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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN IN JOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE R.H. GWANDU DATE: MARCH 3RD, 2014 SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/15/2013 BETWEEN 1. MR. AYUBA G.S. CHINSHAK’A 2. DR. SYLVESTER S. DASAK 3. MR. BENEDICT L. GOEWAM PLAINTIFFS 4. MR. YOHANNA A. ASHOMS 5. MR. ISAAC F. DANBAKI AND PLATEAU INVESTMENT AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED ................... DEFENDANT REPRESENTATION K.M Mallan esq, S.I Bukar esq for the Plaintiffs. F.O Shuaibu esq, Bala Akor esq, G.M Kawan esq, M.S. Jlaguma esq for the Defendant. JUDGMENT This is an Originating Summons brought pursuant to Section 254 C (1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Order 3 Rule 5 (a) (1) and (2) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 as amended by the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Practice Direction 2012. The Originating Summons seeks the determination of three (3) questions as contained therein and the Plaintiffs claim six (6) reliefs. BRIEF: This matter was first mentioned on 6th June, 2013 before His Lordship Hon. Justice O.A. Shogbola and adjourned to 24th July, 2013 for full hearing. On 24th July, 2013, before His Lordship Hon. Justice R. H. Gwandu, the Claimants’/Plaintiffs’ Counsel adopted their pleading and their written address (wherein 13 exhibits were tendered) all dated and filed on the 15th day of March, 2013 in proof of their case. Counsel admitted the exchange of pleadings from the Defendant upon which he reacted by filing a reply on points of law and urged the court to find in their favour and grant the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant filed their defence dated the 3rd day of April, 2013, upon which the defence urged the Honourable Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Claims. The summary of the case is that the Plaintiffs are all Senior Management Staff of the Defendant who were employed at various times (Exhibit 1-5). By Exhibits 1 – 5, the employment of the Plaintiffs is regulated by the terms and conditions stipulated in the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, Exhibit 6. Exhibit 6 provides for, among other things, the various forms of leave duty a staff can embark on as well as disciplinary measures that can be initiated against any staff whether for minor or major misconducts. The Plaintiffs, against whom no disciplinary measures have been initiated or pending, were surprised when they received letters of similar contents from the Defendant, dated 7/2/2013 with reference no: PIPC/MD/134/Vol. 11/X entitled “RE-RESTRUCTURING OF PLATEAU INVESTMENT AND PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (PIPC) LIMITED directing them to proceed on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from Tuesday, 12th February, 2013. (Exhibit 7-11). After Exhibits 7 – 11 the Defendant proceeded to changing the various key to the Plaintiffs’ offices, collected all Defendants’ properties in their custody and appointed other persons to be acting in their stead. Upon receipt of Exhibit 7-11 respectively, the Plaintiffs caused their solicitors to write Exhibits 12 and 13 to the Defendant, requesting the Defendant to withdraw Exhibit 7-11. The Defendant did nothing hence the present action before this Honourable Court. Thus, the Plaintiffs formulate three questions for determination as follows: QUESTIONS/ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 1. Can the parties herein, in relation to the employment of the Plaintiffs in the Defendant, go outside the Terms and Conditions contained in the Plaintiffs’ letter of Appointment, and the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, to import and exercise powers or contractual rights, not contained in the said documents? 2. In view of the provisions of Article IX of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service applicable to the Plaintiff’s employment in the Defendant, is compulsory leave one of the various forms of leave duty available to the Plaintiffs as staff of the Defendant? 3. In view of the contents of the Plaintiffs’ Letter of Appointment and the provisions of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, particularly Article XIV thereof, is the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from the 12th day of February, 2013, contained in the Defendant’s letters to the Plaintiffs dated 7/3/2013 and referenced as PIPC/MD/134/Vol. 11/X, not punitive and a violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair hearing and the terms of the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant? In answer to the above questions, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel submits thus: ARGUMENT QUESTION NO. 1 Can the parties herein, in relation to the employment of the Plaintiffs in the Defendant, go outside the Terms and Conditions contained in the Plaintiffs’ Letter of Appointment, and the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, to import and exercise powers or contractual rights, not contained in the said documents? It is humbly submitted that the parties herein cannot, in relation to the employment of the Plaintiffs in the Defendant Company, go outside the terms and conditions contained in the Plaintiff’s Letter of Appointment (Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) and the Defendant’s Staff Condition of Service (Exhibit 6) to import and or exercise powers or contractual rights, not contained in the documents. It is settled law that parties are bound by their contracts. Please see the case of EVBUOMWAN Vs. ELMA (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 353) 638 at 650 where the Supreme Court Per Adio JSC held that “if parties enter into an agreement, they are bound by its terms. One cannot legally or properly read into the agreement the terms of which the parties have not agreed”. See also the case of ALHASSAN Vs. AHMADUBELLOUNIVERSITY, ZARIA (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 417 at 470 para. C, where the Court of Appeal held that “the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract of employment between them...” Exhibits 1, 2,3,4,5 and 6 constitute the contractual relationship between the parties, it is humbly submitted that the documents to be considered by this Honourable Court are Exhibit 1,2,3,4,5 and 6. In ODIASE Vs. AUCHI POLYTECHNIC AUCHI, (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 477 at 479 the Court of Appeal Per Ige JCA held that: “In cases of master and servant the first hurdle to be crossed is for the court to examine what the terms and conditions of service in order to determine the contractual relationship between the employer and employee. In doing this the court is bound to look at the letter of appointment, any service regulation connected with the establishment of the employer and also provision of any statute or decree which relates to or regulates the establishment.” In this case Exhibits 1,2,3,4 and 6 are the Letters of Appointment while Exhibit 6 is the Conditions of Service connected with the employment of the Plaintiffs. It is humbly submitted that where parties, as in this case, have reduced their contract into writing, it is no longer open to them or the courts to go outside their contract to look for more palatable terms. In CALABAR CEMENT COMPANY LTD. Vs. DANIEL (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 750 at 760,Niki Tobi JCA (as he then was stated the law thus: “The crux of this appeal lies basically on the interpretation of Exhibit 5, the Junior Staff Conditions of Service for CALCEMCO, particularly Articles 22 and 29, vis-a-vis Exhibit 1, the letter of termination. I say so because in a contract of service, parties are bound by the terms of the contract. Where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the parties cannot move out of them in search for more favourable terms or greener pastures.However, where the terms of the contract are not clear and ambiguous, a court of law can move them out and invoke the general rules of contract applicable to the nature of the contract of service.” Exhibit 6, more particularly, copiously sets out the duties and obligations of the parties herein in the employment contract. It makes no provision for “Government Policy” as a factor to be reckoned with in the contract of the parties. It is humbly submitted that the Defendant in dealing with the Plaintiffs’ contract of employment in the company, cannot invoke a strange and unknown “Government Policy” not provided for in the contract of the parties, as a basis for exercising powers it does not have in the contract. This Honourable Court is humbly urged to answer question one in the negative and hold that the parties herein cannot, in relation to the employment of the Plaintiff in the Defendant, go outside the terms and conditions contained in Exhibits 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 to import and exercise powers or contractual rights not provided for or contained in the said documents. QUESTION No. 2 In view of the provisions of Article IX of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service applicable to the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant, is compulsory leave one of the various forms of leave duty available of the Plaintiffs as staff of the Defendant? It is humbly submitted that in view of the provisions of Article IX of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service (Exhibit 6) which is applicable to the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant, compulsory leave is not one of the various forms of leave available to the Plaintiffs as staff of the Defendant. Article IX of Exhibit 6 provides thus: “Various forms of leave duty are available to staff for variety of purposes. (a) Annual Leave – a vacation period given annually to all staff who have served the company for at least one year. (b) Casual Leave – a short period of vacation granted to staff to attend to urgent and specific private matters of unplanned occurrence. (c) Examination Leave – granted for the purpose of sitting for examinations. (d) Sports Leave– granted to staff to participate in approved sporting events. (e) Maternity Leave – granted to pregnant female staff, for periods before and after child birth. (f) Sick Leave – granted to staff for limited periods as required for medically certified illness. (g) Study Leave– granted to staff for the purpose of undertaking course of study approved by the company.” It is clear from the above quoted provisions of Exhibit 6 that there is indeed no provision for sending the Plaintiffs on compulsory leave as that particular specie of leave is totally unknown to the contract of the parties. Indeed, in the whole of Exhibit 6, there is no mention of “compulsory leave”. The law is expressiouriusestexclusioalterius, meaning that the express mention of one thing automatically exclude any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regards to the same rules. Please see the case of SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Vs. PROFESSOR A.B. KASUNMU (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 509 at 537 para. D – F. The Court is also urged to answer question No. 2 in the negative and to hold that in view of the provisions of Article IX of the Defendant’s Conditions of Service applicable to the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant; compulsory leave is not one of the various forms of leave duty available to the Plaintiffs as staff of the Defendant. QUESTION No. 3 In view of the contents of the Plaintiffs’ Letters of Appointment and the provisions of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, particularly Article XIV thereof, is the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from the 12th day of February, 2013, contained in the Defendant’s letters to the Plaintiffs dated 7/3/2013 and referenced as PIPC/MD/134/Vol. 11/X, not punitive and a violation of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights to fair hearing and the terms of the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant? It is humbly submitted that from the contents of the Plaintiffs’ Letter of Appointment and the entire provisions of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service (Exhibit 6) the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from the 12th day of February, 2013, contained in the Defendant’s letters to the Plaintiffs (Exhibits 1,2,3,4 and 5) is punitive and a violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair hearing and the terms of the Plaintiff’s employment in the Defendant, as contained in Exhibit 6. In ordinary labour relations “compulsory leave” is (where applicable) a way of removing an employee, who is under investigation or other disciplinary measure, from office, pending the conclusion of investigation or disciplinary procedure against the affected employee. It is normally forced upon the employee who is thus compelled against his wish to leave office pending the outcome of the investigation. It is therefore a punitive measure. In the Plaintiffs’ case, they are neither being investigated by the Defendant nor are they facing any form of disciplinary measures as provided for in Article XIV of Exhibit 6. They were merely forced out of office and replaced by mere reference to nebulous and undisclosed “Government Policy”, a strange feature in the contract of the parties. A calm perusal of Exhibits 7, 8, 9,10 and 11 vis a vis the provisions of Exhibit 6 will reveal clearly that the Defendant appears to “punishing” the Plaintiffs for an undisclosed “offence”, but without following the procedure laid down in Article XIV of Exhibit 6. By Exhibits 7 to 11, the Plaintiffs are to stay away from their offices pending the conclusion of the purported restructuring exercise “to allow the consultants free and unhindered access” to their department. The concluding paragraphs of Exhibits 7,8,9,10 and 11 all read thus: “Consequently, you shall handover the affairs of your Department to the most Senior Officer latest by the close of work on Monday 11th February 2013. You shall also handover all Company’s Property in your possession before proceeding on the said leave please” A comparison of the above with the provisions of Article XIV (4) (b) of Exhibit 6 will reveal that the contents of Exhibits 7 to 11 are the exact features of suspension from office, a disciplinary measure provided for in Exhibit 6, and which is meted out to a staff of the Defendant who is suspected of a serious misconduct. Article XIV (4) (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) (page 28 of Exhibit 6) is relevant. It provides: “(b) Suspension (i) An employee could be sent on suspension either with or without pay depending on the gravity of the offence. (ii) Where an employee is suspected of serious misconduct, he may be suspended from work until the case has been fully investigated and decided (iii) An employee under suspension shall handover any uniforms, keys, books, or records and any other such property of the company in his charge to any employee as the Head of Department shall order and the employee shall be forbidden to carry on his duties and or visit his place of work except with the express permission of the Managing Director.” The above underline portion of Article XIV (4)(b), (iii) capture the punishment meted out on the Plaintiffs by the Defendant in Exhibits 1,2,3,4 and 5 respectively. In the Plaintiffs case, while they are being “suspended” from office in the guise of compulsory leave, they have not been notified in writing of any misconduct for which it is intended to discipline them, as provided for in Article XIV (3) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Exhibit 6, which states thus: “3. Procedure: If the nature of an alleged misconduct is such that it might warrant disciplinary action, the following procedures shall apply:- (a) The employee shall be notified in writing of the nature of the misconduct for which it is intended to discipline him. (b) The matter shall be investigated by the Company Secretary through the Disciplinary Committee and the employee shall be given every opportunity to defend himself. (c) If any witnesses are called to give evidence the employee shall be entitled to be present and to put questions to them. (d) No documentary evidence shall be used against an employee unless he was previously been supplied with a copy or have been given access thereto.” Plaintiffs are not being investigated and have not been called upon to defend themselves over any allegation of misconduct. Plaintiffs do not know their accusers and what they are being accused of, yet they are punished without being heard, under the disguise of compulsory indefinite leave. In punishing the Plaintiffs for their “undisclosed offence”, the Defendant gladly turned blind eyes towards the clear procedure for doing so as laid down in Article XIV (3) page 28 of Exhibit 6. It became convenient for the Defendant to violate not just the Plaintiffs’ right to be heard, but even its own Rules, by contriving a new term, “Compulsory Leave”, as a safety valve to suspend the Plaintiffs from office. The Court is urged to answer question 3 in the affirmative and hold that in view of the Plaintiffs’ Letter of Appointment and the provisions of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service (Exhibit 6) particularly Article XIV thereof, the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from the 12th day of February, 2013, contained in the Defendant’s letter to the Plaintiffs dated 7/3/2013 and referenced as PIPC/MD/134/Vol. 11/X, is punitive and a violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair hearing and Article XIV of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, Exhibit 6. The Plaintiffs’ Counsel therefore urged the Honourable Court to grant all the reliefs sought in their Originating Summons viz: 1. A Declaration that the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant is regulated by the Terms contained in their respective letters of appointment as well as the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, and the parties herein cannot go outside the terms contained in the said documents to import or exercise powers or contractual rights not provided for by the documents regulating their contract. 2. A Declaration that under the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, compulsory leave is not one of the various forms of leave duty available to the Plaintiffs as staff of the Defendant. 3. A Declaration that the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite leave with effect from 12/2/2013 which is contained in the Defendant’s letters to the Plaintiffs dated 7/2/2013 and referenced as PIPC/MD/134/Vol.11/X is punitive and violates the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair hearing and the Terms and Conditions of the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant as contained in the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service. 4. An order setting aside the said directive of the Defendant sending the Plaintiffs on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from 12/2/2013, for not being provided for in the Plaintiff’s contract of employment, and for being a violation of the Plaintiffs’ right to fair hearing and thus null and void. 5. An order directing the Defendant to allow the Plaintiffs access to their respective offices and duty posts in the Defendant, with all the rights, privileges, perks and perquisites attaching thereto, their employment in the Defendant being subsisting. 6. An order of injunction restraining the Defendant, its agents and privies by whatsoever name called, from doing anything or taking any step capable of prejudicially affecting the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant or the enjoyment of any right, privilege, perks and perquisites attaching to their said employment. CONCLUSION: In conclusion, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel respectfully urged the Honourable Court to answer questions 1 and 2 in the negative, answer question 3 in the affirmative and grant the Plaintiffs all the reliefs sought herein. The Defendant Counsel in defence of the suit states as follows:- INTRODUCTION: It is the submission of the Defendant Counsel that the Defendant in a bid to re-position the company vide re-organisation, took administrative decision to engage consultants to go through the operations of the company and give it proper technical advice on the way to re-organize the company to meet up with the current challenges in the economy. That the 2nd Plaintiff herein as the then Acting Managing Director of the Defendant wrote for the re-organization of the company for the approval of the Executive Governor of PlateauState. The said memo was approved and the implementation is what the present. Acting Managing Director of the Defendant wants to execute. The decision leading to suit is purely administrative and has nothing to do with the terms of employment and conditions of service of the claimants herein as their jobs are still intact and untampered with. He formulated a sole issue for determination thus: ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION: Whether the administrative decision of the Defendant to re-organise the Defendant is actionable at the instance of the Plaintiffs, their employment not being affected”. LEGAL ARGUMENT: The decision to re-organise the Defendant is completely administrative. Administrative policies and decisions are not contained in the letters of employment of an employee nor contained in the Conditions of Service. They are day to day directions for running an organisation. For such a decision therefore to be actionable, it must be contrary to an express provision of the terms and conditions of service of an employee. In the terms and Conditions of Service of the claimants herein, there is no provision there contained that the Defendant cannot take administrative decision to give them compulsory leave to enable the Defendant re-organise its operations. Even if the action is perceived by Plaintiffs to be illegal as long as it does not attack their employment they cannot complain. In the case of SPDCN NIG. LTD – V – NWAWKA (2003) FWLR part 144 page 506 at 523 paragraphs A – B, the Supreme Court held; “Be that as it may, it is not the law that where an employee conceives that his contract of employment may be affected adversely due to irregular or illegal conduct of the employer or irregular manner of recruitment which may directly or indirectly affect him, he has a cause of action regard less of whether the terms of his contract of employment, including a term as to termination of the contract, have not been breached”. This authority is apposite and on all fours to the instant case. No term of employment of the Plaintiffs herein is breached. The letters Exhibits 7 – 11 of the claimants is clear even from the title that it is restructuring. The letters in paragraph 1 states clearly that the leave is “pending the conclusion of the exercise”. This clearly puts the action administrative as the letter is not for suspension, termination or Dismissal of the Plaintiffs. Where the decision of an employer is not to suspend, terminate or dismiss an employee or a decision to take his right to work away such as constructive termination etc, the right of action does not ensue to the employee. In the case at hand, after the completion, of the re-organisation the Plaintiffs will come back to work. They have admitted they are senior administrative Staff; it will be embarrassing for them to be hanging around in the premises as Senior Staff while the consultants will be carrying out their duties in their offices, that is why they are given the honour to go and rest while the consultants do their work. Finally, by Exhibit “P1”, it is the 2nd Plaintiff that applied for the re-structuring. Can he complain about the administrative decision taken for affective implementation of the re-structuring, the answer is No. He cannot approbate and reprobate. See section 169 E A. 2011 LFN as amended. The Court is urged to hold that the administrative decision of the defendant to re-structure the defendant has not breached any terms and conditions of the Plaintiffs services herein to give them any right of action. The Court is urged to Strike out or dismisses the claims of the Plaintiffs for lacking in merit. On further reply, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel relied on the learned defence Counsel’s cited authority ieThe shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd and 6 orsVs E.N. Nwawka (2003) FWLR (Pt 144) 506, and distinguished between the two as he submitted that the facts of the two were different and could not apply. The Shell (Supra) being a case of termination of employment on grounds of redundancy, the Plaintiff’s case on the other hand is that the Defendant has breached certain terms of their contract by tacitly suspending them from office under the guise of indefinite compulsory leave, which is not known to, or provided for in their contract. Therefore, the Defendant cannot run away from the alleged breach by simply answering that the alleged breach “is purely administrative”. He posited that the Defendant is bound by its contract with the Plaintiffs. He cited SPDCN Ltd VNwawka (Supra) at P 522 “ when parties make a contract, they make their own law which they are subject and which creates the rights and obligations, which bind them, to which the general law only gives recognition and force” Secondly, Counsel contended that the Defendant stated that because the 2nd Plaintiff herein, while acting as the Managing Director of the Defendant, wrote Exhibit P1 requesting for the restructuring of the Defendant, he could not ‘complain about the administrative decision taken for effective implementation of the restructuring’. Plaintiffs’ Counsel submitted that restructuring should not mean sending any staff of the Defendant on compulsory indefinite leave, nor relieving some staff of their duties by way of indefinite compulsory leave. He urged the court to hold that making P1 does not deter the 2nd Plaintiff from complaining against the violation of the terms of his employment by the Defendant. I have carefully gone through and considered the processes filed, the submissions of counsel on both sides and the authorities cited. Both parties to me, seems to be in agreement as to the terms of their contract. However, to resolve the above matter, I wish to formulate one issue thus: Can an administrative action/decision of any one running an administrative machinery run counter and or vitiate the agreement entered into by parties? In answer to the above, I will set out to consider what cements the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant in this suit. The Plaintiffs in this suit are the employees of the Defendant though in various ranks. The plaintiffs were employed at various times as reflected in their various letters of appointment (exhibits 1 – 5) and are regulated by the common administrative book, the staff condition of service (exhibit 6). These two instruments conferred on both parties, an existing contract. As it is, the existence and the regulation of the service of the employee are wholly deposited in the two instruments. Thus,“in the determination of this issue, I need to emphasise the bindingness of the terms of the contract of service between the parties. There is no doubt that the parties’ freedom of contract carries with it the inevitable implication of sanctity of their contracts. This means, that if any question should arise with respect to the contract, the terms in any documents which constitute the contract are invariably, the guide to its interpretation”. See the case of Joseph IfetaVs Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (Nigerian Supreme Court Quarterly Law Reports) Volume 26 Pt 1 (April – June 2006) P 605 @ P 607 ratio 2, per Mahmud Mohammed Jsc. Instructive is the Conditions of Service of Plateau Investments Company Ltd which I shall reproduce in parts particularly as it touches the gravamen of this suit to wit: the issue of LEAVE Article IX of the Defendant’s staff Conditions of Service (Exhibit 6). As noted, Article IX of Exhibit 6 provides as follows: “Various forms of leave duty are available to staff for a variety of purposes: (a) Annual Leave – a vacation period given annually to all staff who have served the company for at least one year. (b) Casual Leave – a short period of vacation granted to staff to attend to urgent and specific private matters of unplanned occurrence. (c) Examination Leave- granted for the purpose of sitting for examinations. (d) Sports Leave – granted to staff to participate in approved sporting events. (e) Maternity Leave – granted to pregnant female staff, for periods before and after childbirth. (f) Sick Leave – granted to staff for limited periods as required for medically certified illness. (g) Study Leave – granted to staff for the purpose of undertaking course of study approved by the company. It is crystal clear that from the available exhibit 6, the specie of leave branded as “compulsory leave”: was conspicuously missing and totally avoided. Therefore, the Latin Maxim ‘expressiouniusest exclusion alterius’ (the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another) rightly applies here. See the case of Securities and Exchange Commission Vs Professor A.B. Kasunmu (2009) 10 NWLR pt 1156) 509 at 537 para D-F. Also the proper approach to the interpretation of clear words of a Statute is to follow them, in theirsimple grammatical and ordinary meaning rather than look further because that is what prima facie gives them their reliable meaning. See Fawehinmi V. IGP of Police (2002) Vol. 8 MJSC P. 12; African Newspaper VsFederalRepublic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR, p76, 137. Further, it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that where in their ordinary meaning the provisions are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to them without resorting to any aid internal or external. It is the duty of the court to interpret the words of the law makers as used. Those words may be ambiguous, but even if they are, the power and duty to the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited. (see Magor And St. Mellow R.D.C V. Newport Corporation (1951) 2 All ER 839. Attorney-General of Bendel State v AG of the Federation &Ors (1981) 12 NSCC 314) P.50 Paras E-G.,AGOndo State V AG Ekiti State: (2001) 9 MJSC, 25 @ 28 or 1. Thus, Exhibit 6 Article IX of the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service is completely ignorant of the administrative courage of its administrators in sending the plaintiffs on “compulsory leave” and therefore an Ultra-Vires action. The employees are not holding their offices at the pleasure of anybody executing any administrative policy be it government (Plateau State inclusive or otherwise). See Shitta Bey V. The Federal Republic Service Commission (1981) NSCC Vol 12 p19 @ 21. Ratio 3: herein reproduced: “Public servants in the established and pensionable cadre of the Federal Government Service are not employed at the pleasure of the Federal Government. The Civil Service rules vests in a public servant a legal status and they can be properly or legally removed only as provided for by the said rules. These rules, by virtue of the fact that they are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the respondent commission by virtue of Constitutional provisions in the 1963 Constitution have Constitutional force thus conferring on a public servant a status which makes his relations with the respondent and government one beyond the ordinary or mere master and servant relationship.” Inferred from above, it is instructive to note that every administrative role (including “Government Policy” as adduced by the Defendant) performed in an establishment should conform to the same rule set out and governing the institution or establishment. This shuts the door of the institution or establishment from embarking on a discretionary administrative exercise as in sending her employees on a ‘foreign’ (not contemplated) “compulsory leave”. On the other hand, it would have been different and permissible if any administrative rule or journal (which forms part of the contract) is pleaded to justify the stand of the Defendant in pursuit of the tagged “administrative” decision. I have my doubt if such could have held water in the face of an out-right refusal to follow the terms of the parties’ contract. Also, it has been reiterated several times that in all things in Nigeria that the rule of Law is highly favoured against an unlawful action. See the case of Military Governor, Lagos State & ors Vs Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (2001) 1 Monthly Judgments of the Supreme Court (MJSC) 184, @ 188. Per Obaseki JSC (P202) paras A-B. ......The Nigerian Constitution is founded on the rule of law the primary meaning of which is that everything must be done according to law. It means also that government should be conducted within the framework of recognised rules and principles which restrict discretionary power which Coke colourfully spoke of as ‘golden and straight metwand of law as opposed to the uncertain and crooked cord of discretion’. In-so-far-as there isno disagreement between the parties as to the clear terms of their letters of appointment, their acceptance and also the Staff Condition of Service but only on the administrative decision which invariably turned out to be an ultra-vires action, I shall hold thatthe discretionary action of the Defendant shall fail being an unlawful act. See Stitch VAG Federal &Ors (1986) NSCC (Vol. 17 Pt 11) P 1389 @ 1390 Ratio 1. “The contention of the respondent that the Minister of Commerce under section 3 of the Finance Act, 1981 had unfettered power to grant or refuse import licences with or without assigning reasons, is not true in law. The discretionary power of the Minister under section 3 of the Finance Act 1981 is clearly within the reviewable jurisdiction of the Courts. Whether the Minister failed to exercise his discretion, or refused to exercise his discretion, or misused the discretionary power, it being a Principle established by the courts that once a prima-facie case of misuse of power has been established, it would be open to the courts to infer that the Minister acted unlawfully whether or not he supplied a justification.” Since, I have located this action on the sole issue raised and answered, the whole matter is now resolved in favour of the claimants as there is no need to deal with the issues raised by the Claimants/Plaintiffs one after another. However, for the benefit of doubt, the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs are hereby granted and ordered as Follows; 1. The Court Declares that the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant is regulated by the Terms contained in their respective letters of appointment as well as the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, and the parties herein cannot go outside the terms contained in the said documents to import or exercise powers or contractual rights not provided for by the documents regulating their contract. 2. The Court declares that under the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service, compulsory leave is not one of the various forms of leave duty. 3. The Court Declares that the directive of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to proceed on an indefinite leave with effect from 12/2/2013 which is contained in the Defendant’s letters to the Plaintiffs dated 7/2/2013 and referenced as PIPC/MD/134/Vol.11/X is punitive and violates the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to fair hearing and the Terms and Conditions of the Plaintiffs’ as contained in the Defendant’s Staff Conditions of Service. 4. Court gives an order setting aside the said directive of the Defendant sending the Plaintiffs on an indefinite compulsory leave with effect from 12/2/2013, for not being provided for in the Plaintiff’s contract of employment. 5. Court gives an order directing the Defendant to allow the Plaintiffs access to their respective offices and duty posts in the Defendant, with all the rights, privileges, perks and perquisites attaching thereto, their employment in the Defendant still subsisting. 6. Court gives an order of injunction restraining the Defendant, its agents and privies by whatsoever name called, from doing anything or taking any step capable of prejudicially affecting the Plaintiffs’ employment in the Defendant or the enjoyment of any right, privilege, perks and perquisites attaching to the said employment. Judgment is entered accordingly and I make no order as to cost. .................................................... Hon. Justice R.H Gwandu Judge