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1. When the instant suit was filed on 18th April 2016, the claimants had sued four defendants. By order of Court made on 19th September 2017, the names of the 3rd and 4th defendants were struck off this suit; and by a further order of Court made on 13th December 2017, the name of the 2nd defendant was equally struck off this suit and all the claims against the 2nd defendant are to be maintained against the 1st and now only defendant, Skye Bank Plc. As per the their complaint, the claimants are accordingly praying for the following reliefs: a) A declaration that the defendant having failed to determine the claimants employment with Afribank Plc upon the nationalization of the bank and pay them their due terminal benefits, the claimants’ employment with the defendant was a continuous one from the period of their employment with Afribank Nigeria Plc. b) A declaration that what the defendant carried out when it terminated the claimants’ employment on 22nd June 2012 is redundancy exercise and the claimants are therefore entitled to redundancy benefits in line with the provisions of the Collective agreements between the claimants’ respective unions, which are the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and The Nigeria Employers’ Association of Banks Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI). c) A declaration that the failure or refusal of the defendant to pay to the claimants their redundancy benefit based on the redundancy exercise it carried out on 22nd June 2012 when it terminated the claimants’ employment constitute a violent breach of the claimants’ conditions of service contained in the Collective: agreement between the claimants’ respective unions, which are the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) and Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASBIFIE) and Nigerian Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEIBIA) and is therefore wrongful, illegal, unfair, null and void. d) A declaration that the failure of the defendant to give to the claimants three months’ notice or pay them three months’ salary in lieu of notice before the termination of their respective employment with the bank based on the redundancy exercise carried out by the defendant on 22nd June 2012 constitutes a violent breach of the claimants’ conditions of service contained in the collective agreement between the claimants and their respective unions, which are the National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE) and Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASBIFIE) and Nigerian Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEIBIA) and is therefore wrongful, illegal, unfair, null and void. e) A declaration that by the provisions of the collective agreement between the claimants and their respective unions…and the Nigerian Employers' Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEIBIA), the claimants are entitled to be paid respectively the amounts listed against each of their names, being and representing their redundancy benefits computed by using the parameters set in the collective agreement which governs the Claimants employment… f) A declaration that having terminated the claimants’ employment in the manner which it did and having failed to pay to the claimants their correct terminal benefits, it is wrongful, unfair and arbitrary for the defendant to debit the claimants account with the various sums of money earlier paid to them as well as their outstanding loans and leave their respective salary accounts in debit and also charge interest on the said debit balance at penal rate. g) An order mandating the defendant to pay to the claimants respectively the amount hereinafter specified against each of their names, being the outstanding difference of what is due to the claimants as redundancy benefit calculated by using the parameter specified in the collective agreement between the claimants’ unions…and the Nigerian Employers' Association of Banks Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) which governs the claimants’ employment. h) An order mandating the defendant to write off the claimants’ outstanding loan transferred from the books of the defendant and all interest charged on such loans. i) An order mandating the defendant to pay the claimants respectively the amounts stated against each of their names…being their respective due long service benefit. j) An order mandating the defendant to pay to the claimants respectively the amount stated against each of their names…being their respective productivity allowance for 2012. k) Interest at the rate of 26% per annum from the date of this suit until judgment is delivered, thereafter interest at the rate of 21% per annum until judgment sum is liquidated. l) An order entering judgment for the claimants against the defendant in the sum of N799,565,599.61 being the cumulative total due to them…from the defendant…representing their redundancy benefits, three months basic salary in lieu of notice, long service benefit and productivity allowance for 2012 as highlighted above. m) An order entering judgment for the for the claimants against the defendant for the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million, Naira) only as general damages for injuries of financial hardship, mental torture and psychological trauma suffered by the claimants as a result of willful refusal/failure of the defendant to pay the claimants their redundancy benefit, three month basic salary in lieu of notice, long service benefit and productivity allowance for 2012. n) Cost of this action. 2. In defending the action, and coming pursuant to Order 11 Rule 1(1) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Rules 2007 (the old Rules, now repealed), section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the defendant filed on 28th June 2016 a notice of preliminary objection in terms of the competence of the entire suit as presently constituted and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain same. The preliminary objection is supported by a 10-paragraphed affidavit sworn to by one Sesan Adebayo, Litigation Assistant in the Law Firm of counsel to the applicant with 4 exhibits annexed The defendant prayed for three orders, the second of which was dismissed on 13th December 2017. The two remaining orders the defendant prayed for are: (1) An order striking out the General Form of Complaint and all other accompanying processes filed therewith for lack of competence. (2) An order striking out and/or dismissing this suit for lack of jurisdiction. 3. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection was brought are: (a) The suit was commenced by the claimants in a representative capacity, without the written authorization of each and every other claimant. (b) The claimants having commenced this suit in a representative capacity, do not have common interest, common grievance and the reliefs sought is (sic) not in a nature to be beneficial to all the claimants. (c) The claimants lack the requisite locus standi to bring this suit in a representative capacity whereas their employments with the dissolved 2nd defendant have been terminated, and each claimant given a separate and individual contract of employment that was duly terminated on mutually accepted terms with the dissolved 2nd defendant. (d) There is no privity of contract between the claimants and the defendant. (e) This Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to grant relief h) of the reliefs sought herein as the contractual relationship between the claimants and the dissolved 2nd defendant has been terminated and thus puts the nature of the reliefs sought in relief h) in the realm of simple contracts between individuals over which this Court has no jurisdiction to grant. (f) The complaint and statement of facts do not disclose any reasonable cause of action, as all the claimants are NOT seeking to nullify the several individually executed agreements entered into at different times and places with the dissolved 2nd defendant/applicant upon termination of their employment. (g) The claimants’ claims are caught by the doctrine of issue estoppel and estoppel per rem judicatam as most of the claims have been judicially decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. (h) The 2nd defendant, Mainstreet Bank, is no longer a legal person in law, and it has since been dissolved without being wound up by an order of court dated 29th June 2015. (i) The claimants have no locus standi to institute their action based on the collective agreement of the trade union reached amongst members of the union as such terms of the collective agreement were not incorporated into their terms of employment with the 2nd defendant. (j) The prosecution of this case in a representative capacity will deprive the defendant/applicant of its fundamental right to fair hearing against each of the claimants whom the 2nd defendant had individually discharged for valuable consideration. 3. Given that the 2nd defendant was struck off this suit, I must right away discountenance ground (h) of the preliminary objection, which is that the 2nd defendant, Mainstreet Bank, is no longer a legal person in law and has since been dissolved without being wound up by an order of court dated 29th June 2015. Ground (h) is accordingly discountenanced for purposes of this ruling. THE DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS 4. The defendant submitted three issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the conditions for commencement of an action in a representative capacity was met by this suit as presently constituted. (2) Whether an action can be instituted against a non-juristic/legal person. (3) Whether this action as presently constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the applicant. 5. On issue (1), the defendant referred to Okukuje v. Akwido [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 261 SC at 293, which held that given the definition of a representative, it would appear that there must be some kind of authorisation given by the person or persons to be represented. To the defendant, to be able to sue under a representative action, such persons must have same or common interest, to the extent that they have a common mission or a cause to pursue; and that in such a representative action, representees or representers must have a common interest with those represented to the extent that they stand or fall together, referring to the concurring judgment of Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in CCB (Nig.) Plc v. Rose [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) 49 where His Lordship held that in the realm of master and servant, it is the law that although ten or one hundred persons are given employment the same day under the same conditions of service, the contract of employment is personal or domestic to each of the persons; and that in the event of breach, the persons do not have collective right to sue or be represented in a suit. The defendant then submitted that in the instant case, just as the CCB (Nig.) Plc case under reference, the respondents have different contracts of employments having been employed at different times and dates, they had distinct conditions of service, they were on different cadres/grades upon retirement, their salaries were different, their alleged accrued claim on terminal benefits are different and even though their employment was terminated on the same day, it was done under different circumstances. That it is trite law that parties who wish to institute a representative action must have a common interest or right, citing the CCB (Nig.) Ltd case at page 46. 6. The defendant went on that in this instant case, there is a slightly different twist even though the names of the 94 ex-staff are reflected on the face of the processes and their claims are even particularized on the statement of claim. That it is apparent nevertheless that it was a representative action instituted by the sole witness Mr. Eyinannaya Amugo on the basis of the fact that they have an alleged common interest. That assuming, but not conceding, that the 94 ex-staff of the dissolved 2nd defendant have a common interest and can bring a representative action, such action can only be brought with authorisation from at least substantial number of the ex-staffers whose names are listed on the face of the processes. That authorisation to sue, defend or so act must be given by the persons interested in suing or defending, for the benefit of all persons with same interest. That if the authorisation does not come from the persons interested to sue or defend, the action must stand in their personal capacity, citing Ndulue v. Ibezim [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) at 164. That the objectionable character of the instant suit mirrored the scenario in Olasa v. Ezemuo [2003] 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 146 at 148 Paras. C-F where though the members of the group the plaintiff claimed to represent did not challenge the authority of the plaintiff, the Court held that the failure of the members of Umuakamuchu family to challenge the authority of the 1st respondent in Suit No. HN/14/89 to sue in representative capacity did not exonerate him from the onus to prove his authority in taking the action; and that if the authorization does not come from the other persons or community interested to sue or to defend, the action must stand in their personal capacity. Also cited is Wiri & ors v. Wuche & ors [1980] 12 NSCC 1 at 4 - 5. That the respondents especially the 13th claimant/respondent, Mr Amugo Enyinnaya, who is the sole witness of the claimants, therefore, has a duty to satisfy the requirement of authority which is nowhere in sight in pleadings as presently constituted. 7. The defendant continued by referring to Jack v. Whyte [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 266 SC at 275 where it was observed that it may not be compulsory for a party wishing to sue or defend in a representative capacity to obtain leave of Court before filing his suit; it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. If there is evidence that the parties appear to possess representative capacity to act or presumably act on the authority of those they represent, the Court will not hesitate to approve of the representative capacity. To the defendant, even when the issue of not obtaining leave to institute a representative action is not mandatory based on the provisions of the Rules of Court, the endorsement of the Complaint with the necessary capacity is made mandatory. That the non-endorsement of capacity on the complaint and other originating processes by the respondents makes the supposed representative action void. That this is because where a statute provides a particular way of taking any step, only that mode provided by statute must be followed and no other, citing Mako v. Umoh [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 82 at 106. That it is judicially settled that Rules of Court, being a subsidiary legislation, have the force of a statute, citing Mako v. Umoh (supra) and Dragetanos Const. (Nig) Ltd v. FMV Ltd [2011] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1273) 308 at 395 - 396. In addition, that the operative word used in the above provision is “shall” which means must, compulsory and mandatory, citing Nwankwo v. Yar’Adua [2011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1263) 81 at 125. 8. Proceeding, the defendant submitted that in the respondents’ statement of facts to the complaint and as well as witness statement of oath filed, there is no exhibit of any resolution or authorisation from the 93 other ex-staff whose names are on the face of the process authorizing the 13th claimant/respondent, Mr. Amugo Enyinnaya. That such show of authority is imperative; it is indispensable to cloth an action in a representative capacity as echoed in Olasa v. Ezimuo (supra) at 148 that failure of any member of the group a party claims to represent to challenge the authority of the party does not exonerate the party from the onus of proof placed on him for his authority in taking out the action where his capacity is challenged by the adverse party, and the absence of an authority of a party who claims to sue in a representative capacity means that he has no locus standi to have brought the action. The defendant then submitted that if there was any authorization the respondents would have exhibited it but there is clearly none. That this action is, therefore, grossly incompetent as a representative action and thus liable to be dismissed in limine. That it must stand against the named 13th claimant/respondent or Mr. Amugo Eyinnaya who is the sole witness of the claimants alone as he can only testify for himself and not for the other claimants whose names are reflected on the face of the processes, citing CBN v. Adedeji [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 242. The defendant then urged the Court to resolve issue (1) in its favour and dismiss the suit for lack of competence. 9. Issue (2) deals with the issue of the 2nd defendant already dissolved being a juristic/legal person. Since the 2nd defendant had already been struck off this suit, arguments regarding issue (2) are needless and so are hereby discountenanced. 10. Issue (3) deals with the question whether the instant suit discloses a reasonable cause of action against the defendant. The defendant referred to Shell Petroleum v. Nwaka [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 401 SC at 421, which held thus: …for a statement of claim to disclose a reasonable cause of action, it must set out the legal right of the plaintiff and the obligation of the defendant. It must then go on to set out the constituting infraction of the plaintiff’s legal right or failure of the defendant to fulfill his obligations in such a way that if there is no proper defence, the plaintiff will succeed in the relief or remedy he seeks. To the defendant, where the Court finds that a claimant discloses no reasonable cause of action in its pleading, it will strike out the pleading and dismiss the suit, citing Jegede v. Akande [2014] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 43 SC. That in this instant case, the respondents only relied on the collective agreement and the fact that it was made for their benefit, without more. That it is an established law that non-members of a trade union cannot take benefit of the provisions of the collective agreement, citing NUPENG v. MWUN [2015] 61 NLLR (Pt. 214) 403 CA. 11. Continuing, the defendant contended that in the instant case, the case of the respondents is premised on the Collective Agreement between The Nigeria Employers’ Association of Banks Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI), and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI). That the respondents have no locus standi to premise their action based on the collective agreement to which they are not parties. That there is no privity of contract between them and the applicants derivable from the said collective agreement to enable them take benefit of the collective agreement. That the law is trite that the terms of employment supersede any other agreement including collective agreements; and for a collective agreement to be binding it must be incorporated into the terms of employment, citing Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 SC at 27 - 31. That the present case is even worse for the claimants. They predicated their case on collective agreement which was never part of their contact of employment. They then went further to sue the parties to the collective agreement on both sides of the bargain, namely, the employer and the trade unions. In other words the claimants seek to enforce an agreement to which they are total strangers, and not made in their favour against the parties who entered into the agreement. That this is nothing short of an abject exhibition of law turned on its head, referring to Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Coop Society Limited [2015] 62 NNLR (Pt. 216) 40 at 133 - 134. To the defendant, the respondents in this suit have disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the defendant. 12. The defendant went on that what is more, the claimants have admitted in their statement of facts that they were paid their benefits which they accepted and utilized. That the respondents had agitated and were subsequently paid additional terminal benefits in full and final settlement of their claims upon executing individual and several contracts with the dissolved 2nd defendant. That to allow them to resile on their agreement will be to indulge them with double compensation, which the law and equity loathes and frowns at. That where the employees collected/accepted their severance benefits upon their ceasing to hold their employment, although wrongfully computed or calculated, without any protest, they can no longer make/lodge any complaints in respect of same, referring to paragraph 3 of the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection. as well as Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Technology [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) SC 506 at 528, and contesting it with Onalaja v. African Petroleum Ltd [1991] 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) 691 at 697 where the Court made an exception where employee had declined to accept or utilize terminal benefits as demonstration of his objection to his disengagement from employment. To the defendant, this is a proper case for the Court to hold that the respondents have not disclosed a reasonable cause of action against it, praying that the case be dismissed for lack of a reasonable cause of action. THE CLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS 13. On their part, the claimants submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: whether the defendant/applicant is entitled to the relief(s) sought. To the claimants, it is trite law that cause of action is fact or series of facts which gives rise to a right to sue, citing Onuekwuzi v. RTCMZC [2011] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1243) 341 at 359 - 360. That in the instant case, it is the case of the claimants that their employment was wrongfully terminated. That the claimants have supplied the relevant facts via their originating processes giving them rights to sue the defendants in this suit. That the defendant by its preliminary objection is challenging the competence of this suit based on the 3 issues it raised. 14. In response to the defendant’s issue (1), which deals with whether the conditions for commencement of an action in a representative capacity were met in this suit as presently constituted, the claimants referred to the meaning of a representative action as defined by Fidelis Nwadialo in his book, Civil Procedure in Nigeria, Second Edition at page 110, which is: An action which is thus brought by or against one or more persons as representing other persons together with whom the one or more persons have a common interest in the subject matter of the action is called a Representative action. That in the instant case, the 94 claimants are clearly listed on the face of the General Form of Complaint and as such the case as constituted is not in a representative capacity rather it is a joint action which the Court has jurisdiction to entertain. That to the extent that the defendant cited CCB (Nig) Plc v. Rose [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) at 46 and posited that it is in all fours with the instant case and further went on to state that there is a slight difference between the principle enunciated in the CCB case and the instant case as the names of the 94 Ex-staff are reflected on the face of the processes and their claims are even particularized on the statement of claim, the defendant bus be read to saying two things at the same time. 15. The claimants went on that assuming but not conceding to the fact that having Mr. Enyinnaya Amugo as the sole witness in the instant case makes it a representative action, it is left for the parties being represented to raise the objection and not the defendant, referring to The Registered Trustees of the Christ Apostolic Church v. Victoria Dada [2017] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1548) 61 at 83 - 84. That it is not for the defendant to complain at the capacity in which the claimants have brought their suit; rather the claimants are the ones to raise the complaint as to whether they authorized the suit or not. Moreover, that section 14 of the NIC Act 2006 empowers this Court to decide all matters in dispute between parties in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. That in the instant case, there are 94 claimants therein and to hold that they should all file individual suits against the same defendants is not just tedious but will be offending the intent and purpose of section 14 of the NIC Act, citing Esther & ors v. Skye Bank Plc [2012] 26 NLLR (Pt. 76) 303 at 325, Chief Raymond D. Ogolo v. Chief Paul Fubara & ors [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 831) 231 at 261 - 262 and Kanu & ors v. Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Cross River State & ors [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63. The claimants then submitted that in the instant case they were co-workers and have a common interest in that their employments were wrongly terminated by the same defendant, they have common grievance because the claimants herein had meritoriously served the defendant and for the defendant to treat them the way it did, the claimants are aggrieved and the claimants are making same claim which of course by the nature of the claim will be beneficial to all the claimants, urging the Court to discountenance issue (1) raised by the defendant and resolve same in favour of the claimant. 16. Issue (2) raised by the defendant is whether an action can be instituted against a non-juristic/legal person. It has already been discountenanced; as such it is needless considering the reaction of the claimants on it. 17. Issue (3) raised by the defendant is whether this action as presently constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the defendant. To the claimants, all that the defendant relied on in arguing this issue is that the claimants premised their case on the Collective Agreement between the Nigeria Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI), Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions Employees (NUBIFIE); and contended that the claimants have no locus standi to premise their action based on the Collective Agreement to which they are not parties. That as a result, there is no privity of contract between them and the claimants derivable from the Collective Agreement to enable them take benefit of the Collective Agreement. the claimants then submitted that a cause of action is a factual basis or some factual situation which gives a claimant an enforceable right of action. That in paragraphs 14, 22, 23 and 24 of the counter-affidavit filed by the claimants, it was expressly stated that the Collective Agreement regulating their employment was incorporated into their contract of employment. Letters of Employment of 3 of the claimants were also exhibited to show that their letters of employment contained a clause that all other terms and conditions of service shall be as stated in the Collective Agreement. That it is trite law that the terms of employment supersedes any other agreement including collective agreements and for a collective agreement to be binding it must be incorporated into the terms of employment, referring to Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 at 27 - 31 also cited by the defendant. 18. Continuing, the claimants contended that the defendant in its notice of preliminary objection annexed a copy of Mainstreet Bank letter of employment. That it is important to explain that the claimants spent several years in the service of Afribank Nigeria Plc ranging from 5 to over 25 years and when their services were taken over by Mainstreet Bank Limited, they spent just about 10 months; as a result the claim for the payment of redundancy which is the subject matter of this suit relates primarily to the period the claimants spent in the service of Afribank Nigeria Plc prior to it being taken over by the defendant. That the collective agreement was expressly incorporated into Afribank Nigeria Plc contract of employment. More so, that it is an established fact that Mainstreet Bank Limited having assumed the deposits and/or liabilities of Afribank Nigeria Plc (Afribank) is continuing the business hitherto carried on by Afribank, citing Joseph Adegoke Adekanmbi v. Skye Bank Plc unreported, the judgment of which was delivered on 17th February 2016 at the Ibadan Division of this Court, which decision laid to rest the issue, whether Mainstreet Bank took over the assets and liabilities of Afribank Nigeria Plc. That as a result, the employment of the claimants which started in Afribank Nigeria Plc continued in Mainstreet Bank Limited; it is, therefore, clear that the collective agreement is incorporated into the individual contracts of the claimants. 19. Furthermore, that from the several documents annexed to the notice of preliminary objection of the defendant, it is obvious that the alleged payment of 100% gratuity to the claimants is for their period of service in Afribank Nigeria Plc and not necessarily the period spent in Mainstreet Bank Plc. That the claimants did not utilize the purported 100% gratuity paid by the defendant; the said payment was made into the claimants individual accounts without prior notice to them and immediately the said accounts were debited with outstanding balance in the loan accounts of the claimants. That the payment was immediately rejected, citing Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Technology [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 SC. That in the instant case, the payment of the purported 100% gratuity which was made by the defendant without prior notice to the claimants does not amount to utilization as it was clearly rejected by the acts of the claimants. The claimants then submitted that they have in this suit disclosed reasonable cause of action against the defendants. The claimants concluded by urging the Court to discountenance the preliminary objection filed by the defendant and hold same to be frivolous, unsubstantiated and misleading. 20. The defendant did not file any reply on points of law. COURT’S DECISION 21. After a careful consideration of the processes filed and the submissions of the parties, the preliminary objection of the defendant can be said to rest on two fundamental grounds representing the two issues left of the issues raised by the defendant in its written address in support of the preliminary objection, namely: that this action is one brought in a representative action the conditions of which were not met by the claimants; and the suit discloses no reasonable cause of action against the defendant. I must right away dispel the erroneous assumption of the defendant that the claimants filed this suit in a representative capacity. There is nothing on the face of the originating processes to show that the claimants filed this suit in a representative capacity. What the claimants did is to simply file this suit in their individual but joint capacity. On the face of the complaint, the claimants indicated as claimants “Enyinnaya Amugo & 93 Others”. It was on the face of the statement of facts and the witness statement on oath that the all the names of the 94 claimants were listed out as claimants. The law is that in cases of conflict the statement of facts (statement of claim) supersedes the complaint (writ of summons). See Omnia Nigeria Ltd v. Dyktrade Ltd [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 394) 201 SC at 225; [2007] 7 SC 44 and Otu v. ACB Int’l Bank Plc & anor [2008] LPELR-2827(SC); [2008] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 179 SC; [2008] 33 NSCQR (Pt. I) 143. 22. Even if the suit was brought in a representative capacity, I agree with the claimants that it is not open to the defendant to raise the issue. It is the claimants that can raise that issue. See Shell Petroleum Development Company Nig. Ltd v. Chief Tigbara Edamkue [2009] LPELR-3048(SC);[2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1 SC; [2009] 6 - 7 SC 74, relying on Chief P. O. Anatogu & ors v. Attorney-General East Central State [1976] 11 SC 109; [1974] ECSLR 36, Oyemuze & ors v. Okoli & ors [1973] 3 ECSLR 150, Alhaii/Chief Otapo & ors v. Chief Sunmonu & ors [1987] 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 587 at 603; [1987] 5 SCNJ 57; [1987] 2 NSCC Vol. 18 page 677, Daniel Awudu & anor v. Bautha & anor [2005] 2 NWLR (Pt.909) 199 at 222 - 223 CA and Busari v. Oseni [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 557, which held thus: …It is settled that once the Plaintiff/Plaintiffs, expressed on a writ or Statement of Claim that the action, was brought in a representative capacity as appears in the two consolidated suits, it is/was prima facie, though not conclusive evidence of authority by his/their group, family or Community to sue in that capacity. It is only a member of that group, family or Community, who can dispute, intervene or challenge, the proper representation or the capacity in which the plaintiff/plaintiffs sued. It will be futile for a defendant who is not one of those the plaintiff/plaintiffs purport to represent, to challenge his/their said authority for or because, if the plaintiff/plaintiffs wins/win, the losing defendant, cannot share in the victory and if the plaintiff/plaintiffs case be dismissed, such dismissal, can never affect the defendant adversely… See also Mr Eyiaromi Christopher Oladele & ors v. The Attorney-General, Lagos State & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/102/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 6th June 2017 and Akeem Lawal & ors v. The Honourable Minister of Transport & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/177/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 14th December 2017. 23. The defendant, however, added an extension to its argument on the issue of this suit being in a representative capacity, which is that the 94 claimants cannot jointly sue since they do not have any common interest in this suit as to file the suit as they did. Here, I am in agreement with the claimants that expedience dictates that they come to this Court jointly as they did since their case is one for the claim of redundancy. It will be idle to expect that the 94 claimants will file separate suits in respect of the same subject matter. This is the anomaly that section 14 of the NIC Act 2006 seeks to remedy. Even if the 94 claimants filed separate suits, there is nothing in principle stopping this Court from consolidating them and treating them as one case for purposes of hearing and determining them. As it is, I do not find any merit in the defendant’s argument as to this suit being a representative one and so incompetent. That argument is hereby discountenanced and dismissed. 24. It is the further argument of the defendant that this suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action. Now, the instant case of the claimants is essentially a claim for redundancy, a claim for which they rely on the collective agreement between ASSBIFI, NUBIFIE and NEABIAI. See paragraphs 19 to 25 of the statement of facts as well as reliefs b) to g), l) and m). The key thing here is that the claimants are relying on the collective agreement in issue for their claims, and this includes the claims for long service benefit, productivity allowance and three months basic salary in lieu of notice as per reliefs i), j) and l) respectively. In relying on the collective agreement for these entitlements, the point is that the claimants cannot succeed unless the collective agreement applies to them and they can claim the benefits therein. This is the sense in which the defendant argued that because the collective agreement was not incorporated into the respective contracts of employment of the claimant, they cannot claim or rely on it for any entitlement in this suit. 25. The defendant’s argument as to the non-incorporation of the collective agreement into the contract of employment has been raised and rejected by this Court in Mr. Valentine Ikechukwu Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 12 July 2016. This Court held such an argument to be a lazy form of analysis by the defence counsel in that case. The defence counsel in that case had relied on Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Emmanuel Aderewaju Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550; just like the instant case where the defence counsel relies on Osoh & ors v. Unity Bank [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 SC, a case also relied on by the claimants. I take the liberty to reiterate (repeat) the stance this Court took in Valentine. In both cases (Valentine and Osoh), the cause of action arose long before the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution was promulgated. The state of the law under which these cases were decided is certainly different from that under which the instant case is to be decided. The law as to the applicability of collective agreements when these cases were filed is certainly not the same with the law in that regard today under the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution. Today, under section 254C(1)(j)(i), this Court has jurisdiction in terms of the interpretation and application of any collective agreement. It is needless that a Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply a collective agreement if the intendment of the law maker is not that the collective agreement is to be binding as such. It should be noted that under section 7(1)(c)(i) of the NIC Act 2006, the jurisdiction of this Court was only in terms of interpretation of collective agreements; the issue of application was not included therein. So when the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution added application of collective agreement to the fray, this must mean that the law maker deliberately intended collective agreements to be enforceable and binding. I so hold. 26. In any event, the rule (the orthodoxy, I dare say) which held collective agreements not to be binding or to be binding in honour only is a common law rule. There is no gainsaying that this common law rule is not only rigid but harsh. Legal policy teaches that the rigidity and harshness of the common law is always ameliorated by the rules or principles of equity. In this regard, section 13 of the NIC Act permits this Court to administer law and equity concurrently; but where there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law, the rules of equity shall prevail. See section 15 of the NIC Act 2006. Incidentally, in the instant case, this harsh common law rule is not even being ameliorated by the principles of equity but by the 1999 Constitution itself. This is the state of the law under which the instant case is to be decided. Accordingly, Osoh and cases like Soares are distinguishable from the instant case in terms of the state of the law under which the matter at hand calls for determination in this Court. 27. To be able to discern whether the instant case discloses a reasonable cause of action, it is necessary to consider the law as to the applicability of collective agreements today. And here, I go back to Mr. Valentine Ikechukwu Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 12 July 2016, where this Court put the law thus: The law regarding the applicability of a collective agreement to an employee, and indeed the extent to which an employee can rely on one have been declared by this Court in Aghata N. Onuorah v. Access Bank Plc [2015] 55 NLLR (Pt. 186) 17 and Samson Kehinde Akindoyin v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/308/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on 15th April 2015…In both Aghata N. Onuorah v. Access Bank Plc and Samson Kehinde Akindoyin v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, this court stated the position of the law as to the applicability of a collective agreement to an employee, and indeed the extent to which an employee can rely on one. For instance, actual proof of membership is the key to recovery under a collective agreement. Proof of that membership of a trade union has to be by direct documentary evidence. Here, Habu v. NUT Taraba State [2005] 4 FWLR (Pt. 283) 646 held that the deduction from salaries and wages as check-off dues of a worker and the remittance of same to a trade union is an incidence of membership of the worker. The fact of unionism is pleaded and not denied i.e. a deemed admission or even a direct admission in pleadings is not sufficient to clothe the toga of membership of the trade union and hence entitlement to benefits from the collective agreement entered into by the trade union. So, the argument of the claimant that the defendant consistently acted on the collective agreement in dealing with him…is not helpful to him, as I indicated earlier, membership of a trade union is not, and cannot be, bestowed by an employer or through an admission in pleadings. Also, like I indicated earlier, the claimant’s contention is that the collective agreement was incorporated into his contract of employment. The claimant’s contract of employment is Exhibit C1, the offer of employment dated 1st April 1981. A look at Exhibit C1 will show that when the claimant was employed, he was employed as a clerk. As a clerk, the claimant was a junior staff and so was automatically a member of the trade union. After several promotions, the claimant became Head of Operations, a position that makes him a senior staff. As a senior staff, membership of the trade union is no longer automatic. The claimant must indicate in writing and as an individual that he desires to join the senior staff union. See also Mr C. E. Okeke & ors v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/09/2010 the judgment of which was delivered on 26th October 2016 and Mrs Benedicta Uzoamaka Marchie v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/48/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 30th March 2017. 28. The critical questions which arise for present purposes are: is there any pleading by the claimants as to their membership of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE in order to take the benefit of the collective agreement they rely on? ASSBIFI is the union catering for senior staff. Who amongst the claimants are senior staff? NUBIFIE is the union catering for junior staff. Who amongst the claimants are junior staff? In Onuekwusi & ors v. The Registered Trustees of the Christ Methodist Zion Church [2011] LPELR-2702(SC); [2011] 6 NWLR 341, the Supreme Court laid down the criteria for an action to be clothed with competence, which criteria among others must be complied with. Relevant for present purposes are the criteria as to the existence or accrual of a cause of action, under which the Supreme Court laid down five. However, criterion (b) is what is relevant for present purposes. It is that each of the factual elements making up the cause of action should have come into being before any proceedings are commenced otherwise the proceedings will be premature and consequently unsustainable. See also Esin v. Matzen and Timin Nig. Ltd [1966] 1 All NLR 233 and Mohammed v. UBA [1976] 2 FNR 21. In terms of the pleadings of the claimants, what are the factual elements needed for the claimants to rely on the collective agreement for their claims in this suit? It is that the claimants must have pleaded the facts of membership of the trade union in issue. They must have pleaded whether they are junior of senior staff, etc; all of which is not the case in the instant suit. I draw support from Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig) Ltd [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 602 - 603, which held thus: “Terms and conditions of service, in a labour agreement, are concise and precise and so stated in the agreement. A court of law will therefore not find it difficult to grant a relief based on the labour agreement, if the plaintiff pleads it…” The relevant pleadings as far as the instant case is concerned are lacking. Accordingly, in terms of competence, the claimants have not disclosed any reasonable cause of action in terms of the state of their pleadings. I so find and hold. This being the case, this action must fail on the ground of competence; and I so hold. The suit is accordingly struck out. 29. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD