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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS BEFORE HER LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE DATE: February 13, 2015 SUIT NO: NICN/LA/185/2014 BETWEEN USANGA EYO BRIAN & 321 OTHERS CLAIMANTS AND 1. MAINTREET BANK LTD 2. ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR STAFF OF BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (ASSBIFI) DEFENDANTS 3. NATIONAL UNION OF BANKS, INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYEES (NUBIFIE) REPRESENTATION B.C Anyanwu (Mrs.) with her John Nwogwu for claimants. Femi Gbede with him Gbeminiyi Ajayi for the 1st defendant. Adeniyi Pokanu for the 2nd Defendant Femi Adisa-Isikalu for Skye Bank Plc, party sought to be joined. Olawale Adeniyi for AMCON, party sought to be joined RULING This is a Notice of Preliminary dated and filed on 23rd June 2014 by the 1st defendant seeking the following: 1. An Order declining jurisdiction to deal with this matter. 2. An Order dismissing this action, or in the alternative and Order striking out the suit. 3. And for such further orders or other orders as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The ground upon which this application is brought is that the instant action constitutes an abuse of court process for misjoinder of the claimant’s cause of action. The application is supported by an affidavit of 6 paragraphs sworn to by Femi Gbede, a legal practitioner and a written address. In opposing the objection, the claimants filed a written address dated 13th October, 2014 and filed on 14th October, 2014. The 1st defendant/applicant filed a reply on point of law dated 11 November 2014 and filed the same day. The 2nd defendant filed no processes in respect of this objection. Learned Counsel for the Defendant raised one issue for determination as follows: Whether this suit should not be dismissed or in the alternative, struck out on the ground set out in the Notice of Preliminary Objection. He submitted that the law is clear that for an action to lie in a representative capacity there must be a common interest, existence of a common grievance and the relief claimed must be beneficial to all, citing the case of Adediran V. Interland (1991) 2 NSCC 707. He submitted that the claimants’ case before this court failed to satisfy any of the conditions stated. He argued that assuming without conceding that the claimants’ employment with the 1st defendant is a continuation of their employment with Afribank Plc, they have shown that each of them has a separate agreement with the 1st defendant. He submitted that even though the grievance of the claimants relate to the purported termination of their separate and distinct contracts of employment by the 1st defendant, same does not confer on the claimants the right to institute one and the same action before this court to challenge the alleged acts which arose out of separate transactions. Learned Counsel further argued that each breach of contract of employment gives rise to a distinct cause of action actionable at the instance of the party whose contract was wrongly terminated. He submitted that the courts have held that where the claims of a class or group of persons border on contract of employment, such persons cannot bring an action collectively even if they were given employment the same day under the same condition of service. He referred to Bossa V. Julius Berger Plc (2005) 15 NWLR (pt. 948) 409. He submitted that this suit constitutes an abuse of the process of court citing Umeh V. Iwu (2008) 8 NWLR (pt.1089) 225, Onyebuchi V Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors (2002) 4 SC (pt. 2) 27. He then urged the court to dismiss the action for misjoinder of causes of action and for constituting an abuse of the process of court. Learned counsel to the claimants raised one issue for determination as follows: Whether the 1st Defendant/Applicant is entitled to the relief (s) sought. She submitted that a cause of action is the fact or series of facts which gives rise to a right to sue, citing Onuekwuzi V. R.T.C.M.Z.C (2011) 6 NWLR (pt.1243) 341. She submitted that misjoinder is a procedural issue that must be located in the Rules of Court; and that the cases of C.C.B (Nig) Plc v Rose supra and Bossa V. Julius Berger Plc supra cited by the 1st defendant were decided based on the relevant rules of court applicable to those cases which did not permit joinder of actions and as such are not relevant or applicable to the instant case. It was her submission that there is no provision in the Rules of this Court relating to joinder of parties and causes of action or forbidding same. She argued that the jurisdiction of this court relating to disputes arising from labour related matters is that suits filed jointly by persons with different contracts of employment as in this case can be properly entertained by this court. She referred the court to Section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and submitted that this provision empowers the court to decide all matters in dispute between parties in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. She argued that to hold that the 322 claimants should file individual suits against the defendants is not only tedious but will be offending the intention of the legislature as expressed in Section 14 of the NIC Act citing Esther & Ors. V. Skye Bank Plc (2002) 26 N.L.L.R (Pt.76) 303, Kanu & Ors v Attorney General & Commissioner of Justice, Cross River State & Ors (2013) 32 N.L.L.R (pt. 91) 63. She submitted that in construing any statute, the primary concern of the court is to seek the intention of the legislature, citing the case of Taiwo V. Adegbenro (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 562; and that the practice of this court permits joinder of causes of action in the manner filed by the claimants. She submitted that the claimants have a common interest, a common grievance and the same claim. She referred to the cases of Chief Raymond Ogolo V. Chief Paul Fubara & Ors (2003) 11 NWLR (pt. 831) 231 and Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria v National Orientation Agency & Anor [2005] 3 NLLR (Pt 7) 1 at 26. She submitted that this action does not constitute an abuse of the process of court and urged the court to dismiss the 1st defendant’s application with substantial cost. Replying on points of law, the 1st defendant submitted that what the court decided in the case of C.C.B Nig Plc V. Rose supra cited by the claimant was that Order 3 Rule 3 of the High Court of Anambra State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1988 applicable to Enugu State permits joinder of parties but not causes of action. He submitted that the argument of the claimant that there is no provision against joinder in the rules of this court is not tenable and submitted that this cannot be the intention behind the non-inclusion of rules on joinder in the rules of this court. He urged the court to dismiss this suit. Having carefully considered the pleadings and submissions of counsel the issue which arises for determination is whether this court can permit the joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action in this suit. The main thrust of the 1st defendant/applicant objection is that the claimants and different causes of action have been joined together in this suit. The extant Rules of this Court have no provision on joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action. However, Order 15 of the Rules provides that: Where no provision is made in these Rules as to practice and procedure or where the provision are inadequate, the Court may adopt such procedure as will in its view do substantial justice to the parties. As can be seen, the court is to adopt a procedure that will ensure substantial justice in the absence of any provision for joinder of parties and causes of action. A careful look at the pleadings reveal that the claimants in this suit who are former staff of Afribank Plc allege that their respective employments were terminated by the 1st defendant on 22nd June, 2012. The claimants who are all aggrieved by the termination of their appointments by the 1st defendant on the same day and by similar letters of termination are properly joined as co-claimants. The reliefs sought by them arise from the same decision to terminate their appointments as contained in the letters of termination issued to each one of them. All the claimants are by this suit making the same claims of redundancy benefits under the collective agreement, three months salary in lieu of notice, and terminal benefits against the 1st defendant. It cannot be seriously argued that if separate actions are brought by each of the three hundred and twenty two (322) claimants’, common questions of law and facts will not arise. The most obvious of such common question of law and fact is whether or not the termination of the claimants’ appointment carried out on 22nd June 2012 was a redundancy exercise entitling them to redundancy benefits. A situation in which three hundred and twenty two (322) claimants will file separate suits against the same defendants in respect of the same action/decision of the 1st defendant will in my view amount to an unnecessary multiplicity of actions. The claimants have a common interest, the same grievance, and the same reliefs the nature of which will be beneficial to all of them. See Dr Kingsley Ekwere & Ors v Akwa Ibom State Civil Service Commission & Ors (Unreported) Suit No NICN/LA/95/2013 Ruling delivered on May 15,2014, Cross River State Newspaper Corp. v J.L Oni [1995] 11 NWLR (Pt 371) 270 at 288 and A – G Federation v A – G Abia State & Ors [2001] 7 SC (Pt 1) 32. To save time and prevent unnecessary and undesirable multiplicity of suits where the issues involved are similar, the Court is empowered in Section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 to resolve all disputes in a manner that avoids multiplicity of actions. It provides: The Court shall in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested on it by or under this Act in every cause or matter, have power to grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by the Court so that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided. Section 12(1) and 12 (2) (a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 also provides that: 12- (1) The jurisdiction vested in the Court shall, so far as practice and procedure are concerned, be exercised in the manner provided by this Act or any other enactment or by such rules and orders of court as may be made pursuant to this Act or, in the absence of any such provisions, in substantial conformity with the practice and procedure of the Court existing immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Subject to this Act and any rules made there under, the Court-- (a) may regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit; By these two provisions, the Court has the powers to discountenance the individual actions desired by the 1st defendant/applicant and to encourage the aggregation of the interests in one action. The law is settled that even where a case of misjoinder is established, a cause or matter cannot be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder. See Bello v INEC [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt 1196) 342. It will not be substantial justice to the claimants/respondents as provided in Order 15 for this court to decline jurisdiction and dismiss and/or strike out this matter as the 1st defendant/applicant has urged the court to do. The courts have since moved away from the era of technical justice to substantial justice. In any event, the 1st defendant/applicant has not shown the court how the joinder will delay the trial or otherwise be inconvenient. No case of misjoinder whether of parties or causes of action has been established in this objection. I hold that this action does not constitute an abuse of the process of court. This objection is hereby dismissed. Costs of N5,000 awarded to the claimants/respondents. Ruling is entered accordingly. ------------------------------------------- Hon Justice O.A.Obaseki-Osaghae