acts of the Defendant were illegal, null and void. It was the case of the Defendant that following the need for it to build staff quarters for its employees, it applied to the then Federal Military Government for land to actualize the project; that the Federal Government obliged and allocated the land in Satellite Town, Badagry Road, to the Defendant; that the letters of allocation were subject to some terms and conditions; that it built the staff quarters and allocated flats to its employees as official accommodation; that some of the staff have since occupied and relinquished their flats as a result of getting another accommodation, retirement and termination of appointment or a result transfer out of Lagos; that as employee of the Defendant, the Claimant benefited from the scheme and was allocated a flat as an official accommodation and not on owner occupier’s basis; that in the course of living in the estate the Claimant had cause to change her apartment which was done for her; that the allocation was made subject to the National Provident Fund Board Condition for Occupation of Staff Quarters and the Federal Civil Service Rules Condition for Occupation of Government Quarters. It was also the case for the Defendant that due to perennial flooding and other environmental challenges at the staff quarters and after several meetings with the Technical Committee on Privatization charged with the responsibility of restructuring, the Defendant and the two unions ASSBIFFI and NUBIFIE which the Claimant belonged and representatives of occupants of the staff quarters agreed that the staff quarters be demolished and a befitting one built in its place; that it was further agreed that any occupant of the staff quarters may apply for a special personal loan to augment the housing allowance advance earlier given to them to enable them secure alternative accommodation; that the entire occupants of the staff quarters accepted the agreement and applied for the special loan; that the some occupants including the Claimant after collecting their housing allowance and the expiration of the three months notices to vacate the flats refused to do so and instead commenced action against the defendant at the Federal High Court and that following the acts of indiscipline of the occupants including the Claimant in disobeying lawful instructions to vacate the said staff quarters they were suspended from work and subsequently dismissed from the Defendant’s service pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act Cap. 381 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Under cross examination, CW1 stated that by Exh. C6 the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity ordered her dismissal; that generally a dismissed staff is not entitled to any benefit; that she is aware that the Defendant applied for and was granted allocation to build the estate; that she is aware that there are conditions attached; that she moved to the estate on 18/5/92; that she was given a letter of allocation; that no condition was stated on her letter of allocation and that the 1st time she was given quit notice was one of 11/7/97. CW1 testified further that Exh. C16 was not addressed and not served on her; that she belonged to NUBIFIE while working with Defendant and that her rent deduction was =N=25.00 as stated in Exh. C3 and deducted monthly. One Obi Osita Oliver was called as CW2. The witness adopted his witness deposition made on 2/5/14 and tendered three documents which were admitted as exhibits and marked as Exh. C17, Exh. C18 & Exh. C19. Under cross examination, CW2 testified that he was appointed in 1979 and left in 1993; that they (staff of his then employer staying in staff quarters) were made to forfeit their housing allowance while he was still in service; that when he left in 1993 he had to go to Court to contest the ownership of the property that by the letter of allocation, it was not stated that he was given the property on owner – occupier basis; that they found documents leading to realisation that the property ought to be allocated to them as occupiers; that in 2007 in Suit No. LD/3274195 O.O. Obi v UBA Plc parties settled out of Court; that he made payment to UBA at N400,000 and was declared owner by the Court judgment; that he does not have the CTC of the Judgment; that he has been given the necessary documents of the property and that he is not aware that parties in this suit also made out of Court settlement and offer for purchase. On 9/12/14, the Defendant opened its defence and called one Aliu Shuaib as its DW1. The witness adopted its witness written statement on oath made on31/1/14 as his evidence in chief and tendered 23 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted as exhibits and marked as Exh. D1-Exh. D23. The case for the Defendant is that the Claimant was dismissed from her employment on the authority of the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity pursuant to the Pubic Officers (Special Provisions) Act and that property allocated to the Claimant was not allocated on owner occupier basis. Under cross examination, witness stated that he was employed by the Defendant on 10/12/90; that he was not allocated any apartment by the Defendant; that he did not apply for any; that the land was transferred to Defendant; that he does not have evidence of the transfer and that the Defendant has built staff quarters on the land. Witness added that Exh. C7 was not addressed to the Defendant; that the Defendant did not enter into any Tenancy/Purchase Agreement with the Claimant; that the Defendant was represented in Exh. D20 and that from Exh. C3 Defendant was deducting Rent from the Claimant up to December 1996. According to the witness, illness was not the basis for the dismissal of the Clamant nor inefficiency, lateness, not for sleeping on duty and not because she was too old to work; that the Claimant was not accused of corruption; that before suspension Defendant did not issue Claimant a Query; that the Claimant did not face any disciplinary panel in respect of any misdemeanor; that no reason was given for dismissal of the Claimant; that the Claimant was not paid any money after suspension and after dismissal and that no warning was issued to the Claimant by her Head of Department. In re-examination the witness stated that the condition of occupation was attached to letter of allocation and given to the occupants individually and that the dismissal of the Claimant was from the Minister of Labour and Productivity as the Supervising Minister. At the close of the trial, learned Counsel on either side were directed by the Court to file their final written addresses in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The 14-page final written address filed by the Defendant was dated and filed on 3/2/15. In it, learned Counsel canvassed the following four issues for the just determination of this case - 1. Whether the Claimant were (sic) properly dismissed under Public Officers Special Provisions Act. 2. Whether on the totality of evidence before the Court, was the Defendant property given on owner occupier's basis to staff especially to the Claimant in this suit. 3. What is the effect of the purported allocation paper presented by the Claimant dated the 15th day of August 1994, 16 years after the allocation paper dated the 9th day of October, 1978 that was given to the Defendant. 