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JUDGMENT. On 23/1/19, when argument on this Originating Summons was concluded the suit was adjourned to 10/4/19 for judgment. However, due to unforeseen circumstances judgment could not be delivered as scheduled. Thus, the judgment was rescheduled to be delivered on 12/4/19. Again, due to a panel sitting to which I was involved the judgment could not be delivered on 12/4/19. And it happened that the 12/4/19 was the last juridical day before commencement of Esther vacation. The last date of 90 days allowed by the Constitution within which to deliver judgment falls on 22/4/19 during the Esther Court vacation. Thus, why the judgment is being delivered today 6/5/19 twelve days after the elapse of 90 days. Vide the Originating Summons filed on 10th day of April 2018, the claimants’ submitted the following questions in the Originating Summons. They are:- 1. Whether having regard to the express provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004, (as amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005, in a community reading with section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act Cap Ll LFN 2004 it is not unlawful, arbitrary, illegal, wrongful and ultra vires the powers and authority of the Kaduna State Executive Council to order Stoppage of deduction and remittance of unions dues (check-off dues) of all workers employed by the Kaduna State Government, to the accredited registered office of the Unions? 2. whether considering the express provision of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004, (as Amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 2005, in a community reading with the provision of Section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act Cap Ll LFN 2004 it is not unlawful, illegal, wrongful, and/or an act of harassment or intimidation by the Government of Kaduna State to the workers - in their employment, to coerce them to denounce or deny their membership of the Trade Unions to which they are eligible and voluntarily enlisted as members as permitted and stipulated under the Act? 3. whether considering the provisions of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and subsection 12 (4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended), the stoppage and non-remittance of union dues from the salaries of workers in the employment of the Kaduna State Government as directed and circulated in the Government Internal Memo of 23rd January 2018 issued by the Kaduna State Government is not a flagrant breach and deliberate infringement and violation of the Fundamental Human Rights (FHR) of workers in the employment of the Kaduna State to associate and belong voluntarily to Trade Unions of their choice for purposes of their welfare and interest, particularly in democracy like Nigeria? 4. whether in the light of the provisions of the 2nd Schedule to the constitution of the FRN 1999 (as amended), PART 1 thereof, item 34, on the list, which specifies labour matters inclusive of Trade Unions under the Exclusive legislative list, the Governor of a state and/or the State Executive Council can lawfully, legally, expressly and/or unilaterally dabble into or interfere with and/or pronounce upon and regulate by Executive FIAT the stoppage of union dues (check-off des) from workers’ salaries, without doing violence to the law on the subject? 5. Whether it is lawful, competent and permissible under the law, for the Governor of a state to dabble into and/or interfere with deduction of check-off dues from salaries of workers in the service of the state, considering the spirit and tenor of the provisions of the law on check-off dues, particularly by the community reading of the provisions of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004 section 5 (3) (a) and (b) thereof; together with section 17 Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004 as amended by Trade Unions (amendment) Act 2005 No 17 thereof all of which makes deductions of union dues (check-off dues) voluntary and automatic from wages or salaries of workers who are members of such registered and recognized Trade Unions without any inhibition, or control whatsoever? Upon determination of all the questions herein above in favour of the Claimants, the Claimants herein seek the following reliefs from the Court: 1) A DECLARATION that by virtue of the provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act (as amended) by the Trade Unions (amendment) Act (2005), employees and workers in the service of Kaduna State Government, covered and affected by the directives of the Government Internal Memo of 23rd January 2018 and who are all eligible members of the Nigeria Labour Congress NLC, (the 4th claimant), herein cannot and should not by whatever means, guise, device and/or any machination of the Executive Council of the State Government, howsoever and whatsoever, either by way of a Circular, Internal Memo, directives and by whatever name so called, be compelled or coerced by the Defendants to deny or denounce their membership and statutory obligation to the 4th Claimant or any other recognized affiliated Trade Unions of the 4th Claimant, to which they may belong, such as Nigeria Union of Teachers, (NUT), Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU); Radio, Television and Theatre Arts Workers Union (RATIAWU) etc, in accordance with the provisions of the law, which makes such membership totally voluntary and a personal decision. 2) A DECLARATION that the provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No 17 of 2005 together with the provisions of section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004, is peremptory, mandatory and a command of the law and not directory, since the word Shall is used in the provisions of the Statute and therefore does not brook of any iota of discretion, choice or option by the employer as regards compliance with the express provisions of the law as stipulated therein. 3) A DECLARATION that by virtue of the provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act (as amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 2005, check- off dues are the statutorily permitted deductions under the Trade Unions Act, which in relation to unions specified under the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, are compulsory, automatic and do not rely on the pleasure of an employer. 4) A DECLARATION that by virtue of the provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act (as amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 2005, that the directives of the State Executive Council as issued and dictated by the Internal Memo from the Ministry of Finance dated 23rd January 2018, violates and offends the provisions of the extant labour and Trade Unions laws on the subject and ought to be rescinded forthwith, and withdrawn as being a nullity and completely invalid, unlawful, illegal and wrongful in its entirety. 5) AN ORDER rescinding and quashing forthwith the Internal Memo dated 23rd January 2018 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Kaduna State on the directives of the Kaduna State Executive Council for being a nullity, invalid, unlawful, illegal and completely wrongful in its entirety. 6) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining all the defendants herein, jointly and severally, whether by themselves or through their servants , agents, privies or in any other capacity whatsoever, from stoppage and non-remittance of Unions dues to the appropriate union which membership employees and workers belong to voluntarily under the law. 7) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMPELLING all the defendants herein, jointly and severally to pay all check- off dues collected from the employees and workers in the service of the Kaduna State Government and which was withheld by the Defendants herein, to the registered office or designated bank account of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants in accordance with the provision of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14, LFN 2004 (as amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005. AND FOR SUCH FURTHER or other orders as this Honorable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The Originating Summons is supported by an eight (8) paragraphs affidavit deposed to by one Comrade Ango Adamu, a Trade Unionist and Chairman of the Nigeria Labour Congress Kaduna State Branch. A written address was also filed along with the Originating Summons. F. T. Shotikare, Esq; counsel for the claimants, leading Jimoh Balogun, Esq; and A. Abiodun Olayiwole, Esq; in adumbration of the position of the claimants relied on all the depositions contained in the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and the exhibits attached therein. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. The grouse of the claimants that led to filing of this action is as narrated in the affidavit in support of the originating summons. In a nutshell the claimants averred in the affidavit that since the assumption of office by the executive Governor of Kaduna State in 2015, there had been moves by the administration to decimate labour unions in the state through the introduction of screening with a form designed to get to workers not to belong to any trade union. The height of hate and disdain to labour unions was reached when vide memo of 23rd January 2018, the Government of Kaduna state issued a circular directing the stoppage of deductions of union dues with immediate effect. The Claimants aggrieved by the aggravated injury, caused by the issuance of EXHIBIT AA.7, to wit: the Internal Memo, had written to the Governor a letter Exhibit. AA 10 through their Lawyers without any positive response or reaction whatsoever. The Claimants have therefore taken out this application to challenge the veracity, lawfulness, legality and/or constitutionality or otherwise of the said Internal Memo (EXHIBIT AA.7) which is ultra-vires the powers and authority of the State Government and its functionaries. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION. 1. Whether the directives contained in the Internal Memo of the Kaduna State Ministry of Finance dated 23rd January 2018 and authorized by the Kaduna State Government acting through its organ, the State Executive Council in the absence of any State Law to that effect, is wrongful, improper, unconstitutional, ultra vires the powers of the Governor and/or the State Executive Council and therefore null, void and of no effect whatsoever? 