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BEFORE THEIR LORD SHIPS Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice V. N. Okobi - Judge Lion. Justice 0. A. Obaseki-Osaghae - Judge DATE: September 28, 2010 SUIT NO. NIC/LA/08/2009 BETWEEN Mr. Lawrence Idemudia - Claimant AND The Lagos State University - Defendant REPRESENTATION Prof. J. N. M. Mbadugha, for the claimant L. B. Shopeyin, for the defendant RULING By a complaint dated 4th March; 2009 and filed on the same day, the claimant approached this court for the following reliefs against the defendants — 1. A declaration that the defendant’s dismissal of the claimant from its employment was wrongful, unlawful or ultra vires and null and void. 2. A declaration that the defendant did not give the claimant a reasonable opportunity of putting his case. 3. A declaration that the defendant’s trial of the claimant was contrary to the rules of natural justice, fair trial and fair hearing. 4. A declaration that the defendant has no jurisdiction to sit on appeal over its decision and that its review of its previous decision over the allegation against the claimant was unlawful and illegal. 5. A declaration that defendant’s retrial or re-adjudicating the allegation against the claimant is contrary to public policy. 6. A declaration that the defendant’s right of action as at the time it re-opened or retried the claimant was extinguished. 7. A declaration that the defendant had by its letter of 6th January, 2009 injured the claimant’s reputation, portrayed him as a hooligan, irresponsible, nontrustworthy and lowered his estimation in the eye of every right thinking member of the society. An order setting aside the defendant’s dismissal of the claimant from its service. 9. The sum of One Hundred Million Naira (N100,000,000,00) being special, general, exemplary and aggravated damages. The defendant reacted by filing a memorandum of appearance on the 9th April, 2009 and a statement of defence on the 14th April, 2009. Thereafter, on the 6th November 2009, the defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1(1) and Order 15 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, section 6(3), (4), (5), (6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution praying for the following orders: 1. An order setting down the issue of jurisdiction of the Court to entertain this action. 2. An order striking out this action in toto as the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the same. 3. An order striking out paragraphs I — 13 of the amended statement of facts as same discloses no reasonable cause of action. 4. An order striking out the action for incompetence. The grounds of the objection are as follows: 1. The claims of the claimant as stated in the General Form of complaint, to wit wrongful and/or unlawful dismissal, breach of right of fair hearing, libel and/or defamation of character, setting aside etc do not come within this Court’s jurisdiction under section.? of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. 2. This Court not being a court specifically created by the Constitution but by an Act of the National Assembly has limited powers and can only assume jurisdiction over matters under its powers. 3. The claimant’s claims or reliefs can only be entertained by the Federal High Court or High Court of Lagos State and not this Court. 4. The claimant did not by his amended statement of facts disclose he has justifiable claims to maintain this action hence same is incompetent. 5. The claimant failed to exhaust the internal remedies under the University rules and regulations before instituting this action. 6. There is no breach of the principles of natural justice, rules of fair hearing, error of law on the face of the proceedings or report of panel “N” and the report of Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee which are before the court. 7. The conditions precedent to the institution of the action have not been fulfilled. 8. The said paragraphs of the amended statement of facts disclose no reasonable cause of action. In support of the preliminary objection is a 16-paragraphed affidavit sworn to on the 6th of November 2009 by Olaolu Ogbeyemi, a litigation clerk, to which is attached nine exhibits. Also attached to the preliminary objection is the defendant’s written address in support of the objection dated and filed on 6th of November 2009. The claimant in reaction filed a 14-paragraphed counter-affidavit sworn to by Felicia Nwankwo-Otobo on the 20th of January 2010 and to which is attached two exhibits. The claimant also filed a reply written address dated 6th January 2010 but filed on the 20th January 2010. The defendant responded by filing a further affidavit of 9 paragraphs sworn to by Olaolu Ogbeyemi on 21st April 2010 and a reply on points of law dated 20th April 2010 but filed on the 21St April 2010. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the defendant’s counsel both in his oral argument, written address and reply on points of law consistently referred to the “motion on jurisdiction dated 31st August 2009.” There is no such motion dated 31st August 2009 in the records before the court. Rather the submissions of defendants counsel relate to the objection dated and filed on the November 2009 which is also the process the claimant has reacted to. The defendant’s counsel commenced by adopting the written submission and relying on all the processes filed in respect of the objection. He began the written address with a long introduction stating the facts of this case which are already contained in the pleadings and concluded by stating that some paragraphs particularly paragraph 8 of thestatement of facts are mere speculation not backed by facts and contradict sections 86 —89 of the Evidence Act Cap. E14 LFN 2004, and therefore should be struck out. Learned counsel then raised one issue for the determination of this court: Whether the claimant’s action is competent and this court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. He submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is a threshold issue and can be raised at any time and once it is raised the court must consider it before any further step is taken in the proceedings because if there is no jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are a nullity. He cited Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya [1977] 1 SC 11, Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 7 SC 1, Jeric Nigeria Ltd v. Union Ban/c of Nigeria Plc [2000] 12 SC (Pt. 11)133, Elabanjo v Dawodu [2006] 6-7, SC 24 at 33-38. The defendant’s counsel submitted further that there are various ways of objecting to jurisdiction which could be on the basis of the statement of claim, or on evidence received or by a motion on notice supported by affidavit giving the facts upon which reliance is placed as in this case or even on the face of the writ of summons. That this court need not restrict itself to the statement of facts but can look at other materials filed including the facts in the statement of defence in support of the application. He cited Izekwe v. Nnadozie [1953] WACA 361 at 363, Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9—10 SC 31,National BankNig Ltd V. Shoyoye [1977)5 SC 1l0,A-GKwara State v. Olawale [2003] 2 — 3 SC1, Elabanjo v. Dawodu, supra, Barclays Ban/c of Nigeria v. Central Bank of Nigeria [citation was not supplied by counsel]. The defendant’s counsel also submitted that the claims of the claimant do not fall within the purview of section 7 of the NIC Act 2006. That this court not being a superior court of record as provided in sections 6(3) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution but one with subordinate jurisdiction under section 6(4)(a) of the Constitution can only exercise the powers conferred on it by the law establishing the court which in this case is the Act. That the three conditions precedent to the institution of this action have not been fulfilled which are that, the court must be properly constituted as to numbers, the subject matter must be within the powers of the court and thirdly all the conditions precedent to the exercise of the courts power must be fulfilled. He referred to Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, Sken Consult v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 1, Gambari v. Gambari [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt 150) 527. Counsel continued by submitting that when the competency of an action is challenged by a defendant, the claimant has the onus of proof of establishing it because the incompetence of the action robs on the jurisdiction of the court. He cited Ajao v. Sonola [1973] 5 SC 119 at 123, Sani v. Okene Local Government Traditional Council [2008] 5 — 6 SC 131. He further submitted that the claimant’s claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. That a reasonable cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim which consists of two elements, the wrongful acts of the defendant which gives the claimant his cause or complaint and the consequent damage. He submitted that this is not the situation here and, therefore, the claimant cannot be heard by the court because there is no justifiable dispute between the parties before the court. He cited Savage v. Uwachie [1972] 3 SC 214, Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR(Pt. 18) 669. Arguing further, counsel submitted that a University has authority to discipline an erring student or staff for acts amounting to misconduct and such discipline is an administrative act. That the defendant in disciplining the claimant did not breach the principles of natural justice as the claimant was given an opportunity to be heard. That fair hearing does not lie in the correctness of the decision handed down by a body or tribunal but b the procedure followed relying on Onyekwuleje v. Benue State Government [2005] FWLR (Pt. 280) 1615. Learned counsel submitted further that by instituting this action in the wrong court, there has been an abuse of the court process and this suit should be struck out. He cited Idoko v. Ogbelcwu [2003] FWLR (Pt. 149), Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156, Opekepe v. Sadiq [2003] FWLR (Pt. 150) 1654 and finally submitted that because the claimant’s claims are not within the court’s power, especially reliefs 7 and 9 in which the claimant is seeking for damages to his reputation and/or libel, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the courts jurisdiction have not been met. He urged the court to so hold, strike out the claimants action with costs and resolve the sole issue for determination in favour of the defendant. Learned counsel to the claimant adopted the lairnant’s written address and relied on all the processes filed in opposition to the preliminary objection. He raised three issues for the determination of the court, namely — 1. Would the claimant exhaust the defendant’s internal remedies becore resorting to litigation in the light of section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution and/or if the defendant has no jurisdiction to try the claimant for an alleged breach of Public Officers Code (keeping double appointment)? 2. If a set of facts gives rise to a multiple cause of action resulting in different courts having exclusive jurisdiction in respect of some of the causes to the exclusion of others will any of the courts assume jurisdiction over all the causes of action? 3. Did the claimant’s case disclose a cause of action? On issue 1, the claimant’s counsel referred to paragraph 13 of the counter-affidavit and submitted that the defendant has no internal remedies which must be exhausted by the claimant before commencing this suit. That even if the defendant has such internal remedies (which is not conceded) they are not constitutionally provided. That the claimant is challenging the jurisdiction of the defendant to try him for a misconduct which amounts to an offence in law by reason of which the intended domestic remedies are inapplicable to the claimant. He cited University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 557 at 583 paragraphs D and G where the Court of Appeal held per Onnoghen, JCA (as he then was) held as follows — On the issue as to whether the respondent exhausted the domestic remedies on his expulsion before resorting to court action, it must be noted that the respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the appellants to expel him on misconduct which amounts to criminal offences, the findings of which was not made by a court of law of competent jurisdiction; yet the appellants are contending that the respondent ought to have waited for the result of his appeal against the expulsion. Finally on this point, we must remember that section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 guarantees uninhibited right to every person to go to court seeking a determination of any question as to his civil rights and/or obligations. It is my view that for any condition precedent to the exercise of that constitutional right to be effective it must be constitutionally, legally and expressly provided. The claimant’s counsel argued that by the provisions of paragraphs 2, 12, 15 and 18 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, the defendant’s allegation of double employment is a criminal offence triable exclusively by the Code of Conduct Tribunal and if found guilty he will be liable to punishment under paragraph 18 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. That where a person is accused of a criminal offence, it is only a court or tribunal established by the Constitution that has jurisdiction to try the matter. He referred to the decision in Dr Sotekun v. Chief Akinyemi & ors [1980] 5 — 7 SC 1, Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 550) 18. Counsel argued further that where a disciplinary committee instead of a Court tries an allegation of a crime, such a trial is null and void and the accused is not bound to exhaust any internal remedies of the body setting up the disciplinary committee before resorting to litigation, referring to University of llorin V. Oluwadare, supra. On issue 2, the claimant’s counsel submitted that the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia determine civil disputes bordering on labour including trade unions and industrial relations, environment and conditions of work as well as any collective agreement, referring to section 7(l)(a), (b) and (c)(i) of the NIC Act 2006. He submitted further that labour/trade union dispute means any dispute between employers and employees including disputes between their respective organizations and a federation which is connected with inter alia the employment or non-employment of any person, the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. He referred to section 54(l)(a) and (b) of the MC Act 2006, section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 LFN 1990, Oloruntoba-Oju & ors v, Dopamu [2008] 2 — 3 SC (Pt. 1) 95 at 132 paragraph 30. He also submitted that a collective agreement means any agreement in writing regarding working conditions and terms of employment concluded between employers and employees, referring to section 54 of the National Industrial Court Act. Continuing, counsel argued that the question to be answered is whether the claimant’s case is a labour or trade union dispute within the context of section 7 of the NIC Act, the interpretative section and section 47 of the Trade Disputes Act. He referred to the reliefs claimed in the complaint and paragraphs 5(a d), 6(a — d), 9 and 10 of amended statement of facts and submitted that the claimant’s case is a labour/trade union dispute. That this is the main claim of the claimant with the claim on libel (relief 7) being the ancillary claim. Learned counsel argued that every court of record has jurisdiction to declare what the law is when invited by the process of litigation except if the Constitution has declared that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a matter referring to Oloruntoba-Ojat v Dopamat, supra. That relief 7 being a declaratory relief, the court has the jurisdiction to entertain it, given that the 1999 Constitution did not declare that this court cannot entertain an action in libel arising from labour/trade union dispute. Learned counsel argued further that no action can be defeated on the basis that a court that has jurisdiction to entertain the principal claim has no jurisdiction to entertain the ancillary claim. That no court can decline jurisdiction to entertain a case on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain an ancillary claim even though it has jurisdiction to entertain the principal claim. He cited Tukur V. Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 549 and 567, NSITF Management Board v. Adebiyi [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt. 633) 16 and submitted that this court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit given that it has jurisdiction to entertain the principal claim. He also argued in the alternative, that assuming without conceding that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, because it has no jurisdiction to entertain the ancillary claim, which court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit? He submitted that where there is a court with jurisdiction to determine all issues raised in a maner, including the principal issue, it is improper to approach a court that is competent to determine oniy some of the issues, citing Ajao v. [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 471 at 479 A — B, Okoroma v. UBA [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt. 587) 359 at 379 H—A. Counsel further argued that no court in Nigeria has jurisdiction to determine all the issues raised in the present matter or the reliefs being sought. That section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act gives this court exclusive jurisdiction to entertain labour and trade union disputes and, therefore, any other court with jurisdiction to try relief 7 (libel) will not have jurisdiction to try labour and trade union disputes. He submitted that where a set of facts gives rise to a multiple cause of action with no court having jurisdiction to try all the causes, it is tidier to allow the court that has exclusive jurisdiction to try some of the issue, try the entire issues rather than allow the claimant to split them into two and maintain them in different courts. He stated that this submission is supported by the settled principle of law that where a cause of action gives rise to more than a remedy, all the remedies must be claimed in the same action and must not be pursued by separate. He cited Gafaru v. UAC [1961] 1 ANLR 785, Savage v. Uwechia [1972] 1 ANLR (Pt. 1) 251, Ofume v. Okoye [1966] 1 ANLR 94. That assuming without conceding that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit or part of the the court should transfer this suit or part of the cause of action to the appropriate court by virtue of section 24(2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. On issue 3, the claimant’s counsel submitted that a cause of action means a factual situation, the existence of which enables one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. He referred to Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315 at 365 B — D. He stated that the above definition presupposes a legal relationship between two or more parties in which one of the parties, the defendant, acted injuriously against the other party the claimant, and that every cause of action is reasonable, and a reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered, citing Oshoboja v. Amuda [1992] 7 SCNJ 317 at 326. He submitted that in determining whether a case discloses a cause or reasonable cause of action, it is only the writ of summons and the statement of claim that should be looked at and considered, citing Adesokan v. Adegorolu [1997] 3 SCNJ 1 at 16 — 17. The claimant’s counsel then submitted that the claimant’s action discloses a reasonable cause of action. He finally submitted that the paragraph 3.5 of the defendant’s written submission which deals with the issue of breach of the rules of natural justice can only be determined during the trial of the matter. He urged the court to dismiss the objection with punitive costs. In reply on points of law, the defendant’s counsel began by making references to paragraphs in the affidavit and counter-affidavit in respect of the preliminary objection. We must state categorically that all these are facts relating to the merits of this case and not reply on points of law in respect of principles of law raised by the claimant and will therefore be discountenanced as they are not relevant at this stage of proceedings. Learned counsel to the defendant submitted that the written address of the claimants in accordance with Order 20 of the Rules of this court as there is no list of authorities and, therefore, same should be struck out. He submitted also that conditions precedent notice before the institution of actions against Public Authorities is not contrary to the Constitution, citing Egbe v. Alhaji [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 and Gambari v. Gambari, supra. He submitted further that the allegation of double employment leveled by the defendant against the claimant is not a crime by virtue of the defendant’s regulations and does not come within the ambit of criminal acts. Therefore, all the submissions about crime and the authorities relied upon by the claimant’s counsel in this regard should be discountenanced. He argued that the allegation is within the ambit of civil actions and powers of the disciplinary committee of the defendant. In reply to the claimant’s submission that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this action, the defendant’s counsel submitted that though this court was established by the Trade Disputes Act, its jurisdiction as stated in section 20 was improved upon by section 7 the National Industrial Court act 2006. That notwithstanding this, the claimant’s claim are not within the jurisdiction of this court. Counsel also submitted that the claimant’s reliefs 1 — 7 are for declaratory orders which this court does not have the jurisdiction to make, citing Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & ors v. Prof Shuaib & ors [20091 5 — 6 SC (Pt. 11) 57, Western Steel Workers v, Iron & Steel Workers [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 248 and Kalango & ors v. Dokubo & ors [2003] 16 WRN 32 at 49. That the reliefs of setting aside of claimant’s dismissal and libel are not within the jurisdiction of this court. He urged the court to so hold and dismiss this action with substantial costs. We have carefully considered all the arguments for and against this objection. The issue for determination is whether the claims of the claimant come within the jurisdiction of this court. The defendant’s counsel submission is that this court not being a court of superior record under section 6(3) & (5) of the 1999 Constitution, but being one with subordinate jurisdiction under section 6(4)(a) of the Constitution, can only exercise the powers conferred on it by the law creating it; in this case the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Sections 1(3)(a) and (b) and section 7(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act are reproduced as follows — 1(3) The Court shall — (a) be a superior court of record; and (b) except as may be otherwise provided by any enactment or law, ha e powers of a High Court. 7(1) The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes matters — (a) relating to — (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and (ii) environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto. A court is competent and has jurisdiction in a case if inter alia the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 and Mwana v. UBN Plc [2003] 16 NWLR (Pt. 846) 218. The question then is whether the claimant’s claim for wrongful dismissal and for a sum of money in relation to unpaid entitlements and other terminal benefits against the defendant all come within the purview of section 7(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Are they claims in relation to labour or matters incidental to labour as conferred on the court? It is the statement of facts of the claimant that is relevant in deciding whether this court has to hear and determine this case. In the recent case of Oloruntoba-Oju & ors v. Dopamu & ors [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 1 at 23, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle as espoused in the cases of Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron & Steel Workers [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 and Adeyemi & ors v. Oyeyori [1976] 1 FNLR 149 in the following words — It is fundamental that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the court which entertains the claim. The claims of the claimant which have been reproduced earlier deal mainly with his dismissal from the service of the defendant and the need to pay him his severance benefits. These are all labour related and so come within the purview of the jurisdiction of this court under section 7(l)(a) of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju v. Prof Shuaib & ors [2009] 5 — 6 SC (Pt. 11) 57, a case the cause of action of which arose in 2003 long before the NIC Act 2006 was enacted, and which counsel to the defendant cited, did not consider the ambit of sections 16 and 19 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which confer on this court the powers to grant injunctions, declaratory orders and urgent interim reliefs amongst other orders. The decision was, therefore, not based on the National Industrial Court Act 2006. Two quick points must be made here. Firstly, the reference to the cases of Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & ors v. Prof Shuaib & ors [2009) 5 — 6 SC (Pt. 11) 57, Western Steel Workers v. Iron & Steel Workers [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 and Kalango & ors v. Dokubo & ors [2003) 16 WRN 32 at 49 by the counsel to the respondent loses sight of the fact that they are all cases centered on the Trade Disputes Act 1990 as amended by Decree 47 of 1992. In the TDA 1990, as amended, there is no specific or direct provision similar to sections 16 — 19 of the NIC Act 2006. As it stands today, neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to pronounce on the jurisdiction powers of this court in terms of sections 7 and 16 — 19 of the NIC Act 2006. The second point is that the fact that a court is not specifically named in section 6(3) & (5) of the 1999 Constitution does not take from that court the status of a court of law as canvassed by counsel to the defendant. The court remains a court properly so called. The counsel to the defendant would, however, agree that under section 6(4)(a) of the Constitution even inferior courts can exercise the powers conferred on it by the law establishing the court in question. We do not, therefore, see how the issue of the status of the NIC i.e. whether it is a court of superior or inferior record affects its jurisdiction/power to resolve labour disputes or disputes incidental thereto. We, however, agree with the defendant’s counsel that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim for damage to reputation which the claimant claims in relief 7 of the Complaint and Statement of Facts and is referred to by his counsel as an ancillary relief. While this court has the jurisdiction to entertain the main claim, it cannot adjudicate over the ancillary claim of defamation because this is a court with limited jurisdiction as prescribed by law. Consequently, we hereby decline jurisdiction in respect of the claim of damage to reputation as this court has not been conferred with jurisdiction to hear and determine such a claim. Consequently, all claims regarding relief 7 are hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction. On the submission by defence counsel that the claimant has not disclosed a reasonable cause of action, a careful look at paragraphs 3(a d), 4(a — b), 5(a d), 6(a d), 7(a — c) and 8 of the statement of facts reveal that the claimant was employed by the defendant as an Assistant Lecturer on August 13, 1997 before he was dismissed from the services of the defendant on January 27, 2009 on the allegation of double employment without any severance benefits paid to him. A cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. See Savage v. Uwachie [1972] 3 SC 214, Owodunni v Registered Trustees of Celestial Church [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315 at 365. The statement of facts has established that there is a reasonable cause of action. We have also not been shown by the objector that there has been an abuse of the process of court in the filing of this suit. The counsel to the defendant in his submission that the claimant failed to exhaust the internal remedies provided in the defendant’s regulations which is a condition precedent before the institution of an action such as pre-action notice, did not refer the court to the relevant provision he was relying on, neither did he exhibit the said regulations in the affidavit in support of the objection. Counsel also submitted that the claimant’s written address should be struck out because it is not in compliance with Order 20 of the Rules of this court as the list of authorities referred to was not submitted with the written address. This infraction is not serious enough to warrant having to strike out the written address of the claimant as prayed for by the respondent. The argument of the defendant on this score must, therefore, fail. For all the reasons stated above, we hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain and determine reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 but not relief 7. Consequently, the preliminary objection in respect of relief 7 only succeeds while the objection in respect of the reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 & 9 fails and is hereby dismissed. The matter shall proceed to hearing. We make no order as to costs. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon Justice B.B Kanyip Presiding Judge, Hon. Justice V.N Okobi Judge, Hon Justice O. A Obaseki-Osaghae Judge