4. Whether the then Minister of Works and Productivity can on his own nullify the terms and conditions as contained in the allocation paper 9th October, 1978 and create a new terms and conditions as contained in the purported allocation paper dated the 15th August, 1994. Arguing issue 1, learned Counsel submitted that the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act is an Act that provides for the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of certain public officers for diverse reasons and to prevent any civil proceedings being instituted against such action; that one of the major conditions to be met by the Act is that the letter of dismissal must be issued by the appropriate authority as provided under section 4(2) of the Act; that the power can only be exercised by the President in the case of Federal and Governor in the case of State or any other person authorised by them and that Minister of Labour and Productivity rightly falls into the category of ''any other person authorised by him'', citing FCDA v. Sule (1994)3 NWLR (Pt. 332) 257. Submitting further, learned Counsel stated that by section 147, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 the President appoints Ministers and that by section 148 of the same Constitution, the President performs his duties through his Ministers who administer Departments and Ministries assigned to them. Counsel further submitted that there is a correlation between Exhibits C6, D1 and D22 and section 4(2)(a) or (b) of the Act, citing LGSC v. Dada (1997)8 NWLR (Pt. 516) 293. According to learned Counsel, the Claimant is a public officer; that the issue leading to her dismissal relates to Federal Government's Policy in providing land for establishments which have above 500 staff to build staff quarters; that the Defendant's application for land to build for its staff was granted and conditions for occupation were given; that the conditions did not include giving the property out rightly to staff on owner occupier basis; that the cost of building was solely borne by the Defendant; that whatever actions or decisions undertaken by the staff who were public officers in this suit in relation to the Federal Government Policy has a lot to do in affecting the public interest if not curbed, hence the need for the Minister to quickly intervene. Citing Dauda v. UNAM (2002)17 NWLR (Pt.796) 362, Nwosu v. I.S.E.S.A (1990)2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688 & Shitta-Bey v. A.G. Federation (1998)16 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392 submitted that by virtue of section 3(3) of the Public Officers (Special Provision) Act the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case of termination of appointment if done by the appropriate authority in accordance with the Act. Learned Counsel urged the Court to so hold and dismiss this suit accordingly. The second issue is whether on the totality of evidence before the Court, was the Defendant property given on owner occupier basis. On this issue, learned Counsel submitted that the allocation and its terms and conditions were clearly spelt out referring to Exh. D1, Exh. D2 & Exh. D3 and that the terms and conditions did not in any way state that allocations are to be given on owner occupier basis. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant failed to tender her letter of allocation of Flat A11 and also claimed she was not given regulation of Defendant's Conditions for Occupation of Staff Quarters Satellite Town at the taking up her Flats at the Estate. It was the submission of learned Counsel that at times staff of Defendant relinquish their Flats for another which they considered better sometimes when some staff have moved out of their own or for one reason or the other, such staff have to give up their accommodation referring to Exh. D9 and that if the property were given out on owner occupier basis such a scenario would not have been possible. Counsel further pointed out that the Defendant maintains the property regularly with various facilities provided at the request of the occupants referring to Exh. D8; that the occupants are also guided by Regulation of National Provident Fund Management Board Conditions for Occupation of Staff Quarters Satellite Town and that these regulations would not have been possible were it that the property were allocated on owner occupier basis. Counsel finally submitted that the property was not allocated on owner occupier basis and as such the Claimant is a mere licensee since she occupied the premises in the performance of her service and acquires no interest or estate in the property citing Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Limited (1993)4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. On issue 3, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant did not lead evidence in proof of her assertion that the property was allocated to her on owner occupier basis but rather tendered Exh. C7 & Exh. C8 which were issued in 1994 and 1995 to prove same. Counsel stated that the Claimant was one of the Plaintiffs that sued the Defendant on the issue at the Federal High Court in Suit No: FHC/CS/L/CS/1156/94 and that Exh. C7 & Exh. C8 were made during the pendency of that suit. Citing Section 83(3), Evidence Act, 2011 & Abdullahi v. Ashidu (1994)4 NWLR (Pt. 600) 638, Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the two exhibits having been made contrary to the provision of the Evidence Act. On issue 4, learned Counsel argued that the allocation papers i.e Exh. D1, Exh. D2 & Exh. D3 clearly spelt out the conditions upon which the Defendant allocated the property to the Claimant; that parties are bound by the contents of those exhibits and that since the contents are clear the Court will look elsewhere for their construction. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance Exh. C8 and resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant. On its counterclaim, learned Counsel referred to the testimony of CW2 and stated that most staff of the Defendant except the Claimant took advantage of the offer to them to purchase the property and paid for theirs referring to Exh. D17. According to learned Counsel, before the Claimant could claim to be the rightful owner of the property, she must comply with the modalities put in place; that the modalities are as contained in paragraph 30 of the Claimant's second amended statement of facts and particularly paragraph 30(iv) of the same pleadings and that if the Claimant fails to pay for her apartment as done by others and the CW2 the Court should order the Claimant to vacate the Flat occupied by her immediately. The Claimant filed her final written address on 15/6/15. It is a 50-page document dated 12/6/15. In it, learned Counsel set down and canvassed the following four issues for determination - 1. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant is not null, void and of no effect whatsoever for failure to follow the applicable procedure for the dismissal of a public officer. 2. Whether in view of No.1 above, the Claimant is not entitled to be paid (a). Her outstanding salaries and allowances from 23rd July 1997 when she was suspended or 24th October 1997, when she was dismissed till 8th August 2009 when she would have been due for retirement (b). Her pension from 9th August 2009 till date. 3. Whether in view of the Federal Government Guidelines issued pursuant to the Public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Claimant is not the owner or entitled to ownership of Unit 22, D Close, National Provident Fund Housing Scheme, Badagry, Lagos. 4. Whether the Defendant's counterclaim ought not be dismissed for being unmeritorious. On issue 1, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is a Public Office in accordance with section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 having been employed by the Defendant a statutory body created by a Federal enactment; that the Claimant's employment is thus one with statutory flavour; that the provisions of Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Act and the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Staff Conditions of Service (Exh. C10) that regulate the employment of the Claimant and same must be followed in suspending her. It was the submission of learned Counsel that the purported dismissal of the Claimant pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act was not done or authorised by the appropriate authority referring to Exh. D21 and Exh. D22. Counsel also submitted that indeed the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity was not expressly defined as the appropriate authority in that statute and there being no evidence of the President's delegation or authorisation cannot be said to be the appropriate authority under the Public Officers (Special Provision) Act cap. 381, laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 to be able to exercise the power under it, citing Wilson v. A.G. Bendel State & Ors. (1985)1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572 & Anyah & Ors. v. Iyayi (1993)7 NWLR (Pt. 305) 290 at 319. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Secondly, learned Counsel submitted that the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity did not authorise the Claimant's dismissal. Counsel referred to Exh. D21 in which the Defendant had written thus to the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity - ''Accordingly, the Honorable Minister is prayed upon to approve the Management summarily dismisses the erring staff in accordance with the provisions of the Funds Conditions of Service''; that Exh. D22 was the reply to Exh. D21 and that instead of complying with the instruction in Exh. D22, the Defendant issued Exh. D23 purporting to dismiss the Claimant on the authority of the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity which was neither signed by the Hon. Minister nor by any known person. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the dismissal of the Claimant is void. Thirdly, learned Counsel submitted that the dismissal of the Claimant had nothing to do with her conduct in relation to the performance of her duties within the meaning of Section 1 of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. Counsel referred to Exh. C12 in which the Claimant was commended for loyal, dedicated and meritorious service and the testimony of DW who stated that illness, inefficiency, lateness or sleeping on duty was not the basis for the dismissal of the Claimant. Submitting that the basis for dismissal pursuant to Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act must be one of the conditions set out in the Act, citing Emuze v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Benin (2003)10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 378 Counsel urged the Court to declare the dismissal of the Claimant as null and void and set same aside. On the submission of learned Counsel to the Defendant that pursuant to section 3(3) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this suit, Claimant Counsel submitted that the attitude of the Courts has been consistent over the years. Counsel submitted that the Courts would always have the power to look into whether the criteria set out in the Act were met and the provisions of the Act followed in dismissing the Claimant and that it is only then that the jurisdiction of the Court would be ousted, citing Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007)4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423, Federal Capital Development Authority v. Sule (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 332) 257, Anyah & Ors. v. Iyayi (supra) & Garba v. Federal Civil Service Commission (1988)1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 449. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It was also the argument of the learned Counsel to the Claimant that the Claimant's employment was regulated by the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Act and the NSITF Staff Conditions of Service; that they must be followed in ending the employment of the Claimant and that a breach of statutory laid down procedure renders the act of dismissal or termination ultra vires, citing Bamgboye v. University of Benin (1990)10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290, Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (No.2) (1985)2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Olufegba v. Abdulraheem (2009)18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 & Federal Medical Centre, Ido-Ekiti & Ors. (2012)2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 411.According to learned Counsel, the Defendant in the exercise of its power under Section 9 of NSITF Act made Exh. C10 - Staff Conditions of Service which laid down procedure for disciplining of staff; that Defendant first suspended the Claimant for ''disobedience of lawful official instruction'' (Exh. C5) and subsequently dismissed the Claimant claiming that it was authorised to do so by the Hon. Minister of Labour & Productivity (Exh. C6). Counsel submitted that by the disciplinary procedure under Exh. C10, the Defendant was bound to first issue Query to the Claimant, the Claimant must be afforded appearance before a disciplinary panel and issued a warning letter by her Head of Department. Counsel argued that the Defendant by failing to follow its own laid down rules before suspending and eventually dismissing the Claimant, both the suspension and dismissal are null and void and of no effect. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. On issue 2, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant led evidence that she would be 60 years on 8/809 referring to paragraphs 5,18-22 of the Claimant's witness statement on oath dated 3/12/13 and Exh. C3 (Sworn Declaration of Age). Counsel submitted that these pieces of evidence were not challenged or controverted at all and that the Court has a duty to act on them, citing Matanmi v. Dada (2013)7 NWLR (Pt.1353) 219 & Ighrerinovo v. S.C.C & Ors. (2013)10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 138 and that where there it is found that there has been an unlawful removal of an officer from an office specially protected by the law, the remedy is to declare the removal null and void and to reinstate the employee to his former position relying on Iderima v. RSCSC (2005)16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378 & Omidiora & Anor. v. Federal Civil Service Commission (2007)14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 17. Counsel urged the Court to grant the salaries and allowances of the Claimant from July 1997 when she was suspended till 8/8/09 when she would have retired from the service of the Defendant. Regarding the entitlement of the Claimant to her pensions from 9/8/09 till the date of Judgment and thereafter, Counsel submitted that the claim is premised on the fact that the Claimant turned 60 years old on 8/8/09 which is the statutory retirement age for public servants. Counsel stated that the Claimant was not exempted by section 8(1) of the Pension Reforms Act, 2004 and also covered by Exh. C10. Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is qualified for pension and that since her dismissal was unlawful, the position is as if she was never dismissed. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. Respecting issue 3, learned Counsel argued that the land upon which the Defendant built its estate was allocated free of charge to the Defendant by the Federal Government; that the usage of the land in accordance with the Federal Government Guidelines was a condition of the allocation of the land citing Exh. D3; that the said Guidelines were restated by the Hon. Minister of Works and Housing in a circular issued on 15/8/94 (Exh. C7) where it was said to include that the living units are to be allocated on owner-occupier basis with the prospect of the staff owing the house eventually among others; that the Hon Minister of Works & Housing further reiterated the government policy when he stated in paragraph 10 of Exh. C7 that ''The Federal Ministry of Works and Housing has received series of petitions from allottees of the houses and wishes to reiterate the above points to facilitate the resolution of the outstanding disputes''. Learned Counsel submitted that Exh. C7 is evidence of the Federal Government Policy on housing; that the Court, citing Ike v. Nzekwe (1975)2 S.C 1, must take judicial notice of the declared policy of the Federal Military Government and that Exh. C4 & Exh. C5 are evidence of the Defendant's wilful violation of the terms upon which it was granted the land in question by the Federal Military Government. Learned Counsel further argued that the making of National Provident Fund Management Board Conditions for Occupation of Staff Quarters, Satellite Town and the Federal Civil Service Rules for Occupation of Government Quarters (Exhs. D6 & D7) are of no moment as the requirements of the Federal Military Government's policy are clear and submitted that a similar situation as the present case was decided by the Court in Suit No: LD/26337/2006 Patrick A. Ogbodu v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc - Exh. C15.Counsel urged the Court to be persuaded by that decision and resolve the issue in favour of the Claimant. Arguing issue 4, learned Counsel first submitted that the Defendant failed to formulate issues from its counterclaim as required by Order 20 Rule 5 of the National Industrial Court Rules; that Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed and that Final Written Address is akin to appellate brief where failure to formulate issues has been held to sufficient to render a Brief incompetent citing Orji v. Zara Industries Limited (1992)1 NWLR (Pt. 216) 124 & Echo Enterprises Limited v. Standard Bank of Nigeria Limited & Anor. (1989)4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 509 at 512. Counsel thus urged the Court to discountenance all the argument canvassed in support of the counterclaim. Counsel argued further and stating without prejudice to earlier submission that it is clear from Exh. C18 tendered by CW2 that although the Bungalow initially allocated to him by his employer was not stated to be on owner occupier basis, same was subsequently allocated to him on owner occupier basis by Exh. C19 and that CW2 testified that he believed the property to be his because he came across documents which led him to that belief on the premise of which he instituted Suit No: ID/3247/95 O.O. Obi v. UBA. Counsel submitted that the evidence of CW2 not having been impinged the Court should rely on same. According to learned Counsel, the Defendant's offer for sale to the Claimant of her 2-Bedroom apartment was made in bad faith as the price was prohibitively high in view of the fact the Claimant's salary which was paid last in June 1997 was =N=1,667.50 apart from the fact that she had no income since then and was also denied her entitlements and that the Defendant ought to have considered all payments made by the Claimant such as her monthly rent and her annual housing allowances which she forfeited. On the contention of learned Counsel to the Defendant that Exhs. C7 & C8 were made during the pendency of a previous suit between the parties by person interested, Counsel submitted otherwise. Learned Counsel submitted that both exhibits were made by the Hon. Minister for Works in an official capacity and in the course of carrying out his official duties and that he does not fall within the meaning of ''a person interested'' as stated by the Supreme Court in Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2010)13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 307. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Learned Counsel concluded by urging the Court to grant the claims of the Claimant and dismiss the counterclaims. The Defendant filed a 7-page reply on pints of law on 1/9/15. In it, learned Counsel argued that the Claimant did not plead anywhere in her amended statement of facts that her employment was one with statutory flavour and prayed the Court to discountenance all submissions made in the final written address respecting same. Secondly, learned Counsel submitted that the employment of the Claimant is not one clothe with statutory flavour as contended. Thirdly, that if the defence of the Defendants fails respecting dismissal of the Claimant, Claimant is only entitled to damages in action for wrongful dismissal; that the Claimant cannot treat the employment as still subsisting citing Ilodibia v. NCC Limited (1997)7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 174. Thirdly, Counsel submitted that the effect of the Defendant's failure to formulate issues from its counterclaim can be treated as a mere irregularity pursuant to Order 5 Rules 1 & 2, National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. I read carefully and with understanding all the processes filed by learned Counsel on either side. I listened with attention and watched the demeanour of all the witnesses who testified in this case. In addition to all this, I listened and understood the oral submissions of learned Counsel in this case as well as reviewed and evaluated all the exhibits tendered. Having done all this, I narrow the issue for the just determination of this case down to mainly three as follows - 1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case in view of the provision of Section 3(3) Public Officers (Special Provision) Act. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved her claims to be entitled to any or all of them. 3. Whether the Defendant is entitled to a grant of any or all of her counterclaims. On issue 1, it is important to bring to the fore from the outset that this issue was not made out for determination by the Defendant. It is also open to the Court to feign ignorance of its being of any relevance and consideration to the just determination of this case. Suffices to state however that learned Counsel to the Defendant on page 7 having cited Dauda v. UNAM (2002)17 NWLR (Pt. 796) 362, Nwosu v. ISESA (1990)2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688 & Shitta-Bey v. A. G. Federation (1998)10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 392 urged the Court to decline jurisdiction in this case. Issue of jurisdiction is of fundamental importance to the hearing and determination of a case. It is said to be akin to blood in human and that as human cannot do without blood so also a Court without jurisdiction over a case cannot thrive. In the absence of jurisdiction therefore, every effort of a Court in a case is nothing but effort in futility. This, the appellate Courts have said, is immaterial the brilliance, the ingenuity or the good intention of the Court respecting the case. The fact however remains that for a Court to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it must first assume jurisdiction to determine same. Section 3(3), Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act Cap. 381, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 states thus - ''No civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any court or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done by any person under this Act and if any such proceedings have been or are instituted before or after the making of this Act, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and void''. Now the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, in section 6 ascribes the judicial powers of the nation to the Judiciary as an arm of government. By that provisions, the Courts established under the Constitution are charged with the responsibility of adjudication over all manner of causes, matters and persons both inter se as well as between individuals and governments and between different levels of governments - Local government, State government and Federal government. The only exception or ouster of judicial intervention relates only to matters stated in Section 6(6)(c) & (d) of the same Constitution. It is imperative to state that the Constitution had early enough declared its supremacy when it provides in Section 1(3) that where any other law in the country is in conflict with any of its provisions such other law remains void and ineffective to the extent of its inconsistency. The Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act by its Section 3(3) ousting the jurisdiction of the Court is undoubtedly inconsistent with the provision of section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. It is therefore bound to give way for the Courts to perform their constitutionally assigned role of adjudication. I have not been requested to declare section 3(3) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act unconstitutional. It is therefore sufficient to simply state that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. As an aside however, it is important to note that the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act was promulgated as a Decree during the dark days of military interregnum in Nigeria. That was during the era when constitutionalism was an aberration just as democracy was. It was in that era when the Constitution and the Courts virtually existed at the mercy of the Military officers and institutions. That era and such laws as the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act, I dare say, have been consigned into the dustbin of history. I have not been moved to declare the provision of the Act ousting the jurisdiction of the Court unconstitutional. It is therefore sufficient for me to simply state that this Court in hearing this matter acts within the adjudicatory power as conferred on it by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant has made out a case to be entitled to any or all of her claims. The first relief of the Claimant is for a declaration that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24th October, 1997 is null and void. An employer will continue to retain the power to discipline its employees or any of them. Disciplinary measures to so impose range from issuance of query, warning letter, suspension, termination of employment to dismissal. See Calabar Cement Company Limited v. Daniel (1991)4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 750 Except in some certain circumstances, especially where an employment is one with statutory flavour the Court will not declare either termination of employment or dismissal from employment as null and void. This is because of the consequences that will ordinarily follow such a declaration for instant an order of reinstatement. Again this is premised on the common sense and trite saying that the Court will not force an unwilling employer to retain a willing employee and vice versa. See Adebayo Sunday Joseph & Ors. v. Kwara State Polytechnic & Ors (2013) LPELR-21398. Therefore where an employer has the power to discipline an employee but fails to follow the laid down procedure for such discipline, the step taken by the employer can only be declared wrongful but certainly not null and void. In the instant case, the Claimant was alleged to have been dismissed by the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act. Query: Did the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity possess power to so do? If yes, did the Hon. Minister follow the procedure for the exercise of the power conferred by the statute? Exh. C6 was the letter of dismissal from service issued to the Claimant on behalf of the Managing Director of the Defendant and dated 24/10/97. the first paragraph of the two-paragraph letter states that - ''The Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity acting under the authority conferred on him by the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by virtue of section 4(2)(b) of the above Act, has authorised your dismissal from the services of the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board with immediate effect''. It is important to bring to the fore that the Hon. Minister did not just wake up and on his own direct the dismissal of the Claimant along with some other members of staff of the Defendant. For, by Exh. D21 dated 30/7/97, the Defendant had in that exhibit titled ''Request for Approval to Dismiss some Members of Staff on Account of Gross Misconduct'' sought the dismissal of the Claimant among others. In paragraph 2 of that Exhibit, the Defendant had written that - ''The decision of the committee was predicated on the refusal of the staff to abide by series of instructions to vacate the staff quarters at the Satellite town in Lagos culminating in the issuance of an ultimatum by management which was brazenly defiled by the staff. Indeed, the offence committed by staff is punishable by summary dismissal hence we would like to seek your consideration and approval to effect the immediate dismissal of all the erring staff placed on suspension''. The reply of the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity is contained in one-paragraph Exh. 22 personally signed by the Hon. Minister. In that exhibit, the Hon. Minister simply wrote - ''Further to your submission Ref. No. AJ/1/SEC/1 of 30th July, 1997, on the above subject matter, approval is hereby granted for the fund to implement the management's recommendation as requested''. The review of the exhibits as done above becomes imperative so as to appreciate in a clearer form what actually transpired. Now, from the analysis thus far, was the approval sought to dismiss the Claimant pursuant to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act? The answer to this question is certainly in the negative. Secondly, was the approval of the Hon. Minister of Labour and Productivity given to dismiss the Claimant in the exercise of the power conferred on him by the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act? Again the answer to this question can only be and it is in the negative. I need to state further that indeed, nowhere in the correspondences leading to the dismissal of the Claimant was any reference made to the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act as contended by the Defendant. This case and in particular the issue of dismissal is a typical example of the misfortune often suffered by senior and top government officers, holders of top public offices and political office holders. These class of individuals are more often than not misled and misadvised by those who should ordinarily properly and truthfully advise them in accordance with the established rules of public service and applicable circulars. For instance, it is difficult to understand the rationale for seeking approval to dismiss a staff simply because the staff refused to vacate a staff quarters legitimately allocated to and occupied by the staff. If for instance, dismissal is the appropriate punishment for the ''crime'' of the Claimant in the instant case, what will the punishment be for a civil or public servant who forged certificates or found to have embezzeled billions of Naira of pension funds of retirees? Dismissal is the maximum punishment that could be met to an employee. It is akin to capital punishment in criminal trial. Besides, dismissal carries with it infamy and stigma in addition to the fact that a dismissed employee is denied of any form of disengagement entitlement from the employer, see Adeki v. Ijebu-Ode District Council (1962)1 SCNLR 349, Anite v. University of Calabar (2001)3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 239 (CA), Ezenna v. KSHSMB (2011)1 NWLR (Pt. 1251) 89 and UBN Plc v. Soares (2012)29 NLLR 329. May the day never come when such will find its way into labour and industrial relation as punishment for the alleged ''crime'' of the Claimant in this case. I find and hold that the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant is wrongful. The second relief sought by the Claimant is an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal. I have held in the Judgment that dismissal is an hybrid of discipline which an employer is legitimately empowered to exercise over an employee. By dismissal, an employer/employee relation is automatically brought to an end even where it is improperly or wrongly done. The law is trite that the Court will not force a willing employee on an unwilling employer. Once an employment relationship is effectively brought to an end, it is not open to an employee to continue to treat same as still existing. See Olatunbosun v. NISER (1988) LPELR-2574 To restrain the Defendant as sought by the Claimant will amount to hindering the power of an employer to discipline its employee. That will spell doom for labour relations in this country. The prayer for an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal is therefore refused and dismissed. The third relief is for payment to the Claimant by the Defendant of the sum of One Million One Hundred and Sixty Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty Three Naira Thirty Kobo (=N=1,160,323.30) being special damages for her wrongful dismissal from the service of the Defendant. The law is settled that damages lie for wrongful dismissal or termination. It is also well accepted that the measure of damages is the amount due to the Claimant in lieu of notice required to be served. See NEPA v. Adeyemi (2007)3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 315, 336. The Claimant was dismissed on 24/10/97. Here a claim for special damages particulars of which were given to include Salary, Transport Allowance, Lunch Allowance, Utility Allowance, Housing Allowance, Leave Allowance and Furniture Grant for the period of July 1997 and 8th of August 2009 except Leave Allowance that was calculated to be from 1998 to 2009 and Housing Allowance from January 1997 to March 2009. The basis of this claim is that the Claimant would have retired in August 2009 when she would have attained the age 60 years. I find no evidence to attest to it that the Claimant was employed for a fixed term or employed to retirement age. Exh. C1 - Claimant's Offer of Employment dated 26/10/84 does not have such a provision or anything close to it and neither was my attention drawn to any provision of Exh. C10 - Defendant's Staff Conditions of Service on the tenure of the employment of the Claimant. It is the duty and indeed an obligation of any litigant to prove his case by credible and cogent evidence in order to be entitled to an award by the Court. See I hold that this relief is not proved as required by law. Same is therefore refused and dismissed accordingly. The fourth relief sought is for a declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsisted till 8th August 2009, being the date the Claimant ought to have retired by law, having attained the statutory retirement age for public servants of 60 years. I have held in relation to the first relief sought that the dismissal of the Claimant valid, though wrongful. I have also held that once the power to dismiss is validly exercised, an employee cannot continue to treat the employment as existing. Again, there is no evidence tendered to prove that the Claimant would remain in employment till her retirement age. Both the Offer of Employment and the Defendant Staff Conditions of Service did not so provide. I note that the learned Counsel submitted in her written address that the employment of the Claimant was one with statutory flavour. This argument is hinged on the legislation establishing the Defendant and the Conditions of Service of the Defendant. When is an employment said to be with statutory flavour? With respect to employment with statutory flavour Adekeye JSC in Dr. Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Prof. Shuaibu O. Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC) put the position of the law as follows - '... where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are specifically provided for by statute or regulations made there under - it is said to be a contract protected by statute or in other words an employment with statutory flavour''. His lordship went further to state that the question of whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute and that the duty to construe the contract or the relevant statute is the exclusive preserve of the Courts. Without much ado, it is trite to state, perhaps for clarity, that for an employment to be one with statutory flavour, it must meet one of two conditions. One, the terms and conditions applicable to that particular employment must have been specifically provided for by a particular statute. Or in the alternative, the regulation which contains the applicable terms and conditions of the particular employment must have been made pursuant to or in the exercise of power conferred by a statute. It is also correct to add that it is not just sufficient that a statute confers power to make such regulations and the regulations are made. The making of such regulations must certainly be expressed to be in pursuance of the power so conferred to make same. The Defendant's Conditions of Service in the instant case did not satisfy any of the two conditions laid down to be qualified as one having statutory clout. That being the case, it is impossible not to hold that the employment of the Claimant is not protected by the statute and I so hold. Not having been proved a prayer for a declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsisted till 8th August 2009, being the date the Claimant ought to have retired by law, having attained the statutory retirement age for public servants of 60 years is refused and dismissed accordingly. The fifth relief sought is for an order that the Defendant do account for and pay till date, all the accrued pension of the Claimant from 9th August 2009, being the date the Claimant’s pension began to accrue. This Court has held that the employment of the Claimant was effectively brought to an end on 24/10/97 though wrongful. Effectively from that day, the Claimant had no pension accruable to her from the Defendant. Thus, the prayer sought for an order that the Defendant do account for and pay till date, all accrued pension of the Claimant from 9/8/09 being the date the Claimant' pension began to accrue is refused and accordingly dismissed for absence of sufficient evidence. The sixth relief is for a declaration that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the owner or the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit D22 at “D” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. The law is trite that he who asserts must prove. The Claimant is therefore under an obligation to prove the existence of the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government in order to be entitled to a grant of the relief sought. What are the available evidence before me? There is no controversy regarding the fact that the Claimant as a staff of the Defendant was allocated the property she occupied in the Defendant's Housing Estate. She did not force herself into the property. In Exh. C2, the Defendant acknowledged the Claimant's application to change from her former Flat A11 to D22 and was directed to '' ... submit your former flat A11 keys and collect the new keys (flat D22) from the officer incharge of Housing/property in Administration Department''. There is also no argument that the land upon which the property was built was allocated to the Defendant by the Federal Military Government at the time at no cost. The area of disagreement is whether or not there was a specific government public housing policy which the Defendant was bound to comply with. Were there any government policy to ensure home ownership to Nigerians? I find some of the exhibits tendered and admitted in this case very instructive and their analysis will provide the much needed response to the various queries raised. The first in this line of exhibits is Exh. C7 dated 15/8/94 and signed by Alh. L. K. Jakande then Hon. Minister of Labour. The exhibit was headed '' The Staff Housing Scheme By Employers of Labour At Satellite Town, Lagos'' . I find it both imperative and instructive to reproduce the first five paragraphs of that exhibit here. They are as follows - 1. The Federal Military Government, pursuant to its Public Housing Policy embarked on the Staff Housing Scheme at Satellite Town, Lagos in 1977, with the objective of facilitating home ownership for Nigerian workers. 2. Under the scheme, the Federal Government constructed over one thousand (1000 No.) modest bungalows, consisting of two, three and four bedroom units, with the cost range of N12,000.00, N16,500.00 and N21,500.00 respectively, which was allocated to its employees on owner-occupier basis. 3. Standard parcels of land, comprising 4 blocks each, were allocated at no cost to Employers who employ a minimum of 500 staff, in an attempt to spread the benefits of the scheme to all categories of workers. 4. The following conditions were also established and govern the scheme:- (i) Any land where actual buildings do not up by 1st June, 1978, would be withdrawn and re-allocated to other organizations who are ready to commence immediate construction. (ii) The building shall be related in designed and cost to the Government’s own housing scheme with which they shall be integrated. In this regard, plans and layouts were made available to the Employers for adoption at no cost. (iii) The title to the land is vested in the Federal Government but the individual parcels will be transferred to the Employers upon completion of development and utilization for the welfare and benefit of their staff in accordance with the Federal Military Government’s guidelines. 5. The Federal Government’s guidelines mentioned in 4(iii) above include the following:- (a) At completion of the buildings, 75% of the units must be allocated to the lower income bracket of the staff, while the rest goes to the middle level management or top management staff. (b) The living units are to be allocated on owner-occupier basis with the prospect of the staff owning the house eventually. (c) Every owner-occupier will enter into a combined Tenancy/Purchase Agreement with the Company/Parastatals and as such the occupier shall not be treated as tenant in the conventional sense but as a prospective owner of the property he occupied. (d) The occupier shall not pay more than 20% of income as rent and such rent paid will be regarded as deposits towards eventual purchase of the living unit. (e) Any occupier who fails to meet the standard of hygiene sanitation and maintenance required on the estate units in default with regard to his financial obligations shall be ejected. (f) Problems connected with transfer of ownership as a result of staff withdrawing their services from the company/parastatals before the date fixed for purchase are to be referred to the Government for sorting out by the Federal Ministry of Labour''. The content of the above exhibit is clear and unambiguous. Indeed by paragraph 5 of the exhibit, the Federal Military Government did not mince words in its determination to ensure that the houses when constructed on the land allocated were allocated to staff of various organisations and establishments concerned (including the Defendant) on owner-occupier basis. Secondly, Exh. C8 (Exh. D18) is a document addressed to the Director General of the National Provident Fund and dated 10/3/94. The title read thus - ''Re: Employees Housing Scheme At Satellite Town, Lagos Occupants Demand for the Implementation of the Federal Government's Guidelines on Allocated Houses''. It contained the following three paragraphs - '' I am directed to refer to the Conditions established for the implementation of the above scheme, with particular reference to the provision that the completed housing units should be allocated to your Employees on Owner-Occupier basis, with the prospect of the occupants eventually owning the houses. ''2. I am to therefore forward the attached list of allottees, and to request that you confirm the status of both the staff and the houses, as well as your arrangements for the transfer of ownership of the houses to the Allottees. ''3. Please expedite action, to enable the Ministry take a firm decision on the subject. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Allottees through the Association of Satellite Town Residents, in this regard''. Again paragraph 2 of Exh. C9 signed by one C.C. Obi for the Honourable Minister states inter alia, ''... I am directed to bring to your notice that the Honourable Minister has formally approved that organizations in Satellite Town transfer the houses to the residents on owner occupier basis''. The contents of these exhibits are clear and unambiguous and being documentary evidence, it is trite that they constitute the best form of evidence relating to their contents to which no parole evidence will be allowed to vary or contradict. See Rangaza v. Micro Plastic Company Limited (2013) LPELR-20303 (CA) & Bongo v. Governor of Adamawa State (2013)2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 403. From the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to hold that there is an established government policy on housing respecting Satellite Town housing scheme and I so hold. Secondly, there is also evidence before me to the effect that by the government housing policy and the established guidelines, the property constructed in Satellite Town was meant and designed to be allocated the staff of the organizations concerned on owner-occupier basis and I so hold. Thirdly, there is evidence before me to the effect that the Claimant being a staff of the Defendant who was allocated a Flat at the housing scheme of the Defendant is entitled to ownership of the said property on owner occupier basis and I so hold. I deem it necessary to comment that while Exh. D18 was dated 10/3/94 Exh. D21 was dated 30/7/97. Thus, as at when Exh. D21 was made seeking the dismissal of the Claimant she was by Exh. D18 ought to have been allocated the property on owner occupier basis and Exh. D22 dated 13/8/97 should not have been made ordinarily in an ideal and humane environment. I must add that the request made for the approval of the Hon. Minister to dismiss the Claimant was made in bad faith and without the milk of human kindness. The Federal Military Government designed a policy on housing which was meant for the benefit of the Nigerian workers. That Policy was meant to be implemented by workers in government service. Yet the same set of workers or some of them for whose benefit the Policy was meant were the same people working against the success of that government Policy. What else is there to be said? The seventh relief sought is for a declaration that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. By Exh. C8 which is the same as Exh. D18, the Claimant ought to have been allocated the property on owner occupier basis. The exhibits were dated 10/3/94. If the Defendant had complied with the directive of the Federal Military Government to allocate the property on owner-occupier basis, the need to issue quite notice would not have arisen. I hold that the Quit Notice dated 11/7/97 and served on the Claimant is invalid. It is null and void. It is of no effect whatsoever. The final relief sought was for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and occupation of the said housing unit. The relief of perpetual injunction is a consequential order which should naturally flow from the declaratory order sought and granted by the Court. Essentially, the imperative of this hybrid injunction is to prevent permanently the infringement of those rights and to obviate the necessity for bringing multiplicity of suits in respect of every repeated infringement. See Goldmark Nigeria Limited & Ors. v. Ibafon Company Limited & Ors. (2012) LPELR-9349(SC). Perpetual injunction is only grantable after a trial and the applicant has established an actual or threatened infringement of his rights. Having reviewed and evaluated all the evidence tendered and admitted in this case, I find and hold that the Claimant has established and proved her right and entitlement to the property the subject of this action. I therefore issue a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and occupation of the said housing unit. The third and final issue for determination is whether the Defendant is entitled to a grant of any or all of her counterclaims. The first Counterclaim is for a declaration that the quarter was not allocated to the Claimant on owner-occupier basis. I have already held in this Judgment that the Claimant was entitled to ownership of the property. That being the case, there is no basis for granting this counterclaim as sought. It is therefore refused and dismissed accordingly. The second counter claim is for an order directing the Claimant to vacate the Flat occupied by her immediately. Again respecting this counter claim this Court has granted an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with the possession of the said allocated staff quarter. The second head of counter claim is also therefore refused and dismissed. For the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as stated in this Judgment - 1. It is declared that the dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant vide letter of dismissal dated 24/10/97 by the Defendant was not null, void and of no effect but wrongful. 2. The relief sought by the Claimant for an order of injunction restraining the Defendant from treating the employment of the Claimant with it as having ended pursuant to the aforesaid letter of dismissal is refused and dismissed. 3. The claim for payment to the Claimant by the Defendant of the sum of One Million One Hundred and Sixty Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty Three Naira Thirty Kobo (=N=1,160,323.30) being special damages for her wrongful dismissal from the service of the Defendant is refused and dismissed. 4. The relief sought for a declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant subsisted till 8th August 2009, being the date the Claimant ought to have retired by law, having attained the statutory retirement age for public servants of 60 years is refused and dismissed. 5. The prayer sought for an order that the Defendant do account for and pay till date, all accrued pension of the Claimant from 9/8/09 being the date the Claimant's pension began to accrue is refused and accordingly dismissed for absence of sufficient evidence. 6. It is declared that under and by virtue of the Federal Government guidelines issued pursuant to the public Housing Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria the Claimant is the person entitled to ownership of the Housing Unit D22 at “D” Close Satellite Town at the National Provident Fund Estate. 7. It is declared that the purported Quit Notice dated 11th July 1997 issued by the Defendant and served on the Claimant is invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 8. I issue a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by itself, its servants, agents and, or representatives from ejecting the Claimant or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with the Claimant’s possession and occupation of the said housing unit. 9. The Counter claim for a declaration that the quarter was not allocated to the Claimant on owner occupier basis is refused and dismissed. 10. The Counter claim for an order directing the Claimant to vacate the flat occupied by her immediately is refused and dismissed. All the terms of this Judgment shall be complied with within 30 days from the date of delivery. Judgment is entered accordingly. ___________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge