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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE OYEWUMI. OYEBIOLA.O DATED 14TH OF OCTOBER, 2015 SUIT NO: NIC/LA/198/2011 BETWEEN 1. MR. DAVID E. UKAA 2. MR. MUSTAPHA MUBI ABARI CLAIMANTS 3. MR. JOSHUA OLANIPEKUN 4. MR. SYLVESTER NDUKWU (Suing for themselves and on behalf of 16 other Employees) AND ACCESS BANK PLC DEFENDANT REPRESENTATION: Funmi Falana (Mrs) with her is Audu Augustine Chukwuma Onwuemene, Stanley Imhanruor, O.K Salawu, Modupe Omo-ekpadi (Mrs), EyitayoOgunye, Oluwagbenga Ige and Hamed Gbadamosi for the Claimants E.A Okorie with him is C.C Otti, Tolulope Lana for the defendant JUDGMENT A complaint dated 1st of December, 2011 was filed by the claimant suing for themselves and on behalf of sixteen (16) other employees against the defendant claiming the following reliefs: 1. A DECLARATION that the claimants are entitled to be paid their full severance package in accordance with the collective agreement based on the total numbers of years they have served in the respondent’s employment. 2. A DECLARATION that the non computation of the claimants severance package to include the period they served before the re-capitalization and merger of the claimant is wrongful. 3. AN ORDER of Court compelling the defendant to compute the severance allowance of the Claimants in accordance with the collective agreement reached with the union based on the total number of years of service including the period before the re-capitalization and merger. 4. AN ORDER of Court compelling the defendant to immediately pay to the claimants the full severance package and allowance which shall include the period before recapitalization and merger. 5. AN ORDER of court compelling the defendant to pay the claimants hazard allowance which are normally paid to security personnel in the defendant’s industry. It is the case of the Claimants that they were at various times employed by the then Intercontinental Bank Plc (Now Access bank) as Security guards. The claimant averred that they became employees of Intercontinental Bank Plc, following the merger of Intercontinental Bank, Equity Bank, Gateway Bank and Global Bank, in 2005. After the merger, Intercontinental Bank reassigned the claimants to Intercontinental Properties Limited its subsidiary as security guards and were issued letter of appointment/transfer letters. They were also paid salaries and were issued pay-slip by the then Intercontinental Bank. However in March 2010, and as result of the restructuring in the bank, their appointments were terminated and their employers refused and/or neglected to pay their full entitlement benefit and allowances in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions of their employment negotiated by the union. Claimant continued that also unpaid are several of their allowances and their years of service have not been properly computed into their severance benefit to include the period they served before the mergers and recapitalization as most of the claimants worked with the old banks which includes; Intercontinental Bank, Global Bank and Equity Bank. That when the Defendant wanted to pay them, it only calculated the number of years they worked with Intercontinental Bank Plc, and neglected the number of years they already worked with the old banks before the merger in 2005.That the calculation of the severance package and benefits of the claimants in accordance with the collective agreement reached with the union ought to be calculated from the years of service of the claimants with the old banks before the Merger in 2005 up till the year of termination from the service of Intercontinental Bank in 2010. That this averment was corroborated by a financial expert who also revealed that the claimants’ severance package was not properly computed and they were short paid. That the defendant also failed to pay the claimants hazard allowance which is normally paid to security personnel in the industry. Claimant went on that they informed the Managing Director formally to revert to the correct mode and correctly calculate their entitlements but he failed to respond to the letter. That the old bank metamorphosed into the Defendant herein and they inherited all liabilities and assets of the old banks. The claimants during trial testified through CW1 and CW3 and tendered Exhibits which were admitted and marked Exhibits DEU1- DEU10 and OJ. CW1 confirmed that he was working with the Intercontinental Bank before its merger with the other Legacy Bank. The defendant on the other hand traversed that by virtue of the recapitalisation which caused the following banks Intercontinental Bank Plc, Equity Bank Plc, Global Bank Plc, and Gateway Bank Plc merge into a new corporate entity known as Intercontinental Bank Plc, the employment of the claimants under the banks that engaged them terminated. That the Claimants were given a new contract of employment with Intercontinental Properties Limited as their employer effective from November 1st, 2005. It continued that at retrenchment in February/March, 2010 the claimants were fully paid their entitlements (benefits and allowances) as negotiated and agreed between the parties. That the offer and acceptance of employment between the defendant and the claimants in November, 2005 created a new employer/employee relationship with no recourse to their various previous relationship with their former employers as contract of personal service is not assignable and for the purpose of computation of allowances for the claimants the relevant year was November 2005 being the date of employment by the claimants by Intercontinental Bank Plc. The defendant stated further that the engagement of a financial expert amounts to effort in futility arising from the misconception of the claimants in thinking that their employment with the defendant amount to an elongation of their previous employments. That it replied the letter of the claimant on the 16th of December, 2012 and it is not responsible to pay personnel hazard allowance as alleged by the claimants. Defendant states that this suit is vexatious, vague and unsubstantiated for and thus urged the court to dismiss same with cost. The defendant during trial testified through its group Head of Security one Mr.Chuks Maha and tendered through him documents which where admitted and marked Exhibits CM1- CM3 The defendant on the 2nd of March, 2015 filed its written address by framing two issues for the determination of this court; 1. Whether the contract of employment of each and every one of the claimant (who are now erstwhile staff) with the defendant, was not a valid contract? 2. Whether the claimants have successfully proved/substantiated reliefs claimed in this suit, based on the pleadings and evidence before the court. On issue one counsel submitted that by virtue of the claimants employment letters dated November 18, 2005, the defendant entered a legal, enforceable and valid contract with the claimants. Counsel submits that the claimants’ various letters of employment expressly states that their contract of employment with the defendant starts from the 1st day of November, 2005. That the claimants did not question the validity of the terms of their employment at the point of entering into the contract with the defendant and as a distinct legal entity it is not privy to the contract of employment the claimants had with its erstwhile employers. Counsel submitted that prior to the emergence of the defendant, the claimants, who were former employees of the erstwhile Intercontinental Bank and Equity Bank and who were qualified were duly paid all their entitlement in accordance with their contract of employment and placing further reliance on the evidence of DW1 states that the 1st claimant, Mr. David Ukaa was duly paid all his entitlement by his former employer prior to the commencement of a contract of employment with the defendant in November 1st, 2005. Counsel cited the case of U.B.N. LTD V. EDET [1993] 4 N.W.L.R. (pt. 287) 288 @ 300 were Uwaifo J.C.A. (as he then was) posited thus: “Therefore, in the present case, the only document which spells out the plaintiff’s conditions of service and which the court can look at to determine her entitlements in addition to those admitted or assured by the 1st defendant bank is Exhibit 21, the service agreement. It is not open to the court to look anywhere else for the terms upon which an employment could be terminated other than the contract of service”. Counsel urged the court to hold that the contract of employment between the claimants and defendant is valid with the commencement of employment being the 1st day of November, 2005. On issue two, Counsel submitted that it is the law of common that he who asserts must prove and the claimants in this case has failed to substantiate their case against the defendant. Counsel referring the court to the Agreement between the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees and the defendant dated 18th January, 2010 and also the Claimants’ various disengagement letters dated February 25th, 2010 in addition to claimants’ various computation of entitlements dated March 2nd, 2010 submitted that the defendant paid all the entitlements of the claimants as agreed by parties and the union and in accordance with parties contract of employment. Counsel reproduced the disengagement letter dated February 25th, 2010 provides thus: “In accordance with the collective agreement reached with the union, you will be paid three months’ basic salary in lieu of notice in addition to other benefits which you are entitled to (if any). You will however be advised of the position of your terminal account as soon as this has been computed. Management has also approved that you should be paid ex - gratia based on years of service effective November 1, 2005, to be computed as stated below" YEARS OF SERVICE SEVERANCE PACKAGE 3 years or less 6 weeks’ salary for every year worked 4 years 7 weeks’ salary for every year worked Counsel posited that upon receiving of defendant's letter of computation dated 2nd March, 2010, none of the claimants neither protested therein nor returned his or her cheque issued by the defendant to them. Counsel placing reliance on paragraph 5 and particularly paragraph 5.3 of the Agreement between the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees and the defendant dated 18th January, 2010 which provides that; "Each member of staff who accepts this exercise undertakes to absolve Intercontinental Bank of any action now or in the future on this exercise" Counsel posited that it is trite that a declaratory relief is equitable in nature, and a party who seeks equitable declaratory relief of the court must place materials before the court to substantiate the grant of such relief. That in all cases where a plaintiff is seeking a declaration that he is entitled to a severance package, the burden lies on such a plaintiff to prove his case on his evidence and will fail if he fails to discharge that burden. Counsel submitted that the defendant has fully paid the claimants all their entitlements in accordance with parties' terms and conditions of contract of employment and in accordance with parties' collective agreement based on the total number of years they have served in the respondent's employment. Counsel with regards to claims three (3) of the claimant’s reliefs submitted that the relief being one in special damages ought to be specifically pleaded and proved and the claimants having failed to do so, the claim must necessary fail. He cited the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V ALHAJI ADAMS AJABULE &ANOR. [2011] 18 NWLR (PT. 1278) 152 at 174 paras E-F, the supreme court held thus: "In this respect, I must emphasize that the law is firmly established that special damages must be pleaded with distinct particularity and strictly proved and as such is not entitled to make an award of special damages based on conjecture or some fluid and speculative estimate of alleged loss sustained by the plaintiff’’ Counsel also submitted that the claimants brought this action in a representative capacity without providing the particulars and identities of the said other 16 claimants. That it is trite that a claimant seeking the court's discretion must ensure that he supports the application with all necessary evidence and the claimants, having failed to do so fails in their claim. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claimants’ claims with substantial costs in favour of the defendant. Claimants on the 14th of May, 2015 filed their written address wherein they distilled four issues for the court’s determination; 1.Whether by the letter dated 18th day of November 2005 titled appointment/transfer of service, the claimants’ employment were transferred to the Intercontinental properties Ltd and therefore in continuous employment; 2. If issue 1 is answered in the positive; whether in computing the claimants' entitlement; the years of service before the transfer should be taking into consideration; 3. Whether the defendant in computing the claimant's severance entitlement took into consideration the years of service before the transfer and if not whether the claimants are entitled to have their severance computed to include the years of service before the transfer. 4. Whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the Complaint and statement of facts. Counsel arguing issues one and two together, submitted that by the letter dated 18th of November 2005, the claimants' employment has been transferred to the new company with the consent of the claimants and they are in continuous employment. He stated that the letter had a caption 'appointment /transfer of service' which states that; "Following the merger of Intercontinental Bank, Equity bank, Gateway Bank and Global Bank which resulted into the formation of the new Intercontinental bank and the transfer of all support staff under the management of intercontinental properties Ltd, we are pleased to confirm your appointment as Security Guard II grade 10 with effect from November 1, 2005." Continuing counsel submitted that the letter did not put an end to the claimants' contract of employment rather, it transferred the claimants' employment to Intercontinental Properties Ltd which thereafter confirmed the appointment of the claimants as having been transferred from the original employer. Counsel posited that the defence claimed that those who were employed by Intercontinental bank were paid but no evidence of such payment was shown to the court. It is the law that he who assert the positive must prove. The onus of proof of a fact in issue is on the party who will lose when no other evidence is adduced to prove the fact he alleges. He cited the case of IBADAN L.G.P.C.LTD V OKUNADE (2005) 3 NWLR (PT. 911)43; DAUDA V NNPC [1998] 2 NWLR (PT.538) 355, and submits that in the absence of any document to proof that the categories of claimants from Global banks and Intercontinental bank were paid their severance entitlement and in the absence of any letter expressly determining the employment of the claimants from the old legacy bank, claimant urged the court to hold that the non-payment of the claimants severance entitlement and the non-issuance of payment advice and disengagement letter is proof that the claimants employment was only transferred from the old banks to Intercontinental Properties Ltd without any break in employment and the letter of 18 of November 2005, was a confirmation of the transfer of the employment of the claimants from the old legacy bank to Intercontinental Properties Ltd fully acquired by the defendant which was accepted by the claimants. He cited the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA .V. IGWILLO [2007] 14 NWLR (PT. 1054) 393 where the court held that acceptance of an employee by an employer implies that the employer shall take into consideration the years of service of the employees before his transfer to the employers. Counsel urged the court to resolve Issues 1 and 2 in favour of the claimants and hold that by the document dated the 18th of November 2005, the claimants' employment was transferred to Intercontinental property Ltd and that the claimants' years of service before the transfer ought to have been taking into consideration in computing the claimants’ severance entitlement. Counsel on issues three and four argued together submitted that the claimants’ employment having been transferred to Intercontinental Properties Ltd, ought to take into consideration the years of service before transfer. Continuing he submitted that a careful perusal of the document dated 25th of February 2010 will reveal that the claimants were only paid for four years which was the period of the years of service with Intercontinental Properties Ltd without taking into consideration their years of service before the transfer which is variously shown by their letter of original appointment dated 21st of February 2000, 3rd of October 2001, 13th February 2000,11thMay 2001, etc. He also submitted that with respect to the claimants from Global bank, the defendant's witness claimed that there were not paid any severance entitlement because there was nothing in their contract of employment which granted them such entitlement. However, exhibit CM4 which is a Global Bank Hand book expressly provided for the terms and condition of the employment of the claimants from Global Bank wherein their rights to severance was well articulated and provided for in paragraphs 47 and 48, which provided for the payment of the claimant severance entitlement including redundancy and termination contrary to the defendant's witness earlier assertion. Counsel submitted that having substantiated that the claimants' entitlement was not computed to take into consideration the period of years of their service before the transfer of service, the employer is liable to pay to the claimants the remainder of their entitlement. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the defendant's submission that the claimants has failed to prove their claim of special damages as same is erroneous and misconceived and a clear misunderstanding of the claim presented by the claimants to the court. Counsel posited that the claimants claim for hazard allowance was proved in view of the defendant's witness admission under cross-examination that the claimants are entitled to hazard allowance. Counsel urged the court to resolve the issues in favour of the claimants and enter judgment accordingly. Upon a careful scrutiny of the processes filed in this case, the submissions of counsel to both parties and the authorities referred in support of their respective arguments, I frame this issue for the determination of this suit as follows: ''Whether or not the claimants have substantiated their claims to be entitled to the reliefs sought.'' It is pertinent to sort out at this preliminary stage the issue raised by the defendant which is that the claimants filed this suit on behalf of themselves and sixteen (16) other employees whose names were not listed on the complaint. As noted by the defendant in its final submission, the claimants brought this action in a representative capacity without providing the particulars and identities of the said other 16 claimants. From the perusal of the originating processes and the record of court, the claimants listed just four parties therein that is Messrs. David E. Ukaa, Mustapha Mubi Abari, Joshua Olanipekun and Sylvester Ndukwu in its writs of summons without listing the names of other parties, the 1st and 3rdclaimants swore to their witness statements on oath and also testified during the trial. The 1st and 3rd witness statements on oath, impliedly incorporated other parties not expressly mentioned in the originating processes with the use of the pronoun “we and our” as deposed in paragraphs 5-10 therein. That evinces the fact that this suit was filed as a representative suit by the named claimants on behalf of their other 16 colleagues. It is trite that a counsel’s address, no matter how brilliant or scholarly, cannot be a substitute for and cannot take the functions of pleadings. Thus I hold that the arguments of defence counsel is therefore discountenanced. On the main issue, it is the contention of the claimant that they were at various times employed by Intercontinental Bank Plc (Now Access bank) as Security Guards. That following the merger of Intercontinental Bank, Equity Bank, Gateway Bank and Global Bank in 2005, they became employee of Intercontinental Bank which in turn reassigned them to Intercontinental Properties Limited its subsidiary as security guards and were issued letters of appointment/transfer. However in March 2010, and as a result of the restructuring in the bank, their appointments were terminated and their employers refused and/or neglected to pay their full entitlement benefit and allowances in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions of their employment negotiated by the union as the calculation of the severance package and benefits of the claimants in accordance with the collective agreement reached with the union ought to be calculated from the years of service of the claimants with the old banks before the Merger in 2005 up till the year of termination from the service of Intercontinental Bank in 2010. The defendant on the other hand contended that following the merger of Intercontinental Bank, Global Bank and Equity Bank into Intercontinental Bank, the Claimants were given a new contract of employment with Intercontinental Properties Limited as their employer effective November 1st, 2005. It averred that at retrenchment in February/March, 2010 the claimants were fully paid their entitlements (benefits and allowances) as negotiated and agreed between the parties. From the evidence provided in Exhibit DEU 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11, it can be deduced that the claimants were at various times employees of the various banks that merged with Intercontinental bank and its subsidiary Intercontinental Properties Limited between the periods of 1996 – 2003, i.e. a period of about 7 years. As contended by the defendant, they were offered a new contract of employment into Intercontinental Properties Limited a subsidiary of Intercontinental bank in 2005 with a new a letter of appointment/transfer of service. For ease of reference I will reproduce Exhibit CM1 hereunder; ''Intercontinental Plaza, Plot 999C, Danmole Street, P.M.B. 80150, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria. Tel/Fax: 2623026 Tel: 262294059 INTERCONTINENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED (A Subsidiary of Intercontinental Bank Plc) November 18, 2005 OLANIPEKUN JOSHUA GLOBAL BANK H/O Dear Sir/Ma LETTER OF APPOINTMENT/ TRANSFER OF SERVICE Following the merger of Intercontinental bank, Equity Bank, Gateway Bank and Global Bank which resulted into the formation of the now Intercontinental Bank Plc and the transfer of all support staffs under the management of Intercontinental Properties Ltd, we are pleased to confirm your appointment as a SECURITY GUARD II GRADE 12 with effect from November 1, 2005 on the following terms and conditions; ……….. Yours faithfully, FOR: INTERCONTINENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED UKACHI CHRIS ASAMU O.I HEAD HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGING DIRECTOR/CEO It is the law that parties are bound by the agreement they freely enter into and intention expressed in an agreement is binding on them. See OKWUNAKWE V. FBN [2015] 53 NLLR, PT. 180, 568; UDEAGHA EGBE V UNION BANK PLC AND ANOR [2015] 58 NLLR (PT. 200) P.192 @ 302. It is also the cardinal principle of construction of a document by the court to give an interpretation which is consistent with the object of the entire document. SEE OKAFOR V. OKAFOR [2015]4 NWLR (PT. 1449), P. 335 @ 368-371; LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT AND ANOR V MRS C.S.K. TOLUWALASE [2013] 1 NWLR (PT 1336) P.555 @572. A careful perusal of Exhibit CM1 letter of appointment captured supra, that to the defendant portrays that the Claimants and Intercontinental Properties Limited intends that a new contract of employment between both parties will take effect from November 1, 2005. Now, it is important to take a detour by considering the words used in the title of the letter as well as in the body of the letter; i.e. The use of the words ''transfer of service'' and ''transfer of all support staff'' to see whether or not the defendant's position is correct. First and foremost the words ''transfer of service' portend that the claimants are not newly appointed staff of the Bank but their services were transferred from the banks that culminated/merged into Intercontinental Bank Plc (Legacy Banks) . If it is not so the word 'transfer' would not have been used in the letter. The word 'Transfer' according to the Black's Law Dictionary 9th Edition at page 1636, means '' To convey from one place or one person to another; to pass or hand over from one to another, to change over the control or possession of...'' The Oxford Dictionary defines it as, "To move from one place to another, to move from one job or station to another''. Applying these meanings to the instance case, exhibit CM1 is a clear indication of what happened to the claimants in 2005. The holistic reading of exhibit CM1 reveals that the claimants were infact passed on, or handed over to the Intercontinental Properties Ltd by the Intercontinental Bank ( Also known in this case as the Legacy Banks). The import of which is that the claimants' services were transferred/continues from Intercontinental PLC to Intercontinental Properties Ltd in 2005. It is my finding that the contract of service of the claimant continues with the Intercontinental properties and the letter of November 2005, if it does anything at all was to confirm their appointment/ contract of employment by Intercontinental Bank Plc. I so find and hold. It is the argument of the defendant that Exhibit CM2 is a Collective Agreement dated 18th January, 2010 between the Intercontinental Bank and the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees wherein the parties reached a consensus ad idem before the defendant paid the terminal benefits of the claimants. Exhibit CM2 makes provision for payment of 3 months basic salary in lieu of notice to all the affected staff ''... in addition to each staff's normal gratuity payment...''; there is provision for committal to cash of any outstanding leave; proof of remittance of fund of accrued pension fund to PFA to be shown to the union representatives. The pertinent question now that requires an answer is, what is the effect and nature of a Collective Agreement vis a viz a contract of employment. By the provision of Section 254C(1) (j)(i) of the 1999 Constitution as amended by the third alteration Act 2010, Hereunder captured for ease of reference thus: "254C – (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- (j) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any. (i) collective agreement;" This court by the above provision has exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters to both interpret and apply collective agreement. It also bestows on the court the corresponding power to declare as to the nature of rights, privileges and obligations existing in the Collective Agreement. The overall import of which is that Collective Agreement is justiceable and enforceable. Section 54 (1) of NIC Act 2006 defines collective agreement as any agreement in writing regarding working conditions and terms of employment concluded between an organization of employers or an organization representing employers ( or an association of such organizations) on the one part, and an organization of employees or an organization representing employees (or an association of such organizations) on the other part. It is obvious from the above constitutional provision that this court has unfettered power to interpret the collective agreement dated 18th January, 2010 between the Intercontinental Bank and the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees and equally enforce same. Now, it is germane to answer this question; which is, is the collective agreement binding on the claimants in this suit? It is the law in the world of works that a junior employee is presumed to be automatic member of his union, which in this case is NUBIFIE unless he opts out of the union in writing. The case law authority of ASCSN V. HON. MIN. OF WORKS & ORS [2011] 22 NLLR.(PT. 63) 493 @ 539 paras A-B strengthens this position. Having held that the claimants as junior staff of Intercontinental Properties Ltd/Intercontinental Bank Plc are members of NUBIFIE, I therefore find and hold that the claimants are bound by the Collective Agreement entered into between the Intercontinental Bank Plc and NUBIFIE. It is evident on exhibit CM2, i.e. the Collective Agreement, which was a new independent agreement executed by both parties that parties are precluded from taking any further steps on all the issues agreed on as it relate to all the staff affected by the staff rationalization exercise. In effect parties have agreed by their conduct that the Collective Agreement supersedes their contract of service with the defendant. I so hold. It is the contention of the claimants that they were not paid according to their number of years of service. It is important to note here that it is provided by the collective agreement that the Unit Chairman and Unit Secretary of NUBIFIE would be allowed to verify the calculations of the entitlements in favour of the affected staff. A list of which was attached to the collective agreement, which means in effect that the claimants Union Chairman and Secretary verified the calculations of all the entitlements of the claimants before payment to each of them. I have painstainkingly perused the documents tendered by both parties, most especially the letters of appointment/transfer, fresh letters of appointment of some of the claimants and their letters of disengagement conveying their terminal benefits. It would be deduced that the claimants were appointed variously by Intercontinental Securities Ltd, Global Bank, Intercontinental Properties Ltd between 2000 and 2002. It is obvious for instance in a letter of disengagement of the 1st claimant, i.e Ukaa David, that he was paid a final terminal benefit of N446,351.46; comprising 3 months basic salary in lieu of notice ( which according to him is more than one month notice provided in his contract of service), severance package, Legacy Payoff in the sum of N266,180.67 and pro rated unearned leave allowance. One Effiong Henry, it is observed was equally paid a Legacy Payoff of the sum of N266,180 and all other benefits as specified in exhibit DEU1 ; While Joshua Olanipekun who started work with Global Bank in 2001, was not paid any Legacy Payoff. It is the evidence of DW that prior to the merger, claimants that qualified for gratuity were paid by their respective Banks in accordance with their terms of contract. He specifically stated this by his averments in paragraph 15 of his sworn deposition and confirmed under cross examination that employees of the Legacy banks are parts of the assets and liabilities of the defendant and that some of the banks that merged into Intercontinental Bank has provision for payment of gratuity, which was paid to all their staff prior to the merger. It is evident on record that some of the claimants were paid both their gratuity under the collective agreement and at the same time their entitlements under the Legacy Payoff. CW2 Olanipekun Joshua also admitted that some of the staff of the Legacy Banks were paid. It is thus obvious that some of the claimants who were paid Legacy Payoff as part of their entitlements in 2010 were not paid at the time of merger, hence the payment in 2010, the converse of which is according to DW and CW2 that those who were not paid any Legacy Payoff were already paid before the merger if entitled to any. CW1 and CW2 admitted that they are entitled to one month basic salary in lieu of notice under their contract of service but they were paid 3 months basic salary in lieu of notice under the collective agreement, which makes it more than what they were entitled to under the contract of service. I find that the claimants were paid their entitlements as agreed to in their collective agreement. I equally find that some of the claimants who were entitled to terminal benefits under the Legacy Banks were paid their terminal benefits as legacy payoff in their terminal benefit in 2010. I so hold. The relevant portion of the Collective Agreement is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference as it affects the parties. ''5. NUBIFIE’S OBLIGATIONS 5.1 NUBIFIE undertakes to ensure that all members of its union affected by this staff rationalization exercise accepts this agreed package as full and final settlement of their entitlements from Intercontinental Bank in respect of their employment; and that each of its members would fully comply with their individual obligations there under. 5.3 Each member of staff who accepts this exercise undertakes to absolve Intercontinental Bank of any action now or in the future on this exercise. 6. CONTRACT GOVERNED BY LAW The terms of this agreement shall be construed and governed according to the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 8. BINDING EFFECT OF AGREEMENT This agreement shall be binding on parties and their respective heirs, legal representatives successors and assigns.'' It is on record that claimants accepted the payments and by clauses 5.3, 5.4 and 8 of the Collective Agreement captured supra, the claimants are estopped from raising any further issues or claims. Differently put, the claimants have by the Collective Agreement and acceptance of payment in 2010, waived their rights to any further claims. See the cases of EKEAGWU V. NIGERIAN ARMY [2006] 11 NWLR (PT. 991) 382, C.A; In MORONHUFOLU V KWARA TECH [1986] 6 CA (PT 11) 187 @ 205 TO 206, Where Karibi Whyte JSC (as he then was) whilst concurring with the lead judgment held thus- ''He admitted he was paid three months salary in lieu of notice as provided in Exh.2A. Thus conceding for the purposes of this argument that appellant has a contract of employment with the defendant, that contract was validly and properly determined by appellant's acceptance of its determination, i.e. the acceptance of the three months salary paid to him in lieu of notice. See DR. O. AJOLORE V. KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY [1986] 2 S.C. 374. If appellant had rejected the three months salary in lieu of notice, the unilateral repudiation of his contract of service with the defendant by the appellant would not have operated to determine the contract. See OLANIYAN & ORS. V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS [1985] 2 N.W.L.R. (PT.9) 599 AT P.683. His conduct rendered the determination mutual''. The Court in EKEAGWU's and MORONHUFOLU's supra, held that where an employee accepts salary or payments after employment is brought to an end, he cannot be heard to complain later that his contract of employment was not properly determined. It is premised on these case law authorities and from the above clauses of the Collective Agreement that both parties agreed to abide by it and agreed to be bound, that I find that claimants have waived their right to any other claims in this case having accepted the terminal benefits agreed to in their collective agreement and the cheques in various sums paid to them. It is in view of all that have been stated supra coupled with the evidence on record that some of the claimants were actually paid their entitlement as Legacy payoff that I find and hold that the claimants have failed to prove their claims 1 to 4. I so hold. As regards the Hazard allowance, It is also the claimants’ contention that the defendant also failed to pay the claimants' hazard allowance which is normally paid to security personnel in the industry. The defendant denying same by paragraph 12 of its statement of defence posited that it is not the industry standard to pay the security personnel hazard allowance as alleged. I have combed through the letters of employment and Transfer of Service letters both 2000 and 2005 letters and could not see any provision for such payment. This was also corroborated by CW1, CW2 and DW. To both CW1 and CW2, there is no provision in their contract of service but they maintained that they are entitled to it and that their CSO informed them about it, while DW posited that there is no such provision for security men, except bullion Van drivers. It is the law of common place that pleadings and evidence are like siamese twins which must go together to aid a litigant in proving his case and also to assist the court from embarking on a voyage of discovery. Thus, failure of a litigant to present either of them will lead to abandoning the claim or relief prayed for. In this case the claimants pleaded that they are entitled to hazard allowance without substantiating same and invariably asking the court to embark on a voyage of discovery which the laws precludes it from. From the foregoing I discountenance claims 5. I so hold. In summary, I find that the claimants have failed to prove their claims against the defendant. The claimants’ case is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. HON. JUSTICE OYEWUMI OYEBIOLA .O JUDGE