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JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The claimant was the Registrar-General of the Abuja Multi-Door Court House of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in the service of the 1st defendant. She was compulsorily retired from service by the 1st defendant through a letter dated 26th June 2018. Dissatisfied with the way and manner in which she was retired, she instituted on 20th September 2018 this action through a complaint and a Statement of facts claiming jointly and severally against the defendants for following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the compulsory retirement of the claimant by the 1st defendant through the instrumentality of a letter issued under the hand of Mrs Binta Mohammed (Secretary of the 1st defendant) dated 25th of June 2018 based on a purported policy on tenure of Permanent Secretaries and Directors in the Federal Capital Judiciary inter alia is illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional and therefore null and void in light of the extant Public Service Rules and the circular with Reference HCSCF/428/S.1/139 issued by Office of the Head of Service of the Federation, the Presidency suspending the operation of the said tenure policy in the Federal Civil Service. (2) A declaration that Rule 020810(iv)(b) of the Public Service Rules adopted by the 1st defendant at her 102nd meeting held on the 4th day of October 2013 creating a policy on tenure of Permanent Secretaries and Directors is no longer applicable to staff of the Federal Capital Territory Judiciary in light of the extant Public Service Rules and the circular with Reference HCSCF/428/S.1/139 issued by Office of the Head of Service of the Federation, the Presidency suspending the operation of the said tenure policy in the Federal Civil Service. (3) An order setting aside the proceedings and recommendations of the 1st defendant at its 130th meeting held on 26th of June 2018 together with its deliberations on the matter approving the compulsory retirement of the claimant and her purported removal communicated by the Secretary of the 1st defendant through a letter dated 25th of June 2018. (4) An order reinstating the claimant into Federal Capital Territory Judiciary service forthwith and immediate settlement of all her outstanding salaries and other emoluments as if her purported compulsory retirement never took place. (5) An order reinstating the claimant to her office forthwith as the Registrar General of the Abuja Multi Door Court FCT High Court of Justice Abuja forthwith. (6) An order of injunction restraining the defendants acting either by themselves or their privies from enforcing the purported letter of compulsory retirement and the conditions stated therein in determination of the claimant’s employment. (7) The cost of this action. 2. The 1st defendant, but not the 2nd, reacted by filing its defence processes; and the matter went to trial. 3. At the trial, the claimant testified on her own behalf as CW and tendered Exhibits C1 to C29. For the 1st defendant, Jatau Attah Tesda, Director of Administration of the 1st defendant, testified as DW but tendered no document except for the reference to the Public Service Rules and the 1999 Constitution in his deposition. 4. At the close of trial, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The 1st defendant’s written address was field on 24th July 2019; and the reply on points of law on 6th November 2019. The claimant filed her written address on 21st October 2019. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT 5. To the claimant, she joined the service of the 1st defendant on 10th December 1996. That she was appointed Secretary, Federal Capital Territory Judicial Service Committee on 14th July 2010 until 31st July 2013 when she was appointed as Acting Chief Registrar on 1st August 2013. She was then transferred to the Abuja Multi-Door Court House as Registrar-General on 13th November 2015, a position which she occupied at all times material to the institution of this action. 6. That the 1st defendant in its 102nd extra-ordinary meeting held on 4th October 2013 adopted the Federal Government policy on tenure of the office of Permanent Secretaries/Directors in the Public Service made in 2009. The 1st defendant subsequently in its 125th meeting held on 22nd January 2018 conveyed their decision advising the claimant to put in a notice of retirement from service by a letter dated 22nd January 2018 along with a copy of the minutes of the 126th meeting of the 1st defendant. The claimant responded to the 1st defendant’s letter via a letter dated 7th February 2018 to the effect that the policy on tenure of Permanent Secretary and Directors was no longer applicable to staff of the Federal Capital Territory Judiciary in the light of the extant Public Service Rules and the circular dated 20th June 2015 with Reference HCSCF/428/S.1/139 issued by the Presidency suspending the operation of the tenure policy in the Federal Civil service. The 1st defendant refused/rejected the claimant's afore-stated position vide a letter dated 22nd May 2018 wherein it confirmed albeit erroneously that the expired policy governing the tenure of Permanent Secretaries/Directors still subsists in the FCT and advised the claimant to tender her resignation to avoid compulsory retirement. The claimant was subsequently compulsorily retired from service by the 1st defendant through a letter dated 26th June 2013 on the ground that she would have been “eight years in office as a category 4 officer which was equivalent to that of Permanent Secretary” and based on a pre-existing policy in the FCT judiciary on tenure of Permanent Secretaries and Directors in its service pursuant to Rule 020810(iv)(b) of the Public Service Rules 2008. 7. The case of the 1st defendant is that Exhibit C21(a), the circular dated 20th June 2016 with reference HCSC/428/S.1/139 issued by the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation of the Presidency suspending the operation of the tenure policy in the Federal Civil Service, is not and does not apply to the 1st defendant as its independence was deeply rooted in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. That the circular No HCSF/1061/3.1/III/68 dated 26th August 2009, which was earlier adopted by the 1st defendant at its 102nd extra-ordinary meeting held on 4th October 2013 is the one adopted and in force till date. The 1st defendant went on that the Federal Government policy on tenure of the office of Permanent Secretaries/Directors in public service made in 2009, which was adopted by the 1st defendant at its 102nd extra-ordinary meeting held on 4th October 2013 is still in force and not in any way affected by the circular dated 20th June 2076. It is also the 1st defendant’s case that by virtue of sections 304 and 158 of the 1999 Constitution and Chapter 1 of the Public Service Rules, it has power to make its own policies or adopt whichever policy it wishes at any time in its operation. SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT 8. The 1st defendant formulated two issues for determination which are: (a) Whether the Judicial Service Committee as provided for by section 153(1) and section 304 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is independent to make and ratify its own rules, regulations and orders. (b) Whether from the totality of evidence before the Honourable Court, the claimant has proved her claims to entitle her to judgment against the 1st defendant. 9. On issue (a), the 1st defendant submitted that by virtue of section 304(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution that created the Judicial Service Committee, read together with section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which sections specifically state how the 1st defendant should exercise its powers to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons or staff, the 1st defendant shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person. For clarity, section 304(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution provides thus: (1) There shall be for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the composition and function of which shall be as provided in Part III of the Third schedule to this Constitution. (2) The provisions of sections 154(1) and (3), 155, 156, 157(1) and (2), 158(1) and 159 - 161 of this Constitution shall apply with necessary modifications to the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. 10. That it is paramount to also reproduce the provisions of Part III of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, which is established by section 304 of the 1999 Constitution. Paragraph 2(c) of Part III to the Third Schedule of the Constitution provides thus: The Committee shall have power to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over the Chief Registrar and Deputy Chief Registrar of the High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, magistrates, the judges and members of the District and Area Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, if any, and all other members of the staff of the judicial service of the Federal Capital Territory not otherwise specified in this Constitution and of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. 11. Section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which applies to the Judicial Service Committee by virtue of section 304(2), provides thus: In exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the National Judicial Council, Federal Civil Service Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, the Federal Character Commission, the Independent National Electoral Commission, shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person. 12. That in Manuwa v. NJC [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 5, the Court of Appeal held thus: Section 158(1) of the 1999 constitution does not seem to oust the jurisdiction of the court but only provides that in the process of disciplinary control over persons the National Judicial Council shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person. This means that the National Judicial Council shall remain independent and shall not be influenced by any person or authority while exercising its power to make appointment or disciplinary control (underlining is the 1st defendant’s). 13. To the 1st defendant, therefore, by the combined effect of the sections mentioned above that is sections 304(1) and (2) and 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution and by extension of Part III of the Third Schedule, the Judicial Service Committee has the constitutional powers to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over person and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person, urging the Court to so hold. That the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, citing INEC v. Musa & ors [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72 and section 1(3) of the Constitution. 14. The 1st defendant went on that from the acknowledged supremacy of the Constitution all powers (legislative, executive and judicial) must ultimately be traced to the Constitution. Secondly, the legislative powers of the legislature cannot be exercised inconsistently with the Constitution. Where it is so exercised it is invalid to the extent of such inconsistency. Thirdly, where the Constitution has enacted exhaustively in respect of any situation, conduct or subject, a body that claims to legislate in addition to what the Constitution had enacted must show that it has derived the legislative authority to do so from the Constitution. Fourthly, where the Constitution sets the condition for doing a thing, no legislation of the National Assembly or of a State House of Assembly can alter that condition in any way, directly or indirectly, unless, of course the Constitution itself, as an attribute of its supremacy expressly, so authorized. That the 1st defendant while exercising its powers as provided for above as an independent body created by the Constitution, at its 102nd (Extra-Ordinary) Meeting held on the 04/10/2013, which is Exhibit C26, considered and adopted the memo of the Chief Judge and Chairman FCT JSC which incidentally contains the Public Service Rules 020810(A and B) and the Federal Government Circular Ref No, HCSF/1061/3.1/111/68 dated 26th August 2009 both prescribing the tenure of office for Permanent Sectaries and Directors in the Federal Public Service. 15. That the contention of the claimant that the 1st defendant cannot rely on the circular adopted by the 1st defendant at its 102nd extra-ordinary meeting in making its decisions is purely misconceived as the 1st defendant had the unfettered discretion as to which of the circulars of the Federal Government is most suitable for the conduct of its affairs. The 1st defendant then submitted that in line with the above arguments the Judicial Service Committee since they are independent of any outside control can make rules as is provided for in section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the Public Service Rules (Chapter 1) to make its own policies, rules or adopt whichever policy it wishes at any time in its operation, the compulsory retirement of the claimant by the 1st defendant was lawfully and constitutional, urging the Court to so hold and dismiss the claimant’s case. 16. The 1st defendant also relied on section 32(1), (2) and (3) Part V of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Regulations (Revised Edition 2018). To the 1st defendant, it made the regulation while enjoying its constitutional rights. The said section 32(1), (2) and (3) provides thus: (1) Where it appears to the Chief Judge, the Grand Kadi or the President as the case may be that there is a reason why an officer who holds pensionable office should be called upon to retire, the Chief Registrar shall, on the direction of the Chief Judge, the Grand Kadi or the President make a recommendation, giving reasons to the Committee, and the Committee on receiving the recommendation shall consider it, and may either (a) Reject such recommendation; or (b) call upon the officer to submit representation regarding his proposed compulsory retirement within a specific date( which date shall allow a reasonable time for the Purpose). (2) The committee upon receiving such representation or if the officer or if the officer does not make any representation before the date specified, shall deliberate on the issue and take a decision. (3) The decision of the committee shall be communicated to the officer by the secretary, Judicial service Committee of the FCT. 17. The 1st defendant then submitted that it is by this provision empowered to retire the claimant even though she is a pensionable officer, so long as reasons are adduced and the preconditions as set out in section 32(1)(b) and (2) of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Regulation (Revised Edition 2018) are met. That the Committee after their findings made a letter dated the 22/01/2018, which is marked as Exhibit C25 (C27?) stating the reason why the claimant should retire and served same on the Claimant. The claimant in turn was given the opportunity to make a representation as can be seen in a letter dated 7/02/2018 and marked as Exhibit C28. That in two letters dated 22/5/2018 and 26/6/2018, which are marked as Exhibits C22 and C22A respectively, it is glaring that the 1st defendant deliberated on the issue, took a decision and communicated same to the claimant before her retirement. The 1st defendant then prayed the Court to hold that the retirement of the claimant has the full backing of the law and hence proper. Accordingly, that from the foregoing, the Court should answer issue (a) in the affirmative i.e. the Judicial Service Committee as provided for by section 158(1) and section 304 of the 1999 Constitution is independent to make and ratify its own rules, regulations and orders as a constitutional provision takes precedence over other laws. 18. For issue (b), the 1st defendant submitted that it is trite law that the burden of proving the existence of any fact is on the party who asserts it, citing section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011 and JWE Metibaiye v. Narelli International Limited [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 326 at 335. That in this case, it is the claimant who asserted that her compulsory retirement by the 1st defendant was unlawful, unconstitutional and null and void. That the question begging for an answer now is this: whether from the totality of the evidence adduced by the claimant, she has been able to prove her case to entitle her to the reliefs claimed against the 1st defendant. That Exhibit C28 is a letter dated 7th February 2018 and captioned RE: TENURE OF THE OFFICE OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES/DIRECTORS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: AN APPEAL. That in the said letter, the claimant in paragraph 2 reason 1 of the said letter clearly stated thus: “that I have no difficulty in understanding and accepting the fact that it is within the purview of the committee to adapt and formulate laws to guide the smooth functioning of the FCT-Judiciary…” To the 1st defendant, from the wording of Exhibit C28, the claimant is fully aware of the fact, which she has accepted and admitted, that the 1st defendant has constitutional powers to make laws to guide its functioning and this in its peculiar nature amounts to an admission against interest. That the claimant was clearly aware of the 1st defendant’s constitutional powers to adopt and make policies for the smooth running of the 1st defendant. That it is trite in our laws that facts expressly admitted need no further proof, citing section123 of the Evidence Act 2011. That the interpretation given to section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 is that where both parties have agreed to admit on a fact in issue, no further proof of such fact is necessary as it is no longer an issue between them, citing Din v. African Newspapers of Nig Ltd [1990] 21 NSCC (Pt. 2) 313 and praying the Court to so hold and dismiss the claimant’s case. 19. It is the further submission of the 1st defendant that the claimant is in the know of the policies and the powers of the 1st defendant having acted as the Secretary of the body one time. That her admission of the fact in issue does not come as a surprise because this is a person who has benefitted greatly from this policy and cannot be heard to be denying same now that it is being applied in her case. That from the forgoing, the claimant has not discharge the burden of proving her assertions against the 1st defendant. That by Exhibit C19 (the letter of posting from the position of the Deputy Chief Registrar to that of the Secretary, Judicial Service Committee dated 21/7/10), the claimant once occupied the seat of the Secretary of the 1st defendant and so knows how the Judicial Service Committee operates; and so must have at some point while occupying the post of the Secretary applied this policy on others hence her admission in the facts pleaded, urging the Court to so hold and dismiss the claimant’s claims. 20. The 1st defendant further submitted and prayed the Court to hold that the evidence elicited from the sole claimant’s witness during examination in chief and cross-examination has not in any way helped the claimant’s case; neither can the evidence aid the Court to meet the ends of justice in favour of the claimant. That due to the claimant’s young start in service, having been employed in the year 1996, she rose all the way to the zenith of her career as she was initially appointed as the Secretary, Federal Capital Territory Service Committee. She was then appointed as Acting Chief Registrar before she was again appointed as Registrar General of the Abuja Multi-door Court House. That one cannot help but agree with the fact that the claimant had through her service to the Judicial Service Committee attained a post equivalent to that of the Permanent Secretary, a post she occupied for the cumulative number of 8 years. The 1st defendant then invited the Court to discountenance the averment in paragraph 13 of the claimant’s statement of facts as Rule 020810(iv)(b), which is still in force, mandates a Permanent Secretary who had served a period of 2 terms to retire from public service. 21. Rule 020810(iv)(a) and (b) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) states thus: (a) A Director shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on the post; and (b) A Permanent secretary shall hold office for a term of four years and renewable for a further term of four years, subject to satisfactory performance, and no more (underlining is the 1st defendant’s). To the 1st defendant, a careful perusal of Rule 020810(iv)(a) and (b) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules will show that the word “and” was used, which word has always been used in a conjunctive context. That Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition defines the word “AND” to mean: “A conjunction connecting words or phrase expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first. Added to; together with; joined with; as well as including”. 22. The 1st defendant then submitted that from the forgoing, what could be easily understood from the rule is the fact that a Director will compulsorily retire upon the service of 8 years on the post and a Permanent Secretary will hold office for a period of 4 years, renewable for another period of 4 years subject to satisfactory performance, and no more. That a pertinent question to be asked here is that, which other post will the claimant occupy from here? That the question seems to be a rhetorical one that needs no answer. That what “and no more” connotes is compulsory retirement, given the antecedent of that of the post of the Director as reflected under Rule 020810(iv)(a). That Rule (a) or Rule (b) cannot be read in isolation of the other as the word “AND” was used. That the usage of that word made the wordings of both as good as conjoined twins that what is good for the goose is good for the gander, urging the Court to so hold. 23. The 1st defendant continued that assuming without conceding that because the claimant has not attained the age of 60 years, she ought not to have been compulsorily retired by the 1st defendant and this Court is minded to reinstate her, the questions that come to mind are limitless few of which are: will she be reinstated to continue to man the post equivalent to that of the Permanent Secretary, which she had earlier enjoyed for a consecutive period of 8 years? Or will she be demoted? The 1st defendant then urged the Court not to allow injustice prevail as the claimant has done her time as the Permanent Secretary for the period of 8 years being the highest administrative rank any public officer can attain; and to hold that the claimant's claim is bound to fail and indeed has failed in its entirety. 24. The 1st defendant went on that it is also worthy of note that the evidence of DW (Jatau Attah Tseda) was neither challenged nor controverted during cross-examination. That the only question that relates to the subject matter goes thus: Question - Are you aware of Exhibit “C21A” (letter dismissing the Policy). Answer - Yes, my lord. To the 1st defendant, DW being the Director of Administration is in the position to be aware of the Exhibit C21(a). That other aspects of his witness deposition as it relates to the particular circular adopted at the 102nd extra-ordinary meeting in the conduct of the affairs of the 1st defendant and averments in his statement on oath remain uncontroverted, citing Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd v. Chief Tugbara Edamukue & ors [2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 15 and urging the Court to so hold. That the claimant did not deny or challenge the assertions of the 1st defendant and it is, therefore, deemed as an acceptance of the fact stated therein. In conclusion, the 1st defendant urged the Court to hold that from the totality of the evidence before the Court, the claimant has not proved her claims to entitle her to judgment against the 1st defendant; and so the case should be dismissed. SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 25. The claimant submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether on the preponderance of evidence led before this Court, the claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in this complaint. To the claimant, her suit is anchored on the fact that the 1st defendant is bound by the Public Service Rules 2008 and all the incidences of its amendment, which is by circulars issued by the Head of Civil Service of the Federation (HCSF). That she has established by evidence that the basis of her retirement which was the policy enshrined in Rule 020810(iv)(b) of the said Public Service Rules has been suspended by virtue of a circular dated 20th June 2016 i.e. Exhibit C21(a). That the contention of the 1st defendant is that they are not bound by the Exhibit C21(a). According to the 1st defendant, it enjoys constitutional independence by virtue of section 158 of the 1999 Constitution as one of the bodies that are not subject to the direction and control of any other authority or person. 26. The claimant went on that flowing from section 158(1), the 1st defendant has arrogated to itself the power to make its own policies and no person or authority can direct otherwise. That there is nothing in section 158(1) that empowers the 1st defendant to compulsorily retire the claimant who has neither reached 50 years of age nor attained 35 years of service as a civil servant without recourse to the extant Public Service Rules. That the powers donated to the bodies mention therein at section 158(1) of the Constitution relate to the power to make appointments and to exercise disciplinary control over their staff. That this is not the issue in the instant suit as the power of the 1st defendant to exercise disciplinary control over the claimant and other employees is certainly its prerogative provided these powers are exercised within the confines of law. That the issue before this Court borders on the lawfulness or otherwise of the compulsory retirement of the claimant by the 1st defendant in the light of the undisputed fact that there has been an amendment to the provisions of Public Service Rules 2008 relating to the 8-year tenure rule for Directors and Permanent Secretaries. 27. As a starting point, it is the claimant’s submission that the Judicial Service Committee of the FCT (the 1st defendant) does not share with the Federal Civil Service Commission the basic powers or functions conferred expressly by paragraph II of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution on the Federal Civil Service Commission to make regulations relating to retirement of officers in the Public Civil Service of the Federation, and or the power to make rules relating to dismissal and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding such public offices. 28. The claimant further submitted that the Public Service of the Federation is item 53 of the Exclusive Legislative List contained in Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. The Exclusive Legislative List is drawn pursuant to section 4(2) of the said Constitution. Section 153(1)(d) of the said Constitution establishes the Federal Civil Service Commission. By dint of section 159(1) of the Constitution, the Federal Civil Service Commission, being one of the bodies expressly established by section 153(1) of the Constitution, is an independent body which shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person. The Federal Civil Service Commission, by virtue of section 160(1) of the Constitution may, with the approval of the President, make rules to “regulate its own procedure or confer power and impose duties on any power or authority for the purpose of discharging its functions”, which covers all the bodies expressly stated in Paragraphs II and III of the Third Schedule to the Constitution including the 1st defendant. In other words, that while such bodies like the 1st defendant have the powers to appoint and discipline their staff, they cannot in exercise of those powers make rules that are at variance with the extant Public Service Rules of the Federation as same is the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the Federal Civil Service Commission. That to allow such would entail a gross violation of the exclusive constitutional powers of the Federal Civil Service Commission. 29. The claimant continued that a statement of policy in the form of Exhibits C22, C24 and C25, general or otherwise by the 1st defendant, cannot overrule or wipe away the specific provisions of the Public Service Rules made by the Federal Civil Service Commission, which are written into the terms of the pensionable contract of an officer in the Public Service. That it is crystal clear from the express provisions of section 153(1), 159(1), and 160, read together with paragraph II of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, that the Public Service Rules are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Federal Civil Service Commission by the Constitution, citing Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission [1981] SC (Reprint) 26 and Federal Civil Service Commission v. J. O. Laoye [1989] 4 SC (Pt. II) 1; [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt.106) 652. That the said Public Service Rules are a bye-law of the Constitution made with the main object and intention of protecting officers, particularly those holding pensionable employment, in the Public Service of the Federation. 30. Furthermore, that the said Public Service Rules are not only a bye-law of the Constitution but also have added constitutional flavour to the employment of members of the public Service of the Federation. That the said rules replaced the relationship between the civil servant and the government beyond mere master and servant relationship. That the 1st defendant in its relationship with the claimant herein is bound by Exhibit C2 being the “Offer of Permanent and Pensionable Appointment” it issued to the claimant on 10th December 1996 to respect the extant Civil Service Rules. This is particularly pertinent given the fact that in Exhibit C2 the 1st defendant clearly stipulated in clause C therein that the claimant “would be subject in all respects of all conditions of service stipulated in the Civil Service Rules pertaining to employees”. It is our contention that the 1st defendant cannot under the guise of exercising its constitutional powers to appoint and dismiss public officers under its control, proceed to tinker with the accrued and indeed settled rights of the claimant to retire from the Civil Service of the Federation either upon attaining the age of 60 years, or having served for 35 years, whichever is earlier in line with the extant Public Service Rules and the claimant’s conditions of service. That it is too late in the day for the 1st defendant to shift the goal posts while the match is till on. In sum, that the principles of estoppel prevent or halt the 1st defendant peremptorily from resiling its original position, relying on Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau [2017] LPELR-42081(SC). 31. To the claimant then, the purported provisions of the Public Service Rules upon which the 1st defendant relied upon to compulsorily retire the claimant on the ground that she had served in a capacity equivalent to that of a “Permanent Secretary” for a period of eight years is a mere statement of policy intent as the application of those provisions has been suspended by the circular issued by the Head of Service of the Federation as captured by Exhibit C21(a). Therefore, the decision of the 1st defendant at its 130th Meeting held on 26th June 2018 approving the compulsory retirement of the claimant had no force of law and it is in conflict with the provisions of section 8 Rule 020810(i) or section 8 Rule 020810(ii), read together with Chapter l-6 Rule 150103, of the Public Service Rules, 2008, which provide that “the compulsory retirement age for all grades of officers in the service shall be 60 years or 35 years whichever is earlier”. 32. Furthermore, that a close perusal of paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Public Service Rules discloses that amendment in the Public Service Rules is by means of circulars issued by the Head of Service of the Federation. That it is pursuant to this that the Head of Service issued a circular dated 20th June 2016, Exhibit C21(a), wherein the purported policy on tenure/retirement of certain public officers was suspended. That it follows that after the issuance of Exhibit C21(a) on the suspension of the Tenure Policy, the said policy on which the 1st defendant relied on to suspend the claimant has ceased to exist on the ground of supersession. That it is clear that the 1st defendant acted without any legal foundation; therefore, her retirement is not only illegal but manifestly unsupportable by any law. 33. In furtherance of he argument and in response of the submissions of the 1st defendant that the retirement was based on the extant policy on retirement hinged squarely on Rule 020810(iv)(b), the claimant submitted that a closer perusal of the said provisions even if applicable do not in any way support the actions of the 1st defendant. For the ease of reference, the said Rules provides thus: (i) The compulsory retirement age for all grades in the Service shall (ii) No officer shall be allowed to remain in service after attaining the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. (iii) ……………………… (iv) Provided the officer would not have attained the retirement age of 60 years or spent 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier; (a) A Director shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on the post; and (b) Permanent Secretary shall hold office for a term of four years and renewable for a further term of four years subject to satisfactory performance and no more (underlining is the claimant’s). 34. To the claimant, this provision, particularly Rule 020810(iv)(b) upon which the 1st defendant purportedly relied on to issue compulsory retirement on the claimant does not even in any way avail the 1st defendant. That sub-paragraph (b) underlined above merely stated that a Permanent Secretary (as the claimant is in the instant case) shall hold the office for a term of four years renewable for another four years subject to satisfactory performance and nothing more. That the above position of the Rules does not need a person with clairvoyant skills to understand the plain meaning of the law. It simply means that when a person has occupied the office of a Permanent Secretary up to two times (Eight years of 4 years tenure each) the said person is no longer eligible to occupy the position of a Permanent Secretary and no more. That by no stretch of legal imagination could that provision be construed to mean that after two terms as a Permanent Secretary that the occupier of the said office should be compulsorily retired against the general statutory principles of retirement of public officers at 35 years of service or 60 years of age whichever comes first. That the 1st defendant acted outside the provisions of the law when they relied on an outdated provision of the Public Service Rule to issue a compulsory retirement letter to the claimant, citing Comptroller General of Customs v. Gusau (supra), which held that the policy of the Customs Service which required “an officer on a duty post for 10 years to vacate that duty post by the management of Nigeria Customs Service” could not be used as a basis to compulsorily retire such an officer from the Service unless the officer had attained 60 years of age or had spent 35 years in service, whichever is earlier. 35. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the action of the 1st defendant being challenged herein is ultra vires, void and illegal for all intents and purposes. That Rule 020810(ii) in its entirety does not apply to the claimant who is yet to attain to either the retirement age of 60 years or the 35 years of service (whichever comes earlier). That from the unchallenged records before the Court, it is not in doubt that the claimant had not attained 60 years and had only spent only 22 years in the public service. That Rule 020810(iv)(b), which the 1st defendant referred to as the statutory basis for its decision to compulsorily retire the claimant who until the time of her compulsory retirement had served as a Category 4 officer (a position equivalent to that of a Permanent Secretary), applies to the claimant only to the degree that she is to hold office for a term of 4 years and renewable for another four year term and that is all. That a close perusal of the said Rule clearly and unambiguously makes no mention whatsoever of the retirement of the claimant from the Public Service. That the principle, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, meaning that the express mention of one thing is to the exclusion of all others, is the most appropriate principle to be called in aid in interpreting the law wrongly relied upon by the 1st defendant in compulsorily retiring the claimant. To the claimant, had the law makers intended to prescribe retirement for a Permanent Secretary who has spent two tenures of 4 years each, the provisions of the Rule would have said so, citing Skye Bank Plc v. Victor Anaemem Iwu [2017] LPELR-42595(SC), which held that interpretation of statutes should always be given its ordinary meaning where it is clear, unambiguous and to the point, any addition or subtraction being an introduction of an illegal back door amendment. Also referred to are: Saraki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2015] LPELR-400013(SC), NNPC v. Famfa Oil Ltd [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 194 and Duru v. FRN [2013] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 441 at 445. That it is clearly established unequivocally that the decision to compulsorily retire the claimant is questionable and blatantly challengeable as same was not done in accordance with the appropriate authority in this case, Rule 020810 of the Federal Government Civil Service Rules, citing Evaristus D. Egbebu v. The Inspector General of Police & ors [2005] LPELR-7490(CA). 36. The claimant went on that the 1st defendant’s position that its decision to compulsorily retire her was lawful by virtue of the section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution is totally misconceived. That the section clearly states that the 1st defendant is independent and shall not be subject to any other authority except with respect to its power to make appointments and exercise disciplinary control over persons only. That the literal interpretation of this section with respect to the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory is that the 1st defendant acted ultra vires in compulsorily retiring the claimant outside its power to exercise disciplinary control over her by the fact that the claimant had not committed any act of misconduct whatsoever in her capacity as a public servant. That the 1st defendant’s decision to unlawfully compulsorily retire the claimant compels the inference that she is being subjected to disciplinary action and as can be seen in the evidence led by the claimant, that is not the case, citing Chief Augustine A. Nawa v. AG, Cross River State & ors [2007] LPELR-8294(CA). That a side by side perusal into section 158 of the Constitution with the rule, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, in the interpretation of this section, it is without doubt that the 1st defendant acted outside its powers in unlawfully and compulsorily retiring the claimant, citing Sun Insurance Nig Plc v. Umez Engineering Construction Co. Ltd [2015] LPELR.24737(SC). 37. Furthermore, that the simple question to ask is whether there is anything in section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution upon which the 1st defendant purportedly relied on to justify the compulsory retirement of the claimant that supports their action? That the 1st defendant has relied on the said section 158(1) to submit that it is not subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person. That it must be noted that an eagle-eyed perusal of the section discloses that the law therein contained is as to appointment or exercise of disciplinary control over persons. But the meat of this case has nothing to do with appointment or exercise of disciplinary control. That it appears that the 1st defendant has misconstrued the clear provisions of the Constitution here to mean that it has the powers to retire any person and no body or authority can call her to order in the circumstances. To the claimant, this above notion is unfounded in law and is manifestly unsupportable by the facts and circumstances of this case. That the claimant is not contending that she was denied appointment nor is she aggrieved by wrong disciplinary measure as there is no allegation of misconduct in the entire facts leading to this case. That the claimant (defendant?) is reading into the law what is never there and seeking to draw this Court into such legal quagmire. The claimant urged the Court to resist such an invitation and state the law as it ought to be. That if the draughtsman of section 158(1) of the Constitution had intended to clothe the 1st defendant with the vires to retire persons in her employment at the latter’s whims and caprices, the law makers would have expressly and copiously provided so. But this is not the issue here. 38. The 1st defendant had contended that it is not bound by circulars emanating from the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation, particularly Exhibit C21(a), which is the circular suspending the tenure policy of Directors and Permanent Secretaries in the public service. To the claimant, the 1st defendant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold on the same point or pick and choose from the same document, what to obey or reject. That the defendant had stated that because its independence is rooted in the 1999 Constitution, it has no regard for Circular No. HCS/428/S.|/139 of 20th June 2016 from the Head of Civil Service on the directive of the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on retirement of Directors/Permanent Secretaries on serving 8 years on the same post or position. That the 1st defendant who has argued that they were not bound by Exhibit C21(a) had earlier in the 102nd (Extra-Ordinary) meeting held on 4th October 2013 tendered Exhibit C26 adopted Circular No. HCSF/1061/3.1/111/68 dated 26/8/2009, which emanated from the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation in implementing the tenure policy. However, that the same 1st defendant has refused to be bound by another circular issued later on from the same office on the ground that it has constitutional independence by virtue of section 158 of the Constitution to formulate its own policies without any control by any person or authority. 39. Additionally, that there is no law that clothes the 1st defendant with such a latitude to pick and choose which circular to be bound by or not. In fact, that the 1st defendant has no legal basis to refuse to be bound by Exhibit C21(a). The claimant then reiterated that paragraph 3 of the introduction to the Public Service Rules, 2008 specifically states that amendment of the rules can be by circulars issued by the Head of Service of the Federation; submitting thereby that Exhibit C21(a) is binding on the 1st defendant and there is no legal excuse whatsoever from which the 1st defendant could be exonerated from the binding effect of circulars emanating from the Presidency vide the Head of Service. That it is unreasonable to accept part of the circular from the Head of Civil Service of the Federation while rejecting the other part. That the defendant has not denied that the Head of the Federal Civil Service is the custodian of the Rules of the Public Service. That being the case, the Head of Civil Service can by circular alter any portion of the Rules as it is the practice that the Civil Service is conducted via circulars. The claimant then urged the Court to restrain the1st defendant from approbating and reprobating at the same time. That the principle of estoppel operates to bar a party from holding a different position from that which it has benefited from. That what the defendant struggles with in this proceeding is to blow hot and cold or approbate and reprobate at the same time which cannot be permitted in law. 40. The defendant had referred to a portion of Exhibit C28 being a letter dated 7/2/18 by the claimant to the JSC in response to its earlier letter to the claimant and concluded that the claimant admitted that the 1st defendant has the power to formulate its own policies and that she was removed properly. To the claimant, this is mischievous as no portion of that letter which counsel deliberately omitted to reproduce in full show that the claimant agreed that the defendant can illegally remove her from office and in breach of the circular from the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation who is custodian of the Rules. That relying on this erroneous premise, the 1st defendant argued that the claimant having admitted this there is no need for further proof. In response, the claimant submitted that it appears that the 1st defendant’s understanding of the principles of admission in civil proceedings is lopsided. This is because section 20 of the Evidence Act defined admission thus: “An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, or conduct which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and in the circumstances mentioned in the Act” (underlining is the claimant’s). That this provision speaks of admission of facts, not of law. That from the tenor of the argument of the 1st defendant, there seems to be an introduction of admission of law. That the law is trite that a litigant cannot by admission or denial authenticate or deny the existence and the efficacy of an extant law. This is because, parties cannot alter the provision of the law even by consent. Whatever letter or admission the claimant has made as to the provisions of the Public Service Rules does not in any way offer another interpretation to the law as it is. 41. The claimant further contended that the defendant has not been able to show that the removal of the claimant (who is a statutory employee) from a public office before serving out 35 years or attaining age 60 is regular in law. That their reliance on the circular from the Head of Civil Service dated 26/8/2009 which from the evidence is no longer extant having been overtaken by that of 26/6/16 cannot help their case as that is only a vain attempt to put something on nothing, citing Mcfoy v. UAC [1962] 152 at 160 and Adeyemi v. O. Achimu/NDIC/AB Ltd [2016] All FWLR (Pt. 814) 144 at 169 - 170. That the circular of 26/8/2009 is only worthless and non-existent having been cancelled by the issuing authority, and that being the case, it is illegal, not to reckon with except for history and upon which no right can be claimed, referring to Oiukwu v. Gov. of Lagos State [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 806, Oiiba v. Oiiba [1991] SCNJ 156 and Nvuma v. Aor [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 439) 571 at 595. That the effect is as if she was never retired, citing R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent) Cherrv and others {Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant) (Scotland) [2019] UKSC 41 on the effect of the consequences of a void act, where Hale P who delivering the unanimous judgment of the court held thus: This court is not, therefore, precluded by article 9 or by any wider Parliamentary privilege from considering the validity of the prorogation itself. The logical approach to that question is to start at the beginning, with the advice that led to it. That advice was unlawful. It was outside the powers of the Prime Minister to give it. This means that it was null and of no effect: see, if authority were needed, R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, para 119. It led to the Order in Council which, being founded on unlawful advice, was likewise unlawful, null and of no effect and should be quashed. This led to the actual prorogation, which was as if the Commissioners had walked into Parliament with a blank piece of paper. It too was unlawful, null and of no effect. 42. Finally, in answer to the question of the 1st defendant as to what duty post the claimant would return to in the event this suit is successful, the claimant submitted that she has clearly sought as a part of her reliefs in this suit for an order returning her to her last duty post with the 1st defendant, as a non-existent rule which was neither part of her terms of employment or part of the extant Public Service Rules was used to compulsorily retire her from service. In other words, the 1st defendant is of the misconceived view that the suspension of the tenure policy in the Public Service Rules does not apply to the 1st defendant in posing this question. That even if the Court holds otherwise, Comptroller General of Customs v. Gusau (supra) held that any compulsory retirement of a public officer that is contrary to express provisions of the extant Public Service Rules is liable to be set aside. In that case, that where similar sentiments were raised by the employer, the Supreme Court held that the fact the said official of the Customs Officer had served at a duty post for 10 years did not automatically entail that the Customs Service has the right to compulsorily retire the said officer from the Custom Service. That applying same to the circumstances of this case, the fact that the claimant has served at various duty posts equivalent to the office of as “Permanent Secretary” for a period of 8 years does not automatically entail that the 1st defendant had the right to compulsory retire her from its service. More so, the claimant has already clearly sought for reliefs setting aside her compulsory retirement by the 1st defendant and for an order reinstating her into its service. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to grant her all the reliefs sought. THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 43. In replying on points of law, the 1st defendant reiterated some of the points it already made in the main written address. Since a reply on points of law is not meant to fill gaps omitted in the main address, I shall endeavour to skip such points made by the 1st defendant in its reply on points of law. Accordingly arguments as to section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution, being merely repetitive or an attempt to improve of the quality of arguments in that regard in the main address, will be discountenanced for present purposes. 44. To the 1st defendant, the argument of the claimant in paragraph 8, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,27 and 28 as to the legal implication of Rule 020810 of the Public Service Rules 2008 is purely misconceived and misleading. That the message section 8 Rule 020810 of the Public Service Rules is trying to send to all public servants is the fact that when someone other than a Director or a Permanent Secretary has spent a period of 35 years in public service or has attained 60 years of age he shall be compulsorily retired whichever comes first. That the inclusion of paragraph (iv)(a) and (b) to the Rule is the exception to the attainment of 60 years of a public servant and 35 years in service in the public Service. That the draftsman of the Public Service Rules acknowledges these public servants i.e. the Director and a Permanent Secretary as special persons who had contributed their quota to the Public Service and need not attain the age of 60 years or served for 35 years in the public service before they are compulsorily retired, urging the Court to so hold. 45. The 1st defendant went on that Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau [2017] LPELR-42081(SC) cited by the claimant does not in any way support her case; neither does it bear the same facts with the substantive suit. That this is because the instant suit relates to a public officer who had attained the peak of the position known to public office period of which the claimant had manned for a period of 8 years while Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau relates to a case of an officer of Nigerian Custom who was unduly retired from service while still in his formative years; the officer still has a number of ranks to attain before getting to the peak of his career. In the same vein, that Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau, which is the pillar upon which the entire address of the claimant’s case was built is totally unrelated to the case at hand because the judgment turned on number of points that are non-existent in the instant case. For instance, the appellants were held to be whimsical in the way they did lock the respondent out of his office in order to shove him out of the office and also show him the way out of service; and the appellants had no general regulations or by-laws made pursuant to section 9 of the Nigeria Customs Service Act relating to the manner of leaving service. 46. To the 1st defendant, section 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution gave powers to the Federal Judicial Service Commission to make a set of regulations that will best suit their affairs. No wonder that the 1st defendant has a set of Regulations for themselves titled, Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja Regulations made pursuant to section 169(1) of the 1999 Constitution, section 36 of which deals with voluntary retirement and compulsory retirement. That the constitutional powers that have been given to the 1st defendant cannot be taken away. 47. In any event, that Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau held that the Nigeria Custom Service Board, the 4th appellant, does not share with the Federal Civil Service Commission the basic powers or functions conferred expressly, by Paragraph II of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. And so each case must be considered on its own peculiar facts or circumstances, citing Skye Bank and anor v.. Akinpelu [2010] LPELR-3073 (SC). It is, therefore, the 1st defendant’s submission that Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau is distinct form the present case and should be discountenanced. Also, that by the very unique and distinctive nature of the 1st defendant, it has the statutory powers to make its own laws. That since Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau does not bear the same facts with the instant case, the Court should hold that the case in irrelevant in this case as using the case as a precedent in this case will cause grave injustice in this matter. 48. The 1st defendant continued that it has statutory powers derived from the Constitution and so has ratified most of the rules and orders as theirs as can be seen in Exhibit C26 and they are basically relying on the ratified one which has become law in their clime. That authorities abound on the doctrine of covering the filed that all other Federal and State legislation must bow to the dictates of the Constitution. That such legislation, if not repugnant, must be supplementary or subsidiary to the Constitution, citing section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution. That the claimant stated this at paragraph 30 of her address thus: “The section (referring to section 159(1) of the 1999 Constitution) clearly states that the 1st Defendant is independent and shall not be subject to any other authority except with respect to its power to make appointments and exercise disciplinary control over persons only”. To the 1st defendant, with this submission, it means that the claimant does not understand the essence of the provision in section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That by that submission, the claimant is saying that the 1st defendant is independent but not in the regards of making appointments and exercising disciplinary control. That a question now comes to mind: “what power is the 1st defendant now independent on?” The 1st defendant then urged the Court to hold that the submission in paragraph 30 of the claimant’s address compromises the integrity of that whole address. 49. Furthermore, that the claimant in her address at paragraphs 34, 35 and 36 stated that the 1st defendant was blowing hot or cold by choosing the circular dated 26/8/2009 with number HCSF/1061/3.1/111/68 and not choosing the second one with number HCS/428/S.1/139 dated 20/6/2016 at its meetings. In answer, the 1st defendant submitted that section 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution clothes it with the powers to regulate and conduct its affairs the best way it will suit them. Moreover, that the first circular adopted with No. HCSF/1061/3.1/111/68 bears similarities with both section 8 Rule 020810(1) of the Public Service Rules and section 36 of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja Regulations. 50. That the 1st defendant knows as a fact that the neither a Director nor a Permanent Secretary can hold on to their respective offices in perpetuity. That that is among other reasons why the circular number HCS|428/S.1/139 dated 20/6/2016 was never adopted at their meetings. In any event, that the 1st defendant never had the claimant in mind while adopting Circular Number HCSF/l061/3.1/111/68 dated 26/8/2009, so it cannot be said that the 1st defendant intentionally used the earlier circular to witch-hunt the claimant. Accordingly, that the claimant’s counsel having realized that its case is unmeritorious embarked on an academic exercise to further dissipate this Court’s time and energy in perusing the various judicial precedents that are miles away from the case at hand and also the law in insisting that the claimant’s retirement is unlawful and illegal. The 1st defendant concluded that the Court should refuse all the reliefs sought by the claimant. COURT’S DECISION 51. I have carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. I indicated earlier that some parts of 1st defendant’s reply on points of law consists of either re-argument of already made points or attempts at filling in gaps of earlier arguments. The law is that a reply on points of law is meant to be just what it is, a reply on points of law. It should be limited to answering only new points arising from the opposing brief. It is not meant for the party replying on points of law to reargue its case or bring in points it forgot to advance when it filed its final written address. It is not a form to engage in arguments at large. Alternatively put, a reply on points of law is not meant to improve on the quality of a written address; a reply brief is not a repair kit to correct or put right an error or lacuna in the initial brief of argument. See Dr Augustine N. Mozie & ors v. Chike Mbamalu [2006] 12 SCM (Pt. I) 306; [2006] 27 NSCQR 425, Basinco Motors Limited v. Woermann Line & anor [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 149; [2009] 8 SCM 103, Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-40220(CA), UBA Plc v. Ubokolo [2009] LPELR-8923(CA), Musaconi Ltd v. Aspinall [2013] LPELR-20745(SC), Ojo v. Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 679 at 693, Ogboru v. Ibori [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 and Cameroon Airlines v. Mike Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 202. The effect of non compliance is that the Court will discountenance such a reply brief. See Onuaguluchi v. Ndu [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 590) 204, ACB Ltd v. Apugo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 and Arulogun & ors v. Aboloyinjo & anor [2018] LPELR-44076(CA). And this is what I did in discountenancing those paragraphs of the 1st defendant’s reply on points of law that were not highlighted. 52. The Federal Government had come up what it called the Tenure Policy (also termed the 8-year tenure rule). By this policy/rule, which is to be found in Rule 020810(iv) of the Public Service Rules (PSR) 2008 Edition, Directors who spend 8 years on the post and Permanent Secretaries who spend two terms of 4 years each must retire form the service. This 8-year tenure rule was applied for a while until Exhibit C21(a) dated 20th June 2016, a circular, was issued, which suspended the 8-year tenure rule. The 1st defendant adopted the 8-year tenure rule but not the suspension of it. Because it adopted the 8-year tenure rule, the 1st defendant had asked the claimant who was in a position equivalent to a Permanent Secretary and had spent 8 years on the post to retire. She did not; and so was compulsorily retired by the 1st defendant, hence the instant suit. To the claimant, her compulsory retirement is unlawful and illegal since it was done after the 8-year tenure rule was suspended. Alternatively, that even if the 8-year tenure rule still subsists i.e. was not suspended, the interpretation of the rule did not require that she be compulsorily retired. In response, the 1st defendant argued that it is independent and so can adopt whatever rule it likes. That it has adopted the 8-year rule, but not the suspension of the rule; and so the rule still applies to its staff in its original form. Are the parties correct in their respective positions? This is the crux of the case at hand. 53. In their respective submissions, the parties made submissions that require a closer look. The claimant had submitted that a closer perusal of Rule 020810(iv)(b) of the Public Service Rules, even if applicable, will show that it does not in any way support the actions of the 1st defendant. The said Rule provides thus: (i) The compulsory retirement age for all grades in the Service shall be 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. (ii) No officer shall be allowed to remain in service after attaining the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. (iii) The provisions of (i) and (ii) of the Rule is without prejudice to prevailing requirements for Judicial officers and Academic Staff of Universities who retire at 70 and 65 respectively. (iv) Provided the officer would not have attained the retirement age of 60 years or spent 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier; (a) a Director shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on the post; and (b) a Permanent Secretary shall hold office for a term of four years and renewable for a further term of four years subject to satisfactory performance and no more. 54. To the claimant, this provision, particularly Rule 020810(iv)(b) merely stated that a Permanent Secretary (as the claimant is in the instant case) shall hold the office for a term of four years renewable for another four years subject to satisfactory performance and nothing more. That the Rule simply means that when a person has occupied the office of a Permanent Secretary up to two times (eight years of 4 years tenure each) the said person is no longer eligible to occupy the position of a Permanent Secretary and no more. That by no stretch of legal imagination did the provision mean that after two terms as a Permanent Secretary the occupier of the said office should be compulsorily retired against the general statutory principles of retirement of public officers at 35 years of service or 60 years of age, whichever comes first. Is the claimant right in this interpretation? I do not think so. Rule 020810(iv) must be taken and read in its totality. It was His Lordship Nweze, JSC who said in Dr Olubukola Abubakar Saraki v. FRN [2016] LPELR-40013(SC) that “…the construction of any document (and this includes the construction of the precious and organic document known as the 1999 Constitution) is a holistic endeavour”. 55. As already quoted, Rule 020810(iv) provides that: (iv) Provided the officer would not have attained the retirement age of 60 years or spent 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier; (a) a Director shall compulsorily retire upon serving eight years on the post; and (b) a Permanent Secretary shall hold office for a term of four years and renewable for a further term of four years subject to satisfactory performance and no more. Now, sub-rule (iii) of Rule 020810 qualified sub-rules (i) and (ii) in allowing Judicial Officers and Academic Staff of Universities to retire at 70 or 65 years as their own law allows. 56. The proviso in sub-rule (iv) on its part is a qualification to sub-rule (ii) given the use of the phrase “the officer”. It should be noted that sub-rule (ii) talks of “No officer shall…”, while sub-rule (iv) talks of “Provided the officer would…” The phrase, “the officer” in sub-rule (iv) given the definite article “the” refers to the word “officer” referred to in sub-rule (ii). Now, sub-rule (ii) in providing that “No officer shall be allowed to remain in service after attaining the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service whichever is earlier” bars officers of 60 years of age or 35 years of service form continuing in service. So when the proviso in sub-rule (iv) talked of “the officer would not have attained the retirement age of 60 years or spent 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier”, it meant that both the Director and Permanent Secretary talked of in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of sub-rule (iv) are each the officer talked of who must compulsorily retire after serving for 8 years on the post even if they are yet to attain 60 years of age or 35 years of service. This is the meaning of sub-rule (iv) read in conjunction with especially sub-rule (ii). I do not accordingly agree with the claimant’s interpretation that a Permanent Secretary who served 8 years (two terms of 4 years each) cannot be retired until he attains 60 years of age or 35 years of service. What the claimant did not address her mind to is that by sub-rule (iv)(a) a Director must compulsorily retire after eight years on the post. If the Permanent Secretary is not to retire after two terms, will the Permanent Secretary go back to being a Director since it is from Director that one becomes a Permanent Secretary? Why would a Director compulsory retire after eight years on the post and the Permeant Secretary not retire after two terms? I accordingly reject the agreement of the claimant in this regard as it has no merit. I so hold. The reliance of the claimant on the principle expressed in the Latin maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that the express mention of one thing is to the exclusion of all others, has accordingly no application to the instant case. And further still, the argument of the claimant that had the law makers intended to prescribe retirement for a Permanent Secretary, who has spent two tenures of 4 years each, the provisions of the Rule would have said so, equally has no place here as makers of the Rule already provided so. I so hold. 57. On the part of the defendant, its submission hinged on section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution requires clarification. Here, the clarification relates to the context and indeed ambit of the reliance of the 1st defendant on its independence in defending this suit. The question is whether the 1st defendant was correct in the context it used, and the interpretation of, its independence as a defence to the claimant’s case especially in terms of section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution. As Lord Steyn put it in R v. Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; [2001] 1 AC 532; [2001] 2 WLR 1622; [2001] UKHL 26: “In law, context is everything”. 58. The basic argument of the 1st defendant, the Judicial Service Committee (JSC) of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), is that since it is independent of any outside control, it can make its rules and policies as is provided for in section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the Public Service Rules (Chapter 1), or adopt whichever policy it wishes at any time in its operation. Accordingly, the compulsory retirement of the claimant by the 1st defendant was lawful and constitutional. In answer, the claimant submitted that the Judicial Service Committee of the FCT (the 1st defendant) does not share with the Federal Civil Service Commission the basic powers or functions conferred expressly by paragraph 11 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution on the Federal Civil Service Commission to make regulations relating to retirement of officers in the Public Civil Service of the Federation, and or the power to make rules relating to dismissal and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding such public offices 59. Now, section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution applies to the 1st defendant in virtue of section 304(2) of the Constitution; even then, it applies only with necessary modifications. So when section 158(1) talked of “in exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons” the bodies listed, which would in virtue of section 304(2) of the 1999 Constitution include the JSC of the FCT (the 1st defendant), “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person”, the question that arises is whether in compulsorily retiring the claimant, the JSC of the FCT acted in terms of “exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over” the claimant. The point is that section 158(1) applies only when the bodies listed act “in exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control”. The independence of the 1st defendant only comes to the fore and is active only if an appointment is being made or it wants to discipline a staff. Was the claimant then being appointed or disciplined to warrant the application of section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution as the 1st defendant now argues? The evidence before the Court given Exhibits C27, C22 and C23 is that the claimant was compulsorily retired, not because she committed any wrongdoing for which she was being disciplined, but because the 1st defendant simply adopted a policy of the Federal Government that requires Directors and Permanent Secretaries to retire after being in that office for 8 years. The claimant, being the equivalent of a Permanent Secretary, was then simply asked to retire. 60. The reliance of the 1st defendant on section 32(1), (2) and (3) Part V of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Regulations (Revised Edition 2018) does not take away the point being made. The 1st defendant itself had earlier submitted that once the Constitution sets the condition for doing a thing, that condition cannot be set aside by any subsidiary legislation or rule made by the legislature or some other body such as the 1st defendant. As far as section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution is concerned, it comes alive (and so to the fore) only when the bodies listed (including the 1st defendant) act when exercising their power to make appointments or to discipline. I so hold. I have not been shown by the 1st defendant that either of this was the case when the claimant was asked to retire for it to rely on section 158(1) of the Constitution. 61. The 1st defendant, in relying on section 32(1), (2) and (3) Part V of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Regulations (Revised Edition 2018), had submitted that it made the regulations while enjoying its constitutional rights; and so is by the said section 32(1), (2) and (3) empowered to retire the claimant even though she is a pensionable officer, so long as reasons are adduced and the preconditions as set out in section 32(1)(b) and (2) of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Regulation (Revised Edition 2018) are met. What was the reason for compulsorily retiring the claimant? From the evidence before the Court, the only reason is the 8-year tenure rule. Nothing is said about disciplining the claimant for any infraction. So, section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as argued by the 1st defendant, remains inapplicable to the instant case. 62. It is curious that paragraph 2(c) of Part III of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution talks of the power of the 1st defendant “to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over” the staff of the FCT Judiciary and of the 1st defendant. Unlike paragraph 2(b), which talks of the power to recommend to the National Judicial Council (NJC) the removal of judicial officers of the FCT, paragraph 2(c) does not use the word “removal”. The only saving grace is that because section 318(4) of the Constitution provides that the Interpretation Act shall apply for purposes of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, section 11(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act becomes applicable. This section 11(1)(b) provides that the power to appoint shall include the power to remove or suspend. So, because the 1st defendant in virtue of paragraph 2(c) of Part III of the Third Schedule to the Constitution has the power to appoint, it also has the power to remove. But this power to remove cannot be absolute because of section 158(1) of the Constitution except it stems from the exercise of disciplinary control over the staff in issue. 63. If the argument of the 1st defendant is that it has absolute powers to compulsorily retire the claimant whether or not it is exercising its disciplinary powers, the said section 32 of the FCT JSC Regulations talks of there being a reason first. Like I pointed out, the only reason adduced before the Court is the 8-year tenure rule. The FCT JSC is not the initiator of this rule. The Federal Government did. The FCT JSC merely adopted and applied it. So when the Federal Government suspended it, was it in place to warrant the FCT JSC to continue to apply it? The 1st defendant’s argument is that it is independent and so can do as it wishes; and so it chose to continue to apply the rule. But the independence of the FCT JSC by section 158(1) relates only to when it is exercising its appointment or disciplinary powers. Since this was not the case with the claimant, the FCT JSC cannot plead that independence here. The 8-year tenure rule is a Federal Government policy, which in virtue of the Public Service Rules applies to all except those indicated such as Judicial Officers and Academic Staff of Universities. See Rule 020810(iii) of the PSR 2008. So when, this rule was suspended, it ought to equally apply across board. By Rule 010101 of the PSR 2008, the PSR itself applies “to all officers except where they conflict with specific terms approved by the Federal Government and written into the contract of employment or letters of appointment”. For holders of the offices of the President, Vice President, Federal Judicial Officers (somehow those of the Federal High Court and National Industrial Court of Nigeria were left out) and Chairmen/Members of some named Federal Executive bodies and any other similar organs that derive their appointments form the Constitution (this would thereby include the 1st defendant), the PSR will”apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution…in so far as their conditions of service and any other law applicable to these officers are concerned”. Rule 010103 of the PSR then defines “officer” as: “when used without qualification means staff of an established post, either on pensionable or contract terms”. The claimant is a staff on pensionable terms and so qualifies as officer under the PSR 2008. So, in terms of section 158(1) of the Constitution, I do not think that the FCT JSC, the 1st defendant, has the kind of independence it says it has. 64. The 1st defendant invited the Court to discountenance the averment in paragraph 13 of the claimant’s statement of facts as Rule 020810(iv)(b), which is still in force, mandates a Permanent Secretary who had served a period of 2 terms to retire from public service. I must first state that the averment in paragraph 13 as to what Rule 020810(iv)(b) of the Public Service Rules mandates or states is one of interpretation. And I do not think it is one open to evidence as the interpretation of laws and documents is the exclusive preserve of the courts, not of witnesses. See Olapade Samuel Olatunwo Oyebola & ors v. FAAN unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/259/2013, the judgment for which was delivered on 20th May 2019; as well as Mr Akindele Adedipe v. Oracle Software Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/214/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 15th May 2019, Ambassador D. C. B. Nwanna v. National Intelligence Agency & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/123/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th December 2013, Mr Ugochukwu Duru v. First Guarantee Pension Ltd unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/246/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 2nd February 2015 and Prince Benjamin Saliu Ikani v. Chairman/Chief Executive National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/351/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th July 2018. 65. Additionally, the point made in paragraph 13 as to Rule 020810(iv)(b), being one of law, has no place in pleadings. In Mrs Roseline Ekeng v. International Energy Insurance Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 18th June 2019, this is what I said in paragraph 42: …the point itself is one of law and so not governed by the rules of pleadings. Pleadings relate only to facts. See Auto Import Export v. Adebayo [2005] LPELR-642(SC); [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 44, which, relying on Lever Brothers Ltd & ors v. Bell and anor [1931] 1 KB 557, held thus: there is a vital distinction between pleading law, which is not permitted, and raising a point of law in a pleading, which is permitted; pleading law obscures or conceals the facts of the case, raising a point of law defines or isolates an issue or question of law on the facts as pleaded; the practice of the courts is to consider and deal with the legal result of pleaded facts, although the particular result alleged is not stated in the pleading; and the inferences of law to be drawn from the pleaded facts need not be stated in pleadings - thus, if the material facts are alleged, it is not necessary to plead an implied warranty. Secondly, parties cannot admit to law as they would to facts. Parties can only submit as to law, leaving the Court to agree or not agree with them as to what the law is. Lastly, the law is not proved as you would facts in pleadings. 66. The claimant had argued that the 1st defendant incorporated the Public Service Rules in her letter of “Offer of Permanent and Pensionable Appointment” i.e. Exhibit C2 and that the rules governing her conditions of service cannot at this stage be reneged from in terms of the applicability of same. Clause (c) of the first paragraph of Exhibit C2 provides thus: That you will be subject in all respects of all conditions of service stipulated in the Civil Service Rules, Financial Regulations and Judicial Service Regulations of 1985 pertaining to employees. To start with, what was incorporated into the claimant’s appointment was not just the Civil Service Rules (replaced in 2008 by the Public Service Rules), but the Financial Regulations and the Judicial Service Rules of 1985. So the claimant talking as if only the Public Service Rules, which replaced the Civil Service Rules, applies to her case is out of place. What all of this means is that by her letter of appointment, the PSR 2008 together with Rule 020810(iv) applies to the claimant. 67. The question, however, arises whether Rule 020810(iv)(b) is still in force; and if it is, whether it admits of the interpretation given to it by the claimant. Both parties appear to think that the Rule subsists and so is in force. The divergence is that the claimant thinks that in applying the Rule, the Rule does not say the Permanent Secretary is to retire after the 8 years of being on the post. I already disagreed with the claimant on this point. What then is the true import of the Rule? I already gave a hit on the import of the Rule in disagreeing with the claimant. What is left is a fuller discussion of the Rule. 68. Exhibit C21(a) dated 20th June 2016 is the circular which suspended the 8-year tenure rule. It simply states thus: With reference to letter No. SH/COS/100/A/1462 dated 17th June, 2016, I write to convey Mr President’s directive that the Tenure Policy in the Federal Civil Service is suspended with immediate effect. 2. This notice is for the attention of all concerned for compliance. Two issues arise here. First, the Tenure Policy is a product of Rule 020810(iv) of the PSR. Was this Rule amended to accommodate the suspension of the Rule? Rule 010104 of the PSR provides that “nothing in these Public Service Rules shall be construed as limiting the powers of the Federal Government to amend or revoke any of its provisions at any time”. The question that arises is how i.e. the manner in which the PSR can be amended. The claimant’s argument is that paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Public Service Rules discloses that amendment of the PSR is by means of circulars issued by the Head of Service of the Federation; and so it was pursuant to this that the Head of Service issued Exhibit C21(a), the circular dated 20th June 2016, wherein the purported policy on tenure/retirement of certain public officers was suspended. However, in Ambassador D. C. B. Nwanna v. National Intelligence Agency & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/123/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th December 2013, on the issue of how notional promotion affects the 8-year tenure policy, I held that a circular cannot amend the PSR. 69. In Mr. Chinweorder Chukwu Awa v. Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 211) 544, I was asked to reconsider my holding in Nwanna to the effect that circulars from the Head of Civil Service could not override the PSR since my holding clearly overlooked the preamble to the PSR. In rejecting this call, this is what I said: …what is actually a preamble? Is the preamble quoted by the learned SAN actually a preamble in the true sense of the word? In other words is it even part of the Public Service Rules? In determining these issues I must point out that the word, “preamble”, as used and understood in law is not necessarily the same with its usage and understanding in ordinary English. Within the context of legal usage, the Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 9th Edition at pages 1294 – 1295, for instance, defines a preamble as – An introductory statement in a constitution, statute, or other document explaining the document’s basis and objective; esp. a statutory recital of the inconveniences for which the statute is designed to provide a remedy. A preamble often consists of a series of clauses introduced by the conjunction whereas. Such a preamble is sometimes called the whereas clauses. The Black’s Law Dictionary then refers to Den v. Urison 2 NJL 212 (1807) as stating – The preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute, in cases where the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms; but in case any doubt arises on the enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to explain it, and show the intention of the law maker. The Court of Appeal in Ona v. Atenda [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 144 at 267 had this to say – The proper function of a preamble is to explain certain facts which are necessary to be explained before the enactment contained in the Act can be understood. It is undoubtedly part of the Act and it is a legitimate aid in construing the enactment, particularly when there is ambiguity or conflicting view which fits the preamble ought to be preferred. See…Ogbonna v. AG, Imo State & ors [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647 and Olowosago v. Adebanjo [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt. 88) 275 at 287 – 288. Within the context of ordinary usage, the Chambers Dictionary, for instance, defines “preamble” as: “a preface; an introduction, esp, that of an Act of Parliament, giving its reasons and purpose…a prelude”. By Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (Revised Edition), it is “an introduction or preface, eg to a speech or document; an opening statement”. And by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (International Student’s Edition), it means “an introduction to a book or a written document; an introduction to [something] you say….” Now the Public Service Rules (2008 Edition) meant to review the 2007 Edition came as Government Notice No. 278 in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 57 of 25th August 2009 Vol. 96. It has a foreword at page (i) by the Late President, Umar Musa Yar’Adua, GCFR and a preamble at page (ii) by A. I. Pepple, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation. This is then followed by the table of contents at page (iii), index at pages (iv) to (xvi) and thereafter the provisions of the Rules themselves. In terms of the actual Rules, the pages are not numbered but the Rules are numbered sequentially according to the Chapters starting with Rule 010101 in Chapter 1 and ending with Rule 160601 in Chapter 16. The Appendixes to the Rules follow thereat and accordingly end the Rules. It is in the preamble by A. I. Pepple that would be found the following quotation quoted by the learned SAN – 3. Amendments Further amendments to these Rules shall be made through Circulars, which will be issued from time to time. Can this preamble be said to be part of the Rules; and if so what is its legal effect? Given the submissions of the learned SAN, the preamble is part of the Rules and consequently has legal effect. I indicated earlier that, to the Black’s Law Dictionary, the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute. In this sense, the preamble quoted by the learned SAN cannot control the Public Service Rules. I do not even think that as couched the preamble talked of by the learned SAN is part of the Public Service Rules. It is merely to introduce the Rules as published. For instance, in explaining the arrangement of Chapters, Sections and Rules, the preamble states that “except where otherwise indicated by the context, the Index at the back contains the list of topics with their corresponding rule numbers”. Like I indicated earlier, the Index is actually provided for at pages (iv) to (xvi) and so comes at the front, not back, of the Rules. Even within the context of the strict legal usage, a preamble, although part of the Act, is not used in construing the Act unless there is ambiguity in interpreting the sections of the Act. See Ona v. Atenda (supra). Even here, a preamble is to aid the interpretation of sections of the Act. In the scenario of Nwanna, there was no ambiguity as to construction of the provisions of the Public Service Rules needing the preamble to aid in resolving. The preamble the learned SAN cited is one that simply says that amendments of substantive provisions of the Rules can be through circulars. How then can this preamble be an aid to construing sections of the Public Service Rules? A preamble explains the objectives of an Act or document. How is the instant preamble one that explains the objectives of the Public Service Rules? In all I am of the firm opinion that the instant preamble was used, not in the legal sense, but in its ordinary sense of an introduction to a booklet; even if it were used in the legal sense, there is no ambiguity as to the construction of any provision of the Pubic Service Rules for which the preamble can be called in aid. This being the case, I reiterate my holding in Nwanna that circulars cannot override clear provisions of the Public Service Rules especially if it is noted that the Rules themselves derive from the Constitution and accordingly have constitutional force. See Iderima v. RSCSC [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378 SC. I earlier indicated the supremacy of the Public Service Rules over and above the conditions of service of the defendant. In that wise, I find no reason not to abide by Nwanna. As far as this Court is concerned, Nwanna remains good law and so is binding and applicable in the instant case. It was the further argument of the defendant that circulars have the effect of statutory instruments since they can by the preamble to the Public Service Rules amend the main Rules themselves. I must however state here that by Exhibit C6, Circular Ref. No. HCSF/061/S.1/III/183 interpreted and clarified Circular Ref. No. HCSF/061/S.1/III/68. Two things need to be noted here. First, if circulars were statutory instruments in the manner canvassed by the defendant, it must then be noted that the question of interpreting and clarifying them will not lie with the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation (HCSF) but with the Court since the construction of contracts and statutory provisions is a function of the law courts, not the executive arm of government. Secondly, in labour relations, circulars may have the kind of force of statutory instruments canvassed by the defendant but only if they confer a benefit on the employee(s). See Oyo State v. Alhaji Apapa & ors [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 284, where this Court acknowledged that a circular conveying salary increase for workers would have the force of law. So could Exhibit C21(a) in the instant case amend the PSR? I maintain that it cannot being a circular except (and this is going by cases such as Oyo State v. Alhaji Apapa & ors just referred to) if it confers a benefit on the claimant. Is the suspension of the 8-year tenure rule, therefore, a benefit? I think so. It is a benefit because it extends the period in which an officer of the public service could be in service. But was Exhibit C21(a) targeted at all public officers such as the claimant? This leads me to the second issue. 70. The second issue is: Exhibit C21(a) suspended the policy “in the Federal Civil Service”. Is the JSC of the FCT part of the Federal Civil Service? I think not. The Constitution makes a distinction between the Public Service and the Civil Service. Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution, for instance defines “civil service of the Federation” as “service of the Federation in a civil capacity as staff of the office of the President, the Vice-President, a ministry or department of the Government of the Federation assigned with the responsibility for any business of the Government of the Federation”. The same section then defines “public service of the Federation” as “the service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation, and includes service as” Clerk or staff of the National Assembly and staff of all the Federal Courts (including the FCT). Now, the noticeable thing in all of this is that while the definition of civil service restricts it to staff of the Executive arm of Government, that of the public service encompasses all including staff in the Legislative and Judicial arms of Government. In virtue of section 5 of the 1999 Constitution, Executive powers resides in the President; and so the President is the repository of Executive power. This reinforces the definition of civil service in terms made in section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The evidence of DW under cross-examination that he is a Federal Civil Servant will accordingly go to no issue here since being a staff of the 1st defendant, he is a public officer, not a civil servant. The implication of all this is that in suspending “the Tenure Policy in the Federal Civil Service”, Exhibit C21(a) cannot be read to have done so in respect of staff of either the National Assembly or the Federal Judiciary. This means that the claimant in the instant case cannot rely on Exhibit C21(a). 71. The 1st defendant adopted the 8-year tenure rule. However, does it have the power to accept the Rule but not its suspension since the 1st defendant did not initiate the rule in the first place? While the 1st defendant thinks it has, the claimant thinks otherwise. An employer (and the 1st defendant is in the position of an employer to the claimant) has the right to change the conditions of service. Mbachu v. AIRBDA [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 691 SC held that an employer can at his discretion prune the schedule of duties of an employee; and the employee cannot preclude the employer from doing so. So in having the right to change the conditions of service, the 1st defendant had the right to adopt the 8-year tenure rule just as it did. In fact, the evidence of the claimant under cross-examination that the NJC told the 1st defendant that it was wrong of it to apply the 8-year tenure rule goes to no issue as in respect of staff (not Judicial Officers) of the 1st defendant, the latter is not answerable to the NJC. Did the 1st defendant, however, have the right not to adopt the suspension of the 8-year rule? Since it has the right to adopt, logic demands that it also has the right not to adopt. This means that it has the right not to adopt the suspension of the 8-year rule. The choice here is the 1st defendant’s since the right to change conditions of service is its right. Even if it did not have the right to refuse the adoption of the suspension of the 8-year rule, that fact will still not be helpful to the claimant since Exhibit C21(a) suspended the 8-year tenure rule “in the Federal Civil Service” and the 1st defendant is not the Federal Civil Service or part of it. 72. I must clarify that the power of the 1st defendant to change conditions of service is not in virtue of its independence under section 158(1) of the 1999 Constitution but in virtue of section 160 of the Constitution (though subject to the approval of the President) and its position as an employer of the claimant. The President in authorizing Exhibit C21(a) restricted its application to the Federal Civil Service. Since the 1st defendant is not the Federal Civil Service or part of it, Exhibit C21(a) has no application to the 1st defendant. I so hold. 73. The claimant relied on Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau [2017] LPELR-42081(SC) and asserted that it dealt with circumstances identical with the facts of her case. One basic distinguishing fact, aside from the distinguishing points the 1st defendant made in its reply on points of law, is that both parties in Comptroller General of Customs & ors v. Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau were of the Executive arm of Government, not Judicial or Legislative. The instant case, however, relates to parties of the Judicial arm of Government. So the basic statement of the Supreme Court must be read as applicable to persons and organs of the Executive arm of Government since the Constitution itself makes the distinction between the civil service (applicable to the Executive arm of Government) and the public service (applicable to all arms of Government). 74. Since Exhibit C21(a) has no application to the claimant, the 8-year tenure rule as adopted by the 1st defendant subsists and so applies to the claimant. This being so, none of the reliefs claimed by the claimant in this suit is grantable. Her case accordingly fails and so is hereby dismissed. 75. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD