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RULING. Vide notice of preliminary objection dated 7th day of August 2017 and filed on the 8th day of August 2017, the Judgment Debtors/Applicants challenged the competency and jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain and/or continue with the hearing of the Garnishee proceedings instituted by the Judgement Creditors/Respondents before this Court. The Judgment Debtors/Applicants are by this preliminary objection seeking for:- 1. An order voiding the order nisi and nullifying the entire proceedings. 2. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The ground upon which this objection was raised is that the Judgment Creditors/Respondents’ non-compliance with sine quo non to commence and proceed with this action as per the provisions of section 83 and 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap. S6 and Order 51(3) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. In compliance with rules of this Court the objectors filed a written address along with the notice of preliminary objection wherein they submitted lone issue for determination to wit: ‘‘Whether having due regard to the material facts of the case the Honourable Court is seized with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and conclude the Garnishee proceedings before it’’. E. S. Wambai, Esq; Counsel for the Judgment Debtors/Applicants started his submission by contending that as a general rule the relevant parties to Garnishee Proceedings who have right of audience are the Judgment Creditor and Garnishee, however, there is exception to the General Rule, that is in a situation where the issue of jurisdiction of Court is in issue. Counsel submitted that in the case of NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE V ABILEOWO INVESTMENT LTD & ANR. (2014) 10 WRN 99 @ 108, the Court of Appeal held that a judgment Debtor has the jurisdiction to raise a preliminary objection in the proceedings to make absolute garnishee order nisi. On the sole issue for determination Counsel submitted that the answer is in the negative. While placing reliance on the cases of MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR and AG LAGOS STATE V DOSUNMU (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 552, Counsel submitted that condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled. Counsel submitted that there is none service of order nisi on the Judgment Debtors/Applicants as required by law. Counsel contended noncompliance with service of order nisi on Judgment Debtors/Applicants has rendered any further hearing incompetent and an exercise in futility. Counsel referred to section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and submitted that 14 days prior to the hearing for order absolute the order nisi must first have been served on both the Garnishee and the Judgment Debtors/Applicants. Counsel submitted that the use of the word ‘shall’ in section 83(2) has made compliance mandatory and obligatory without allowance for discretion. On this submission Counsel relied on AGBITI V NIGERIAN NAVY (2011) 13 WRN 1, (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1236). Counsel submitted though the Garnishee has been served the Judgment Debtors till time of filing the application has not been served. It is the contention of Counsel that the requirement of 14 days is sine quo non to the further hearing of the Garnishee proceedings for purposes of making order absolute. Counsel continued with his submission that the cardinal principle of law is ex nihilo nihi fit i.e you cannot put anything on nothing and expect it to stand. Counsel referred to WEMA BANK PLC V BRASTERM STERR NIGERIA LTD (2010) LPELR- and submitted that failure to serve the order nisi where service is mandatory before order absolute was made is a fundamental omission. Counsel submitted that the second reason why this proceedings cannot continue or be concluded is the non-compliance with sine quo non for its commencement. Counsel contended where money is under the custody of public officer an order nisi shall not be made under section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, unless consent for such attachment is sought and obtained from the appropriate officer that is the Federal or State Attorney General as the case may be. Counsel submitted in the light of the extant law i.e sections 83 and 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act coupled with the judicial precedent, the originating processes commencing this action i.e ex-parte motion is ab initio most irregularly issued. Counsel contended the proceeding subsequent to the issue of the originating process and more particularly grant of order nisi was without jurisdiction and the order nisi incompetent. All that has transpired is a nullity. Counsel further submitted that the rules of this Court also require service of the order nisi on both Garnishee and Judgment Debtors, on this contention reliance was placed on Order 51 Sub-Rule (3), of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. Counsel submitted it is now too late for counsel to comply with this requirement of the law. According to Counsel the situation is incurably bad. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE JUDGMENT CREDITORS/RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In opposition to the Judgment Debtors/Applicants’ notice of Preliminary objection, the Judgment Creditors/Respondents filed a written address dated 18th day of August 2017. In the written address Counsel submitted two issues for determination. To wit: 1. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court is vested with requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter’’. 2. ‘‘Whether considering the circumstances of this case, failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation robs the Court of its jurisdiction’’. Arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that jurisdiction is a threshold issue which must at all times, first be dealt with so as not to render nullity the entire proceedings. On this submission Counsel relied on MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (Supra). It is the submission of Counsel that that the Garnishee was served on 8th August 2017 and hearing was slated for 28th August 2017, which is even more than 14 days window stipulated by section 83 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is the contention of Counsel that since the order nisi has not been heard or granted the preliminary objection of learned Counsel is premature and ill-conceived. Counsel urged the court to strike out the preliminary objection. It is the contention of Counsel that the provisions of section 83 is clear and unambiguous and should be given ordinary meaning. On this contention Counsel cited the cases of CBN V INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT.1462) 457. It is also the contention of the judgment Creditors/Respondents that they have complied with the provisions of the law. Counsel also urged the court to ignore the cases cited by the Judgment Debtors as misleading. On issue two, Counsel contended that by the provisions of section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and section 18 of the Interpretation Act as well as the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974, reference to public officer means natural person and does not accommodate artificial persons. Counsel submitted where statute mention specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. Thus, the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue. Counsel contended by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case according to Counsel the Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel cited CBN V NJAMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276, where it was held that CBN is not a public officer, it serve as financial adviser and banker of Federal Government. Counsel submitted money under the custody and control of CBN are not under public officer. Counsel therefore submitted consent of Attorney-General is not required in this case. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE V AG LAGOS STATE (2004) 9 NWLR (PT.897) 665. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. GARNISHEE’S NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION Vide notice of preliminary objection dated 11/8/17, filed on 14/8/17, the Garnishee prays this Honourable Court For:- 1. An order of this Honourable Court striking out the garnishee proceeding for lack of requisite jurisdiction. 2. An order setting aside the garnishee order nisi made by this Honourable Court on the 26th day of July 2017, same having been granted without the requisite consent of the Attorney General of the Federation. 3. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The grounds for the aforementioned reliefs are:- 1. This Honourable Curt lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear the suit as presently constituted this Court is only empowered to entertain matters that border on labour issues of employer, employee related matters and not issues that borders on recovery of money between the judgment debtors and the Garnishee. 2. Consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is a condition precedent before this Honourable Court can have the requisite jurisdiction to make an order of Garnishee order nisi. In support of the notice of preliminary objection, the garnishee filed a 5 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by one Lukman Tairu, a Litigation secretary in the law firm of D. B. Legal Consultants, Counsel for the Garnishee. In the affidavit in support it was averred that the garnishee order nisi attached as exhibit CBN 01, was made on 26/7/17, without the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation. It was also averred that condition precedent before instituting this matter was not complied with. It was stated that the garnishee proceeding as commenced by the judgment creditors was wrongly commenced in this court (National Industrial Court). The deponent further deposed that this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a garnishee proceeding between the judgment Creditors, Judgment Debtors and the Garnishee. That this Court has inherent powers to decline jurisdiction and strike out the garnishee proceeding and set aside the order nisi for having been made in error. In the written address filed in support of the notice of preliminary objection, three issues were submitted for determination. They are:- 1. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter as presently constituted. 2. ‘‘Whether the failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is vital to the commencement of this action’’. 3. ‘‘Whether this court is empowered to set aside its garnishee order nisi’’. M. P. Podos, Esq; Counsel for the Garnishee/Applicant relied on the affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection and adopted the written address filed along with the preliminary objection as his argument on the objection. In arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this proceedings. According to Counsel this court does not possess power and requisite jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel continued his submission that the fact that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain dispute between Judgment Creditor and Judgment Debtor does not mean the Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings which is a distinct separate action meant to secure payment of money judgment against the judgment Debtor. On this contention Counsel relied on STB LTD V CONTRACT RESOURCES (NIG.) LTD (2001) @ 4426 NWLR (Pt.708) 115 @ 123 and DENTON-WEST V MUOMA (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt.1083) 418. Counsel while relying on section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, contended that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction of entertain this matter. Counsel also relied on the case of CBN V KAKURI (2016) LPELR-41468 (CA). Counsel also submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is being governed by the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and judgment Enforcement Rules. Counsel contended that since section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act goes hand in hand with Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules garnishee proceedings are not within the purview or jurisdiction of this Court. Counsel referred to the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V OKEB NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS. (2014) LPELR-23162 (CA) and submitted that garnishee proceeding can only be initiated in a Court where the judgment Debtor can sue for the Debt. Continuing his submission Counsel submitted that the Court has to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the judgment Debtor against the garnishee in respect of the debt. Counsel also submitted that the judgment debtor cannot institute an action for recovery of its debt against the Garnishee in the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Counsel submitted in the circumstances the garnishee proceeding as presently constituted cannot be legally and validly maintained in this Honourable Court for lack jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the Garnishee, 1st and 2nd Judgment Debtors/Applicants being agencies of Federal Government this Court does not have the inherent jurisdiction to entertain any matter as it relates to debt between them. Counsel also cited MADUKOLO V NKENDLIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. In concluding argument on this issue counsel submitted that from the express provisions of the Constitution and above cited authorities, it is clear that a Garnishee proceeding can only be initiated in a Court where the judgment Debtor can ordinarily sue the Garnishee for recovery of his debt and the Court where an action of this nature can be instituted against the Garnishee. On issue two, Counsel submitted that failure of the judgment Creditor to seek and obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is vital to the commencement of this action and the suit is liable to be struck out on this basis. Counsel submitted that the suit before the Court being Garnishee proceeding is sui generis. Before it can be commenced all conditions precedent must be fulfilled and complied with. It is contended that the failure of the Judgment Creditors/Respondents to obtain consent affect adversely the power of this Court to continue to entertain this suit. Counsel submitted it is not in dispute that the Garnishee is a public officer within the ambit purview of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) particularly in the fifth schedule and afortiori a public officer. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 1 @ 36. It is the contention of Counsel that the Garnishee being a public officer before an action for recovery of debt can be commenced consent of the Attorney General of the Federation has to be sought and obtained. In support of this submission Counsel referred to section 84(1) & (3) (a) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is contended that since the Court order nisi was made without the consent of the Attorney General the failure to obtain consent of Attorney General of the Federation before applying for order nisi has rendered the order nisi null and void. Counsel also referred to CBN V KAKURI (supra) and submitted that Garnishee proceeding cannot be validly commenced without the consent of the relevant Attorney General to such attachment having been first sought and obtained. The consent of Attorney General is a condition precedent to competence of Garnishee proceedings and a valid exercise of jurisdiction to entertain it and issue relevant order. Counsel contended that due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent the order nisi is liable to be set aside. On issue three, Counsel submitted that this Court has requisite jurisdiction to set aside its order made in error without jurisdiction. On this submission Counsel relied on ALHAJI TAOFEEK ALAO V AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD (2000) LPELR-SC.14/1995(2), where it was held any Court of record has inherent powers to set aside its judgment or order which is a nullity. Counsel also while relying on UBA V MAJEED TAAN & ORS. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 368 @ 378, submitted that this Court has power to set aside its previous ruling, where it is a nullity made without jurisdiction, where it is obtained by deliberate concealment of facts or fraud or where it is obvious on the face of the record that the Court was misled. It is the submission of Counsel that apart from the power to set aside its previous decision, this court can also ex debito justitiae to have judgment or order set aside on application of an affected or aggrieved party or even suo moto by the Court itself. On this submission Counsel cited DINGYADI V INEC (NO. 1) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt.1224) 91. In concluding his submission Counsel contended that once a Court lacks jurisdiction, a party cannot use any statutory provision or common law principle to impose it because absence of jurisdiction is irreparable in law. Counsel relied on UMMANAH V OBONG VICTOR ATTAH. Counsel urged the Court to strike out the Garnishee proceedings with substantial cost. SUBMISSION IN OPPOSITION OF THE NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In opposition to the notice of preliminary objection, the Judgment Creditors filed a 7 paragraphs counter-affidavit sworn to by Iheasiaba Ethelbert Chinweoke, the 1st Judgment Creditor. In the counter-affidavit, the Judgments Creditors averred that the deposition in the affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection were false. They also averred that if the notice of preliminary objection is granted it will greatly inconvenience and deny them the fruit of their judgment. They also averred that it is in the interest of justice to refuse the notice of preliminary objection. Odeh Evans, Esq; Counsel for the judgment Creditors relied on the averment in the counter-affidavit and adopted the written address filed together with the counter-affidavit as his argument in opposition to the preliminary objection. In the written address Counsel distilled two issues for determination. To wit: 1. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court is vested with requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter’’. 2. ‘‘Whether considering the circumstances of this case, failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation robs the Court of its jurisdiction’’. On issue one, Counsel submitted that the cases of STB LTD V CONTRACT RESOURCES (NIG.) LTD (20091) 6 NWLR (PT708) 115 @ 123, DENTON-WEST V MOUMA (2008) 6 NWLR (PT.1083) 418, CBN V KAKURI (2016) LPELR-41468, AND CBN V OKEB NIGERIA LTD & ORS. (2004) LPELR-23162, cited by the Counsel for the Garnishee were not only misleading and frivolous but vexatious and illusory as none of these cases contend the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine matters relating to Garnishee proceedings. In reply to the submission of Counsel for the Garnishee on Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules Counsel contended that the use of the words ‘any court’ in the provisions of the Order means not only the High Court, Federal High Court, Magistrate Court but also include National Industrial Court. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of CBN V KAKURI (supra). Section 254C (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), provides:- ‘‘The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, or pertaining to any matter which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain’’. It is the submission of Counsel that for purpose of achieving the mandate, section 254F of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) enjoined the president of this Court to make rule for regulating the practice and procedure of the National Industrial Court. Thus, why the 2017 rules were made and Order 51 makes provision for Garnishee proceeding. Counsel submitted this Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel also submitted that garnishee proceeding being sui generis must be distinguished from substantive suit initiated against the Central Bank of Nigeria. Counsel submitted this Court can adjudicate on garnishee proceeding. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of CBN V CHIEF UBANA (2016) NGCA 59. On issue two, Counsel submitted that consent of Attorney General of the Federation is not required. According to Counsel in section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, it is only when the money is in the custody or control of public officer that consent is required. Counsel contended that section 318 has clearly stated persons under public service of the Federation and the garnishee is not in the public service. Counsel submitted section 318 was interpreted in the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974. Counsel submitted since the definition of public service persistently made reference to natural persons it cannot be said to accommodate artificial persons. Counsel also submitted that it is trite that where a statute mentions specific things or persons the intention is that those not mentioned are not included. Counsel insisted that the express reference to individuals throughout section 318 effectively excludes the inclusion of artificial persons with regard to the interpretation. Counsel contended that by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel cited CBN V NJAMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276, where it was held that CBN is not a public officer, it serve as financial adviser and banker of Federal Government. Counsel submitted money under the custody and control of CBN are not under public officer. Counsel submitted consent of Attorney-General is not required in this case. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE V AG LAGOS STATE (2004) 9 NWLR (PT.897) 665. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. GARNISHEE’S REPLY ON POINT OF LAW On issue one, Counsel submitted that for this Court to have jurisdiction to entertain this matter, it must be shown that the Judgment Debtors can sue the Garnishee at National Industrial Court to recover debt. On issue two, it is submitted that counsel for Judgment Creditors expended time on procedure during garnishee proceeding which is not the issue. While the issue in focus is consent of Attorney General of the Federation as condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction. COURT’S DECISION I have painstakingly examined the two notices of preliminary objections filed by the Judgment Debtors and the Garnishee as well as the affidavit and counter-affidavit filed in respect of the objection filed by the Garnishee. I have also thoroughly examined the written addresses of Counsel for the parties herein and the cases cited in support of their various positions. In my view the two applications under consideration can be determined on consideration of three issues for determination as follows:- 1. ‘‘Whether there is non service of order nisi on the Judgment Debtors’’. 2. ‘‘Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Garnishee proceedings’’. 3. ‘‘Whether lack of consent of the Attorney General of the Federation has vitiated the order nisi issued by this Court on 26th July 2017’’. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE The counsel for the Judgment Debtors/Applicants has submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to continue with the Garnishee proceeding before the Court in view of non-service of the order nisi on the Judgment Debtors/Applicants as required by the provisions of Section 83(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. The Judgment Creditors/Respondents on their part have submitted that the order nisi was served on the judgment Debtors/Applicants on 8th August 2017 before the date fixed for hearing of the Garnishee proceeding. Counsel on behalf of Judgment Creditors submitted that the Order nisi was duly served and provision of section 83(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act was duly complied with. It is to be noted that none of the parties to the Preliminary objection filed by the Judgment Debtors file any affidavit either in support or otherwise. The non-filing of affidavit by any of the parties to this object left the Court with the option of resorting to the record of the Court in resolution of the question for determination. I have perused the record of the Court it is clear without any doubt that the order nisi which the Judgment Debtors are claiming lack of service was dully served at the Headquarters of the Judgment Debtors on 8th day of August 2017. The copy of the order meant for endorsement and return by the bailiff of the Court after effecting service as contained in the record of the Court clearly shows that the order nisi was actually served on the Judgment Debtors at the Headquarters of the 1st Judgment/Debtor. In the circumstances and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary I have no reason to doubt the record of the Court. The objection of the Judgment Debtors on this leg of their preliminary objection fails and is hereby dismissed. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO The Counsel for the Garnishee has submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this Garnishee proceedings on the ground that the Judgment Debtor cannot sue the Garnishee before this Court for recovery of his debt and also that the Judgment debtors are Federal Government agencies only Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain action against them. Counsel relied on section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) in support of his position. Counsel continued his submission that the fact that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain dispute between Judgment Creditor and Judgment Debtor does not mean the Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings which distinct separate action meant to secure payment of money judgment against the judgment Debtor. Counsel while relying on section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, contended that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Counsel also submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is being governed by the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and judgment Enforcement Rules. Counsel contended that since section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, goes hand in hand with Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules garnishee proceedings are not within the purview or jurisdiction of this Court. Continuing his submission Counsel submitted that the Court has to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the judgment Debtor against the garnishee in respect of the debt. Counsel also submitted that since the judgment debtor cannot institute an action for recovery of its debt against the Garnishee in the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, in the circumstance the garnishee proceeding as presently constituted cannot be legally and validly maintained in this Honourable Court for lack jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the Garnishee, 1st and 2nd Judgment Debtors being agencies of Federal Government this Court does not have the inherent jurisdiction to entertain any matter as it relates to debt between them. In reply to the submission of Counsel for the Garnishee, on Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules, Counsel for the Judgment Creditors submitted that the use of the words ‘any court’ in the provisions of the Order means not only the High Court, Federal High Court, Magistrate Court, but also include National Industrial Court. Counsel also referred to Section 254C (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), which provides:- ‘‘The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, or pertaining to any matter which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain’’. It is the submission of Counsel that for purpose of achieving the mandate, section 254F of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) enjoined the president of this Court to make rule for regulating the practice and procedure of the National Industrial Court. Thus why the 2017 rules were made and Order 51 makes provision for Garnishee proceeding. Counsel submitted this Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel also submitted that garnishee proceeding being sui generis must be distinguished from substantive suit initiated against the Central Bank of Nigeria. Counsel submitted this Court can adjudicate on garnishee proceeding. As aptly asserted by the Apex Court of the Land, jurisdiction is only donated by the constitution and/or statute. See BELGORE V AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (pt.1355) 60, SAEED V YAKOWA (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1352) 124. Jurisdiction is life wire of a court as no court can entertain a matter where it lacks the jurisdiction. It is settled that the jurisdiction of courts in this country is derived from the constitution and statutes. No court is allowed to grant itself power to hear a matter. Therefore, every Court must ensure that it is well endowed with jurisdiction to hear a matter before embarking on the exercise else it would be wasting precious judicial time. See UTIH V ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) 166, MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (1962) 2 All NLR (Pt.ii) 5. It is also settled that Rules of procedure cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court. In CLEMENT & ANOR. V. IWANYANWU & ANOR. (1989) NWLR (Pt.107) 39, (1989) 4 SC Pt. ii, 89, Obaseki, J. S. C. (of blessed memory) has this to say:- ‘‘on the issue of jurisdiction, jurisdiction in the broad and substantive sense cannot be conferred by Rules of Court. Having regard to the Constitutional powers conferred on the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the President Court of Appeal, the Rules of Court they can lawfully makes are to regulate the practice and procedure in the Court and not to confer jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal cannot therefore have recourse to the Supreme Court Rules 1985 as source of jurisdiction to entertain the application. Unless the Court of Appeal incorporate by reference the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules’’. In the same decision: Oputa, J. S. C. (of blessed memory) also said:- ‘‘I think it is trite law that Rules of Court are Rules of procedure. They do not by themselves alone confer jurisdiction. They merely regulate the exercise of a jurisdiction conferred aliunde’’. It is patently clear beyond reproach that Rules of Court cannot confer jurisdiction, as such a rule regulates practice of the Court in the exercise of a derived power. Rules of practice and procedure confer procedural but not substantive jurisdiction on a Court. They are meant to ensure that affairs of Court are carried out in an orderly fashion. But, it must be obeyed strictly. ATANDA V AJANI (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.111) 511, G. M. O. N. & CO Ltd V AKPUTA (2010) 9 NWLR (PT.1200) 443, THE STATE V ONAGORUWA (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt.1) 1 @ 19. It is to be remembered that judgment of Court of law is certainly not an end onto itself, no matter the result. The purpose of litigation over any dispute is to secure for the aggrieved party the subject matter, object or thing in contention and obtain redress for the loss or injury caused by the opposing party in one form of judgment or the other. The result of securing judgment does not translate to anything until such judgment is obeyed and complied with by the party against whom the court order was made. Most a times, a successful party find it difficult to have the judgment given in his favour obeyed. Thus, why the Court exercise powers to enforce obedience to judgment through the powers conferred by Constitution, statutes and inherent powers of the court as preserved by section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). A part from the inherent powers of Court to enforce judgment and orders, the Constitution which is the fundamental law has also amply make provisions conferring power on Courts to enforce judgments and orders, which they made. By the provisions of Section 287 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), the decision of the Federal High Court, the National industrial Court, a High Court and all other Courts established by the Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by other Courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court and a High Court respectively. What emerges from the foregoing, is the fact that one attribute of a Court of law is its competence to enforce its judgments. However, other Courts, authorities, or persons, unless empowered by statutes or Constitution creating the particular Courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and orders of the Court. It should be remembered that the term ‘judicial powers of the Federation’’ include powers to enforce a decision or judgment or order given and when section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) vested the judicial powers of the Federation in the Court, it vested it with inherent power to enforce or execute its own judgment and orders. The intent and purpose of section 6 of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. This constitutional provision has clearly cloth this Court with requisite jurisdiction to enforce its own judgment or decision through any of the recognised methods of enforcement, including by way of Garnishee proceedings. It is in furtherance of the desire to enable this Court carry out its constitutional powers of enforcement of its own judgments and decisions that the president of the Court in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the provisions of section 254F of the constitution, as amended and section 36 of the National Industrial Court At 2006, made Order 51 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, to regulate Garnishee proceedings before the Court. It is clear from the foregoing, that the provisions of Sheriff and Civil Process Act as well as the provisions of Judgment Enforcement Rules were procedural in nature and are not capable of conferring Court with jurisdiction. They only laid down procedure to be followed to enforce judgment of Court by way of Garnishee proceedings. The submission to the effect that they are part of forms of enforcement of judgment was given credence by the Supreme Court decision in TUKUR V GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (pt35) 604. In view of the reasons given above this Court has requisite jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by way of Garnishee proceedings. Issue two has been resolved against the Garnishee. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE On issue three, Counsel for the Judgment Debtors has submitted that this proceedings cannot continue or be concluded due the non-compliance with sine quo non for its commencement. Counsel contended where money is under the custody of public officer an order nisi shall not be made under section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, unless consent for such attachment is sought and obtained from the appropriate officer that is the Federal or State Attorney General as the case may be. Counsel submitted in the light of the extant law i.e sections 83 and 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, coupled with the judicial precedent, the originating processes commencing this action i.e ex-parte motion is ab initio most irregularly issued. Counsel contended the proceeding subsequent to the issue of the originating process and more particularly grant of order nisi was without jurisdiction and the order nisi incompetent. Counsel for the Garnishee on his own part submitted that failure of the judgment Creditor to seek and obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation which is vital to the commencement of this action has rendered the suit liable to be struck out on this basis. Counsel submitted that the suit before the Court being Garnishee proceeding is sui generis. Before it can be commenced all conditions precedent must be fulfilled and complied with. It is contended that the failure of the Judgment Creditor to obtain consent affect adversely the power of this Court to continue to entertain this suit. Counsel insisted that the consent of Attorney General is a condition precedent to competence of Garnishee process and a valid exercise of jurisdiction to entertain it and issue relevant order. Counsel contended that due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent the order nisi is liable to be set aside. The Counsel for the Judgment Creditors in his submission contended that by the provisions of section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and section 18 of the Interpretation Act as well as the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974, reference to public officer means natural person and does not accommodate artificial persons. It is the contention of Counsel that where statute mention specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. Counsel contended that by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. It is patently clear from the affidavit evidence and the submissions of Counsel in this matter that the order nisi was issued pursuant to Section 83 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. The Judgment Debtors and Garnishee are contesting the validity of the order nisi on the ground that the funds to be attached by the order nisi is in the custody of a public officer in the circumstance, the order ought not to have been made under section 83. They insisted that the order ought not to have been made until the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is first sought and obtained pursuant to section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. However to the Judgment Creditors the funds to be attached are not under the control of a public officer (Garnishee). The issue of consent of Attorney General before execution judgment has its origin from the common law principle of Crown Immunity, the concept of ‘’Crown can do no wrong’’ Rex non protest peccae’’ I’e goods cannot be distressed by a sheriff or bailiff of the king. Goods of the king are privileged and being for public good ought to be privileged. Such goods ought to be free from distress because they are for public advantage and benefit of the whole society. The provision of section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act shares from the concept of ‘crown can do no wrong’. It is interesting to note that the provision of section 84 has attracted judicial pronouncement and diverse academic opinion. A quick survey of decided cases shows that the Courts in interpreting the section have given it a wider meaning to mean that no garnishee proceedings or order nisi can be validly made, save with the consent of the Attorney General, as long as the money belongs to the government. Some decisions have even held the view that wherever the money may be, so long as it is money of the Government, in other words, as long as the ownership is traced to a government, whether in bank, treasury or wherever, there is absolute immunity from Garnishee proceedings save with consent of Attorney General. The trend of the decisions of the Courts is to the effect that obtaining prior consent of the Attorney General under section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, is mandatory as they are necessary procedural safe guard needed by government to avoid embarrassment. The failure to fulfil the precondition/condition precedent of seeking and obtaining the consent of the Attorney General will rob Court of the requisite jurisdiction to enforce its judgment and rendered all proceeding already conducted nugatory. The Court of Appeal followed the trend in the following cases:- CBN V AMAO 2012 16 NWLR PT.1219 271, CBN V HYDRO AIR PTY 2014 16 NWLR PT.1434 482, CBN V JAMES EJIMBA OKEFE 2015 LPELR-24825, CBN V N. J. NWANYAWU ENT. 22745, OMENKA ODE V ATTORNEY GENERAL BENUE STATE& ORS 2011 LPELR -4774. It is to be noted that in a recent unreported decision in Appeal No. CA/L/710/2015 between ADEBAYO LATEEF SANUSI V UNITY BANK, CBN, delivered on 10th March 2017, the Court of Appeal followed the consistent position of the Court of Appeal that the consent of the Attorney General is a condition precedent before commencing a garnishee proceedings against CBN, even where the judgment debt as in that appeal was against a private commercial Bank. In line well cherished doctrine of stare decisis, I have no choice that to apply the decisions of the above mentioned Court of Appeal cases to the case at hand. It will therefore be in tandem with established case law that for any action to be commenced for enforcement of judgment or order of Court against the Central Bank of Nigeria through garnishee proceedings, the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation must first be sought and obtained before commencing the action. Failure obtain consent as required by the provisions of section 84(1) of the Sheriff and civil process will render nugatory the proceeding conducted before securing the consent. In view of this the present Garnishee proceeding is null and void for having been commenced without compliance with condition precedent laid down in section 84 (1) of the sheriff and Civil Process Act. This has divested the Court with requisite jurisdiction to continue with the garnishee proceedings. However, it must be pointed out here that this is a temporary setback, if the Judgment Creditor complied with the condition precedent he can still approach the Court for redress. In view of the foregoing, the garnishee proceedings is hereby struck out for non-compliance with condition precedent. Sanusi Kado, Judge. IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT ABUJA BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO 26TH DAY OF APRIL 2018 SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/219M/2017 IHESIABA E. CHINWEOKE & 20 ORS. AND NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE BOARD COMPTROLLER GENERAL CUSTOM G. B. MAKARFI AND CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA REPRESENTATION: RULING Vide notice of preliminary objection dated 7th day of August 2017 and filed on the 8th day of August 2017, the Judgment Debtors are contesting the competency and jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain and/or continue with the hearing of the Garnishee proceedings instituted by the Judgement Creditors before this Court. The Judgment Debtors are by this preliminary objection seeking for:- 3. An order voiding the order nisi and nullifying the entire proceedings. 4. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The ground upon which this objection was raised is that the Judgment Creditors/Respondents non-compliance with sine quo non to commence and proceed with as per the provisions of section 83 and 84 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap. S6 and Order 51(3) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. In compliance with rules of court the objectors filed a written address along with the notice of preliminary objection wherein they submitted lone issue for determination to wit: ‘‘Whether having due regard to the material facts of the case the Honourable Court is seized with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and conclude the Garnishee proceedings before it’’. E. S. Wambai, Esq; Counsel for the Judgment Debtors/Applicants started his submission by contending that as a general rule the relevant parties to Garnishee Proceedings who have right of audience are the Judgment Creditor and Garnishee, however, there is exception to the General Rule, that is in a situation where the issue of jurisdiction of Court is in issue. Counsel submitted that in the case of NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE V ABILEOWO INVESTMENT LTD & ANR. (2014) 10 WRN 99 @ 108, the Court of Appeal held that a judgment Debtor has the jurisdiction to raise a preliminary objection in the proceedings to make absolute garnishee order nisi. On the sole issue for determination Counsel submitted that the answer is in the negative. While placing reliance on the cases of MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR and AG LAGOS STATE V DOSUNMU (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 552, Counsel submitted that condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled. Counsel submitted that there is none service of order nisi on the Judgment Debtor as required by law. Counsel contended noncompliance with service of order nisi on Judgment Debtor has rendered any further hearing incompetent and an exercise in futility. Counsel referred to section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and submitted that 14 days prior to the hearing for order absolute the order nisi must first have been served on both the Garnishee and the Judgment Debtor. Counsel submitted the use of the word ‘shall’ in section 83(2) has made compliance mandatory and obligatory without allowance for discretion. On this submission Counsel relied on AGBITI V NIGERIAN NAVY (2011) 13 WRN 1, (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1236) and NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE (supra). Counsel submitted though the Garnishee has been served the Judgment Debtor till time of filing the application has not been served. It is the contention of Counsel that the requirement of 14 days is sine quo non to the further hearing of the Garnishee proceedings for purposes of making order absolute. Counsel continued with his submission that the cardinal principle of law is ex nihilo nihi fit i.e you cannot put anything on nothing and expect it to stand. Counsel referred to WEMA BANK PLC V BRASTERM STERR NIGERIA LTD (2010) LPELR- and submitted that failure to serve the order nisi where service is mandatory before order absolute was made is a fundamental omission. Counsel submitted that the second reason why this proceedings cannot continue or be concluded is the non-compliance with sine quo non for its commencement. Counsel contended where money is under the custody of public officer an order nisi shall not be made under section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, unless consent for such attachment is sought and obtained from the appropriate officer that is the Federal or State Attorney General as the case may be. Counsel submitted in the light of the extant law i.e sections 83 and 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act coupled with the judicial precedent, the originating processes commencing this action i.e ex-parte motion is ab initio most irregularly issued. Counsel contended the proceeding subsequent to the issue of the originating process and more particularly grant of order nisi was without jurisdiction and the order nisi incompetent. All that has transpired is a nullity. Counsel further submitted that the rules of this Court also require service of the order nisi on both Garnishee and Judgment Debtor Order 51 Sub-Rule (3). Counsel submitted it is now too late for counsel to comply with this requirement of the law. The situation is incurably bad. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE JUDGMENT CREDITORS/RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In opposition to the Judgment Debtors notice of Preliminary objection, the Judgment Creditors filed a written address dated 18th day of August 2017. In the written address Counsel submitted two issues for determination. To wit: 3. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court is vested with requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter’’. 4. ‘‘Whether considering the circumstances of this case, failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation robs the Court of its jurisdiction’’. Arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that jurisdiction is a threshold issue which must at all times, first be dealt with so as not to render nullity the entire proceedings. MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (Supra). Counsel submitted that the Garnishee was served on 8th August 2017 and hearing was slated for 28th August 2017, which is even more than 14 days window stipulated by section 83 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act. It is the contention of Counsel that since the order nisi has not been heard or granted the preliminary objection of learned Counsel is premature and ill-conceived. Counsel urged the court to strike out the preliminary objection. Counsel submitted the provisions of section 83 is clear and unambiguous and should be given ordinary meaning. CBN V INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT.1462) 457. Counsel submitted the judgment Creditors have complied with the provisions of the law. Counsel also urged the court to ignore the cases cited by the Judgment Debtors as misleading. On issue two, Counsel contended that by the provisions of section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and section 18 of the Interpretation Act as well as the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974, reference to public officer means natural person and does not accommodate artificial persons. Counsel submitted where statute mention specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. The principle is expressio urius est exclusion altrius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. The express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue. Counsel contended by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel cited CBN V NJAMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276, it was held CBN is not a public officer, it serve as financial adviser and banker of Federal Government. Counsel submitted money under the custody and control of CBN are not under public officer. Counsel submitted consent of Attorney-General is not required in this case. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE V AG LAGOS STATE (2004) 9 NWLR (PT.897) 665. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. GARNISHEE’S NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION Vide notice of preliminary objection dated 11/8/17, filed on 14/8/17, the Garnishee prays this Honourable Court For:- 4. An order of this Honourable Court striking out the garnishee proceeding for lack of requisite jurisdiction. 5. An order setting aside the garnishee order nisi made by this Honourable Court on the 26th day of July 2017, same having been granted without the requisite consent of the Attorney General of the Federation. 6. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The grounds for the aforementioned reliefs are:- 3. This Honourable Curt lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear the suit as presently constituted this Court is only empowered to entertain matters that border on labour issues of employer, employee related matters and not issues that borders on recovery of money between the judgment debtors and the Garnishee. 4. Consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is a condition precedent before this Honourable Court can have the requisite jurisdiction to make an order of Garnishee order nisi. In support of the notice of preliminary objection, the garnishee filed a 5 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by one Lukman Tairu, a Litigation secretary in the law firm of D. B. Legal Consultants, Counsel for the Garnishee. In the affidavit in support it was averred that the garnishee order nisi attached as exhibit CBN 01, was made on 26/7/17, without the consent of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation. It was also averred that condition precedent before instituting this matter was not complied with. It was stated that the garnishee proceeding as commenced by the judgment creditors was wrongly commenced in this court (National Industrial Court). The deponent further deposed that this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a garnishee proceeding between the judgment Creditors, Judgment Debtors and the Garnishee. That this Court has inherent powers to decline jurisdiction and strike out the garnishee proceeding and set aside the order nisi for having been made in error. In the written address filed in support of the notice of preliminary objection, three issues were submitted for determination. They are:- 4. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter as presently constituted. 5. ‘‘Whether the failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is vital to the commencement of this action’’. 6. ‘‘Whether this court is empowered to set aside its garnishee order nisi’’. M. P. Podos, Esq; Counsel for the Garnishee relied on the affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection and adopted the written address filed along with the preliminary objection as his argument on the objection. In arguing issue one Counsel submitted that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this proceedings. According to Counsel this court does not possess power and requisite jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel continued his submission that the fact that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain dispute between Judgment Creditor and Judgment Debtor does not mean the Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings which distinct separate action meant to secure payment of money judgment against the judgment Debtor. On these submissions Counsel relied on STB LTD V CONTRACT RESOURCES (NIG.) LTD (2001) @ 4426 NWLR (Pt.708) 115 @ 123 and DENTON-WEST V MUOMA (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt.1083) 418. Counsel while relying on section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, contended that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction of entertain this matter. Counsel also relied on the case of CBN V KAKURI (2016) LPELR-41468 (CA). Counsel also submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is being governed by the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and judgment Enforcement Rules. Counsel contended that since section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act goes hand in hand with Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules garnishee proceedings are not within the purview or jurisdiction of this Court. Counsel referred to the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V OKEB NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS. (2014) LPELR-23162 (CA) and submitted that garnishee proceeding can only be initiated in a Court where the judgment Debtor can sue for the Debt. Continuing his submission Counsel submitted that the Court has to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the judgment Debtor against the garnishee in respect of the debt. Counsel also submitted that this the judgment debtor cannot institute an action for recovery of its debt against the Garnishee in the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Counsel submitted in the circumstances the garnishee proceeding as presently constituted cannot be legally and validly maintained in this Honourable Court for lack jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the Garnishee 1st and 2nd Judgment Debtors being agencies of Federal Government this Court does not have the inherent jurisdiction to entertain any matter as it relates to debt between them. Counsel also cited MADUKOLO V NKENDLIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. In concluding argument on this issue counsel submitted that from the express provisions of the Constitution and above cited authorities, it is clear that a Garnishee proceeding can only be initiated in a Court where the judgment Debtor can ordinarily sue the Garnishee for recovery of his debt and the Court where an action of this nature can be instituted against the Garnishee. On issue two, Counsel submitted that failure of the judgment Creditor to seek and obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is vital to the commencement of this action and the suit is liable to be struck out on this basis. Counsel submitted that the suit before the Court being Garnishee proceeding is sui generis. Before it can be commenced all conditions precedent must be fulfilled and complied with. It is contended that the failure of the Judgment Creditor to obtain consent affect adversely the power of this Court to continue to entertain this suit. Counsel submitted it is not in dispute that the Garnishee is a public officer within the ambit purview of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) particularly in the fifth schedule and afortiori a public officer. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 1 @ 36. It is the contention of Counsel that the Garnishee being a public officer before an action for recovery of debt can be commenced consent of the Attorney General of the Federation has to be sought and obtained. . Counsel referred to section 84(1) & (3)(a) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and the case of ONJEWU V K.S.M.C.I. (………………….) 10 NWLR (Pt.827) 40 @ 84 and submitted that Court has no jurisdiction to made order nisi without the consent of Attorney General. Counsel maintained that failure to obtain consent of Attorney General of the Federation before applying for order nisi has rendered the order nisi null and void. Counsel also referred to CBN V KAKURI (supra) and submitted that Garnishee proceeding cannot be validly commenced without the consent of the relevant Attorney General to such attachment having been first sought and obtained. The consent of Attorney General is a condition precedent to competence of Garnishee process and a valid exercise of jurisdiction to entertain it and issue relevant order. Counsel contended that due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent the order nisi is liable to be set aside. On issue three, Counsel submitted that this Court has requisite jurisdiction to set aside its order made in error without jurisdiction. On this submission Counsel relied on ALHAJI TAOFEEK ALAO V AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD (2000) LPELR-SC.14/1995(2), where it was held any Court of record has inherent powers to set aside its judgment or order which is a nullity. Counsel also while relying on UBA V MAJEED TAAN & ORS. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 368 @ 378, submitted that this Court has power to set aside its previous ruling, where it is a nullity made without jurisdiction, where it is obtained by deliberate concealment of facts of fraud or where it is obvious on the face of the record that the Court was misled. It is the submission of Counsel that apart from the power to set aside its previous decision, this court can also exdebitojustitiae to have judgment or order set aside on application of an affected or aggrieved party or even suo motu by the Court itself. On this submission Counsel cited DINGYADI V INEC (NO. 1) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt.1224) 91. In concluding submission Counsel submitted that once a Court lacks jurisdiction, a party cannot use any statutory provision or common law principle to impose it because absence of jurisdiction is irreparable in law. Counsel relied on UMMANAH V OBONG VICTOR ATTAH. Counsel urged the Court to strike out the Garnishee proceedings with substantial cost. SUBMISSION IN OPPOSITION OF THE NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In opposition to the notice of preliminary objection, the Judgment Creditors filed a 7 paragraphs counter-affidavit sworn to by Iheasiaba Ethelbert Chinweoke, the 1st Judgment Creditor. In the counter-affidavit, the Judgments Creditors averred that the deposition in the affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection were false. They also averred that if the notice of preliminary objection is granted it will greatly inconvenience and deny them the fruit of their judgment. They also averred that it is in the interest of justice to refuse the notice of preliminary objection. Odeh Evans, Esq; Counsel for the judgment Creditors relied on the averment in the counter-affidavit and adopted the written address filed together with the counter-affidavit as his argument in opposition to the preliminary objection. In the written address Counsel distilled two issues for determination. To wit: 3. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court is vested with requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter’’. 4. ‘‘Whether considering the circumstances of this case, failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation robs the Court of its jurisdiction’’. On issue one, Counsel submitted that the cases of STB LTD V CONTRACT RESOURCES (NIG.) LTD (20091) 6 NWLR (PT708) 115 @ 123, DENTON-WEST V MOUMA (2008) 6 NWLR (PT.1083) 418, CBN V KAKURI (2016) LPELR-41468, AND CBN V OKEB NIGERIA LTD & ORS. (2004) LPELR-23162, cited by the Counsel for the Garnishee were not only misleading and frivolous but vexatious and illusory as none of these cases contend the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine matters relating to Garnishee proceedings. In reply to the submission of Counsel for the Garnishee on Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules Counsel contended that the use of the words ‘any court’ in the provisions of the Order means not only the High Court, Federal High Court, Magistrate Court but also include National Industrial Court. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of CBN V KAKURI (supra). Section 254C (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), provides:- ‘‘The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, or pertaining to any matter which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain’’. It is the submission of Counsel that for purpose of achieving the mandate, section 254F of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) enjoined the president of this Court to make rule for regulating the practice and procedure of the National Industrial Court. Thus why the 2017 rules were made and Order 51 makes provision for Garnishee proceeding. Counsel submitted this Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel also submitted that garnishee proceeding being sui generis must be distinguished from substantive suit initiated against the Central Bank of Nigeria. Counsel submitted this Court can adjudicate on garnishee proceeding. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of CBN V CHIEF UBANA (2016) NGCA 59. On issue two, Counsel submitted that consent of Attorney General of the Federation is not required. According to Counsel in section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act it is only when the money is in the custody or control of public officer that consent is required. Counsel contended that section 318 has clearly stated persons under public service of the Federation and the garnishee is not in the public service. Counsel submitted section 318 was interpreted in the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974. Counsel submitted since the definition of public service persistently made reference to natural persons it cannot be said to accommodate artificial persons. Counsel also submitted that it is trite that where a statute mentions specific things or persons the intention is that those not mentioned are not included ‘expressio urius est exclusion altrius’ Counsel insisted that the express reference to individuals throughout section 318 effectively excludes the inclusion of artificial persons with regard to the interpretation. Counsel contended that by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel cited CBN V NJAMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276, it was held CBN is not a public officer, it serve as financial adviser and banker of Federal Government. Counsel submitted money under the custody and control of CBN are not under public officer. Counsel submitted consent of Attorney-General is not required in this case. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE V AG LAGOS STATE (2004) 9 NWLR (PT.897) 665. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. GARNISHEE’S REPLY ON POINT OF LAW On issue one, Counsel submitted that for this Court to have jurisdiction to entertain this matter, it must be shown that the Judgment Debtors can sue the Garnishee at National Industrial Court to recover debt. On issue two, it is submitted that counsel for Judgment Creditors expended time on procedure during garnishee proceeding which is not the issue. While the issue in focus is consent of Attorney General of the Federation as condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction. COURT’S DECISION I have painstakingly examined the two notices of preliminary objections filed by the Judgment Debtors and the Garnishee as well as the affidavit and counter-affidavit filed in respect of the objection filed by the Garnishee. I have also thoroughly examined the written addresses of Counsel for the parties herein and the cases cited in support of their various positions. In my view the two applications under consideration can be disposed of on consideration of three issues for determination as follows:- ‘‘Whether there is non service of order nisi on the Judgment Debtors’’. ‘‘Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Garnishee proceedings’’. ‘‘Whether lack of consent of the Attorney General of the Federation has vitiated the order nisi issued by this Court on 26th July 2017’’. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE The counsel for the Judgment Debtors has submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to continue with the Garnishee proceeding before the Court in view of non service of the order nisi on the Judgment Debtors as required by the provisions of Section 83(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. The Judgment Creditors on their part have submitted the order nisi was served on the judgment Debtors on 8th August 2017 before the date fixed for hearing of the Garnishee proceeding. Counsel on behalf of Judgment Creditors submitted that the Order nisi was duly served and provision of section 83(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act was duly complied with. It is to be noted that none of the parties to the Preliminary objection filed by the Judgment Debtors file any affidavit either in support or otherwise. The non filing of affidavit by any of the parties to this object left the Court with the option of resorting to the record of the Court in resolution of the question for determination. I have perused the record of the Court it is clear without any doubt that the order nisi for the Judgment Debtors was served at the Headquarters of the Judgment Debtors on 8th day of August 2017. The copy of the order meant for endorsement and return by the bailiff of the Court after effecting service as contained in the record of the Court clearly shows that the order nisi was actually served on the Judgment Debtors. In the circumstances and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary I have no reason to doubt the record of the Court. The objection of the Judgment Debtors on this leg of their preliminary objection fails and is hereby dismissed. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO The Counsel for the Garnishee has submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this Garnishee proceedings on the ground that the Judgment Debtor cannot sue the Garnishee before this Court for recovery of his debt and also that the Judgment debtors are Federal Government agencies only Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain action against them. Counsel relied on section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) in support of his position. Counsel continued his submission that the fact that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain dispute between Judgment Creditor and Judgment Debtor does not mean the Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings which distinct separate action meant to secure payment of money judgment against the judgment Debtor. Counsel while relying on section 251 (1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, contended that this Court does not have the requisite jurisdiction of entertain this matter. Counsel also submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is being governed by the Sheriff and Civil Process Act and judgment Enforcement Rules. Counsel contended that since section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act goes hand in hand with Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules garnishee proceedings are not within the purview or jurisdiction of this Court. Continuing his submission Counsel submitted that the Court has to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the judgment Debtor against the garnishee in respect of the debt. Counsel also submitted that this the judgment debtor cannot institute an action for recovery of its debt against the Garnishee in the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Counsel submitted in the circumstances the garnishee proceeding as presently constituted cannot be legally and validly maintained in this Honourable Court for lack jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the Garnishee 1st and 2nd Judgment Debtors being agencies of Federal Government this Court does not have the inherent jurisdiction to entertain any matter as it relates to debt between them. In reply to the submission of Counsel for the Garnishee submitted that on Order VIII Rule 2 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules Counsel the use of the words ‘any court’ in the provisions of the Order means not only the High Court, Federal High Court, Magistrate Court but also include National Industrial Court. Counsel also referred to Section 254C (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), which provides:- ‘‘The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, or pertaining to any matter which the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain’’. It is the submission of Counsel that for purpose of achieving the mandate, section 254F of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) enjoined the president of this Court to make rule for regulating the practice and procedure of the National Industrial Court. Thus why the 2017 rules were made and Order 51 makes provision for Garnishee proceeding. Counsel submitted this Court has jurisdiction to entertain garnishee proceedings. Counsel also submitted that garnishee proceeding being sui generis must be distinguished from substantive suit initiated against the Central Bank of Nigeria. Counsel submitted this Court can adjudicate on garnishee proceeding. As aptly asserted by the Apex Court of the Land, jurisdiction is only donated by the constitution and/or statute. See BELGORE V AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (pt.1355) 60, SAEED V YAKOWA (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1352) 124. Jurisdiction is life wire of a court as no court can entertain a matter where it lacks the jurisdiction. It is settled that the jurisdiction of courts in this country is derived from the constitution and statutes. No court is allowed to grant itself power to hear a matter where it is not is a nullity. Therefore every court must ensure that it is well endowed with jurisdiction to hear a matter before embarking on the exercise else it would be wasting precious judicial time. See UTIH V ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) 166, MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (1962) 2 All NLR (Pt.ii) 5. It is also settled that Rules of procedure cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court. In CLEMENT & ANOR. V. IWANYANWU & ANOR. (1989) NWLR (Pt.107) 39, (1989) 4 SC Pt. ii, 89, Obaseki, J. S. C. (of blessed memory) has this to say:- ‘‘on the issue of jurisdiction, jurisdiction in the broad and substantive sense cannot be conferred by Rules of Court. Having regard to the Constitutional powers conferred on the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the President Court of Appeal, the Rules of Court they can lawfully makes are to regulate the practice and procedure in the Court and not to confer jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal cannot therefore have recourse to the Supreme Court Rules 1985 as source of jurisdiction to entertain the application. Unless the Court of Appeal incorporate by reference the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules’’. In the same decision: Oputa, J. S. C. (of blessed memory) also said:- ‘‘I think it is trite law that Rules of Court are Rules of procedure. They do not by themselves alone confer jurisdiction. They merely regulate the exercise of a jurisdiction conferred aliunde’’. It is patently clear beyond reproach that Rules of Court cannot confer jurisdiction, as such a rule regulates practice of the Court in the exercise of a derived power. Rules of practice and procedure confer procedural but not substantive jurisdiction on a Court. They are meant to ensure that affairs of Court are carried out in an orderly fashion. But, it must be obeyed strictly. ATANDA V AJANI (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.111) 511, G. M. O. N. & CO Ltd V AKPUTA (2010) 9 NWLR (PT.1200) 443, THE STATE V ONAGORUWA (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt.1) 1 @ 19. It is to be remembered that judgment of Court of law is certainly not an end onto itself, no matter the result. The purpose of litigation over any dispute is to secure for the aggrieved party the subject matter, object or thing in contention and obtain redress for the loss or injury caused by the opposing party in one form of judgment or the other. The result of securing judgment does not translate to anything until such judgment is obeyed and complied with by the party against whom the court order was made. Most a times, a successful party find it difficult to have the judgment given in his favour obeyed. Thus, why the Court exercise powers to enforce obedience to judgment through the powers conferred by Constitution, statutes and inherent powers of the court as preserved by section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). A part from the inherent powers of Court to enforce judgment and orders, the Constitution which is the ground norm has also amply make provisions conferring power on Courts to enforce judgments and orders, which they made. By the provisions of Section 287 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), the decision of the Federal High Court, the National industrial Court, a High Court and all other Courts established by the Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by other Courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court and a High Court respectively. What emerges from the foregoing, is the fact that one attribute of a Court of law is its competence to enforce its judgments. However, other Courts, authorities, or persons, unless empowered by statutes or Constitution creating the particular Courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and orders of the Court. It should be remembered that the term ‘judicial powers of the Federation’’ include powers to enforce a decision or judgment or order given and when section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) vested the judicial powers of the Federation in the Court, it vested it with inherent power to enforce or execute its own judgment and orders. The intent and purpose of section 6 of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. This constitutional provision has clearly cloth this Court with requisite jurisdiction to enforce its own judgment or decision through any of the recognised methods of enforcement, including by way of Garnishee proceedings. It is in furtherance of the desire to enable this Court carry out its constitutional powers of enforcement of its own judgments and decisions that the president of the Court in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the provisions of section 254F of the constitution, as amended and section 36 of the National Industrial Court At 2006, made Order 51 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, to regulate Garnishee proceedings before the Court. It is clear from the foregoing, that the provisions of Sheriff and Civil Process Act as well as the provisions of Judgment Enforcement Rules were procedural in nature and are not capable of conferring Court with jurisdiction. They only laid down procedure to be followed to enforce judgment of Court by way of Garnishee proceedings. The submission to the effect that they are part of forms of enforcement of judgment was given credence by the Supreme Court decision in TUKUR V GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (pt35) 604. In view of the reasons given above this Court has requisite jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by way of Garnishee proceedings. Issue two has been resolved against the Garnishee. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE On issue three Counsel for the Judgment Debtors has submitted that this proceeding cannot continue or be concluded due the non-compliance with sine quo non for its commencement. Counsel contended where money is under the custody of public officer an order nisi shall not be made under section 83(2) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, unless consent for such attachment is sought and obtained from the appropriate officer that is the Federal or State Attorney General as the case may be. Counsel submitted in the light of the extant law i.e sections 83 and 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act coupled with the judicial precedent, the originating processes commencing this action i.e ex-parte motion is ab initio most irregularly issued. Counsel contended the proceeding subsequent to the issue of the originating process and more particularly grant of order nisi was without jurisdiction and the order nisi incompetent. Counsel for the Garnishee on his own part submitted that failure of the judgment Creditor to seek and obtain the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation which is vital to the commencement of this action has rendered the suit liable to be struck out on this basis. Counsel submitted that the suit before the Court being Garnishee proceeding is sui generis. Before it can be commenced all conditions precedent must be fulfilled and complied with. It is contended that the failure of the Judgment Creditor to obtain consent affect adversely the power of this Court to continue to entertain this suit. Counsel insisted that the consent of Attorney General is a condition precedent to competence of Garnishee process and a valid exercise of jurisdiction to entertain it and issue relevant order. Counsel contended that due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent the order nisi is liable to be set aside. The Counsel for the Judgment Creditors in his submission contended that by the provisions of section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and section 18 of the Interpretation Act as well as the case of AGBOROH V WAEC (2016) LPELR-40974, reference to public officer means natural person and does not accommodate artificial persons. Counsel submitted where statute mention specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. Counsel contended that by section 84 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act, the fiat of the Attorney General can only be resorted to when monies sought to be attached is in the custody of a public officer; in this case Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be regarded as such. Counsel urged court to strike out the preliminary object for lacking in merit. It is patently clear from the affidavit evidence and the submissions of Counsel in this matter that the order nisi was issued pursuant to Section 83 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. The Judgment Debtors and Garnishee are contesting the validity of the order nisi on the ground that the funds to be attached by the order nisi is in the custody of a public officer in the circumstance the order ought not to have been made under section 83. The order ought not to have been made until the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is first sought and obtained pursuant to section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. However to the Judgment Creditors the funds to be attached are not under the control of a public officer (Garnishee). The issue of consent of Attorney General before execution judgment has its origin from the common law principle of Crown Immunity, the concept of ‘’Crown can do no wrong’’ Rex non protest peccae’’ i.e goods cannot be distressed by a sheriff or bailiff of the king. Goods of the king are privileged and being for public good ought to be privileged. Such goods ought to be free from distress because they are for public advantage and benefit of the whole society. The provision of section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act shares from the concept of ‘crown can do no wrong’. It is interesting to note that the provision of section 84 has attracted judicial pronouncement and diverse academic opinion. The courts in interpreting the section has given it a wider meaning to mean that no garnishee proceedings or order nisi can be validly made save with the consent of the Attorney General, as long as the money belongs to the government. Some decisions have even the held the view that wherever the money may be, so long as it is money of the Government, in other words, as long as the ownership is traced to a government, whether in bank, treasury or wherever, there is absolute immunity from Garnishee proceedings save with consent of Attorney General. The trend of the decisions of the court is to the effect that obtaining prior consent of the Attorney General under section 84(1) of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is mandatory as they are necessary procedural safe guard needed by government to avoid embarrassment. The failure to fulfil the precondition/condition precedent of seeking and obtaining the consent of the Attorney General will rob court of the requisite jurisdiction to enforce its judgment and rendered all proceeding already conducted nugatory. The Court of Appeal followed the trend in the following cases:- CBN V AMAO 2012 16 NWLR PT.1219 271, CBN V HYDRO AIR PTY 2014 16 NWLR PT.1434 482, CBN V JAMES EJIMBA OKEFE 2015 LPELR-24825, CBN V N. J. NWANYAWU ENT. 22745, OMENKA ODE V ATTORNEY GENERAL BENUE STATE& ORS 2011 LPELR -4774. It is to be noted that in a recent unreported decision in Appeal No. CA/L/710/2015 between ADEBAYO LATEEF SANUSI V UNITY BANK, CBN, delivered on 10th March 2017, the Court of Appeal followed the consistent position of the Court of Appeal that the consent of the Attorney General is a condition precedent before commencing a garnishee proceedings against CBN, even where the judgment debt as in that appeal was against a private commercial Bank. In line well cherished doctrine of stare decisis I have no choice that to apply the decisions of the above mentioned Court of Appeal cases to the case at hand. It will therefore be in tandem with established case law that for any action to be commenced for enforcement of judgment or order of court through garnishee the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation must first be sought and obtained before commencing the action. Failure obtains consent as required by the provisions of section 84(1) of the Sheriff and civil process will render nugatory the proceeding conducted before securing the consent. In view of this the present Garnishee proceeding is null and void for having commenced without compliance with condition precedent lad down in section 84 (1) of the sheriff and Civil Process Act. This has divested the Court with requisite jurisdiction to continue with the garnishee proceedings. However, it must be pointed out here that this is a temporary setback, if the Judgment Creditor complied with the condition precedent he can still approach the Court for redress. In view of the foregoing, the garnishee proceeding is hereby struck out for noncompliance with condition precedent. Sanusi Kado, Judge.