2. Whether where the words used in the provisions of a statute, are very clear and unambiguous, the Court will not construe or interpret it accordingly so as to give effect to the clear and express intention of the Lawmaker without scouting around for any external aid in that regard. 3. Whether having regard to the community reading of the provisions of Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004 section 17 (a) and (b) thereof as amended by Trades Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 together with the provisions of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004 section 5 (3) (a) and (b) thereof where the word "shall" is used, if any form of executive fiat or dictate, can operate to override the said provisions or vary the provisions in any way or manner whatsoever? AND/OR In the alternative whether considering and in view of the mandatory provisions of section 17 (a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004 (as amended) by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005, when given a community reading with section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act Cap L1 LFN 2004, if the Internal Memo Exhibit AA.7 herein, has any legal basis or constitutional basis or authority to warrant and validate the directive so conveyed by it? AND if the answer to the above is in the negative, whether the said Memo should not be declared a complete nullity, null and void in law ab-initio and therefore ultra-vires the powers of the Kaduna State Government? ARGUMENT: ISSUE 1: Whether the directives contained in the Internal Memo of the Kaduna State Ministry of Finance dated 23rd January 2018 and authorized by the Kaduna State Government acting through its organ, the State Executive Council in the absence of any State Law to that effect, is wrongful, improper, unconstitutional, ultra vires the powers of the Governor and/or the State Executive Council and therefore null, void and of no effect whatsoever? Counsel for the Claimants began his argument on this issue by making reference to exhibit AA 7 and argued that there is no state law or any local legislation of Kaduna State which vests in the Governor, state executive council or any organ of the state Government or any government functionary the power to dabble into or interfere with or regulate, control howsoever or whatsoever Trade Unions matters. It is the contention of counsel that exhibit AA7 issued on the orders of the Government of Kaduna State was issued without requisite power, the document is not legally issued as the item it sought to regulate is within the exclusive legislative list which only Federal Government can legislate and regulate. The internal memo of 23/1/18 purporting to meddle into the affairs of deduction of union check-off dues as depicted in exhibit AA 7 is an exercise in futility as it has no legal basis. Counsel further argued that with the placement of labour and trade union matters under item 34 of the exclusive legislative list in second schedule, part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) it is only the National Assembly that can legislate on Trade Union either by way of legislation substantive or subsidiary or in any way and not state Assembly of executive organ of state government. On this submission counsel relied on the Supreme Court decisions in A.G Federation v. A.G Lagos State (2013) 55 NSCQR 374 particularly at pages 470-471 paragraph A and B thereof where my Noble Lord Honorable Justice Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad, JSC stated as follows: "ln the federated democracy, powers of the various Governments such as states and the central Government are shared between organs of a State Government or that of the central federal Government for the purposes of limiting where powers of one organ starts and where they end, they call it separation of powers in Constitutional Law parlance. The Nigerian Constitution in limiting the powers of the Federal central Government and those of a state Government demarcated them by means of Legislative List as contained in the Second Schedule to the Constitution. Exclusive Legislation List thereof refers to those items which the federal Government has the Exclusive preserve/power (and it alone) can make laws to govern those items that is contained in part 1 of the Schedule." Based on the above authority counsel contended that the action of Kaduna State Government which culminated in the issuance of the internal memo (exhibit AA 7) of the 23/1/18 by the Ministry of Finance directing the stoppage and deduction of the Trade Unions dues from workers’ salaries in the state amounts to what the Supreme Court refers to and described as executive subversion of the Constitution by the State Government as per the pronouncement of Justice Kayode Eso, JSC (as he then was). MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE & 2 ORS. V CHIEF EMEKA ODUMEGU OJUKWU & ANOR. (1986) 2 Sc 277. It is also the contention of counsel that Nigeria being a democratic society governed by rule of law, the full force and potency of rule of law should be the guiding principle and dogma of both the government and the governed. The dabbling into a subject matter not within the legislative competence of state by the state constitute an affront and outright violation of the constitution and lack of respect for the rule of law. On this proposition of law counsel refers to the Supreme Court decision in the case of The Military Governor of Lagos State & 20rs. V. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu & Anor. (1986) supra at page 286 thereof Hon. Justice Obaseki JSC (as he then was) in his judgment pronounced as follows: "The Nigeria Constitution is founded on the rule of law, the primary meaning of which is that everything must be done according to the law. It means also that Government should be conducted within the frame work of recognized rules and principles, which restrict discretionary power.’’ Counsel also refers to the pronouncement of Honourable Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, JSC (as he then was) in the same judgment at page 320, as follows:- "The rule of law presupposes 1. That the state is subject to the law. 2. ………………………………………. 3. That Government should respect the right of individual citizens under the rule of law. 4. ………………………………………. In concluding his submission on this issue counsel argued that the directive of the Kaduna State Government as contained in exhibit AA 7 directing stoppage of deduction of check-off dues from workers’ salaries has no legal basis, it is wrongful in law and unconstitutional. ISSUE TWO In arguing issue two counsel placed reliance on section 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004 as amended by the Trade Unions (amendment) Act, which introduced a new section 12 (4) into the provisions of the Act. And repealed the proviso to section 17. Section 17 of the extant Trade Unions Act provides: "Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall- (a) Make deduction from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered; and (b) Remit such deductions to the registered office of the trade union within a reasonable period or such period as may be prescribed from time to time by the Registrar." Section 12 (4) thereof of this amendment provides as follows: (4) "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member." Section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act Cap L.I LFN 2004 states: (3) "Upon the registration and recognition of any of the Trade Unions specified in part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, the employer shall- (a) Make deductions from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the Union for the purpose of paying contributions to the Trade Union so recognized; and (b) Pay any sum so deducted to the Union, But a worker may contract out of the system, in writing, and where he has done so, no deductions shall be made from his wages in respect of contributions mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section." It is the submission of counsel that the question to pronounce upon is the legal effect and implication of the provisions of law stated above. That is to discover the intention of the legislature regarding the provisions. In doing so where words used in a legislation or statute are clear and unambiguous the Court is bound to give the word so used their ordinary meaning without looking for aid elsewhere. The duty of the Court in this regard when faced with the construction or interpretation of the statute has been well defined and pontificated upon by our appellate Court in a multiple of decided authorities. And which we humbly commend to your Lordship as follows: In the Supreme Court decision A.G Federation v. A.G Lagos State (2013) 55 NSCQR 374 (Supra) Honorable Justice A.M. Mukhtar, GCON, CJN at pages 454- 455 stated: ‘‘The Court cannot bring into a statute extraneous matters that do not form part of the intention of the legislature, even when read together with other provisions in the statute in totality. It is a settled principle of interpretation that provisions in statutes must be given their simple and direct meaning, which construes and give the statute its legal meaning. In the process of doing so the intention of the legislature must be explored and taken into consideration, but this will not be to the extent of bringing into the provision a different complexion from what was intended by the legislature. In this wise the Court should confine itself to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used." In the case of Ajayi Fasakin Kayode v. Owolabi Ajibade Sunday ORS (2010) 9 WRN 156 at page 171 to 172 Honorable Justice Jummai Hannatu Sankey, CA, pronounced as follows: ‘‘lt is a fundamental rule for the interpretation of statutes that where the words used are clear and unambiguous, they should be construed as they are and given their plain and ordinary meaning, see Jammal Steel Structures Ltd.v. ACB. {1973} 1 All NLR {pt.2} 208; {1973} 11 S.C 77. It is not in such circumstances permissible to go beyond what the words themselves actually convey and to consider what other things they are capable of and could mean. This is because where the provision is unambiguous and clear they contain the intention of the law maker and no words inferred ... are required to discover the intention which have been fully expressed in the words used. This is literal rule and golden method of interpretation. I equally belong to the school of thought that holds firmly to the conviction that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be construed as they are and given their plain and ordinary meaning without reference to any external aids. Words should be ascribed their face value, as they are the best indices of the intention of the law maker. Where clearly expressed in a statute, words are the mirror through which we must look to discover the intent which has been fully expressed therein. It is only where there is doubt or ambiguity in words, that recourse would be had to other cannons of interpretation. See also A-G, Ogun State v. Aberuagba {2002} 2 WRN 52; {1985} 1 NWLR {pt.3} 395." Counsel also placed reliance on the cases of OJOKOLOBO V ALAMU (1987) 3 NWLR (377, CHIEF DR. FELIX AMADI V INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2013) 23 WRN 1, MALLAM ABUBAKAR V INEC (2012) 49 NSCQR (Part ii). Counsel while applying the principle of interpretation enunciated in the above cited cases, argued that the provision of section 17(a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T 14 LFN 2004 (as amended) by the Trade Unions amendment Act 2005, read together with section 5(3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act, which stipulate expressly and clearly the authorization of deduction from the salaries/wages of every eligible worker and the payment and/or the remittance of same to the registered office of the Trade Unions as a compulsory statutory requirement and which makes it automatic, without permitting or allowing for the discretion of the employer, counsel on the statutory provisions calls on this court to declare the Internal Memo of the Kaduna State Government as being meddlesome in intent and design, unwarranted and illegal in all the circumstances of its issuance and circulation. Counsel further argued that the language and the wordings used and employed by the lawmaker speaks the mind of the lawmaker which cannot be manipulated by the whims and caprice or machination of any employer because the words used in the statute are plain, clear and unambiguous. The clarity of the language of the provisions herein, demands the Court to apply the law as it is and give the provisions their ordinary and plain meaning and effect so as to avoid reading into the provisions meanings not intended by the lawmaker. It is argued by counsel that applying the principle of interpretation as espoused in the case of Mallam Abubakar Abubakar .vs. INEC (Supra), the question of interpretation as far as section 17 (a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act and section 5 (3) (a) and (b) are concerned become a non-issue as there is nothing to be interpreted or constructed in view of the clear, plain and unambiguous words used in the provisions and which convey clearly the intention of the lawmaker. The court is duty bound to accord the provisions their ordinary plain meanings. Further to the above counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Honorable Court where the mandatory provision of section 17 (a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 combined with section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act has been judicially pronounced upon and given effect to as being a mandatory provision which has not given room for any discretion by an employer. Hence in the case of Air Transports Services, Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN) vs. Nigeria Aviation Professional Association and 2 others (2009) 14 NLLR (part 39) 345 at page 369, the Court pronounced as follows: "Check- off dues are the statutorily permitted deductions under the Trade Unions Act, which in relation to Unions specified under the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, are compulsory, and do not rely on the pleasure of an employer" . The court also stated in this judgment that; ‘‘ No consent is needed before management or employer can deduct a worker's wages. It is wrong interpretation of section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act to say so. This is reinforced by Section 16A of the Trade Unions Act. The rule is that eligibility is the yardstick for recognition and deductibility of check-off dues for Trade Unions specified in part A of the Schedule to the Trade Unions Act. (Corporate Affairs Commission v. AUPCTRE (2004) 1 NLLR (pt. 1) and section 5, 16A and 24 of the Trade Unions Act, as amended, section 5 of the Labour Act. Referred to) (p. 369, para O-G Furthermore in the same case of Corporate Affairs Commission .v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations (2004) 1 N.L.L.R (part 1) 1 Honorable Justice B.A Adejumo President National Industrial Court (NIC) in the leading Judgment decided among others issues as follows: On whether recognition of a Trade Unions and deduction of check-off dues are compulsory and automatic, the Court stated that: "Regarding the workers Unions, which the respondent union is one the combined effect of section 24 (1) and (2) and section 16 (A) of Trade Unions Act as amended is that the law intends and stipulates for compulsory recognition and deduction of check-off dues in respect of workers who are eligible to be members of a union’’ (page 30 paras E-H page 31 paras B-D). The constitutionality of compulsory deduction of check-off dues has been settled as the court pronounced that: "Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees freedom of association and the Supreme Court in Osawe V Registrar of Trade Unions (1985) 1 NSCC (Vol. 16) upheld the constitutionality of compartmentalized Trade Unions regime in Nigeria. That each worker has the freedom and liberty to opt out of Trade Unionism cancels out whatever compulsion that can be said to exist and so would have rendered the Law unconstitutional. Compulsory recognition and automatic deduction of check-off dues as stipulated in section 24, 14 A of the Trade Unions Act as amended, and section 5 (3) of the Labour Act are therefore not unconstitutional (page 32 paras. O-E)" On the purport of section 16 A of the Trade Unions Act as amended and test for determining deductibility of check-off dues the Court decided that: "section 16 A obliges an employer to make deduction in respect of a worker who is eligible to be a member" and " Eligibility is the yardstick test or standard for deductibility and the employer has no choice in the matter" (page 31 para G-H). Finally the Court in its pronouncement on duty of employer to deduct check- off dues stated that: "The duty to deduct check-off dues is mandatory and no employer is permitted to choose whether or not to deduct". Counsel submitted that the duty imposed on an employer to deduct from the salaries of workers check-off or Union dues and pay or remit same to recognized Trade Unions in strict compliance with the provision of section 5(3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act has also been given judicial approval in the case of MIX AND BAKER FLOUR MILLS INDUSTRIES LTD V NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD BEVERAGE AND TOBACCO EMPLOYEES (NUFBTE) reported at page 467 of Digest of Judgment National Industrial Court (DJNIC) particularly at page 470. Counsel also refers the court to yet another case of this court in Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Governing Council of Kwara State polytechnic Ilorin & another (2003) 34 NLLR (pt. 101) 576 NIC at page 615 where His Lordship Honorable Justice O. A. Obaseki Oshaghae on this issue of check-off dues pronounced as follows: "By the combined effect of section 17 (a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act, check-off dues deducted from wages of every worker who is a member of any of the Trade Unions for the purpose of paying to the contributions to the Trade Unions so registered shall be remitted to the registered office of the Trade Unions within a reasonable period or such period as may be prescribed from time to time by the Registrar" Counsel submitted further in order to buttress the argument herein that considering the spirit and the letters of the law, it is not the business or function of an employer (the Kaduna State Government inclusive), to interfere with or dabble into Trade Unions matters, particularly when it relates to and concerns membership by workers and also that the employer cannot device any means to coerce the workers not a provision.to meet their statutory obligation to the union, he or she belongs to. This is much so in the light of the principle of voluntariness as entrenched and in the Trade Unions (amendment) Act 2005 which by this amendment has introduced a new section 12 (4) into the Trade Unions Act. ISSUE THREE In arguing this issue counsel contended that the use of the word ‘shall’ when used in a statute connote command and duty to obey and comply with such a provision. It is mandatory and admit no discretion or choice by way of its application, operation and compliance. To support this contention counsel relied on the cases of Corporate Ideal Insurance Ltd .vs. Ajaokuta Steel Company 2 ORS (2014) 57 NSCQSR (pt.1) 559 at599, ADESANOYE V ADEWOLE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.1000) 242. It is the contention of counsel that exhibit AA 7 is of no legal consequence as it was issued in breach of extant provisions of the law governing trade unions and labour Act. The directive is unenforceable ab initio and outright nullity. Counsel submitted that under the inherent powers of the court the claimants are entitled to consequential order. On this submission counsel relied on the case of DINGYADI V INEC (2010)44 NSCQR 301 at age 358, ILANO V IDAKWO (2003) 14 NSCQR 1011. Counsel urged the court to grant claimants consequential order in accordance with the reliefs sought before the court. In concluding argument counsel submitted that based on the facts presented before the court exhibit AA 7 is ultra vires the power and authority of the government of Kaduna state. Counsel urged the court to resolve all the question in the originating summons in favour of the claimants and grant the reliefs sought. THE DEFENDANTS WRITTEN SUBMISSION In response to the Originating Summons the Defendants jointly filed a 7 paragraph Counter Affidavit in opposition to the Claims and reliefs sought by the Claimants. A written address was also filed along with the counter-affidavit. Hadiza Shehu, Esq; Senior State Counsel Ministry of Justice of Kaduna State, who appeared for the defendants in his oral submission relied on all the depositions contained in the counter-affidavit and adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address a sole issue was distilled for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether it is lawful for check-off deductions to be made from the salaries of workers employed by the Kaduna State Government without their consent as provided by law? ARGUMENTS In arguing the sole issue for determination counsel contended that the entire suit bothers on the sanctity of the fundamental right to peaceful assembly and association as provided for, and guaranteed by section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides thus: 'Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests ... ' It is the submission of counsel that it is clear and unambiguous from the wordings of the above provision that much as every person has a right to freely assemble and associate, forming or belonging to a political party, trade union or other association is not automatic but based on the exercise of choice, hence the use of the word "may" in the provision. It is in recognition of the supremacy and sanctity of the above Constitutional provision that the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005, in section 12(4) thereof provides thus: 'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member' Furthermore, section 5 (4) of the Labour Act, Cap Ll, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 provides that: "No deductions shall be made from the wages and salaries of persons who are eligible members of any of the trade unions specified in part B of the Schedule to the Trade Union Act except the person concerned has accepted in writing to make voluntary contributions to the trade union'. According to counsel the combined effect of the above provisions is that an employee or worker must voluntarily accept in writing to be a member of a trade union and to make contributions to the trade union before deductions of any kind can be validly and legally made from his salaries and wages. Therefore automatic deductions from the wages of workers and expecting the workers to opt out later if they so choose is tantamount to "putting the cart before the horse" and it is against the spirit and intendment of the Constitution and therefore a gross violation of section 40. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the authorities cited and relied upon by the Claimants as same do not depict the true spirit and intendment of the Constitution. The question then is this - can these clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution and the above extant Labour Laws be said to have been complied with in the instant case? Counsel also submitted that it is not in dispute that the employees or workers of the Kaduna State Government are eligible and free to belong to any trade union of their choice, but being eligible does not translate to membership without the affected persons indicating in writing that they want to be union members. And check-off deductions and/or union dues are only made from the wages of workers who are members of the union and not from the wages of every worker under the employers’ employment. Counsel further argued that Section 17 (a) of the Trade Union Act which was cited and heavily relied upon by the Claimants is in support of our position. It provides thus: 'Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall- (a) make deduction from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered ... ; This presupposes that some workers might not be members of unions and therefore no deductions can be made from their wages. The only way to determine who is a member and who is not a member is for the workers to indicate their choices in writing. It is also submitted that in the instant case Kaduna State Government workers were hitherto automatically classified as union members and deductions made from their wages without affording them the opportunity to indicate whether they want to be union members or not. This practice is a gross violation of the right of the workers as enshrined in the Constitution and it is on realization of this breach of rights that the State Government while conducting its staff verification exercise provided a column for the workers to voluntarily indicate whether or not the belong to any trade union. Counsel submitted that many workers indicated their membership of unions and many others decline and no single worker has been victimized or threatened on account of that. The submission by the Claimants that workers were ask in the verification form to indicate union membership amount to threat of victimization or intimidation is imaginary, speculative and without any factual basis. Counsel urged the court to discountenance same. On the issue as to whether the directive of the Kaduna State Ministry of Finance for the stoppage of automatic check-off deductions from the wages of workers is null and void, it is submitted that the said directive is valid and properly issued. According to counsel, the submission by learned counsel for the Claimants that the action of the Kaduna State Government amounts to interference in union matters is erroneous and misconceived and should be discountenanced. The State Government is the employer of the workers and it is the body vested with power to effect check off deductions from their wages and conversely it is therefore vested with the power to stop the deduction of workers which is being done illegally. To the extent that deductions are carried out on the wages of workers who have not freely and voluntarily indicated their willingness to be members of any union, the said deductions are illegal and the employer concerned have the power to stop the illegal deductions. Counsel urged the court to find and so hold. Counsel also urged the court not to be swayed by the sentiments being expressed by the Claimants as they are the ones perpetrating illegality and not the other way round. The action of the state government does not amount to interference but meant to ensure that the right of peaceful assembly and association guaranteed by the Constitution is complied with. It is the contention of counsel that by provisions of Section 1 (1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution, the Constitution is supreme and if any other is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and in this case section 40 thereof, are sacrosanct and no law can take away this right. It is submitted that the provision of section 5 (3) (a) which provides for deductions from the wages of all "eligible" workers to be made ... is inconsistent with section 40 of the Constitution and therefore void. This is because making deductions from the wages of any worker without the free and voluntary consent of the said worker amounts to a violation of the right guaranteed by section 40 of the Constitution and therefore illegal. It is argued that by virtue of the constitutional and statutory provisions above on the right to freedom of association and section 5(4) of the Labour Act 2005 an employee has the freedom of belonging to any trade union and any act contrary to the provisions of the Law is a violation. Furthermore, before check-off deductions can be made from salaries consent which must be voluntary and in writing must be given by the concerned worker. Consequently, the claimants in this suit are trade unions specified under Part B of the Trade Union (amendment) Act and therefore consent is mandatory. According to counsel it is worthy of note that in all the provisions above the word "shall" is deliberately employed which makes it mandatory for consent to be sought. It has been held in a plethora of cases that the word "shall" is a word of command which is normally given a compulsory meaning when used in a statute, it is not permissive. It is mandatory and imports that a thing must be done. To support this contention counsel relied on the case of Adams v Umar (2009) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1133) 41, l09, paras G-H, where the Court of Appeal held that the word "shall" when used in a statutory provision imports that a thing must be done and when the negative phrase "shall not" is used, it implies that something must not be done. It is a form of command or a mandate. Furthermore, it is submitted that the rule with regards to affidavit evidence is that an affidavit must show facts and avoid matters of inference or conclusion which fall within the province of the court thus Section 115(2) of the Evidence Act provides; ‘‘An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion.’’ In the instant case, a careful examination of paragraphs 6(viii),(ix),(xii)(xxv) and (xxvi) of the Applicants affidavit together with all the annexures marked as Exh AA.2,Exh.AA.3,Exh AA.S,Exh M.12 and Exh.M 13 are not statement of facts but mere arguments and conclusions. Counsel urged the Court to find and hold that this contravening paragraphs have led a fatal blow to the Applicant claim and strike out the said paragraphs. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the case of Maduka v Ubah (201S) 11 NWLR (Pt.1470) p.22S.paras. c-d It is also argued that the consent of workers for check off dues to be deducted was not obtained and therefore the continuation of deductions amounted to coercion and a violation of their right to association. Counsel urged the court to find and hold so. In concluding his submission counsel submitted that the right of association guaranteed by the Constitution must be complied with ab initio by giving workers the opportunity to decide whether to belong to a union or not belong before deduction can be made from their wages. Counsel urged the court to resolve the issues for determination in favour of the defendants and to dismiss the claims and reliefs sought for by the claimants in their entirety as baseless and totally lacking in merit. CLAIMANTS REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO THE DEFENDANTS WRITTEN ADDRESS OF 9TH JULY 2018 AND FILED ON 10TH JULY 2018. In reply counsel submitted that the defendants’ submission on section 5(4) of the Labour Act, was incongruous with the law and misleading. It was an attempt to hoodwink the court on the main crux and thrust of the issues and questions placed before the court. Counsel then quoted in extensor the entire provisions of section 5 of the Labour Act. Counsel submitted that in line with principle of construction of statute, the provisions of the law must be read as a whole and holistically and not disjunctively in order to enable the court appreciate and comprehend the intendment of the lawmaker as contained in the particular provision of the subsection under consideration. Curiously, the defendant quoted only sub-section 4 of section 5 of the labour Act without more. Counsel submitted sub-section 4 of section 5 is not resting on its own but the provisions flows from and is contingent upon the other provisions under the main section 5, particularly sub-section (1) thereof which provide for an exception as stated copiously at the beginning of the subsection. Counsel submitted it is wrong to rely on subsection (4) alone. Counsel submitted an exception cannot be wished away or deliberately disregarded when considering other provisions of the section, particularly subsection (4), which the defendants placed heavy reliance upon. It is the contention of counsel that section 5(3) which deals with deduction of check-off dues does not make any requirement for consent in respect of workers who are eligible to be members of a trade union, neither is there any requirement that the eligible member of a union must voluntarily accept in writing to be a member of a Trade Union before making contribution to the trade union for check-off deductions to be made, and/nor is there any requirement for the acceptance in writing by the worker to be a member of a Trade Union. Counsel submitted that section 5(1) permits under the Labour Act the deduction of check-off dues expressly under subsection 5(3). Counsel also contended that section 5(1) of Trade Union Act, particularly section 17(a) & (b) thereof. This provision did not anticipate any consent of the worker. It is the submission of counsel by combine reading of section 5(1), (3) of Labour Act and the provisions of section 17(a) & (b) of the Trade Unions Act the law specifically and mandatorily permits deductions of check-off dues in particular as a peculiar deduction allowed by the law from wages of workers by the employer. Counsel also argued that section 5(3) of the Labour Act has provided option to opt out of check-off dues deduction, this clearly is a restatement of voluntariness and no worker is foreclosed from opting out. The section has also offered worker first right of refusal whether to belong or not to belong to a union. Therefore no worker or employee is under any compulsion to belong to a union or to pay check-off dues. It is also argued that section 5(3) refers to any Trade Unions Specified in Part A of the Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act. For the purpose of deduction permitted under this section. Whereas section 5(4) on which defendants placed heavy reliance refers to trade unions specified in part B of the schedule 3 of trade unions Act. This means subsection (4) is not applicable to deduction of check-off dues and is totally irrelevant. Counsel also referred to the title of each part A and B of schedule 3 of the Trade Unions Act whereas Part A of schedule 3 is subtitled and has a heading; ‘List of re-structured trade unions affiliated to the central Labour Organization’’, under this particular sub-heading, the claimants are listed as nos. 26, 27, ad 28 respectively however the Part B of the schedule 3 subtitled: ‘’The jurisdictional scope of each of the restructured trade unions’’ It is the contention of counsel that from the foregoing, there is no doubt that the deductions for check-off dues provided for under subsection 5 (3) of the Labour Act is different and separate from the deduction referred to under subsection 5 (4) of the Labour Act upon which the Defendants rest their argument, and simply refers to another head or type of deduction. In support of this position counsel placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Lamikoro Ojokoloba & Ors. V. Lapade Alamu & Ors (1987) 7 SC (part1) 124 at 144 or 1987 3 NWLR Part 61 pg 377 at pg 402 para. F-G thereof the Supreme Court stated therein in their decision as per Honourable Justice Obaseki JSc. As follows: "In the area of construction, the primary concern of the Courts is the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature or lawmakers. From this function, the court may not resile however ambiguous or difficult of application the words of the law or Act may be, the court is bound to place some meaning upon them. If the language is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, for in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. The word of a statute must not be overruled by the judges. There is the presumption against intending injustice or absurdity". It is the submission of counsel that based on the above decision of the Supreme Court the intendment of the lawmaker as contained and provided for in subsection 5 (3) and subsection 5 (4) of the Labour Act is very clear and not absurd and that the deductions provided for in each of the subsections should be interpreted to be different from each other as clearly indicated by the wordings of the two provisions, and specifications under PART A and PART B of Schedule 3 TUA CAP T14. According to counsel another strenuous argument being canvassed by the Defendants is that membership of trade union by a worker and payment of check-off dues by member of Trade Unions offend their fundamental right particularly Section 40 CFRN 1999 (as amended). Firstly Sir, the CAVEAT! EXIT WINDOW OPTION under Section 5 (3) (b) of the Labour Act answers this and debunks, and also negates, their argument in this regard. It is to be noted that right under section 40 of the Constitution as amended is absolute but restrictive, in view of the provisions of Section 45 (1) (a) and (b) thereof of the constitution which expressly provides for restriction on and derogation from some of the rights stated therein Section 40 inclusive. Section 45 (1) provides as follows: Nothing in Section 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society- (a) In the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or (b) For the purpose of protecting right and freedom of other persons Based on the above provision and since both the Trade Union Act in Section 12 and the Labour Act in Section 9 (6) (a) recognize the freedom of an employee to belong to a Trade Union, the two Acts are in conformity with Section 45 (1) particularly Subsection (b) thereof, of the 1999 Constitution. Therefore the restrictions placed on qualification to join a particular Union, are constitutional. Counsel referred to paragraph 8 of the FIRST SCHEDULE of the Trade Unions Act CAP T 14 on this. And commend to the court the decision of this Court in the case of Precision, Electrical & Related Equipment Senior Staff Association (PERESSA) .v. Senior Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSACGOC) and 2 0rs reported in (2009) 14 NLLR (pt. 39) page 306 at page 342 para F-G thereof where the full panel of the National Industrial Court Lagos Division held as follows: as per B. B. Kanyip , P. J "Even the fundamental human rights guaranteed in chapter iv of the 1999 Constitution are not absolute. Section 45 (1) (a) and (b) provides for derogation from these rights". On argument of the defendants that the deductions of check-off dues and membership of workers to Trade Unions without written consent of the worker offends Section 40 CFRN 1999 (as amended), goes to no issue. This argument is of no moment but rather spurious, misconceived and totally misplaced in law. This very argument has been subjected to judicial crucible, and pronounced upon by this Court to the effect that there is no breach whatsoever of Section 40 CFRN 1999 (as amended). 0n this counsel relied on the decision of the full panel of this court in the case of CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES (AUPCTRE) reported in (2004) 1 NLLR (part 1) pg 1 particularly at pg 32 paragraphs D-E thereof as per Honourable Justice B.A Adejumo, President of the Court wherein His Lordship stated as follows; - ‘‘Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees freedom of association and the Supreme Court in Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions (1985) 1 NSCC (Vol. 16) upheld the constitutionality of compartmentalized trade union regime in Nigeria. That each worker has the freedom and liberty to opt out of trade unionism cancels out whatever compulsion that can be said to exist and so would have rendered the law unconstitutional. Compulsory recognition and automatic deduction of check-off dues as stipulated in Section 24, 14A of the Trade unions Act as amended, and section 5 (3) of the Labour Act are therefore not unconstitutional. Also at page 30 paragraphs E-H, and page 31 paragraphs B-D of the decision the Court also stated as follows; Regarding the workers' unions, which the Respondent union is one, the combined effect of section 24 (1) and (2) and section 16 (A) of Trade Union Act as amended is that the law intends and stipulates for compulsory recognition and deduction of check-off dues in respect of workers who are eligible to be members of a union. Counsel further referred to another pertinent holding of the court at page 29 paragraph H, where it was stated: ‘‘Recognition of the trade unions by an employer is compulsory and automatic by the combined effect of Section 5 (7) and Section 24 (1) of the Trade Unions Act 1990 as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1999 and by section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 1990. Based on the above tacit pronouncement of the Court, the argument of the Defendants in this regard lacks any merit whatsoever and the Court is respectfully urged to so hold. Counsel also argued that Section 18 (4) of the Trade Unions Act CAP T14 LFN 2004 has further alluded to the fact that check- off dues is automatic. And at this juncture in addition to the earlier authorities cited by us in support of our argument, counsel referred to most recent decision of this court per Honourable Justice O.A OBASEKI OSAGHAE delivered on 14th June, 2018 in the case of National Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives and 2 Ors v. Lagos University Teaching Hospital Management Board and 4 Ors. In suit No NICN/LA/l05/2017- (unreported) Certified True Copy of Judgment attached incompliance with Order 45 Rule 3 (1) of the Rules of Court 2017. This most recent decision of this Honourable Court regarding the issue of deductions of check-off dues as provided for in Section 5 (3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act CAP Ll LFN 2004 and Section 17 TUA CAP T14 also confirms and gave judicial approval and nod to compulsory deductions of check-off dues as being mandatory by the employer and that it is automatic. Counsel quoted His Lordship decisions as follows; "Regarding the issue of deduction of check-off dues, section 5 (3) (a) & (b) of the Labour Act, CAP LI LFN 2004 provides: (3) Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, the employer shall- (c) Make deductions from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the union for the purpose of paying contributions to the Trade Union so recognized and; (d) Pay any sum so deducted to the Union. But a worker may contract out of the system, and in writing, and where he has done so, no deductions shall be made from his wages in respect of contributions mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section. Section 17 (a) and (b) of the Trade Union Act CAP TI LFN 2010 also makes an identical provision. The law therefore provides compulsory deduction by the employer from the wages of members of trade unions and remittance to the registered office of trade union within a reasonable period. The deduction from the salaries or wages of union members by the employer referred to as check-off dues is mandatory as can be seen by the use of the word "shall" in both legislations. The written consent of the worker who is a member of the trade union is not required by the employer to deduct check-off dues. The law is that registration is deemed, recognition is automatic, and deduction of check-off dues compulsory, based on mere eligibility to be a member of the union. See Nest oil Pic v NUPENG (2012) NLLR (pt.82) 90 at 155, CAC v AUPCTRE (2004}1 NLLR (pt.l) 1 Mix & Bake v NUFBTE (2004) 1 NLLR (pt.2) 247, Mgt of Tuyil Nig Ltd v NULFRIL & NMPE (2009) 14 NLLR (pt. 37) 109. It must be emphasized that it is the payment of check-off dues that entitles the worker to the rights and privileges of membership of a trade union. COURT’S DECISION. I have carefully perused the originating summons and all the accompanying processes accompanying the originating summons as well as the counter-affidavit, further and better affidavit and the addresses of counsel for both sides. I have also attentively listened to oral submissions of counsel in adumbration of their respective position before the court. Before proceeding to determine the questions submitted for determination, I consider it necessary to first of all comment on exhibit AA 7. The exhibit is an internal memo dated 23rd January 2018 and signed by one Lucius T. Bossan, Director Treasury Operations, Ministry of Finance, Kaduna State. The claimants vide exhibit AA 11, a letter dated 27th March 2018 requested for a certified true copy of exhibits AA7. The claimants averred in paragraph 6 (xviii) of the affidavit in support of the originating summons that all effort to secure certified true copy of exhibit AA7 proved abortive. The claimants vide notice to produce dated 10th July 2018 and filed on the same day, requested the claimants to produce the certified true copy of exhibit AA 7. However, the defendants never honoured the notice to produce. Consequently, vide motion on notice dated 10th July 2018 and filed on the same day, the claimant sought for an order directing the 3rd and 4th defendants to release for the use of the court, certified true copy of the internal memo of 23rd January 2018, exhibit AA7. The motion was argued on 7th day of November 2018. In the absence of objection by the counsel for the defendants who participated in the proceeding of the court, the application was granted as prayed. The defendants were given 7 days within which to make available the certified the copy of exhibit AA 7. However, the defendants failed and neglected to comply with the explicit order of the court regarding the production of certified true copy of exhibit AA7. The claimants demand for the certified true copy of exhibit AA 7, was because the said document is a public document which require the tendering of original or certified true copy. Furthermore, the said document is in the possession and custody of the defendants. It is disheartening to note that the defendants frustrated all efforts made to have the said document certified by the appropriate public officer in the custody of the document. The defendants did not also obey the court order of 7th November 2018 directing them to make available the certified true copy of exhibit AA 7. With the recalcitrant attitude exhibited by the defendants on refusing to make certified true copy of exhibit AA 7, this court has been left with no option that to resort to the provisions of section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 in giving exhibit AA 7 evidential value notwithstanding its state of being a photocopy. I take solence in taking this position by the fact that the defendants have not denied issuing the said document or raise objection to authenticity of exhibit AA 7. Another issue to be trashed out at this stage is the objection raised by the defendants in their written address to paragraph 6 (xviii), (ix), (xii), (xxv) and xxvi) of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, together with the annexures marked as exhibitsAA2, AA3, AA5, AA12 and AA13. The ground for the objection is that they are not statement of facts but mere arguments and conclusions. Counsel urged the court to strike out the offending paragraph of the affidavit. I have perused the contents of the affidavit being objected to. A careful perusal of paragraph 6 (viii) and (ix) will show that the sub-paragraphs are not conclusions as being alleged. Rather they are meant to tender newspaper publications. On paragraph 6 (xii), (xxv) and (xxvi) it is manifestly clear that they contain argument and conclusions they offend section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act and accordingly they are hereby discountenanced. Coming to the main issues raised by the Originating Summons, I shall consider together the three issues formulated by the claimants for determination, as they are all related and interwoven. The position taken by the claimant was predicated on exhibit AA 7, which is an internal memo conveying the decision of Government of Kaduna State directing the stoppage of deductions of check-off dues from the salaries of workers under the employment of Kaduna State Government. The claimant brought this action seeking for the interpretation of exhibits AA 7 vis-à-vis the provisions of section 5(3) (a) and (b) of Labour Act as well as section 17 of the Trade Unions Act which deals with deductions of check-off dues. It is the case of the claimants that exhibit AA 7 is null and void as it has no support in law. The reason being that issue of deduction of check-off dues is not an item within the legislative competence of state to have allowed the state government to have dabbled into by making regulations. The issue being covered by item 34 of the exclusive legislative list of 3rd schedule Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). The defendants on their part claimed that exhibit AA 7 was validly issued as it was meant to ensure compliance with the law that allowed workers to voluntarily join trade union of their choice. According to defendants workers must authorize deduction of check-off dues before an employer can deduct and remit to the union the deducted dues. There is no disputing the fact that labour and employment matters are within the exclusive legislative list as item 34 in the 3rd schedule Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). This goes to show that regulation of Labour and Employment matters can only be regulated by the Federal Government and not the State government. If there is need for any legislation on areas covered by item 34 of the exclusive legislative list must be by the National Assembly who have been constitutionally conferred with requisite power to do so. Consequently, any attempt by a state government to interfere dabble into the affairs which it had no power over must be resisted. From the facts as disclosed in the affidavit of the parties the area of divergence of opinion is in the way in which the parties consider the law governing deduction and remittance of check-off dues. The questions posed in the originating summons under consideration calls for interpretation of the provisions of section 5(3) of the Labour Act, section 17 of the Trade Dispute Act and the provisions of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). For proper appreciation, it is appropriate at this juncture to reproduce the relevant provisions of the constitution and statute that deals with the subject matter of dispute. Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) read ‘'Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests ... ‘’ Section 5. Deductions (including deductions for overpayment of wages) (3) Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in Part A of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act, the employer shall— [1986 No. 17. Cap. T14.] (a) make deductions from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the union for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so recognised; and (b) pay any sum so deducted to the union, but a worker may contract out of the system, in writing, and where he has done so, no deductions shall be made from his wages in respect of contributions mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section. (4) No deductions shall be made from the wages and salaries of persons who are eligible members of any of the trade unions specified in Part B of Schedule 3 of the Trade Unions Act except if the person concerned has accepted, in writing, to make voluntary contributions to the trade union. (5) ………………………….. (6) An employer shall, when making a payment to a trade union under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section, include with such payment a list of the employees from whom deductions were made pursuant to paragraph (c) of the said subsection. Section 17 of the Trade Union (amendment) Act, 1999, provides: Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in in the third schedule of this Act, the employer shall; (a) make deductions from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the union for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union; and (b) Pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union. It is in recognition of the supremacy and sanctity of the above Constitutional provision that the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005, in section 12(4) thereof provides thus: 'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member' Furthermore, section 5 (4) of the Labour Act, Cap Ll, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 provides that: "No deductions shall be made from the wages and salaries of persons who are eligible members of any of the trade unions specified in part B of the Schedule to the Trade Union Act except the person concerned has accepted in writing to make voluntary contributions to the trade union'. According to counsel for the defendants the combined effect of the above provisions is that an employee or worker must voluntarily accept in writing to be a member of a trade union and to make contributions to the trade union before deductions of any kind can be validly and legally made from his salaries and wages. Therefore automatic deductions from the wages of workers and expecting the workers to opt out later if they so choose is tantamount to "putting the cart before the horse" and it is against the spirit and intendment of the Constitution and therefore a gross violation of section 40. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the authorities cited and relied upon by the Claimants as same do not depict the true spirit and intendment of the Constitution. The question then is this - can these clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution and the above extant Labour Laws be said to have been complied with in the instant case? Counsel also submitted that it is not in dispute that the employees or workers of the Kaduna State Government are eligible and free to belong to any trade union of their choice, but being eligible does not translate to membership without the affected persons indicating in writing that they want to be union members. And check-off deductions and/or union dues are only made from the wages of workers who are members of the union and not from the wages of every worker under the employers’ employment. Counsel further argued that Section 17 (a) of the Trade Union Act which was cited and heavily relied upon by the Claimants is in support of the defendants’ position. It provides thus: 'Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall- (a) make deduction from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered ... ; This presupposes that some workers might not be members of unions and therefore no deductions can be made from their wages. The only way to determine who is a member and who is not a member is for the workers to indicate their choices in writing. It is also submitted that in the instant case Kaduna State Government workers were hitherto automatically classified as union members and deductions made from their wages without affording them the opportunity to indicate whether they want to be union members or not. This practice is a gross violation of the right of the workers as enshrined in the Constitution and it is on realization of this breach of rights that the State Government while conducting its staff verification exercise provided a column for the workers to voluntarily indicate whether or not the belong to any trade union. Counsel submitted that many workers indicated their membership of unions and many others decline and no single worker has been victimized or threatened on account of that. The submission by the Claimants that workers were ask in the verification form to indicate union membership amount to threat of victimization or intimidation is imaginary, speculative and without any factual basis. Counsel urged the court to discountenance same. The parties in this suit relied on the above provisions of the constitution and the provisions of the Labour Act and those of Trade Unions Act to support their respective position. What this means is that each party is arguing his position based on the interpretation which accorded to the provisions of the Constitution and the statutory provisions being relied upon. However, it must be pointed out here that one of the cardinal principles of canon of interpretation of statute is that the duty of a judge is to interpret and not to make law. In the interpretation process, the judge should be liberal and give the natural meaning of the provisions of the statute where the words are clear and unambiguous. The proper approach is to follows them, in their simple, grammatical and ordinary meaning. This means the duty of court is to interpret words in a statute or constitution in their ordinary meaning and literal meaning. Certainly, it is not the duty of court to go outside the words used and import an interpretation which may be or is convenient to it or the parties or one of the parties. See DAPIALONG & ORS V DARIYE & ANOR. (2007) ALL FWLR (PT.373) 81, FAWEHINMI V IGP (2002) FWLR (PT.108) 1355, GAFAR V THE GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2007) ALL FWLR (PT.360) 1415. Another important and well settled principle of interpretation is that court in interpreting the provisions of a statute or constitution, must read together related provisions of the constitution or statute in order to discover the meaning of the provisions. The court ought to not to interpret related provisions of a statute or constitution in isolation and then destroy in the process the true meaning and effect of particular provisions. See AMAECHI V INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227. In interpreting provisions of a statute or constitution, provisions should not be interpreted in isolation but rather in the context of the constitution or statute as a whole. The whole statute must be read in determining the meaning and effect of words being interpreted. But where the words are plain and unambiguous no interpretation is required, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. In interpreting statute court are enjoined to give the interpretation a global view or what is termed as ‘broad interpretation’. See BUHARI V OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (pt.941) 1, ADESANYA V THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLICOF NIGERIA & ANOR (1981) 5 SC 112. In UDOH V O. H. M. B. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.142 52 @ 68, Oguntade, JCA (as he then was) has this to say on interpretation: ‘’where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words or by rejecting them altogether on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify and that manifestations made are mere correction of careless language and really give the true meaning. P 68 paras D-E. Continuing on interpretation, His lordship stated further:- ‘‘It must however be stated that the primary duty of court is to is to interpret and not make laws. It is therefore only in rare and exceptional cases that the modification of the language of statute to meet the intention of lawmaker can be resorted to.’’ 68 G It is in line with the well settled principles of interpretation that the provisions under consideration would be viewed. The claimants in this suit have insisted that the defendants in this suit who are the employers of their members have no right whatsoever to order stoppage of deductions of check-off dues as contained in exhibit AA 7. According to claimants deductions of check-off dues is automatic and compulsory by virtue of the provisions of section 5(3) (a) & (b) of the Labour Act. And the provisions of section 17(a) & (b) of the Trade Unions Act. The defendants on their part are contending that the automatic deductions of check-off dues without authorization of workers in writing consenting to the deduction negate the freedom of association as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and section 40 thereof. The defendants placed reliance on the provisions of section 5(4) of the Labour Act and section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act to derive home their position and insist on validity of exhibit AA 7. The position of this court regarding the right of workers to form or join a trade union is that it is a guaranteed right under section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). In the same vein section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act has made the right to belong to a trade union voluntary. Thus, it provides that ‘’an employee shall not be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member’’..’’ It is equally necessary to refer to section 5(3) of the Labour Act which allowed workers to whom labour Act applies to the right to freely opt out of a trade union in writing. However, it must be borne in mind that the right to associate or belong to a trade union is not an absolute right under the constitution. It is a right that is restrictive. See section 45(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Apply the provisions of the Constitution as amended in section 45(1), it is the view of this Court that the requirement of deduction of check-off dues from the workers’ salaries for remittance to trade union cannot be said to be in violation of the Constitution. The reason being that the workers are imbued with right of choice they can decide to opt out of the check-off dues without let or hindrance. Therefore there is no conflict between the provisions of section 40 of the Constitution and the provisions of Labour and Trade Unions Act. Generally the freedom to organize or associate include an equal a negative right at that freedom not to organize or disassociate. Thus, in the case of CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATION, CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICE EMPLOYEE (2004) 1 NLLR (PT.1) 32, this court held that ‘the freedom to associate under section 40 of the constitution certainly, includes freedom to disassociate or not to associate. In order to ascertain the exact purport of section 12(4) of the Trade Dispute (Amendment) Act 2005, the entire section needs to be examined and construed. This court has the opportunity of construing the provision of section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act. The court after adopted the global approach method in construing the said provision in the case of NUSDE V SEWUN (2013) 35 N.L.L.R. PT.106 606 @ 649, has this to say; ‘‘The problem with argument of the appellant is that it is citing section 12(4) out of context. The provision must be understood within the context of the whole section, which is that it is a provision given under the context of ‘‘membership of trade union not to be restricted on discriminatory grounds’’. It is not a provision that has given an unfettered freedom to workers. In stating that ‘‘membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member’’ section 12(4) merely restate what is already the law. Section 9 (6) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act, Cap LI LFN, 2004, provides that – No contract shall- (a) Make it a condition of employment that a worker shall or shall not join a trade union or shall or shall not relinquish membership of a trade union; or (b) Cause the dismissal of, or otherwise prejudice, a worker- (i) By reason of trade union membership or (ii) Because of trade union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours; or (iii) By reason of the fact that he has lost or been deprived of membership of a trade union or has refused or been unable to become, or for any other reason is not, a member of a trade union’’. The position of the law on voluntarism prior to the 2005 amendment was that membership of a trade union was voluntary, incorporating as it were the right to associate or disassociate as the case may be. For junior staff, the rule was that membership was deemed with right to ‘‘opt out’’, while for senior staff they were not deemed to be members and so had to voluntarily ‘‘opt in’’. In other words junior staff could only ‘‘contract out’’ of trade union membership, while senior staff could only ‘‘opt into’’. In line with principles of interpretation the provision of section 12(4) of the Trade Dispute (amendment) Act 2005, has to be construed along with the provisions of section 40 and 45 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). A combine reading of these constitutional and statutory provisions will clearly revealed that the freedom to associate or belong to a trade union is not an absolute right, it is a qualified right that has to be based for protection of workers interest. See SEA TRUCKS (NIG.) LTD V PYNE (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt.607) 514, where it was held that the phrase for protection of interest does not give a citizen unrestricted freedom to join any trade union as a person proposing to join a trade union must show it protects his interest. See also the case of PERESSA V SSACGOC (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (pt.39) 306, where it was held that trade union Amendment Act 2005 did not repeal, or amend or substitute any of the provisions of the Third Schedule Parts A, B, C of the Trade Dispute Act 2004. The law on voluntarism prior to 2005, remain the law as at today nothing has changed. The right of a worker to decide which union to belong to is not absolute it must be exercised within the limit of the Trade Union Act. The right can only be exercised in respect of unions empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope as contained in the Third Schedule to Trade Union Act. It is clear from the foregoing that a worker cannot use the provision of section 12(4) to contract out of his union to which he is jurisdictionally bound. What is now clear is that all junior staff are deemed to be members of trade unions within their jurisdictional scope as enunciated in the Third Schedule to Trade Union Act. This means that an employer is duty bound to deduct check-off dues from all deemed members and eligible members of trade unions to the benefit of the unions without authorization to do such in writing. It is only senior staff that are not deemed members’ that need to give their written authorization. For the deemed members of trade union, if they wish to opt out or contract out and stop deduction of their check-off dues, they have to do that by notify their employer in writing of such opting out. See BEMIL V NATOONAL UNION OF HOTELS (2009) 16 N.L.L.R. (pt.43) 135, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AUPCTRE (supra), TUYIL NIG, LTD (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (pt.37) 127. It is trite law that an employer is under an obligation to automatically give recognition to all registered unions and compulsorily deduct check-off dues and remit to the unions concerned. The current position of the labour law in Nigeria is that an employer must recognize all registered trade union automatically without prompting, an employer is as well duty bound to compulsorily deduct check –off dues from all deemed employees for the benefit of the trade unions unionizing the employer’s employees. The only exception is in respect of senior staff who have to opt in and authorize deduction in writing. The argument of counsel for the defendants that the claimants have failed to establish that its members in the employment of the defendants have authorized or permitted deduction of check-off dues is a clear misconception of the law. Any employee that do not want to be members of the claimants can opt out. See CAC V AUPTRE 2004 1 N.L.L.R. PT.1 1, MIX & BAKE V NUFBTE 2004 1 N.L.L.R. PT.2 247, TIB V NUBIFIE 2008 10 N.L.L.R. PT.27 322 AND NESTOIL V NUPENG 2012 29 N.L.L.R 90. The law is that registration is deemed, recognition automatic and deduction of check-off dues compulsory, being based on mere eligibility to be a member of the union in question. This means that an employer does not have right to stop deduction of check-off dues on the ground that there is written authorization from staff for such deduction. In other words an employer has no right to order stoppage of deduction and remittance of check-off dues to trade unions unionizing the employees of the employer. Any stoppage of deduction by employer unilaterally will be in violation of the extant provision of the law. See UDOH V O. M. H. B. (supra) The counsel for the claimants maintained that the provisions of section 5(3) of the Labour Act and that section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, have made imposed a duty on the defendants to promptly deduct check-off dues from members of the claimants and remit same to claimants’ failure to do so violate the extant provisions of the law. The provisions of section 5(3) (b) of the Labour Act and section 17(d) are very clear and unambiguous they say what they say. The provisions are plain and unambiguous they should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. The two sections have imposed a duty on employer to deduct check-off due from the salary of an employee for the benefit of the trade union concerned. The obligation is mandatory it allows for no discretion. However, the defendants are of the view that the combine effect of section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act and section 5(4) of the Labour Act have derogated on the issue of automatic compulsory deductions of check-off due. According to counsel these provisions have made it clear that there must be consent of workers before deductions can be made which has to be in writing. Based on this the counsel insist that exhibit AA 7, was validly made and issued. By paragraph 5(f) of the counter-affidavit of the defendants it was averred that the said automatic deductions were stopped by the state government in order to correct the anomaly by giving each employee the opportunity to exercise their freedom of choice with regards to membership of the unions at page 17 of the their written address the defendants have argued that many workers indicated membership of unions and many others decline and no single worker had been victimized on account of that. Despite this submission counsel went to on to argue that the directive of the Kaduna State Ministry of Finance for the stoppage of automatic check-off deductions from wages of workers, the said directive is valid and properly issued. If defendants can clearly argue that there are many workers who have indicated membership of unions and still goes to argue on validity of directive to stop deduction of check-off dues, what is the justification of the stoppage? It would have been different if the directive is in respect of non-eligible workers or non-members that would have made the directive sensible. The counsel for the defendant has also argued that the practice of deducting check-off dues is a gross violation of the right of workers as enshrined in the constitution. If this is the case then should it be the state government that will fight for the workers when it is not their union who has the locus to provide legal representation for the claimants. There was also nowhere it was shown that the workers have lodged or complained to the government about the illegality of the deduction of check-off dues. In view of the foregoing, the directive as contained in exhibit AA 7, has no legal basis or justification in law it is hereby declared null and void for being in violation of extant laws on deduction of check-off dues. It appears from the provisions of section 5 (3) & (4) of the Labour Act that there seems to be confusion and contradiction when in subsection (3) the legislature use Part A which refers to restructured Trade Unions. While subsection (4) of section 5 of Labour Act refers to Part B which refers to jurisdictional scope of trade unions this created absurdity and becloud the intention of legislature. In the circumstance the most and appropriate interpretation to be accorded to these two subsection for harmonious and purposeful construction is the views of this court to the effect that deduction of check-off dues is compulsory and automatic. However, a worker can opt out if he so wishes. All eligible members’ i.e junior staff must be deemed to be members of trade unions within the jurisdictional scope. While senior staff have the right to opt in and give their written consent for deduction of check off dues. This position find support in the Court of Appeal decision in the case of UDOH V O. M. H. B. (supra), where it was held that an employer must deduct check off dues from the wages of a worker and pay to the trade unions concerned. It was further held that an employer is not concerned with whether or not a worker is actually a member of the trade union concerned before deducting check off dues from his wages. All that the employer has to determine is whether or not the worker in question is eligible for membership of trade union which the employer has recognized. A worker may however if he wishes to contract out of check-off system the reason being that deduction is not in law based on membership of trade union but on eligibility for such membership. The decision in the case of UDOH (supra) has knocked off from the bottom the argument of the defendants that there must be consent in writing of workers before deduction of check-off dues can be effected. The decision has also settled the criteria for deduction which is eligibility and not membership. From the above exposition of the law exhibit AA 7, was issued in violation of the law and cannot stand to deprive the claimants the proceeds of deductions from check-off dues as there was no law that authorized the defendants to order or direct stoppage of deductions of check-off dues. In view of the foregoing, the claimants claims succeeds and is hereby granted. For avoidance of doubt the orders of the court are:- A declaration is hereby grated to the effect that deductions of check-off dues from salaries of eligible workers of Kaduna state Government are mandatory statutorily permitted deductions. A declaration is hereby grated nullifying exhibit AA 7 in its entirety for being invalid, unlawful, illegal and wrongful for being in breach of statutory provisions authorising deductions of check-off dues, from the wages of eligible workers. Judgment is entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge.